



# A re-inspection of Border Force's management of Project KRAKEN at small seaports

January – February 2023

**David Neal**

Independent Chief Inspector of  
Borders and Immigration



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ISBN 978-1-5286-3998-9

E02884805 06/23

Printed on paper containing 40% recycled fibre content minimum.

Printed in the UK by HH Associates Ltd. on behalf of the Controller of His Majesty's Stationery Office.

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# Foreword

It is easy to underestimate Border Force's task, working with other law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to protect the UK's 11,000 miles of coastline from the threat of serious organised crime.

Project KRAKEN is one part of the operational response to this threat at the border, through co-ordinated multi-agency operational and prevention activity. ICIBI's inspection of this area in 2021 looked at the effectiveness of Border Force's role in managing the project. It highlighted difficulties in measuring the project's success due to the low and declining number of referrals, which was indicative of issues with the reporting mechanisms and low levels of public awareness. At that time, I stated my intention to conduct a more comprehensive follow-up inspection by the spring of 2023.

Border Force relaunched Project KRAKEN in July 2022, unfortunately missing the peak of the recreational boating season, and I received mixed feedback about the relaunch's success during engagement with stakeholders. While further work is needed to increase the volume and quality of intelligence received through the project, the number of reports received following its relaunch is at its highest level ever. While this is clearly positive, the Home Office needs to do more to track the outcomes of intelligence generated through the project and measure its effectiveness.


My inspectors agreed with stakeholders' views that the Border Force staff who managed the relaunch and oversee the project are enthusiastic and hard-working. However, my inspectors saw evidence of the project's new publicity materials in only four of the nine harbours and marinas they visited during the re-inspection (with some displayed just days before their visits). It is perhaps unsurprising that Field Intelligence Officers have limited time to dedicate to promoting Project KRAKEN alongside their primary role. More time is undoubtedly needed to publicise the relaunch more widely, but Border Force also needs an effective engagement strategy to ensure that awareness raising is as far-reaching and effective as possible. My inspectors found no evidence of such a strategy.

Border Force, through effective management of the project's governance structure, also needs to ensure that all relevant LEAs are playing their part in this multi-agency initiative to effectively support awareness of the project.

Border Force staff highlighted that the Crimestoppers social media campaign which accompanied the relaunch appeared to have been effective. However, the Home Office did not run its own social media campaign and the funding to measure the effectiveness of the Crimestoppers campaign ended after only five months. Indeed, Project KRAKEN still does not have a dedicated budget, which will affect planning and raises questions as to the Home Office's long-term commitment to the project.



In sum, Border Force has made some progress since the last inspection, but the Home Office should give staff more time – and develop a comprehensive engagement plan – to sell the project if it is to realise its potential and play its role in protecting the border. This report makes four recommendations and was sent to the Home Secretary on 16 March 2023.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'D. Neal', with a horizontal line underneath.

**David Neal**  
**Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration**

# 1. Background

## Project KRAKEN

- 1.1** Project KRAKEN was established in 2008 as a joint initiative between Border Force, the National Crime Agency (NCA) and local police forces to tackle maritime border crime. Border Force took over the lead for the project from the NCA in 2016.
- 1.2** Project KRAKEN aims to raise vigilance and awareness of suspicious behaviour which may be linked to terrorism or other serious crime around the UK's marinas, ports and 11,000 miles of coastline. This could include boats arriving at unusual times or landing in strange places, strange activity by the shore, or someone being seen in an area where they should not be.
- 1.3** The project is managed by the General and Commercial Maritime (G&CM) team in Border Force's National Operational Headquarters (NOHQ) Strategic Operational Planning Command.
- 1.4** As of January 2023, NOHQ (G&CM) had four staff – a part-time Assistant Director and three Senior Officers. The Senior Officer with responsibility for Project KRAKEN has several other general maritime (GM) workstreams in their portfolio and allocates 20% of their time to Project KRAKEN work.
- 1.5** Project KRAKEN is supported by Border Force Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs). They work in the Intelligence Collection workstream in the Home Office Intelligence Directorate and their primary role is to collect and receive information based on identified intelligence requirements within prioritised or high-risk areas determined by the Border Force Control Strategy. As part of the Intelligence Collection activity programme, FIOs provide ongoing support for the promotion of Project KRAKEN and GM community presentations. The FIO role, and how it supports Project KRAKEN, was also examined in the ICIBI's inspection of the Border Force intelligence functions at the Humber ports in 2022, which was unpublished at the time of drafting this report.

## Previous ICIBI inspections

- 1.6** In 2018, the ICIBI conducted 'An inspection of Border Force operations at south coast seaports'.<sup>1</sup> The inspection identified issues with the reporting processes for Project KRAKEN and a lack of knowledge by the call handlers receiving the reports. It also identified "the importance placed by harbour masters and marina managers on face-to-face contact with familiar officers as the best way of gathering information from the maritime and boating communities (making sure that Field Intelligence Officers and visiting port officers have sufficient time for this)".
- 1.7** The report made recommendations on both issues which were accepted by the Home Office.

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<sup>1</sup> Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 'An inspection of Border Force operations at south coast seaports, January – May 2018, (published 12 November 2018). <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/an-inspection-of-border-force-operations-at-south-coast-seaports>

**1.8** In 2019, the ICIBI conducted ‘An inspection of the Home Office’s response to in-country clandestine arrivals (‘lorry drops’) and to irregular migrants arriving via ‘small boats’.<sup>2</sup> One of the recommendations was that the Home Office should:

“Work with the National Police Chiefs Council to create joint plans for the monitoring and ‘policing’ of the whole of the UK coastline (including ports and harbours) for the smuggling of people and goods and related criminal activities, integrating Border Force/Immigration Enforcement priorities, resources and functions, including intelligence collection, with those of coastal police forces.”

**1.9** The Home Office partially accepted this recommendation. In its response to the report, it stated that:

“The operational response will be led for the Home Office by Border Force National Operations with a new team being set to better co-ordinate the approach to maritime security. This will include a relaunch of project KRAKEN, a joint project designed to raise the ‘vigilance’ capability among the general maritime community against the threat from general crime at the border, illegal immigration and smuggling. The relaunch will improve the communications approach with the general public and review information flows into law enforcement agencies.”<sup>3</sup>

**1.10** In 2021, the ICIBI conducted ‘An inspection into the effectiveness of Border Force’s role in Project KRAKEN at small seaports’.<sup>4</sup> The inspection found that it was difficult to measure the success of Project KRAKEN due to the low number of referrals, which had decreased annually since 2018. This was indicative of issues with the reporting mechanisms and low levels of awareness of the project among the public.

**1.11** The report highlighted how, “to raise awareness of Project KRAKEN, FIOs, alongside Border Force frontline teams, were tasked with, among other things, conducting outreach to small seaports to highlight Project KRAKEN through conversations and by disseminating promotional material, as well as building and maintaining relationships with local stakeholders”. However, “the success of this outreach was limited as FIOs were generally ‘tasked to risk’ and spent much of their time on more urgent priorities”. While the FIOs’ role had been simplified in the summer of 2021, “they remained overstretched”.

**1.12** At the time of that inspection, Border Force said that it planned a relaunch of Project KRAKEN in the spring of 2022. The project had already been rebranded and relaunched a number of times in its 14-year history, which indicated an appetite to make it work, but another relaunch suggested that issues had not been successfully addressed. The report made one recommendation:

“As part of the Project KRAKEN relaunch, due in spring 2022, critically evaluate and, where necessary, implement:

- a. the resources required (including staffing, strategic communications and promotional materials)

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2 Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, ‘An inspection of the Home Office’s response to in-country clandestine arrivals (‘lorry drops’) and to irregular migrants arriving via ‘small boats’’, (published 11 November 2020). <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/an-inspection-of-the-home-offices-response-to-in-country-clandestine-arrivals-lorry-drops-and-to-irregular-migrants-arriving-via-small-boats>

3 Home Office, ‘Response to an inspection of the Home Office response to ‘lorry drops’ and ‘small boats’ (published 11 November 2020). <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/response-to-an-inspection-of-the-home-office-response-to-lorry-drops-and-small-boats>

4 Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, ‘An inspection into the effectiveness of Border Force’s role in Project Kraken at small seaports’ (published 27 January 2022). <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/an-inspection-into-the-effectiveness-of-border-forces-role-in-project-kraken-at-small-seaports>

- b. any new intelligence reporting mechanisms, including changes to improve their efficiency and effectiveness where appropriate
- c. mechanisms to continuously measure the effectiveness of the Project.”

**1.13** The recommendation was accepted by the Home Office, which, in its response to the report, outlined the workstreams it would initiate to “redesign and reinvigorate” Project KRAKEN.<sup>5</sup>

## Internal Home Office review

**1.14** In May 2022, Border Force’s Operational Assurance Directorate (OAD) delivered an internal report on a review it had conducted into Project KRAKEN. This involved visiting 55 marinas in England and Wales between November 2021 and April 2022. The objective of the review was to establish whether appropriate and up-to-date promotional material on Project KRAKEN was available to members of the public or anyone working in or arriving at a small port or marina to help them report suspicious or unusual behaviour.

**1.15** The review found that of the 55 locations visited, only 23 had any posters or promotional material relating to Project KRAKEN on display (most of which were outdated versions of the material). It noted that while a large number of marinas were owned or run by large companies “which have comprehensive websites detailing relevant information for marina users and members of the public”, only one was found to contain “any links or information in relation to Project KRAKEN”. While some marina managers had telephone numbers for FIOs, at three of the locations the phone numbers provided were out of date and the managers “had struggled to obtain alternative numbers”.

**1.16** Good practice was observed at one port which reported the review team to the local intelligence team over concerns about their identity. Several locations also held comprehensive incident logs detailing suspicious activity that had been reported to Border Force or other stakeholders, but it was not clear whether this activity was reported under Project KRAKEN or what the outcome had been.

**1.17** The report made three recommendations:

“PK-01: As part of the KRAKEN refresh NOHQ to ensure through the FIO network, Frontline and Maritime Commands, as well as partner agencies, that all marinas have up to date KRAKEN material available (posters and leaflets) and are aware how to obtain more.

PK-02: Border Force Intel to ensure as FIOs change roles/areas, up to date contact details are provided to marinas.

PK-03: NOHQ to contact major marina operators to encourage and provide relevant KRAKEN links/material for their websites.”

**1.18** The findings of the review were provided to the NOHQ General Maritime team to inform its planned relaunch of the project. Following the relaunch, the Home Office told inspectors in December 2022 that OAD would “assure the effectiveness of the project before formally considering closure”. That activity had been scheduled for January to March 2023 but had been paused to avoid “the upcoming industrial action and whilst dates for a proposed ICIBI inspection are under discussion”.

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<sup>5</sup> Home Office, ‘Response to an inspection of Border Force’s role in Project Kraken’ (published 27 January 2022). <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/response-to-an-inspection-of-border-forces-role-in-project-kraken>

## 2. Recommendations

|          |  |
|----------|--|
| <b>1</b> | The Home Office should develop a mechanism to track the outcomes of intelligence generated through Project KRAKEN and use the information to assess the effectiveness of the project and promote 'good news' stories.  |
| <b>2</b> | The Home Office should allocate an annual budget for Project KRAKEN work, including an ongoing communications campaign, to enable planning for future years and demonstrate its long-term commitment to managing the project.                                |
| <b>3</b> | The Home Office should develop an engagement strategy that encompasses Border Force, stakeholder and law enforcement agency activities to raise awareness of Project KRAKEN and identify opportunities for smarter working around planned engagement events. |
| <b>4</b> | The Home Office should develop and finance its own social media campaign to continually raise awareness of Project KRAKEN.   |

# 3. Scope and methodology

## Scope

3.1 This inspection focused on the effectiveness of Project KRAKEN, including:


- strategic and tactical project delivery
- engagement with stakeholders (pre and post relaunch)
- publicity materials, reporting mechanisms and outcomes

3.2 Inspectors sought to:

- review the aims, objectives and success criteria for the relaunch of Project KRAKEN
- assess the effectiveness of the implementation and ownership of key deliverables (including partner law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and engagement with stakeholders)
- analyse the effectiveness of the project during onsite interviews, analysis of data and examination of the outcomes of the relaunch, including reporting mechanisms

3.3 The scope is summarised in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Inspection scope<sup>6</sup>



<sup>6</sup> NCA – National Crime Agency, HOI – Home Office Intelligence Directorate, BFNH – Border Force National Intelligence Hub, NMIC – National Maritime Information Centre.

## Out of scope

**3.4** The following areas were outside the scope of this inspection:

- the performance of partner LEAs and industry stakeholders in delivering the aims of Project KRAKEN
- re-visits to the locations examined in ICIBI's inspection into the effectiveness of Border Force's role in Project KRAKEN at small seaports (Whitby and Wells-next-the-Sea) in 2021
- re-visits to locations in the Humber region following ICIBI's inspection of the Border Force intelligence functions at the Humber ports in 2022 (unpublished at the time of drafting this report)
- visits to locations in the south-east of England and the south coast, given the focus on small boat arrivals in these locations (the subject of another ICIBI inspection at the same time as this inspection)
- visits to the 55 locations included in the review of Project KRAKEN undertaken by Border Force's Operational Assurance Directorate in 2021 to 2022 (with the exception of Whitehaven and Milford Haven Marina)
- the Common Travel Area and related issues

## Methodology

**3.5** Inspectors undertook the following activities:

- reviewed publicly available information on Project KRAKEN
- received and analysed documentary evidence from the Home Office
- conducted a total of 64 interviews with stakeholders and Border Force staff
- distributed a short survey to members of the ICIBI's Maritime Forum and their contacts, and analysed the responses<sup>7</sup>
- held a feedback session with Border Force staff on 13 February 2023, sharing initial thoughts and indicative findings
- visited nine locations (see Figure 2 below)

---

<sup>7</sup> The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration chairs a number of stakeholder forums to advise on specific areas of borders and immigration and make recommendations within their areas of expertise. <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/independent-chief-inspector-of-borders-and-immigration/about/membership#maritime-stakeholder-forum>

**Figure 2: Inspection locations**



- 3.6** Inspectors chose these locations as they provided a geographical spread of small harbours and marinas across the country, including the devolved nations. They also included a mix of private and commercial maritime operations at their locations.
- 3.7** Inspectors conducted interviews on a national, regional and local level as shown in Figure 3 below.



**Figure 3: Inspection interviews conducted at national, regional and local level**

| National  | Regional   | Local                   |
|---|--|-------------------------|
| Members of the Project KRAKEN Tactical Delivery Group (TDG)                       | Home Office Field Intelligence Officers and their managers responsible for the locations visited | Harbour masters         |
| Members of the ICIBI's Maritime Forum   |  | RNLI                    |
| UK Harbour Masters' Association   |  | NCI                     |
| Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI)  |  | Police                  |
| National Coastwatch Institution (NCI)   |  | Sailing clubs           |
| Crimestoppers   |  | Fishing industry bodies |
| Border Force Operational Assurance Directorate (OAD)                              |  |                         |
| Border Force National Operational Headquarters General & Commercial Maritime team |  |                         |

- 3.8** The inspection findings are set out in line with the Home Office's response to the ICIBI's inspection into the effectiveness of Border Force's role in Project KRAKEN at small seaports in 2021. They are addressed in a different order in this report to assist the reader in understanding the governance process of the project and how information flows from the point at which it is reported and then on to Border Force and other agencies.

## 4. Inspection findings: Governance

**4.1** In the Home Office’s response in October 2021 to ICIBI’s inspection into the effectiveness of Border Force’s role in Project KRAKEN at small seaports, it committed to a redesign and relaunch of the project by spring 2022.

**4.2** Under the ‘Governance’ heading, it stated:

“We have established a multi-agency Tactical Delivery Group. This oversees the redesign of KRAKEN and will provide a mechanism to monitor effectiveness and control activity in the future by reviewing operational deployments, monitoring reporting levels and ensuring national consistency.”

### Governance structure for Project KRAKEN

**4.3** In January 2020, ownership of Project KRAKEN moved from Border Force Maritime Command to a centrally governed structure within Border Force National Operational Headquarters (NOHQ), with responsibility sitting with NOHQ’s General and Commercial Maritime (G&CM) team.

**4.4** The G&CM team conducted a review of Project KRAKEN in 2021, concluding that a refresh and relaunch was necessary, with a projected completion date of spring 2022. The overall objectives of the redesign were to:

- “increase public awareness of Project KRAKEN and the channels the public can use to report anything suspicious or unusual within general maritime environments
- increase public reporting of unusual or suspicious behaviour in and around coastal and maritime environments
- strengthen industry’s response and security surrounding general maritime to reduce the impact of the threat from terrorism and serious and organised crime.”

**4.5** It was also recognised that “[Project] KRAKEN implementation had become fragmented, with a lack of control of comms material and inconsistent branding”, demonstrating the need for a greater steer in its management and messaging.

**4.6** To address this, a new Tactical Delivery Group (TDG) was established in July 2021 to deliver on the redesign and operational activity of Project KRAKEN. The governance also moved to a strategic, tactical and operational model, with the General Maritime Sub-Threat Group maintaining the strategic lead and governance of the project and the TDG overseeing the operational approach taken by each stakeholder. Responsibility for operational implementation remained with individual stakeholders and organisations. This is set out in Figure 4 below.

**Figure 4: Project KRAKEN governance structure**



- 4.7** At the time of ICIBI’s inspection in 2021, it was accepted that the effectiveness of the new TDG would not be realised until after the 2022 relaunch, although the creation of a cross-agency group with a sole focus on Project KRAKEN was seen as a positive step by the inspection team.

## **Project KRAKEN resourcing**

- 4.8** Although Project KRAKEN is a multi-agency initiative, it has a small, centrally allocated resource falling under the portfolio of a Border Force manager reporting to a senior manager in NOHQ.
- 4.9** Since the ICIBI’s last inspection of Project KRAKEN in 2021, the lead for the project had changed, with a new manager assuming responsibility in August 2022. Although supported by the NOHQ team, the new manager had not previously led a formal project. Project KRAKEN constituted around 20% of their time and they had several other general maritime workstreams within their portfolio. This included holding the lead for Operation TIPSON, the principal operation for general maritime in relation to supporting Project KRAKEN, which aims to collate information for every official maritime entry point into the UK.
- 4.10** The NOHQ G&CM team is supported by Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs), who work within the Intelligence Collection workstream in the Home Office Intelligence Directorate. The FIOs are tasked to support NOHQ and, alongside frontline colleagues, have responsibility for the operational delivery of the Project KRAKEN messaging. They are tasked with visiting all maritime locations to promote, educate and refresh Project KRAKEN materials.
- 4.11** A senior manager in NOHQ noted the lack of continuity of staff involved in Project KRAKEN which they accepted was not conducive to the delivery and retention of corporate knowledge.

## Strategic governance (General Maritime Sub-Threat Group)

- 4.12** The General Maritime Sub-Threat Group (GM STG) is one of nine multi-agency task groups which report to a Borders Coordination Board (BCB), chaired by the National Crime Agency (NCA). The BCB sits under the overarching National Border Security Group (NBSG), the senior multi-agency board and system owner of serious and organised crime at the border.
- 4.13** The GM STG was formed in 2021 and has responsibility for driving multi-agency delivery against the threats and vulnerabilities at the border and formulating appropriate responses to inform the principal NBSG Strategic Action Plan. These quarterly meetings are chaired by senior representatives from the Border Force National Operational Headquarters (NOHQ) GM team, who have responsibility for arranging meetings, circulating papers, producing minutes, and liaising with the NCA Borders Coordination Group Secretariat.
- 4.14** Membership includes various representatives from Border Force, the Home Office, the NCA, the Department for Transport, the Maritime & Coastguard Agency, HM Revenue & Customs, the Ministry of Defence and Counter Terrorism policing.
- 4.15** The GM STG has the overall strategic lead and governance of Project KRAKEN, alongside other key work in the maritime area. A senior manager in NOHQ said that Project KRAKEN was a “standing agenda item [at GM STG meetings] – but it doesn’t need a mention every time”.
- 4.16** The GM STG provides a forum for discussion, with strategic aims cascaded to the TDG through formal tasking. Evidence provided to inspectors included several agendas and action points relating to GM STG meetings between December 2021 and September 2022. Of the five meetings that took place over this period, only one set of minutes was provided, dated 13 September 2022. They highlighted “challenges in relation to BAU [business as usual] activity versus targeted taskings”. There also appeared to have been an update on Project KRAKEN in the section for any other business, although no further information was provided regarding the information that was shared.
- 4.17** A senior manager in NOHQ told inspectors that they discouraged the use of minutes, preferring instead to use action plans. In the absence of meeting minutes or a clear audit trail that documented decisions taken, alongside the rationale and context for those decisions, inspectors were unable to fully assess the effectiveness of the GM STG meetings based on the evidence provided.
- 4.18** A position statement was provided to inspectors outlining the current risks and mitigations for Project KRAKEN. This is set out in Figure 5 below.

**Figure 5: NOHQ risks and mitigations in relation to Project KRAKEN**

| Risks   | Mitigations  |
|---|--|
| 1. Suspicious activity reports not being received by Border Force from the public or members of the GM community or recorded accurately   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Reinvigoration of Project KRAKEN via the TDG, including wider partner engagement</li> <li>2. A Project KRAKEN comms campaign including the use of social media and other means to raise awareness</li> </ol>   |
| 2. A lack of co-ordination between law enforcement partners and confusion around the methods of communication for the GM community and public, leading to potential information and intelligence not being received | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Management by the Border Force G&amp;CM team via the TDG</li> <li>2. Wider inclusion of GM partners within the TDG</li> <li>3. Correlation of reports from Crimestoppers with Border Force Management Information</li> <li>4. Use of advertising within the GM pleasure craft community</li> </ol> |
| 3. An inaccurate and disjointed intelligence picture leading to under-reporting of suspicious activity  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ongoing assurance of reports to correlate returns</li> <li>2. Training for Crimestoppers call handlers to endure understanding of Project KRAKEN</li> <li>3. Further training and performance goals for FIOs</li> </ol>  |

- 4.19** Inspectors analysed a copy of the risk register for Project KRAKEN, which was reviewed monthly by the NOHQ G&CM team and forwarded to the governance management team in NOHQ to assure and track the risks and any changes to them. At the time of drafting this report, the register was last updated on 4 January 2023 and contained one identified risk, which had a vague rationale and no mitigating actions to address the issues. It also did not include the additional risks as outlined in the position statement (Figure 5).
- 4.20** Overall, the inspection team was not presented with evidence of the strategic management of Project KRAKEN, despite the GM STG owning the strategic lead, in accordance with its governance structure. Inspectors also found that TDG members, including those from Border Force, were largely unable to explain what the strategy was and could not recall strategic aims being disseminated via the TDG.
- 4.21** Senior managers in NOHQ told inspectors that they considered the TDG to be the forum to drive Project KRAKEN and to identify the right people to be involved in that delivery, rather than at the STG level. However, one senior manager told inspectors that the TDG had a different membership to the STG which needed to be aligned. They also said that through the TDG, Project KRAKEN had “grown organically” and that going forward the aspiration was to encourage partners to sign up to a strategy and to be clear on its governance.
- 4.22** The GM STG met twice in 2022, with a senior manager in NOHQ acknowledging that there was “no real tactical direction from the GM STG”. Conversations had taken place to review how useful it was and whether it was fit for purpose.

## Tactical governance (Tactical Delivery Group)

**4.23** The multi-agency Tactical Delivery Group (TDG) was established to drive national Project KRAKEN activity across all agencies and to ensure that operational activity is consistent and targeted towards the key threats in general maritime.

**4.24** The TDG is chaired by the lead for Project KRAKEN. Its specific aims are to:

- “provide a consistent tactical steer to multi-agency KRAKEN activity around the UK, in line with the strategic needs identified through the GM Sub-Threat Group
- review levels of intelligence reporting and operational outcomes delivered through KRAKEN activity
- identify and share good practice from KRAKEN activity
- share the latest branding and communications materials, ensuring consistency of use
- establish and maintain appropriate support and funding for KRAKEN activities.”

**4.25** Membership for the TDG is set out in Figure 6 below.

**Figure 6: Project KRAKEN TDG membership**

| Border Force                          | Home Office                | Partner agencies                               |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| NOHQ G&CM team                        | Clandestine Threat Command | Police (territorial and Counter Terrorism)     |
| Regional General Maritime Leads       | Immigration Enforcement    | National Crime Agency                          |
| FIO representatives                   |                            | Maritime and Coastguard Agency                 |
| Maritime Intelligence Bureau          |                            | Ministry of Defence                            |
| Border Force Intelligence Directorate |                            | Department for Transport                       |
| Maritime Command                      |                            | Marine Management Organisation                 |
|                                       |                            | Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities |

**4.26** In addition to promoting a more joined-up approach, the purpose of the TDG is to provide a forum to discuss how Project KRAKEN is performing, as well as an opportunity to share good practice and ideas for improvements.

**4.27** Since the introduction of the TDG, Border Force held nine meetings with partner agencies between July 2021 and October 2022. Members told inspectors they felt the group was reasonably well attended, with all regions represented and a good representation from other agencies and Border Force staff.

**4.28** At the time of the inspection, there had only been one TDG meeting since the appointment of the new NOHQ Project KRAKEN lead in August 2022. However, several stakeholders were highly supportive of the work being undertaken, describing the team as “doing an excellent

job”, despite the limitations on budget and resourcing. There was further recognition of the drive and commitment of the team as part of the relaunch, as well as attempts to link Project KRAKEN to wider operational activity such as Operation TIPSON, and a “continued desire for it to work from the centre”.

- 4.29** For some stakeholders, however, there was a lack of cohesion with other agencies to engage in the promotion of Project KRAKEN, as well as a degree of scepticism due to its long-standing history and numerous relaunches. Others highlighted the need for better intelligence sharing between the agencies. A Border Force manager told inspectors that while they [Border Force] had good support from other agencies both internally and externally, they were unable to co-ordinate any tasking as “they are not my resource to task” and had their own priorities.
- 4.30** Overall, TDG members considered Border Force to be the right agency to lead Project KRAKEN, and the TDG was regarded as an opportunity to bring all the agencies together to share information and feed back on the work being done to promote the project. There was general positivity that the TDG would be a worthwhile forum moving forward, but most agreed that it was still early days and that it needed time to develop and evolve.

## Performance and effectiveness measures

- 4.31** Inspectors were provided with a copy of the Project Initiation Document (PID) for Project KRAKEN, dated 12 November 2020, which set out the objectives of the project, including:
- “To increase, by 20%, the awareness and number of calls received from the public leading to actionable intelligence within three months of any refresh
  - To set up measures that will enable BF [Border Force] to evaluate the impact of the campaign.”
- 4.32** The PID also referred to a key performance indicator for communications being an “increase of intelligence reports and relative public concern about border security compared to other issues”, although there was no detail on how this would be measured.
- 4.33** The PID highlighted that very little intelligence received by Border Force was badged under the umbrella of Project KRAKEN, and therefore did not reflect the true intelligence picture. It acknowledged that this needed to be addressed as “future funding and deployment within this area will be dependent on being able to demonstrate evidence” of Project KRAKEN activity.<sup>8</sup>
- 4.34** In January 2023, Border Force provided inspectors with a narrative description of the mechanisms implemented to measure the effectiveness of Project KRAKEN since the relaunch. It described “the key performance measurement of effectiveness” already being seen through a “tangible increase of reports being submitted via Crimestoppers and sent on as part of Project KRAKEN”, which at that time stood at [redacted] reports. This was in direct comparison to the [redacted] reports received during the 3½ year period between January 2019 and June 2022. This data is analysed in more detail in chapter seven.
- 4.35** While the number of reports received through the dedicated Crimestoppers line had increased, inspectors were not provided with evidence of actionable intelligence or outcomes as a result of those reports. A senior manager in NOHQ told inspectors that they were reluctant to set

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<sup>8</sup> The Home Office, in its factual accuracy response, stated, “Not all the intelligence in the GM/CM space has originated through Project Kraken and is the result of ongoing Collection, Development and investigation by Home Office Intelligence and LE [Law Enforcement] partners. Project Kraken is only a small part of that response.”

targets for Project KRAKEN and there were no identified measures of success. They also said that the evidence base was not sufficiently wide enough to review the relaunch at the time of this inspection, and that it would “take a while for the machine to work”.

- 4.36** Inspectors were not provided with evidence of the plans to evaluate the impact of the relaunch and Project KRAKEN going forward, beyond the number of reports submitted under Project KRAKEN. The Home Office told inspectors that “with time and consistent leadership Project KRAKEN will deliver an increased level of reporting, with the aim of achieving increased frontline taskings, operations and success stories directly attributed to Project KRAKEN via the Crimestoppers relationship”.
- 4.37** The Operational Assurance Directorate and NOHQ told inspectors that a second-line assurance review of Project KRAKEN would be undertaken in the fourth quarter of the 2022-2023 business year. This had been delayed due to industrial action and the timing of this inspection, but the focus of the review would be revisited in light of the inspection and any recommendations it made.

## Project KRAKEN and the wider contextual picture

- 4.38** Stakeholders with knowledge of Project KRAKEN generally agreed that it was a necessary project in the absence of any alternative. They told inspectors that the project had an important part to play in building a deterrent capability and in trying to engage the public in creating “a neighbourhood watch for the coastline”. This included the need for consistent messaging and sufficient funding to achieve its aims, as well as ensuring that the communication and reporting aspects work in tandem.
- 4.39** One of the key issues reflected by Border Force staff and agency stakeholders was the absence of a legislative requirement for the electronic submission of advance information regarding general maritime activity, which is impacting the quality of intelligence products for law enforcement, including the effectiveness of Project KRAKEN. While pleasure craft owners are encouraged to use the ‘Submit a Pleasure Craft Report’ electronic system to record journeys arriving in the UK, there is no legal requirement for them to do so.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, the use of the Automatic Identification System, an automatic tracking system that uses transceivers on all passenger vessels and all commercial vessels over a certain weight, is not a legal requirement for pleasure craft. A senior manager in NOHQ told inspectors that work was required to keep this issue on the political agenda and that further discussions were required in this area with the Department for Transport. Stakeholders and members of the TDG also emphasised the need for a mandated reporting mechanism, similar to the provisions set out for general aviation, to combat the threats along the coastline and to provide Project KRAKEN with a framework within which to operate.
- 4.40** Border Force and agency stakeholders further commented that Project KRAKEN was not “a universal panacea for all the ills in maritime” yet it had “a degree of importance that it cannot bear, and we should not be in a position where this is our only option”.

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<sup>9</sup> HM Revenue & Customs, ‘Sailing a pleasure craft that is arriving in the UK’ (published 29 December 2021, last updated 21 December 2022). <https://www.gov.uk/guidance/sailing-a-pleasure-craft-that-is-arriving-in-the-uk>



# Conclusion

**Figure 7: Governance**

| Working well   | Requires attention  |
|--|---|
| Border Force was seen by TDG members and key partners as the right agency to lead Project KRAKEN.  | A lack of ownership and strategic direction from the GM STG.  |
| There was a good governance structure in place.  | The absence of clear tasking and direction from the TDG with an effective escalation mechanism to the GM STG.                             |
| The TDG had good attendance from key partners.   | A lack of cohesion between all agencies to engage in the promotion of Project KRAKEN as well as the need for better intelligence sharing. |
| The TDG provided a useful channel for information sharing and providing feedback on intelligence reports received.   | The absence of established mechanisms for measuring effectiveness.  |
| Project KRAKEN played an important part in creating a deterrent capability.  | The absence of success stories including actionable intelligence and outcomes.  |
|  | A lack of defined performance objectives for Project KRAKEN single points of contact and FIOs.  |
| Conclusions  |   |
| The NOHQ team had no clearly defined, ongoing measures of success for Project KRAKEN. Although Border Force officials stressed that it was too soon to measure its effectiveness, they also said that future funding would be reliant on it, which demonstrates the need for measures to be implemented. |   |
| Beyond the number of intelligence reports, there was little evidence of plans in place to evaluate the impact of the relaunch and Project KRAKEN going forward, and the challenges linking Project KRAKEN reports to outcomes remained a barrier to measuring its success.                               |   |
| There was drive and commitment from NOHQ, as part of the relaunch, with attempts to link Project KRAKEN with wider operational activity (such as Operation TIPSON).  |   |
| Project KRAKEN had an important part to play in creating a deterrent capability and in trying to engage the public in creating “a neighbourhood watch for the coastline”.  |   |
| A key issue was the absence of a mandated reported mechanism for general maritime activity to increase the effectiveness of Project KRAKEN through the provision of a framework within which to operate.   |   |

# 5. Inspection findings: Communications and branding

## Introduction

5.1 Under the 'Communications & Branding' heading in the Home Office's response to the 2021 inspection, it stated:

"We will maximise the impact of our refreshed promotional materials. In particular, we will make our materials more relevant to the pleasure craft sector and the unique nature of the General Maritime community."

## Rebranding

- 5.2 Working with 'Design102', a creative design studio for government departments and public bodies, the Project KRAKEN team created five new promotional posters, as shown in Annex A.
- 5.3 In 2022, Project KRAKEN collaborated with Project FALCO, which is led by Border Force's Disruptive Effects for Maritime Protective Security team and also sits within National Operations Headquarters (NOHQ), "to share finances and promotional resource opportunities". A manager told inspectors that "consistent branding is key", and this led to the decision to merge the campaigns for both projects.
- 5.4 As also reported in ICIBI's 2021 inspection report, Border Force did not allocate funding for Project KRAKEN-specific communications or branding material, and an NOHQ manager told inspectors that there was no "defined budget" for the relaunch of the project in the summer of 2022. However, as a result of the collaboration with Project FALCO, funding was provided to cover the cost of the new artwork for Project KRAKEN, demonstrating NOHQ's ability to flex its resources.
- 5.5 A Border Force manager told inspectors that during the design of the posters, stakeholders, including Crimestoppers, were consulted and the posters were changed several times before the final design was agreed. The posters included new artwork that was intended to be more relevant to the general maritime community and introduced a new strapline which differed slightly to the previously used "Don't ignore it. Report it", as shown in Figure 8.

**Figure 8: Updated strapline used for Project KRAKEN and Project FALCO promotional materials**

**REPORT IT. LET'S SORT IT.**

**To report anonymously, call the Coastal Crime Line powered by Crimestoppers on 0800 011 3304. In an emergency, always call 999.**

- 5.6 Feedback from stakeholders on the branding was broadly positive. They said it was “more eye-catching than previous iterations” and “more professional than previously ... simple and concise”. Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs) also said that the branding had improved, as it was “more hard-hitting and will bring people’s attention [to it]”.
- 5.7 However, some stakeholders believed that retaining the name ‘KRAKEN’ could have hindered its prospects of success. A representative from the police said they had received feedback from their networks that Project KRAKEN was, by now, a “tarnished brand” and suggested that a “new name” might have improved this. Similarly, in response to a question in the survey sent by inspectors to stakeholders in the maritime industry, one respondent commented that “the name now induces a sense of irrelevance and may thus hobble the relaunch”.
- 5.8 Border Force staff in Northern Ireland suggested to inspectors that the branding and images on posters should be tailored to reflect the situation there. In many areas of Northern Ireland, they said that the public did not differentiate between Crimestoppers, Border Force, the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the police. As some police vehicles displayed the Crimestoppers logo and strapline, members of the public could be reluctant to pass on information due to concerns about being seen as a “tout”. Staff said they had raised this with NOHQ before the relaunch in 2019 and had been sent posters that they could “try and put logos on”, but they had been unable to do so, as they did not have the necessary tools.
- 5.9 Staff in NOHQ said they had not heard of this issue and had confirmed that Crimestoppers received a high number of calls to its line in Northern Ireland. If Crimestoppers was used on police cars there they did not view its use for Project KRAKEN as an issue. They had spoken to staff in Northern Ireland who said that working with Crimestoppers was “actually seen as a positive”.

## **Introduction of new promotional materials**

- 5.10 The Home Office’s plans to relaunch Project KRAKEN in the spring of 2022 slipped to the summer (July 2022) following delays to the implementation of the Crimestoppers contract and internal Home Office approval for the new promotional materials. In December 2022, inspectors noted that the GOV.UK page relating to the project had not been updated since April 2019 and still directed users to report a crime by using an online form or by calling the police on 101, or 999 for an emergency.
- 5.11 Updated Project KRAKEN materials were eventually published on the GOV.UK website on 5 January 2023, six months after the relaunch had taken place and three weeks after the Home Office had been notified of this inspection. The updated page provides details on the new

online reporting mechanism and the Coastal Crime Line number.<sup>10</sup> New promotional posters were also published on GOV.UK on 5 January 2023.<sup>11</sup> Inspectors asked Home Office staff about the reasons for these delays and were told that it had not been clear to the project team who had “owned” GOV.UK, and that NOHQ had too many “competing workstreams and priorities” which prevented the updates being implemented earlier.

**5.12** There were also delays to the materials being translated into Welsh, which meant they were not distributed to locations in Wales until after they were received in other areas. FIOs responsible for Fishguard told inspectors they had only received the new posters in January 2023.

**5.13** In terms of how stakeholders were able to access the new materials prior to them being updated on GOV.UK, the Home Office told inspectors:

“[Project KRAKEN] was relaunched on 1 July 2022 with marketing materials that were shared across all partners. NOHQ provided web based links to enable partners to download marketing materials. A press release and social media campaign originating from Crimestoppers went live in August.”

**5.14** Inspectors received several presentations from Border Force which provided updates on the progress of the relaunch. In one presentation to the Tactical Delivery Group (TDG) on 25 April 2022, Border Force said that it had produced and distributed “over 18,000 assets including A5 leaflets, 6-ft vinyl banners, pop-up rollers, pavement boards and business cards”, although it was not clear from this presentation which locations they had been distributed to.

**5.15** Border Force also shared its overarching ‘Border security campaign toolkit’ with inspectors, which was designed to provide partners with the tools to produce “aligned communications about Project Kraken and Project Falco”. The toolkit sought to ensure campaign materials were consistent, and encouraged partners to support the campaign by:

- displaying posters in relevant coastal, community and port locations
- distributing flyers in public areas or at events
- posting social media suggestions on their Facebook, Twitter and Instagram
- promoting the campaign internally through their intranets, newsletters or emails
- promoting the campaign externally through their community partnerships

**5.16** Stakeholders and Border Force staff praised the re-energised approach to the relaunch, which was led by NOHQ. A representative from Border Force’s Maritime Command said they had “never seen it launched like it has been launched now”, observing that there was “so much more energy in it, with more visual comms out there” and a “greater desire to make it work than [they had] ever seen before”. A representative from a partner law enforcement agency (LEA) said that the NOHQ lead had “done marvels given [they] had no budget”.

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<sup>10</sup> Border Force and Home Office, ‘Report suspicious behaviour on the coast or at sea: Project Kraken’ (published 8 November 2016, last updated 5 January 2023). <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-suspicious-behaviour-at-sea-project-kraken>

<sup>11</sup> Home Office and Border Force, ‘Project Kraken: promotional posters’ (published 5 January 2023). [https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/project-kraken-promotional-posters?utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=govuk-notifications-topic&utm\\_source=5f10830b-17e8-4db6-867a-b969f4e16b23&utm\\_content=immediately](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/project-kraken-promotional-posters?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=govuk-notifications-topic&utm_source=5f10830b-17e8-4db6-867a-b969f4e16b23&utm_content=immediately)

## Social media campaign


- 5.17** A Crimestoppers-led press release and subsequent social media campaign promoted the relaunch of Project KRAKEN on LinkedIn, Twitter, Facebook and Instagram from July 2022. The Home Office’s position statement, dated 17 January 2023, stated: “A press statement was also released and picked up by some regional BBC stations and used on both TV and Radio alongside some newspapers”.
- 5.18** Crimestoppers also told inspectors they had carried out “targeted media activities”, which the “Southwest were particularly interested in”.
- 5.19** The Home Office provided the inspection team with a briefing pack produced by Crimestoppers in August 2022, which stated that the campaign’s aims were to:
- “Highlight the warning signs to look out for when it comes to coastal crime, and how to stop the criminals behind it”.
- 5.20** The briefing defined ‘coastal crime’ as “any crime that has an impact on, or happens around, our coasts and borders, including smaller ports, docks and marinas ... from theft, to smuggling [and] to criminal damage”. Crimestoppers regularly posted on social media about Project KRAKEN between July 2022 and February 2023, as demonstrated in Figure 9 below. Many of the posts were shared or ‘retweeted’ by other stakeholders on their own profiles.

Figure 9: Screenshots of Crimestoppers' Twitter and Instagram page between July 2022 and February 2023

Twitter



Instagram




5.21 Crimestoppers shared statistics with the Project KRAKEN team on the number of ‘impressions’ its posts received and the figures are shown in Figure 10 below. The Home Office told inspectors that the campaign results were only available for August to September 2022 as this was the period for which paid social media was funded.

**Figure 10: Crimestoppers campaign results for August to September 2022**

| Campaign results |                           |                       |                     |
|------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
| Channel          | Impressions <sup>12</sup> | Actions <sup>13</sup> | Reach <sup>14</sup> |
| Facebook         | 541,608                   | 3,222                 | 101,919             |
| Instagram        | 399,634                   | 17,222                | 21,984              |
| LinkedIn         | 108,158                   | 582                   | 8,959               |
| <b>Total</b>     | <b>1,049,400</b>          | <b>21,026</b>         | <b>132,862</b>      |

5.22 Crimestoppers also has a dedicated webpage for Project KRAKEN and Project FALCO and an indication of its usage is shown in Figure 11 below. The webpage statistics ended in December 2022 due to the expiration of the reporting contract with Crimestoppers.

**Figure 11: Crimestoppers webpage statistics for July to December 2022**



12 Impressions is a common metric used by the online marketing industry. Impressions measure how often an advertisement was on screen for a target audience. See: <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/675615482516035>

13 An action is an activity that happens on an advertisement (for example, someone watches a video advertisement) or as a result of an advertisement (for example, someone views an advertisement and then downloads an app). Actions that occur on an advertisement may include link clicks, outbound clicks, post engagement, video views and more. See: <https://www.facebook.com/business/help/350128498372094?id=1794272243992044>

14 Reach is the number of unique users who see your content, whether it's displayed in their news feed, on your page, as a story, or in an advertisement. See: <https://www.quintly.com/blog/facebook-post-reach-explained>

- 5.23** NOHQ staff told inspectors that these statistics were a measure of a successful campaign and that they did not know of any other Border Force campaign that had achieved such a level of social media exposure. A representative from Crimestoppers also held the view that the social media campaign had been successful, telling inspectors that following the press release, the number of calls they had received to the line reflected this and was “good compared to other customers”.
- 5.24** However, the Home Office’s own social media accounts did not publish relevant Project KRAKEN promotional material. Inspectors were told by several Border Force staff that there were issues when it came to the Home Office’s communications team publicising anything related to Project KRAKEN. One senior manager said: “There is sensitivity we cannot lose sight of with the politics ... there might be [nervousness] it is going to be associated with small boats.” They concluded that “politics will always be an anchor around [Project KRAKEN’s] feet when it comes to comms”.
- 5.25** A representative from an LEA stakeholder reflected this when they told inspectors that Border Force needed “to pay more attention to social media”, which is something that had “never been done” but “as an agency they are reluctant to use it, and we can’t sort a social media strategy for them”.
- 5.26** The lack of communications from the Home Office’s own channels appeared to be at odds with governance documents related to the project’s relaunch. The project initiation document drafted by NOHQ in November 2020 for the relaunch of the project stated that, as Project KRAKEN was “a key part of the Home Office’s Communication Strategy to increase public confidence in border security, ... a comms and stakeholder engagement plan will be developed in line with the high-level plan”. It also listed one of the project’s activities to “agree a ‘briefing pack’ with campaign posters, leaflets and digital assets (HO Twitter account, GOV.uk etc.)”. Inspectors were not provided with any evidence that the Home Office Twitter account or any other of its social media platforms had been used to publicise the relaunch.
- 5.27** The General Maritime Tactical Action Plan (TAP) from March 2021, for which the GM Sub-Threat Group held responsibility, included a deliverable to: “Improve GM Intelligence and address issues around [the] lack of [a] comprehensive picture of [the] global to local General Maritime threat.” One of the responses to this was to: “Re-fresh Project KRAKEN and evaluate impact”, including a “full strategic communications piece including use of social media, new comms material, posters, flyers, cards”.
- 5.28** The TAP was replaced by the Strategic Action Plan (SAP) in February 2023. The Home Office provided inspectors with a copy of the draft SAP which also referred to the relaunch of Project KRAKEN in 2022, and a “new social media campaign and adverts within chosen sector newsletters”.
- 5.29** The lack of communications from the Home Office regarding the relaunch was also contrary to the views of senior managers in other parts of Border Force. One told inspectors that Border Force needed to “invest more in a continuous comms campaign” for Project KRAKEN and that it needed to “cultivate it and build the narrative”. It also limited the Home Office’s ability to provide context to the new posters when they were shared by mainstream news media. The Times newspaper published the posters in an article in January 2023 in which it conflated them with attempts to target people arriving by small boats.<sup>15</sup>

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15 The Times, ‘Revived Kraken project urges coastal residents to keep watch’ (published 6 January 2023). <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/revived-kraken-project-urges-coastal-residents-to-keep-watch-h2063hj23>



## Partnership working

- 5.30** In a presentation from March 2022 entitled ‘Project KRAKEN, Securing the UK Coastline’ and delivered by the General and Commercial Maritime (G&CM) team, it was highlighted to stakeholders that Border Force would be “working with all partner agencies to increase reach” and that partners were “key to supporting [Border Force’s] work”.
- 5.31** The TDG was created to help “drive national KRAKEN activity across all agencies who use the branding”. A Border Force presentation, dated November 2022, stated that one of the aims of the group was to “share the latest branding and communications materials, ensuring consistency of use”.
- 5.32** Inspectors interviewed members of the TDG to understand its role in promoting the Project KRAKEN relaunch. TDG members told inspectors they had actively disseminated materials among their networks and to those working “on the ground”, following a request from the TDG. However, the members were slower to update their own websites.
- 5.33** As a result of its review of Project KRAKEN in May 2022, Border Force’s Operational Assurance Directorate (OAD) made a recommendation for NOHQ to “contact major marina operators to encourage and provide relevant [Project] KRAKEN links/material for their websites”, recognising that many marinas were owned or run by “large companies with comprehensive websites”. In January 2023, inspectors reviewed the websites of ten national stakeholders, including members of the TDG, and found that only one contained information about Project KRAKEN, which was out of date.
- 5.34** Similarly, inspectors visited eight small seaport locations and spoke to local stakeholders working there. Following this, they consulted the websites of 18 of these stakeholders and found that only six referred to Project KRAKEN. Of those six, either the links did not work, the material was out of date, or the information provided was confused with other initiatives. When inspectors raised this with NOHQ staff, they said they had asked attendees at the TDG meeting in October 2022 to update their websites with the new Project KRAKEN material and help promote the campaign with Crimestoppers. They said: “No one said they wouldn’t do it,” but their websites were “still being updated”.

## Events and public engagement

- 5.35** To promote the relaunch of Project KRAKEN, Border Force representatives attended several events in late summer 2022. Senior Officers responsible for managing FIOs in one region told inspectors that they received too many requests for engagement opportunities in the summer and were unable to meet them all.
- 5.36** In addition to these events, Border Force requested cross-agency support through the TDG to deliver Project KRAKEN materials at “large-scale, public maritime events” that were planned for the summer of 2022.
- 5.37** Stakeholders involved in raising awareness of Project KRAKEN told inspectors that posters and materials had not been available to them early enough to use in their summer events, which began in May or June. A representative from Counter Terrorism policing, for example, told inspectors that the delay in producing promotional materials had hampered their ability to promote Project KRAKEN’s relaunch. They said that although the engagement from Border Force around the relaunch had been positive, the information they had shared at the summer

events was less impactful as they did not have the supporting materials to hand out. At one event they “ended up using old materials and putting the new numbers on them like Blue Peter”, which “was not very professional”.

- 5.38** In January 2023, the inspection team sent a short survey to stakeholders working in the maritime industry to gauge their awareness of, and views on, Project KRAKEN and its relaunch. Of the 89 people who completed the survey, 92% (82 of 89 respondents) were aware of Project KRAKEN, and 62% (50 out of 81) were aware it had been relaunched in July 2022. A more detailed analysis is contained in Annex B.

## Distribution and display of new promotional materials

- 5.39** Inspectors asked Border Force to provide details of the marinas and seaports that had received new material or presentations from Border Force as part of the relaunch of Project KRAKEN in 2022. As at 20 January 2023, the Operation TIPSON spreadsheet, which is discussed in more detail in chapter six, listed [redacted] locations in total, [redacted] of which had recorded a visit from an FIO in 2022. It showed that Project KRAKEN material was updated on [redacted] of those visits.
- 5.40** One of the recommendations from Border Force OAD’s review of Project KRAKEN in May 2022 was for NOHQ to ensure that: “all marinas have up to date KRAKEN material available (posters and leaflets) and are aware how to obtain more”. Given the figures quoted above, it was clear that considerable work was required to deliver this recommendation.
- 5.41** The inspection’s stakeholder survey asked respondents whether they had seen or received updated Project KRAKEN material, and 86% (43 of 50 respondents) said they had. Of those, 56% (24 of 43 respondents) had received materials from Border Force, and 21% (9 of 43 respondents) had seen them around a harbour or marina.
- 5.42** Inspectors visited nine locations around the UK’s coastline in January 2023. During their visits, they looked for evidence of updated Project KRAKEN material in and around those locations. They also interviewed stakeholders working in them, including harbour masters and port managers, representatives from the Royal National Lifeboat Institute (RNLI), the National Coastwatch Institution, the fishing industry, and recreational boating organisations.
- 5.43** Figure 12 below summarises inspectors’ observations. In four of the nine locations, inspectors observed up-to-date project material on display, but they also observed outdated materials being displayed in one marina. In two locations, stakeholders told inspectors that the new posters were only displayed after the Home Office had been notified about this inspection in January 2023. NOHQ staff said this demonstrated that Border Force was trying to get its house in order ahead of the inspection and that it was taking the inspection seriously.

**Figure 12: Updated Project KRAKEN material in locations visited by inspectors**

| Location                                       | Public-facing area | Updated Project KRAKEN material observed |
|--|--------------------|--|
| Newquay  | Yes                | Yes                                      |
| Fishguard                                      | Yes                | No                                       |
| (Including Milford Haven Marina) <sup>16</sup> | Yes                | No                                       |
| Warrenpoint <sup>17</sup>                      | No                 | No                                       |
| (Including Kilkeel) <sup>18</sup>              | Yes                | No                                       |
| Whitehaven                                     | Yes                | Yes                                      |
| (Including Silloth) <sup>19</sup>              | Yes                | No                                       |
| Troon  | Yes                | Yes (and old material observed)          |
| Blyth  | Yes                | Yes                                      |

**5.44** Examples of the materials observed by inspectors during their visits can be seen in Annex C.

## Levels of awareness

**5.45** In all of the locations except one, inspectors found that the responsible harbour master had some level of awareness of Project KRAKEN. However, where harbours were occupied by a number of stakeholders in close proximity to one another, inspectors identified missed opportunities for wider engagement when Border Force staff had visited that location. Local stakeholders suggested that in locations where there were busy beaches, for example, Border Force could engage with the RNLI lifeguards on duty during the season, who were “involved heavily in management of the whole beach environment [and] liaison with stakeholders on the beach” and were “part of communities” who “see odd stuff going on”.

**5.46** In another location, a local stakeholder said that Border Force needed to be “more proactive” in publicising Project KRAKEN. It was “not just handing out a poster, they have to be present. They need to link into the NCA and police more.”

**5.47** Inspectors also heard examples of good practice. For example, the FIO responsible for Blyth had made effective use of their time and, “through contacts”, had identified when there would be a meeting with several harbour masters present at which they delivered a presentation to promote Project KRAKEN. Explaining this, they said: “The key point was to make our faces known.”

**5.48** A widely held view among stakeholders at all locations other than Warrenpoint and Kilkeel, was that there would be appetite among the community to engage with Project KRAKEN if they had the information to do so and knew “what to look out for”. A harbour master explained: “It would be good if they could speak to other harbour users so that they were aware of the

<sup>16</sup> While in Fishguard, inspectors also visited Milford Haven Marina to meet a stakeholder, and confirmed during this visit that there were no posters visible around the marina.

<sup>17</sup> Warrenpoint has a secure commercial maritime port which is not accessible to the public and visitors without correct identification. There is also a publicly accessible harbour around which promotional materials could be displayed.

<sup>18</sup> While in Warrenpoint, inspectors also visited Kilkeel to meet stakeholders, and confirmed during this visit there were no posters visible around the harbour.

<sup>19</sup> While in Whitehaven, inspectors also visited Silloth and confirmed during this visit there were no posters visible around the RNLI station.

issues as well. They may see and report something but not know what it is or if it relates to something bigger.”

- 5.49** Stakeholders in some areas identified coastal paths and community noticeboards as useful places to display posters. Inspectors did not see evidence of this in the locations visited. However, the FIO responsible for the north-east of England told inspectors they had contacted the local council to establish ownership of car park noticeboards near beaches, which they had observed were empty, demonstrating a proactive approach. They also heard that the police in Cornwall had made contact with the council to make use of noticeboards around the town but with limited success.

## Conclusion

**Figure 13: Communications and branding**

| Working well  | Requires attention   |
|---|--|
| NOHQ had demonstrated the ability to flex budget between Project FALCO and Project KRAKEN to produce new materials. | Delays to the relaunch and availability of materials had limited stakeholders’ ability to promote Project KRAKEN in early summer 2022. |
| Stakeholders provided mostly positive feedback on the new branding for Project KRAKEN and Project FALCO.            | Some viewed ‘Project KRAKEN’ as a tarnished brand and felt the name should have been changed when the project was relaunched.          |
| Stakeholders and Border Force colleagues observed the campaign for the relaunch had been “re-energised” by NOHQ.    | The uptake from stakeholders in publishing updated materials on their websites was inconsistent.                                       |
| The social media campaign by Crimestoppers was deemed to be successful by Border Force and Crimestoppers.           | The lack of Home Office communications and media from its own channels had limited its ability to provide context to Project KRAKEN.   |
| There was evidence of the TDG encouraging stakeholders to promote Project KRAKEN.                                   | There were some missed opportunities to promote Project KRAKEN during visits to harbours.  |
| There was good awareness of Project KRAKEN among harbour masters.   |  |

## Conclusions

Border Force's internal and external stakeholders observed that NOHQ had re-energised Project KRAKEN through the relaunch, and most provided positive feedback on the updated branding used in promotional materials. However, some suggested that it would have benefited from a different name, as 'Project KRAKEN' had negative connotations.

Crimestoppers' social media campaign was deemed a success by Border Force and Crimestoppers. However, reluctance from the Home Office to publish anything relating to Project KRAKEN limited its ability to promote the project through its own social media.

The NOHQ team told inspectors that it was too early to assess awareness of Project KRAKEN, as January was not "in season" for recreational boaters and other harbour or marina users. However, inspectors found that there was awareness of Project KRAKEN among key stakeholders, such as harbour masters, and many had found out about it through a Border Force presentation, visit, or communication from a maritime stakeholder.

Inspectors found varying levels of awareness of Project KRAKEN in the locations visited. In four of the nine locations, inspectors observed up-to-date project material on display. They identified missed opportunities for FIOs to engage with multiple local stakeholders where they were located in proximity to one another. However, they also found examples of FIOs being proactive in identifying ways to reach several stakeholders at once and seeking to display promotional materials on empty noticeboards.

Although there was some evidence of TDG members promoting Project KRAKEN among their networks, only a small number had published updated materials on their websites. NOHQ told inspectors that this was being addressed.

## 6. Inspection findings: Operational and community link

6.1 Under the heading ‘Operational and Community Link’ in the Home Office’s response to the 2021 inspection, it stated:

“In order to ensure that Border Force operational resources are being used to greatest effect in Project KRAKEN, thus maximising value from deployments, we will deploy large-scale, highly-visible and impactful operations into General Maritime with an emphasis on community engagement. We will resource deployments by effectively utilising flexible frontline resources, working alongside intelligence collection resources and partner agencies.”

### Field Intelligence Officers

6.2 ICIBI’s 2021 inspection reported that Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs) were overstretched. FIOs interviewed during the current inspection said that they remained overstretched, given the vast lengths of coastline they were required to cover. [redacted].

6.3 Inspectors visited six primary locations during this inspection, and the number of FIOs based at the permanent location covering each is provided in Figure 14 below.

**Figure 14: FIOs’ geographical remit**

| Location visited   | Geographical remit of FIOs  | [redacted] |
|--------------------|---|------------|
| <b>Blyth</b>       | Whitby to Berwick-upon-Tweed  | [redacted] |
| <b>Fishguard</b>   | South Wales – from Chepstow and Newport to Cardiff, and Aberdovey                       | [redacted] |
| <b>Newquay</b>     | All of Devon and Cornwall from Axmouth to Penzance and the Isles of Scilly              | [redacted] |
| <b>Troon</b>       | All of Scotland and the Islands   | [redacted] |
| <b>Warrenpoint</b> | All of Northern Ireland   | [redacted] |
| <b>Whitehaven</b>  | Mid-West Wales – up to Holyhead and Merseyside and from there up to Silloth and Cumbria | [redacted] |

- 6.4** FIOs received very little direction as to which harbours and marinas to visit for Project KRAKEN work. Explaining this, one FIO said: “We are asked to go out and disseminate to ports, but it is left to our decision which ports we visit and deliver to – we are not told to visit particular ports.”
- 6.5** Similarly, they received little guidance on which stakeholders to engage with during their visits, as Border Force managers said they should be the ones with the “local knowledge”. An FIO said, “It is left down to us mainly but obviously there are key people in the community you can’t fail to engage with – like harbour masters out of courtesy as it is their jurisdiction.”
- 6.6** A senior manager in National Operations Headquarters (NOHQ) told inspectors: “We have to be very careful about telling an FIO who they should go and see – it’s very fluid. We leave it to the FIOs to decide who to engage with as part of their patch.” While this led, in theory, to an inconsistent engagement approach in different regions, the manager described it as a “regional, parochial approach”, which needed to be addressed.
- 6.7** Stakeholders recognised the scale of the challenge faced by FIOs, with one law enforcement agency (LEA) representative telling inspectors that the “FIO network is subject to massive scale and unfunded mandate” and there were “huge challenges”. They also said that FIOs were “never going to be able to devote the time required to work areas and sites and members of the maritime milieu who have never spoken to a border expert”. However, they also recognised the work undertaken by staff in NOHQ to upskill the FIOs. Acknowledging the multi-agency approach to Project KRAKEN, they said that if the LEA community wanted the project to work, resources would have to be found and it was not just for Border Force to create them.
- 6.8** The stakeholder survey received responses to a similar effect, with some respondents commenting that Border Force did not have sufficient resource to make Project KRAKEN successful. One said: “I think they do their best with the resources available to them, however, in my view they are under-resourced” and another described Border Force as “woefully underfunded and underequipped to achieve the aims of Project KRAKEN”.

## Operation TIPSON

- 6.9** FIOs also provide support for Operation TIPSON, a Border Force initiative that supports Project KRAKEN. It falls within the portfolio of the Senior Officer with responsibility for Project KRAKEN. [redacted]. It is a “standing tasking” and intends to “assist both Border Force and [its] partner agencies in understanding the maritime risk”.
- 6.10** NOHQ delivered a presentation on Operation TIPSON in November 2022, which, although not stated, appeared to have been aimed at FIOs. The presentation stated that visits to maritime ports would take place over a period of two to three years and would require FIOs to complete a proforma after visiting each location, and then upload it to SharePoint. The proforma contains information on the location visited, [redacted]. It includes two questions on awareness about Project KRAKEN at the port and whether the promotional materials had been refreshed following the relaunch. The presentation highlighted how visits carried out under Operation TIPSON should also provide an opportunity for Border Force’s maritime priorities, of which Project KRAKEN is one, to be promoted. The presentation instructs: “We also need you to assure that KRAKEN materials are being refreshed, so please contact your nearest KRAKEN single point of contact (SPOC) to receive a batch of the newest assets.”

- 6.11** Inspectors were told by Border Force managers that Operation TIPSON provided a useful framework for Project KRAKEN engagement, as it mapped all small seaports, and when they had been visited. As a result of Operation TIPSON, managers in NOHQ told inspectors that the FIO network would have a reason to go to each location, so it was “a good use of resource”. [redacted].
- 6.12** Operation TIPSON was also a means for NOHQ to provide assurance, as managers or senior leaders could consult the Operation TIPSON database to establish which sites had been visited and received updated materials. NOHQ planned to quality assure the reports completed by the FIOs.

## Community engagement

- 6.13** When interviewed by inspectors, FIOs and stakeholders highlighted the importance of face-to-face engagement in building trust and increasing the likelihood of members of the public reporting suspicious activity. They said this was particularly important in small coastal towns which had close-knit communities. One FIO explained to inspectors: “If you can build up engagement and continually visit every three months, they recognise you, and the more you get out to them, the more likely they are to open up to you.”
- 6.14** NOHQ staff also recognised this and told inspectors that as the “summer and sailing season [was] approaching”, NOHQ and FIOs would try to engage further with communities to drive Project KRAKEN, as they said: “It is not just about social media and posters, we need staff out there explaining what KRAKEN is.” However, because of the large geographical area FIOs had to cover, it was difficult for them to have sufficient presence to establish these relationships within communities.
- 6.15** Some local stakeholders expressed frustration at the lack of perceived action which had been taken following the submission of a report to the police or Border Force, which had damaged trust and made them less likely to report something in the future. A stakeholder in Northern Ireland, for example, said: “People don’t bother reporting things if they know that nothing is going to happen as a result of it. If I see something tomorrow that’s suspicious and I report it, I am just wasting my time.”
- 6.16** Similar comments were provided in responses to the inspection’s stakeholder survey. One respondent said: “Posters and briefings are all well and good, but they mean nothing to people who live, work and socialise in these areas if action is not seen to be taken.”
- 6.17** FIOs themselves told inspectors that more feedback from intelligence and outcomes achieved through Project KRAKEN reports would help them during their engagement, with one saying: “when you give examples in real terms you can see people feeling more engaged”. Another FIO said: “It also speaks to our credibility – it doesn’t look good if I walk in and the harbour master says they have put in three referrals, and I am none the wiser.”

## Border Force’s Maritime Command

- 6.18** When the lead for Project KRAKEN was initially passed from the National Crime Agency (NCA) to Border Force in 2016, it was the responsibility of Border Force’s Maritime Command. NOHQ took responsibility in January 2020, but a senior manager described the Maritime Command as their “super-allies”, and it was evident from the current inspection that the Maritime Command continued to play an important role in promoting Project KRAKEN.



- 6.19** The inspection team requested evidence from the Home Office of any “highly-visible and impactful operations into General Maritime since the relaunch of Project KRAKEN in 2022”. The Home Office provided a narrative which stated: “The Maritime Command, due to being the ‘at sea’ response to Border management, have been a key frontline resource in supporting Project KRAKEN.” The document also stated: “It is standard practice for the crews to liaise with the harbour masters and public when encountered, to upskill and educate them on Op [Project] KRAKEN. Leaflets are provided to public locations and posted for information.”
- 6.20** Representatives from the Maritime Command confirmed this, telling inspectors that their crews had been provided with a stock of posters and cards that they were encouraged to hand out whenever they came into contact with harbour stakeholders, and should be part of their business-as-usual activity.
- 6.21** In its position statement, the Home Office provided an overview of recent operations which had included the Maritime Command, [redacted].
- 6.22** In order to measure their output, representatives from the Maritime Command told inspectors that they recorded their KRAKEN-related activity in their patrol plans. They said this helped them to “quantify what [they had] done” so it could be collated by managers. However, it was not clear whether this was being collected and fed into a central measure of success or assurance for Project KRAKEN which, as discussed in chapter four, appeared to remain a challenge.
- 6.23** Generally, the Maritime Command representatives said they had good engagement with FIOs and told inspectors that this was part of their patrol plan. They were “always involved with FIOs and going to quieter parts looking at modern slavery or exploitation issues”, and before going to a location would contact the relevant FIO to see whether they would like to accompany them.
- 6.24** In addition to this business-as-usual activity, the Maritime Command also supported Project KRAKEN by attending public engagement events, which it listed as Falmouth Maritime Festival, Whitby Festival of the Sea, Dartmouth Regatta and Fowey Maritime Festival, all of which took place during the summer of 2022. During these events, they told inspectors that they “open the boats up, get kids on board, then their parents go home with KRAKEN leaflets”. As well as attending a recent presentation for senior instructors from the Royal Yachting Association (RYA), one member of Maritime Command staff provided written content for the RYA newsletter to raise awareness of Project KRAKEN among its members and encourage them to report suspicious activity. They did this by providing case studies of successful taskings that had taken place as a result of intelligence received through the RYA or similar organisations.

## Flexible frontline resources

- 6.25** Border Force has teams of regional frontline officers who were cross-trained, and whose primary functions include: manning the immigration control, conducting freight searches, carrying out general maritime and general aviation tasks, and conducting mandatory Cyclamen checks.<sup>20</sup>
- 6.26** Inspectors were told by FIOs and NOHQ that Border Force’s regional frontline teams provided “contingency” and “resilience” to FIOs in some areas as required. This meant that if FIOs were

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<sup>20</sup> Cyclamen is a key part of CONTEST, the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy. Cyclamen uses a combination of equipment to screen vehicles, containers, freight and persons for the presence of radiological and nuclear materials.

unable to visit a particular location, they could contact their regional frontline counterparts and request their assistance. Inspectors heard examples of this in Fishguard, when FIOs were not available to distribute Project KRAKEN posters due to commitments elsewhere. FIOs there said that, generally, they persuaded frontline staff to promote the project “during the course of their usual duties”.

- 6.27** Frontline officers had also attended public engagements “in support of KRAKEN, as well as raising the profile of Border Force” during summer 2022, including:
- Scarborough Seafest – which was a joined-up initiative with the Counter Terrorism (CT) ports lead for the region and included staff from Border Force North region
  - Southampton Boat Show – which NOHQ and General and Commercial Maritime teams attended annually, to liaise with partner agencies
- 6.28** FIOs told inspectors about events they had attended with frontline officers and said they had been a “joint effort”. However, FIOs also highlighted how frontline staff could have “competing priorities back at port”, which meant their capacity was also limited.
- 6.29** A Border Force frontline manager told inspectors that while they wanted to support Project KRAKEN, they could not commit as much time as they would like to. For example, between March and December 2022, they had been deployed to support Immigration Enforcement’s response to small boat arrivals. They said that at the time of the project’s relaunch, their teams “were busy with operational stuff” and “when yachts came across, [they] were too busy dealing with small boats and Manston<sup>21</sup>”, which meant they did not have further capacity to promote Project KRAKEN.

## Single point of contact role

- 6.30** NOHQ had requested Border Force regions to appoint a SPOC for Project KRAKEN and act as a central distribution point for project materials which are provided by NOHQ. They act as the lead for information which requires sharing and anything that requires “rolling out”.
- 6.31** SPOCs could be contacted by other LEAs or Border Force staff to request additional promotional materials as required. The Home Office provided a list of 14 Project KRAKEN SPOCs as at January 2023. They held the “new KRAKEN assets”, and one SPOC worked for a partner agency. This involvement from a partner was driven by their previous experience of, and interest in, Project KRAKEN, and they were a member of the Tactical Delivery Group (TDG), so were deemed to be the most appropriate person in that particular area to act as the SPOC.
- 6.32** In the Home Office’s position statement, it stated:
- “Resourcing KRAKEN continues to be a challenge. To try to mitigate this, talks are underway to formalise the Border Force KRAKEN SPOC role which includes clear expectations of the role to be included in officers’ performance reporting. The Border Force SPOC role, although in its infancy does appear to have been critical to the success of the KRAKEN material roll out. Discussions have started to expand this model into partner agencies to increase coverage.”
- 6.33** FIOs in one region told inspectors that they were “not quite clear of the role” of the SPOC, but in others they said the SPOC would be the “go to” if FIOs or frontline officers ran out of posters.

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21 A centre in Kent used for the initial processing of migrants arriving in the UK via small boats.

## Law enforcement partners' role in Project KRAKEN

- 6.34** Until 2016, Project KRAKEN was a police-led initiative. It was transferred to the NCA in 2014 before moving to Border Force in 2016. Of the stakeholders spoken to during the current inspection, the police were the most consistently engaged and involved with Project KRAKEN, and all the police representatives spoken to by inspectors saw its value while being aware of its challenges.
- 6.35** A manager in NOHQ told inspectors:
- “Project KRAKEN is a multi-agency approach so it should not just sit with one agency. We should all be refreshing our comms. I cannot make them do it, but it is in everyone’s benefit when the comms are refreshed ... We have good support from LEAs.”
- 6.36** Inspectors were told by CT policing representatives on the TDG that although TDG members were asked to promote Project KRAKEN among their regional forces, it was “patchy as to how much different regions do”, and “without a formal tasking, [they had not] got oversight of how many visits were being done”. They also said that feedback they had received from police in some regions was “that they want to do it but with other taskings it’s further down the priorities list”.
- 6.37** Because the ‘ask’ to promote Project KRAKEN was not mandated, stakeholders and Border Force staff observed that it was difficult for the police or FIOs to prioritise it, and there were few consequences for not doing so. Stakeholders suggested it therefore required greater senior level buy-in and involvement to mobilise the different agencies at a senior level for this to filter down to the operational level.
- 6.38** Devon and Cornwall Police benefited from having a CT lead who had particular interest and previous experience of Project KRAKEN, and this region was said by Border Force and national police representatives to be the “gold standard” of policing in relation to Project KRAKEN. Border Force and other stakeholders praised Devon and Cornwall Police for its ‘Operation FIRST POST’ and the creation of a mapping system for Project KRAKEN activity. They had invested in a live database which Police Community Support Officers populated following their visits to small seaports, enabling the activity to be effectively monitored, although the database could not be accessed by or shared with Border Force. The police and Border Force in this area reported having a good working relationship, with the FIOs saying they were “very lucky” to have proactive and cooperative police.

- 6.39** A similar system had been put in place by the police in Northern Ireland, who had created a RAG-rated<sup>22</sup> database containing information about small seaports, their level of risk and when they were last visited by police. They told inspectors that there had been “a recent push to refresh KRAKEN and put that out to all police officers”, although they also said that the ownership and joint working in Project KRAKEN was “a bit vague” and lacked “a bit of strategic oversight and who has primacy”. This had led to them creating their own system to monitor small seaports and harbours, without having any engagement with the FIOs covering Northern Ireland.
- 6.40** Similarly, in Scotland, the police said they took a lead on Project KRAKEN work, which they saw as “a useful icebreaker to get people talking about security”. Although they had no contact with the Border Force FIOs responsible for the same region, they had been instructed by national CT police to replace the old Project KRAKEN materials. A Border Force FIO told inspectors that the Project KRAKEN webpage was out of date on the Police Scotland website and that they planned to ask for it to be refreshed.

## Lack of overall engagement strategy

- 6.41** The project initiation document drafted by NOHQ in November 2020 for the relaunch of Project KRAKEN listed one of the project’s activities as: “An engagement plan involving all BF Regions including Frontline and Intelligence in conjunction with police partners.” It said that following implementation, each Border Force region would “devise a visit programme with partners to continually encourage information to be received”. While inspectors heard about good examples of local engagement between FIOs and police forces, they were not provided with any evidence that each region had set up visit programmes with partners to continually encourage information to be received.
- 6.42** The General Maritime Tactical Action Plan from March 2021 included a deliverable to: “Improve GM Intelligence and address issues around [the] lack of [a] comprehensive picture of [the] global to local General Maritime threat.” One of the responses to this was to: “Re-fresh Project KRAKEN and evaluate impact”, including: “Co-ordination of cross agency regional visits – with end result being a continuous plan of engagement across the year.” Border Force did not provide inspectors with any evidence of such a plan.

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22 RAG (Red-Amber-Green) rating, where red indicates a high risk and green a low risk.

## Conclusion

**Figure 15: Operational and community link**

| Working well  | Requires attention  |
|---|---|
| Border Force’s Maritime Command and frontline teams supplemented the FIOs’ work in supporting Project KRAKEN.   | It was difficult for FIOs to have sufficient presence in each location to develop trusted relationships within communities. |
| Operation TIPSON, which is a standing tasking for FIOs, incorporated Project KRAKEN activity and provided an opportunity for assurance.   | Several stakeholders spoken to by inspectors in coastal locations had no engagement with an FIO.                            |
| Inspectors found examples of good joint working with police, although it was inconsistent across regions.   | Stakeholders expressed frustration at the lack of perceived action when they had reported suspicious activity in the past.  |
|   | There was a lack of a clear, overarching engagement strategy.   |
| Conclusions   |   |
| Alongside FIOs, different teams in Border Force are also supporting Project KRAKEN, increasing the opportunities for the project to be promoted and for materials to be distributed.  |   |
| Part of the Operation TIPSON tasking is to ensure there is awareness of Project KRAKEN at the location, and promotional materials are visible. This provides a framework in which activity that contributes to Project KRAKEN can be mapped and assured and is a good use of FIO resource.  |   |
| FIOs remain overstretched, which makes it difficult for them to build relationships and trust within communities. There is therefore some way to go in Border Force achieving its “emphasis on community engagement”.   |   |
| Stakeholders expressed frustration at the lack of action they had seen as a result of reports they had previously made about suspicious activity and, consequently, felt they would be “wasting their time” reporting anything in the future.   |   |
| FIOs said there would be value in them having information on outcomes or action taken as a result of Project KRAKEN intelligence to encourage stakeholders to report suspicious activity. Without this information, they risked entering a location and being unaware that suspicious activity had been reported there, damaging their credibility. |   |

# 7. Inspection findings: Information flows

## Introduction

**7.1** Under the heading ‘Information Flows’ in the Home Office’s response to the 2021 inspection it stated:

“We will improve reporting mechanisms by providing a more bespoke service, including a dedicated reporting line. This will enable us to improve the user journey for members of the public, address concerns raised by the sector and better monitor KRAKEN reporting levels thus improving efficiency and effectiveness of reporting. The importance of measuring the levels of reporting linked to Project KRAKEN – and therefore its effectiveness – also forms part of this workstream. We will revise how we record information linked to Project KRAKEN to ensure better data is available on reporting levels.”

**7.2** During the current inspection, inspectors examined whether information flows had improved due to the relaunch of Project KRAKEN. They also considered whether the processes were consistent with the ICIBI expectation that: “Errors are identified, acknowledged and promptly ‘put right’”, which includes “a commitment to continuous improvement, including by the prompt implementation of recommendations from reviews, inspections, and audits”.<sup>23</sup>

## Legacy reporting mechanisms

**7.3** The previous reporting mechanisms had proven unsuccessful with low numbers of referrals being received. One method of reporting suspicious activity had been through telephoning the police 101 number, but the lack of awareness of Project KRAKEN by the 101 call handlers and lengthy waiting times for calls to be answered had undermined the effectiveness of this method. Not all the information reported to the 101 number was passed to Border Force as it was retained by other law enforcement agencies (LEAs).

**7.4** Some of these legacy issues were highlighted during the current inspection and a senior manager within an industry told inspectors: “I’ve called 101 before, but they’ve never heard of KRAKEN.” A senior Border Force manager told inspectors that “a big issue even with police was the loss of information through 101 ... the attrition rate of 101 call handlers is crazy”.

**7.5** Representatives from Counter Terrorism (CT) policing told inspectors that when they had been consulted on the relaunch, they had advocated a move away from the 101 reporting method.

**7.6** A second reporting mechanism was the use of the generic Crimestoppers reporting number. This experienced similar issues in that relevant information did not always reach Border Force but was instead shared with other LEAs. The generic Crimestoppers line did not record information relating to suspicious activity and only recorded information relating to identified criminality. The Crimestoppers call handlers also had limited awareness of Project KRAKEN.

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<sup>23</sup> See Annex E – ICIBI ‘expectations’.

- 7.7** Industry stakeholders, Border Force staff and other LEAs all believed that these historical issues had damaged the Project KRAKEN brand and had reduced confidence in its effectiveness. A senior member of a sailing association told inspectors: “Project KRAKEN has lost its reputation and credibility and we invested a lot of time and energy in it. It’s all been lost.”
- 7.8** Stakeholders told inspectors that the presence of different projects and initiatives to generate intelligence was confusing and disjointed. A senior manager within an industry told inspectors: “I am a professional in the know and I don’t understand who to call to be honest.” National Operational Headquarters (NOHQ) staff recognised these challenges and told inspectors that: “I feel it’s our last-ditch crack to keep KRAKEN online in GM [general maritime] communities.”
- 7.9** Considering these historical challenges, a new relationship and reporting mechanism was established with Crimestoppers, in conjunction with Project FALCO. Project FALCO is the name given to a joint law enforcement operation tackling border crime around ports and rail terminals, which could be exploited by terrorists and serious criminals. The Project FALCO page on GOV.UK describes how Border Force “runs a range of unpredictable security arrangements in ports and rail terminals. These involve uniformed and plain clothes officers who are specially trained to spot signs that an individual may have criminal intent. They are supported by other resources, such as dog teams, CCTV operators, scanners and vehicle checkpoints.”<sup>24</sup>

## The Coastal Crime Line and Crimestoppers

- 7.10** ICIBI’s 2021 inspection reported that NOHQ had begun a review of Project KRAKEN which made recommendations for its relaunch. The review made suggestions for alternatives to the 101 reporting mechanism, one of which was to have a dedicated reporting line, as reports that had been made previously to 101 had not been shared with Border Force.
- 7.11** Based on this and other feedback, the Home Office re-established a partnership with Crimestoppers and entered a contract with it to provide a dedicated reporting line for Project KRAKEN and Project FALCO. Crimestoppers suggested naming it the ‘Coastal Crime Line’ as its experience suggested that project names did “not land with the public”. The Coastal Crime Line went live in July 2022. The line provides an anonymous and bespoke reporting service through a dedicated phone number which appears on the posters and promotional materials. This number replaces the reporting instructions on previous materials to “call the police on 101 or report online [through GOV.UK]”. The new posters also contain a QR code for members of the public to scan on their mobile phones and complete an online report.
- 7.12** Crimestoppers is a registered charity and is independent from law enforcement. It operates a telephone and online reporting system that guarantees to maintain the anonymity of the individual providing the information. A report is produced which brings together all the information provided, while ensuring that it does not contain anything that could identify the source of the information. The report is then sent to the relevant authority.<sup>25</sup>
- 7.13** Crimestoppers also provides bespoke reporting mechanisms, tailored to specific themes or crime types. Project KRAKEN has established a bespoke contract, creating two reporting mechanisms through which the public can provide information.

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<sup>24</sup> Border Force, ‘Report suspicious behaviour at the border: Project Falco’ (published 30 July 2019). <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-suspicious-behaviour-at-the-border-project-FALCO/report-suspicious-behaviour-at-the-border-project-FALCO>

<sup>25</sup> <https://crimestoppers-uk.org/about-the-charity/who-we-are>

- 7.14** The cost of the contract with Crimestoppers for one year was £32,334. This included management of the bespoke reporting line and a data protection agreement. The new contract addressed important issues that had previously been perceived as barriers to success:
- the merger of the two projects resulted in a simplified public reporting mechanism
  - all the Crimestoppers call handlers for the Coastal Crime Line would have a minimum of six months' experience in the role and would receive an internal, bespoke briefing in relation to both Project KRAKEN and Project FALCO
  - it created a bespoke online reporting form, accessed through a QR code
  - call handlers could record details of suspicious activity (which was previously outside the general Crimestoppers remit)
  - all information reports were anonymous and checked before being disseminated
  - the provision of a two-way function enabled Crimestoppers and the person providing the information to communicate in the future, while preserving their anonymity
  - Crimestoppers engaged in an active media campaign to promote the relaunch across its website, social media and through press outlets
  - all information reports would be sent directly to the Border Force National Intelligence Hub
- 7.15** When asked about the success of the Crimestoppers contract, a senior Border Force manager said they had initially been reluctant to enter into the contract as another similar project had used alternatives “without the expense that Crimestoppers carries”, and they had been aware of the high rate of attrition of call handlers. However, they had been reassured by Crimestoppers that there was a dedicated and trained team of call handlers, and the reports that came from them were traceable and auditable. On this basis, they said they were “a convert to using them”.
- 7.16** The aim of Project KRAKEN is to raise awareness of suspicious and criminal activity within the maritime community and the public. It is hoped that any suspicious activity observed will be reported to the authorities through its partnership with Crimestoppers.
- 7.17** The success of the Coastal Crime Line as a reporting mechanism is dependent on the effectiveness of the communication and branding, to ensure that members of the public know how and to whom they can report suspicious activity.
- 7.18** Analysis of Border Force data showed that between January 2019 and June 2022 (a period of 3½ years) the total number of Project KRAKEN referrals received was [redacted]. In comparison, the data showed that in the six-month period since the launch of the Coastal Crime Line in July 2022 to December 2022, the total number of referrals received was [redacted]. Of the [redacted] referrals received during this time, [redacted] were received through the Coastal Crime Line, [redacted] through the online reporting form and [redacted] through two-way engagement.




**Figure 16: Number of referrals received by the Home Office from Crimestoppers between May 2017 and December 2022 relating to Project KRAKEN<sup>26</sup>**

| [redacted] | [redacted] |
|------------|------------|
| [redacted] | [redacted] |
| [redacted] | [redacted] |
| [redacted] | [redacted] |
| [redacted] | [redacted] |
| [redacted] | [redacted] |
| [redacted] | [redacted] |
| [redacted] | [redacted] |

**7.19** Border Force officials did not introduce any numerical performance targets to measure the success of the relaunch. However, NOHQ staff were generally pleased with the number of information reports received. Putting the statistics into context, a representative from Crimestoppers told inspectors, “[redacted] is quite good. We have some [telephone] lines that don’t get any calls.”

**7.20** The number of reports received via Crimestoppers since July 2022 is shown in Figure 17 below.

**Figure 17: Reports received by Border Force from Crimestoppers relating to Project KRAKEN between July 2022 and January 2023**



<sup>26</sup> Figures to October 2021 are taken from Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, ‘An inspection into the effectiveness of Border Force’s role in Project Kraken at small seaports’ (published 27 January 2022). <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/an-inspection-into-the-effectiveness-of-border-forces-role-in-project-kraken-at-small-seaports>. Figures from November 2021 to December 2022 were provided by the Home Office in January 2023.

**7.21** In comparison, Project FALCO only received [redacted] calls during the same period. ‘PortSafe’, an initiative designed to encourage the collection of intelligence relating to insider threats, criminality and national security concerns in commercial maritime ports, also has a dedicated Crimestoppers telephone line, similar to the Coastal Crime Line. A manager from an LEA told inspectors that PortSafe only received [redacted] pieces of intelligence between March 2020 and January 2023.

## Contact with Crimestoppers


- 7.22** A Crimestoppers representative told inspectors that its call handlers had received an internal briefing in relation to the aims and objectives of both Project KRAKEN and Project FALCO. NOHQ staff had aimed to visit the Crimestoppers call handling suite to deliver specific training to its staff but had not done so at the time of the inspection. Staff told inspectors: “It’s been delayed, and I think we should have done it in September ... I think we have a date in February to visit them.”
- 7.23** A Crimestoppers representative told inspectors that all the information it received through the Coastal Crime Line was titled ‘Project KRAKEN and Project FALCO’ adding, “we don’t distinguish between them”, and that they were sent directly to the Border Force National Intelligence Hub.
- 7.24** Inspectors asked staff in NOHQ how they assured the quality of the reports received by the Crimestoppers call handlers. They were told that a review of the Crimestoppers contract had been planned to take place after six months but had been delayed. Managers said that “going forward” they had plans to visit the call handlers at Crimestoppers, but this had not yet taken place as at January 2023. However, they said they had been reassured that the staff were “security checked and trained”. Despite not having carried out formal quality assurance of the reports, managers were confident in the service being provided.
- 7.25** One senior manager said that the benefit of intelligence reports coming from Crimestoppers was that it would all be badged as Project KRAKEN and would be able to be “traced to Crimestoppers”, making it easier to assure. They concluded that the “risk sits in-house, with civil servants, rather than outside house”, referencing challenges they had persuading Border Force colleagues to correctly label intelligence reports relating to Project KRAKEN.
- 7.26** A Border Force manager told inspectors that there continued to be uncertainty as to where funding would come from for the continuation of Project KRAKEN activities. The Crimestoppers contract had been paid for by drawing on funding from Project FALCO. However, it was not clear whether this would be a permanent arrangement and managers had, so far, had to go “cap in hand” to directors for authorisation for significant expenditure.

## Border Force National Intelligence Hub

- 7.27** The Border Force National Intelligence Hub (BFNIH) is a ‘twenty-four seven’ team that acts as the single point of contact (SPOC) for UK and international LEA partners to share operational intelligence with Border Force. It also acts as the SPOC for online public allegations, and as a triage point for intelligence from frontline Border Force officers.
- 7.28** BFNIH staff told inspectors that the hub receives approximately [redacted] referrals per year and that Project KRAKEN-related information accounted for a “very small percentage of that”. Reports are received from Crimestoppers in a specific format and the information is assessed, allocated handling conditions and uploaded to Border Force intelligence systems. The

intelligence report is then shared with a 'Project KRAKEN' distribution list. This distribution list includes the [redacted], and the Project KRAKEN team based in NOHQ. This intelligence flow is shown in Figure 18.

**Figure 18: Project KRAKEN process map for the flow of intelligence**



- 7.29** In addition to Crimestoppers information reports, the BFNIH also receives intelligence from other sources which is marked up as Project KRAKEN. This could have originated from the police or other stakeholders.
- 7.30** A BFNIH manager told inspectors that it was not always clear whether the information they received related to Project KRAKEN or another intelligence-gathering operation. Reports could be badged with different project names which could cause confusion within the team. The manager told inspectors: “We have to remember to badge up as KRAKEN, it’s a manual process for an officer badging up and capturing within the title of the report. We do bang the drum every day and if there are any missed [reports] we go back and flag them, but it’s a pretty high success rate in terms of badging.”<sup>27</sup>
- 7.31** A further issue was raised by a senior leader in Border Force around “instances where a piece of information has come in as KRAKEN and is then unbadged” as it is “washed” through the intelligence process. The result of this was that if it eventually resulted in an outcome, it could not be traced back to Project KRAKEN. They added: “We need to make sure we are consistent in how we record and manage information as well as working with regional commands and FIOs [Field Intelligence Officers].”
- 7.32** The issue of how intelligence was passed on was also captured in the general maritime risk register for Project KRAKEN. A note was added on 13 October 2022 stating: “Noticeable issue with Intel being forwarded on from BNIH to MIB and other LE Agencies.”
- 7.33** Managers in NOHQ and the BFNIH told inspectors that they held monthly meetings to check that all Project KRAKEN referrals from Crimestoppers had been correctly captured and recorded as Project KRAKEN intelligence.

<sup>27</sup> The term ‘badging up’ means ensuring that the intelligence report contains specific reference to Project KRAKEN in a searchable format.

## Maritime Intelligence Bureau

- 7.34** The Maritime Intelligence Bureau (MIB) is located in the National Maritime Information Centre and works with the public via the National Coastwatch Institution and Project KRAKEN.<sup>28</sup> It is responsible for intelligence development and the targeting of commercial and general maritime vessels.
- 7.35** The MIB is formed of Maritime Intelligence and Vessel Targeting officers and works with multi-agency stakeholders to target general maritime threats. However, it does not have responsibility for work on small boats crossing the Channel.
- 7.36** The MIB receives Project KRAKEN intelligence from several sources. One source of intelligence is Crimestoppers, and a manager told inspectors that these intelligence reports were “badged as KRAKEN”. Other sources of intelligence also recorded intelligence as ‘KRAKEN’, including those received through the Intelligence Management System (an IT system used by Border Force staff for recording information received from members of the public).
- 7.37** A manager in the MIB described the intelligence management process to inspectors as follows:
- when new intelligence arrives, it is reviewed to establish whether it falls within the MIB’s remit and
    - [redacted]
    - [redacted]
  - [redacted]
  - [redacted]
  - [redacted]
- 7.38** The manager also told inspectors that if intelligence was submitted from frontline officers but was not marked as Project KRAKEN, they had the ability to “rebadge it” retrospectively.

## National Maritime Information Centre

- 7.39** The National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC) is the intelligence arm of the Joint Maritime Security Centre and provides a mechanism for law enforcement, civilian and military maritime organisations to join intelligence, data and capabilities. A manager from an LEA working in the NMIC told inspectors that the unit received Project KRAKEN intelligence from the BFNIH. They also said that although the system generally worked well, some intelligence was not shared, stating “a few bits [of intelligence] haven’t made it through ... and we weren’t sighted”. The manager clarified that they communicated with Border Force through review meetings to gain access to any missing intelligence.

## Development

- 7.40** Border Force provided inspectors with a table outlining the nature of the [redacted] information reports received via the Project KRAKEN reporting line. This included information relating to Class A and B drugs, cigarette smuggling, money laundering, theft, [redacted] and immigration fraud.

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<sup>28</sup> The National Coastwatch Institution operates a network of volunteers in 60 locations across the UK coastline. It monitors the coastline to protect and preserve life at sea.

**7.41** Most of the intelligence reports had been disseminated and shared with Border Force modal hubs, which hold a national intelligence remit and are focused on specific ‘modes’ of transport of goods or people, or specific threats. In addition, intelligence was shared with other internal and external intelligence partners. Only one of the intelligence reports suggested that any frontline action had taken place. The outcome was described as “interception. Nil result.” All the other intelligence reports were marked as “no feedback received”. Inspectors considered that Border Force needed to develop a mechanism to track the outcomes of intelligence and use the information to assess the effectiveness of Project KRAKEN and promote ‘good news’ stories.

## Frontline tasking and response

**7.42** Border Force provided inspectors with data which showed that only one piece of information received from Crimestoppers resulted in an interdiction by frontline Border Force staff. The remaining information referrals did not generate any feedback and it was therefore difficult for inspectors to evaluate how effectively this aspect of the information flow was operating.

**7.43** FIOs told inspectors that they did not receive updates on the number of referrals generated following the relaunch of Project KRAKEN in July 2022. They were unaware of both the local and national response to the relaunch and told inspectors they felt they should be informed of local issues as it could affect their credibility if they were not aware of them when engaging with stakeholders. Of greater concern were examples of missed opportunities to follow up on reports of suspicious activity. An FIO told inspectors that intelligence relating to Project KRAKEN was received into Border Force and assessed but took six weeks before it was forwarded to the FIOs on the ground. [redacted]. A separate instance identified that intelligence badged as Project KRAKEN was relevant to an ongoing investigation. The intelligence was not passed to the FIO and was only identified by accident through a separate conversation with the NMIC.

**7.44** An FIO told inspectors: “The problem is we don’t get any feedback around what’s coming in from KRAKEN, no measures ... we’ve had no feedback or taskings through from KRAKEN since the relaunch ... we could do with some stats ... it would be handy to know and to focus and target our resources. It would be an indication as to criminality.” Another said: “There has to be some recognition of the information; we need to make sure people hear about what action is being taken. We need to provide feedback and thank them for the information.”

**7.45** Stakeholders across the United Kingdom told inspectors that they valued face-to-face contact with Border Force staff and that they recognised that the establishment and maintenance of those relationships was resource intensive. However, they said that it would ultimately improve information flows.

# Conclusion

**Figure 19: Information flows**

| Working well  | Requires attention  |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Learning from previous experience, the team relaunched the project with improved reporting mechanisms.</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring outcomes of intelligence to better understand the impact of the project and promote 'good news' stories.</li> </ul> |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The co-operation between Project FALCO and Project KRAKEN has simplified reporting mechanisms.</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>FIOs need timely feedback on the local and national response to the Project KRAKEN relaunch.</li> </ul>                        |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Crimestoppers call handlers are more experienced and knowledgeable.</li> </ul>   |   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The number of information referrals received by Border Force has increased.</li> </ul>   |   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Intelligence reports are sent direct to Border Force.</li> </ul>   |   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The NOHQ holds regular meetings with partners to check that intelligence is flowing correctly.</li> </ul>  |   |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The information received by Border Force from Crimestoppers is marked as 'Project KRAKEN'.</li> </ul>  |   |
| Conclusions   |   |
| <p>The challenges and failings in the previous reporting mechanisms were recognised by the Project KRAKEN team and addressed in the relaunch. They have developed a bespoke contract with Crimestoppers, including a dedicated reporting line, with better trained and more experienced staff.</p>  |   |
| <p>All information that is received is sent directly to Border Force via a single route and was clearly marked as 'Project KRAKEN'.</p>   |   |
| <p>Between July 2022 and December 2022, [redacted] referrals were received by Crimestoppers. This number is a significant increase on previous volumes and is considerably higher than other, similar information-gathering initiatives.</p>  |   |
| <p>New information and intelligence received by Border Force is marked up as 'Project KRAKEN' and the introduction of a new IT system will allow intelligence to be attributed to an operational name. NOHQ holds regular meetings with partners to check that all 'KRAKEN' intelligence reports are being shared with the correct departments. This will assist Border Force in monitoring and measuring reporting levels.</p> |   |
| <p>[redacted]. Border Force should develop a mechanism to track the outcomes of intelligence and use this information to assess the effectiveness of the project and promote 'good news' stories.</p>   |   |

**Working well****Requires attention**

FIOs should be provided with feedback on the local and national response to the KRAKEN relaunch. FIOs were not informed of Project KRAKEN reporting generated in their geographical areas and felt that this could affect their operational effectiveness and credibility with stakeholders.

# Annex A: New promotional posters – July 2022





**PROJECT  
KRAKEN**

# BOATS ARRIVING AT UNUSUAL TIMES?

**REPORT IT. LET'S SORT IT.**

To report anonymously, call the Coastal Crime Line powered by Crimestoppers on 0800 011 3304. In an emergency, always call 999.

# Annex B: Analysis of stakeholder survey responses

## Introduction

Inspectors surveyed members of the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration's (ICIBI) Maritime Stakeholder Forum<sup>29</sup> and asked them to disseminate the survey among their networks. The National Harbour Masters' Association also shared the survey with its members on behalf of the inspection team.

The survey asked questions relating to respondents' awareness of Project KRAKEN, views on its effectiveness in tackling maritime crime around the UK's coastline, confidence in reporting suspicious activity, and their perception of risk in their coastal area.

A total of 89 respondents completed the survey. Not all questions were relevant to every respondent and so response volumes varied depending on the question.

### Figure 20: Headline results







| Headline results        |  |
|-------------------------|--|
| <b>General findings</b> | <p>The survey results demonstrated that Project KRAKEN was well known among industry and recreational boating stakeholders. Many had received or seen updated promotional materials and there was some confidence in the likely success of the relaunched project.</p> <p>Respondents reported varying perceptions of risk from crime along the coastline, with 39% of respondents saying they felt that their local marina, harbour or coastal area was 'very' or 'extremely' vulnerable to criminal activity, while 28% said their area was 'not very' or 'not at all' vulnerable.</p> <p>Respondents were confident that they knew how to report suspicious activity on the coastline. However, none of those that had reported such activity since July 2022 had used the Crimestoppers Coastal Crime Line or scanned the QR code on the posters. Instead, they had mostly reported directly to a Border Force official or the police.</p> |

<sup>29</sup> A list of ICIBI's Maritime Forum members can be found on the ICIBI website: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/independent-chief-inspector-of-borders-and-immigration/about/membership#maritime-stakeholder-forum>

## Respondents

Of the 89 respondents, 53% were harbour masters, 21% were from the maritime industry and 11% were recreational boaters, as shown below:



**Figure 21: Respondents based on organisation type**

| Q1. What best describes you/your organisation? |                      |   |                |
|--|----------------------|---|----------------|
| Answer choices:                                |                      | Response percent  | Response total |
| 1  | Maritime industry    |  | 21% 19         |
| 2  | Recreational boater  |  | 11% 10         |
| 3  | Harbour master       |  | 53% 47         |
| 4  | Member of the public |  | 5% 4           |
| 5  | Would rather not say |  | 2% 2           |
| 6  | Other                |  | 8% 7           |
|  |                      | Answered  | 89             |
|  |                      | Skipped   | 0              |

## Awareness of Project KRAKEN and relaunch

The majority of stakeholders who completed the survey (92% of 89 respondents) were aware of Project KRAKEN, and 62% (50 of 81) were aware it had been relaunched in July 2022. All of the harbour masters that responded had heard of Project KRAKEN.

**Figure 22: Respondent general awareness of Project KRAKEN**

| Q2. Before this survey, were you aware of Project KRAKEN? |     |   |                |
|---|-----|---|----------------|
| Answer choices:   |     | Response percent  | Response total |
| 1   | Yes |  | 92% 82         |
| 2   | No  |  | 8% 7           |
|   |     | Answered  | 89             |
|   |     | Skipped   | 0              |

Harbour masters were also the group with the greatest awareness of Project KRAKEN's relaunch, with 81% (38 of 47 respondents) indicating they were aware it had taken place.

**Figure 23: Respondent awareness of the July 2022 Project KRAKEN relaunch**

| Q3. Are you aware that Project KRAKEN was relaunched in July 2022? |     |                  |                |
|--|-----|------------------|----------------|
| Answer choices:  |     | Response percent | Response total |
| 1  | Yes | 62%              | 50             |
| 2  | No  | 38%              | 31             |
| Answered   |     |                  | 81             |
| Skipped  |     |                  | 8              |


It was evident from the responses that the updated Project KRAKEN materials were shared with respondents, with 18 of 50 (36%) having gained awareness of the relaunch by seeing posters or promotional materials. A further 14 of 50 respondents (28%) said they had gained awareness of the relaunch by attending a Border Force presentation.

Stakeholders were also a source of awareness, with 12 of 50 (24%) respondents saying they heard about the relaunch through organisations such as the UK Harbour Masters’ Association (UKHMA), Royal Yachting Association (RYA) or British Ports Association (BPA). This reinforced the value of NOHQ’s stakeholder engagement.

22% (11 of 50 respondents) said they had heard about the relaunch through a visit by Border Force staff to the harbour or marina where they worked.

**Figure 24: Communication methods of Project KRAKEN relaunch**

**Q4. How did you find out about the relaunch? (Please select all that apply)**



When asked whether stakeholders had seen or received updated Project KRAKEN material, 70% (35 out of 50 respondents) said they had. Those who had were invited to select all responses which applied, with the most common response being that they had received materials from a Border Force official, as shown in Figure 25.

**Figure 25: Respondent awareness of new Project KRAKEN promotional material**

| Q5. Have you seen or received updated promotional material (such as posters) relating to Project KRAKEN? (Please select all that apply) |                            |                              |
|---|----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Answer choices:   |                            | Response total <sup>30</sup> |
| 1   | Seen around the port       | 9                            |
| 2   | Received from Border Force | 24                           |
| 3   | Received from elsewhere    | 10                           |
| 4   | No                         | 15                           |
|   |                            | Answered                     |
|   |                            | 50                           |
|   |                            | Skipped                      |
|   |                            | 39                           |

## Confidence in Project KRAKEN and relaunch

Confidence in the relaunch of Project KRAKEN varied. Overall, 64% had some degree of confidence that the relaunch would be successful. Harbour masters were the group with the greatest levels of confidence, with 28 of 38 respondents (74%) saying they were ‘somewhat’ or ‘very’ confident it would be successful.

**Figure 26: Respondent confidence levels in relation to the success of the Project KRAKEN relaunch**

| Q6. How confident are you that the relaunched Project KRAKEN will be successful? |                      |                |
|--|----------------------|----------------|
| Answer choices:  | Response percent     | Response total |
| 1  | Extremely confident  | 0%             |
| 2  | Very confident       | 12%            |
| 3  | Somewhat confident   | 52%            |
| 4  | Not so confident     | 26%            |
| 5  | Not at all confident | 10%            |
|  |                      | Answered       |
|  |                      | 50             |
|  |                      | Skipped        |
|  |                      | 39             |

Views on Project KRAKEN achieving its aim of tackling maritime crime around the UK’s coastline also varied. Of the 29 respondents who agreed, 20 (69%) were harbour masters.

30 Although 50 people responded to this question, the total number of responses was 58 as respondents could select more than one response to indicate they had received updated material from more than one source.

**Figure 27: Respondent views in relation to the aim of Project KRAKEN**

| <b>Q7. To what extent do you agree that Project KRAKEN achieves its aim to tackle maritime crime around the UK's coastline?</b> |                            |                         |                       |
|---|----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Answer choices:</b>  |                            | <b>Response percent</b> | <b>Response total</b> |
| 1   | Strongly agree             | 4%                      | 3                     |
| 2   | Agree                      | 32%                     | 26                    |
| 3   | Neither agree nor disagree | 35%                     | 28                    |
| 4   | Disagree                   | 18%                     | 15                    |
| 5   | Strongly disagree          | 11%                     | 9                     |
|   |                            |                         | Answered              |
|   |                            |                         | 81                    |
|   |                            |                         | Skipped               |
|   |                            |                         | 8                     |

Respondents who said they disagreed with this statement were asked to provide an explanation and 23 responses were provided. Three focused on issues with the brand being another version of something that had not worked in the past, with one describing it as “outdated and [needing] a complete rethink”. Three others suggested the project needed more publicity and a further two expressed frustration at the lack of action taken on activity they had reported in the past.

## Reporting criminal or suspicious activity

Although respondents were confident that they knew how to report suspicious activity on the coastline, none of those that had done so since July 2022 had used the Crimestoppers Coastal Crime Line or scanned the QR code on the posters. Instead, they had mostly reported activity directly to a Border Force official or the police.

**Figure 28: Respondent confidence levels in reporting suspicious and criminal activity**

| <b>Q8. How confident are you that you know how to report suspicious or criminal activity in your coastal area?</b> |                      |                         |                       |
|--|----------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Answer choices:</b>   |                      | <b>Response percent</b> | <b>Response total</b> |
| 1  | Extremely confident  | 38%                     | 33                    |
| 2  | Very confident       | 39%                     | 34                    |
| 3  | Somewhat confident   | 19%                     | 16                    |
| 4  | Not so confident     | 2%                      | 2                     |
| 5  | Not at all confident | 2%                      | 2                     |
|  |                      |                         | Answered              |
|  |                      |                         | 87                    |
|  |                      |                         | Skipped               |
|  |                      |                         | 2                     |

**Figure 29: Methods of reporting activity in relation to Project KRAKEN**

| <b>Q9. Have you reported suspicious or criminal activity in your coastal area since July 2022 (when Project KRAKEN was relaunched)?</b> |  |                         |                       |
|---|--|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Answer choices:</b>  |  | <b>Response percent</b> | <b>Response total</b> |
| 1   | Yes – by scanning a QR code on a poster                            | 0%                      | 0                     |
| 2   | Yes – by calling the Coastal Crime Line (powered by Crimestoppers) | 0%                      | 0                     |
| 3   | Yes – by calling 999   | 5%                      | 4                     |
| 4   | Yes – by calling HM Coastguard                                     | 3%                      | 3                     |
| 5   | Yes – by reporting to a Border Force official directly             | 18%                     | 16                    |
| 6   | No   | 65%                     | 57                    |
| 7   | Would rather not say   | 2%                      | 2                     |
| 8   | Other (please specify):  | 7%                      | 6                     |
|   |  | Answered                | 88                    |
|   |  | Skipped                 | 1                     |



## Engagement with Border Force

In the event of noticing suspicious activity around the coastline in the future, 87% (75 of 86 respondents) said they would be ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’ to report it to Border Force. 47% of respondents said that they had a named Border Force official to whom they could report suspicious activity.

**Figure 30: Respondent likelihood of reporting suspicious activity around the coastline**

| <b>Q10. How likely would you be to report suspicious activity around the coastline to Border Force?</b> |                             |                         |                       |
|---|-----------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| <b>Answer choices:</b>  |                             | <b>Response percent</b> | <b>Response total</b> |
| 1   | Very likely                 | 72%                     | 62                    |
| 2   | Likely                      | 15%                     | 13                    |
| 3   | Neither likely nor unlikely | 5%                      | 4                     |
| 4   | Unlikely                    | 7%                      | 6                     |
| 5   | Very unlikely               | 1%                      | 1                     |
|   |                             | Answered                | 86                    |
|   |                             | Skipped                 | 3                     |






**Figure 31: Respondent access to a named Border Force official**

| Q11. Do you have a named Border Force official who you can contact in the event that you wish to report suspicious or criminal activity on the coastline? |                  |                |
|---|------------------|----------------|
| Answer choices:   | Response percent | Response total |
| 1 Yes    | 47%              | 41             |
| 2 No   | 53%              | 46             |
|   | Answered         | 87             |
|   | Skipped          | 2              |

## Perception of risk

There were varying perceptions of risk among respondents, with 39% (34 of 88 respondents) feeling that their local port or surrounding coastal area was ‘very’ or ‘extremely’ vulnerable to criminal activity.


**Figure 32: Perceived vulnerability levels of the risk to local ports and surrounding coastal areas**

| Q12. How vulnerable do you feel your local port/surrounding coastal area is to criminal and suspicious activity? |                  |                |
|--|------------------|----------------|
| Answer choices   | Response percent | Response total |
| 1 Extremely vulnerable        | 18%              | 16             |
| 2 Very vulnerable             | 21%              | 18             |
| 3 Quite vulnerable            | 33%              | 29             |
| 4 Not very vulnerable         | 25%              | 22             |
| 5 Not at all vulnerable       | 3%               | 3              |
|  | Answered         | 88             |
|  | Skipped          | 1              |




# Annex C: Photographs<sup>31</sup>

## Blyth



Outdated material – Harbour master's office.




Current poster – Harbour master's office.

## Tron



Outdated material – Tron Yacht Haven.



Current poster – Tron Yacht Haven.

31 No photographs were taken at Warrenpoint. Warrenpoint has a secure commercial maritime port which is not accessible to the public and visitors without correct identification. There is also a publicly accessible harbour around which promotional materials could be displayed.



Current poster – RNLI office.

### Whitehaven



Current poster – Whitehaven Marina.

### Milford Haven Marina



No material – Marina noticeboard.

### Fishguard




No material – Border Force noticeboard, ferry terminal.



No material – RNLI station.

## Newquay



New material – Harbour master's noticeboard.



New material – RNLI noticeboard.

# Annex D: Role and remit of the Independent Chief Inspector

The role of the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (until 2012, the Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency) was established by the UK Borders Act 2007. Sections 48-56 of the UK Borders Act 2007 (as amended) provide the legislative framework for the inspection of the efficiency and effectiveness of the performance of functions relating to immigration, asylum, nationality and customs by the Home Secretary and by any person exercising such functions on her behalf. The legislation empowers the Independent Chief Inspector to monitor, report on and make recommendations about all such functions and in particular:

- consistency of approach
- the practice and performance of listed persons compared to other persons doing similar activities
- the procedure in making decisions
- the treatment of claimants and applicants
- certification under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (c. 41) (unfounded claim)
- the law about discrimination in the exercise of functions, including reliance on paragraph 17 of Schedule 3 to the Equality Act 2010” (exception for immigration functions)
- the procedure in relation to the exercise of enforcement powers (including powers of arrest, entry, search and seizure)
- practice and procedure in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of offences
- the procedure in relation to the conduct of criminal proceedings
- whether customs functions have been appropriately exercised by the Secretary of State and the Director of Border Revenue
- the provision of information
- the handling of complaints
- the content of information about conditions in countries outside the United Kingdom, which the Secretary of State compiles and makes available, for purposes connected with immigration and asylum, to immigration officers and other officials

In addition, the legislation enables the Secretary of State to request the Independent Chief Inspector to report to her in writing in relation to specified matters.

The legislation requires the Independent Chief Inspector to report in writing to the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State lays all reports before Parliament, which she has committed to do within eight weeks of receipt, subject to both Houses of Parliament being in session.

Reports are published in full except for any material that the Secretary of State determines it is undesirable to publish for reasons of national security or where publication might jeopardise an individual's safety, in which case the legislation permits the Secretary of State to omit the relevant passages from the published report.

As soon as a report has been laid in Parliament, it is published on the Inspectorate's website, together with the Home Office's response to the report and recommendations.

# Annex E: ICIBI ‘expectations’

**Background and explanatory documents are easy to understand and use (e.g., statements of intent (both ministerial and managerial), impact assessments, legislation, policies, guidance, instructions, strategies, business plans, intranet and GOV.UK pages, posters, leaflets etc.)**

- They are written in plain, unambiguous English (with foreign language versions available, where appropriate)
- They are kept up to date
- They are readily accessible to anyone who needs to rely on them (with online signposting and links, wherever possible)

**Processes are simple to follow and transparent**

- They are IT-enabled and include input formatting to prevent users from making data entry errors
- Mandatory requirements, including the nature and extent of evidence required to support applications and claims, are clearly defined
- The potential for blockages and delays is designed out, wherever possible
- They are resourced to meet time and quality standards (including legal requirements, Service Level Agreements, published targets)

**Anyone exercising an immigration, asylum, nationality or customs function on behalf of the Home Secretary is fully competent**

- Individuals understand their role, responsibilities, accountabilities and powers
- Everyone receives the training they need for their current role and for their professional development, plus regular feedback on their performance
- Individuals and teams have the tools, support and leadership they need to perform efficiently, effectively and lawfully
- Everyone is making full use of their powers and capabilities, including to prevent, detect, investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute offences
- The workplace culture ensures that individuals feel able to raise concerns and issues without fear of the consequences

## **Decisions and actions are ‘right first time’**

- They are demonstrably evidence-based or, where appropriate, intelligence-led
- They are made in accordance with relevant legislation and guidance
- They are reasonable (in light of the available evidence) and consistent
- They are recorded and communicated accurately, in the required format and detail, and can be readily retrieved (with due regard to data protection requirements)

## **Errors are identified, acknowledged and promptly ‘put right’**

- Safeguards, management oversight, and quality assurance measures are in place, are tested and are seen to be effective
- Complaints are handled efficiently, effectively and consistently
- Lessons are learned and shared, including from administrative reviews and litigation
- There is a commitment to continuous improvement, including by the prompt implementation of recommendations from reviews, inspections and audits

## **Each immigration, asylum, nationality or customs function has a Home Office (Borders, Immigration and Citizenship System) ‘owner’**

- The BICS ‘owner’ is accountable for:
  - implementation of relevant policies and processes
  - performance (informed by routine collection and analysis of Management Information (MI) and data, and monitoring of agreed targets/deliverables/budgets)
  - resourcing (including workforce planning and capability development, including knowledge and information management)
  - managing risks (including maintaining a Risk Register)
  - communications, collaborations and deconfliction within the Home Office, with other government departments and agencies, and other affected bodies
  - effective monitoring and management of relevant contracted out services
  - stakeholder engagement (including customers, applicants, claimants and their representatives)

# Acknowledgements

The inspection team is grateful to the Home Office for its co-operation and assistance during this inspection and for the contributions from the staff who participated. We are also grateful to the stakeholders who contributed.

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