

## Recommendation(s) Status: Collision between a passenger train and a hand trolley at Challow, Oxfordshire

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

### Key to Recommendation Status

<b>Open</b> (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
<b>Closed</b> (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
<b>Insufficient response:</b>	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
<b>Superseded:</b>	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
<b>Awaiting response:</b>	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

**Red** – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

**Blue** – The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

**White** – The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

# Recommendation Status Report



<b>Report Title</b>	Collision between a passenger train and a hand trolley at Challow, Oxfordshire
<b>Report Number</b>	11/2022
<b>Date of Incident</b>	21/10/2021

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
11/2022/01	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to make shorter-term changes to the existing line clear verification process to reduce the likelihood of vehicles such as hand trolleys or rail skates being left on the track when the line is handed back after engineering work.</p> <p>Network Rail should examine the safeguards and controls in the existing line clear verification process to establish what improvements could be made. This should build on any relevant existing work that has already been undertaken by Network Rail and should specifically consider:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• why the current vehicle management forms are not being used by some hand trolley and rail skate users</li> <li>• whether the overall risk of using hand trolleys and rail skates could be reduced through a consistent application of an improved line clear verification process across its infrastructure, rather than limiting its use to only those areas that use axle counters for train detection</li> <li>• if the line clear verification process should be integrated with the planning processes for managing the safety of people working on or near the line.</li> </ul> <p>Network Rail should then implement any changes identified to create a revised line clear verification process, clearly define when and where the revised process should be applied on its infrastructure, and brief staff on any changes that are made (paragraphs 146a, 146c.i, 146c.ii, 147b and 147c).</p>	

# Recommendation Status Report



11/2022/02	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to consider longer-term changes to the line clear verification process which incorporates technology to reduce the risk of vehicles such as hand trolleys or rail skates being left on the track when the line is handed back after engineering work.</p> <p>Network Rail should investigate what technology could be used to support the line clear verification process and minimise the influence of predictable limitations of human performance. This should build on the existing work that has already been undertaken by Network Rail and the Infrastructure Safety Leadership Group to look at potential solutions which use technology. Network Rail should then implement any changes identified to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• create a revised line clear verification process that is supported by technology</li> <li>• clearly define what equipment is needed</li> <li>• provide the equipment to allow the use of the revised process on its infrastructure</li> <li>• brief and/or train staff on the changes that are made to the process and the equipment that is introduced (paragraphs 146a, 146c.i, 146c.ii, and 147b).</li> </ul>	
11/2022/03	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to remove the risk of hand trolleys with red flags not being seen by staff during darkness and subsequently left on the track.</p> <p>Network Rail, following the prescribed industry processes, should propose an amendment to Rule Book Handbook 10, GE/RT8000/HB10, so that hand trolleys are required to display an illuminated red light in both directions, at all times when on the track, and that the existing reference to the red flag is completely removed (paragraphs 146b and 147a).</p>	

# Recommendation Status Report



11/2022/04	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of hand trolleys not being seen by staff during the hours of darkness and subsequently left on the track.</p> <p>Network Rail should develop and implement processes to ensure that any hand trolley placed on its track has illuminated red lights displayed in both directions at all times. These processes should include pre-use equipment checks, provision of spare parts, availability of alternative equipment should a red light fail or break, and a mechanism to report and rectify faults before the hand trolley is used again (paragraphs 146b and 147a).</p>	
11/2022/05	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of hand trolleys or rail skates being used in an unsafe way and left on the track when the line is handed back after engineering work.</p> <p>Network Rail should review the effectiveness of its safety assurance activities relating to the use of hand trolleys. It should address any deficiencies that are identified so that the associated risks are better controlled (paragraphs 146b, 146c.ii, 147a and 147d).</p>	