

## Recommendation(s) Status: Wrong side signalling failure and derailment at Dalwhinnie, Badenoch and Strathspey

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

### Key to Recommendation Status

<b>Open</b> (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
<b>Closed</b> (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
<b>Insufficient response:</b>	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
<b>Superseded:</b>	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
<b>Awaiting response:</b>	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

**Red** – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

**Blue** – The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

**White** – The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

# Recommendation Status Report



<b>Report Title</b>	Wrong side signalling failure and derailment at Dalwhinnie, Badenoch and Strathspey
<b>Report Number</b>	10/2022
<b>Date of Incident</b>	10/04/2021

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
10/2022/01	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that signalling maintenance teams have a full and complete understanding of all the tasks required when carrying out pre-planned renewal work, and of each person's role and responsibility in undertaking such work. This recommendation should build on the findings of the review that Network Rail has scheduled as a result of its own investigation (paragraph 197).</p> <p>Network Rail should review and update its processes for signalling equipment installation and signal maintenance testing so that all work undertaken by signalling maintenance teams, that is not the result of reactive fault finding activity, is suitably planned and that sufficiently detailed instructions are made available.</p> <p>This review should ensure that the resulting instructions include details of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the preliminary work required, such as establishing the relevant technical requirements and ensuring the suitability of the equipment to be installed</li> <li>• designated roles for the work along with the respective tasks and responsibilities of each role</li> <li>• the required competencies and licences required for each designated role</li> <li>• the information each designated role needs to be provided with</li> <li>• the process by which hand over between installation and testing and hand back between testing and railway operation will be arranged (paragraphs 177a.i, 178 and 179).</li> </ul>	

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10/2022/02	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that, before replacing an item of signalling equipment with an item that is apparently similar, signalling engineering staff are able to detect if there is the possibility of the replacement item inadvertently affecting the safe operation of signalling infrastructure, and therefore that additional precautions and checks are required.</p> <p>that it has accepted on the basis of historical (grandfather) rights, which could affect the safe running of trains over switches and crossings. It should identify any items that may need to be modified, configured or adjusted before installation and ensure that information or warnings are provided to signalling engineering staff alerting them to this modification and the action that they need to take.</p> <p>This recommendation may also be applicable to other types of signalling equipment that affect the safe running of trains (paragraph 177a.ii).</p>	
10/2022/03	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that, when signalling maintenance teams replace signalling equipment, specified pre- installation checks are effective in confirming that the item being installed is operationally equivalent to the item being replaced.</p> <p>Network Rail should review its signal maintenance testing handbook and update the guidance for the defined check for correct equipment type to describe, in sufficient detail, the steps needed to determine like- for- like equipment equivalence. It should make enhancements so that the importance of following this guidance is clear to those installing and testing signalling equipment and, according to their appointed role, the work elements they are permitted to undertake.</p> <p>This recommendation may be relevant to other defined checks that are described in Network Rail's signal maintenance test handbook (paragraph 177b.i)</p>	
10/2022/04	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that, when signalling maintenance teams make engineering changes to the signalling infrastructure, the requirement for the maintenance tester to be</p>	

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			<p>independent of the installers is effective in assuring the integrity of the signalling system.</p> <p>Network Rail should review how it can best achieve the required level of independence between the installation and testing roles when pre-planned renewal work is carried out under the processes described in its signal maintenance testing handbook. This should take into account how people undertaking these roles work currently. It should make enhancements so that practical working arrangements are defined. This recommendation may be relevant to other types of signalling work undertaken under arrangements described in Network Rail's signal maintenance test handbook (paragraphs 177b.i, 177b.ii, 177c.i, 177c.iii and 178).</p>	
10/2022/05	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the likelihood of essential signal maintenance testing tasks being overlooked and not completed.</p> <p>Network Rail should review its arrangements for recording progress when carrying out testing defined in its signal maintenance testing handbook. This should take into account environmental and other challenges relevant to the workplace and make enhancements that ensure practical contemporaneous recording of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the completion of each test step</li> <li>• relevant test results, measurements, and findings (paragraph 177c.ii and 177d).</li> </ul>	