

ACCIDENT REPORT

VERY SERIOUS MARINE CASUALTY

REPORT NO 11/2022

SEPTEMBER 2022

Extract from The United Kingdom Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012 – Regulation 5:

"The sole objective of the investigation of an accident under the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012 shall be the prevention of future accidents through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances. It shall not be the purpose of an such investigation to determine liability nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve its objective, to apportion blame."

NOTE

This report is not written with litigation in mind and, pursuant to Regulation 14(14) of the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012, shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose purposes is to attribute or apportion liability or blame.

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Capsize of the creel fishing vessel Goodway (FR23) with the presumed loss of one life, near Cairnbulg, Scotland on 16 October 2021

SUMMARY

At 2018 on the evening of 16 October 2021, the coastguard was informed that the 6.85m UK registered creel fishing vessel *Goodway* was overdue and that attempts to contact its owner, who had taken the vessel out that morning, had been unsuccessful. About 2 hours later, *Goodway*'s upturned hull was located close to rocks near Cairnbulg, Scotland by the crew of a search and rescue helicopter. The owner was not found and is presumed deceased.

The exact sequence of events leading up to the accident and the circumstances of the capsize and loss of the owner overboard are unclear. However, the investigation concluded that *Goodway* most likely capsized as the owner was attempting to free a snagged fleet of creels and that the owner fell overboard. It is unknown if the vessel's owner was wearing a personal flotation device or carrying a personal locator beacon.

A recommendation has been made to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency to issue an Advice Note to its surveyors concerning personal locator beacons.



Goodway






Figure 1: Area in which Goodway was spotted by a fisherman and (inset) wreck of FV Sovereign

FACTUAL INFORMATION

Narrative

At about 1140 on 16 October 2021, the creel fishing vessel *Goodway* departed its home berth in Cairnbulg harbour, Scotland, with its owner, Joe Masson, on board. He drove *Goodway* out of the harbour and headed towards Cairnbulg Briggs reef, north-east of Cairnbulg Point. At 1330, a local fisherman saw him working a fleet of creels to the south-east of the Cairnbulg Briggs beacon (**Figure 1**).

At 1340, the owner's mobile phone disconnected from the network and did not reconnect at any point thereafter.

When *Goodway*'s owner failed to return home as expected at around 1600, family members became concerned and started to call friends to enquire about his whereabouts. Because no one had seen him, they then went to look for him at a local golf club and at Cairnbulg harbour. The owner's van was found at the harbour but there was no sign of him or his vessel. At 2018, an increasingly concerned family member called the coastguard and reported *Goodway* as overdue. The coastguard immediately tasked several Coastguard Rescue Teams (CRT) to search along the coast and look for any signs of *Goodway* or its owner.

At 2038, the coastguard tasked the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) to search for *Goodway*: Fraserburgh's all-weather lifeboat (ALB) and inshore lifeboat (ILB) were launched; Peterhead's ALB was launched; and Peterhead's ILB was tasked shortly afterwards.

At 2136, two search and rescue helicopters were tasked to join the search. At 2233, using a night vision camera, one of the helicopter crews located an upturned hull close to Cairnbulg Briggs reef and directed the Fraserburgh ALB to the hull's position. At 2248, Macduff's ALB was tasked to assist the other RNLI lifeboats.

The hull was in shallow water and the Fraserburgh ALB crew launched their XP class small inflatable boat to enable safe access to it (**Figure 2**). The crew cut several ropes that were trailing in the water from the hull. At 2303, the lifeboat crew confirmed that the upturned hull was *Goodway* but were unable to search underneath it due to the hazards posed by its position close to the rocks and the danger of entanglement with the ropes. At 2339, the Fraserburgh ALB crew reported to the coastguard that *Goodway* was held fast to the rocks and that they were unable to tow it clear.



Image courtesy of RNLI

Figure 2: RNLI still footage, showing the upturned hull of Goodway

When the RNLI crew arrived on scene, they noted that *Goodway* had been damaged, the engine was missing, and the A-frame was floating free in the water. As the tide fell, *Goodway*'s upturned hull grounded on the rocks. At about 0150 on 17 October, a search and rescue helicopter winchman was lowered onto the rocks to search for the vessel's owner. He checked around and under the hull and reported that there was no sign of the owner. The winchman attempted to secure *Goodway* to the rocks using ropes before he was winched clear.

As the tide rose through the morning, the securing ropes slipped off the rocks and *Goodway* floated off the reef and was carried south by the current and wind. At about 1100, the vessel was washed ashore onto Cairnbulg Point (**Figure 3**). The CRTs and police turned *Goodway* upright to inspect it and noted that the wheelhouse, engine, and most of the vessel's equipment was missing. They then secured *Goodway* to the beach to prevent it drifting away. At 1720, the search for the owner was called off. On 19 October, a police dive unit conducted an underwater search of the area near Cairnbulg Briggs where *Goodway*'s upturned hull was found. The search located the fleet of creels that *Goodway* had been anchored to and confirmed that there was no sign of the owner trapped within the fleet.

Some of the owner's fleets of creels were subsequently recovered ashore. Adverse weather hampered the recovery of the fleet identified in the search by police divers, which was never found once the area became accessible.

Environmental conditions

During the afternoon of 16 October, the wind direction was variable but mainly westerly force 2 to 3, with a slight sea and a low north-westerly swell. The sea temperature was 12°C, there was no rain and visibility was good. The tidal stream in the vicinity of Cairnbulg Briggs reef had begun to set north parallel to the coast in the early afternoon. Because it was 2 days after neap tide, the tidal stream was not very strong. The evening was very dark due to extensive cloud cover. Low and high water tides were predicted to occur at 1520 and 2122, respectively.

Post-accident wreck inspection

No electronic navigation or safety equipment was found in the wreck of *Goodway*. All superstructure, including the pot hauler, had been ripped off and no creels or catch were found in the vessel. The bottom of the hull was intact with no obvious signs of breaches or impact damage. The port side of the hull was found to be damaged, but this was thought to have been caused when the vessel was inverted and it grounded on the rocks.

One of the trailing ropes that had been cut by the RNLI crew was found to be attached to a cleat on the aft end of the starboard bulwark (Figure 4).

Goodway's owner

Goodway's owner, Joe Masson, was 73 years old and had worked on a wide variety of commercial trawlers throughout his 50-year fishing career. He had always owned a small fishing boat for use as a hobby and to earn extra money between commercial trawling trips, fishing for crab, lobsters and mackerel. He and his wife had also owned a local pub, which they ran for over 20 years until their retirement in 2011.

The owner had completed all the required training and certification to work on a UK registered fishing vessel and usually fished alone (single-handed) on board *Goodway*.

In 2017, *Goodway*'s owner underwent a triple heart bypass operation; he was not taking any medication for a heart condition at the time of the accident.



Figure 3: The wreck of Goodway washed ashore on Cairnbulg Point



Figure 4: Starboard aft cleat, showing the rope attached to it

FV Goodway

Goodway was a glass reinforced plastic (GRP) Wilson Flyer 23, built in 2004. It was commercially registered as a fishing vessel and had been purchased by the owner in 2011. *Goodway*'s size meant that it was not required to undertake any stability assessment before the date of the accident. The shallow draught of *Goodway*'s hull form meant that it was the only fishing vessel that regularly worked close to Cairnbulg Briggs reef.

Goodway was originally fitted with twin outboard engines and an aluminium shooting ramp between them, leading from the deck over the centre of the transom. It had subsequently been modified and the starboard engine had been removed, which enabled the fitting of a wider shooting ramp across the starboard side of the transom (**Figure 5**). *Goodway* was powered by a 30 horsepower outboard engine mounted on the port side of the transom, offset from the centreline by 500mm to port. The vessel's lowest area of freeboard was at the transom and measured 270mm.

The inside of the bulwarks and parts of the deck had been overlayed with aluminium checker plate sheet, covering the GRP hull structure; two lightweight 2-metre-high aluminium A-frames were fitted across the transom and deck aft; a hydraulic pot hauler was mounted on the starboard side forward, next to the small wheelhouse.




Image courtesy of the MCA

Figure 5: 30 horsepower outboard engine, mounted 500mm offset to port on *Goodway*'s transom

Creels were stowed on deck and, to separate the owner from the fishing gear and prevent entanglement while shooting, a hook release mechanism had been designed and fitted to allow the gear to be shot remotely from the wheelhouse.

Goodway was equipped with two fixed very high frequency (VHF) radios. For navigation, an electronic chart plotter with integral global positioning system (GPS) was fitted in the wheelhouse. *Goodway*'s radio licence, which was issued in 2015, listed an automatic identification system (AIS) unit registered to the vessel. Historic AIS data indicated that this unit transmitted sporadically between April 2019 and October 2020, with no further AIS signals transmitted thereafter.

About 3 months before the accident, the owner had purchased additional safety equipment. The MAIB conducted checks of the owner's home, van and storage buildings in the course of its investigation but failed to locate any of this new equipment.

Fishing operations

The owner usually operated *Goodway* single-handed but was occasionally assisted by other local fishermen. *Goodway*'s owner worked mainly during daylight hours and fished within half a mile of Cairnbulg harbour. *Goodway*'s mooring at Cairnbulg allowed departure to the fishing ground at any state of tide and the owner would habitually depart in the morning, return to the harbour in the early afternoon for lunch, then head back out to sea and return before darkness fell.

Goodway's owner possessed eight fleets of creels. Each fleet consisted of 10 creels, spaced approximately 20m apart and connected by short leader lines to a 14mm leaded back rope. The end of the back rope was marked with plastic floats attached to a float line and weighed down with car brake discs.

The owner used two different types of creel; some were half-cylindrical, each weighing 20kg when empty, but the majority were a rectangular plastic-coated steel mesh type, which weighed 15kg each when empty **(Figure 6)**. The hydraulic hauler was used to recover the fleets of creels from the seabed.

The seabed where *Goodway* fished was rocky and fleets of creels sometimes became snagged, preventing their retrieval with the pot hauler. As a result, the owner had often attached the end of the float line to a cleat on *Goodway*'s bulwark and used a burst of power on the vessel's engine to pull the creels free. A few weeks before the accident, during an attempt to recover a snagged fleet, the owner had tied the float line to a cleat and powered rapidly forward using the engine. *Goodway* had heeled over quickly until the float line parted, narrowly preventing the vessel from capsizing.

Industry guidelines for single-handed fishing operations

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) Fishermen's Safety Guide stated that *Single handed operations are not recommended due to the high level of risk involved*. [sic]

The guide identified several hazards associated with single-handed fishing, including having no help available if injured, and no one to raise the alarm and stop the vessel or help recover a person that goes overboard.

The guide offered advice on removing as much risk as possible, giving examples such as having non-slip decks, separation from pots/creels, ropes and wires, and checking that bulwark heights were sufficient. The guide also advised skippers to equip the vessel with a boarding ladder, an Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB), and to carry a personal locator beacon (PLB). The guide stated that fishermen *MUST wear a PFD or a safety harness* if the risk of falling overboard could not be eliminated. It further advised that single-handed fishermen should inform someone ashore of their intended fishing area and when they planned to return to harbour, and give contact details.



Figure 6: The two different types of creels used by the skipper on Goodway

Regulations and inspection

Goodway had been inspected regularly by the MCA and held a UK Small Fishing Vessel Certificate that was valid until 10 December 2023. Previous inspections had revealed numerous deficiencies that required rectification by the owner, including missing and poorly maintained safety equipment and a lack of risk assessments. It was also identified that the owner did not hold a valid Short Range Certificate to operate VHF radio equipment.

During an inspection in 2018, the attending MCA surveyor discussed risk assessments with the owner and provided him with leaflets that detailed the risks of single-handed fishing operations and going overboard from a vessel.

In October 2019, it became mandatory for fishing vessels under 10m to be fitted with an EPIRB or for each crew member to be provided with a PLB.

The MCA's Merchant Shipping Notice (MSN) 1871 Amendment 2¹: *Code of Practice for the Safety of Small Fishing Vessels of less than 15m Length Overall*, in force at the time of the accident, stated:

If a 406 MHz² EPIRB with GPS is carried, then Personal Locator Beacons can either be 406 MHz and comply with EN 302 152³ or be AIS⁴. If no EPIRB is carried, then PLBs must be 406MHz and comply with EN 302 152. This is because the EPIRB is considered to be the mandatory equipment and the PLB is a voluntary addition. [sic]

When activated, 406MHz EPIRBs and PLBs transmit a signal that, once detected by satellites, is automatically routed to alert the designated marine rescue coordination centre to the beacon's location.

Goodway detention

On 23 July 2021, *Goodway* was inspected by the MCA due to its previous poor safety record. The unannounced inspection found several deficiencies that included missing and out-of-date mandatory safety equipment. *Goodway* was detained until these deficiencies had been rectified. Following the inspection the owner purchased the required equipment, which included an auto-inflate personal flotation device (PFD), safety ladder and a PLB (**Figure 7**). It is unknown if *Goodway*'s safety ladder was rigged ready for use on the day of the accident, but no safety ladder was found in the wreck.

The PLB was purchased as an alternative to fitting *Goodway* with an EPIRB, in accordance with MSN 1871 requirements. However, the purchased unit was designed to transmit a distress alert and position via a combination of AIS and Digital Selective Calling⁵ (DSC) technologies. Therefore, it did not meet the regulatory requirement to transmit to satellites on 406MHz in order to be accepted as a suitable alternative to fitting an EPIRB.

On 3 August 2021, the MCA surveyor revisited *Goodway* to verify that the deficiencies identified 2 weeks earlier had been rectified and then released the vessel from detention. It was evident that both he and the owner were under the misapprehension that the owner had purchased an approved 406MHz PLB.

¹ MSN 1871 Amendment 2 superseded Amendment 1 on 6 September 2021.

² A megahertz is a unit of radio frequency. One megahertz equals one million cycles per second.

³ EN 302 152-1 January 1 2003, Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Satellite Personal Locator Beacons (PLBs) operating in the 406,0 MHz to 406,1 MHz frequency band; Part 1: Technical characteristics and methods of measurements.

⁴ AIS uses VHF radio frequency to transmit GPS positional data and vessel details.

⁵ Digital Selective Calling uses VHF radio frequency and enables the user to quickly send a distress alert and message to other nearby vessels and shore radio stations.

Although it did not meet the regulatory requirements, the purchased PLB was designed to activate automatically on contact with water. It had an integral antenna, a 12-hour battery life once activated, and a detection range of up to 75 miles by a search and rescue aircraft. The unit would not operate unless it was at, or above, the surface of the water. It was not buoyant so would not float to the surface if it fell or was dropped into the sea.




Figure 7: MCA surveyor photograph of safety equipment purchased to satisfy deficiencies

Cold water immersion and hypothermia

Sudden immersion in water less than 15°C can result in cold water shock and cold incapacitation.

Cold water shock happens within the first 30 seconds to 2 minutes following immersion and is associated with a gasp reflex, hyperventilation and a rapid increase in heart rate and blood pressure as the body encounters cold water. These involuntary reactions can result in cardiac arrest, especially if the casualty has an existing cardiovascular condition. Panic can cause hyperventilation to continue after the initial physiological effects of cold water shock have subsided.

Cold water incapacitation usually occurs within 2 to 15 minutes of entering the water. The blood vessels become constricted as the body tries to preserve heat and protect vital organs. This results in the blood flow to the extremities being restricted, causing cooling and consequent deterioration in the functioning of muscles and nerve ends. Hands and feet lose useful movement, which impacts the casualty's ability to perform survival tasks, such as activating a PLB, and the progressive incapacitation of arms and legs impedes the casualty's ability to swim and reboard a vessel.

The survival time in calm water temperatures between 11 to 15°C is about 1 hour⁶ while wearing work clothes.

Hypothermia is a potentially dangerous drop in body temperature, usually caused by prolonged exposure to cold temperatures.

Cold water exposure can cause the body to lose heat 25 times faster than if it was exposed to the same air temperature.

Previous accidents

The inability to raise the alarm, coupled with the limited options available to reboard the vessel after going overboard, was identified as a safety issue in two recent MAIB investigations.

On 2 May 2021, the skipper of the creel fishing vessel *Saint Peter* (MAIB report 6/2022⁷), died after he became caught in his fishing gear and was dragged overboard, near Torness Point, south-east Scotland. His body was recovered several hours later by a coastguard helicopter. The investigation found that *Saint Peter*'s working deck was cluttered, making it difficult for the skipper to work separated from the fishing gear. The skipper was kept afloat by a PFD, but there was no easy means for him to reboard *Saint Peter* and he had no equipment with which to send a distress signal from the water.

On 28 August 2021, the skipper of the creel vessel *Harriet J* died after he became entangled in the fishing gear while it was being deployed near the port of St Abbs, south-east Scotland. The skipper was operating the vessel alone and could not reboard it or send a distress signal once in the water. He was not wearing a PFD.

⁶ Review of Probable Survival Times for Immersion in the North Sea published by the Health and Safety Executive, 1996.

⁷ <u>https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/person-overboard-from-single-handed-creel-fishing-vessel-saint-peter-with-loss-of-1-life</u>

ANALYSIS

Overview

The exact sequence of events, the circumstances of *Goodway*'s capsize and the loss of its owner overboard are unknown because the accident was not witnessed. It is known that the owner was fishing alone, near to where his vessel was found, and that it was anchored to a fleet of creels on the seabed.

The investigation considered various factors that could have led to the loss of *Goodway*. These included, but were not limited to, collision, flooding, grounding, loss of stability and snagging of the fishing gear.

In this section of the report the most likely sequence of events, causes of the capsize, and the loss of the owner will be discussed. The underlying factors that might have contributed to both events will also be analysed.

The accident

Goodway's owner had fished around Cairnbulg Briggs reef for many years and was very familiar with the shallow waters and the hazard of snagging creels.

Since *Goodway* was the only vessel fishing over the reef due to the shallow depth of water, and with no other vessels observed in the vicinity, it is highly unlikely that it was involved in a collision.

There was no evidence to indicate that the underside of the upturned hull had recently been in contact with the rocky seabed. Given the location where the upturned hull was located, coupled with it being found anchored to a snagged fleet of creels, it is unlikely that *Goodway* capsized by grounding on the reef.

Sequence of events


It is most likely that a fleet of creels had become stuck in the rocks on Cairnbulg Briggs reef. Because the upturned hull was found with lines attached, it is probable that the skipper had secured the back rope to the cleat on the starboard quarter of his vessel and was using the engine to drive the vessel forward to pull the creels free, a method he had successfully employed on previous occasions. With the outboard motor offset to port and with the tow secured to starboard, this action most likely induced a tilting moment that was sufficient to capsize *Goodway* (Figure 8). As the owner was not found with the upturned hull, it is almost certain that he fell into the water during the capsize and could not board the upturned hull of his vessel. He is likely to have then been carried offshore and to the north by the prevailing wind and tide.


It is likely that the vessel capsized at 1340, when the owner's mobile phone disconnected from the network because it was immersed in seawater after the owner fell overboard.

Because *Goodway*'s upturned hull was found attached to a snagged fleet of creels, it is likely that the damage observed by the RNLI crew was caused when the vessel grounded on the rocks between 1340 and the low tide at 1520. It is also likely that the wheelhouse and pot hauler impacted on the rocks and were lost at that time.

The capsize

The vessel had been modified before being purchased by Joe Masson. The addition of the A-frames, larger shooting ramp, metal plating and pot hauler would have reduced the vessel's inherent stability to some extent, but the effect of these modifications is not thought to have significantly reduced *Goodway*'s stability.





Goodway heeled and dipped by stern

Goodway capsized to starboard, leading to inversion



The owner's use of a burst of engine power to free the creels had previously been successful and evidence from the wreck indicated that this method was probably being applied immediately before the accident. It is likely that the minor changes to *Goodway*'s stability, coupled with the reduced freeboard at the transom and resultant free surface effect[®] of any water on deck during the evolution, may have accelerated the capsize sequence.

Loss of the owner

The dark conditions on the evening of the accident made it difficult for the search and rescue teams to find *Goodway* or see any sign of its owner in the water. It was only when the helicopter's night vision camera was used that the upturned hull was located and the lifeboats could be directed to its position. Between the vessel's presumed time of capsize and the discovery of its upturned hull, it is likely that the skipper had been in the water for almost 9 hours.

It is possible that the sudden shock of entering the cold water as the vessel capsized may have induced a heart attack that proved fatal due to the owner's previous heart condition. If the owner was wearing a PFD when he fell overboard, it would have kept his face and head clear of the water and helped to prevent drowning. However, he was unlikely to have survived the debilitating effects of cold water immersion and hypothermia for much longer than 1 hour because of the local water temperature.

Emergency preparedness

The owner occasionally wore a PFD while at sea. On the day of the accident, a member of the public filmed *Goodway*'s departure from the harbour but it was not possible to determine from the footage whether the owner was wearing a PFD or not.

The owner would have remained attached to *Goodway* when it capsized if, in accordance with the MCA Fishermen's Safety Guide, he had been wearing a safety harness and line that was secured to his vessel. If the boarding ladder that he had purchased had been fitted to *Goodway*, he may have been able to climb onto the upturned hull and possibly improve his chances of being rescued.

Safety equipment was purchased following the MCA's intervention. However, if the owner had complied with MCA regulations, and either fitted *Goodway* with an EPIRB or carried a 406MHz PLB, a distress signal may have been sent to the coastguard that would have initiated earlier search and rescue operations, and possibly saved his life.

The PLB purchased by the owner was designed to operate automatically on contact with water. However, it would not have operated underwater as the antenna needed to be in clear line of sight of any receiving station. At the time of the accident, no AIS or DSC distress alerts were detected in the area and, if the PLB was on board *Goodway* when it capsized, it is most likely that it sank to the seabed or became trapped in the part of the vessel that was ripped off by the rocks as it grounded.

It is unknown if the owner's new PFD was on board *Goodway* at the time of the accident. If the PFD was on board, and had not been stowed in a waterproof bag, it should have inflated automatically. However, because of the interval between the assumed capsize and start of the search and rescue operations, coupled with its small size and the darkness, it is possible that the inflated PFD could have drifted outside the search area or not been spotted at all.

⁸ Free surface effect occurs when the centre of gravity of a body of water moves, causing or extenuating any rolling motion, reducing a boat's stability.

CONCLUSIONS

- *Goodway*'s owner was lost because he entered the water and there was no evidence found to indicate that he was able to climb back on board or attempt to raise the alarm.
- It is likely that the owner entered the water at about 1340, when his mobile phone signal disconnected, and he had probably been in the water for almost 9 hours before the upturned hull was discovered.
- It is likely that the owner entered the water because *Goodway* capsized while he was attempting to free a fleet of snagged creels. It is unknown whether the skipper was wearing a PFD or carrying a PLB at the time.
- The owner probably drowned or suffered a fatal heart attack due to the effects of cold water shock or cold water incapacitation.
- The owner was fully aware of the dangers associated with entrapment in his gear and had taken adequate steps to separate himself from it during shooting operations. However, it is likely that the owner had not prepared himself or *Goodway* for the hazard of falling overboard.
- The PLB purchased by the owner did not meet the MCA's regulatory requirement to transmit to satellites on 406MHz if carried as an alternative to an EPIRB. No VHF, DSC or AIS distress alert was received from *Goodway*.

ACTION TAKEN

MAIB actions

The MAIB has issued a safety flyer to the fishing industry.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is recommended to:

2022/133 Issue an Advice Note to remind surveyors of the different types of PLBs that they may encounter and which of these are acceptable alternatives to the vessel being equipped with an EPIRB.

Safety recommendations shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability

VESSEL PARTICULARS

VEGGEL FARTIOCEARD	
Vessel's name	Goodway
Flag	UK
Classification society	Not applicable
IMO number/fishing numbers	FR23
Туре	Creel fishing vessel
Registered owner	Privately owned
Year of build	2004
Construction	Glass reinforced plastic
Length overall	6.85m
Registered length	6.85m
Gross tonnage	1.64
Minimum safe manning	Not applicable
Authorised cargo	Not applicable

VOYAGE PARTICULARS

Port of departure	Cairnbulg
Port of arrival	Cairnbulg (intended)
Type of voyage	Fishing
Cargo information	Not applicable
Manning	1

MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATION

Date and time	16 October 2021 at about 1340
Type of marine casualty or incident	Very Serious Marine Casualty
Location of incident	Off Cairnbulg Point, Scotland
Place on board	Deck
Injuries/fatalities	One presumed fatality
Damage/environmental impact	Vessel total constructive loss
Vessel operation	Fishing
Voyage segment	At sea
External & internal environment	Wind force 2 to 3, slight sea, low swell, sea temperature 12°C, visibility good.
Persons on board	1