



Ministry  
of Defence

# Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01

## UK Defence Doctrine




Sixth Edition



# Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01

# UK Defence Doctrine

Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (JDP 0-01) (6th Edition),  
dated November 2022, is promulgated as directed  
by the Chiefs of Staff

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of stylized initials and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Director Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre

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# Foreword

It is a pleasure to introduce the new edition of *UK Defence Doctrine*. The world has changed markedly since the last edition was published in 2014. The years of counter-insurgency operations have given way to a renewed era of great power competition. The pace of technological development and the growth of information has enabled new tools and tactics. And now our competitors are actively challenging the global order, with all that means for our defence, for our economic and energy security, and for international stability.

And yet the nature of warfare has not changed. It is still violent and brutal. It is still unpredictable, with the power to fuel instability and inequality worldwide, and to affect people everywhere.

This doctrine represents an evolution in our military thinking, combining the old and the new. It is a framework to modernise our capabilities and develop the culture we need for the future. The central tenets are familiar: mission command and the manoeuvrist approach, which are the traditional strengths of the UK Armed Forces. But we have introduced a third tenet to this edition – integrated action. This reflects the fact there are now five operational domains. But it also reflects the need to align our activity more closely with the other arms of government, and with our allies and partners.

Successive governments have shown they expect the Armed Forces to be used. They want us to be out in the world, delivering more for our nation, whether traditional defence and security, or in support of trade and prosperity, while also demonstrating to our adversaries that we are ready, if required, to fight and win.

This publication is an intellectual handrail on our journey to become match-fit to meet the demands of state-on-state competition, more agile in how we work, and even more global in outlook. And it matters to all of us. Read it. Understand it. Discuss and debate it as part of your professional development. And, most importantly, apply it to what we do. Because we are privileged to be entrusted with our nation's security and prosperity. And the more we do, and the better we do it, the stronger and safer we will become, and the more we enhance the nation's authority in the world.

A handwritten signature in green ink that reads "Tony Radakin". The signature is written in a cursive style and is underlined with a single horizontal line.

Admiral Sir Tony Radakin KCB ADC  
Chief of the Defence Staff



# Preface

## Purpose

1. The purpose of Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine* (UKDD), 6th Edition is to guide the employment of the military instrument and to explain its utility. While UKDD is authoritative, it requires judgement in its application.

## Context

2. As doctrine, JDP 0-01 is connected to policy, strategy and concepts. While it must be coherent with, and refer to, these documents, they are not covered in detail. UKDD will be revised and revisited as the context develops over time, and as the philosophies and principles that guide the employment and utility of the military instrument evolve.

## Audience

3. UKDD is relevant to all personnel within Defence, across government and to our allies and partners. It forms an essential part of professional military education to reinforce understanding as people progress through their careers.

## Structure

4. UKDD is divided into three chapters. A brief synopsis of each is below.
- a. **Chapter 1 – The strategic context.** Chapter 1 considers the enduring nature of war and the changing character of warfare. It highlights the changes to the strategic context and introduces the continuum of competition.
  - b. **Chapter 2 – Employment of the military instrument.** Chapter 2 focuses on what guides the use of the military instrument of power. It explains the application of the military instrument developed through the formulation of strategy. It reiterates the doctrinal tenets of the manoeuvrist approach and mission command, and also introduces integrated action, an evolution of our doctrine. It describes the principles of war, the components of fighting power, and legitimacy and the use of force.

c. **Chapter 3 – Utility of the military instrument.** Chapter 3 explores how the military instrument can be employed, highlighting the horizontal and vertical integration across hard and soft power, operational domains and levels of operations. It describes the types of operations that Defence conducts and also details Defence’s contribution to an active deterrence posture.

## Linkages

5. The philosophies and principles in this edition of UKDD are amplified in Allied Joint Publication-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine* and in subordinate keystone joint doctrine.<sup>1</sup> A number of reference documents that add context to UKDD include:

- *Global Britain in a competitive age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy* (referred to as the *Integrated Review* throughout);
- *Defence in a competitive age*;
- *How Defence Works*;
- *Defence Strategy 2022*;
- *The Good Operation*;
- *Integrated Operating Concept*;
- *Defence Experimentation for Force Development Handbook*;
- *The Defence Capability Framework*;
- *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept*;
- *NATO Military Strategy*;
- Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR’s) *Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area*; and
- SACEUR’s *Area of Responsibility-Wide Strategic Plan*.

.....  
<sup>1</sup> All national joint doctrine can be found on the [defnet doctrine homepage](#) with all unclassified doctrine also available externally at <https://www.gov.uk/mod/dcdc>



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# Chapter 1

Chapter 1 considers the enduring nature of war and the changing character of warfare. It highlights the changes to the strategic context and introduces the continuum of competition.

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Today, however, the international order is more fragmented, characterised by intensifying competition between states over interests, norms and values. A defence of the status quo is no longer sufficient for the decade ahead.

”

*Integrated Review, 2021*

## Chapter 1

# The strategic context

The future operating environment will not be limited by lines on maps or by geography.



*Defence in a competitive age, 2021*

1

## Section 1 – The enduring nature of war and changing character of warfare

1.1. The nature of war does not change; war is violent, competitive and chaotic. It is a fundamentally political activity. War and warfare are not synonymous, and there is more to war than warfare. Warfare – the conduct of war primarily, though not exclusively, by military means – has a changing character. The character of warfare is shaped by the pace and extent of technological, economic, societal and cultural change.

1.2. War can be variously described, including Clausewitz's philosophical phenomenon of 'violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will'. In simple terms, war is defined as: a state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country.<sup>1</sup> War is the last resort for resolving irreconcilable political differences and warfighting remains the pre-eminent purpose of our Armed Forces.<sup>2</sup>

1.3. The character of warfare is changing rapidly, driven by the pace and pervasiveness of information and technological change, not least in terms of space and cyber, and in emerging and disruptive technologies. Distinctions between public and private, foreign and domestic, state and non-state, and virtual and physical are blurred. The root cause of conflict and violence exists

<sup>1</sup> *Concise Oxford English Dictionary*, 12th Edition, 2011. The term 'war' as used in this publication does not have any legal significance. See Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 3-46, *Legal Support to Joint Operations* for an explanation of the legal framework governing military operations.

<sup>2</sup> The terms 'warfight' and 'warfighting' are not defined in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the UK. They are included in JDP 0-01 as they are in common use across Defence.

where another actor has an exploitable vulnerability or where a perceived imbalance exists. Understanding these drivers of conflict and violence improves our responses to protect the most vulnerable, and understanding the motives of actors results in more successful outcomes in the longer term. This approach is known as human security.<sup>3</sup>

## Section 2 – International context

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
1.4. The strategic context is complex, dynamic and competitive. Pervasive instability defines the security environment and it is challenged by those who seek to transgress the rules-based international order, test national resilience and exploit the lack of seams in a global and interconnected world, not least through hybrid attacks and disinformation. Climate change will increasingly exacerbate fragility and drive geopolitical competition.

1.5. As described by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in its *Strategic Concept 2022*, the Euro-Atlantic area is no longer at peace. The norms of the multilateral system that has assured our security and stability for several generations has been violated through the Russian Federation's actions in Ukraine. This represents another step in a recent history of coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation. Without seeking confrontation, the UK, along with our allies and partners, need to enhance resilience and strengthen deterrence and defence to meet this challenge; there is no guarantee the Russian Federation will not go further and threaten UK sovereignty, or that of our allies.

1.6. Alongside the Russian Federation, which NATO views as the most direct threat to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, we also face diversifying, intensifying, persistent and proliferating challenges from other authoritarian actors, such as the People's Republic of China, who seek to subvert international norms and undermine our interests and values. We need to counter this but remain open to constructive engagement. Threats also emanate from non-state actors such as violent extremists, cyber hackers and international criminal gangs. Terrorism, in its many forms, represents the most acute asymmetric threat to security and international peace and prosperity. Economic and political (and demographic) challenges across the globe, but especially in Africa and the Middle East, fuel instability and conflict, and open opportunities for coercive interference by strategic competitors.

.....  
<sup>3</sup> See Joint Service Publication 985, *Human Security in Defence* for further detail, which includes considerations of a range of factors and cross-cutting themes.





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The Euro-Atlantic area is no longer at peace – Kyiv, Ukraine, 25 February 2022

1.7. In many instances, the goal of all these actors is to achieve objectives, ideally without fighting. Their aim is to break our willpower using attacks that would not prompt a warfighting response. This does not, however, suggest an absence of potential escalation to violence and armed conflict. Therefore, the capability to act with responsive and combat-ready forces remains a primary competence of Defence.

1.8. Threats to UK security and stability also require Defence to understand the domestic context in which it operates and is enabled (for example, as a resilient base for strategic outload, or as the source of recruitment, industry and innovation). Consensus for Defence activity will be underpinned by a compelling narrative for the UK population, often against competing domestic challenges (such as a pandemic), and a narrative which must be consistent and synchronised across all instruments of national power domestically and internationally.

## Section 3 – Continuum of competition

1.9. Relationships between national governments, between groups and factions within a state, and between state and non-state actors are always competitive. The degree of competition at any given moment will dictate the position of a relationship on a continuum spanning from cooperation, through rivalry and confrontation, to possible armed conflict. The boundaries between the four are complex, dynamic and may be overlapping. The ‘continuum of competition’, shown in Figure 1.1, illustrates these relationships and shows the dynamic context within which Defence may be employed.

- a. Cooperation occurs when states or states and non-state actors work together to achieve the same objectives. This provides the ideal basis for enduring stability. However, domestic and international relations normally involve some degree of discord, such as economic competition, even during periods of cooperation.
- b. Rivalry occurs when two or more states or non-state actors have incompatible interests and contend for power in one or more sectors, whilst avoiding confrontation or conflict. Rivalry is normal in international relations and most states compete within the framework of the rules-based international order. Certain states use ways and means to create a form of strategic competition aimed at undermining their target's status and values for their own interests.
- c. Confrontation occurs where differences can no longer be reconciled, and adversaries oppose one another with hostile intent. It can result from misperception and miscalculation.
- d. Armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between states or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups within a state. As to whether any particular intervention crosses the threshold so as to become an armed conflict will depend on all the surrounding circumstances.<sup>4</sup> The terms 'war', 'warfight' or 'warfighting' are sometimes used to describe situations that amount, in law, to an armed conflict.




Figure 1.1 – The continuum of competition

<sup>4</sup> See Joint Service Publication 383, *The Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict*, 2004 Edition, paragraphs 3.3 and 3.3.1.



## Key points

- The nature of war does not change; the character of warfare is changing rapidly.
- The strategic context is increasingly complex, dynamic and competitive.
- Where human security cannot be achieved there is an increased probability of continued conflict and violence. The Russian Federation has violated the norms of the international system. This defines the security environment for the UK, NATO and our allies and partners.
- Our rivals are pursuing a strategy designed to undermine cohesion, to erode political, social and economic resilience, and to challenge our strategic position in key regions of the world. Their goal is to achieve objectives, ideally without fighting.
- The capability to act with responsive and combat-ready forces remains a primary competence of Defence.
- The UK needs to be prepared for an era of competition: having a strategic approach, consistent but flexible over the long-term.
- The degree of competition at any given moment will dictate the position of a relationship on a continuum spanning from cooperation, through rivalry and confrontation, to possible armed conflict.



# Chapter 2

Chapter 2 focuses on what guides the use of the military instrument of power. It explains the application of the military instrument developed through the formulation of strategy. It reiterates the doctrinal tenets of the manoeuvrist approach and mission command, and also introduces integrated action, an evolution of our doctrine. It describes the principles of war, the components of fighting power, and legitimacy and the use of force.

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Strategy is the bridge that relates  
military power to political purpose.

”

Colin Gray, *Modern Strategy*

## Chapter 2

# Employment of the military instrument

## Section 1 – Strategy

2.1. **Policy and strategy.** National political objectives and desired outcomes are articulated in policy and implemented through strategy. Policy is a statement of intent, or a commitment to act. Strategy integrates policy ends (what we need to achieve) with ways (how we will do this) and means (the resources we need) to support decision-making and achieve successful outcomes. Policy and strategy are interdependent. Policy ends can only be achieved if there is a credible strategy to deliver them, and strategy demands an achievable policy end state as well as a willingness to act and a commitment to resource the strategy.

2.2. **Effective strategy.** The goal of a strategy is to fulfil a vision. Strategy informs the plan and resources necessary to achieve success in a coherent manner, increasing the probability of achieving policy objectives. Given the increasing complexity of the multipolar international system and the growing threats ranged against the UK, its allies and partners, clear and effective strategy is more important than ever. To be effective, the military instrument must be employed as part of an integrated national and international strategy. As well as clarity of purpose, effective strategies have several other characteristics. Taken collectively, these characteristics give strategy ‘substance’ and ensure that it is more than just a politically expedient narrative, but aligns ‘power, commitment and national interest to political realities’.<sup>5</sup>

2

The UK is renowned as a thought leader and is envied for its ability to bring together the instruments of power.

Sir Stephen Lovegrove,  
speaking at the Council on Geostrategy, 16 September 2021

<sup>5</sup> Patrick Porter, ‘Why Britain Doesn’t Do Grand Strategy’, *The RUSI Journal*, 2010.

2.3. **Instruments of national power.** National strategy directs the integrated use of national power to achieve policy ends. Doctrine has traditionally characterised three instruments of national power – diplomatic, military and economic – with information as the latest addition.

- a. **Diplomatic.** The diplomatic instrument of national power uses diplomacy to manage international relations in support of national interests.
- b. **Information.** The information instrument of national power is the application of the UK’s institutional narrative using information activities (including strategic communication) in support of national interests. Information activity is underpinned by information technologies.
- c. **Military.** While warfighting remains the pre-eminent purpose and core competence of the military instrument, the UK is also adapting its forces to operate and compete more effectively below the threshold of armed conflict. This requires us to think differently about employing the military instrument.
- d. **Economic.** Economic success provides the foundation for security, stability and prosperity, and can be exploited to encourage desirable attitudes and behaviour. Economic and military levers are closely connected and are often employed together to achieve aims.

In the contemporary context, we must think beyond the four instruments to a broader range of civil-military responses, such as bringing together defence, diplomacy, development, intelligence and security, trade and aspects of domestic policy in pursuit of national and alliance objectives.

2.4. **Integrated approach.** The UK government pursues its objectives by leveraging the four instruments of national power. Military forces are rarely used in isolation but are often integrated and synchronised with partners across government. This provides more options for decision-makers to use all of the instruments of national power towards common national goals. This is referred to by the UK government as the integrated approach and is similar to the comprehensive approach used by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).<sup>6</sup> This is coherent with the new military doctrine of integrated action that describes how the military instrument is employed in an interconnected world and across operational domains.

.....  
<sup>6</sup> See the *Integrated Review* and Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine* for further detail.

2.5. **Defence strategy.** The Ministry of Defence is both a department of state and a strategic military headquarters. Employing a campaigning approach, Defence strategy aligns corporate strategy (namely, organising and managing Defence resources to generate capability) and military strategy. *Defence in a competitive age* sets out what the *Integrated Review* means for Defence. *Defence Strategy 2022* translates the four *Integrated Review* objectives into a set of Defence strategic outcomes (the changes we want to make in the world) and Defence enabling outcomes (the changes we want to make to ourselves). Defence strategy is designed to be iterative. It sets the framework for Defence, and will be systemically evaluated, allowing Defence's high-level strategy to be continuously assessed and validated.

2.6. **Military strategy.** Military strategy is a subset of Defence strategy. Military strategy comprises the high-level direction and employment of the UK's Armed Forces in campaigns, usually as part of an integrated UK response with allies and partners, focused on contributing to the desired outcomes set out in the national strategy. Military strategy is fundamentally about choices and priorities. Based on analysis it creates a theory of change between the present and a desired future state or condition, providing flexible options on how best to arrive there, expressed in coherent and clear terms.



Defence supports a range of activities focused on agreed objectives with the intent of delivering desired strategic outcomes





Strategy walks on two feet, one deliberate, the other emergent.

Henry Mintzberg and James A. Waters,  
*Strategic Management Journal*, Volume 6, 1985

2.7. **Implementing strategy.** We need to be as pre-emptive and anticipatory as emergent opportunities allow. However, strategy is rarely implemented in a straightforward manner. As a strategy is implemented it will unavoidably need to be adapted to changing circumstances, in particular the actions of rivals and adversaries, as well as events that could not have been foreseen in advance. While every effort will be made to hold to the original policy ends, these may need to be rethought and ways and means adjusted. In this respect strategy-making is a continuous process.

2.8. **Campaigns.** A campaign is defined as: a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective.<sup>7</sup> Campaigns are set out in military strategy and orchestrated through operational art.<sup>8</sup> Traditionally we associate campaign management with the operational level, although, for example, space effects, special forces and offensive cyber are routinely planned at the strategic level. Given that the current strategic context requires greater integration of all instruments of national power, campaign management must be conducted at the strategic level as well as the operational level.

## Section 2 – Tenets of doctrine

2.9. The successful employment of the military instrument is guided by the three tenets of doctrine described in this chapter. Mission command remains our enabling command philosophy and will be enhanced through our ability to gather, process, evaluate and transmit data at speed and empower our people to make faster, better decisions. The manoeuvrist approach continues to seek indirect approaches and to exploit success. However, in today's complex and dynamic environment, where pervasive information allows a much broader audience to judge our actions, our third tenet has evolved to ensure the continued successful planning and execution of operations – this is now called integrated action. Such activity has previously been termed 'joint action'; however, this is now considered too narrow and too focused on: the role of the military instrument; the enemy rather than the audiences; 'jointery'

.....  
<sup>7</sup> NATOTerm.

<sup>8</sup> For further detail see AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine* and AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations*.



at the operational level; and integrating the traditional three operational domains of maritime, land and air at the expense of space, cyber and electromagnetic domains; and on national rather than collective (alliance) outcomes.

## The manoeuvrist approach

2.10. The manoeuvrist approach is directly focused on the enemy. It has two specific requirements.

- a. **An attitude of mind.** The manoeuvrist approach is based on an attitude of mind that seeks indirect solutions, pitching strength against vulnerability, the use of initiative to act in original ways and a relentless determination to retain the initiative and exploit success. It depends on practical knowledge, agility, mission command and the willingness to accept risks.
- b. **Understanding.** Understanding helps us to identify audiences' vulnerabilities (including the population) and how these might be exploited, as well as our own vulnerabilities and how these might be protected. Centre of gravity analysis can be a useful tool for this. Commanders must also understand their own centre of gravity and critical vulnerabilities and protect their forces accordingly.

2.11. The manoeuvrist approach seeks to out-think and outmanoeuvre competitors and potential adversaries physically, cognitively and virtually across the operational domains.<sup>9</sup> The manoeuvrist approach seeks to seize and hold the initiative, shape understanding, and undermine will and fracture cohesion.

- a. **Seizing and holding the initiative.** Seizing and holding the initiative aims to impose multiple and simultaneous dilemmas. Significant features are momentum, tempo, deception, simultaneity, pre-emption and agility which, in combination, aim to achieve surprise and induce shock.
- b. **Shaping understanding.** The manoeuvrist approach seeks to manipulate understanding to produce favourable attitudes and behavioural outcomes in selected audiences. The perception of failure is the best mechanism to promote actual failure.
- c. **Undermining will and fracturing cohesion.** Will and cohesion are indivisible. Will is the determination to persist in the face of adversity.

<sup>9</sup> Physical, cognitive and virtual dimensions are described in AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*.

It has two aspects: intent and resilience. Cohesion is linked to all the components of fighting power. Our will and cohesion must be protected from the actions of adversaries. Will and cohesion can be targeted through dislocation, disruption and ultimately destruction.

## Integrated action

2.12. Integrated action can be described as the audience-centric orchestration of military activities, across all operational domains, synchronised with non-military activities to influence the attitude and behaviour of selected audiences necessary to achieve successful outcomes.

2.13. Successful integrated action begins with commanders being clear about the outcome they seek; they need to study the audiences relevant to achieving the identified outcome and analyse the effects they wish to create on those target audiences. Only then should the mix of capabilities be determined to create physical, cognitive and virtual effects across the operational domains to affect the understanding, physical capability, will and cohesion of the audiences to achieve a successful outcome. These lethal and non-lethal capabilities may belong to the force itself, or intergovernmental, inter-agency, non-governmental, private sector or multinational actors involved in the operation. Activities can be conducted by, with or through partners. What is important is for commanders and staff to work out how to orchestrate and, where capabilities lie outside the force, synchronise all the relevant levers. Understanding the audiences is the major consideration of integrated action.

2.14. An audience-centric approach<sup>10</sup> recognises that people are at the heart of competition; it is their decisions and behaviours that determine how competition is conducted and resolved. Audiences are segmented into three general categories – public, stakeholders and actors – depending on their ability to affect our outcomes, as depicted in Figure 2.1. A sophisticated understanding provides the focus for planning and executing activity to create or maintain the attitudes that constitute behaviour. Commanders, with an understanding of the strategic narrative, can then conduct target audience analysis to identify the effects that they wish to create.

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<sup>10</sup> NATO uses the term behaviour-centric rather than audience-centric.




Figure 2.1 – Audience-centric approach

2.15. **Multi-domain integration.** Multi-domain integration (MDI) is a concept and as such articulates developing thinking on the future of Defence. The intent of MDI is to ensure Defence develops into a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts across the ‘operate’ and ‘warfight’ spectrum. It therefore provides a force development philosophy: the need to join-up policy, process, people, information and promote integrated capabilities across the five operational domains. The greatest benefit will come from being able to sense, understand, plan and then orchestrate combinations of activities across operational domains in concert with the other instruments of national power, NATO and other like-minded allies and partners. Strategic Command as Defence’s integrator is responsible for realising Defence’s ambition for MDI, with its MDI Change Programme responsible for leading and catalysing the change. By integrating the five operational domains, MDI seeks to move us beyond joint and provides the wherewithal to draw upon and exploit as many capabilities as possible, including non-military, to create multiple dilemmas that can unhinge a rival’s understanding, decision-making and execution. By improving our ability to sense, understand, decide, generate options and tempo across multiple operational domains, and act with greater precision, MDI will improve our ability to conduct integrated action and thereby achieve successful outcomes.

## Mission command



Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.

General George Patton

2

2.16. The employment of the military instrument is enabled by mission command. Command is the authority vested in an individual of our Armed Forces for directing, coordinating and controlling military forces. The way command is exercised within our Armed Forces is described as their command philosophy. Mission command is founded on the clear expression of intent by commanders and the freedom of subordinates to act to achieve that intent. Mission command is a form of decentralised decision-making, which promotes initiative and the ability to dictate tempo, but which is responsive to superior direction. Mission command is essential to integration and integrated action at the lower operational and tactical levels. Integration is complex; commanders may need to cohere activity from across the force and the different levels of operations, integrating multi-domain actions that are delivered at speeds ranging from the speed of light to walking pace, to create multiple synchronised effects in the engagement space.<sup>11</sup>

2.17. Mission command emphasises the importance of making a timely decision, and the importance of understanding the intention of the commander. There is a responsibility to fulfil that intention based on clear understanding of common doctrine, mutual trust between commanders, obedience to orders and the initiative to act within any freedom of action given, or purposefully in the absence of further orders. Trust is a prerequisite of mission command. Trust – by commanders in their superior’s plans and by commanders in their subordinates that they will sensibly interpret their intent and persevere to achieve it – can only be developed through shared experience, training and testing. Trust is earned and cannot be demanded. Commanders will decide the extent of delegation based upon the specific context and judgement of their subordinates. A commander must understand which subordinates will thrive and excel with fewer constraints, and which will require more direction and control. This is likely to inform the kind of tasks different subordinates receive.

.....  
<sup>11</sup> Engagement space is described in AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*. Engagement space and battlespace have been agreed by NATO as synonyms. The UK’s preferred term is engagement space.

## Section 3 – Principles of war

Principles of military art shine in history like the sun on the horizon, so much the worse for blind men incapable of seeing them.

Napoleon Bonaparte



2.18. The principles of war reflect war's enduring nature within the context of the changing character of warfare and inform and guide the way in which we apply the military instrument. The principles of war are not an exhaustive list, nor are they rules to be rigidly followed, but they do provide comprehensive considerations for planning and executing campaigns and operations. Underpinned by understanding and the three tenets of doctrine, their expression, emphasis and application change in relation to context. Except for selection and maintenance of the aim, placed first as the master principle, the relative importance of each of the principles will vary according to context. Applying them requires judgement, common sense and intelligent interpretation. The rapidly changing character of warfare, driven by the pervasiveness of information and pace of technological change, informs their contemporary relevance and, by extension, the evolution of two of the principles: 'concentration of effects' replacing 'concentration of force'; and 'integration' replacing 'cooperation'.

### Selection and maintenance of the aim

2.19. Regarded as the master principle of war, selection and maintenance of the aim provides focus. It enables military strategy and an outcome-focused execution at all levels of command. It is a reference point to assess progress, prevents unnecessary activity and conserves resources.

2.20. It is founded on understanding, as insight and foresight are required for effective decision-making. Yet the complexity and uncertainty of the strategic context, amplified by the 'noise' of pervasive information, makes selection and maintenance of the aim harder to achieve. A flexible and iterative approach can help ensure strategies and plans remain valid because uncertainty, chance, political reality and insufficient understanding of a situation may prevent the selection of a single aim from the outset.



Morale is susceptible to external influences, including public opinion

## Maintenance of morale

2.21. Maintenance of morale provides the will to fight. High morale is characterised by steadfastness, courage, confidence and sustained hope. Morale manifests itself as staying power and resolve, as well as the will to prevail despite provocation and adversity. It is a product of: inspired political and military leadership; the legitimacy of operations; a shared sense of purpose and values; well-being; confidence in equipment; and training that forges fighting spirit, moral cohesion and calculated risk taking without fear of failure.

2.22. Morale is susceptible to external influences, including public opinion. The will to fight is substantially reinforced and sustained by the belief that the nation supports us; therefore, the media's contribution is important. Positive reporting reassures Service personnel that they enjoy national support and public recognition. Equally, adverse media reporting can erode morale.

## Offensive action

2.23. Underpinned by fighting spirit, offensive action implies a vigorous, incisive approach to exploiting opportunities and seizing the initiative. The principle of offensive action is reflected in assertive and confident campaigning that confronts threats early and proactively.

2.24. Critically, applying offensive action does not preclude defensive action when required and is not synonymous with killing and destroying – although that might be necessary. It is better to strive for the imposition of will at the least possible loss, recognising the willingness to accept political and military risk, but not to gamble.

## Security

2.25. Security entails balancing the likelihood of loss against achieving objectives. Skill in command is, therefore, a foundation of security. It is a shield that can help conserve fighting power and affords freedom of action, when and where required to achieve objectives. It demands managing risk, protecting high-value assets (including data and networks) and resilience.

2.26. Security contributes to preparedness and deterrence but does not demand overcommitting our resources to guard against every threat or possibility, thereby diminishing relative fighting power. Bold action remains essential to success.

2.27. Lack of security, or a false interpretation of the principle of security, leads directly to being surprised. Commanders should anticipate the effects of being surprised and make appropriate contingency plans to safeguard their freedom of action.

## Surprise

2.28. Surprise, in its direct meaning, presupposes the unexpected. Whether achieved through physical or virtual methods, or a combination of both, surprise achieves a cognitive effect – a feeling of relative confusion, or perhaps shock – that can undermine an opponent’s cohesion and morale.

2.29. Surprising an opponent is a significant way of seizing the initiative and may be a critical precondition for success. It is transient and must be exploited rapidly. Deception is closely related to surprise and requires deliberate measures to mislead targeted decision-makers into behaving in a manner advantageous to achieving our objective.



## Concentration of effect

2.30. A commander must balance the concentrated delivery of lethal and non-lethal capabilities at critical points and times and increasingly at greater range and dispersal to realise effect. This must be done in concert with other national instruments to generate the most appropriate blend of hard and soft power.

2.31. Concentration applies to all operations and requires unity of effort through integration. Commanders must accept that achieving concentration demands economy elsewhere.

## Economy of effort

2.32. Economy of effort may be described as the effective and efficient application of the components of fighting power: conceptual, moral and physical.

2.33. Commanders must prioritise resources between all campaigns, operations and activities. Economy of effort is best summarised as creating the right effect, in the right place, at the right time, with the appropriate resources. An important first step to success is to conserve our own strength and to force an opponent to dissipate theirs. Effective risk management will enable economy of effort and is aligned with the manoeuvrist approach.

## Flexibility

2.34. Flexibility is the ability to change readily to meet new circumstances and comprises the adaptability, versatility, resilience and responsiveness of the whole force – both mental and physical aspects. Really flexible organisations are highly responsive. Responsiveness is a measure of speed of action, reaction and of how quickly the initiative can be seized or regained.

2.35. Adaptability is an increasingly important aspect of flexibility. Adaptability is not solely adjusting to new external conditions or responding to adversaries; it is also about our ability to learn rapidly and respond to internal stimuli to change. The quality of our people, their creativity and resourcefulness provide our adaptive edge. This must be combined with a willingness to take risk, the creation of an innovative instinct, experimentation and the ability to field capability quickly.



## Integration

2.36. To integrate is to combine or be combined to form a whole. Integration has an amplifying effect that must support and not hinder the adaptability of the force. It may be likened to the connective tissue that knits all the parts of the force together whilst retaining the benefit of diverse perspectives and approaches.

2.37. The effectiveness and efficiency of the force is improved through: mutual trust and goodwill; a common aim; and integration across operational domains and through strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations. Integration is therefore closely associated with the principles of concentration of effect and economy of effort.

## Sustainability

2.38. Sustainability of a fighting force is a critical enabler of fighting power's moral and physical components and helps to enable freedom of action.<sup>12</sup> It is anchored on a resilient and capable strategic base at the heart of a global support network.

2.39. Sustainability directly influences the tempo, duration and intensity of activities, and exploited effectively it allows constant pressure to lessen an adversary's will to fight. It is an enabler of operational agility and reflects our preparedness and resolve, and therefore contributes to deterrence. The ability to sustain activity is a factor in assessing the feasibility of an operation. Increasingly, our operations will need to be delivered sustainably.<sup>13</sup> This will include making Defence activity less dependent on fossil fuels and successfully managing the energy transition to a more diverse mix.

.....  
12 Sustainability is defined as: the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. NATOTerm.

13 In this instance sustainably is used as an encompassing term for activity that is delivered in a manner that minimises adverse effects by aligning to environmental, social and governance positive practice.

## Section 4 – Fighting power



Human force is threefold: it is mental, moral and physical, but none of these forms of force can be expended without influencing the other two.

Major General J F C Fuller

2

2.40. Fighting power determines the ability of our Armed Forces to operate and warfight. Fighting power's hierarchy consists of a pre-eminent moral component (the will), a conceptual component (the thought process) and a physical component (the means). This is shown in Figure 2.2. Each component mutually supports and informs the other. The changing character of warfare requires adaptation of our fighting power if we are to function successfully.




Figure 2.2 – The components of fighting power

## Moral component

2.41. The moral component concerns the ability to get people to fight. Many theorists and all practitioners of war have pointed to the significance of the moral aspect in fighting.<sup>14</sup> For Clausewitz it was so important, ‘with uncertainty in one scale, courage and self-confidence must be thrown into the other to correct the balance.’ The moral factor is difficult to define. It is often summed up in the term morale which Napoleon quantifies in his statement that: ‘morale is to the material [physical] as three is to one.’ Maintenance of morale is a principle of war and as such embraces both the moral and physical aspects of fighting power. High morale will stem from sound training, confidence in equipment and good administration, as well as confidence in commanders, discipline, self-respect and a clear knowledge of what is going on and what is required. Yet the ability to get people to fight is not just a question of morale, it will also require consideration of the features detailed below.

2.42. **Leadership.** Leadership is a variable combination of example, persuasion and compulsion. It is the projection of personality and purpose to influence subordinates to prevail in demanding circumstances. Leadership at all levels is the principal element in maintaining morale. The effectiveness of the whole force is dependent on military and civilian leadership at all levels. While natural leaders are rare, training and experience can develop latent potential. Leaders should consider the following.

- a. A leader’s foremost duty is to those they lead, they must know their subordinates, and they must always place the care of their subordinates before themselves.
- b. Effective leaders must demonstrate integrity, strength of character, judgement, initiative and professionalism. They must respect the diversity of those they lead.
- c. The style of leadership should be adapted to the circumstances.
- d. To gain the respect and commitment of their subordinates, leaders must demonstrate professional competence, fair discipline and moral courage.

.....  
<sup>14</sup> The 2022 Ukraine conflict has demonstrated the Clausewitzian trinity of the power of people, government and armed forces working together to generate significant national resilience and the will to fight.



Commanders should seek as inclusive an approach as possible

- e. Leaders should engender in their subordinates the confidence that breeds initiative and the acceptance of risk and responsibility.
- f. In the face of adversity, leaders must demonstrate courage and contain their own fear.
- g. Subordinates' perceptions of their leaders are based on their reputation, demonstration of competence, personal example and authority.

2.43. **Followership.** Followership is the act or condition of following an appointed leader. Good followership is as vital as strong leadership, and its benefits achieve unity of purpose. Commanders should seek as inclusive an approach as possible. Effective collaboration requires flexibility, openness and sensitivity toward all stakeholders. Followership does not preclude initiative and the important role of challenge, which are essential to mission command and good decision-making.

2.44. **Culture.** The deep and distinctive organisational cultures of Defence have emerged and evolved over centuries. Comprising complex traditions, practices, organisational structures, artefacts and unwritten norms, our cultures underpin effective fighting power and our warfighting ethos. But they are also the cause of deep-seated behaviours and cognitive biases across all

ranks and grades in Defence such as groupthink, tribalism, ‘can-do’ mentality, presentism, cultural blindness, and consent and evade mindsets. This can hinder change and innovation and often contributes to poor decision-making, breaches of discipline, unacceptable behaviours, systemic and human failings that lead to errors, incidents and accidents. Defence also contributes to changes in wider national strategic culture. As Defence adapts at pace, we must safeguard positive aspects of our organisational culture while seeking to identify and change those that hold us back.<sup>15</sup>

2.45. **Warfighting ethos.** Warfighting ethos is the characteristic spirit of the cultures of our Armed Forces manifested in our attitudes and aspirations. It provides us with the vital moral, emotional and spiritual capacity to overcome fear and cope with the visceral and highly ambiguous nature of war; it is crucial to instilling courage and human resilience in our personnel who are required to fight. Warfighting ethos unifies those who serve and emerges out of the complex processes, practices and norms of the cultures of our Armed Forces. It is inculcated in our people particularly through leadership, tradition, unit cohesion, training and discipline.

2.46. **Moral cohesion.** Moral cohesion underpins the moral courage to fight and keep on fighting. It is built on shared experiences, a common sense of worth, discipline and collective identity. It is sustained by shared common values and standards. Commanders should consider three aspects.

- a. **Professional ethos.** Derived from identifiable and intangible qualities of each Service that promote a fighting spirit and determination to succeed.
- b. **Self-esteem.** Derived from a sense of belonging to a highly capable, professional organisation.
- c. **Tradition.** A sense of heritage and professional reputation strengthens team cohesion.

2.47. **Motivation.** Motivation is a product of training, confidence in equipment, leadership, management, reward, welfare, discipline and mutual respect. Motivation and morale are interdependent. Motivation can be affected by external influences (including public opinion), which can reassure or erode

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<sup>15</sup> For more on overcoming cognitive bias see Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 04, *Understanding and Decision-making*, Ministry of Defence (MOD), *Red Teaming Handbook* and MOD, *Reasonable Challenge: A Guide*, 2017.

morale. Motivation is underpinned by the perceived legitimacy of operations. When members of our Armed Forces assume the legal right and duty to apply lethal force they relinquish many rights and freedoms enjoyed by civilians and accept the liability to lay down their lives in the service of the nation when required. In return, the nation promises that those who serve, or who have served, and their families are treated fairly through the Armed Forces Covenant.<sup>16</sup>



Let whoever is in charge keep this simple thing in [their] head (not, how can I always do this right thing myself, but) how can I provide for this right thing to always be done?

Florence Nightingale

2.48. **Moral integrity.** Moral integrity provides the foundations upon which both cohesion and motivation are built and requires individuals to understand right and wrong. It is instilled by personal discipline, education and training, and reinforced through the values and standards expressed by each Service. Commanders are responsible for the moral integrity of their units and for ensuring that our operations are conducted in accordance with the relevant legal frameworks.

### Legitimacy and force

2.49. The effective employment of our military instrument is dependent on its legitimacy. The activity of UK Armed Forces, including the use of force and its doctrine, is subject to national and international law. Military objectives and the conduct of UK Armed Forces remain subject to relevant civil control by ministers accountable to Parliament. Applying combat power will be limited to that which is necessary to attain the desired end state and legally permissible.

2.50. Law is central to conflicts. The use of UK and international law by those opposed to the UK government's conduct of Defence activities, so called 'lawfare', has a real impact on how we do our business. Lawfare influences our priorities and informs permissions. The law can be used by adversary states to undermine the legitimacy of the UK government's position directly, or by civil society proxies through vexatious litigation to prevent or slow activities. We must ensure that our legal frameworks continue to allow us to meet our ethical standards while reflecting the realities of the operating environment and

<sup>16</sup> Information can be found at <https://www.armedforcescovenant.gov.uk>

its tempo. Furthermore, maintaining legitimacy is crucial to campaign authority. It builds morale and promotes cohesion, both within a force and between coalition partners, and confers both the freedom to act and constraints on military activity. We must be mindful of the risk of vicarious liability when operating with partners.

2.51. Legitimacy encompasses the legal, moral, political, diplomatic and ethical propriety of the conduct of military forces at both an organisation and individual level. Legitimacy is based upon both subjective perceptions, such as the values, beliefs and opinions of a variety of audiences, and demonstrable, objective legality. Therefore, the audiences and their perceptions of legitimacy will vary with each operation. It follows that the authority for military action, both legal and political, should be articulated clearly to members of our Armed Forces, the public, international audiences, and to our opponents and their domestic populations. The potential for the law to be used against us must be anticipated in operational planning. Equally, we must be robust in calling out our adversaries' abuses of the law.

## Conceptual component

2.52. The conceptual component provides a framework of thinking within which military personnel can develop understanding about both their profession and the activities that they may have to undertake. It has relevance at all levels of operations and depends on the development and exploitation of human qualities such as critical thinking, challenge, diversity of thought, foresight, resilience and adaptability to build the agility that Defence needs to succeed. The conceptual component reflects accumulated experience, improvements to existing practice (gained through lessons and experimentation) and analysis of the future security environment. It is the distilled experience of many years of making strategy and of mounting and conducting operations, disseminated and implemented through a variety of means, including publications and professional military education. The conceptual component comprises: strategic analysis and assessment; concept development; and doctrine.

2.53. **Strategic analysis and assessment.** Strategic analysis and assessment is the analysis of current and future trends and plausible outcomes to provide the context for long-term decision-making. It informs and supports the development of Defence policy and capability. It is conducted through three interconnected activities:

- developing understanding of the strategic context for Defence;
- supporting policy and strategy by building the evidence base; and
- challenging the assumptions that underpin policy and strategy.

2.54. **Concept development.** A concept is defined as: an agreed notion or idea, normally set out in a document, that provides guidance for different working domains and which may lead to the development of a policy.<sup>17</sup> Concept development is the application of a deliberate methodology to:

- explore, understand and define Defence problems;
- determine possible solutions that guide how forces will operate; and
- influence the policies and capabilities that are required to enable the force to achieve success.

Concepts propose solutions to challenges and opportunities for which no doctrine exists or for which existing doctrine is inadequate. They contain a combination of informed judgement, underpinned by available evidence, and must be developed through experimentation designed to discover new information, test a hypothesis or validate a solution or choice. Concepts can be initiated from across a broad spectrum of activity including: operational lessons; technological advances; policy and strategy changes; academic research; and horizon-scanning. A concept must be sufficiently detailed to be tested and developed through experimentation and it must be validated by demonstrating a clear and substantial paradigm shift in the way we operate. Ultimately, a successful concept should be translated into doctrine.

2.55. **Doctrine.** Doctrine is defined as: the fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative advice but requires judgement in application.<sup>18</sup> Doctrine can be simply described as considered thought on the best way of doing things now. It interprets ideas about war and how they affect its conduct and character by combining conceptual ideas and operational lessons into functional guidelines for action. Doctrine can also be used as an agent for change. The UK follows the NATO Standardization Policy and uses Allied joint doctrine where it can

.....  
17 NATOTerm.

18 NATOTerm.



to guide operational-level commanders and staff.<sup>19</sup> The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) is the UK lead for Allied and UK joint doctrine development. Doctrine for the tactical level comprises Allied tactical publications, UK joint tactics, techniques and procedures (produced by the Directorate of Joint Warfare) and UK single-Service tactical doctrine.

## Physical component

2.56. The physical component of fighting power provides the means to operate and warfight. It comprises personnel, equipment, training and collective performance, sustainability and readiness.

2.57. **People.** Defence's success depends on its people; they are the critical component of Defence capability. As a consequence, it is essential there are sufficient, capable and motivated people to continue to give Defence its competitive edge. This demand is met through investment in recruiting, developing and retaining a high-quality, diverse workforce of the right mix of Regulars, Reserves, civil servants, industry partners and contractors. Rather than only relying on superior fire power and technical capabilities, and the skills our people require to exploit them, our leaders must seek out, develop and exploit human qualities such as critical thinking, diversity of thought, human resilience and adaptability to build the agility through which Defence will succeed. As the force structure changes in response to the changing character of warfare, so too must our employment models to maximise the advantage we seek.

2



Defence invests in its people to provide the decisive edge

<sup>19</sup> Chief of the Defence Staff/Permanent Secretary Directive, *Putting NATO at the Heart of UK Defence*, 13 July 2012.

2.58. **Equipment.** A credible fighting force depends upon sufficient and effective equipment, optimised and scaled according to strategic direction. Equipment is purchased in an evidence-based manner within resource constraints. Wherever possible it must be designed to be technically interoperable across Defence and with allies and partners. Projecting and employing a force demands a sustainable equipment capability programme. Informed by Defence Force Development, including both strategic need and conceptual innovation, our equipment acquisition programme should be underpinned by both sustainable and robust manufacture and supply, as well as flexible and affordable through-life support.

2.59. **Training and collective performance.** The current strategic context requires Defence to think about training and associated activity as a surrogate for warfare. Conditioning personnel for adversity and the changing character of warfare begins with initial training and continues through demanding collective training. This should entail the right balance of live and simulated training and match the character of the likely operating environments as closely as possible. It must be designed to generate innovation and adaptation and build warfighting ethos. Collective performance is characterised by the high levels of cohesion, confidence and proficiency achieved by units and formations that have trained or operated together. Where time and resources allow, this should be achieved by individual Services preparing their respective force elements for joint activity. Thereafter, collective performance should focus on contributing to joint and multinational operations and integrating personnel and equipment, and the activities' effects on potential adversaries and allies. Collective performance is also optimised when it integrates industry partners and contractors within the force.

2.60. **Sustainability.** The ability to sustain operations is an essential element to generating credible and effective fighting power and which affects the moral as well as the physical component. As such it is a UK principle of war. It is, however, vulnerable to macroeconomic changes as equipment programmes and materiel costs may vary. It is enabled by combining:

- logistics, which links the strategic base (including infrastructure, stock and industrial capacity) with deployed forces through the Defence Support Network;<sup>20</sup>
- personnel and administrative force structures;

<sup>20</sup> See JDP 4-00, *Logistics for Joint Operations* and AJP-4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Logistics*.

- health and medical support;
- training and equipment;
- infrastructure; and
- communications and information management.

2.61. **Readiness.** The UK holds forces and supporting capabilities at varying states of readiness (routinely measured in days and hours) consistent with the assessed risks and threats. Readiness is defined as: the period measured from an initiation order to the moment when the headquarters or unit is ready to perform its task from its peacetime location (permanent or forward deployed) or ready for deployment.<sup>21</sup> Readiness postures:

- balance the time needed for force generation, preparation and deployment with available resources;
- comprise a combination of capacity (how much of the force is usable within a certain time frame, in itself underpinned by equipment availability), capability (relative to an adversary), interoperability (an absolute requirement and potential mitigation for capability gaps) and sustainability (provision of sufficient materiel to ensure the deployed force is fully prepared to operate); and
- can contribute to deterrence by demonstrating our preparedness and resolve.

2.62. **Notice to effect.** Readiness is complemented by notice to effect, which is the time allowed for units to be at a location of employment, creating a prearranged effect, with an agreed capability. It includes readiness, mounting, deployment time, and reception, staging, onward movement and integration (if required), including time to integrate with international allies as part of a multinational force. As notice to effect is situation specific and may not be able to be predetermined, force elements are not routinely held at a defined notice to effect.<sup>22</sup> Responsiveness requires force resilience, speed of recognition, speed of decision-making and speed of assembly, as much as readiness.

<sup>21</sup> JDP 0-01.1, *UK Terminology Supplement to NATO Term*.

<sup>22</sup> See *Defence Strategy 2022*.

## Section 5 – Human security

2.63. Closely associated with legitimacy and the use of force, as described under the moral component, is the essential requirement to consider aspects of human security, including countering conflict-related sexual violence. This is essential to a compelling narrative; thereby maintaining the UK's and its allies and partners' legitimacy and campaign authority. In contrast, the absence of human security is a vulnerability of many authoritarian states and non-state actors. Human security describes several considerations that, if ignored or compromised, are drivers of instability. These include factors of human insecurity, such as personal/physical, political, food, health, environment/ climate, economy, cultural, information and a number of cross-cutting themes. The cross-cutting themes are:

- protection of civilians;
- women, peace and security;
- effect of armed conflict on children and youth;
- impact of conflict on modern slavery and human trafficking;
- criticality of building integrity and countering corruption in affected areas;
- imperative to protect cultural property; and
- importance of preventing and countering state and non-state adversaries.

2.64. Addressing human security considerations in a coherent manner contributes toward more sustainable security outcomes and supports mission success. It requires the military to better understand how human insecurities affect individuals, communities and other actors. This understanding allows the military to plan operations that minimise harm to civilians, reduce human rights violations and achieve conflict-sensitive outcomes. Defence must take responsibility for coordinating human security in its areas of operations when operating and warfighting in all five operational domains. It is UK and NATO policy for Allied and UK joint doctrine to consider human security.

## Key points

- Strategy integrates policy ends (what we need to achieve) with ways (how we will do this) and means (the resources we need).
- The UK's national strategy integrates all instruments of national power in pursuit of national policy aims to secure our national interests.
- Defence strategy aligns corporate strategy (namely, organising and managing Defence resources to generate capability) and military strategy.
- Military strategy is a subset of Defence strategy and comprises the high-level direction and employment of the UK's Armed Forces in campaigns.
- As a strategy is implemented it will unavoidably need to be adapted to changing circumstances. Whilst ends should, by and large, remain constant, these may need to be rethought and the ways and means adjusted.
- The UK has three core tenets of doctrine. The requirement for the manoeuvrist approach and mission command endures. However, in today's complex and dynamic environment our third tenet has evolved to ensure the continued successful planning and execution of operations – this is now called integrated action.
- The principles of war reflect war's enduring nature. However, the rapidly changing character of warfare, informs the evolution of two of the principles.
- Fighting power's hierarchy consists of a pre-eminent moral component (the will), a conceptual component (the thought process) and a physical component (the means).
- The effective employment of our military instrument is dependent on its legitimacy.
- It is an essential requirement to consider human security in operations.



# Chapter 3

Chapter 3 explores how the military instrument can be employed, highlighting the horizontal and vertical integration across hard and soft power, operational domains and levels of operations. It describes the types of operations that Defence conducts and also details Defence's contribution to an active deterrence posture.

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The Armed Forces, working with the rest of government, must think and act differently. They will no longer be held as a force of last resort, but become more present and active around the world.

”

*Defence in a competitive age, 2021*

## Chapter 3

# Utility of the military instrument

3.1. Defence and the military instrument of national power play a unique role in protecting and promoting the three fundamental national interests: sovereignty, security and prosperity. Defence's fundamental purpose is to protect the people of the UK, prevent conflict and be ready to fight our enemies. To meet national ambition and to protect the UK, its citizens, its interests and its allies, our Armed Forces must be ready and able to fight; it is their core competence. The willingness to commit credible warfighting capabilities is an essential part of our ability to compete and operate more effectively and therefore our ability to deter, including whilst engaged in an armed conflict.

3.2. Defence and partners across government need to continually adjust the way we think about applying the military instrument to match circumstances, recognising that the military instrument is just one of the instruments that would need to be applied. Long-held beliefs, assumptions and attitudes (that give meaning to shared experiences and shape corporate behaviour) must evolve rapidly if our strategic culture is to keep pace with the security context and our ambition.

## Section 1 – Smart power, operational domains and levels of operations

3.3. As described in Chapter 2, multi-domain integration will enhance the utility of the military instrument through being able to sense and then orchestrate combinations of activities across the five operational domains – maritime, land, air, space, and cyber and electromagnetic – in concert with our allies and partners, and across government using a combination of hard and soft power, which is known as smart power. In addition to this horizontal integration (activity across operational domains), further advantage will be realised by vertical integration (activities within the same domain) through the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations.

## Smart power

3.4. States and organisations apply power across the instruments to achieve policy goals through a blend of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power. These are described below. The skill of smart power lies in knowing when to use differing levels of each as necessary.

a. **Hard power.** Hard power employs military capability and economic strength (both sanctions and incentives) to achieve the desired behaviours of states, groups or individuals, or to directly change the course of events. Those using hard power often seek to coerce opponents to adopt a course of action that they would not otherwise choose themselves. The military and economic instruments are important sources of hard power, supported by the diplomatic and information instruments. They also serve as deterrents. The difference between deterrence and coercion is important. Both are aspects of hard power, but deterrence aims to dissuade a course of action whilst one of the aims of coercion is to encourage a course of action. Deterrence is described in greater detail at Section 3.

b. **Soft power.** Soft power is the ability to persuade or encourage others to adopt an alternative approach primarily through cultural and ideological means or by encouraging emulation. Soft power is generally slower and more difficult to employ in a targeted way. Much soft power lies outside a democratic government’s control, presenting a challenge to its generation. Therefore, applying soft power demands: investment over time; clear, consistent communication strategies and measures of effectiveness; and a developed understanding of the intended audience and their societal codes, beliefs and cultures. Diplomatic and informational capabilities underpin the effectiveness of soft power. Soft power is important to the UK. The UK’s soft power, the size and depth of its global connections and the trust we enjoy, has a direct impact on our prosperity and security. The military is generally considered the quintessential instrument of hard power, but it has important soft power uses, for instance in training assistance, professional military education, carrying out or enabling humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and promoting Global Britain.



The military is generally considered the quintessential instrument of hard power, but it has important soft power uses

## Operational domains

3

3.5. Military activity occurs within the five operational domains. Operational domains provide a framework for organising the military instrument and represent spheres of military activity within the engagement space. The term ‘operational’ does not refer to the operational level of warfare, it reflects operations and activity within the engagement space.

- a. **Maritime domain.** The maritime domain comprises capabilities and their activities primarily related to operating below, on and above the surface of the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas and at the high-water mark, overlapping with the land domain in the landward segment of the littorals.<sup>23</sup>
- b. **Land domain.** The land domain comprises capabilities and activities primarily related to operating on the Earth’s land mass, ending at the high-water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals.<sup>24</sup>
- c. **Air domain.** The air domain comprises capabilities and activities primarily related to operating in the airspace that begins at the Earth’s

<sup>23</sup> See Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-10, *UK Maritime Power* for further detail.

<sup>24</sup> See JDP 0-20, *UK Land Power* for further detail

surface, extending to the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible.<sup>25</sup>

d. **Space domain.** The space domain comprises activities and capabilities primarily related to operating in space, where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible but its capabilities are enabled by assets on Earth. Therefore, the space domain includes the satellites in orbit and beyond, supporting ground infrastructure and the information layer connecting ground and space.<sup>26</sup>

e. **Cyber and electromagnetic domain.** The cyber and electromagnetic domain comprises capabilities and activities primarily related to operating within the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data. This includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, embedded processors, controllers and the electromagnetic waves with frequencies that constitute the electromagnetic spectrum.<sup>27</sup>

3.6. Although information is not a domain, information activities are operational domain actions whose primary focus is to create a cognitive effect. The integration of information operations staff in planning processes ensure that the full range of domain and information activities required to achieve a successful outcome are harnessed.<sup>28</sup>

3.7. Successful integration of actions, within and across domains, enables the commander to gain and maintain the initiative by enhancing pre-emption, surprise, simultaneity, tempo and exploitation. This generates greater freedom of manoeuvre in the engagement space to create physical, virtual and cognitive effects within their operations area.

## Levels of operations

3.8. The military instrument is applied across three levels of operations: strategic, operational and tactical. This delineation helps clarify the relationships and actions required to link national aims, strategic objectives,

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<sup>25</sup> See JDP 0-30, *UK Air Power* for further detail.

<sup>26</sup> See JDP 0-40, *UK Space Power* for further detail.

<sup>27</sup> See JDP 0-50, *UK Defence Cyber and Electromagnetic Doctrine* for further detail. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization refers to cyberspace as the domain and not cyber and electromagnetic.

<sup>28</sup> See Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.10, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations* for further detail.

military campaigns and major operations, and tactical operations and actions. In theory, each level has its own purpose, time horizons, command and control structures, and capability ownership. In practice, the difference between these blurs and the need for greater integration through the levels of operations is increasing.

a. **Strategic.** Defence works to integrate military capability and activity across government and with allies and partners. Military strategies are created and managed at the strategic level. Strategic objectives are generally long-term and evolve over time, unless a significant change in the operating environment requires more dynamic reassessment. Political necessity may, at times, drive the strategic level to direct discrete tactical activities, bypassing the operational level.

b. **Operational.** The operational level is the level at which major operations are planned and effects are created to achieve strategic objectives. The operational level can modulate the intensity of a campaign by increasing or decreasing the number, types, location or limitations of tactical operations to create the desired strategic effect. Capabilities that are required by multiple tactical commands are often controlled at the operational level to enable them to be allocated when required. In a national context, the operational level is the responsibility of the joint commander, with a commander joint task force operating in theatre under their command, spanning the tactical and operational levels. In a multinational setting, the UK contingent commander will be responsible for integrating the national contribution into the overall force, again under the command of the joint commander.

c. **Tactical.** At the tactical level, operations are planned and executed, within the context of the narrative, to achieve defined objectives. Increasingly, tactical commands are multi-domain by nature. Tactical actions typically manifest themselves as individual operations in which the tactical commander must increasingly integrate activity.

3.9. A component commander will normally be designated and is responsible for planning and conducting operations within a specific operational domain to organise a joint commander's span of command.<sup>29</sup> Components are groupings of force elements normally organised by domain or function, but the force will be organised to reflect each specific operational requirement. The maritime,

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<sup>29</sup> See AJP-5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations*. Componenty is explained further in AJP-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations*.

land, air, special operations, and the Joint Force Logistics Component are the normal UK component commands. Space, now a standalone command, will be a separate component. Recent operations have seen a mission assurance component commander appointed who has delivered defensive cyber operations as part of their wider mission assurance remit (offensive cyber operations being delivered separately). Concurrently, cyber operations staff are integrated into the appropriate headquarters to coordinate and integrate activity.

## Section 2 – Categorising operations

3.10. **Integrated Operating Concept.** In common with multi-domain integration, the *Integrated Operating Concept* (IOpC) is a concept. It creates a framework of understanding, the intent of which is to provide Defence with clarity when thinking about strategic competition. The IOpC considers activities across four functions: protect, engage, constrain and warfight. The functions must not be thought of as a linear progression. Their successful application requires a mindset that thinks in several dimensions so that escalation and de-escalation is dynamically managed up and down the levels of operations and across operational domains. Parallel activities across the functions can be expected to take place simultaneously. An activity may contribute to more than one function. The magnitude of each function must be dynamically adjusted to compete with, deter and, if necessary, defeat our adversaries.

3.11. **Operation types.** Operations are categorised into types by the essential characteristics that differentiate them from one another. *Defence Strategy 2022* lists five types of operation to be undertaken by Defence: homeland, global foundation, persistent engagement, crisis response and warfighting. Examples of how the types of operations relate to the IOpC functions are given below.

### Protect

3.12. The protect function is the enduring foundation, it is fundamental to deterrence. Its purpose is to prevent modern threats exploiting our vulnerabilities. The priority will always be to defend the UK, our Overseas Territories, Crown Dependencies and sovereign rights, and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies. As the nature, reach and persistence of the threats that adversaries can bring to bear against the home base have radically evolved, our contribution to domestic security and resilience is increasing in scale and importance.<sup>30</sup> The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the essential contribution of an adaptable and skilled Defence workforce to other

30 For further detail see JDP 02, *UK Operations: the Defence Contribution to Resilience*.



government departments during a period of national and global crisis. It has also highlighted that natural hazards and other risks can cause as much disruption to the UK's core interests as security threats.

3.13. Protect activity includes hardening Defence's critical infrastructure and contributing to the resilience of critical national infrastructure. Defence therefore needs to be able to respond rapidly to a wide range of national and overseas events and crises from environmental hazards through to malicious attacks by terrorists or states, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents. Indeed, extreme threats to the UK and our allies have not gone away. Meeting these challenges requires us to mitigate Defence's own vulnerabilities and to recognise that the critical role of the protect function is not just to enable freedom of action for Defence but to contribute to protecting our way of life – as such, it is non-discretionary.

3.14. The protect function is delivered by *Defence Strategy 2022's* homeland operations. Examples include: military aid to the civil authorities to assist partners across government responding to significant events; counterterrorism and intelligence operations in support of partners across government; and military deterrence activity over the UK's sovereign territory to counter maritime, land, air, and space and cyber incursions. The protect function encompasses the continuous at sea deterrent and NATO's vigilance activity also contributes to it (for example, the Royal Air Force's (RAF) Quick Reaction Alert).



The protect function spans all operational domains

## Engage

3.15. The engage function is founded on a forward deployed posture to assure influence, to deter and to reassure. Activities that establish and maintain the human networks, enhanced through digital connectivity, are the foundation on which posture is established and are at the heart of the engage function. Our global military footprint is an expression of our international and alliance resolve and can be modulated and enhanced through a blend of Defence diplomacy, Defence attachés, strategic hubs, permanently forward-based forces and stockpiles, permanent joint operating bases, episodic training and exercises, and mobile command and control nodes. Building partner capacity through ‘train, advise and assist’ operations strengthens coalitions, enhances regional security and provides an alternative to the offers of our rivals, denying them influence whilst securing it for ourselves.<sup>31</sup> The engage function also involves developing appropriate channels of communication with rivals to build understanding, avoid miscalculation and underscore credibility. All engage activities should contribute to insight and understanding.

3.16. The engage function is enduring and allows Defence to pursue UK foreign policy objectives and shape conditions for stability and is, therefore, a critical component of how the force operates. It requires a long-term campaigning mindset focused on posture and the use of the force as part of the overall campaign design; therefore, securing the political and policy permissions to create desired effects is vital. Persistent engagement prioritised in places where we can achieve impact against prominent challenges increases our ability to pre-empt and manage crises before they escalate. This minimises the opportunities for state and non-state actors to undermine international stability.

3.17. Our effectiveness can be enhanced by driving the tempo of strategic activity in a sustained, dynamic, calibrated approach that is integrated with other government departments and the international engagement networks of our allies. Persistent engagement enables real time accurate understanding to inform the development of options, decision-making and influence, and helps us to achieve strategic advantage. Overall, enhanced presence and greater commitment will strengthen our partnerships and create the unity which our adversaries fear. It will contribute to trade and strengthened prosperity, deter adversaries and reassure our allies. Done well, global engagement can promote the UK as a force for good, delivering against national objectives.

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<sup>31</sup> For further detail see JDP 05, *Shaping a Stable World: the Military Contribution*.



All engage activities should contribute to insight and understanding

3.18. Global foundation and persistent engagement operations primarily support the engage function. Examples include: the Royal Navy's presence in the Gulf; the RAF's contribution to NATO's enhanced air policing in the Baltic (which can provide a protect or a constrain function); capacity building by the British Army's Security Force Assistance Brigade; and cross-government promotion of UK trade and industry in conjunction with the Defence attaché network and supporting Defence activity such as Royal Navy port visits. Disaster relief operations overseas, humanitarian assistance and non-combatant evacuation operations can also be associated with this function.

## Constrain

3.19. Constrain is the most proactive and assertive function. It may involve the use of force, for example, by:

- escalating beyond training, advising and assisting to accompanying partners to enable them to act offensively;
- restricting a rival or adversary's choice of action by deploying armed forces or strategic effects to demonstrate reach and responsiveness;
- shaping an adversary's behaviour through covert and overt activity;
- contesting the cyber and electromagnetic domain to limit an adversary's freedom of action, protect our own networks or enhance the impact of our activities in the other operational domains;

- challenging assertions of sovereignty through deployments and freedom of navigation operations that aim to constrain 'fait accompli' strategies; and
- preventing an adversary from achieving escalation dominance.

3.20. The intensity at which constrain activity takes place is not fixed. It will be modulated in relation to the nature of the broader relationship that the UK has with our rivals at any one time. The constrain function requires us to demonstrate the will and capability, lethal and non-lethal, to confront threats early. This requires a force that is agile, resilient and 'front-footed' in mindset and posture. As part of an integrated wider-government approach, and alongside allies and partners, we are better able to address conflict and instability, and can present adversaries with multiple dilemmas to shape and alter their decision calculus. The credibility of constrain activity will at times require us to operate with our partners in hostile environments to counter and deny state and non-state threats. It must therefore be underpinned by the will and capability to reconfigure, surge and apply hard power, within an appropriate legal framework, when the threat demands it.

3.21. Where persistent engagement operations are insufficient to pre-empt and manage crisis, crisis response operations may take place within the constrain function. Examples of such operations include: counter-irregular activities (terrorism, insurgency, piracy and criminality); support to embargoes; exclusion and no-fly zones; protecting shipping from attack; and larger peace support operations. The potential level of intensity and violence encountered mean that constrain activity may well involve armed conflict.

## Warfight

3.22. Warfighting is a contest between the regular armed forces of states, including irregular elements, and can be distinguished from the constrain function by the significantly increased risk and financial commitment. Warfighting is highly resource-intensive, often involves protracted violence, and requires the integration and commitment of all instruments of national power. The increasingly blurred interface between conventional and nuclear conflict introduces more complex routes for escalation. In its ultimate form, warfighting requires the full resources of the state, including mobilising the nation. The ability and willingness to commit hard power to fighting wars is a fundamental foundation of our influence and deterrence.

## Section 3 – The Defence contribution to deterrence

Deterrence exists in the mind of an adversary.


Jim Mattis, former United States Secretary of Defense, 2018



3.23. Deterrence is defined as: the convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act.<sup>32</sup>

3.24. A credible capability to deter remains central to our military purpose and contributes to a whole-of-government response alongside NATO and like-minded partners. In the *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept* NATO has reaffirmed its resolve in the face of the Russian Federation's actions and committed to strengthening the deterrence and defence posture to deny opportunities for aggression. As with war, the nature of deterrence is constant, but its character is changeable, reflecting several factors, such as politics, economics, technology and culture. In the contemporary environment this is demonstrated by the tension between the West and assertive authoritarian states, principally the Russian Federation, but also the People's Republic of China and Iran.

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The UK must determine what adversary activities can and must be deterred

<sup>32</sup> NATO term.



3.25. Our deterrence must remain active and focused. It is impossible to deter all threats and so the UK must determine what adversary activities can and must be deterred, and which are better tackled through resilience or other forms of activity. In an era of persistent competition our deterrence posture needs to be actively managed and modulated.

3.26. **Comprehension.** An active deterrence posture requires us to be better at comprehension. Comprehension is about more than conducting audience analysis with international partners to understand our adversaries' intent, the drivers of their behaviour, their thresholds and points of influence. It also requires an understanding of our own strengths, weaknesses, limitations and essential red lines, nationally and in concert with others. The sum of this analysis is insight. Comprehension affords a better prospect of conducting escalation management by prioritising actions and activities across government, acknowledging areas where greater risk can be tolerated. Continual assessments that evaluate the effectiveness of ongoing activities on our target audiences allow Defence to be strategically predictable but operationally unpredictable. Comprehension is therefore fundamental to communicating an active deterrence posture.

3.27. **Capability.** As part of a whole-of-government approach, and in conjunction with partners and allies, the UK must demonstrate credible capability to deny benefits and impose costs on adversaries with malign intent. In an increasingly complex and uncertain environment, Defence continually develops and updates responsive multi-domain options informing political choice to proactively shape the security environment or mitigate the effect of a failure to deter.

a. **Denial of benefits.** Deterrence by denial of benefits aims to convince adversaries that they will not realise their desired benefit through malign activity.

b. **Imposition of costs.** This aims to ensure that the cost to our adversaries of conducting activities will outweigh any potential benefit they seek. Adversaries will seek to identify and defend their vulnerable points of influence. Defence should, therefore, identify and formulate indirect ways of affecting these points of influence, while denying the adversary the ability to bring their strengths to bear.

3.28. **Credibility.** Credibility is underpinned by political will and the capability to act if threatened. Audiences constantly analyse our attitudes and behaviours; patterns of behaviour over time contribute to their perceptions of our credibility. Predictable behaviour can add to credibility. In some cases, it is necessary to take risk to communicate the strength of UK commitment.

3.29. **Communication.** All levels of command should share a common narrative that continuously reinforces the strategy. Unclear outcomes, objectives, actions, words or apparent discrepancies and contradictions may signal the policy position is not firm. Vague or unclear narratives also increase the likelihood of confusion, misinterpretation and potentially unintentional escalation. Communications can have a deterrent effect on non-state actors, for instance, countering irregular activity reinforces a narrative of national resolve.

## Escalation management

3.30. Deterrence is a continuous escalation management activity that cuts across our strategies, actions and words. It involves enhancing our ability to manage and de-escalate a crisis. An important and complicating feature of deterrence is the blurring between conventional strategic and nuclear capabilities. Some states have integrated nuclear weapons into their military strategies alongside conventional capabilities. In parallel, the increase in global competition and proliferation of disruptive technologies expands the range of options to create strategic effect. Some non-nuclear capabilities have the potential to threaten strategic stability through miscalculation and rapid escalation, or by offering incentives to move first and fast in a high-end conventional fight. Both elements introduce more complex routes for escalation to armed conflict.

3.31. In response, we must improve our ability to think in several dimensions so that escalation and de-escalation can be dynamically managed up and down multiple ladders and across operational domains in which there will be asymmetries of capabilities and interests. This will require us to be better able to detect, comprehend, attribute and act in response to aggression across the full range of possible threats. Exercising whole-of-government responses alongside NATO and like-minded partners will be a vital part of improving understanding and addressing the challenges of managing conflict escalation.



## Key points

- Defence's fundamental purpose is to protect the people of the UK, prevent conflict and be ready to fight our enemies.
- The utility of the military instrument is to both operate and warfight, gaining advantage through offering a wide breadth of political choice and credible military options that can be threatened or used to break the will of our adversaries.
- States and organisations apply power to achieve policy goals using smart power: a blend of 'hard' and 'soft' power.
- Operational domains provide a framework for organising the military instrument and represent spheres of military activity within the engagement space. Integration is necessary across operational domains in which there will be asymmetries of capabilities and interests.
- The military instrument is applied across three levels of operations: strategic, operational and tactical.
- The IOpC describes military activity through the protect, engage, constrain and warfight functions.
- *Defence Strategy 2022* lists five types of operation to be undertaken by Defence: homeland, global foundation, persistent engagement, crisis response and warfighting.
- A credible capability to deter remains central to our military purpose. The UK requires an active deterrence posture against a broad array of threats.
- We must improve our ability to think in several dimensions so that escalation and de-escalation can be dynamically managed up and down multiple ladders and across instruments of power, operational domains and levels of operations.

# Lexicon

## Section 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations

AJP	Allied joint publication
COED	Concise Oxford English Dictionary
DCDC	Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
IOPC	Integrated Operating Concept
JDP	joint doctrine publication
MDI	multi-domain integration
MOD	Ministry of Defence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RAF	Royal Air Force
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
UK	United Kingdom
UKDD	UK Defence Doctrine

## Section 2 – Terms and definitions

This section lists the definitions used in the publication along with some additional terms that may be useful to the reader.

### **actor**

An individual, group or entity whose actions are affecting the attainment of the end state. (NATOTerm)

### **adversary**

An individual, group or entity whose intentions or interests are opposed to those of friendly parties and against which legal coercive political, military or civilian actions may be envisaged and conducted. (NATOTerm)

### **audience**

An individual, group or entity whose interpretation of events and subsequent behaviour may affect the attainment of the end state.

Note: The audience may consist of publics, stakeholders and actors. (NATOTerm)

### **audience analysis**

The understanding and segmentation of audiences in support of the achievement of objectives. (NATOTerm)

### **campaign**

A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective. (NATOTerm)

### **concept**

An agreed notion or idea, normally set out in a document, that provides guidance for different working domains and which may lead to the development of a policy. (NATOTerm)

### **deterrence**

The convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act. (NATOTerm)

**doctrine**

Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (NATOTerm)

**enemy**

An individual or group, entity or state actors whose actions are hostile and against which the legal use of armed force is authorized. (NATOTerm)

**fighting power**

The ability of the armed forces to shape, contest, and fight.

Note: It represents three interrelated components: the moral, conceptual and physical. (NATOTerm)

**narrative**

A spoken or written account of events and information arranged in a logical sequence to influence the behaviour of a target audience. (NATOTerm)

**operation**

A sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose. (NATOTerm)

**operational art**

The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. (NATOTerm)

**operational domain**

A specified sphere of capabilities and activities that can be applied within an engagement space. (NATOTerm)

**public**

An individual, group or entity who are aware of activities that may affect the attainment of the end state. (NATOTerm)

**readiness**

The period measured from an initiation order to the moment when the headquarters or unit is ready to perform its task from its peacetime location (permanent or forward deployed) or ready for deployment. (JDP 0-01.1)

**stakeholder**

An individual, group or entity who can affect or is affected by the attainment of the end state. (NATOTerm)

**sustainability**

The ability of a force to maintain the necessary level of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. (NATOTerm)

**target**

An area, infrastructure, object, audience or organization against which activities can be directed to create desired effects. (NATOTerm)

**target audience analysis**

The focused examination of targeted audiences to create desired effects. (NATOTerm)

**war**

A state of armed conflict between different countries or different groups within a country. (COED)





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