



Ministry
of Defence

Defence Guidance for Integrated Working

Human Social Science
Research Capability 

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PURPOSE OF THIS GUIDANCE

What are the objectives of this guidance, and who is it for?

This guidance is designed to assist you, as Defence personnel working at the operational and tactical levels, to integrate effectively with Partners across government (hereafter 'Partners') to achieve the UK's objectives.¹ The guidance reflects an increased emphasis in Her Majesty's Government (HMG) on integration. It follows the Integrated Review 2021² and the Integrated Operating Concept³, and contributes to emerging doctrine from the Ministry of Defence (MOD) on Integrated Action. The guidance has its foundation in the UK's Fusion Doctrine.⁴ It is the product of research within UK Defence and has drawn on expertise from across the MOD, HMG and wider industry.

This guidance is intended to complement military doctrine – it is not doctrine itself. Rather than being a step-by-step guide for integrating with Partners, it is intended as a useful reference that you can reach for when working alongside Partners. It also offers a way of operationalising strategic guidance for integrating with Partners. It focuses on planning and delivery of national security activities overseas, and sub-threshold activities where Defence may be supporting different partners. However, the guidance may be useful for other areas, including UK-based activities, and for Partners who work with Defence.

How to use this guidance

Working with Partners or as part of a cross-government team can be challenging. To help you integrate effectively in these instances, the guidance provides you with:

- Guiding principles and questions that you can refer to throughout the process of integration;

- Practical information on relevant structures and processes, such as planning and programmatic processes used by Partner organisations; and
- Illustrative examples of integration across government, the benefits this can bring, and the potential challenges involved.

On the following page you can see an overview of the core guiding principles this guidance presents, as well as guiding questions to help you understand the context of integration as well as relevant structures, cultures and processes that might help you to integrate with Partners. While answers to all of the guiding questions may not be available, they should help you to navigate processes that involve integration with Partners. The remainder of this guidance elaborates on each of these areas in greater detail, concluding with a list of additional resources that may aid you in the integration process.





GUIDANCE ON A PAGE

Guiding Principles



Foster integration



Engage to build trust and understanding



Have empathy for the objectives of others



Be self-aware of how you appear to others



Understand how to navigate complexity



Work to support coherence at all levels



Avoid departmental jargon: use plain English



Understand the local context for Defence-Partner integration

Guiding Questions

Understanding the context of integration

- What is HMG trying to achieve? Is the objective clear or in flux?
- What is Defence's part in what HMG is trying to achieve? Is Defence supporting, being supported by, or working symbiotically with – or independently from – its Partners?
- What is the role of each of the Partners?
- What is Defence's outline concept of operations? Is this in sync with those of its Partners?
- Do any Partners (including Defence) have capabilities that are critical to achieving common objectives? How can these be used to best effect?
- What support may be required for Defence to fulfil its role? What are the potential constraints?
- What timelines are all Partners working towards? Do these differ?

Structures and processes

- Who is the main integrator? Is their role clear and agreed by all Partners?
- What structures or processes are Partners using for planning and coordination? Where does Defence fit in?
- What is being done to integrate different aspects of the Defence contribution?
- What is the status and nature of the planning process? How mature is the situation, and what is the level of situational awareness?
- What structures, processes and technologies are Partners using for communication?
- What reporting processes are in use or are needed?
- What permissions do I have? Are these clear or contested?
- What funding mechanisms are being used? How is this funding being managed?
- How are Partners viewing – and planning for – risk?
- What programming tools and themes should I take into account when integrating with Partners?


Culture and ways of working

- What practices are Partners using that may differ from those Defence are using? What are the similarities that can be built upon?
- What are the underlying differences between the organisational cultures of all Partners?
- How do others perceive Defence ways of working? Are there any misconceptions, and how can these be addressed?
- What can be done to mitigate or address any potential tensions and frictions between Partners' ways of working?
- What terminology are Partners using? Does it have the same meaning as terminology used in Defence?



GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF INTEGRATION

Successful integration can be challenging for personnel in any operational and tactical role. The eight guiding principles outlined below are intended to help you navigate the challenges of integrating with Partners at both the operational and tactical levels.



Foster integration

Make time to encourage integration and foster good relationships with Partners. Persistent competition with adversaries demands that HMG is consistently integrated, so that the full range of resources is applied in the best possible way. One way to achieve this is by incentivising personnel to work with Partners so that their diverse thinking can be used to help prioritise different efforts, manage competing demands and integrate planning and delivery. Integration is not an end in itself, and is more than just the coordination of inputs. Its success depends on building effective and lasting relationships so that all parties benefit whilst delivering HMG objectives.



Engage to build trust and understanding

Take time to interact, establishing and maintaining relationships to help remove any barriers at the individual and organisational level. Build contacts, develop understanding and use any opportunities – formal or informal – to build trust ahead of working with Partners. This will pay dividends – although be aware that working cultures differ. Selective use of specialist advisers can be helpful in navigating this.




Have empathy for the objectives of others

Understand the political objectives, challenges, interests, responsibilities, cultures and working methods of the different Partners you may work with. Be supportive of Partners' objectives, especially where Defence is supporting others. Try to understand your own and your Partners' assumptions about the situation and task(s) at hand: these assumptions may differ. Identify areas of mutual interest, but also acknowledge any differences and the impact that Defence activities can have on others. Embrace the variety of different Partners' approaches and objectives, whilst clearly communicating your own.




Be self-aware of how you appear to others

Avoid overconfidence, as this can undermine relationships, and try to deal sensitively with any misconceptions about Defence ways of working, and what capabilities Defence can offer. There are differences between defence and non-defence culture and language (which can also exist within different organisations). It is helpful to understand these and the frictions they can bring. Partners will have their own specific priorities and obligations; these may include a culture of transparency that is difficult for Defence to match, due to security considerations. Actively listen and be inquisitive about others' working practices and organisational structures. For example, in partner organisations that operate a less hierarchical structure, junior staff can often hold high levels of responsibility.



Understand how to navigate complexity

A degree of uncertainty, complexity and even chaos features in many emergent – or even routine – situations. In such situations, think beyond military priorities and try to navigate complexity in a supportive way, including by re-evaluating your own plans as Partner objectives and requirements evolve. Resist the urge to try to take charge; this may be counterproductive as Partners may have governance structures with less focus on command and control. While you should be prepared to support Partners as needed, avoid assuming that military planning and decision-making models should necessarily dominate, or that others have the resources to participate in detailed military-style crisis planning. Such assumptions can lead to tensions and missed opportunities to integrate effectively. However, you can also explore where military-style planning can support integration.



Work to support coherence at all levels

Recognise and be ready to represent different Partners' perspectives – as well as your own – when planning and reporting. Work to agree a common position – explaining areas of difference where necessary – including how Defence can best support wider HMG objectives. Bear in mind potential challenges to achieving coherence across the military chain of command, which can include complex coalitions and host-nation structures, and may not be seen as integrated or as responsive as civilian structures.



Avoid departmental jargon: use plain English

All organisations have jargon. However, military jargon, including excessive use of acronyms, can be particularly impenetrable to Partners, and can therefore adversely impact mutual understanding, effectiveness and trust. Be aware that military and civilian lexicons may differ – indeed, the same terms and abbreviations may often have different meanings in military and civilian contexts. Communicate in plain English and ensure all your briefing material is formulated in a straightforward way to be accessible to all.



Understand the local context for Defence–Partner integration

Irrespective of the objective, understand that - particularly when overseas - HMG operates in a context of wider local, regional, and international community dynamics. Locally this includes a range of activities pursued by state and non-state actors. Seek to understand who all the relevant actors are - and keeping in mind HMG's overall objectives - work with Partners to coordinate your outreach and engagement activities.

In addition to these principles, consistent integration can be facilitated by using guiding questions to develop understanding. These are summarised below and explored in greater depth throughout this document.



UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT OF INTEGRATION

The process of successful integration starts with defining, to the extent possible, the goals and contributions of all actors involved in reaching an overarching HMG objective. It is important to avoid seeing integration as an end in itself – rather, see it as a vehicle towards successful delivery of HMG objectives. Understanding the imperatives of integration is therefore a key element of its successful delivery.

This section provides guiding questions for understanding the integration context. However, be aware that in an evolving situation, not all of the answers may be available. By seeking answers to these questions, you can reach a better understanding of the wider context for your own mission, and how you might cooperate effectively as part of a single HMG team to achieve overarching HMG objectives.

What is HMG trying to achieve? Is the objective clear or in flux?

In complex situations such as emerging crises, it is important to gather all possible information on relevant actors, their objectives, intended outcomes, and mandates to facilitate coherence between Defence and its Partners. Understanding ministerial and departmental interests, and any differences between them, is key. For example, is there interest from Ministers in specific issues or activities? Is there a well understood and accepted national strategic objective for the activity?⁵ Or are different departments and entities pursuing their own requirements within a broader approach?



Operation ORBITAL: Aligning objectives between Defence and Partners

In the aftermath of the unlawful annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, and the occupation of part of the Donbas region by Russian-backed separatists, MOD launched Operation ORBITAL (2015). The operation involved UK military personnel providing training to Ukrainian military training staff. This effort was undertaken in coordination with the UK Embassy, which was leading a programme of activities to deliver HMG objectives through various means, as well as international Partners.

Noting the differing objectives of Operation ORBITAL and the Embassy-led effort, a challenge arose from the need for military staff 'on the ground' to adapt their objectives in line with those of the Embassy. The MOD-led Operation ORBITAL was directed through the Permanent Joint Headquarters and not controlled by the Ambassador, whilst all other in-country HMG effort came under the control of the Ambassador. In-country planning was therefore less agile.

Defence staff worked to overcome these challenges by ensuring the Defence Attaché coordinated and represented the different branches of the Defence effort, and engaged and communicated with Partners as much as possible. Defence staff also participated in cross-department forums to ensure that Partners were aware of their activities, and vice versa, and where possible these activities were coordinated.

What is Defence's part in what HMG is trying to achieve? Is Defence supporting, being supported by, or working symbiotically with – or independently from – its Partners?

Defence's roles and contributions, including sequencing and transition, need to be clearly understood by all Partners. By establishing and communicating this understanding to others, and acting supportively, you can build trust with Partners as well as manage expectations about Defence contributions. While Defence is likely to be in a supporting role in many scenarios, it may be able to offer specialist skills that Partners do not have (such as planning capability). As such, Defence may lead in a limited fashion on discrete tasks. However, it is important to communicate Defence contributions clearly and realistically, avoiding over-promising and under-delivering.

What is the role of each of the Partners?

Having understood HMG's objectives and the role of Defence, it is important to understand the contributions of all Partners involved. What are their specific role(s), priorities and needs? Do Partners have specific geographic, or thematic, priorities (such as security sector reform)? What do these priorities and needs mean for Defence's role and activities? How can Defence contribute to addressing any competing priorities between Partners?

What is Defence's outline concept of operations? Is this in sync with those of its Partners?

Specifying Defence's outline concept of operations implies communicating Defence's interests, objectives and concerns. Political perspectives on military activities (both within the UK and in-country) also need to be accommodated. Defence requirements, which will likely be captured in a formal directive, may require balancing against Partner requirements to ensure effective integration. Defence's specified, or implied, objectives might carry less priority and thus have less impact than those of its Partners. Managing these issues requires realism and a proactive approach to understanding and accommodating others' perspectives, and what they imply for the role of Defence.

Do any Partners (including Defence) have capabilities that are critical to achieving common objectives? How can these be used to best effect?

It is likely that all actors involved will have some degree of mutual dependence. This could include access to contacts, specialist skills, communications, data processing, logistics, engineering, finance, etc. Partners may not necessarily understand the scope, scale and limitations of what could be provided by Defence. Equally, Partners may possess assets and information that are important to achieving Defence's contribution (e.g. local political, civil society, military, or donor contacts). It is important to understand these factors to ensure effective information-sharing and pooling of scarce resources.

The Role of Embassies

Embassies (commonly referred to as Posts) are the locus of Partner activity, and hence integration. Each Embassy includes staff from a variety of different HMG departments and agencies with various roles in achieving HMG objectives (captured in a Country Business Plan). This includes liaison officers who report directly to their respective department, but are also coordinated at Embassy level. While specific positions may vary by country, and no two Embassies are alike, below are the most common activities supported by those departments and agencies of most relevance to the Defence effort.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO)

Political Section: Coordinates UK foreign policy, promotes national stability and democratic values, and ensures policy-programme integration. Development Office: Manages international development and humanitarian programmes.

Defence Section

Advises on and coordinates Defence activities within the Embassy. Serves as a point of contact for all Defence Engagement delivered in the host nation.

Home Office

Coordinates HMG activity on Serious and Organised Crime and Counter Terrorism, to improve UK and host-nation national security by strengthening local institutions.

Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs

Assists host nation to respond to financial crime and corruption in order to protect UK revenues (e.g. through disrupting criminal attacks and supporting the development of host-nation capabilities).

National Crime Agency

Coordinates countering Serious and Organised Crime in support of HMG's national interests (may not be permanently based in country, but visits as required).



What support may be required for Defence to fulfil its role? What are the potential constraints?

To fulfil its role, Defence will need information and resources from Partners. However, some Partner departments and teams do not possess sufficient resources and liaison staff to be able to respond to multiple information requests, or to attend exercises or planning activities that may be seen as primarily serving a military purpose. In this context, understand that engagement and empathy are key to establishing how Defence can provide support, and what it may need from others to fulfil its role. If Partner resources are stretched, consider how to make effective use of the limited time and resources available (e.g. provide specific short time periods on exercises or in planning activities where Partners can engage, physically or virtually, rather than having to attend whole events). Also consider embedding Defence liaison staff with Partners to assist with the passage of information. This helps to support integration and build mutual trust and understanding.

What timelines are all Partners working towards? Do these differ?

Partner activity may be guided by various short- and long-term political, trade, development or humanitarian timelines. It is important to understand these and establish how planned military activity may potentially support or disrupt this. Additionally, understand what the conditions for scaling back or ceasing Defence involvement are if required, and how integrated planning supports this. Note that Defence planning horizons may differ to those of Partners, which tend to have a longer term view. Culturally, the military can tend towards maximising the opportunities of the moment, resulting in a shorter term view.

Operation SHADER: Balancing mission horizons

In response to the territorial advances made by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq, in 2014 the MOD launched Operation SHADER as part of a 1HMG⁶ operation to contain and counteract ISIL's threat to the UK's strategic interests. Part of the Defence task involved training local forces, working alongside the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Security Services and the Department for International Development (DFID) in the context of a multinational coalition.

Consideration of mission horizons between Defence and Partners during Operation SHADER needed sensitive handling. Whereas the MOD tended to take a shorter term perspective on building up the skills of local fighters, the FCO and Security Services envisioned a longer term approach of consolidating UK influence in Iraq. Further questions emerged from contrasting views between different government departments over the future of the Kurdish region within Iraq.

This vignette highlights the need for military personnel to gain a detailed understanding of the objectives and outcome expectations of Partners involved in missions. It is important to communicate these – and the implied impact on timelines – to the chain of command, particularly during the early phase of events. By setting clear aims and assisting Partners where possible to achieve their own objectives, Defence can achieve a greater impact and develop strong reciprocal relationships to the benefit of HMG.





INTEGRATING STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES

Integration revolves around multiple decision-making and reporting lines, including military and civilian structures, coalition Partners and host-nation stakeholders. The complexity of these structures and potential for misalignment between them creates challenges for integrating in-country activities within wider HMG priorities. To integrate successfully, you must understand some of the underpinning structures and processes that Partners are working within to identify where processes align and where they differ.

Existing Structures for Integrated Working

There are existing structures and processes that underpin integrated working. While these (and potential new structures and processes) will inevitably vary by situation, and there is no single planning process or guidance used by Partners, below are some specific structures and processes that may be implemented.

National Fusion Doctrine	Planning processes	Reporting processes	Direct liaison
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fusion doctrine provides a broad concept for integration, but integrated planning approaches have not been formally developed at the HMG or departmental level. • Cross-departmental planning work is sometimes informed by a Joint Assessment of Conflict and Stability (JACS). • Below the National Security Council (NSC) level, Senior Responsible Officers (SRO), drawn from departments, set strategy and oversee delivery of HMG activity using National Strategy Implementation Groups (NSIG). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At the strategic level, no single cross-government planning process exists to support integrated working for long-term persistent engagement or short-term crisis response. • Departments may bring different views on political objectives and, in the absence of a central planning process, use ad-hoc deliberative approaches (e.g. joint teams). • Ad-hoc approaches can be based on established planning processes from Partner teams or departments, including Partner, Defence and Crisis planning (described below). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Various reporting chains are likely to be in use in addition to military processes, such as assessment reports. • FCDO posts communicate using Diplomatic Telegrams (Diptels), which are authorised by the Ambassador (or equivalent) and usually co-created by partners on a '1HMG' basis – including Defence. In crisis situations diplomatic posts also use situation reports. • Reporting processes are an important part of departmental work and can be a powerful means to obtain cross-departmental engagement, and possibly endorsement, as they span departments and may be preferred over other means of communication (such as email). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Whilst formal authorisations may be needed, direct liaison can enhance tempo and integration by reducing the need for partners – particularly Ambassadors – to obtain the MOD view by routing questions via the FCDO. • Engagement through the senior departmental level often takes time and may not be suitable in fast-moving situations such as unfolding crises. • Direct liaison may be useful when diplomatic activity draws on military leverage, or rapid decisions are needed to secure opportunities or mitigate potential risks to the UK.

When you are undertaking activity alongside HMG Partners, the following guiding questions can help to explore and understand how HMG can collectively rise to the challenge of integration and apply all available instruments to the problem at hand. By seeking out answers to these questions you should have a better understanding of the wider context of your own mission, and how you might cooperate effectively as part of a single HMG team to achieve national objectives.

Who is the main integrator? Is their role clear and agreed by all Partners?

Habitually, Defence will follow a civilian political lead as the chief integrator⁷ in any scenario. However, practical differences between the Defence Chain of Command and other departmental structures could complicate this picture. Many civilian agencies do not have the equivalent of an operational level; at the national level, the integrator could be the FCDO crisis-management department during planning stages, potentially transitioning to a civilian lead in-country as capabilities are deployed. At the in-country level, the civilian lead will routinely be the UK Ambassador, although on occasion a senior civilian may also be deployed to carry out the integrator task. It is important to understand the overall governance and reporting arrangements, including the role and terms of reference of the senior civilian representative and whether these are clear – particularly with reference to the Defence Chain of Command. Terms of reference may differ depending on the situation at hand. In some crisis situations, a degree of co-decision between the senior civilian and military commander may be apt. In others, there may be separate integrators for separate elements of policy delivery.



Operation RUMAN: The importance of the integrator role

In the wake of the destruction caused by Hurricane Irma (2017) to several UK Overseas Territories in the Caribbean, Operation RUMAN was launched by the MOD to support the efforts of DFID and the FCO in the delivery of humanitarian relief and restoration of essential services.

Challenges in developing a clear cross-government direction, combined with the preference of both the FCO and DFID to operate directly from the strategic to the tactical level – without any coordinating structure in-between at the equivalent of Defence’s operational level – led to some confusion and tension over responsibilities. While DFID and the FCO struggled to keep up with the pace and scale of the military response, Defence was unable to articulate the type of capabilities it was able to offer.

The deployment of a 2* DFID civilian to integrate and lead the RUMAN Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) helped align different departmental approaches and foster unity of purpose. This also enabled Defence to offer a number of capabilities and skills (such as essential infrastructure repair and humanitarian support) that previously were underappreciated by civilian Partners. The integrator also initiated consideration of longer term cross-agency planning, looking beyond the immediate crisis. This vignette thus highlights the importance of how integrator roles can enhance the effectiveness of integrated missions.



What structures or processes are Partners using for planning and coordination? Where does Defence fit in?

The basic structure at the in-country level is the diplomatic 'Post' – an embassy or high commission. Sometimes referred to as 'platforms', these are organised along '1HMG' or cross-departmental lines and work to a Country Business Plan, with coordinated delivery of strategic objectives involving a combination of diplomatic engagement and programming with the consent of the host nation. The Ambassador is responsible for delivery and usually acts as a Senior Responsible Officer (SRO), although some specific activities may have separate SROs. Posts will have established coordination arrangements, including the Defence Attaché and Defence Section, and it is important that arriving Defence personnel plan to integrate with these. This applies to all contexts including crisis scenarios, such as non-combatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operations, where there may be a strong rationale for increased Defence involvement in planning, coordination and communications aspects.

Understanding Different Planning Processes

There are several existing processes that underpin integrated working. While there is no single planning process or guidance for Partners to use, below are some processes that may be implemented.



Defence-led planning

- Defence capability, and associated Command and Control (C2), tends to be utilised by HMG as 'a co-ordinated resource', with a focus on resource-based risks and accountability. This is particularly the case for persistent engagement, such as Defence Engagement activities, but also for crisis response.
- Defence-led planning to support integration can include campaign planning, guided by a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) directive to an operational-level headquarters.
- Defence tends to retain a focus on ends-driven planning rather than the ways-focused planning approaches that are more prevalent amongst Partners.
- In all cases, Defence C2 remains responsible – and is accountable – for achieving its mission within HMG strategic objectives.



Partner-led planning

- Integration through Partner-led planning can include a crisis response activity where national civilian policy input and operational control are exercised through the FCDO crisis centre, which could include embedded military liaison staff.
- Alternatively, a military force could be deployed under military C2, but with the commander reporting to a civilian task-force lead.
- Partner planning processes are often largely programmatic, with an emphasis on departmental objectives and delivery in the field. The programmatic process (whether using core or joint funding) is used to identify success criteria, achieve prioritisation and identify and manage risks.
- In the FCDO, the programmatic process develops theories of change – to understand causal pathways, risk, outputs and measures of effectiveness at the policy level – which are then followed through with a Country Business Plan.



Crisis planning

- Partners tend not to have an 'operational level' and nominated 'J5' planning staff to conduct crisis planning.
- Except for the FCDO Crisis Management Department, crisis planning is generally conducted as an additional task for desk officers. This can bring resilience challenges over sustained crisis periods.
- FCDO posts maintain up-to-date Crisis Management Plans for political and security crises, with some posts where the risk of humanitarian crises may be higher also maintaining dedicated humanitarian response plans.



Other (including hybrid) approaches

- Specific expertise to help facilitate planning can be provided through civilian–military structures, including the FCDO's Office of Conflict Stability and Mediation, use of Deployable Civilian Experts or 77 Brigade.
- Defence can also provide practical assistance with planning and communications, such as table-top exercise planning, organising battle rhythm, and analytical or decision-support materials to bring routine to planning.
- Military Defence Engagement activity is often supported through a joint fund, such as the Conflict, Security and Stability Fund (CSSF) and is usually integrated with the Country Business Plan at Post.

What is being done to integrate different aspects of the Defence contribution?

Depending on the scale of the proposed activity, specific pre-deployment arrangements may be needed to support integration. Collective training for larger contingents will likely include exposure to working with Partners, possibly through exercising. This may not be the case with individual augmentees, or small teams, deployed for a specific purpose. Here, specific arrangements will be needed to ensure adequate understanding of and integration with Partners, potentially under the guidance of the Defence Attaché.

What is the status and nature of the planning process? How mature is the situation, and what is the level of situational awareness?

Integration will require an assessment of whether a situation is emergent or mature, and subsequent agreement on the nature of formal and informal interaction. Some FCDO-led fora at the national and in-country level will likely already exist, and may include a weekly cross-departmental meeting or a similar format. In some contexts, there may also be local coordination arrangements with international or local Partners. Depending on the situation and level of agreement, there may be a need to establish a specific planning forum with terms of reference, an agenda and agreed roles and responsibilities.

What structures, processes and technologies are Partners using for communication?

In any given operational context or scenario, Partners are likely to be using a variety of structures, processes and technologies for communication. This can include communications networks, data processing and analysis. It is important to establish what exists, whether there are gaps, and whether these communication structures are compatible with Defence. Security caveats associated with different communications systems may be present, in which case an assessment of their implications for integration will need to be made. Working structures will need to reflect potential differences in communication structures, as well as any possible security caveats.

What reporting processes are in use or are needed?

Partners may have various reporting processes, such as a combination of Diplomatic Telegrams (Diptels) and Situation Reports in place. Think broadly about other Partners involved and how they report to individual departments, as well as how Defence can contribute to these reports. Additionally, consider what degree of integrated reporting may be required. The provision of joint funding (such as the CSSF) may come with reporting requirements or requirements for a joint decision log or audit log, perhaps at Post or task force level.

What permissions are in place? Are these clear or contested?

Defence may have specific processes through which permissions are to be obtained for engaging with others. In any scenario, addressing the following questions is key: To what extent am I able to build networks and develop relationships? Has direct liaison authority (Dirlauth) been agreed, and with what caveats? Do I have freedom to speak on behalf of the chain of command within my remit? Bear in mind that many Partner staff will have direct access to their departmental and other Partners' perspectives – potentially through joint teams – and will be able to voice these.

What funding mechanisms are being used? How is this funding being managed?

As Defence will usually be in a supporting role, understanding budgetary provisions is key to navigating lines of authority and control in an integration context. There are no template solutions to funding arrangements, so it is important to understand which budget pays for what, who has authority, what reporting arrangements are required, and whether expenditure is being tracked correctly. Funding options might include a combination of Defence's own funds, departmental transfers, specific Treasury allocation, or use of a cross-cutting fund, such as the CSSF.

Navigating different funding structures

Understanding the range of potential channels for funding allocation during operations will help to reduce confusion and potential friction over the mission authority and responsibilities that Defence has in a particular mission.

MOD

Defence will provide funding to support the deployment and maintenance of personnel in theatre.

Partner departments

Partners may allocate a portion of their own resources to assist Defence in achieving HMG objectives in theatre.



HM Treasury

The Treasury may provide contingency funding, or fund Defence during specific missions.

Cross-government

When operating together, joint teams can access funding through mechanisms (e.g. the CSSF).

How are Partners viewing – and planning for – risk?

Departments tend to view risk during planning in terms of the risk of operational failure and risk to safety of personnel, as well as financial, reputational or presentational and programme-delivery risk. Be aware that in some circumstances, other departments may accept more risk to personnel than Defence. Risk is also captured and understood through the Overseas Security and Justice Assessment (OSJA), which is primarily designed to assess and mitigate human rights concerns. For overseas work, it is important to avoid the risk of exacerbating underlying conflict factors, or other host-nation risks. The risk methodology in the programmatic process is used throughout the planning and delivery stages, and during the Monitoring Evaluation and Learning (MEL) process. These issues will be key concerns to Partners when considering the application of Defence capabilities.

What programming tools and themes should I take into account when integrating with Partners?

When integrating with Partners, it is important to understand and be able to interact with commonly used programming tools. These include the Theory Of Change (TOC); Results Frameworks (RF); MEL; and the Programme Life Cycle (PLC). [Annex A](#) includes further details on each of these tools. Further to these tools, Partner programming generally includes consideration of several key cross-cutting themes that must be considered when designing and implementing any CSSF-funded programmes, such as Defence Engagement activity. These themes, which are outlined in [Annex B](#), include conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity, gender considerations, and human rights.





UNDERSTANDING CULTURES AND INTEGRATING WAYS OF WORKING

All organisations have unique working environments that are defined by culture and associated ways of working. The differences between the organisational cultures and ways of working of Defence and its Partners – as well as a lack of understanding of these differences – can cause friction, and ultimately constrain integration. This section therefore provides guiding questions for navigating the cultural dimension of integration.

What practices are Partners using that may differ from those Defence are using? What are the similarities that can be built upon?

A lack of mutual understanding of differences in ways of working and organisational practices can be one of the primary challenges in a civil–military environment. This can occur at both the individual and organisational level. Different ways of working can be present in such areas as personnel recruitment, departmental planning, education, training, and delivery strategies. This may reflect different understandings of key concepts and perceptions around behaviours, resources and methodologies (e.g. prioritisation of formal vs. informal planning methodologies). While there may of course be differences in departmental ways of working, there may also be similarities that integration efforts can coalesce around.

Organisational and Cultural Differences

Understanding some of the different ways in which Partner organisations work, and their cultures, can help to avoid misunderstandings. Described here are some examples of typical differences although, even amongst Partners, these will vary.

DEFENCE	PARTNERS
Formal and hierarchical structure	Informal and relatively flat structure
Organisation includes an operational layer	Lack of operational layer in organisation
Formal, structured planning mechanisms	Flexible planning mechanisms
Highly specific lexicon and vocabulary	Some lexicon but with more plain English
Heavy restrictions on external comms	Greater freedom in external comms
Short-term posts and frequent rotations	Longer-term posts and longer rotations

What are the underlying differences between the organisational cultures of all Partners?

Differences in practices used by Defence and Partners are frequently symptomatic of deeper differences in organisational cultures. Beyond specific practices and behaviours, organisational cultures include elements such as symbols (e.g. military uniforms vs. blue/white collar), routines and rituals (e.g. impartiality in some civilian humanitarian organisations) and organisational structures (e.g. hierarchical and formal vs. informal structures).⁸ Any of these elements can shape the behaviour of Defence and its Partners, and underpins potential frictions. As such, integration will usually tend to be shaped by perceptions of the differences or stereotypes that may exist between Defence and civilian staff.

How do others perceive Defence ways of working? Are there any misconceptions, and how can these be addressed?

Aiming to understand differences between Defence's ways of working and those of Partners is key, as is considering how others perceive Defence. Whilst Defence may have misconceptions about other departmental practices, Partners may also have misconceptions about Defence intentions and ways of working, and both of these can negatively shape integration. Understanding these misconceptions and addressing them through self-reflection and communication with others can help to foster cultural awareness as a positive step towards effective integration.



Operation GRITROCK: The challenges and opportunities of organisational and cultural differences

Following the outbreak of the Ebola virus epidemic in West Africa in 2014, UK military personnel were deployed as part of Operation GRITROCK to support DfID, which led the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF). Defence was tasked with providing a mixture of capabilities – including C2, infantry, engineers, medics and communicators. During the course of the operation, Defence and Partners faced a number of challenges stemming from differences in respective organisational cultures and ways of working. This included different reporting chains (with direct high-level reporting on the civilian side). At the same time, these contrasts also brought several benefits that strengthened the impact of the mission. In particular, the different cultures offered diverse perspectives on how to tackle the challenge of the outbreak and how the UK could contribute, thus avoiding so-called 'groupthink'.

While Defence was criticised for certain aspects of the operation (such as the length of time it took to deliver treatment beds), it is important to highlight that Defence can exploit its organisational and cultural strengths when working together with Partners. In Sierra Leone, this took the form of strong coordination capabilities, flexibility in adjusting responses to new outbreaks in infections, and rapid intelligence-gathering activities.



What can be done to mitigate or address any potential tensions and frictions between Partners' ways of working?

Noting that Defence and Partners are likely to have different organisational cultures and ways of working, it is important to understand what practices and strategies can be used to navigate and mitigate these differences. Further to just understanding and acknowledging that different cultures and ways of working exist, be prepared to adapt working practices, styles and systems, particularly where Defence is in a supporting role to others. Communicating frequently and engaging with Partners through formal and informal channels is important for building trust and understanding which

potential tensions and frictions can be addressed more easily. Building relationships and trust on a long-term, continuous basis is also key for identifying similarities in organisational cultures and practices that Defence and Partners can coalesce around. Prioritising the rapid identification of integration points is particularly useful in a crisis scenario.

What terminology are Partners using, and does it have the same meaning as terminology used in Defence?

When seeking to understand Partner perspectives and activities, particularly around their organisation and objectives, be alert for terms Partners use that may differ in meaning from those generally used across Defence. Two examples serve to illustrate the point:

- In the humanitarian community, 'protection' encompasses all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with human rights law, international humanitarian law (which applies in situations of armed conflict) and refugee law.⁹ In contrast, in Defence contexts, 'protection' generally means physical or virtual protection of a location or asset.
- In police contexts, 'operational' and 'tactical' command have the reverse meaning to how the terms are understood in Defence. The police 'tactical' commander is working at something akin to the military 'operational' level, and the police 'operational' commander equates to the military 'tactical' level.¹⁰

The lesson is to ensure that you question the meaning of terms used by Partners, and explain the terms used by Defence. This includes avoiding extensive use of abbreviations and acronyms, which may not be used to the same degree among Partners as they are in Defence.

FURTHER GUIDANCE

A number of publicly available sources provide further guidance and insights related to integrated working, whether from the perspective of Defence or its Partners. The table below provides some key resources that you can use when planning for and working in an integrated fashion.

Title	Link	Description
The Good Operation Handbook	Link	Provides guidance and lessons learned on key principles for successful operational planning across different phases of missions.
Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance (OSJA)	Link	FCDO guidance for justice or security-sector assistance, including human-rights-related risks and ways of mitigating them.
The UK Government's approach to Stabilisation: A guide for policy makers and practitioners	Link	Stabilisation Unit (SU) guidance highlighting the challenges to – and providing key principles for – stabilisation operations in conflict-affected environments.
FCDO Programme Operating Framework	Link	An FCDO framework for policy programme delivery, outlining structures, considerations and values needed for successful programmes.
Conflict Sensitivity: Tools and Guidance	Link	A list of tools and recommendations from the SU for understanding the context of – and interacting with – local populations in fragile and conflict-affected environments.
Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS): Guidance Note	Link	Guidance from the SU describing the components of the JACS framework – which is used for assessing the key conflict drivers and actors involved in an operation – as well as clarifying UK objectives for stabilising these situations.
UK's International Defence Engagement Strategy	Link	Collaborative guidance from the MOD and FCDO on the role that Defence plays in protecting and promoting the UK's national security interests.
Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution	Link	MOD Joint Doctrine Publication 05 outlining Defence's role in stabilisation operations, particularly relating to the importance of cross-government approaches for long-term stability.
UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2018–2022: Guidance Note – Implementing Strategic Outcome 3: Gender-based violence	Link	HMG guidance on how Defence can protect women and girls' human rights during conflicts, in addition to empowering their role in preventing and resolving human rights violations.
Human Security in Military Operations	Link	MOD guidance outlining how Defence personnel can implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, related to protecting and promoting gender and child security in conflict operations.



Annex A: Programming Tools

When integrating with Partners it is important to understand and be able to interact with the basic programming tools that are commonly used.



Theory Of Change (TOC)

- A TOC is a hypothesis capturing how we think our programme will work in the context, and why and how we think certain actions will produce the desired outcomes (usually specific behaviour change).
- A TOC helps to identify the intermediate steps that help achieve a specific outcome.
- A participatory approach and robust discussion during development of a TOC can reveal assumptions and information gaps, and meet stakeholders' needs.
- A graphical representation of a TOC in the form of a logic model aids understanding and facilitates communication among stakeholders by showing how seemingly disparate elements are linked to achieve wider effects.



Results Framework (RF)

- A RF brings the TOC to life in practical terms. (RF is also known as 'Log(ical) Frame(work)' or 'Results Chain').
- A RF represents the intended sequence of inputs and activities and how these deliver outputs, which in turn produce outcomes.
- Aggregated outcomes, potentially together with other programmatic or political activity, produce the desired impact of the programme.
- A RF will illustrate these and the programme's baseline, progress indicators and key milestone targets over the life of the programme.
- A RF should be updated as progress is made and setbacks occur, in order to track change.



Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (MEL)

- MEL should be an intrinsic aspect of programme design to ensure understanding of the baseline, set measurable progress indicators and realistic programme targets, and establish whether a programme is delivering its intended outcomes.
- A routine monitoring process by the programme team (or external MEL provider) reviews reports from implementing partners, maintains an overview of project delivery, and identifies any issues on a monthly and quarterly basis.
- Periodic programme evaluation or review – generally conducted annually and externally – considers the effectiveness, efficiency, and value for money provided by the programme.
- Lessons should be continually captured throughout the monitoring and evaluation process to produce learning. This informs programme adjustments, development of any follow-on programming, and the wider political and diplomatic process.



Annex B: Cross-cutting Programme Themes

Partner programming generally includes consideration of a number of key themes that must be considered when designing and implementing CSSF-funded programmes, including Defence Engagement activity.



Conflict analysis and conflict sensitivity

- Conflict analysis seeks to understand a conflict's context to ensure HMG can operate effectively in fragile and conflict affected contexts.
- A Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS) can provide strategic level analysis. It standardises understanding across HMG of the long-term factors underpinning stability, the triggers of conflict, and any opportunities for fostering stability.
- JACS, or other formal conflict analysis produced locally, can provide an evidence base and potential entry points for programming.
- Conflict sensitivity means acting with the understanding that any initiative conducted in a conflict-affected environment will interact with that conflict, and that such interaction will have consequences that may have positive or negative effects.
- Drawing on conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity analysis is completed in three steps – understanding the conflict dynamics, understanding the potential positive and negative impacts, and taking action to maximise positives and mitigate negatives.



Gender

- Conflict can affect men and women differently. Women are subjected to specific forms of violence, including sexual violence, and often find themselves deprived of basic services or required to raise families alone.
- Intimate partner violence, female genital mutilation (FGM), and child, early and forced marriage (CEFM) are often exacerbated during and after conflict.
- Combined with discriminatory laws and insufficient human-rights safeguards, this can prevent women from accessing comprehensive health, education, security and justice services, becoming financially independent, or participating in governance and peace-building.
- The UK has committed to putting women and girls at the centre of efforts to prevent and resolve conflict, to promote peace and stability, and to prevent and respond to violence against women and girls.
- The UK is a signatory to UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and has an accompanying National Action Plan. Defence has taken this forward with Joint Service Publication 1325: Human security in military operations.



Human rights

- Human rights violations and abuses often precede conflict, even if they do not directly lead to it. Conflict is also often accompanied by large-scale violations of human rights and humanitarian law.
- UK programmes can either directly protect or strengthen human rights (e.g. protection from sexual violence and intimidation; women, peace and security; and access to justice) or support an enabling environment for the protection of human rights (e.g. stabilisation, peacekeeping, peace processes, counter-terrorism, security and justice, defence engagement).
- An Overseas Security and Justice Assessment (OSJA) should be completed for all security and justice activity, including Defence Engagement, to consider the potential negative impacts of HMG interventions for human rights aspects and identify potential mitigating actions. It should be approved at the relevant level before implementation begins.

Endnotes

- 1 In the context of this guidance, 'integration' is understood as a process through which various parts or aspects of HMG are linked or coordinated.
- 2 HMG (2021): '[Global Britain in a Competitive Age: the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy](#)'. HMG.
- 3 UK MOD (2021): '[Integrated Operating Concept](#)'. UK MOD.
- 4 The Fusion Doctrine is an overarching concept for the integration of economic, security and other influence levers across HMG to achieve the UK's national security objectives, guided by the principle 'to deploy security, economic and influence capabilities to protect, promote and project our national security, economic and influence goals'. For more information see HMG (2018): '[National Security Capability Review](#)'. HMG.
- 5 The national objective may be contained in a National Security Council (NSC) strategy, a Country Business Plan, a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) directive, or a Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) directive.
- 6 1HMG refers to 'One HMG Overseas'. The concept was introduced to improve integration of all staff delivering HMG objectives overseas, including by co-locating HMG overseas personnel in single buildings or compounds; regionalisation or consolidation of key Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) functions; improving collaboration between government departments working overseas through single Country Business Plans; and harmonising terms and conditions of service of HMG overseas personnel. For more information, see e.g. National Audit Office (2015): '[One HMG Overseas](#)'. Briefing for the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee.
- 7 In general, integrators can be understood as chief personnel who work to align the HMG response in any given scenario.
- 8 Wilkins, J. (2020): 'The cultural aspects of military-civilian working relationships in Head Office: A Brief Overview'. (non-published).
- 9 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2012): '[What is Protection?](#)'. UNOCHA.
- 10 College of Policing (n.d.): '[Operations: Command Structures](#)'. College of Policing.

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