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Review of the X-Factor 2023

Changes to Civilian Life

A report for the Office of Manpower Economics

IDR

Pay Data | Intelligent Decisions

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Disclaimer
The content of this report reflects the methods developed by IDR for this exercise and the findings do not necessarily represent the views of OME or of the MOD and AFPRB.

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Executive summary

This report has been produced by Incomes Data Research (IDR) for the Office of Manpower Economics (OME), on behalf of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body (AFPRB). The aim of this report is to provide the AFPRB with evidence on changes in civilian life relevant to those compensated by the X-Factor addition to basic military pay between 2017 and 2022.

The X-Factor components reflect a range of aspects of military life, some of which are difficult to measure. Evidence used in this review varies in suitability and depth, however assessments for most components have been made with reasonable certainty.

The exceptions are promotion and early responsibility, separation, and leave where we have limited confidence in the evidence due to a lack of suitability and depth of evidence. There is a lack of suitable evidence for promotion and early responsibility as there is limited time series data to conduct trend analysis. Furthermore, limited sources are available providing a 'convincing measure' of separation experienced by civilians, and no available data analysing the ability for civilians to take leave at the time of their choosing.

Turbulence is a complex component and, in our view, while we have depth of evidence, a question remains as to how robustly the evidence measures turbulence.

Overall, we conclude there has been improvement in civilian life in five components (three of which show clear improvement, although one is based on limited evidence), no change in three of the components and deterioration in four components (one of which shows a clear deterioration). Although five components have shown an improvement in civilian life, the depth and suitability of the evidence for the promotion and early responsibility and separation components is limited, and therefore could not be fully relied upon. Therefore, our conclusion shows a slight deterioration in civilian life due to the deeper evidence seen to this effect.

FIGURE 1 IDR ASSESSMENTS OF CHANGE IN THE X-FACTOR COMPONENTS 2023

Clear improvement	Hours of work Job security Separation
Slight improvement	Promotion and early responsibility Spouse/partner employment
No change	Individual and collective rights Leave Turbulence
Slight deterioration	Autonomy, management control and flexibility Danger Training, education, adventure training and development
Clear deterioration	Stress, personal relationships and impact of the job

Taking into account the data limitations, **our overall conclusion is that there has been a slight deterioration in civilian life over the review period**. We summarise our conclusions for each component below.

Autonomy, flexibility and management control

Our overall conclusion is that there has been a **slight deterioration** in the level of autonomy experienced by civilians at work based on the following:

- Understanding Society data indicates that the degree of autonomy over job tasks, work pace, work manner and task order has reduced, with fewer respondents reporting to have 'a lot' of autonomy.
- The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) Good Work Index indicates that the degree of job autonomy has declined, with fewer respondents reporting to have 'a lot' of autonomy over measures of job and schedule control.
- The NHS Staff Survey indicates that the perceived level of job control has remained stable in the NHS between 2018 and 2020. However, the latest survey (2021) shows a slight decline in the proportion of individuals reporting to have choice in deciding how to do their work which may be attributable to pandemic-related work changes. This is in contrast to data from

the Civil Service People Survey which shows an increase in the perceived level of autonomy among civil servants.

Danger to physical and mental health

Our overall conclusion is that there has been a **slight deterioration** in the safety of work for civilians based on the following:

- There has been a significant increase in the number of referrals to mental health services due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
- The total number of fatal workplace injuries fell between 2017/2018 and 2021/2022 but rose slightly in manufacturing having fallen significantly during the pandemic.

Hours of work

Our conclusion is that there has been a **clear improvement** in this component based on the following:

- The proportion of workers engaging in evening work and night work has declined over the period.
- The proportion of people who work overtime, either paid or unpaid, has declined.
- There has been a slight decline in working longer overtime hours (over 12 hours a week) and the proportion of employees working long hours (over 45 hours a week) has also declined slightly over the period.

Individual and collective rights

Overall, our conclusion for this component is that there has been **no change** in individual and collective rights for civilians over the past five years based on the following:

- The past five years have been a period of remarkable stability in relation to legislation on trade union and employment rights with no significant shift in the rights enjoyed by employees, despite the UK's exit from the European Union. However, there have been improvements in the provisions afforded under legislation from which Armed Forces are exempt, for example the National Living Wage.

- Trade union membership gradually increased between 2017 and 2020, however the latest figures for 2021 show a small decline.

Job security

Overall, there has been a **clear improvement** in job security within the civilian sector since the last X-Factor level review based on the following:

- Unemployment had been generally falling prior to the pandemic. Following increases in 2020, unemployment is now at record lows.
- Despite an uptick in 2020, overall the level and rate of redundancy remained low and fell between 2017-2022.
- There have been general declines in the proportions of temporary and part-time employees unable to find full-time work. However, the number of people on zero-hours contracts has increased by 0.4 percentage points, from 2.8% of all people in employment in 2017 to 3.2% in 2022.
- CIPD data indicates that overall confidence has increased in the labour market following the pandemic and compared to 2018, in terms of workers' own perception of the likelihood of losing their job in the next 12 months and the perceived ease of finding a job as good as their current one.

Leave

Our overall conclusion is that there has been **no change** in this component on the civilian side, although we recognise there is a lack of suitable evidence for assessing the ability of civilians to take annual leave at the time of their choosing.

Promotion and early responsibility

Our overall conclusion is that there has been a **slight improvement** in this component based on the following:

- The CIPD Good Work Index shows UK workers' perceptions of the prospects for career advancement in their job have steadily improved since 2018, although still only a quarter to just over a third of civilian workers (over the period 2018-2022) perceive their job to have good prospects for career advancement.

- Similarly, workers' perceptions that their job offers good opportunities for skills development have also steadily improved since 2018, with broadly half of workers agreeing that they can develop their skills in their role.

Separation

Our overall conclusion is that there has been a **clear improvement** in this component since 2017 based on the following:

- Data from the National Travel Survey (NTS) showed that there was little change in the number of trips, distance covered, or time spent travelling prior to the pandemic (2017-2019). However, the pandemic had a substantial impact on travel trends in 2020 and 2021, with a significant reduction in the number of commuting and business trips. This reduction may reflect the increase in working from home and hybrid working, with homeworking in the UK more than doubling between October to December 2019 and January to March 2022.
- In turn, this means that recently there has been an improvement in the separation experienced by civilians, prompted by a change to working patterns during and following the pandemic.

Spouse/partner employment

Our overall conclusion is that there has been **a slight improvement** in this component based on the following evidence:

- Both married/cohabiting and non-married/single women have experienced a marginal increase in employment.
- The employment rate of non-married/single women has improved significantly over the period whereas the position of those married/cohabiting has improved by less. This is reflected in corresponding falls in inactivity.
- The proportion of women in the managerial, professional and associate professional groups (SOCs 1, 2 and 3) is larger than it was in 2017.

- The proportion of women working in some lower-paying occupational groups is smaller than it was in 2017, for example, in caring and support occupations (SOCs 6 and 7).

Stress, personal relationships and impact of the job

Our overall conclusion is that there has been a **clear deterioration** in this component based on the following:

- There has been a significant increase in self-reported work-related illness classified by individuals as stress, depression or anxiety.
- Alcohol-specific deaths rose significantly in 2020 and 2021, having been relatively stable between 2017 and 2019.
- There has been a significant increase in the number of domestic abuse related crimes over the period.
- Estimates suggest that the number of rough sleepers in England has fallen, mainly due to Government initiatives during the pandemic, while data from charities working in the field indicate that rough sleepers have increased in London.
- The dissolution of marriages and civil partnerships has continued to rise, largely driven by the divorces among same-sex couples.
- The level of recorded suicides increased in every year between 2017 and 2021, except for 2020 when the number of registered suicides fell due to fewer suicides among men and also delays in death registrations due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Training, education, adventure training and personal development

Our overall conclusion is that there has been a **slight deterioration** in this component since 2017 based on the following:

- There have been small reductions in civilian training provisions since 2017. There have been small declines in the proportion of the civilian workforce being trained; in the number of training days delivered per annum; in the total hours spent training on the job; and in the number of employers training staff towards a nationally recognised qualification.

- The number of apprenticeships starts prior to the pandemic had shown a general downward trend (from 2018), but the latest cohort showed numbers rising again, albeit still below 2018/19 levels across all age groups.

Turbulence

Turbulence is a complex component to analyse and the data is very mixed, with improvement in some areas and deterioration in others. On balance we conclude that there has been **no change** in this component based on the following:

- There has been a general improvement in security of housing in the civilian sector since the last review, with a fall in short-term tenures of less than 12 months, and an increase in tenures of 10 years or more indicating greater stability in housing. Meanwhile the proportion of employees who own their own home has been largely stable over the past five years.
- In respect of civilian experience of the NHS, the GP Patient Survey shows a broadly constant level of satisfaction with getting through to the surgery by phone, to getting an appointment and the overall experience of patients' GP surgery until 2022 when there is a sharp increase in those rating their experience as 'poor'. Data on A&E wait times shows a marked deterioration in the percentage of patients being seen within four hours in the latest period.
- Approvals for secured lending remained consistent until the early pandemic period when they fell significantly. Since then, approvals have recovered to pre-pandemic levels.
- Data compiled by the Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (OFSTED) shows that since 2017 the number of childcare providers has declined significantly, mainly due to a fall in the number of registered childminders. However, the number of childcare places remains broadly unchanged since 2017.

Introduction

This report has been prepared for the Office of Manpower Economics (OME) by Incomes Data Research (IDR) and it presents a detailed assessment of changes in each of the X-Factor components for the civilian sector between 2017 and 2022 on behalf of the Armed Forces Pay Review Body (AFPRB) ahead of the 2022/23 X-Factor level review.

Introduced in 1970, the X-Factor is a pensionable addition to basic military pay intended to reflect net disadvantages of conditions of service experienced by members of the Armed Forces compared to workers in the civilian sector. The X-Factor is currently worth 14.5% for UK Regular Forces, with tapering for those in the highest ranks (Colonel equivalent and above). It has 12 components as follows:

1. Autonomy, management control and flexibility
2. Danger to physical and mental health
3. Hours of work
4. Individual and collective rights
5. Job security
6. Leave
7. Promotion and early responsibility
8. Separation
9. Spousal/partner employment
10. Stress, personal relationships and impact of the job
11. Training, education, adventure training and personal development
12. Turbulence

Definitions of the X-Factor components are provided at Appendix 1 and are consistent with the definitions last published in the AFPRB Report 2021.

The focus of this review was to examine available, suitable and relevant data for civilian life for each component of the X-Factor to determine what change, if any, has taken place since 2017.

A separate review, focused on military data, has been conducted by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The AFPRB will take evidence from both reviews to assess any level of change in military life compared to civilian life, and subsequently make recommendations on the value of the X-Factor.

Our approach for conducting the civilian review involved, firstly, undertaking an audit of suggested data sources to confirm availability, confirming the approaches for dealing with any identified data issues, and then subsequently assessing the direction and extent of any change in each component using the available data, taking into account the quality, reliability and limitations of each source. Where available, we also examine data for senior managers separately to the main workforce to see if the direction of change differs.

The Covid-19 pandemic impacted most data sources. Some data sources that we had expected to be available for this review were not because of delays to fieldwork caused by the pandemic. Where data was available some data sources showed a clear pandemic effect in 2020/21 due either to lack of reporting or Covid-19 impacting results. However, all of our assessments consider the broad direction of change over the whole period 2017-2022.

Our assessments draw on a multitude of data sources as shown in Appendix 2.

The rest of this report presents and discusses the evidence for each X-Factor component.

1. Autonomy, management control and flexibility

Summary

This component reflects the amount of control that individuals have over their immediate working environment and the scope allowed for individuals to make decisions and take independent actions related to their work.

Our overall conclusion is that there has been a **slight deterioration** in the level of autonomy experienced by civilians at work, based on the following:

- Understanding Society data indicates that the degree of autonomy over job tasks, work pace, work manner and task order has reduced, with fewer respondents reporting to have ‘a lot’ of autonomy.
- The CIPD Good Work Index indicates that the degree of job autonomy has declined, with fewer respondents reporting to have ‘a lot’ of autonomy over measures of job and schedule control.
- The NHS Staff Survey indicates that the perceived level of job control has remained stable in the NHS between 2018 and 2020. However, the latest survey (2021) shows a slight decline in the proportion of individuals reporting to have choice in deciding how to do their work which may be attributable to pandemic-related work changes. This is in contrast to data from the Civil Service People Survey which shows an increase in the perceived level of autonomy among civil servants.

This chapter examines the level of autonomy civilians experience at work, as measured in two main forms: job control and schedule control. The previous X-Factor level civilian review (2017) used data from the Understanding Society survey to consider change in the level of autonomy civilians perceive they have over certain aspects of their work. The survey asks participants questions regarding autonomy over job tasks, work pace, work manner, task order and work hours. Autonomy variables are only included in biennial waves, so the only data available, to date, is from the periods 2016-17 (wave 8), 2018-19 (wave 10) and 2020-21 (wave 12).

Having autonomy over the way **tasks are performed** at work is a good indication of the degree of flexibility someone has in how they do their job. The proportion of employees advising they have 'a lot' of autonomy fell by 5 percentage points between 2017/18 and 2020/21, while those reporting 'some' autonomy rose by 4.5 percentage points and 'a little' by 1 percentage point over the same period. There was a marginal fall in employees who believe they have no autonomy over job tasks, from 11.5% to 11.2%.

TABLE 1-1 DEGREE OF AUTONOMY OVER JOB TASKS, 2017/18-2020/21

Year	A lot	Some	A little	None
	% of employees			
2017/18	39.3%	34%	15.1%	11.5%
2018/19	36.2%	36.7%	16.6%	10.4%
2020/21	34.1%	38.5%	16.2%	11.2%

Note: Question only asked in alternate years.
Source: Understanding Society (Waves 8, 10 and 12)

The proportion of employees who believe they have 'a lot' of autonomy over the **pace of their work** fell from 42.9% in 2017/18 to 39.8% in 2020/21, while those reporting to have 'some' autonomy rose from 31.4% to 35.6% over the same period. There was also a slight fall in the proportion of employees who believe they have no control over the pace of their workload, from 11% in 2017/18 to 10% in 2020/21.

TABLE 1-2 DEGREE OF AUTONOMY OVER WORK PACE, 2017/18-2020/21

Year	A lot	Some	A little	None
	% of employees			
2017/18	42.9%	31.4%	14.7%	11%
2018/19	39.5%	35.3%	14.4%	10.8%
2020/21	39.8%	35.6%	14.6%	10%

Note: Question only asked in alternate years.
Source: Understanding Society (Waves 8, 10 and 12)

Controlling the way that work is performed in civilian employment could be considered very different to typical military jobs, where the methods in which many roles are carried out is tightly controlled. The data shown below on autonomy over work manner (see Table 1-3) shows a similar trend to data on autonomy over job tasks and work pace, with marginally more respondents over the period reporting some level of autonomy overall but a fall amongst those reporting having 'a lot' of autonomy. Similar trends are evident in the data on the degree of autonomy over **task order** (Table 1-4).

TABLE 1-3 DEGREE OF AUTONOMY OVER WORK MANNER, 2017/18-2020/21

Year	A lot	Some	A little	None
	% of employees			
2017/18	53%	30.4%	10.8%	5.9%
2018/19	50.4%	32.8%	11.3%	5.5%
2020/21	48.6%	34%	12.1%	5.3%

Note: Question only asked in alternate years.
Source: Understanding Society (Waves 8, 10 and 12)

TABLE 1-4 DEGREE OF AUTONOMY OVER TASK ORDER, 2017/18-2020/21

Year	A lot	Some	A little	None
	% of employees			
2017/18	53.1%	29.2%	11.4%	6.3%
2018/19	52.3%	31.2%	10.4%	6.1%
2020/21	49.9%	34.3%	9.8%	6%

Note: Question only asked in alternate years.
Source: Understanding Society (Waves 8, 10 and 12)

There is a noticeable change in the responses on autonomy **over working hours**, perhaps not surprising given the immediate and longer-term impacts of the pandemic on working patterns. As Table 1-5 shows, the degree of autonomy employees believe they have over their working hours has seen a slight improvement between 2017/18 and 2020/21. Employees who consider they have 'a lot' of autonomy has increased from 23.8% in 2017/18 to 25% in 2020/21, and those reporting 'some' autonomy has increased from 22.2% to 24.4% over the same period. Meanwhile those reporting having 'a little' autonomy or 'no autonomy' have fallen indicating that the overall degree of autonomy over working hours has increased.

TABLE 1-5 DEGREE OF AUTONOMY OVER WORKING HOURS, 2017/18-2020/21

Year	A lot	Some	A little	None
	% of employees			
2017/18	23.8%	22.2%	20.6%	33.5%
2018/19	23.6%	24.5%	20.1%	31.8%
2020/21	25%	24.4%	18.6%	32.1%

Note: Question only asked in alternate years.
Source: Understanding Society (Waves 8, 10 and 12)

We also looked at the degree of autonomy over job tasks by major standard occupational classification (SOC). The data shows that the proportion of employees reporting to have 'a lot' of autonomy over job tasks has declined for all major groups except skilled trades occupations, which shows an increase of 3.9 percentage points between 2017/18 (wave 8) and 2020/21 (wave 12). The largest fall among those reporting to have 'a lot' of autonomy over job tasks was in the elementary occupations category (-10.8 percentage points). Data for senior managers show much higher levels of autonomy but follows a similar trend to that for all workers, with fewer senior managers reporting to have 'a lot' of autonomy over job tasks – a decline of 3.9 percentage points.

TABLE 1-6 DEGREE OF AUTONOMY OVER JOB TASKS FOR SENIOR MANAGERS, 2017/18-2020/21

Year	A lot	Some	A little	None
	% of employees			
Senior Managers (SOC1)				
2017/18	66.8%	24.1%	6.6%	2.5%
2020/21	62.9%	29.1%	6.5%	1.5%

Note: Question only asked in alternate years.
Source: Understanding Society (Waves 8 and 12)

Since the last X-Factor data review (2017), the CIPD has developed a 'Good Work Index'. Launched in 2018, the CIPD Good Work Index is based on the UK Working Lives Survey (UKWL) conducted by YouGov, on behalf of the CIPD. The responding sample is weighted to provide a representative reporting sample of all British adults in work (aged 18+), however, in comparison to the Labour Force Survey or Workplace Employment Relations Study, the survey is based on a less robust sample (being a non-probability sample) and has a smaller sample size.

The CIPD Good Work Index captures a series of job design measures that offer an indication of the perceived autonomy and self-determination civilian workers have in their jobs, using similar aspects as those in Understanding Society, albeit with a smaller sample size. The CIPD considers that autonomy measures can be divided into two forms:

1. measures that capture job control: how much influence workers perceive to have over how they do their work; the pace at which they work; and the tasks they do in their job;
2. measures that capture schedule control, or in other words, the time they start or finish their working day (Galvin and Schieman 2012, cited in CIPD, 2022).

It is important to acknowledge that there will be differences in autonomy across types of job and contract type in the civilian sector. For example, analysis conducted by the CIPD in 2018 and again in 2020 found that individuals in higher managerial and professional occupations reported higher levels of job autonomy than their counterparts in unskilled or routine work (CIPD, 2020). In addition, contract type in the civilian sector is also a significant influencing factor, with those on temporary, zero-hours and short-hours contracts reporting lower levels of autonomy than those on permanent contracts or the self-employed (ibid).

Data from the Good Work Index shows that overall job autonomy has declined in recent years, in that the proportions stating they have ‘a lot’ of influence in:

- how they do their work has declined from 47% in 2018 to 41% in 2021;
- the pace at which they do their work has declined from 38% in 2018 to 34% in 2021;
- the tasks that they do in their job has declined from 27% in 2018 to 22% in 2021; and
- the time they start or finish their working day has declined from 31% in 2018 to 26% in 2021 (see Figure 1-1).

In addition, the proportions of workers stating they have ‘no influence’ over these aspects of their work have marginally increased over the period 2018-2021. In support of these findings, the average index score for job autonomy, as calculated by the CIPD as part of its Good Work Index, declined from 0.61 in 2018 to 0.58 in 2020.[1]

[1]Index score for job autonomy was not available for 2021 due to a different method of calculation in 2021.

FIGURE 1-1 PERCEIVED LEVEL OF INFLUENCE OVER ASPECTS OF OWN WORK, 2018-2021



Note: The available autonomy data from the 2022 Good Work Index was cross tabulated against the use of working from home, so is not directly comparable and has therefore been excluded.
Source: CIPD Good Work Index.

To provide further measures of change in the level of work autonomy experienced by civilians we have considered data from the NHS Staff Survey, as it is one of the largest workforce surveys in the world, covering over 600,000 people in 2021, and is conducted annually.

In measuring this component we have taken data on participants' responses regarding to what extent they have:

- frequent opportunities to show initiative in their role;
- a choice in deciding how to do their work.

The time series data from the surveys shows that, overall, almost three-quarters of the workforce believe they have regular opportunities to show initiative in their role and there has been almost no change in this perception over the period 2017-2021 (see Figure 1-2).

FIGURE 1-2 LEVEL OF AGREEMENT FOR FREQUENT OPPORTUNITIES TO SHOW INITIATIVE IN ROLE, 2017-2021



Note: 2022 data not available at time of the review.
Source: National NHS Staff Survey.

In addition, over half of the workforce reported having choice in deciding how to do their work either 'always' or 'often'. The proportion of the workforce reporting this level of autonomy has remained stable over the period 2018-2020, with a slight decline shown in 2021 (see Table 1-7). In addition, the most recent survey (2021) shows there has been a slight increase in the proportion reporting they 'never' or 'rarely' have a choice in deciding how to do their work. These changes to the trend in 2021 may potentially be attributed to work changes (especially safe working protocols) prompted by the pandemic.

TABLE 1-7 I HAVE A CHOICE IN DECIDING HOW TO DO MY WORK, 2018-2021

	% of respondents			Number of respondents
	Never/rarely	Sometimes	Often/always	
2018	14.3%	28.9%	56.8%	480,220
2019	14.1%	28.9%	57%	549,418
2020	14.3%	28.7%	57%	569,041
2021	16.6%	30%	53.3%	618,077

Notes: 1. Question was first asked in 2018. 2. 2022 data not available at time of the review.
Source: National NHS Staff Survey.

The Civil Service People Survey is an annual survey examining the attitudes and experiences of employees working in government departments covering around 300,000 civil servants. The survey includes questions regarding the level of autonomy employees feel they have in their job.

The proportion of employees who agree they have autonomy in how they choose to do their work rose from 68% in 2017 to 73% in 2021. The proportion of employees who reported they can contribute their views before decisions are made affecting their role also increased from 35% in 2017 to 39% in 2021. Additionally, there was a slight rise in the proportion of employees who feel involved in decisions affecting their work, from 55% to 57% between 2017 and 2021 (see Figure 1-3).

FIGURE 1-3 LEVEL OF AGREEMENT REGARDING JOB AUTONOMY IN THE CIVIL SERVICE, 2017-2021



Note: 2022 data not available at time of the review.
Source: Civil Service People Survey.

2. Danger to physical and mental health

Summary

This component considers both the risk and imminent threat of danger to physical and mental health.

Our overall conclusion is that there has been a **slight deterioration** in the safety of work for civilians based on the following:

- There has been a significant increase in the number of referrals to mental health services due to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
- The total number of fatal workplace injuries fell between 2017/2018 and 2021/2022 but rose slightly in manufacturing having fallen significantly during the pandemic.

This chapter examines civilian data on workplace injuries from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and data on referrals for treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder from NHS Digital. Work-related stress is considered under the component ‘stress, personal relationships and impact of the job’. Our assessment does not consider any changes in imminent threat since it is not possible to measure imminent threat using civilian data sources.

The previous X-Factor level civilian review used the NHS Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (APMS) to provide estimates of the number of persons affected by PTSD. This survey is conducted infrequently and was due to be available for the 2022 review, however, there has been a delay in the launch of the APMS fieldwork because the pandemic impacted in-home interviewing. This is currently expected to start in January 2023 and will run for a period of 12 months. While there is no agreed timetable for results, it is expected that results will be available for the next X-Factor level review.

The previous review also noted that the Mental Health Services Data Set (MHSDS) would be a new credible source for the 2022 review, since NHS Digital began collecting data on PTSD as a primary reason for referral as part of the MHSDS from January 2016. This data shows that the number of referrals has increased from 37,753 in 2017/18 to 59,774 in 2021/22, some of which may be due to greater awareness of the condition and greater concerns regarding mental well-being.

FIGURE 2-1 REFERRALS WHERE PRESENTING COMPLAINT IS PTSD, 2017/18-2021/22



Source: NHS Digital.

Fatal workplace injuries

Figures published by the HSE under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) show a fall in the rate of fatal workplaces injuries between 2017/18 and 2021/22, down from 0.44 per 100,000 workers in 2017/2018 to 0.38 in 2021/2022.

The rate of fatal injuries in manufacturing however is higher than that for all industries, and it increased over the period from a rate of 0.52 in 2017/2018 to 0.82 in 2021/2022. It should be noted that the number of fatal injuries is low and the annual rate is prone to fluctuation.

TABLE 2-1 FATAL WORKPLACE INJURIES, 2017/2018-2021/2022

Year (1 April - 31 March)	All industries		Manufacturing	
	Rate per 100,000 workers	Number	Rate per 100,000 workers	Number
2017/18	0.44	141	0.52	15
2018/19	0.46	149	0.92	26
2019/20	0.34	113	0.45	13
2020/21	0.45	145	0.70	19
2021/22p	0.38	123	0.82	22

Notes: 1. Includes both employed and self-employed workers. 2. Figures for 2021/22 are at this stage provisional and are marked as 'p' in the tables. They will be finalised in July 2023 following any necessary adjustments.
Source: Health and Safety Executive.

Data for non-fatal injuries has been excluded from this review due to changes or disruptions to data collection processes relied on to produce Health and Safety Statistics.[2]

[2]See Technical report: The Impact of the coronavirus pandemic on the interpretation of Health and Safety Statistics 2020/21 (hse.gov.uk)

3. Hours of work

Summary

This component aims to reflect longer working hours and the greater extent of unsocial hours working in the military compared to civilian employment.

Our conclusion is that there has been a **clear improvement** in this component based on the following:

- The proportion of workers engaging in evening work and night work has declined over the period.
- The proportion of people who work overtime, either paid or unpaid, has declined.
- There has been a slight decline in working longer overtime hours (over 12 hours a week) and the proportion of employees working long hours (over 45 hours a week) has also declined slightly over the period.

This chapter uses data on evening and night working to examine changes in unsocial hours working in civilian employment, as well as data on paid and unpaid overtime and long hours working.

Unsocial hours working

The proportion of people working evenings in their main job has steadily declined from 27.5% in 2017 to 24.8% in 2022. Evening work has remained more common among the self-employed than employees throughout the period, but also shows a decline.

TABLE 3-1 PROPORTION OF PEOPLE WORKING EVENINGS IN THEIR MAIN JOB, 2017-2022

Year	Employees	Self-employed	All workers
2017	26%	36.4%	27.5%
2018	25.3%	34.3%	26.6%
2019	25.2%	33.8%	26.4%
2020	24.2%	33%	25.4%
2021	23.8%	32.6%	25%
2022	23.8%	32%	24.8%

Source: Annual Population Survey/Labour Force Survey.

The proportion of people working night shifts in their main job has also shown a small decline, from 12.1% in 2017 to 10.9% in 2022. The decline has occurred among both employees and the self-employed.

TABLE 3-2 PROPORTION OF PEOPLE WORKING NIGHT WORK IN THEIR MAIN JOB, 2017-2022

Year	Employees	Self-employed	All workers
2017	12.4%	11%	12.1%
2018	11.6%	10.8%	11.5%
2019	11.9%	11%	11.8%
2020	11.3%	11%	11.2%
2021	11%	9.7%	10.8%
2022	11%	9.8%	10.9%

Source: Annual Population Survey/Labour Force Survey.

Overtime and long hours

The proportion of people who work overtime, either paid or unpaid, has declined over the period, from 33.5% in 2017 to 30.7% in 2022.

FIGURE 3-1 PERCENTAGE OF WORKERS WHO EVER WORK PAID OR UNPAID OVERTIME, 2017-2022



Note: Annual Population Survey reporting year is July to June.
Source: Annual Population Survey.

A look at the amount of paid overtime worked shows that the proportion of those working between 15 minutes and 5 hours of paid overtime a week in 2022 is consistent with that in 2017, while there has been a slight reduction on the proportions working between 5.25 and 12 hours of paid overtime. In both categories we can see a clear Covid-19 impact on the figures for 2020 and 2021. Over the same period we also see a slight fall in longer overtime hours - over 12 hours a week - from 21.2% in 2017 to 20% in 2022.

FIGURE 3-2 DISTRIBUTION OF PAID OVERTIME (% OF ACTUAL HOURS PAID OVERTIME), 2017-2022



Note: APS reporting year is July to June.
Source: Annual Population Survey.

Between 2017 and 2021 there were small fluctuations in the proportions of employees working unpaid overtime but overall, the trend points towards employees working less unpaid overtime (see Figure 3-3).

FIGURE 3-3 DISTRIBUTION OF UNPAID OVERTIME (% OF ACTUAL HOURS UNPAID OVERTIME), 2017-2022



Source: Annual Population Survey.

Between 2017 and 2022, the most common amount of unpaid overtime over the period was five hours a week, with the exception of 2020 and 2021 when the most common level of paid overtime hours rose to 10 hours a week, likely attributable to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.

TABLE 3-3 MOST COMMON AMOUNT OF OVERTIME WORKED PAID VS UNPAID, 2017-2022

Year (Jul-Jun)	Paid overtime	Unpaid overtime
2017	5 hours	5 hours
2018	5 hours	5 hours
2019	5 hours	5 hours
2020	10 hours	5 hours
2021	10 hours	5 hours
2022	5 hours	5 hours

Source: Annual Population Survey.

Further analysis by major socio-economic classification (SEC) also shows higher managerial and professional occupations working fewer hours of paid and unpaid overtime (see Figures 3-4 and 3-5).

FIGURE 3-4 PAID OVERTIME HOURS FOR HIGHER MANAGER AND PROFESSIONALS, 2017-2022



Source: Annual Population Survey.

FIGURE 3-5 UNPAID OVERTIME HOURS FOR HIGHER MANAGER AND PROFESSIONALS, 2017-2022



Source: Annual Population Survey.

The proportion of employees working long hours – over 45 hours a week – declined slightly over the period, from 29.1% in 2017 to 27.9% in 2022. A larger decline was seen amongst the self-employed (who typically have longer working weeks than the employed), falling from 44% to 36.7% across the same period.

Table 3-4 Percentage of people working long hours, 2017-2022

Year (Jul-Jun)	% of people	Employees	Self-employed
2017	Up to 45 hours	70.9%	56%
	More than 45 hours	29.1%	44%
2018	Up to 45 hours	70.3%	55.5%
	More than 45 hours	29.7%	44.5%
2019	Up to 45 hours	70.8%	55.8%
	More than 45 hours	29.2%	44.2%
2020	Up to 45 hours	73.5%	61.8%
	More than 45 hours	26.5%	38.2%
2021	Up to 45 hours	69.9%	58.8%
	More than 45 hours	30.1%	41.2%
2022	Up to 45 hours	72.1%	63.3%
	More than 45 hours	27.9%	36.7%

Source: Annual Population Survey.

4. Individual, trade union and collective rights

Summary

This component aims to reflect individual and collective legal rights from which Armed Forces personnel are exempt.

Overall, our conclusion for this component is that there has been **no change** in individual and collective rights for civilians over the past five years based on the following:

- The past five years have been a period of remarkable stability in relation to legislation on trade union and employment rights with no significant shift in the rights enjoyed by employees, despite the UK's exit from the European Union. However, there have been improvements in the provisions afforded under legislation from which Armed Forces are exempt, for example the National Living Wage.
- Trade union membership gradually increased between 2017 and 2020, however the latest figures for 2021 show a small decline.

Legislative developments

The past five years has been a period of remarkable stability in relation to legislation on trade union and employment rights with no significant shift in the rights attributed to employees. Changes made in the legislative framework have been minor or technical in nature. The only substantive new right to be created is the right to Parental Bereavement Leave. This was introduced in April 2020 and gives parents of any child who dies below the age of 18 (or who suffer a stillbirth after more than 24 weeks of pregnancy) a right to two weeks' leave. This is paid at the rate of £156.66 per week.

The Agency Workers Regulations 2010 were amended with effect from 6 April 2020 to remove the so-called 'Swedish Derogation'. This was the provision that allowed Temporary Work Agencies to pay agency workers less than the amount they would have received had they been directly employed by the end-user provided certain conditions were met. These conditions being that the agency worker was employed under a contract of employment and had a right to minimum remuneration even in weeks where no work was provided. There was general acknowledgement that what was intended to be a limited exception was being abused to the detriment of the agency workers concerned. The result is a widening of circumstances in which the basic terms and conditions of agency workers will have to match those of the directly employed staff they work alongside.

In response to widespread industrial action in the public sector and parts of the private sector the Government repealed Regulation 7 of the Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Business Regulations 2003.[3] This had made it a criminal offence for an employment agency to provide agency workers to take the place of employees taking part in industrial action. As a result of the repeal employers are now no longer restricted from engaging temporary workers when industrial action is taking place. Therefore, from 22 July 2022, employers faced with industrial action will, in theory, be able to use agency workers to cover any staffing shortfall caused by industrial action.

From April 2020 the right of employees to be given a written statement of their terms and conditions of employment was extended to all workers – a wider category that includes many independent contractors who would be regarded as self-employed for the purposes of income tax. At the same time several minor changes were made to the contents of the written statement that must be provided. These included an explanation of any probationary period that applies to the employment, the level of flexibility required in terms of working hours and an explanation of any terms and conditions relating to training. Perhaps most significantly, whereas previously a written statement had to be provided within 8 weeks of the employee starting work, employers are now required to provide the written statement to the worker no later than the start date of the employment.

[3]According to December 2022 figures produced by the ONS, the number of working days lost due to strike action in each of the last three available months (August – 356,000 days, September – 209,000 days, and October – 417,000 days) exceeded the total number of days lost annually in 2019 [the last year for which we have complete set of figures following disruption due to the pandemic], which was 234,000 days.

From April 2020 a change was made in the calculation of holiday pay for workers' who do not have normal working hours or whose pay varies with the amount of work undertaken. Previously their holiday pay would be calculated as an average of their previous 12 weeks' pay. Under the new provisions the calculation of the average is now based on the previous 52 weeks. The intention is to ensure that the holiday pay due is truly representative of the workers' earnings and not distorted by seasonal variations in working patterns.

There has been the usual uprating of compensation limits and other payments. The most significant of these is the limit on a week's pay for the purposes of calculating a redundancy payment or a basic award in an unfair dismissal case. From 6 April 2022 that limit was set at £571 meaning that the maximum statutory redundancy payment is now £17,130. This is based on an employee aged at least 61 with at least twenty years' continuous service.

The National Living Wage refers to the rate of the National Minimum Wage (NMW), which until April 2021, was payable to those workers aged 25 and over. From April 2021 the National Living Wage became payable to those aged 23 or over. Therefore, of most relevance is the NMW rise over the period for workers aged 23 and 24 who now qualify for the full National Living Wage rate of £9.50 an hour. In 2017-2018 such workers would have only qualified for a rate of £7.05 an hour while those aged 25 or above would have been entitled to at least £7.50 per hour.

TABLE 4-1 STATUTORY REDUNDANCY PAY, 2017-2022

Effective date	Week's pay limit	Minimum statutory redundancy pay
April 2017	£489	£14,670
April 2018	£508	£15,240
April 2019	£525	£15,750
April 2020	£538	£16,140
April 2021	£544	£16,320
April 2022	£571	£17,130

Source: Gov.uk for April 2022; Darren Newman for periods April 2017 to April 2021.

TABLE 4-2 STATUTORY HOURLY MINIMUM WAGES, 2017-2022

Period	25 and over	21 to 24	18 to 20	Under 18	Apprentice
April 2017-2018	£7.50	£7.05	£5.60	£4.05	£3.50
April 2018-2019	£7.83	£7.38	£5.90	£4.20	£3.70
April 2019-2020	£8.21	£7.70	£6.15	£4.35	£3.90
April 2020-2021	£8.72	£8.20	£6.45	£4.55	£4.15
	23 and over	**21 to 22**	**18 to 20**	**Under 18**	**Apprentice**
April 2021-2022*	£8.91	£8.36	£6.56	£4.62	£4.30
April 2022-2023*	£9.50	£9.18	£6.83	£4.81	£4.81

*From April 2021 the National Living Wage became payable to those aged 23 or over, which changed the age brackets from 25+ to 23+, and from 21 to 24 to 21- and 22-year-olds. Source: Gov.uk

Trade union membership

Information published by the Certification Officer for Trade Unions and Employers' Association shows that the number of trade unions and employer associations operating in the UK fell between 2017 and 2021. The annual reports also show that the proportion of employees whose pay is affected by collective agreement has also seen a small decline between 2017 and 2021. Between 2017 and 2019 the trend was broadly flat, however, since the pandemic, there has been a substantial decline, of 3.8 percentage points over the last two years.

FIGURE 4-1 TRADE UNION AND EMPLOYERS ASSOCIATION PRESENCE IN THE WORKPLACE, 2017-2021



Note: Reporting year is from 1 April to 31 March and the annual report is published each July.
Source: Certification Officer for Trade Unions and Employers' Associations.

Statistics published by the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), and reported in the Labour Force Survey, show that trade union membership increased between 2017 and 2020, however the latest figures for 2021 show a small decline.

TABLE 4-3 TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP, 2017-2021

Year	Membership level	Proportion of employees with union membership
2017	6,247,000	23.3%
2018	6,350,000	23.4%
2019	6,440,000	23.5%
2020	6,507,000	23.7%
2021	6,445,000	23.1%

Note: trade union statistics are published each May. The most recent available were published in May 2022 and relate to 2021.
Source: Labour Force Survey (statistics published by Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy).

Over the period 2017 to 2021, union membership in firms with over 50 employees has remained consistently higher than within smaller firms with less than 50 employees. Change in union membership across both firm sizes was minimal between 2017 and 2021, with a rise of 0.5 percentage points in firms with under 50 employees and a fall of 1.0 percentage points among firms with over 50 employees.

TABLE 4-4 TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP BY FIRM SIZE, 2017-2021

Year	Union membership in firms with less than 50 employees	Union membership in firms with more than 50 employees
2017	14.4%	31%
2018	15.2%	30.6%
2019	15.2%	30.5%
2020	15.4%	30.5%
2021	14.9%	30%

Note: trade union statistics are published each May. The most recent available were published in May 2022 and relate to 2021.
Source: Labour Force Survey (statistics published by Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy).

Trade union membership density among senior managers is consistently lower than membership levels across the total workforce. The number of managers, directors and senior officials with union membership has declined by 0.8% in the period 2017 to 2021, to 11.1% in

2021, compared with 11.9% in 2017. Comparable figures for the total workforce are 23.1% in 2021, compared with 23.3% in 2017 (see Figure 4-2).

FIGURE 4-2 TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP AMONG SENIOR MANAGERS AND ALL EMPLOYEES, 2017-2021



Note: trade union statistics are published each May. The most recent available were published in May 2022 and relate to 2021.
Source: Labour Force Survey (statistics published by Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy).

Table 4-5 shows the proportion of individuals whose pay and working conditions are covered by trade union agreements by age, since the military workforce tends to be younger than many others in the civilian sector, particularly manufacturing. The data shows that trade union membership in the civilian sector rises with employees' age. Union membership is highest among workers aged over 50, with 41.1% being members of a union in 2021, compared with only 4.3% of those aged 16-24. Within the age groups, there has been little change in union membership between 2017 and 2021, with the exception of the 35-49 years cohort, which experienced a 1.8% reduction in membership between 2017 and 2021 (with the majority of this reduction (1.2%) occurring between 2020 and 2021).

TABLE 4-5 TRADE UNION MEMBERSHIP BY AGE GROUP, 2017-2021

Year	16-24 years	25-34 years	35-49 years	50+ years
2017	4.3%	19.3%	36.6%	39.8%
2018	4.4%	18.7%	37.9%	39%
2019	4.4%	19.5%	36%	40.1%
2020	4.2%	21%	36%	38.8%
2021	4.3%	19.8%	34.8%	41.1%

Note: Trade union statistics are published each May. The most recent available were published in May 2022 and relate to 2021.

Source: Labour Force Survey (statistics published by Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy).

5. Job security

Summary

This factor aims to reflect the greater job security experienced by Armed Forces personnel than is typical in civilian employment.

Overall, there has been a **clear improvement** in job security within the civilian sector since the last X-Factor level review based on the following:

- Unemployment had been generally falling prior to the pandemic. Following increases in 2020, unemployment is now at record lows.
- Despite an uptick in 2020, overall the level and rate of redundancy remained low and fell between 2017-2022.
- There have been general declines in the proportions of temporary and part-time employees unable to find full-time work. However, the number of people on zero-hours contracts has increased by 0.4 percentage points, from 2.8% of all people in employment in 2017 to 3.2% in 2022.
- CIPD data indicates that overall confidence has increased in the labour market following the pandemic and compared to 2018, in terms of workers' own perception of the likelihood of losing their job in the next 12 months and the perceived ease of finding a job as good as their current one.

In line with the previous X-Factor level review conducted in 2017, to assess changes in the job security experienced by civilians, we consider the trends in a number of labour market indicators, including unemployment levels and redundancy; the quality of work measured through the use of zero-hours contracts and temporary contracts; and workers' own perceptions of their job security.

Analysis of the unemployment figures show that there has been much less change in unemployment levels compared with the sharp decline observed in the period relevant to the last X-Factor level review. The unemployment rate had generally been falling since late 2013 until the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. It increased until the end of 2020 but has now returned to record low levels (see Figure 5-1).

FIGURE 5-1 UK UNEMPLOYMENT RATES (SEASONALLY ADJUSTED), 2017-2022



Source: Labour Force Survey.

Overall, the level of redundancies is lower than it was in 2017, however there was a significant increase in 2020 following changes to the Government's Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS), which saw redundancies reach a record high in the autumn of 2020. This was followed by a sharp decline. While there has been a modest rise in redundancies more recently, redundancies are lower than pre-pandemic levels. The redundancy rate was 3.5 per 1,000 workers in the three months to March 2017 and it rose to a peak of 14.4 in the three months to November 2020 before falling back to 2.3 in May to July 2022.

FIGURE 5-2 REDUNDANCIES (NOT SEASONALLY ADJUSTED), 2017–2022



Source: Labour Force Survey.

The rate of temporary employment had been on a declining trend before the pandemic (from Apr-Jun 2017 to Apr-Jun 2019) (see Table 5-1).[4] Increases in the proportion of employees on temporary contracts were recorded during the pandemic (2020-2021), but the latest figures show a return to the Apr-Jun 2017 rate (5.8% of all employees). The number and proportion employed on a temporary basis because they could not find a permanent job has fallen since 2017 (from 27.4% in Apr-Jun 2017 to 24% in Apr-Jun 2022). The total number of employees working part-time had been gradually increasing prior to the pandemic but this rise was not driven by an inability to find full-time employment, with the proportions of part-time workers unable to find full-time work falling prior to the pandemic (from 12.2% in Apr-Jun 2017 to 10.7% in Apr-Jun 2019). The pandemic period saw a fall in the total number of part-time workers and an increase in the number working part-time because they could not find full-time work. However, the latest figures show some recovery, with the current proportion unable to find full-time work being below the Apr-Jun 2017 level (10.2% compared to 12.2%).

[4]Temporary employees in the Labour Force Survey are those who say that their main job is non-permanent in one of the following ways: fixed period contract; agency temping; casual work; seasonal work; other temporary work.

TABLE 5-1 TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND THOSE THAT COULD NOT FIND A PERMANENT JOB, 2017-2022

Year (Apr-Jun)	Temporary employees (reasons for temporary working)				Part-time workers (reasons for working part-time)		
	Total (000s)	Total as % of all employees	Could not find permanent job (000s)	% could not find permanent job	Total* (000s)	Could not find full-time job (000s)	% could not find full-time job
2017	1,582	5.8%	434	27.4%	8,393	1,025	12.2%
2018	1,562	5.7%	436	27.9%	8,427	975	11.6%
2019	1,476	5.3%	361	24.4%	8,575	914	10.7%
2020	1,497	5.4%	380	25.4%	8,164	900	11%
2021	1,632	5.9%	536	32.8%	7,729	987	12.8%
2022	1,635	5.8%	392	24%	8,074	821	10.2%

*The total includes those who did not give a reason for working part-time and it therefore does not equal the sum of the other columns in this section of the table.
Source: Labour Force Survey (16+, seasonally adjusted figures).

Reflective of the trend reported in the previous X-Factor level review, the majority of temporary workers are young, with those aged 16-24 years consistently accounting for around a third of all temporary workers between 2018-2021, with some minor fluctuations in the proportion over the period (see Table 5-2).

TABLE 5-2 PERCENTAGE OF ALL TEMPORARY WORKERS BY AGE GROUP, 2018-2021

% of all temporary worker by age group						
Year (Apr-Jun)	16-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-44yrs	45-54yrs	55-64yrs	65+yrs
2018	33.8%	24%	14.6%	13.5%	10.9%	3.3%
2019	35.2%	20.7%	14.1%	13.5%	12.9%	3.6%
2020	32.4%	23.8%	14.6%	13.4%	12.4%	3.4%
2021	31.3%	21.7%	15.9%	13.5%	14.1%	3.6%

Source: Labour Force Survey.

Data on zero-hours contracts has also been used in previous reviews as an indicator of job security. Under zero-hours contracts employers do not have to guarantee any minimum working hours and individuals do not have to take any work offered. Zero-hours contracts can be a flexible option for both employers and workers, however there has been ongoing criticism of their use due to the unpredictability of the work.[5] Currently zero-hours contract workers account for 3.2% of total employment (Apr-Jun 2022), an increase of 0.4 percentage points from Apr-Jun 2017.The number of people on zero-hours contracts has fluctuated since 2017, reaching a peak of 3.3% of total employment in Apr-Jun 2020. Zero-hours contracts are most common among 16-24-year-olds, followed by the over-65 age group, which is a stable trend. Zero-hours working currently accounts for 10.6% of all employment among 16–24-year-olds, an increase of 2.8 percentage points since Apr-Jun 2017 (see Table 5-3).

This data, however, should be considered with some caution as the Labour Force Survey figures for this analysis are calculated from responses to a question asking people in employment if their main job has flexible working and, if so, to choose from a list of employment patterns which best describe their situation. Only those people who select ‘zero-hours contract’ as an option are included in this analysis and therefore the numbers will be affected by whether people know they are on a zero-hours contract and also by how aware they are of the concept.

[5] Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) (2022) Zero-hours contracts, 14 July 2022.

TABLE 5-3 LEVEL AND RATE OF PEOPLE ON A ZERO-HOURS CONTRACT, 2017-2022

In employment on a zero-hours contract (not seasonally adjusted)						
Apr-Jun	**All ages (aged 16+)**	**16-24yrs**	**25-34yrs**	**35-49yrs**	**50-64yrs**	**65+yrs**
2017	883,000	299,000	166,000	179,000	193,000	46,000
2018	781,000	262,000	147,000	151,000	178,000	42,000
2019	896,000	330,000	137,000	168,000	207,000	54,000
2020	1,069,000	389,000	200,000	198,000	216,000	66,000
2021	919,000	314,000	182,000	178,000	194,000	51,000
2022	1,032,000	386,000	163,000	220,000	197,000	66,000
Percentage of people in employment on a zero-hours contract						
Apr-Jun	**All ages (aged 16+)**	**16-24yrs**	**25-34yrs**	**35-49yrs**	**50-64yrs**	**65+yrs**
2017	2.8%	7.8%	2.2%	1.6%	2.2%	4%
2018	2.4%	7%	2%	1.4%	2%	3.4%
2019	2.7%	8.8%	1.8%	1.5%	2.2%	4%
2020	3.3%	10.8%	2.6%	1.8%	2.3%	5.2%
2021	2.9%	9.1%	2.4%	1.7%	2.1%	4%
2022	3.2%	10.6%	2.2%	2%	2.1%	4.5%

Source: Labour Force Survey.

The CIPD Good Work Index also captures a series of measures that offer an indication of perceived job security in the civilian sector, including 'How likely do you think it is that you could lose your job in the next 12 months?' and 'How difficult or easy do you think it would be for you to find another job at least as good as your current one?'. It is important to acknowledge that job security will be influenced by contract type and the comparable time series data includes workers on different contract types: permanent contracts; atypical contracts; and the self-employed.[6] In addition, in comparison to the Labour Force Survey and Workplace Employment Relations Study, the survey is based on a less robust sample (being a non-probability sample) and has a smaller sample size.

The CIPD time series data indicates that there has not been any major change in workers' perception of the likelihood of losing their job in the next 12 months, and only a minority of workers (between 13-16%) expressed some job insecurities over the period 2018-2021. The

[6] In 2018 it was found that 25% of atypical workers saw themselves at risk of losing their job in the next year, compared with 14% of standard permanent employees and 9% of the self-employed (CIPD UK Working Lives Survey Report, 2018).

latest figures, however, showed a notable shift downwards in workers' views that they would lose their job over the next year, perhaps reflecting increasing confidence that businesses are recovering following the pandemic, and the tighter labour market with unemployment at record lows (CIPD, 2022). A more granular analysis in the 2022 survey also revealed that workers in lower-skilled roles face a situation in which they are more likely to feel they will lose their job (Norris-Green and Wheatley, 2022).

FIGURE 5-3 EMPLOYEES' VIEWS ON JOB SECURITY, 2018-2022



Base: 2018 n=6,009; 2019 n=5,174; 2020 n=6,128; 2021 n=5,680; 2022 n=6,291.
Source: Norris-Green, M. and Wheatley, D. (2022) CIPD Good Work Index 2022. London: Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development.

In the 2022 data, workers are much more confident about being able to find comparable employment than they were during the height of the pandemic (34% in 2022 perceiving it would be easy to find a comparable job, compared to only 13% in 2020). However, it should still be acknowledged that, with the exception of the current year, the majority of workers (50%+) thought it would be difficult to find a job as good as their current role, indicating some negative perceptions of future employment opportunities within the civilian sector.

Overall, however, the CIPD data indicates that confidence in the labour market has increased among civilian workers following the pandemic and compared to 2018 when the survey began. As Figure 5-3 shows, the proportion of respondents that consider themselves at risk of losing their job in the next year fell from 14% in 2018 to 11% in 2022, correspondingly those that thought it unlikely, increased from 59% in 2018 to 66% in 2022.

6. Leave

Summary

This component aims to reflect difficulties for Armed Forces personnel to plan and take holiday at a time of their choosing.

Our overall conclusion is that there has been **no change** in this component on the civilian side, although we recognise there is a lack of suitable evidence for assessing the ability of civilians to take annual leave at the time of their choosing.

There is no available data to assess the ability of civilians to take annual leave at the time of their choosing. Civilian workers have a legal entitlement to paid time off under the Working Time Regulations, from which Armed Forces personnel are exempt.

The Working Time Regulations, which came into force on 1 October 1998, gave UK employees a legal right to three weeks' paid holiday, rising to four weeks (20 days) from November 1999. But, under these regulations, employers were permitted to count bank and public holidays as part of workers' statutory 20 days' leave. This loophole was closed by the Working Time (Amendment) Regulations 2007, which increased holiday entitlement in the UK to 24 days' paid holiday (for a five-day week) from 1 October 2007 and then to 28 days, including eight bank holidays in England, Scotland and Wales, from 1 April 2009. The statutory minimum holiday entitlement of 28 days includes bank holidays. Employees are not necessarily permitted to take time off on the declared public holidays and, if they do work on a public holiday, they are not necessarily entitled to extra pay for doing so.

The Regulations do not state when employees can take holiday or the mechanism by which holiday is booked, however, civilian workers are normally able to take annual leave at the time of their choosing, assuming adequate notice is given.[7] There may be occasions where time off is

[7]In March 2020 the Government granted a two-year extension for taking holiday for employees not able to take leave during the pandemic.

not granted due to staffing shortages or workload commitments, however the right to time off for civilian workers is enshrined in law.

Some organisations, across all sectors, require employees to take three- or four-days' annual leave to cover the Christmas and New Year holiday period. In manufacturing, many companies close at Christmas and also in the summer to allow essential maintenance to be carried out.[8] Consequently, employees are expressly required to take some of their holiday entitlement at these times. Some civilian employers may also apply limits or restrictions to the amount of leave that employees can book at particular times during the year or in a single block, for example a maximum of two weeks.

In the unlikely event that an employee's holiday is cancelled or rearranged by the organisation, employees would usually be allowed to take holiday at another time of their choosing in order for employers to be compliant with the Working Time Regulations.

[8] The 2022 IDR engineering survey shows that 15 of 47 (32%) firms operate a fixed period during which staff must take holiday.

7. Promotion and early responsibility

Summary

This component reflects that service careers provide opportunities for promotion, and therefore greater responsibility, at a younger age than typical for civilian occupations. Early responsibility is viewed as an advantage of military employment.

Our overall conclusion is that there has been a **slight improvement** in this component based on the following:

- The CIPD Good Work Index shows UK workers' perceptions of the prospects for career advancement in their job have steadily improved since 2018, although still only a quarter to just over a third of civilian workers (over the period 2018-2022) perceive their job to have good prospects for career advancement.
- Similarly, workers' perceptions that their job offers good opportunities for skills development have also steadily improved since 2018, with broadly - half of workers agreeing that they can develop their skills in their role.

There is limited available and suitable data to reliably measure promotion opportunities in the civilian sector and the 2021 review of the X-Factor components considered whether it should be removed as a component. However, despite data limitations, the AFPRB agreed to retain it since the factor continues to encapsulate a key difference between military and civilian employment.

The CIPD Good Work Index includes two measures for career development in the civilian sector, including 'My job offers good prospects for career advancement' and 'My job offers good opportunities to develop my skills', with time series data available from 2018. Overall, UK workers' perceptions of the prospects for career advancement in their job have steadily improved since 2018, with the proportion 'agreeing/strongly agreeing' that their job offers good prospects for career advancement increasing from 26% in 2018 to 37% in 2022 and the proportions 'disagreeing/strongly disagreeing' reducing from 44% in 2018 to 35% in 2022 (see Figure 7-1).

Similarly, workers' perceptions that their job offers good opportunities for skills development have also steadily improved since 2018; with some 47% in 2018 'agreeing/strongly agreeing' that they can develop their skills, compared to 54% in 2022. Over the period there has been an upward trend in this measure (see Figure 7-2).[9]

FIGURE 7-1 MY JOB OFFERS GOOD PROSPECTS FOR CAREER ADVANCEMENT, 2018-2022



Unweighted base: 5,995, 2018; 5,124, 2019; 6,596, 2020; 6,257, 2021; 5,787, 2022.
Source: CIPD Good Work Index 2018-2022.

[9]Except for 2020 when the proportion agreeing declined by only 1%. It should be noted the 2020 UK Working Lives survey was conducted pre-pandemic.

FIGURE 7-2 MY JOB OFFERS GOOD OPPORTUNITIES TO DEVELOP MY SKILLS, 2018-2022



Unweighted base: 5,987, 2018; 5,153, 2019; 6,640, 2020; 6,257, 2021; 5,823, 2022.
Source: CIPD Good Work Index 2018-2022.

The CIPD Good Work Index also included a new measure in 2022 examining the workplace factors that have helped career progression. In 2022, around a third (31%) of civilian workers stated that the organisation they worked for encourages progression and promotion from within. Some 44% of workers also stated that a lack of clear career pathways had acted as a barrier to career progression in 2022. However, there is no time series data to determine whether there has been any change in these perceptions since 2017, but the measure may be a useful indicator in the next X-Factor level review.

8. Separation

Summary

This component aims to take account of short periods of separation from family and friends because of working commitments. Longer periods of separation are compensated separately to the X-Factor by the Longer Separation Allowance.

Our overall conclusion is that there has been a **clear improvement** in this component since 2017 based on the following:

- Data from the National Travel Survey (NTS) showed that there was little change in the number of trips, distance covered, or time spent travelling prior to the pandemic (2017-2019). However, the pandemic had a substantial impact on travel trends in 2020 and 2021, with a significant reduction in the number of commuting and business trips. This reduction may reflect the increase in working from home and hybrid working, with homeworking in the UK more than doubling between October to December 2019 and January to March 2022.
- In turn, this means that recently there has been an improvement in the separation experienced by civilians, prompted by a change to working patterns during and following the pandemic.

In the 2017 X-Factor level review, data on civilian business travel was used as a proxy for the separation experienced while military personnel are away for short periods for training or work. The NTS, CAA Passenger - Survey, Great British Tourism Survey and the International Passenger Survey were examined and found that there had been little change in the data over the five-year period preceding the 2017 review. The 2021 review of the X-Factor components, however, acknowledged that these sources generally did not provide a 'convincing measure' of separation experienced by civilians and therefore, for this review, it was agreed in discussion with the OME that only the Department for Transport's National Travel Survey would be used to provide indicative data on the civilian experience.

The NTS is a household survey of personal travel by residents of England travelling within Great Britain, with data collected via interviews and use of a seven-day travel diary, which enables analysis of trends. The Covid-19 pandemic had a substantial impact on travel trends in 2020 and 2021 and on the response rates to the NTS due to the disruption to the survey fieldwork in 2020 and 2021.[10]

The NTS results show that there was little change in the number of trips, distance covered or time spent travelling between 2017 and 2019 (see Table 8-1). Unsurprisingly, the pandemic significantly reduced the number of commuting and business trips, with 29% fewer commuting trips and 54% fewer business trips in 2021 compared to 2019. As Table 8-1 shows, the number of commuting trips was fairly steady around 140,000 a year but this fell significantly to 91,000 in 2020 and rose marginally to 100,000 in 2021. There is a similar pattern in business trips, which were around 28 per year between 2017 and 2019 but fell to 14 in 2020 and to 13 in 2021.

These changes may reflect the increase in working from home and hybrid working, with homeworking in the UK increasing significantly from 4.7 million people in the three months to December 2019 to 9.9 million people in the three months to March 2022. For managers, directors and senior officials in the UK, the number of homeworkers rose from 849,000 to 1.4 million over the same period. In addition, the number of non-homeworkers and regional commuters in the UK fell from 25.6 million between October to December 2019 to 20.7 million between January to March 2022.[11]

[10]NTS base: 14,356 in 2019; 6,239 in 2020; 9,971 in 2021. The number of responses in 2021 represents a 60% increase compared to 2020, but a decrease of 31% compared to 2019 (DfT, 2022).
[11]Office for National Statistics (2022) Homeworking in the UK – regional patterns: 2019 to 2022, 11 July 2022. Available at: Homeworking in the UK – regional patterns - Office for National Statistics (ons.gov.uk).

TABLE 8-1 COMMUTING AND BUSINESS TRIP NUMBERS, DISTANCES AND DURATION, 2017-2021

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Average number of commuting trips per year	144	144	140	91	100
Average commuting miles per trip	9.1	8.8	9.1	8.8	8.2
Average commuting trip time (minutes)	31	30	31	28	27
Average number of business trips per year	27	30	28	14	13
Average business miles per trip	18.8	19.2	19.8	17.9	15.2
Average business trip time (minutes)	40	41	42	35	33
No. of individuals surveyed	14,541	14,150	14,356	6,239	9,971

Source: National Travel Survey.

9. Spousal/partner employment

Summary

This component reflects the detrimental impact of military life on spouse and partner employment, affecting their employment opportunities, career development and remuneration.

Our overall conclusion is that there has been **a slight improvement** in this component based on the following evidence:

- Both married/cohabiting and non-married/single women have experienced a marginal increase in employment.
- The employment rate of non-married/single women has improved significantly over the period whereas the position of those married/cohabiting has improved by less. This is reflected in corresponding falls in inactivity.
- The proportion of women in the managerial, professional and associate professional groups (SOCs 1, 2 and 3) is larger than it was in 2017.
- The proportion of women in some lower-paying occupational groups is smaller than it was in 2017, for example, in caring and support occupations (SOCs 6 and 7).

In this chapter we examine women's economic activity, their employment status and quality of employment. We use women as a proxy for spouse/partner because a large majority (89%) of Armed Forces' personnel are men, and many have a female partner. Throughout this chapter we refer to 'married' women which, for the purposes of reporting, includes married women, women in a civil partnership and those cohabiting. Where we use the term 'non-married', this refers to single women, separated women, divorcees, widows and those with a partner but not cohabiting.

Employment and economic activity

The employment rate for the whole population has risen by 0.7 percentage points over the five-year period, whilst economic inactivity has fallen marginally. The employment rate for women has risen 1.8 percentage points whilst the economic inactivity rate has fallen 1.3 percentage points between Apr-Jun 2017 and Apr-Jun 2022. The employment rate for men has fallen by 0.5 percentage points while the economic inactivity rates has increased by 1.2 percentage points.

Table 9-1 Employment and economic inactivity by gender, 2017-2022

Year (Apr-Jun)	All		Men		Women	
	Employment rate	Inactivity rate	Employment rate	Inactivity rate	Employment rate	Inactivity rate
2017	73.4%	23.2%	78%	18.2%	68.9%	28.1%
2018	73.8%	23.1%	78.4%	18.3%	69.3%	27.8%
2019	74.5%	22.5%	78.5%	18.1%	70.5%	26.9%
2020	74.3%	22.6%	78.2%	18.4%	70.4%	26.7%
2021	73.6%	22.9%	76.7%	19.4%	70.5%	26.3%
2022	74.1%	23.1%	77.5%	19.4%	70.7%	26.8%

Source: Labour Force Survey, employed aged 16-66.

A breakdown of female economic activity by marital status shows that married/cohabiting women are more likely to be in employment than non-married women and that non-married women are more likely to be economically inactive or unemployed. Both have experienced a marginal increase in employment and a small fall economic inactivity since 2017.

Table 9-2 Employment and economic inactivity for married and non-married women, 2017-2022

Year (Apr-Jun)	Employment rate			Inactivity rate		
	Married	Non-married	All	Married	Non-married	All
2018	73.8%	62.3%	69.3%	24.4%	33.1%	27.8%
2019	74.4%	64.4%	70.5%	23.9%	31.5%	26.9%
2020	75.2%	63.3%	70.4%	23.1%	32.2%	26.7%
2021	75.3%	63.9%	70.5%	22.7%	31.2%	26.3%
2022	75.3%	64%	70.7%	23%	32.2%	26.8%

Source: Labour Force Survey, females aged 16-66.

Frequent house moves can affect the ability to find employment. Further examination of economic activity by marital status and short housing tenure of less than 12 months shows a similar picture, with married/cohabiting women more likely to be employed and non-married women more likely to be economically inactive. However, the employment level of unmarried women has improved significantly over the period whereas the position of those married has marginally improved. This is reflected in corresponding falls in inactivity for non-married women.

Overall, the position of women with less than 12 months residence has improved over the period April-June 2017 to April-June 2022. It is important to note that that number of women in the workforce who have been at their current address for less than 12 months has fallen significantly (around a fifth) over the review period due to the pandemic restricting or making house moves more difficult.

TABLE 9-3 CHANGE IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY STATUS OF MARRIED/CO-HABITING WOMEN WHO HAVE BEEN RESIDENT AT THEIR ADDRESS FOR LESS THAN 12 MONTHS, 2017-2022

Year (Apr-Jun)	Employed			ILO unemployed			Inactive		
	Married	Non married	All	Married	Non married	All	Married	Non married	All
2017	70.5%	59.3%	65.5%	4.4%	5.2%	4.8%	25.1%	35.5%	29.8%
2018	72%	55.5%	64.8%	3.4%	5.9%	4.5%	24.7%	38.6%	30.8%
2019	72.8%	60.2%	67%	3.5%	5.9%	4.6%	23.7%	34%	28.4%
2020	75%	63.5%	69.6%	3.7%	4.7%	4.2%	21.3%	31.8%	26.3%
2021	78.3%	65.2%	72.5%	4.1%	6.1%	5%	17.5%	28.7%	22.5%
2022	71.9%	63.3%	68.2%	4.4%	6.2%	5.2%	23.7%	30.5%	26.6%

Notes: 1. Females aged 16-66. 2. ILO unemployment is defined as unemployed people without a job, actively seeking work in the past four weeks, and available to start work in the next two weeks, or unemployed people who have found a job and are waiting to start in the next two weeks.
Source: Labour Force Survey.

The data also shows that the number of married/cohabiting women preferring more hours of work in their current job, as a measure of underemployment, has fallen over the review period, from 7.5% in the three months to June 2017 to 6% in the three months to June 2022.

TABLE 9-4 MARRIED WOMEN'S PREFERENCE FOR MORE HOURS OF WORK, 2017-2022

Year (Apr-Jun)	More hours
2017	7.5%
2018	7%
2019	7.2%
2020	8.7%
2021	6.3%
2022	6%

Note: married/cohabiting women not looking for a new main or additional job.
Source: Labour Force Survey.

Managerial status among married women

Overall, the proportion of married/cohabiting women in managerial or supervisory roles is broadly unchanged over the period between April-June 2017 and April-June 2022 with small year-on-year fluctuations. By role we see a slight increase in the proportion of employed married women in managerial roles by the end of the period and a corresponding fall in the proportion of married employed women occupying a supervisory role.

TABLE 9-5 PROPORTION OF EMPLOYED MARRIED WOMEN WHO ARE MANAGERS OR SUPERVISORS, 2017-2022

Year (Apr-Jun)	Total proportion	Breakdown by level	
		Manager	Foreman or supervisor
2017	35.9%	24.1%	11.8%
2018	34.4%	23.5%	10.9%
2019	35.4%	24.3%	11.2%
2020	35.6%	24.5%	11.1%
2021	33.9%	23.8%	10.1%
2022	35.6%	25.4%	10.2%

Source: Labour Force Survey.

As Table 9-6 shows the proportion of men and women classified as 'Managers, Directors & Senior Officials' has remained stable over the review period, with the proportion of men almost double that of women. However, the proportion of women in the managerial, professional and associate professional groups (SOCs 1, 2 and 3) is larger than it was in 2017.

The proportion of women in SOC1 covering 'Managers, Directors and Senior Officials' rose from 6.8% in 2017 to 7.2% in 2022, those in SOC 2 covering 'Professional Occupations' rose from 22.1% to 27.3% and those in SOC3 'Associate Professional and Technical Occupations' rose from 12.5% to 15%. Meanwhile the proportion of women in some lower-paying occupational groups, for example, 'Caring, Leisure and Other Service Occupations' and 'Sales and Customer Service Occupations' (SOCs 6 and 7) is smaller than it was in 2017. These trends are broadly similar for both married and non-married women (Table 9-7).

TABLE 9-6 EMPLOYEES IN EACH MAJOR SOC GROUP BY GENDER, 2017-2022

SOC	Apr-Jun 2017		Apr-Jun 2018		Apr-Jun 2019		Apr-Jun 2020		Apr-Jun 2021		Apr-Jun 2022	
	%											
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
1	12.1	6.8	12.4	7	13.1	7.4	13.2	7.8	12.5	7.7	11.9	7.2
2	20	22.1	20.2	22.2	21.3	23	21.8	24.3	26.4	25.9	27.3	27.3
3	16.1	12.5	15.8	12.9	15.8	13.2	16.7	13.9	14.1	15.4	14.5	15
4	5.8	17.4	5.6	17.6	5.3	16.8	5.8	15.6	6.8	17	5.8	16.4
5	13.8	1.7	13.2	1.6	13.7	1.6	12.8	1.8	11.6	1.6	11.6	1.5
6	3.5	16.2	3.5	15.6	3.6	15.4	3.5	15.3	3.4	13.4	3.7	12.7
7	6.5	10.9	6.5	10.9	6	10.4	6.1	10.2	5.9	8.9	5.3	8.7
8	10.5	1.6	10.6	1.4	9.9	1.6	9.2	1.4	8.8	1.4	9.1	1.5
9	11.7	10.8	12.2	10.8	11.2	10.6	10.8	9.8	10.5	8.9	10.8	9.6

Source: Labour Force Survey.

Table 9-7 Distribution of married and non-married women in each major SOC group, 2017-2022

SOC	Apr-Jun 2017		Apr-Jun 2018		Apr-Jun 2019		Apr-Jun 2020		Apr-Jun 2021		Apr-Jun 2022	
	%											
	Married	Non-married	M	N	M	N	M	N	M	N	M	N
1	7.8	5	7.9	5.4	8.6	5.4	9	5.6	8.7	6.1	8.6	5
2	25.5	16	25.5	16.2	26	17.8	27.4	18.9	29.3	20.7	30.9	21.6
3	13	11.8	13.5	11.9	13.7	12.2	14.6	12.7	16	14.3	15.3	14.4
4	18.3	15.8	18.2	16.4	17.5	15.5	15.8	15.1	17.7	15.9	16.8	15.7
5	1.7	1.9	1.5	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.7	2	1.4	1.8	1.4	1.8
6	14.7	18.8	14.5	17.5	14.1	17.8	14.4	16.8	12.1	15.4	11.5	14.7
7	8.9	14.4	8.7	14.8	8.4	13.7	8	14	6.6	12.4	6.8	11.9
8	1.7	1.3	1.5	1.3	1.7	1.5	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.2	1.5	1.6
9	8.5	15	8.5	14.7	8.4	14.3	7.7	13.5	6.8	12.1	7.2	13.3

M = married; N = Non-married
Source: Labour Force Survey.

Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) Key:
1 Managers, Directors & Senior Officials
2 Professional Occupations
3 Associate Professional & Technical Occupations
4 Administrative & Secretarial Occupations
5 Skilled Trades Occupations
6 Caring, Leisure & Other Service Occupations
7 Sales & Customer Service Occupations
8 Process, Plant & Machine Operatives
9 Elementary Occupations

10. Stress, personal relationships and impact of the job

Summary

This component reflects stress arising from work pressures and other demands, as well as the short- and long-term impacts of stress.

Our overall conclusion is that there has been a **clear deterioration** in this component based on the following:

- There has been a significant increase in self-reported work-related illness classified by individuals as stress, depression or anxiety.
- Alcohol-specific deaths rose significantly in 2020 and 2021, having been relatively stable between 2017 and 2019.
- There has been a significant increase in the number of domestic abuse related crimes over the period.
- Estimates suggest that the number of rough sleepers in England has fallen, mainly due to Government initiatives during the pandemic, while data from charities working in the field indicate that rough sleepers have increased in London.
- The dissolution of marriages and civil partnerships has continued to rise, largely driven by the divorces among same-sex couples.
- The level of recorded suicides increased in every year between 2017 and 2021, except for 2020 when the number of registered suicides fell due to fewer suicides among men and also delays in death registrations due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

This chapter examines data covering a range of relevant issues, including work-related stress and illness, suicide, self-harm and alcohol-related deaths, rough sleeping, prison statistics and figures on divorce and separation. This variety of data has enabled us to make an assessment of whether civilian life in relation to this X-Factor component has worsened since the last review. We consider data covering both the direct and indirect impacts of stress on individuals.

Work-related stress, anxiety, and depression

Self-reporting of stress, anxiety or depression caused or worsened by a workers' most recent job rose sharply between 2017/18 and 2021/22, while the previous trend had been broadly flat. The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) states that estimates for 2020/21 and to a lesser extent 2021/22 are affected by the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic. Disruption to data collection processes in early 2020 may also be a contributory factor to changes in data in 2019/20. Furthermore, self-reporting figures are likely to be affected by increased awareness of work-related stress and attitudes to stress and wellbeing among both employees and employers.

TABLE 10-1 LEVEL AND RATE OF WORK-RELATED STRESS, ANXIETY, OR DEPRESSION, 2017/18-2021/22

Year (April - March)	Estimated prevalence of employee self-reported work-related stress, anxiety or depression made worse or caused by current or most recent job	Estimated rate per 100,000 workers employed in last 12 months
2017/18	596,000	1,800
2018/19	602,000	1,800
2019/20	824,000	2,440
2020/21	823,000	2,480
2021/22	914,000	2,750

Source: Health and Safety Executive.

The HSE also produces estimates on the level and rate of stress, anxiety, and depression by industry as three- or five-year averages. Data on the three-year average shows that the rate of stress, anxiety and depression caused, or made worse by work increased between 2015-18 and 2018-21 across all examined sectors and most significantly among workers in health and social care and manufacturing.

TABLE 10-2 RATE OF WORK-RELATED STRESS, ANXIETY, OR DEPRESSION, BY INDUSTRY, 2015/16-2020/21

	Estimated rate per 100,000 workers with work related stress, anxiety or depression made worse or caused by current or most recent job	
	2015/16-2017/18	2018/19-2020/21
All industries	1,320	1,780
Construction	620	920
Human health and social work activities	2,080	2,770
Manufacturing	820	1,220
Professional, scientific and technical activities	1,320	1,600

Source: Health and Safety Executive.

Social and mental health issues

The stress, personal relationships and impact of the job component states that some military personnel can suffer from a range of social and mental health issues, both during and after leaving the services (due to the longer-term impacts of the job), including alcohol misuse, vagrancy, crime and suicide. For civilians, we assess changes in data relating to alcohol-specific deaths, rough sleeping, and suicide rates.

The number of alcohol-specific deaths were relatively stable between 2017 and 2019, at around 7,500 a year. There was a significant increase in 2020, reaching almost 9,000, and deaths continued to rise in 2021 to reach over 9,600. The rate of alcohol-related deaths has risen from 12.2 per 100,000 people in 2017 to 14.8 per 100,000 people in 2021. Covid-19 is a contributory factor in the most recent rise in alcohol-specific deaths.

TABLE 10-3 ALCOHOL-SPECIFIC DEATHS BY GENDER, 2017-2021

	Number			Rate per 100,000		
	All	Men	Women	All	Men	Women
2017	7,697	5,133	2,564	12.2	16.8	8
2018	7,551	5,077	2,474	11.9	16.4	7.6
2019	7,565	5,019	2,546	11.8	16.1	7.8
2020	8,974	5,957	3,017	14	19	9.2
2021	9,641	6,348	3,293	14.8	20.1	9.9

Note: Latest available data for alcohol-specific deaths is for 2021, published in December 2022.
Source: Office for National Statistics.

The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) publishes rough sleeping estimates based on a snapshot taken one autumn evening each year. This data shows that an upward trend between 2017 and 2021 was reversed in the years 2019 to 2021 due to Government initiatives, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic.

Data is also available for London, through the regular reports published by the Greater London Authority's (GLA) Combined Homelessness and Information Network (CHAIN) report. Quarterly figures for the total number of rough sleepers counted between April and June of each year show a slight fall and then a levelling off during 2017/18 followed by sharp increases in both 2019 and 2020. Figures then significantly drop in 2021, before returning to the earlier upward trend. These figures also reflect the impact of relevant Government initiatives.

The two data sources have different methodologies with the CHAIN having the advantage in that it is a continuous count, not just a snapshot, provided by charities working in the field with more timely data.

Table 10-4 Rough sleeping estimates in UK, 2017-2021

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
England	4,750	4,680	4,270	2,690	2,440
% change from previous year	15	-1	-9	-37	-9
London	1,140	1,280	1,140	710	640
% change from previous year	19	12	-11	-38	-10
Rest of UK	3,610	3,390	3,130	1,970	1,800
% change from previous year	14	-6	-8	-37	-9

Note: 2021 is the latest available data. Autumn 2022 rough sleeping snapshot will be published on 28 February 2023.
Source: Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) homelessness statistics.

Table 10-5 Number of rough sleepers in Greater London, Apr-June 2017-2022

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Number of rough sleepers	2,584	2,595	3,172	4,227	2,589	2,998
% change from previous year	-3.9	0.4	22.2	33.3	-38.8	15.8

Source: Greater London Authority, 'CHAIN Quarterly Report'.

The prison population has fallen since 2017, declining year-on-year until a small uptick in 2022 for both men and women. The latest figures are affected by the impacts of the pandemic on policing and the courts.

TABLE 10-6 PRISON POPULATION STATISTICS FOR JUNE, 2017-2022

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
All	85,047	82,649	82,422	79,393	78,176	80,476
Men	81,040	78,830	78,656	76,140	74,990	77,241
Women	4,007	3,819	3,766	3,253	3,186	3,235

Source: Ministry of Justice's population and capacity briefing based on data from the last Friday in June of each year.

There has been a significant increase in the number of police recorded domestic abuse-related crimes over the period, up from 599,549 in 2017/18 to 910,980 in 2021/22. Covid-19 is a contributory factor in the most recent rise in domestic violence.

TABLE 10-7 DOMESTIC ABUSE-RELATED CRIMES, ENGLAND AND WALES 2016/17-2020/21

	Apr 2017/Mar 2018	Apr 2018/Mar 2019	Apr 2019/Mar 2020	Apr 2020/Mar 2021	Apr 2021/Mar 2022
Cases	599,549	746,219	798,607	845,734	910,980

Note: Crime statistics for the year ending March 2022 are not classified as National Statistics since they are based on six months of data collection between October 2021 and March 2022 and the figures should be treated with caution.
Source: Home Office.

The level of recorded suicides increased in every year between 2017 and 2021, except for 2020 when the number of registered suicides fell due to fewer suicides among men and also delays in death registrations due to the Covid-19 pandemic. It is important to note that suicide rates are based on date of registration of death, which happens after an inquest has taken place.

TABLE 10-8 SUICIDE RATES PER 100,000 PERSONS BY GENDER, GREAT BRITAIN, 2017-2021

Year	England & Wales						Scotland		
	All Deaths	Rate	Male deaths	Rate	Female deaths	Rate	All	Male	Female
2017	4,840	9.4	3,629	14	1,211	4.6	680	565	158
2018	5,420	10.5	4,097	16	1,323	5	784	575	203
2019	5,691	11	4,303	17	1,388	5.3	833	620	213
2020	5,224	10	3,925	15	1,299	4.9	805	581	230
2021	5,583	10.7	4,129	16	1,454	5.5	753	522	188

Note: 2021 is the latest annual data available, as published in September 2022.
Sources: Office for National Statistics for England and Wales and Public Health Scotland for Scotland.

Divorce and separation

The ONS notes that there were problems in processing divorces in 2018 which has artificially depressed the figures for that year and subsequently inflated the 2019 figures. The dissolution of marriages and civil partnerships combined is increasing, largely driven by the divorces among same-sex couples. This is consistent with the trend noted in the previous report for civil partnerships.

TABLE 10-9 DIVORCES AND DISSOLUTIONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 2017-2021

Year	All divorces and dissolutions	Divorces		Dissolutions	All same sex
		Opposite sex	Same sex	Same sex	
2017	102,345	101,669	338	1,217	1,555
2018	91,727	90,871	428	927	1,355
2019	109,243	107,599	822	916	1,738
2020	104,746	102,438	1,154	671	1,825
2021	114,185	111,934	1,571	680	2,251

Note: 2021 is the latest data available, as published in November 2022.
Source: Office for National Statistics.

TABLE 10-10 DIVORCE RATES IN OPPOSITE SEX MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND AND WALES BY GENDER, 2017-2021

Divorce decrees per 1,000 married population (opposite sex)					
	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
Men	8.4	7.5	8.9	8.4	9.2
Women	8.4	7.5	8.9	8.4	9.2

Note: 2021 is the latest data available, as published in November 2022.
Source: Office for National Statistics.

The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 gave same-sex couples rights identical to those in opposite-sex marriages. Over the period 2017-2019, the number of opposite-sex marriages have continued to fall, in line with a trend evident since the early 1970s. In contrast, the level of same-sex marriages has been consistent over the period, whereas a steady upwards trend in same-sex civil partnerships was reversed in 2020. Opposite sex civil partnerships only became law in December 2019. This is a major development that may provide data for the next X-Factor level review.

TABLE 10-11 MARRIAGES AND CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, 2017-2021

Year	Total	Marriages		Civil partnerships	
		Opposite sex	Same sex	Opposite sex	Same sex
2017	243,750	235,910	6,932	-	908
2018	235,751	227,870	6,925	-	956
2019	220,844	213,122	6,728	171	994
2020	-	-	-	7,566	785
2021	-	-	-	5,692	1,039

Notes: 1. Opposite-sex civil partnerships became legal in December 2019. 2. Latest available data for marriages in England and Wales is for 2019, published in May 2022.
Source: Office for National Statistics.

11. Training, education, adventure training and personal development

Summary

This component aims to reflect the greater opportunities for both job-specific and non-job-specific training and development for Service personnel.

Our overall conclusion is that there has been a **slight deterioration** in this component since 2017 based on the following:

- There have been small reductions in civilian training provisions since 2017. There have been small declines in the proportion of the civilian workforce being trained; in the number of training days delivered per annum; in the total hours spent training on the job; and in the number of employers training staff towards a nationally recognised qualification.
- Pre-pandemic the number of apprenticeship starts had shown a general downward trend (from 2018), but the latest cohort showed numbers rising again, albeit still below 2018/19 levels across all age groups.

This chapter only examines job-specific training, due to limitations with civilian data. The Department for Education's latest biennial Employer Skills Survey (ESS) (2019) provides data relating to the amount and types of training provided to the civilian workforce, and employer investment in training based on data from a sample of 16,057 respondents across England, Northern Ireland and Wales.[12] It shows that:

- Three-fifths (61%) of employers had funded or arranged some training for their employees over the previous 12 months. This is lower than found previously in the ESS series from 2011 to 2017, when two-thirds of employers (65%-66%) had provided training over the previous 12 months.

[12]Fieldwork for the 2022 survey took place in May and December 2022 and results of the survey will be made publicly available on the GOV.UK website in 2023.

- The proportion of the workforce that had received some training fell from 62% in 2017 to 60% in 2019. This decrease has been driven by a decline in England in contrast to the proportion of the workforce receiving training in Northern Ireland (60% in 2017 compared to 62% in 2019) and Wales (65% versus 58%) increasing.
- By occupation, fewer managerial staff had been trained in 2019 compared with 2017 (46% vs. 49%), although, in contrast, the proportion of Associate Professionals receiving training has risen since 2017 (66% compared to 62%).
- Employers provided a level of training equivalent to 6.0 days per annum per trainee and 3.6 days per employee. The total number of training days undertaken was 6% lower in 2019 than in 2017. As a result, the number of training days per person trained and per employee were also lower than in 2017 (6.4 days per trainee and 4.0 days per employee).

The latest ESS (2019) found that more than two-fifths (43%) of training employers had trained staff towards a nationally recognised qualification in the last 12 months.[13] This represents a small reduction (3-4 percentage points) compared with previous ESS waves since 2011. In 2019 2.9m employees across England, Wales and Northern Ireland had been trained to nationally recognised qualifications compared with 3.2m in 2017 and 3.4m in 2015 (DfE, 2020).[14] Overall, results suggest that 18% of the workforce trained over the previous 12 months had trained towards a qualification, which is comparable with 2017 (19%). Almost a fifth (19%) of training employers had arranged or funded training designed to lead to a recognised vocational qualification in the last 12 months, equating to 11% of all employers (DfE, 2020).

Data from the Labour Force Survey also serves as a useful indicator of access to training in the civilian sector. The survey provides data on the number of people in employment who have received job-related training or education within the last three months. The data shows that the proportion of employees receiving job-related training or education showed a small increase over the period 2017-2022, with just over a quarter of all employees receiving some training

[13] Among employers that had conducted some training.
[14] Department for Education (2020), Employer Skills Survey 2019, Summary Report, Research Report, November 2020.

(see Table 11-1). Over the period the incidence of training across all age groups has increased, with the largest increase among the oldest age cohort for people aged 65-69 years old.

TABLE 11-1 INCIDENCE OF JOB-RELATED TRAINING OR EDUCATION IN LAST 3 MONTHS, 2017-2021

Year (Apr-Jun)	Percentage of employees (%)					
	All aged 16-69	16-24yrs	25-34yrs	35-49yrs	50-64yrs	65-69yrs
2017	26.2%	30.9%	25.7%	26.3%	20.2%	17.1%
2018	26.2%	29.8%	26.1%	26.4%	20%	18.3%
2019	26.7%	29.2%	27.3%	27.1%	20.4%	18.8%
2020	25.7%	29.9%	25.9%	26%	19.1%	19.3%
2021	26.4%	29.9%	26%	26.8%	20%	20.7%
2022	27.4%	32.5%	27.5%	26.7%	21.1%	22.5%

Source: Labour Force Survey.

The Labour Force Survey also provides data on total hours spent training. The data covers those who have received some job-related training in the last four weeks (of the survey reference week). Whilst at the lower end, the proportions spending less than one hour in training has increased slightly from 8.4% in 2017 to 9% in 2022 (reaching a peak of 9.7% in 2020); there has also been an increase in the proportion spending more than 40 hours in job-related training (12% in 2017 rising to 13.2% in 2022). However, despite small fluctuations, overall, the proportions spending 5 hours or less in on-the-job training has risen by 2.9% (in 2022 compared with 2017). At the higher end, those spending 20 hours or more in training had been on a downward trend between 2017-2021, with only a slight increase recorded in the latest data (2022). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that there has been a fall in total hours spent training on the job.

TABLE 11-2 TIME SPENT TRAINING ON THE JOB, OF THOSE WHO HAVE RECEIVED SOME JOB-RELATED EDUCATION/TRAINING IN THE LAST 4 WEEKS, 2017-2022

Year (Apr-Jun)	Time spent training on the job, percentage of employees (%)						
	≤1 hour	>1 hour = 3 hours	>3 hours =5 hours	>5 hours =10	>10 hours =20	>20 hours =40	> 40 hours
2017	8.4%	19%	15.4%	24.4%	11.2%	9.6%	12%
2018	8.2%	22%	15.4%	22.9%	12.3%	7.9%	11.3%
2019	8.2%	19%	17.5%	24.2%	12%	7.9%	11.4%
2020	9.7%	23.5%	17.9%	19.6%	11.7%	7.7%	9.9%
2021	9.4%	22.5%	17.7%	21%	11.8%	7.7%	9.9%
2022	9%	21.3%	15.5%	19.9%	11.1%	10.1%	13.2%

Source: Labour Force Survey.

The X-Factor level review in 2017 considered apprenticeship starts as a relevant measure of participation in training among young people in the civilian sector. It revealed a broadly flat trend. There has been an increasing policy focus on increasing the uptake of apprenticeships. In April 2017, the UK government introduced the apprenticeship levy, paid by all employers with an annual wage bill in excess of £3m to help fund apprenticeship training.

In addition, employers in England who do not pay the levy may take advantage of further government funding provided under a co-investment funding model. Despite these reforms, the latest data shows that there was a downward trend in the total number of apprenticeship starts in the period 2018/19 to 2020/21; although numbers recovered in the latest cohort (2021/22); albeit still below 2018/19 levels across all age groups (see Table 11-3). However, the data covers the period affected by the Covid-19 pandemic which impacted apprenticeship learning, therefore caution is advised in comparing and interpreting this data.

TABLE 11-3 APPRENTICESHIP STARTS IN ENGLAND BY AGE, 2018-2022

Age	Number of apprenticeship starts			
	Aug 2018-Apr 2019	Aug 2019-Apr 2020	Aug 2020-Apr 2021	Aug 2021-Apr 2022
Under 19	66,000	58,100	38,800	56,200
19-24	63,500	58,300	46,700	63,100
All 19+	148,200	140,600	123,100	147,800
All 25+	84,700	82,300	76,400	84,600
Total	214,200	198,600	161,900	204,000

Source: Education Statistics, GOV.UK.

12. Turbulence

Summary

This component aims to reflect the turbulence experienced by Armed Forces personnel. This is defined as the dislocation to personal life caused by regular changes and lack of predictability in relation to the type and geographical location of work. Turbulence has wide ranging impacts from home ownership, credit ratings, access to state education and NHS care.

Turbulence is a complex component to analyse and the data for this component is very mixed, with improvement in some areas and deterioration in others. On balance we conclude that there has been **no change** in this component based on the following:

- There has been a general improvement in security of housing in the civilian sector since the last review, with a fall in short-term tenures of less than 12 months, and an increase in tenures of 10 years or more indicating greater stability in housing. Meanwhile the proportion of employees who own their own home has been largely stable over the past five years.
- In respect of civilian experience of the NHS, the GP Patient Survey shows a broadly constant level of satisfaction with getting through to the surgery by phone, to getting an appointment and the overall experience of patients' GP surgery until 2022 when there is a sharp increase in those rating their experience as 'poor'. Data on A&E wait times shows a marked deterioration in the percentage of patients being seen within four hours in the latest period.
- Approvals for secured lending remained consistent until the early pandemic period when they fell significantly. Since then, approvals have recovered to pre-pandemic levels.
- Data compiled by the Office for Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (OFSTED) shows that since 2017 the number of childcare providers has declined significantly, mainly due to a fall in the number of registered childminders. However, the number of childcare places remains broadly unchanged since 2017.

Turbulence is a complex component to analyse. Our assessment of how turbulence has changed in civilian life is based on examining changes in home ownership, as well as data on access to schools and NHS services.

Home ownership is relevant because a rise in the incidence of home ownership indicates a decrease in the extent of turbulence, and vice versa. We look at mortgage approvals and wider unsecured lending as a way of examining access to credit.

Access to NHS services is a basic provision for civilians and availability of childcare is an indication of ease of access to a service which makes other key aspects of life, including stable employment, possible.

Home ownership and tenure

An analysis of length of residence by employment status shows that there has been a fall in very short-term tenures of less than 12 months for all those in employment and an increase in the proportion living at the same address for more than five years but less than 10 years. There is a fall in long-term residence of 10 or more years for employees but not the self-employed.

As shown in Table 12-1, a further analysis of length of tenure by households supports the conclusion of a fall in the number of short-term tenures, especially among renters with the most pronounced fall in the private rented sector. This may be connected to Government policies during the Covid-19 pandemic which restricted evictions.

Figure 12-1 Length of tenure for employed, 2017-2022



Source: Labour Force Survey.

Figure 12-2 Length of tenure for self-employed, 2017-2022



Source: Labour Force Survey.

TABLE 12-1 LENGTH OF TENURE BY TYPE OF TENURE, 2017/18–2020/21

Year	Less than 1 year	1 year, less than 3	3 years, less than 5	5 years, less than 10	10 years, less than 20	20 years, less than 30	30 years or more
Owner occupiers							
2017/18	4.2%	10%	9.4%	12.8%	26.2%	14.8%	22.6%
2018/19	3.7%	9.2%	9.8%	14%	24.2%	16.1%	23%
2019/20	3.8%	10.1%	10.3%	15.3%	23.4%	15.3%	21.9%
2020/21	3.3%	11.1%	10.9%	18.8%	22.3%	15.1%	18.4%
Social renters							
2017/18	6.2%	13%	14.6%	22%	23.7%	10.8%	9.7%
2018/19	8.2%	13.5%	12.7%	21.9%	23.7%	11%	9%
2019/20	7.1%	12.9%	12.6%	22.1%	23.7%	11.6%	10%
2020/21	5.8%	15%	13.4%	24.1%	23%	12.4%	6.3%
Private renters							
2017/18	27.3%	29.2%	16.7%	16.6%	6.8%	1.9%	1.5%
2018/19	25.9%	29%	16.5%	16.7%	8.2%	1.8%	1.8%
2019/20	21.7%	31.3%	17.9%	17.4%	8.1%	1.7%	1.9%
2020/21	20.5%	31.8%	18.9%	17.4%	8.6%	1.8%	1%

Source: English Housing Survey (households).

An analysis of housing ownership of individuals by employment status shows that the proportion of employees who own their own home has been largely stable over the past five years, remaining at the same level as the previous review period. Figures for those classified as 'self-employed' show a small decline of one percentage point in the final year compared to the start with slight upticks over the course of the period with a corresponding rise in renting in the final year (see Table 12-2).

TABLE 12-2 HOUSING TENURE BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS, 2017-2022

	Year (Apr-Jun)					
	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Employed						
Owner or part-owner occupier	68.7%	68.9%	68.8%	68.3%	68.5%	69.3%
Paying rent	31.3%	31.1%	31.2%	31.7%	31.5%	30.7%
Self employed						
Owner or part-owner occupier	72.7%	72.9%	72.1%	73.1%	73.1%	71.9%
Paying rent	27.3%	27.1%	27.9%	26.9%	26.9%	28.1%

Note: Employed persons aged 16-66.
Source: Labour Force Survey.

However, a different picture emerges from the English Housing Survey (Table 12-3). This shows there has been a small increase year-on-year throughout the period in home ownership offset by a decline in private renting.

TABLE 12-3 HOUSING TENURE BY HOUSEHOLD, 2016/17-2020/21

	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Owner occupiers	62.8%	63.2%	64.1%	64.9%
Social renters	17.%	16.7%	16.6%	16.6%
Private renters	19.5%	19.3%	18.7%	18.5%

Source: English Housing Survey.

Housing tenure figures by age and employment status show that there has been an increase in the proportion of those under the age of 35 who own or are buying their own home, offset by a decline among those aged 45 or over (Table 12-4). The changes in home ownership are matched by changes in those renting with falls among those aged under 30 with offsetting rises in the older age groups (Table 12-5). Although the changes in tenure apply regardless of employment status, the rise in owner occupiers among those aged between 16 and 24 is most pronounced for those who are self-employed.

TABLE 12-4 HOUSING OWNERSHIP BY AGE, 2017-2022

Year (Apr-Jun)	Age 16-24	Age 25-34	Age 35-44	Age 45-54	Age 55+
Employees					
2017	59.3%	53.9%	70%	78.7%	83.1%
2018	59.7%	55.9%	70%	78%	81.4%
2019	58.4%	56.1%	69.3%	78%	82.7%
2020	61.2%	55.9%	69.1%	76.9%	79.5%
2021	62.5%	56.4%	69.3%	76.4%	78.8%
2022	60.3%	59.3%	69.4%	77.2%	79.5%
Self-employed					
2017	54.6%	51.2%	68%	79.6%	86.4%
2018	55.2%	53.5%	68.2%	77.9%	87.6%
2019	59%	55.1%	64.6%	76.8%	86.4%
2020	57.2%	57.7%	68.6%	75.3%	86.4%
2021	63.5%	62.1%	68.6%	76.9%	85.1%
2022	61.8%	58.1%	66.5%	72%	85.1%

Notes: 1. Ownership includes part-ownership, for instance in conjunction with a housing association or other provider. 2. Employed persons aged between 16 and 66.
Source: Labour Force Survey.

TABLE 12-5 RENTING BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND AGE, 2017–2022

Year (Apr-Jun)	Age 16-24	Age 25-34	Age 35-44	Age 45-54	Age 55+
Employees					
2017	40.7%	46.1%	30%	21.3%	16.9%
2018	40.3%	44.1%	30%	22%	18.6%
2019	41.6%	43.9%	30.7%	22%	17.3%
2020	38.8%	44.1%	30.9%	23.1%	20.5%
2021	37.5%	43.6%	30.7%	23.6%	21.2%
2022	39.7%	40.7%	30.6%	22.8%	20.5%
Self-employed					
2017	45.4%	48.8%	32%	20.4%	13.6%
2018	44.8%	46.5%	31.8%	22.1%	12.4%
2019	41%	44.9%	35.4%	23.2%	13.6%
2020	42.8%	42.3%	31.4%	24.7%	13.6%
2021	36.5%	37.9%	31.4%	23.1%	14.9%
2022	38.2%	41.9%	33.5%	28%	14.9%

Source: Labour Force Survey.

Access to, and satisfaction with, NHS services

Another facet of civilian life is access to NHS services. The GP Patient Survey is a survey conducted among patients aged 16 and over registered with a GP practice in England. It asks patients a range of questions about their GP, the surgery and health more broadly and specifically asks about the ease of being able to get through on the phone and make an appointment.

The results of the survey covering the review period shows a gradual downward trend in satisfaction, until 2022 when there is a sharp decrease in those indicating their experience as 'good' or 'fairly good'. The same trend applies in responses regarding patient experience getting through to the surgery by phone, getting an appointment and their overall experience of the GP surgery.

TABLE 12-6 PATIENTS REPORTING VERY OR FAIRLY EASY TO ACCESS GP SERVICES, 2017-2022

	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Getting through on the phone	70.9%	70.3%	68.3%	65.2%	67.6%	52.7%
Making an appointment	-	68.6%	67.4%	65.5%	70.6%	56.2%
Overall experience of GP practice	-	83.8%	82.9%	81.8%	83%	72.4%

Note: Question regarding patient's experience of making an appointment and overall experience of GP practice were first asked in 2018.
Source: GP Patient Survey.

The requirement to go to an accident and emergency centre, arising from some trauma of greater or lesser extent, represents a measure of turbulence.

Figures for England show that there has been a marked deterioration in the percentage of patients being seen within four hours at type 1 A&E centres. These are classed as major A&E units and cover around two-thirds of all A&E attendances. Some 85.1% patients were seen within four hours between April and June 2017, but this fell to 59.3% between April and June 2022.

TABLE 12-7 ATTENDANCES AND PERCENTAGE TREATED WITHIN FOUR HOURS, ENGLAND, 2017-2022

	Total A&E attendances	<4 hours to admit/transfer/ discharge % of all attendances	Type 1 attendances	Type 1 admit/transfer/ discharge with 4 hours as % of type 1 attendances
2Q 2017	6,010,607	99.3%	3,897,917	85.1%
2Q 2018	6,242,769	99.3%	3,907,798	84.2%
2Q 2019	6,392,158	98.9%	4,034,294	78.3%
2Q 2020	3,589,014	99.7%	2,630,070	89.7%
2Q 2021	6,098,906	97.7%	4,091,493	76%
2Q 2022	6,400,908	94.7%	4,110,707	59.3%

Source: NHS England.

Mortgages and credit

Armed Forces' personnel often face difficulties accessing credit due to the turbulence caused by work. This can affect their ability to receive approval for loans. We have examined data for civilians from the Bank of England on both secured and unsecured lending; numbers of approvals for lending secured on dwellings (including new mortgages and re-mortgages) and wider consumer lending (principally credit card and overdrafts).

Approvals for secured lending were consistent between summer 2017 and the start of the pandemic in 2020, after which they fell, significantly so for house purchases. Since then, approvals for secured lending have recovered and are broadly in line with pre-pandemic levels. In the three months to August 2017 approvals for secured lending totalled 128,079, compared with a total of 128,381 in the three months to August 2022.

FIGURE 12-3 APPROVALS FOR SECURED LENDING, JUNE 2017-AUGUST 2022



Source: Bank of England

There was strong growth in outstanding unsecured debt – consumer credit – between September 2017 and September 2019. Thereafter, consumer credit fell back to 2017 levels during 2020 and 2021, before growth again in 2022.

FIGURE 12-4 TOTAL CONSUMER CREDIT (EXCLUDING STUDENT LOANS), MARCH 2017-JUNE 2022



Source: Bank of England

Childcare

Data compiled by OFSTED shows that since 2017 the number of childcare providers has declined significantly, mainly due to a fall in the number of registered childminders.[15] However, this appears to have had little impact on the number of childcare places, with the estimated number of places broadly unchanged since 2017. Childminders now account for just 15% of all childcare placements, compared to 20% in 2017.

[15] OFSTED categorises providers as one of the following: childcare on non-domestic premises are nurseries, pre-schools, holiday clubs and other private provision on business premises, usually registered on the Early Years Register (EYR) because they look after children aged 0–5, Childminders are people who are paid to look after one or more children they are not related to in someone's home. The majority are registered on the EYR because they look after children aged 0–5, but those who look after 5–7-year-olds need to register on the Childcare Register (CR), Childcare on domestic premises is where 4 or more people look after children together in someone's home. The majority are registered on the EYR, and some are registered on the CR, depending on the age of the children they look after, and home child carers are nannies who care for children aged 0-18 wholly or mainly in the child's own home. They are not required to register with Ofsted but may choose to do so on the Voluntary Childcare Register (VCR).

Table 12-8 Early years registered providers and places provided in England, 2017-2022

	Early Years Registered Providers	Places
31 August 2017	65,422	1,290,556
31 August 2018	63,460	1,304,902
31 August 2019	61,162	1,319,465
31 August 2020	58,569	1,312,215
31 August 2021	55,723	1,302,300
31 March 2022	53,193	1,291,262

Source: OFSTED registration data.

Appendix 1 – Definitions of the X-Factor components

Autonomy, management control and flexibility

This factor is defined as the degree of management control exercised over the individual. It assesses the scope allowed to the jobholder to exercise initiative and take independent actions and considers the degree of latitude and discretion allowed in making decisions. This factor also takes into account the amount of control that individuals have over their immediate working environment.

Due to the unique nature of their work, Armed Forces personnel operate within a tightly controlled structure (i.e. the Command Structure). In general, civilians have significantly more freedom and flexibility in making decisions which impact upon their immediate working environment.

Danger to physical and mental health

This covers the impact on individual personnel of operating:

a) with a threat of real or perceived violence;

b) in an environment or area which is deemed physically unsafe or uncomfortable for either natural, manmade and/or political reasons;

c) when there is a danger of death

Those impacts cover:

d) short and long-term injury to physical health;

e) short and long-term impact on mental health;

For Armed Forces personnel these impacts may arise from a number of circumstances including:

a) the conduct of military operations

b) training

c) terrorism.

Hours of work

Hours of work would normally be defined within the employment contract and need to accord with related legislation, albeit that UK companies may request employees to sign an agreement which exempts the individual from restrictions imposed by the hours of work legislation.

Unsocial hours are those worked outside regular ‘office hours’ between Monday and Friday. Such hours may be the requirement of the job, especially where it is necessary to operate 24 hours a day.

Employees in many industries and roles receive overtime and shift premia for hours worked in addition to, or outside, normal working hours. However, in some roles, flexibility over hours is expected and accounted for in basic pay.

Armed Forces personnel have a legal obligation under the Armed Forces Act to be available for duty 24 hours a day and 365 days a year. Overtime and shift premia are not paid to Armed Forces personnel.

Individual, trade union and collective rights

Individual legal rights are enjoyed by UK citizens and by those with a right to remain and work in the UK. These rights include:

a) Human Rights legislation;

b) Equal Opportunities legislation;

c) Age Discrimination legislation;

d) Minimum Wage legislation;

e) Working Time legislation, and;

f) Trade Union membership.

Armed Forces are not subject to these pieces of legislation.

Residents of the United Kingdom may belong to a trade union and may actively participate in Union activity, including the right to strike. Armed Forces personnel are permitted to join a trade union and may actively participate in union activity, however they are not permitted to participate in collective bargaining. Armed Forces personnel are, therefore, unable to benefit from worker representation through a collective body such as a trade union or staff association.

In addition to Civil and Criminal Law, Armed Forces personnel are subject at all times to military discipline, as set out in the Armed Forces Act 2006. There are also other restrictions that are imposed on Armed Forces personnel by their employment conditions.

The notice periods for Armed Forces personnel are fixed by reference to laid down procedures. The inability to leave the Services at will means that Service personnel are prevented from securing a job and then handing in their notice – the norm in civilian life for those in employment. Other Ranks are eligible, once they have completed an initial (and variable) return of service, to give notice to leave but, other than in exceptional (e.g. compassionate) circumstances, can be required to serve out a standard 12 month period of notice. Earlier release is sometimes permitted depending on the workforce requirements of the individual's branch/trade.

Service personnel can also be prevented from leaving for operational reasons and may also be required to give a 'Return of Service' on completion of their particular career courses, (for example 36 months for a full-time degree course). On leaving Service personnel remain liable for call out or re-call for periods which vary depending on their engagement/commission.

Service personnel families may also be subject to restrictions, especially when they are living in service accommodation.

Job security

Job security is defined as the knowledge, based on past history, that the individual will be able to work within the same organisations, albeit within different divisions, for a significant number of years and enjoy similar or increased levels of remuneration.

Within the Armed Forces job security has long been recognised as a key benefit compared with the more fluid employment market in civilian life. The more stable career pattern may persuade some personnel to accept the disadvantages that come from service life.

Job security may be affected by the level of personal fitness.

Leave

Annual leave is defined as the entitlement to a fixed number of working days off from one's job as stated in the employment contract.

It would generally be expected that the employer would not be able to dictate the manner that this time would be utilised and that such leisure time can be booked with prior agreement from the employer and/or colleagues in accordance with personal or family requirements. Employees working shifts would normally expect that at main holidays, e.g. Christmas, New Year and August, summer holiday time, that they would be able to take time off, subject to the needs of the business and that where necessary the business would hire additional staff to cover such times.

In the event that the holiday time is lost the employee would expect to be compensated in some way. For some employees, leave would be included in the flexible benefits system and can therefore be traded (i.e. increased or decreased) for other benefits or money.

All ranks across the Services have an allocation of 30 'working days' leave per year. However, leave can be lost for military reasons.

In practice it may be difficult for Service personnel to take leave when they wish (because of programmed commitments and the wider unpredictability of Service commitments) or to be able to take their full complement of leave. It remains MoD policy that commanders enable their personnel to take the full 30 working days leave allowance unless operational imperatives dictate otherwise. Those required to work at weekends or during 'stand-downs' do not necessarily achieve time off in lieu.

Promotion and early responsibility

Career development is a clear goal of Armed Forces personnel. Promotion is the endorsement of an individual's ability in the form of an elevation in both status and responsibility. This could be demonstrated in a variety of forms, including:

- responsibility for teams/personnel;
- responsibility for assets;
- responsibility for strategy and planning.

Service careers provide earlier opportunities for promotion, and thus increased responsibility, than are experienced by those of similar ages in civilian occupations.

Separation

Separation is defined as being separated from normal personal life for a period of time because of working commitments. This component covers physical separation and also recognises that, depending on their precise role/location, Armed Forces Personnel may also be restricted in their wider [electronic] communications with family and friends.

The length of time for which separation takes place will vary according to the nature of the job. Normally the length of separation would be standardised, e.g. a North Sea worker would normally work for a set period of weeks and then return home for a set period of time. This is less the case in the Armed Forces where many personnel enjoy a lower level of predictability in relation to their working lives.

There are two broad categories of Separation:
(i) voluntary separation (i.e. where a Service person chooses to serve unaccompanied in order to give family stability) and (ii) involuntary separation (for example operations and pre-deployment training).

Some separation is an inevitable part of Service life and the X-Factor takes into account short periods of separation. Longer periods of separation are compensated by the Longer Separation Allowance. These allowances are not dependent upon marital status.

Spousal/partner employment

The turbulent nature of life in the Armed Forces may have a varied and detrimental impact on spouse/partner employment.

This includes:

a) Employability - limited employment opportunities for spouse/partner which covers finding employment, finding employment within a specific field or industry and/or employment suitably matched to the spouse's skills, work experience and qualifications;

b) Training and career development - difficulties for spouse/partner to continue their career, professional training and achieve promotion (i.e. an employer may be less likely to consider him/her for promotion as their personal situation is likely to be taken into account by their employer);

c) Earnings - spouse/partner is likely to have to accept a lower level of salary due to (a) and (b) above. This is also likely to affect the benefits package, and in particular the pension.

These effects are likely to be exacerbated when

(i) Service Personnel and their spouses/partners require childcare provision in order to be able to work

(ii) Service Personnel are posted overseas.

Stress, personal relationships and impact of the job

Stress at work arises when individuals have excessive pressures or other demands placed on them at work. In the Armed Forces, it may be a consequence of individuals having difficulty coping with certain aspects of the job.

Employers would expect to minimise stress by planning, providing new or additional resources, and/or re-organising work. However, depending on the organisation, this may not always be possible in the Armed Forces due to lack of resources or personnel.

Depending on the level of deployment, Armed Forces personnel may experience significantly greater levels of stress than would normally be acceptable in civilian occupations. The Armed Forces may also experience additional stress because of overstretch for operational reasons.

Stress may have short- and long-term impacts on Service personnel both during and after employment in the Armed Forces. The impact of this can be varied and detrimental. As a result, individuals may experience difficulties adjusting to civilian life, including difficulties in finding and maintaining civilian employment.

Stress may also contribute to difficulties maintaining relationships with spouse, partner, children, friends and family, having a detrimental impact on family and personal life.

A minority may also experience social and mental problems, such as issues misusing alcohol or drugs, vagrancy, criminal activity and/or suicide.

Training, education, adventure training and personal development

Training is the facilitation of learning new skills, or improving existing skills, which enhance the abilities of individuals to do their job or further their career. This in turn will facilitate career progression and increased responsibility where appropriate.

Training may include:

a) technical skills and/or;

b) trade skills and/or;

c) academic skills and/or;

d) management skills and/or;

e) people skills and/or;

f) transferable skills.

For the Armed Forces this includes the opportunity to undertake a range of non-job-specific training and development opportunities, which are often paid for or subsidised by their employer. This may include skills training at the end of their career prior to retirement outside the Armed Forces.

Adventure training is also an attraction for Service personnel. Adventure training is undertaken by Officers and Other Ranks as part of their initial training and subsequently, to encourage personal fitness and develop individual skills.

The Armed Forces also provide the opportunity to participate in sport on an individual and team basis at no cost to personnel. In particular, individuals may spend significant amounts of time on training for competitions as this is regarded as part of the job.

Turbulence

This is defined as the dislocation to personal life caused by regular changes to both the type and geographical location of work. This effect can be exacerbated by the lack of predictability in changes to working requirements, e.g. when the employee receives short notice about such changes.

Turbulence has an impact on the following:

a) home ownership is more difficult as personnel need to move frequently;

b) maintaining friendships and family contacts outside work;

c) developing external interests;

d) accessing state education;

e) continuity and stability of education for the children of Service personnel;

f) accessing NHS medical and dental care; and

g) impact upon credit rating generally.

Armed Forces personnel can be held at High Readiness and must be able to move at short notice, and sometimes frequently, between units and theatres. However, this may vary considerably between different personnel and vary over a career. Such significant and repeated pressure may have a major impact on the quality of life they experience.

Appendix 2 – Data sources

Source	Author	Years
A&E statistics	NHS England	2017-2022
Alcohol-specific deaths	Office for National Statistics	2017-2021
Annual Population Survey	Office for National Statistics	2017-2022
Annual reports for Trade Unions and Employers' Association	Certification Officer for Trade Unions and Employers' Association	2017-2021
Bankstats	Bank of England	2017-2022
Civil Service People Survey	Civil Service	2017-2021
Combined Homelessness and Information Network (CHAIN) rough sleeping in London	Greater London Authority	2017-2022
Crime statistics	Home Office	2016/17-2020/21
Divorce and marriage statistics	Office for National Statistics	2017-2021
Early years registered providers and places	OFSTED	2017-2022
Education Statistics	Gov.UK	2018-2022
English Housing Survey	Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities	2017/18-2020/21
Good Work Index	CIPD	2018-2022
GP Patient Survey	NHS England	2017-2022
Homelessness statistics	Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities	2017-2021
Labour Force Survey	Office for National Statistics	2017-2022
Mental Health Services Data Set	NHS Digital	2017/18-2021/22
National Minimum Wage rates	Gov.uk	2017-2023
National NHS Staff Survey	NHS	2017-2021
National Travel Survey	Department for Transport	2017-2021
Prison statistics	Ministry of Justice	2017-2022
RIDDOR statistics	Health & Safety Executive	2017/18-2021/22
Statutory redundancy pay	Gov.UK	2017-2022
Suicide statistics in England and Wales	Office for National Statistics	2017-2021
Suicide statistics in Scotland	Public Health Scotland	2017-2021
Understanding Society	Institute for Social and Economic Research	2017/18 (Wave 8), 2018/19 (Wave 10) & 2020/21 (Wave 12)

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