

JSP 815

Element 10: Accident / Incident Management and Emergency Response



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Amendment record

This element has been reviewed by the Directorate of Defence Safety (DDS) together with relevant subject matter experts and key Safety stakeholders. Any suggestions for amendments **should** be sent to <u>COO-DDS-GroupMailbox@mod.gov.uk</u>.

Version No	Date published	Text Affected	Authority
1.0	Dec 22	BETA version for consultation	Dir HS&EP
1.1	7 Jun 23	Final version	DDS
1.2	10 Sep 24	Annual revision and combined element and assurance framework	DDS

Terms and definitions

General safety terms and definitions are provided in the <u>Master Glossary of Safety Terms</u> and <u>Definitions</u> which can also be accessed on <u>GOV.UK</u>.

Must and should

Where this element says must, this means that the action is a compulsory requirement.

Where this element says should, this means that the action is not a compulsory requirement but is considered good practice.

Introduction

1. This element provides the direction that must be followed and the guidance and good practice that should be followed and will assist users to comply with the expectations for Accident / Incident Management and Emergency Response that are set out in this Element.

2. The term 'safety occurrence' is used throughout this element, which is in the context of safety encompasses the terms unsafe condition / unsafe act / near miss or accident / incident or dangerous occurrence. However, there will still be some references to accidents / incidents where statute, Defence policy and regulations defines them.

Purpose and expectations

3. This element focuses on the frameworks that Defence organisations are to have in place to report, notify, record and investigate incidents and plan on how to address investigation recommendations. The purpose of this element is to assist Defence organisations to promote an environment in which there is a culture of learning, where all our people and those external to the organisation feel safe to report safety occurrences. Where lessons are identified and learnt through a process of continual improvement and where there is a proactive approach to identifying and mitigating potential safety occurrences through regular and effective creation and testing of emergency plan.

Reporting, notifying, recording and investigating

4. Defence organisations should ensure that the necessary resources are in place to establish, implement and maintain processes for reporting, notifying, investigating and taking action to determine and manage safety occurrences.

Reporting and recording

5. All safety occurrences relating to Defence personnel, visitors, premises, estate, or equipment, of which Defence exercises an element of control or for which Defence may be otherwise culpable must be reported and recorded on the Defence organisation's safety occurrence reporting, notification and recording system. This process must be detailed in the relevant Defence organisation's SMS.

6. Defence organisations must make sure their SMS is clear on how the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences (RIDDOR) should be conducted and which reporting system should be used.

7. Safety occurrence notification, reporting, recording and investigation must be carried out in accordance with <u>JSP 375 Volume 1, Chapter 16 – Safety occurrence reporting and</u> investigation.

8. When a safety occurrence arises the Defence organisation should:

a. React in a timely manner, take action to control and correct it, and deal with the consequences.

b. Evaluate the need for corrective action(s) to eliminate the root cause of the safety occurrence.

This should be done by investigating the safety occurrence to determine the root cause and consider whether similar safety occurrences have / or could potentially occur.

c. Review existing assessments of safety risks.

d. Determine and implement any actions needed and review their effectiveness.

e. Assess safety risks which relate to new or changed hazards, prior to taking action.

f. Make changes to the Defence organisations safety management system (SMS), if necessary.

9. Corrective actions should be appropriate to the effects or potential effects of the safety occurrences. The Defence organisation should retain documented information as evidence of:

a. The nature of the safety occurrences and any subsequent actions taken.

b. The results of any action and corrective action, including their effectiveness.

c. The Defence organisation should communicate this information to all relevant personnel and stakeholders.

Culture of reporting

10. An organisation that listens to and learns from its people is one that is constantly improving and understands that mistakes, errors in judgement and the need to adapt are normal.

11. Defence organisations should listen and support their personnel by promoting a culture that encourages them to report mistakes and safety occurrences and to conduct investigations into these where appropriate. When an organisation is listening and learning in relation to safety, the following are true:

a. Leaders support fairness, openness and learning by making personnel feel confident to speak up when things go wrong, rather than fearing blame.

b. Actions and decisions are understood before they are judged, and people are supported to learn from their actions.

c. People are asked for their advice to help with designing the systems that could help change things for the better.

d. Those responsible for managing incidents draw on human factors (things which influence people's actions and decisions) investigations, skills and expertise to fully understand how an incident happened, the lessons that can be learned and how to adapt in the future.

12. Some Defence organisations have adopted the approach suggested in the Nimrod Review of 2009, such as the Reporting and Learning cultures, as shown in Figure 1. The importance of listening and learning is explained more in the <u>safety leadership guide</u>.




Figure 1 - Nimrod review culture diagram

Continual Improvement

13. A lesson is something learnt by study or experience. The benefits from learning from experience (LfE) are to anticipate and prevent, other potentially more serious outcomes. Lesson(s) learnt from safety occurrence investigations and formal inquiries should be shared with stakeholders where relevant within the Defence organisation and across the wider Defence safety community where appropriate.

14. Defence organisations should identify lessons from safety occurrences to better predict and prevent future safety occurrences and adopt good practice(s) in order to develop and drive continual improvement of their own safe systems of work (SSW) and those across Defence. This demonstrates a good learning culture within the Defence organisation.

15. Defence organisations may also learn lessons and adopt good practice from other Defence organisations and / or from organisations that are outside of Defence. These lessons and / or good practices should be adopted appropriately by Defence organisations to enable them to identify new methods and maintain currency with the most up to date industry safety standards and practices.

Business Continuity Management and emergency planning

Business Continuity Management (BCM)

16. In simple terms, BCM identifies what needs to be done before an incident occurs to protect people, premises, technology, information, supply chains, stakeholders and reputation. It focused on the development of strategies and contingency plans to manage the consequences of disruption, mitigate the impact on critical activities or outputs, and recover business back to normal levels of operation as soon as possible after an incident.

17. The Defence BCM model is based on the British Standard's BCM lifecycle and has six elements. The specific scope, structure and effort expended within a BCM programme is likely to vary between Defence organisations. However, the six elements of the model should be considered at each level of the Defence organisation.



Figure 2 - Defence BCM Model diagram

a. BCM Programme Management:

The organisational approach to BCM and how it is maintained, taking into account the size and complexity of the Defence organisation.

b. Understanding the Organisation:

This identifies the Defence organisation's key outputs and the critical activities and resources (including personnel) which support them. This phase involves undertaking a Business Impact Analysis and a risk assessment and identifying key stakeholders and dependencies.

c. Determining Business Continuity Management Strategy:

Appropriate BCM strategies are developed, using the output of phase 2, so that key Defence outputs continue their delivery during and following an incident.

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d. Developing and Implementing a BCM response:

Business Continuity Plans, Site Recovery Plans and Incident Management Plans should be developed and implemented. These detail the steps to be taken during and after an incident to maintain or recover the delivery of Defence critical activities.

e. Exercising, Maintaining, Reviewing and Assurance:

Plans must be updated at least annually to reflect Defence organisational changes, and tested regularly to assess if they are fit for purpose. Properly planned and conducted exercises will reveal weaknesses in arrangements which can then be addressed. Best practice Corporate Governance requirements expect that formal assurance reviews occur each year, generating any issues to then be addressed, resulting in improvements to the BCM arrangements.

f. Embedding BCM Culture:

It is crucial that there is widespread and sufficient understanding of Business Continuity aspects. Defence organisations should raise and maintain awareness of BCM so that personnel recognise why it is important and understand their role.

18. For further guidance on Business Continuity Management and implementing the BCM Model across Defence organisations, refer to <u>JSP 503 – Defence Resilience</u>.

Emergency and disaster planning

19. The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 requires Defence to risk assess its activities and to establish appropriate (emergency) procedures to be followed in the event of serious and imminent danger to Defence personnel and visitors, and the necessary contact required with external services (Ambulance, Fire, and so on).

20. For further guidance on Emergency and Disaster Planning, refer to JSP 375 Volume 1, Chapter 1 – Emergency and Disaster Planning.

Element assurance framework

21. The focus of this element requires that the Defence organisation has frameworks in place to report, notify, record, investigate accidents, incidents and near misses and plan on how to address investigation recommendations. The Defence organisation should promote an environment in which there is a culture of learning, where all our people and those external to the organisation feel safe to report accidents, incidents and near misses. Lessons are identified and learnt through a process of continual improvement. There needs to be a proactive approach to identifying and mitigating potential incidents through regular and effective creation and testing of emergency plans.

22. The expectations and performance statements for this element are set out in the following pages.

Element 10: Accident / Incident Management and Emergency Response

The Expectations in this element are:

E10.1 The Defence organisation promotes a culture of open reporting of mistakes, accidents, incidents and near misses that occur.

E10.2 The Defence organisation has a system in place which is consistent with the Defence policy to record and report incidents, accidents and near misses from initial submission to close-out, allowing for effective investigation and resolution.

E10.3 The Defence organisation has resources in place to investigate incidents, accidents and near misses.

E10.4 The Defence organisation has systems in place to implement the corrective actions and learning from incidents, accidents and near misses to manage and drive continual improvement.

E10.5 Emergency and business continuity plans are in place, tested regularly and consider safety matters.

Documents often associated with this element:

- 1LOD assurance reports
- Actions to strengthen Management Information based on this learning
- Analysis and lesson learned
- Business continuity plans
- Command / Corporate plan
- Continual Improvement (CI) Logs
- Defence organisation business plans,
- Defence organisation Operating Model
- Defence organisation SMS
- Effective interface with TUs and statutory regulators including reporting (e.g., Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulation (RIDDOR)) 2013
- Information collection process for safety performance analysis and lessons learned
- Major Accident Control Regulations (MACR) plan
- Samples of emergency response exercise planning
- Whistle blower / anonymous escalation route / reporting

Expectation 10.1 The Defence organisation promotes a culture of open reporting of mistakes, accidents, incidents and near misses that occur.

Unsatisfactory	Limited	Moderate	Substantial
There is little or no evidence to demonstrate that the Defence organisation promote a culture that allows for people to openly report mistakes, accidents, incidents, and near misses that occur.	• There is some, but not enough evidence that the Defence organisation promotes a culture that allows for people to openly report mistakes, accidents, incidents, and near misses that occur. There is not enough evidence of reports being reviewed or acted upon.	 There is some but could be improved that the Defence organisation promotes a culture that allows for people to report mistakes, accidents, incidents, and near misses that occur. Reports are reviewed and acted upon by the organisation and its leadership in a timely manner. Investigations into root cause analysis are conducted, but improvements identified are not implemented in a timely manner. 	 There is robust evidence that the Defence organisation promotes a culture that allows for people to report mistakes, accidents, incidents, and near misses that occur. The organisation positively re-enforces this culture. Reports are reviewed and acted upon by the organisation and its leadership in a timely manner. Leadership use reports to develop methods to prevent reoccurrence and drive continual improvement. The focus of investigations is on the root cause and systematic improvements, with actions being taken in response, in a timely manner.

Expectation 10.2 The Defence organisation has a system in place which is consistent with the Defence policy to record and report accidents, incidents and near misses from initial submission to close-out, allowing for effective investigation and resolution.

Unsatisfactory	Limited	Moderate	Substantial
 There is little or no evidence to demonstrate that the Defence organisation have a system to record and report accidents, incidents and near misses for all stakeholders. Within the Defence organisation there is no, or little understanding, of the importance of leadership review of accidents, incidents and near misses so that recurrence is prevented. 	 The Defence organisation has a system in place to record accidents, incidents and near misses. There is some, but not enough evidence that this is consistent with Defence policy and includes all stakeholders. The Defence organisation conducts investigations into accidents, incidents and near misses. There is some, but not enough evidence that this is inconsistent with Defence policy. 	 The Defence organisation has a system in place which is consistent with Defence policy to record accidents, incidents and near misses. There is some but could be improved evidence that it includes all stakeholders. The Defence organisation conducts investigations into accidents, incidents and near misses, and manages close out in line with Defence policy in a timely manner. 	 The Defence organisation has a system in place which is consistent with Defence policy to record accidents, incidents and near misses and includes all stakeholders. There is robust evidence that the Defence organisation uses root cause analysis or similar methods to avoid future event recurrence and drive continual improvement in a timely manner.

Expectation 10.3 The Defence organisation has resources in place to investigate accidents, incidents and near misses.

Unsatisfactory	Limited	Moderate	Substantial
There is little or no evidence to demonstrate that the Defence organisation has resources in place to investigate accidents, incidents and near misses.	• There is some, but not enough evidence that the Defence organisation have sufficient resources to fulfil its investigatory responsibilities which results in investigations meeting Defence policy expectations.	 There is some but could be improved evidence that the Defence organisation has sufficient resources to fulfil its investigatory responsibilities. The Defence organisation performs investigations which produce recommendations that can be applied both within the organisation and across Defence. 	• There is robust evidence that the Defence organisation proactively assesses its investigatory resources to ensure both current and future requirements can be met.

Expectation 10.4 The Defence organisation has systems in place to implement the corrective actions and learning from accidents, incidents and near misses to manage and drive continual improvement.

Unsatisfactory	Limited	Moderate	Substantial
There is little or no evidence to demonstrate that the Defence organisation have a system in place to implement corrective actions and learning from accidents, incidents and near misses.	• There is some, but not enough evidence that the Defence organisation has systems in place to implement corrective actions and learning from accidents, incidents and near misses and consistently implement the actions and learning.	There is some but could be improved evidence that the Defence organisation has systems in place to implement corrective actions and learning from accidents, incidents and near misses. These are used to manage and drive continual improvement and are shared across the Defence organisation.	 There is robust evidence that the Defence organisation uses its learning to better predict future incidents and take steps to mitigate ahead of realisation. The Defence organisation shares corrective actions and learning both internally and across wider Defence. The Defence organisation adopts good practice from outside organisational boundary to drive continual improvement.

Expectation 10.5 Emergency and business continuity plans are in place, tested regularly and consider safety matters.

Unsatisfactory	Limited	Moderate	Substantial
The Defence organisation does not have an emergency and business continuity plan in place.	• The Defence organisation has an emergency and business continuity plan in place that considers events that could arise, but controls are not tested regularly, not all responsibilities are assigned or there are gaps in competency.	 The Defence organisation has an emergency and business continuity plan in place that considers events that could arise, and controls are tested regularly. Relevant controls are reviewed and revised on a regular basis. 	 The Defence organisation proactively looks forward when planning emergency responses to identify potential scenarios and uses good practice to deliver continual improvement in their planning. Emergency and business continuity plans include defined equipment and infrastructure requirements and are tested regularly. The Defence organisation liaises with relevant external stakeholders (such as their Fire & Rescue) to better prepare its emergency arrangements.