

# Controlling Migration Fund evaluation

## Project-level evaluation report

Lead local authority: Greater Manchester Combined Authority

Project name: Local Authority Asylum Support Officer (LAASLO) pilot project



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# Executive summary

This project-level evaluation report presents the key findings relating to the delivery and outcomes for the **Local Authority Asylum Support Liaison Officer (LAASLO) pilot** project led by Greater Manchester Combined Authority.

## Project overview and objectives

Greater Manchester Combined Authority received a Controlling Migration Fund (CMF) grant of £850,000 for the pilot LAASLO project. The project aimed to support asylum seekers who had been awarded leave to remain in the UK and were due to leave temporary asylum accommodation within 28 days. Activities included scoping and outreach work to engage beneficiaries and establish referrals with asylum accommodation providers, followed by one-to-one support with individuals or families to help secure housing after leaving asylum accommodation, access to public services and labour market skills, and integration. These activities aimed to contribute to the CMF and project-level outcomes listed in the summary table below.

Ipsos MORI undertook an evaluation of the LAASLO pilot project between July 2019 – March 2020. A theory-based approach was taken to the evaluation, with the aim of reviewing and testing the outputs and outcomes intended through the project activities<sup>1</sup>. Evaluation activities included: a scoping phase with project staff, including the development of a project logic model; interviews with project staff, delivery partners and wider stakeholders; interviews with beneficiaries; a pilot beneficiary questionnaire drafted by Ipsos MORI and administered by project staff; and a review of monitoring information and secondary data collected and provided by the project.

## Progress towards intended outcomes

Progress towards intended CMF-level intermediate and longer-term outcomes is summarised in table below.

**Table 1.1 Summary of project CMF outcomes**

Outcome group	Outcome	Assessment of progress made by March 2020
<b>Local authority</b>	<b>Intermediate outcome 1:</b> Acquired expertise and structures in place to deal with local issues	The available evidence indicates that the project contributed towards increasing expertise within the local authorities and improved some of the

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<sup>1</sup> Theory-based approaches to evaluation use an explicit theory of change to draw conclusions about whether and how an intervention contributed to observed results. For more information, see: <https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/audit-evaluation/centre-excellence-evaluation/theory-based-approaches-evaluation-concepts-practices.html>

		processes for refugees to access local services, including housing.
<b>Local authority</b>	<b>Intermediate outcome 2:</b> Improved signposting and referral services, and <b>Intermediate outcome 3:</b> Improved coordination between agencies	The evidence indicates that LAASLOs have made positive steps in developing relationships with a range of internal and external agencies, which have in turn improved signposting and referral procedures for refugees to wider support services. However, referral processes of refugees into the project) appeared inconsistent between areas.
<b>Migrants</b>	<b>Intermediate outcome 4:</b> Increased understanding of and access to public services	All three local projects demonstrated proactive work in supporting beneficiaries to understand and access the public services available to them.
<b>Migrants</b>	<b>Intermediate outcome 5:</b> Access to labour market skills, training and accreditations and <b>Intermediate outcome 6:</b> Access to ESOL provision	There were a few, but limited examples that showed LAASLOs had helped beneficiaries to access employability support and prepare for employment, as well as accessing ESOL.
<b>Migrants</b>	<b>Project level outcome 1:</b> Client refugees feel supported to find appropriate housing through creative solutions provided by LAASLO officers, and <b>Project level outcome 2:</b> Reduced risk of homelessness and destitution amongst refugee service users	The available evidence demonstrates that the LAASLOs provided a valuable support service to some beneficiaries to improve their understanding of the housing market and address challenges they faced accessing housing. There was also evidence of creative solutions to identify permanent accommodation within the 28-day window.
<b>Migrants</b>	<b>Project level outcome 3*:</b> Increased physical and mental wellbeing amongst supported refugees	Evidence suggest LAASLOs played a role in reducing stress for some beneficiaries, which could reduce the risk of worsened mental health. There is not enough evidence to conclude

	*Also a long-term CMF outcome, however the projects deemed that progress would be made within the short-term	whether all project beneficiaries with poor mental health conditions or other wellbeing needs were provided with suitable support.
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Based on the contribution of the project towards the intermediate outcomes above, there is evidence to suggest the project will contribute towards the longer-term outcomes of: expanded / strengthened network / partners, increased living standards, increased English proficiency and labour market skills amongst refugee groups, and increased social mobility in the future. There is less evidence to suggest that the project will lead to increased civic society participation / integration, as project activities tended to be focussed more around providing core support such as housing and public service access, rather than activities directly designed to help migrants integrate with the wider community.

## What works?

- The LAASLO project allowed internal stakeholders and delivery staff to gather intelligence on the numbers and needs of newly recognised refugees, which enabled them to plan improved support.
- The project built a strong network of partners, particularly with local VCS organisations, which helped LAASLOs to deliver support effectively, or refer beneficiaries into other appropriate support services.
- The skills and experience of delivery staff were key to realising the best possible outcomes for migrant beneficiaries, given the time constraints of the 28 days which the LAASLOs had to support with housing solutions. Linked to this, the ability for staff to work flexibly supported the delivery of the project.
- Project staff found creative solutions to provide beneficiaries with temporary and permanent housing in the face of limited or no council or social housing stock. This included utilising the Bed Every Night Scheme in Greater Manchester which was essential to preventing homelessness and destitution amongst beneficiaries after the 28-day window for leaving asylum accommodation had expired.

## For whom?

- The primary project beneficiaries were newly-recognised refugees who had been granted leave to remain in the UK. The project benefited these beneficiaries through providing support to find accommodation, access to core public services, labour market skills & ESOL, and with general wellbeing support.
- The local authorities benefited through establishing the LAASLO role internally, which enabled better established networks between the local authority and key external partners. This improved overall coordination of refugee services and referral pathways which in turn led to better outcomes for beneficiaries. The local authorities also benefited through acquiring expertise regarding reaching and supporting asylum seekers as a result of the pilot.

## In what circumstances?

- LAASLO staff being positioned to work alongside local authority housing teams enabled close working relationships, shared learnings and ease of improvement to services. This was key to helping beneficiaries with solutions to housing needs.
- The pre-existing presence of other organisations and agencies offering support for refugees facilitated better referral systems to direct beneficiaries to support. This was particularly helpful in supporting beneficiaries with needs that fell outside the remit or expertise of the LAASLO.
- The Bed Every Night scheme across Greater Manchester was a key contextual factor improving the delivery and outcomes of the LAASLO project relating to homelessness.



# 1 Introduction

The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC), then known as the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government commissioned Ipsos MORI alongside the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford to conduct an independent evaluation of the Controlling Migration Fund (CMF) in May 2018. Launched in November 2016, the Controlling Migration Fund (CMF) aims to help local authorities across England develop and deliver activities to mitigate the perceived negative impacts of recent and unexpected migration on communities in their area. DLUHC provided funding to local authorities to deliver projects that aim to address local service pressures, tailored to their context and needs. While the primary emphasis is on relieving pressure on public services in a way that delivers benefits to the established resident population, the fund also seeks to support wider community cohesion and the integration of recent migrants. Interventions can also focus on gaining a greater understanding of the local migration data landscape where there is currently a lack of accurate local data.

Project-level evaluations of 14 CMF-funded projects were conducted as part of the CMF evaluation. The project-level evaluations aim to assess the effectiveness of various project approaches in delivering against their local-level objectives and those of the wider fund<sup>2</sup>. They seek to build an understanding of what works, for whom and in what context to relieve pressure on local services due to recent or unexpected migration. This project-level evaluation report presents the key findings relating to the delivery and outcomes for the **Local authority Asylum Support Liaison Officer (LAASLO)** pilot project led by Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA).

## The area context

The North West of England had the second highest proportion of asylum seekers in the UK in relation to population density in June 2018 (14.01 asylum seekers per 10,000 people in the region)<sup>3</sup>. Greater Manchester supported the majority (62%) of asylum seekers in National Asylum Support Service (NASS) accommodation<sup>4</sup>. There are 10 local authorities that make up GMCA, all with variant patterns of refugee migration<sup>5</sup>. At the time of the CMF bid, eight of the ten local authorities in Greater Manchester were asylum dispersal areas (with the exception of Trafford and Stockport).

In the CMF bid, GMCA acknowledged that each of the 10 local authorities were different in relation to their population, demographics and subsequent challenges associated with migration. Each local authority also had different structures in place to deal with migration (including asylum seekers) and different systems of multi-agency working, including varied

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<sup>2</sup> An overall Theory of Change, created during the scoping stage, outlines the intermediate and longer-term fund outcomes (see Appendix 1).

<sup>3</sup> North West Regional Strategic Migration Partnership, Statistics (published February 2020), available at: <https://northwestrsmp.org.uk/statistics/>

<sup>4</sup> Asylum accommodation is provided to eligible asylum seekers who would otherwise be destitute under the National Asylum Support Service (NASS). For more information, see: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/99032/2847-support-asylum-seekers.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/99032/2847-support-asylum-seekers.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> The 10 local authorities that fall under GMCA are Bolton, Bury, Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside Trafford, Wigan

levels of involvement from Voluntary and Community Sector Organisations (VCS Organisations) that provide support for asylum seekers and refugees. Government statistics showed that Greater Manchester is the “most severe hotspot” in terms of the proportion of people being placed in temporary housing outside of Greater London (a recognised barometer for people presenting as homeless), accounting for more than 10 per 1,000 households<sup>6</sup>. Around one in five recognised homeless people in the Greater Manchester area were in the Central Manchester local authority, demonstrating the variation and disparate nature of homelessness across GMCA<sup>7</sup>.

The 2019 Homeless Monitor identified asylum seekers as a group at higher risk of becoming homeless, as while asylum-seekers at risk of destitution can claim NASS accommodation, once a decision is made by the Home Office on their asylum claim, they may lose this entitlement. In addition, some asylum seekers may be granted a form of leave to remain in the UK with no recourse to public funds, meaning they are not automatically entitled to housing support<sup>8</sup>. According to the study, as of May 2019 half (51%) of local authorities in the North of England identified homelessness amongst refugees as a problem<sup>9</sup>.

In the bid for the pilot LAASLO project, GMCA identified individuals who had recently been granted refugee status as representing a high risk of homelessness in the region. In part, this was because once they receive a positive decision on their asylum claim (granted leave to remain in the UK), they are required to leave the NASS accommodation within 28 days (the “move on” period). GMCA identified barriers faced by many refugees in accessing accommodation during this period, which could result in them presenting to homelessness services. Through delivering the project, staff identified this as a particular issue for newly recognised refugees with fewer statutory rights to accommodation<sup>10</sup>. Similarly, individuals arriving in the UK through family reunion (a process to reunite refugees in the UK with family members living abroad) were identified by the project as a priority group, as the existing housing situation of the family member in the UK may not be suitable to accommodate additional family members (for example, due to not having enough bedrooms). These challenges often resulted in disrupted living circumstances, including refugees moving around different temporary accommodation and possibly having to move children to different schools.

Project staff also reported that newly recognised refugees could often struggle to integrate into the wider community, due to cultural and language barriers that prevented them from mixing with the wider community. Project staff identified that refugees needed support to get involved with their local community and enter into work or education.

GMCA project leads identified poor mental and physical health as a prevalent issue for newly recognised refugees, due to experiences of historic trauma, in addition to the stress

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<sup>6</sup> UK Gov Homelessness release Jul-Sept 2019. Temporary Accommodation figures counted per 1,000 households.

[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/873677/Statutory\\_homelessness\\_release\\_Jul-Sep\\_2019.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/873677/Statutory_homelessness_release_Jul-Sep_2019.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> Report on localised homelessness in Greater Manchester, Greater Together Manchester <http://greatertogethermanchester.org/homelessness/>

<sup>8</sup> No recourse to public funds (NRPF) is a condition imposed on someone if they are subject to immigration control. It means they have no entitlement to the majority of welfare benefits, including income support, housing benefit and a range of allowances and tax credits.

<sup>9</sup> Crisis Homelessness Monitor Report, 2019 - [https://www.crisis.org.uk/media/240419/the\\_homelessness\\_monitor\\_england\\_2019.pdf](https://www.crisis.org.uk/media/240419/the_homelessness_monitor_england_2019.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> Local authorities have a statutory duty under housing legislation to provide accommodation to applicants that are homeless and in Priority Need (defined as pregnant women and households with dependent children; anyone who has lost their accommodation in an emergency; being vulnerable due to old age, or particular disabilities or illnesses; or fleeing domestic violence).

that could be caused by moving country or to a different area within the UK. In addition, the evidence in the bid suggested that existing support networks available to this group were fragmented, while newly recognised refugees were often reliant on VCS Organisations to provide support. The bid identified dedicated central points of contact for newly recognised refugees in each local authority as a way to potentially overcome this challenge.

## The CMF-funded project

GMCA was allocated £850,000 CMF funding for 17 full-time LAASLO positions, including salaries, overheads, equipment, expenses and translation/ interpretation costs.

Originally, the bid intended for the funding to provide two LAASLOs in the eight local authorities that were also asylum dispersal areas (with an additional LAASLO in one of these areas). Following the funding grant, the project decided to provide LAASLOs across all 10 local authorities, in order to provide learnings about refugees and provide support across Greater Manchester. The project also intended to help balance pressure points on local authorities that have higher numbers of refugees, by upskilling different local authorities to develop expertise and structures to support refugees. Therefore, the 17 posts were subsequently allocated across all 10 local authorities (with seven local authorities accommodating two LAASLOs and three accommodating one).

The primary activity of LAASLOs was to provide up to three months of tailored support to former asylum seekers who had received a position decision on their asylum claim, based on the identified needs of individuals and their family members<sup>11</sup>. Part of the LAASLO role was to ensure asylum-seekers were aware of the project within that 28-day “move-on” period, to ensure sufficient time for support to find new accommodation. **Specific activities undertaken by LAASLOs included:**

- Scoping and outreach work in order to engage beneficiaries with the service and to establish networks and partnerships with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and VCS Organisations that already worked with the same or similar pool of people and with relevant housing providers (including private rental sector (PRS) landlords).
- Liaising with NASS accommodation providers (Serco) and Advice, Issue, Reporting and Eligibility support (AIRE) service providers (Migrant Help and Reed in Partnership) to facilitate referrals of newly recognised refugees to LAASLOs.
- Assisting beneficiaries to prepare to access temporary or permanent accommodation. Typical support included (but was not limited to): sharing information with beneficiaries about the housing market and locally available housing; supporting beneficiaries to access benefits (including Universal Credit) and set up a bank account. This included direct support (for example, to fill in forms and applications); identifying temporary housing solutions; and making referrals and signposting to wider housing services.

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<sup>11</sup> Beneficiaries are referred to in this report as newly recognised refugees but includes people granted refugee status as well as other forms of leave to remain in the UK, such as leave to remain based on the right to family life.

- LAASLOs also intended to provide wider integration support to beneficiaries, including support to access education and training courses (including English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) provision) and employment support (such as to develop a CV). This included direct support and referrals and signposting to wider support services.

## Project objectives

Project objectives were identified following a review of project documentation and a consultation between the Ipsos MORI Relationship Manager and LAASLO pilot project staff. Following the consultation, the Ipsos MORI Relationship Manager developed a logic model, which was reviewed and agreed with project staff (see figure 1.1)<sup>12</sup>. The logic model outlines planned activities and outputs and how these relate to project and CMF fund-level outcomes<sup>13</sup>. How the project aimed to contribute to CMF intermediate outcomes is outlined below (including longer-term CMF outcomes where contribution was expected or seen within the evaluation time frame).

The LAASLO pilot project had two core objectives: to support newly recognised refugees to reduce the risk of homelessness and destitution among newly recognised refugees, support refugees to move into secure and permanent accommodation and, where necessary, to integrate into the wider community. It was intended that the pilot would also reduce pressures on local housing services and reduce costs to the local authority by minimising the need for project beneficiaries to utilise temporary accommodation or homelessness services.

Through the planned project activities and outputs, the LAASLO project aimed to contribute towards the following CMF intermediate outcomes for **the local authorities and GMCA**:

- **Acquired expertise and structures in place to deal with local issues:** With LAASLOs working closely with refugees and relevant support organisations, local authorities intended to acquire expertise around the issues that newly recognised refugees face and develop understanding of how to address these.
- **Improved signposting and referral services:** Through LAASLOs acting as a liaison between refugees and different support services (both internal local authority departments and external services), the project intended to improve signposting and referral pathways for this group.

The pilot project also aimed to contribute towards the following CMF intermediate outcomes for **refugees**:

- **Increased understanding of and access to public services:** Through the support provided by LAASLOs, the pilot aimed to increase refugees' access to public

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<sup>12</sup> A logic model is a diagrammatic representation of a project which depicts the various stages required in a project that are expected to lead to the desired outcomes. The logic model in turn is used to inform the evaluation approach; specifically, what needs to be measured to determine whether outcomes are being met, and how.

<sup>13</sup> CMF fund-level outcomes are outlined in the Theory of Change in Appendix 2.

services and wider services (including housing, welfare benefits and wider services in the community). Through this support, the project also aimed to further refugees' understanding of the services available to them and the processes involved in accessing them, leading to increased independence.


- **Access to labour market skills, training and accreditations and access to ESOL provision:** Where appropriate, the project sought to help refugees access education or training for future employment, and therefore enable them to contribute to the local economy in the future. This also included help to access ESOL provision, as improved English language skills were considered key to improving employability and integration into the community.
- **Increased physical and mental well-being amongst supported refugees:** The project sought to improve mental wellbeing by supporting clients into a more settled situation and alleviating stress caused by displacement and insecure living circumstances. In addition, where necessary, LAASLOs aimed to refer beneficiaries to specialist physical or mental health services to address their physical and mental health needs.


The pilot hoped to achieve two project-level outcomes which closely relate to the CMF outcomes “**housing issues identified**” and “**housing issues resolved**”. The CMF fund-level outcomes were not included in the logic model as it was the view of project staff that a range of external factors meant the LAASLOs would not have the ability to resolve housing issues within the evaluation timeframe.

- **Client refugees feel supported to find appropriate housing:** the project aimed to contribute to this outcome through LAASLOs identifying and providing housing support and solutions to homelessness, helping beneficiaries to understand what housing is available, and providing support for beneficiaries to move into alternative accommodation within the 28-day move-on period.
- **Reduced risk of homelessness and destitution amongst refugees:** the project aimed to contribute to this outcome through LAASLOs providing support to identify and secure accommodation for refugees.

The logic model in Figure 1.1 below provides a visual representation of the logic behind the project, including longer-term outcomes and impacts not expected to be realised within the evaluation timeframe.

**Figure 1.1 LAASLO pilot logic model**





# 2 Methodology

This section outlines the methodology for the project-level evaluation of the LAASLO project.

## Overview of evaluation approach

A theory-based approach was taken for the project-level evaluations, which focused on reviewing and testing the outputs and outcomes within the project's logic model<sup>14</sup>. The suitability of different approaches was explored in an evaluation scoping phase. The possibility of implementing experimental evaluation designs, including Randomised Control Trials (RCTs), was explored and deemed not feasible at a fund level due to the broad range of projects that were funded across different regions and local contexts – this would have needed to have been built into the programme design from the outset. The feasibility of identifying local-level control groups was also explored during a project consultation with project staff. This was deemed not feasible to establish for the following reasons:

- All newly recognised refugees were eligible for the project and would have been contacted by the LAASLOs if possible, leaving very few individuals that would qualify for a counterfactual group;
- All local authorities in GMCA were involved in the project, making it difficult to identify a comparison area for a control group, given the varied patterns of migration and asylum dispersal in the region.
- Those who would qualify would have been likely to be either those who the project had not been able to contact at all or those unwilling to engage in the support (and therefore unlikely to respond to research requests), and would not be representative of the overall newly recognised refugee population. It was also considered potentially unethical to involve individuals who are not being supported as they might have been living in challenging circumstances without LAASLO support.

Project-level outcomes were “mapped” onto relevant CMF-fund level outcomes contained in the overall fund-level Theory of Change. The evaluation approach was designed in consultation with project staff, including the development of an evaluation framework. Due to the scope of the evaluation and differing delivery in each area, it was not considered feasible to conduct evaluation activities in all 10 local authorities. The Ipsos MORI Relationship Manager worked alongside the GMCA project lead to identify three local authorities to take part in evaluation activities. The selected local authorities were Manchester, Oldham and Salford. The following factors were taken into consideration in selecting these local authorities:

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<sup>14</sup> Theory-based approaches to evaluation use an explicit theory of change to draw conclusions about whether and how an intervention contributed to observed results. For more information, see: <https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/audit-evaluation/centre-excellence-evaluation/theory-based-approaches-evaluation-concepts-practices.html>



According to project staff, migration pressures and volume of asylum seekers settling in these areas tend to be higher as these local authorities are more densely populated than more rural areas of Greater Manchester, and these areas also faced greater challenges in available housing stock.

Due to delays in the allocation of CMF funding, project staff considered that some local authorities would not have been delivering the project for long enough to realise any intended outcomes. It was therefore considered less appropriate to conduct evaluation activities in these areas.

The Manchester local authority pilot was deemed to be unique, because the pilot started earlier than in other local authorities and the LAASLO role was outsourced to a local housing association (Riverside)<sup>15</sup>. Project staff considered this an important approach to capture through the evaluation.

In order to assess value for money, each of the 14 projects were initially assessed through the lens of an 8-step model (outlined in Appendix 1). The assessment involved a review of the availability and suitability of data collected at each of the 14 project sites. Consequently, each project was triaged to one of three methodological groupings:

- 1) **Cost benefit analysis (CBA):** Projects for which data on quantitative and monetizable outcomes was available met the higher threshold for Cost benefit analysis.
- 2) **Cost effectiveness analysis (CEA):** Where quantitative measures for outcome(s) existed, but no data (primary or secondary) was available to monetize the outcomes, cost effectiveness analysis was conducted.
- 3) **No feasibility for quantitative analysis:** Where there was no quantitative measure of outcomes available to the evaluation, neither cost benefit analysis nor cost effectiveness analysis could be conducted.

Two models were developed: the CBA model calculated costs relative to the monetizable benefits, while the CEA model calculated costs relative to the quantifiable outcomes achieved from each of the CMF interventions (without attempting to monetize these outcomes).

As there was no robust control (counterfactual) group against which to assess impact, artificial baselines were constructed. Where possible, input from project leads was used to inform the assessment of the counterfactual and in the cases that this was not available, conservative estimates were made. Given the nature of the data used in the construction of the cost benefit and cost effectiveness models, the accuracy of results produced by the models should be interpreted with a high degree of caution<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>15</sup> Riverside are a social housing provider operating across Greater Manchester and nationally. In the context of this project, Riverside were commissioned to run the pilot LAASLO project in Manchester instead of the local authority. <https://www.riverside.org.uk/about-us/>

<sup>16</sup> The Maryland scientific methods scale scores methods for counterfactuals construction on a scale of one to five (with five representing the most robust method). Due to the use of measures of additionally in the construction of the counterfactual, the approach taken for this analysis cannot be attributed a score. Therefore, the accuracy of results produced by the models should be interpreted with a high degree of caution. For more information, see: [https://whatworksgrowth.org/public/files/Methodology/Quick\\_Scoring\\_Guide.pdf](https://whatworksgrowth.org/public/files/Methodology/Quick_Scoring_Guide.pdf)

**Further information on the methodological approach, including the evaluation framework, is contained in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 outlines the CMF fund-level Theory of Change. Appendix 3 outlines the qualitative and quantitative research tools.**

## **Qualitative data collection**

In-depth interviews were conducted with project staff, stakeholders (including delivery partners), and beneficiaries (newly recognised refugees). Recruitment was facilitated by project staff, to avoid the need for Ipsos MORI researchers to be sent personal information of participants. This included:

- **Project staff and stakeholder interviews:** 10 in-depth interviews were conducted with staff and stakeholders. Six interviews took place initially with project staff, who then suggested key partners and stakeholders to invite to take part in an interview. Interviews were undertaken either face-to-face or via telephone, dependent on the preference of participants.
- **Beneficiary interviews:** 11 in-depth face-to-face interviews were undertaken with project beneficiaries. The recruitment of beneficiaries was first discussed between the Relationship Manager and LAASLO project staff, considering the need to recruit a range of participants that broadly reflected the demographics and circumstances of the wider beneficiary group. All those selected to take part in an interview were first approached by a LAASLO officer to ensure they were willing to take part and understood what participation involved. Once the sample was selected, project staff arranged a suitable time for an interview with an Ipsos MORI researcher at the local authority offices.

## **Quantitative data collection**

A beneficiary questionnaire was designed by Ipsos MORI with input from LAASLO project staff, to explore intermediate outcomes. The survey used emoticons as a way of overcoming language and literacy barriers, raised as a potential barrier to participation by project staff. The intention was for the survey to supplement the qualitative research by reaching a wider number of beneficiaries, and enable triangulation between data sources. There were delays in conducting quantitative fieldwork due to logistical difficulties for local authorities to administer the questionnaire (such as ensuring beneficiaries completed it independently) as well as barriers to understanding the questionnaire without interpreter support. The GMCA project lead agreed to pilot the questionnaire with beneficiaries attending drop-in sessions in a small number of local authorities. A total of 12 paper questionnaires were returned in February and March 2020, with nine coming from the Manchester local authority and three from Oldham. Due to the Coronavirus pandemic, which resulted in a halt to face-to-face support, no further quantitative surveys could be collected. Quantitative responses are included in the outcomes findings, however, findings are used illustratively and should be treated as indicative only due to the limited number of participants.

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## Secondary data and monitoring information

Monitoring information (MI) collected by the local authority and shared with Ipsos MORI was used as supporting evidence in the evaluation. All local authorities submitted quarterly monitoring forms to DLUHC covering some of the key outputs and outcomes relating to the project<sup>17</sup>, including:

- The number of beneficiaries supported into housing (temporary and permanent);
- The number of beneficiaries supported to access public services (benefits, bank accounts, bills and payments, local services); and
- The number of beneficiaries supported to access training, education, ESOL & employment

## Value for money assessment

Based on the available data on quantifiable and monetizable outcomes, the LAASLO pilot project was selected for a CBA. Perceptions of project costs and benefits were also explored through qualitative consultations with staff and delivery partners. Where it was not possible to quantify monetizable outcomes, secondary data on potential monetizable benefits was considered.

## Methodological strengths

- **The breadth of qualitative data collected across three key groups** – staff, stakeholders and beneficiaries. This allowed for comparison of different perspectives and the triangulation of data across respondent groups; and
- **The availability of up-to-date and detailed monitoring data** for the lifespan of the project. Local authorities provided monitoring data up to and including Quarter 1 2020, meaning data analysed in this report is as recent as possible.

## Methodological limitations

- **Participant self-selection bias:** participants were asked if they were happy to take part in an interview. Certain types of beneficiary (such as those in a more stable situation) may have been more inclined to take part, therefore not giving the full picture of the experiences and outcomes for the beneficiary group;
- **Small sample for quantitative survey responses:** Due to the low number of responses (12) the data is not representative of the beneficiary group and can only be used illustratively. Furthermore, most surveys were completed by beneficiaries in Manchester, which means perspectives from other areas were limited or not captured;
- **Delays to the project delivery** meant that some evaluation fieldwork took place in the early stages of the pilot, limiting the ability of the evaluation to gather evidence of contribution towards outcomes that were expected to be realised in the longer-term. The LAASLO pilot in each local authority started at different times. For

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<sup>17</sup> Full list of quarterly MI requirements are listed in the Appendix

example, Manchester started in Q2 of 2019, whereas Salford started in Q3 2019. Oldham started later and had only supported a small number of beneficiaries (>50) by Q4 of 2019. Evaluation fieldwork took place between December 2019 and February 2020.

- **It is difficult to judge attribution of the project due to the lack of a counterfactual**, such as a control group, and the lack of baseline data on outcomes before or at the point of the intervention.
- **Slight differences were apparent in the recording of monitoring data between local authorities.** As such, the monitoring data are caveated throughout the report. For example, Salford recorded additional activities with individuals supported on an ad hoc basis (who were not considered to be project beneficiaries). They also engaged individuals through shared drop-ins with VCS organisations, leading to differences in the number of individuals supported when compared to other areas. Therefore, for some activities the number supported was higher than the number of project beneficiaries. While the monitoring forms are not always directly comparable between local authorities, they are considered to provide a useful indication of the support LAASLOs provided and are therefore included where appropriate.
- Due to the pilot nature of the project, **staff were unwilling to set targets for outputs**, which makes it more difficult to assess the extent to which the project was delivered as intended. Therefore, in some cases qualitative evidence is used as the basis for this assessment.

## Analysis and synthesis

Secondary data and monitoring data shared by the project was analysed to extract key findings related to achievement of outputs and outcomes.

Anonymous questionnaires were collected by local authorities and shared electronically with the Ipsos MORI team. The data was processed by Ipsos MORI to extract aggregate findings relating to project outputs and outcomes.

Interview notes were systematically inputted into an analysis grid for each research encounter, allowing for more in-depth analysis of findings. There was one grid for each type of audience consulted. The grids followed the structure of the topic guide enabling the identification of relevant quotes for each element of the outcomes and process evaluation. A thematic analysis approach was implemented in order to identify, analyse and interpret patterns of meaning (or "themes") within the qualitative data, which allowed the evaluation to explore similarities and differences in perceptions, views, experiences and behaviours. Once all data had been inputted, evidence for each outcome and key delivery themes was brought together in a second analysis matrix to triangulate the evidence and assess its robustness.

Quotes in this report are verbatim and are used to illustrate and highlight key points and common themes. Quotes that contain personal information have been anonymised.

# 3 Key findings: delivery

## Introduction

This section reports on the key findings from the evaluation in relation to how the LAASLO project was delivered. It begins with an assessment of progress made towards the intended outputs set out in the project logic model. This is followed by discussion of the success factors and challenges that were found to have impacted on project delivery and the achievement of outputs.

## Was the project delivered as intended?

Table 3.1 summarises the outputs determined at the start of the evaluation process, the actual output at the point of assessment and a determination of whether it was achieved or not<sup>18</sup>. It should be noted that this evaluation was undertaken mid-way through the project with delivery expected to continue until 2021, so findings should be interpreted accordingly.

Quarterly monitoring data reports on the number of “units” supported. A unit is defined as one supported individual or one supported family/couple. As outlined in the methodological limitations (see Chapter 2), each local authority recorded monitoring information slightly differently. Salford reported supporting 145 units, however, they also recorded supporting additional units with ad hoc requests (for example, setting up benefits) without providing them with a full project support assessment<sup>19</sup>. Salford also ran its service differently through shared drop-ins with VCS organisations which led to a difference in numbers of individuals supported compared to the other areas. These units have been included under some specific monitoring data categories, but not included in the total number of beneficiaries supported.

**Table 3.1 Achievement of project outputs**

<b>Refugees at risk of homelessness supported by Local Authorities into accommodation (no target set)</b>	Quarterly monitoring information (from Q2 2019 in Manchester and Q3 2019 in Salford and Oldham up to Q1 2020) shows that each of the pilot projects supported increasing numbers of “units” (newly recognised refugee individuals or families) over time, as each project developed. <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Manchester</b> supported 232 units</li></ul>	Achieved

<sup>18</sup> The completion measure is a subjective assessment by Ipsos MORI based on the extent to which the project has achieved its intended outputs – scored as follows: inconclusive; not achieved; partially achieved; achieved; exceeded. See Appendix 1 for further details.

<sup>19</sup> Full support from the LAASLO would usually entail support with securing accommodation and a tailored support plan for at least three months.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Salford</b> supported 145 units</li> <li>• <b>Oldham</b> supported 178 units</li> </ul>													
<b>Refugees are referred to appropriate public services (no target set)</b>	<p>Evidence from quarterly monitoring data and qualitative interviews with staff and beneficiaries suggests that referrals into public services took place. Primary referrals to public services included setting up personal finance arrangements. A summary of the monitoring data is outlined below:</p> <p>Units referred to open a bank account:</p> <table> <thead> <tr> <th><b>Manchester</b></th> <th><b>Oldham</b></th> <th><b>Salford</b></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>158</td> <td>34</td> <td>59</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Units referred to access benefits:</p> <table> <thead> <tr> <th><b>Manchester</b></th> <th><b>Oldham</b></th> <th><b>Salford</b></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>196</td> <td>50</td> <td>148</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Qualitative evidence with staff and beneficiaries indicated that LAASLOs referred refugees into a variety of different public services, tailored to the needs of the individual or family.</p>	<b>Manchester</b>	<b>Oldham</b>	<b>Salford</b>	158	34	59	<b>Manchester</b>	<b>Oldham</b>	<b>Salford</b>	196	50	148	Achieved
<b>Manchester</b>	<b>Oldham</b>	<b>Salford</b>												
158	34	59												
<b>Manchester</b>	<b>Oldham</b>	<b>Salford</b>												
196	50	148												
<b>Referral systems in place to link refugees to training, employment opportunities and ESOL (no target set)</b>	<p>Qualitative evidence indicated that individual projects created systems to aid referrals. This included an induction in Salford and the establishment of an additional ESOL adviser in Manchester.</p> <p>There is some evidence from project level Quarterly MI that referrals into training, employment opportunities and ESOL were made by LAASLOs.</p> <p>Referred into training/employment opportunities:</p> <table> <thead> <tr> <th><b>Manchester</b></th> <th><b>Oldham</b></th> <th><b>Salford</b></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>112</td> <td>18</td> <td>195</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>Referred or supported into ESOL:</p> <table> <thead> <tr> <th><b>Manchester</b></th> <th><b>Oldham</b></th> <th><b>Salford</b></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>246</td> <td>16</td> <td>89</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	<b>Manchester</b>	<b>Oldham</b>	<b>Salford</b>	112	18	195	<b>Manchester</b>	<b>Oldham</b>	<b>Salford</b>	246	16	89	Achieved
<b>Manchester</b>	<b>Oldham</b>	<b>Salford</b>												
112	18	195												
<b>Manchester</b>	<b>Oldham</b>	<b>Salford</b>												
246	16	89												
<b>Refugees are supported to settle into their local area (no target set)</b>	<p>There was limited evidence of integration work conducted by LAASLOs at this stage in the project, however this was intended to continue taking place beyond the evaluation timeframe.</p>	Partially achieved (ongoing)												

What worked in delivering the project?

**There were three key elements that were found to facilitate project delivery:**

- 1)** The skills and experience of delivery staff (LAASLOs and service managers), which enabled staff to meet the needs of project beneficiaries;
- 2)** The flexible working approach of LAASLOs (for example, adjusting to beneficiaries' needs through the timing and location of meetings) which provided project beneficiaries with a sense of security; and
- 3)** Strong partnership working between the LAASLOs and VCS organisations, wider local authority services and housing providers.

## **1) The skills and experience of delivery staff**

Previous experience supporting refugees and people from different cultures, knowledge of existing support networks, relevant language skills and knowledge of housing and homelessness helped LAASLOs to meet the needs of beneficiaries. Where there were two LAASLOs in a local authority, it was particularly beneficial if they brought different, complementary skills and could offer mutual support to one another (rather than being dependent on the project lead for guidance). For example, in one area a LAASLO had previous experience of supporting refugees and had existing networks with relevant VCS organisations, while the other LAASLO had key expertise related to housing provision. In addition, where LAASLOs were multilingual, delivery staff reported that this made it easier to build relationships with project beneficiaries and was more effective than using interpreter services. Similarly, LAASLOs with experience of working with people from different countries and cultures felt this aided the development of relationships and trust.

In Manchester, LAASLO staff and the service manager from Riverside Housing (which was commissioned to run the LAASLO project) had previously delivered a Manchester City Council funded project to address homelessness amongst refugees. Through this experience, staff had built established networks and partnerships with relevant service providers in the area (such as temporary housing providers). Delivery staff and an internal stakeholder reported that using this team to deliver the LAASLO project was a key enabler to effective support provision, as their existing experience and infrastructure (including on-site emergency housing) meant that support could be mobilised quickly.

## **2) Flexible working approach of LAASLOs**

Delivery staff reported that a flexible approach was best suited to supporting newly recognised refugees and promoted engagement. For example, working flexible hours and having the flexibility to meet beneficiaries at different locations meant that project beneficiaries could fit meeting LAASLOs around other commitments (such as employment, ESOL classes, childcare, or volunteering commitments) rather than having to attend a fixed drop-in session. Project beneficiaries also reported that having the LAASLO's mobile number was helpful, as they could contact them throughout the day. This was particularly beneficial where support was time sensitive (such as towards the end of the 28-day window for NASS accommodation). Delivery staff felt that this also provided project beneficiaries with a sense of security, as the LAASLOs could be their 'go to' for support on a range of issues. The flexible approach was particularly apparent in areas where a lower caseload meant LAASLOs had greater capacity to provide more intensive support.

*"I think everyone needs a person to be able to ask questions, especially about the things, for example about studying in college, I didn't have any information [before]. [The LAASLO] helped me to know about this, and I know that if I have problem or I don't understand anything, I can ask her, I can text her"* **Project beneficiary, interview**

### 3) Strong partnership working

Having strong local partnerships and networks with VCS organisations and wider local authority services (particularly housing services) facilitated referrals to LAALOs and ensured refugees did not 'fall through the net'. Delivery staff and stakeholders in two areas reported that strong partnerships with local VCS organisations ensured these organisations were correctly and effectively signposting newly recognised refugees to LAASLOs. Delivery staff reported undertaking relationship-building activities with local community organisations at the beginning of the pilot project, in order to increase cross-organisational understanding between LAASLOs and VCS organisations. As a result of these partnerships, LAASLOs reported that if a newly recognised refugee was not directly referred to them by Serco or Migrant Help (for example, because they had moved into the local authority from another area) they would be picked up by another service (VCS organisations or local authority housing services) that would know to refer them to the LAASLOs. For example, the Bed Every Night scheme (a programme in place across Greater Manchester aiming to provide a bed and personal support for anyone who is sleeping rough or at imminent risk of sleeping rough) in particular identified destitute individuals. Some delivery staff and stakeholders expressed concerns that without the Bed Every Night scheme, LAASLOs would not reach all newly recognised refugees, particularly those who had moved from other local authorities (explored in more detail below). Partnership working also enabled LAASLOs to better understand the services offered by VCS organisations and wider agencies, enabling more effective signposting by the LAASLOs.

In addition, LAASLOs in one area ran several weekly joint drop-ins with wider VCS partners who supported refugees. Staff reported that this enabled newly recognised refugees to access multiple services (such as local authority housing services) in one place. Through these drop-ins, the LAASLOs could reach newly recognised refugees who had not previously engaged with the service and refugees had the opportunity for face-to-face interactions with LAASLOs. Delivery staff felt this was more effective than phone calls or texts to ensure beneficiaries were engaged and understood the advice they were given.

## What were the challenges to delivering the project?

### **There were four main challenges to project delivery:**

- 1) An unclear referral system meant there was room for error in the referral of newly recognised refugees to LAASLOs and LAASLOs spent significant time attempting to identify potential beneficiaries;
- 2) The 28-day window made it challenging to source accommodation;
- 3) High delivery staff caseload in areas with higher asylum dispersal rates reduced the time available to support individuals; and



4) Confusion among wider service providers on the remit of the LAASLO's role leading to duplication of work.

### **1) An unclear referrals system into the LAASLO project**

There was no formal referral process to LAASLOs, creating barriers to effective recruitment and engaging participants. Although delivery staff felt that they reached the majority of refugees eligible for support, they raised concerns that without a formal process, some refugees could remain without support.

Both delivery staff and internal stakeholders reported challenges arising from working with the AIRE providers. According to a wider stakeholder, the requirement for project beneficiaries to “opt-in” to be signposted to LAASLOs for support had resulted in some eligible refugees not receiving support. Delivery staff reported that mistakes had been made by AIRE providers when signposting refugees. For example, in some cases Migrant Help had sent notices of the discontinuation of asylum support to LAASLOs with the contact details for people they were already supporting. Delivery staff also highlighted cases where newly recognised refugees had been given incorrect advice by AIRE providers about where to access support (for example being signposted to Manchester City Council rather than the Manchester LAASLOs' office), which project staff reported had reduced the 28-day window available to LAASLOs to identify accommodation.

Delivery staff also reported that partnership working with AIRE providers was disjointed, resulting in a duplication of work, as newly recognised refugees were being contacted by both LAASLOs and Migrant Help and were confused as to who they should be speaking to about their support needs. Delivery staff felt that the large number of organisations that refugees liaised with during the move-on period (including Migrant Help, Serco, the Home Office and Reed in Partnership, alongside wider VCS Organisations that may already be supporting them) further increased their confusion and stress. Delivery staff reported that this could cause delays to refugees accessing LAASLO support during the limited 28-day window to move out of NASS accommodation. Delivery staff reported that they had attempted to resolve these issues through regular meetings and phone calls with AIRE providers, but that this had not been successful to date.

Delivery staff also worked directly with Serco, with Manchester delivery staff reporting that Serco staff could act as conduits where newly recognised refugees had not contacted LAASLOs. Manchester delivery staff felt that when they delivered a similar project, funded by Manchester City Council-funded, to address homelessness amongst refugees (prior to the grant of CMF funding for the LAASLO pilot project), the referral process had been more effective. Project staff attributed this to working solely with Serco during this previous project, without the involvement of the AIRE providers, and reported that these established relationships meant they could contact Serco staff by phone or email to address issues regarding newly recognised refugees straight away. Staff also recalled previously receiving referrals directly from the Home Office and the homelessness directorate at Manchester City Council. Staff reflected that the referral process for the LAASLO pilot project was less effective, which they attributed to the additional involvement of AIRE providers.

As above, good partnership working with wider agencies meant that refugees could be referred to LAASLOs when they encountered them. However, some staff felt that without these connections, it would not be possible to identify suitable beneficiaries for support.

*" We hope that we're not losing people as there are always grey areas and people fall through gaps, but we're trying to ensure as much as possible that there is that connection and the team are aware of as many people as possible that the LAASLO team are aware of"*

**Wider stakeholder**

Concerns were also expressed by delivery staff about the quality of the support provided to refugees by Migrant Help. Delivery staff noted that the telephone support provided by Migrant Help meant that some complex issues may not be recognised (for example, identifying when a safeguarding referral needed to be made) and that some beneficiaries may not understand the information and instructions provided (particularly when they may have low levels of English language). In addition, LAASLO delivery staff felt that support provided exclusively by telephone made it more difficult to be flexible to changing circumstances, such as the time it took getting through and getting to the right department to deal with a query. Staff felt this was likely to be a reason for the delays to referrals to LAASLOs and errors in the referral process.

## **2) The 28-day window to source accommodation**

Delivery staff and stakeholders identified the 28-day "move-on period" during which newly recognised refugees had to find housing before they had to leave their NASS accommodation as a key challenge to delivering project activities. As discussed above, issues with referrals of newly recognised refugees could lead to delays, which often left LAASLOs with less than 28 days to support beneficiaries to identify appropriate accommodation. The 28-day window was also considered too short a period to address housing needs, as this first required beneficiaries to be in receipt of benefits (which involved support from LAASLOs to open bank accounts, undertake benefit assessments and complete relevant applications), which staff reported was a time consuming process. Additionally, delivery staff reported that overcoming project beneficiaries' expectations of the available accommodation was challenging, and that this could negatively impact on the relationship between LAASLOs and beneficiaries when beneficiaries considered housing to be unsuitable. LAASLOs reflected that a longer period could provide more time to address expectations and ensure project beneficiaries understood the local housing landscape and type of accommodation available.

For complex cases requiring multi-agency working, the 28-day window caused additional issues. Delivery staff reported that these cases were very time-consuming, and attempting to resolve issues while finding accommodation in 28 days was stressful and often unachievable as suitable housing was rare or other issues needed to be addressed first, such as identifying whether children would be taken into care or would live with parents. Where extensions to the NASS accommodation period were granted by the Home Office, staff reported that this made it possible to identify a suitable solution and reduce the stress of supporting beneficiaries with complex needs. Staff reported that a change to Home Office policy to extend the time refugees had to move out of NASS accommodation would enable LAASLOs to better prepare beneficiaries and identify appropriate housing.

*"To [address complex cases] in 28 days you're constantly stressed"* **Delivery staff, interview**

While the LAASLO role can include support for asylum seekers before they receive a decision on their asylum claim, at the time of fieldwork, delivery staff and stakeholders reported that, while preferable, this was not possible due to the lack of a referral pathway for asylum seekers who were awaiting a decision. Staff stated that if they received this information they could put in place a pathway plan to prepare asylum seekers for either a positive or a negative decision. In a small number of cases, delivery staff had been approached by asylum seekers and were able to offer advice and signposting to other services. In Oldham, staff had also worked with Serco at the pre-decision stage to plan complex cases. In these cases, the individuals would have given their permission for their information to be shared with the LAASLOs.

### **3) High delivery staff caseload in areas with higher asylum dispersal rates**

In the three local authorities evaluated, delivery staff reported having a high caseload because of the high numbers of asylum seekers in these areas. Manchester and Salford delivery staff stated that while they had a high caseload, this did not affect the quality of the support delivered. However, some project beneficiaries in Manchester expressed a lack of understanding about their housing options and that they had not discussed their needs in detail with LAASLOs. This may indicate that the LAASLOs in this area had insufficient time to support beneficiaries (discussed further in Chapter 4). While this may relate to the higher caseload in this area, there was not enough evidence available to the evaluation to definitively prove causation.

### **4) Confusion among partners on the remit of the LAASLO's role**

A wider stakeholder working in one of the housing services reported that confusion about the role, responsibilities and remit of the LAASLO role risked duplication of work. They wanted to know whether LAASLOs were primarily housing officers or also provided wider support. As a result of this confusion, they were not clear how their own remit overlapped with the LAASLOs, and felt this risked duplication of work or support needs being missed. Due to the limited number of stakeholder interviews carried out, it is not clear whether this was a unique case or more widespread.

## 4 Key findings: Outcomes

This section reports on the key findings from the evaluation in relation to progress made by the LAASLO project towards its intended outcomes. It begins with an assessment of progress made towards each of the intermediate outcomes set out in the project logic model. Where expected during the project timeframe, evidence towards expected longer-term outcomes are also considered. This is followed by discussion of the factors that were found to have contributed to the achievement of project outcomes. Lastly, progress towards outcomes intended to be longer-term is explored.

### Progress towards intended outcomes

**The pilot LAASLO project in Greater Manchester was considered to be well-established and there was evidence of progress towards the intended CMF outcomes in all three areas.**

Evidence suggests that the project led to increased expertise within the local authorities and improved some of the processes for refugees to access local services. Local authorities also successfully built relationships with a range of wider agencies which improved signposting and referral procedures for project beneficiaries although referrals continued to be an issue.

The evidence indicates that LAASLO support improved beneficiaries' understanding of the housing market and addressed some of the key barriers to accessing housing. However, contextual factors (in particular the lack of available housing and the 28-day 'move on' period) created barriers to beneficiary outcomes and meant that beneficiaries were more likely to be placed in temporary accommodation. While this prevented destitution it also meant that solutions were often short term.

There was also evidence that LAASLOs supported beneficiaries to access and understand wider public services. LAASLOs helped some beneficiaries access employability support and prepare for employment, and to access ESOL provision. However, there was also evidence that the remit of LAASLOs was not always fully understood and could have been more clearly communicated to some beneficiaries.

### CMF fund-level local authority outcomes

#### ***Intermediate outcome 1: Acquired expertise and structures in place to deal with local issues***

Through the close working relationship of LAASLOs with the local authority, the project intended to increase internal expertise to support refugees. LAASLOs in Salford and Oldham were positioned within the local authority, while the LAASLOs in Manchester were outsourced to Riverside Housing, but worked closely with Manchester City Council. The project also aimed to put in place structures to address local integration challenges and overcome barriers to engaging newly recognised refugees with support. It was the intention that the LAASLOs would forge links with other local authority services (including housing teams and other relevant departments) and share knowledge to improve local authority processes and ensure that newly recognised refugees were able to access

housing and other services more efficiently. Evidence towards this outcome comes from qualitative interviews with delivery staff and stakeholders at a midway point in the delivery of the project.

An internal stakeholder considered one of the project's key success to be increased intelligence about the needs of newly recognised refugees and the number of refugees who needed support (also linking to the CMF fund-level outcome "housing issues identified"). Through the project, LAASLOs described how they had become more aware of the limited housing options available for young, single men (a large proportion of project beneficiaries were single beneficiaries who made up between two-thirds and three-quarters of households supported. No gender breakdown was available). Staff attributed this to the cap on local housing allowance for those aged under 35. An internal stakeholder also highlighted how data on users of the Bed Every Night scheme showed that a disproportionate number were newly recognised refugees (this data was not available to the evaluation). Consequently, project staff recognised that newly recognised refugees going straight into hostels was an unsustainable short-term solution, and recognised that work was needed to improve pathways into more sustainable accommodation. These planned improvements were still being developed at the time of the evaluation.

*"A massive aim of this [project] and a massive benefit is to have the level of intelligence that we've been able to glean from it, from which we can inform the way we can plan for future services"* **Internal stakeholder, depth-interview**

As outlined in Chapter 3, the local authority benefited from the past experience and skills brought by LAASLO delivery staff. In Manchester, Riverside staff described how the CMF funding meant they could hire an additional staff member who brought language skills and relevant experience, as well as added capacity to deal with the large number of referrals and time-consuming complex cases.

LAASLOs also described increasing their expertise through the role when encountering new issues faced by refugees. In one area, delivery staff reported that there had been an increase in the proportion of project beneficiaries aged over 65, which had increased their knowledge about how to claim pension credits. Similarly, delivery staff considered that since the start of the project, there had been an increase in project beneficiaries with complex needs, which led to increased multi-agency working (explored in more detail below). The LAASLOs also had opportunities for shared learning and skills development from wider VCS organisations. For example, in Manchester immigration specialists provided the LAASLOs with legal training to enable them to advise those refused leave to remain.

One stakeholder reported that the LAASLOs' close working relationship with the local authority led to more cohesive support for refugees, compared to external support services. According to the stakeholder, LAASLOs acquired a holistic understanding of beneficiaries' needs through coordinating with different local authority services (such as education, housing and social care). They also had a clear understanding of local authority statutory processes, which was identified by delivery staff and stakeholders as essential knowledge to support beneficiaries through the complex process of finding housing (explored in more detail below). It also meant that LAASLOs had greater oversight and understanding of the wider local authority approach and were better positioned to suggest improvements to processes. In comparison, the stakeholder reported that VCS

organisations delivering refugee services often had a less comprehensive understanding of local authority processes.

*“There is voluntary sector support but it often differs. Their skill base very much varies in different local authorities. Sometimes I’ve noticed with the LAASLO that they tend to understand a lot of the statutory navigation, whereas some of the smaller voluntary groups don’t have the knowledge of the bureaucracy side of things. They sit in the LA building and act as a public servant.” Wider stakeholder, interview*

In Salford and Oldham, LAASLOs were based within local authority housing teams, while in Manchester LAASLOs described working closely with the Manchester City Council housing team. Delivery staff reported that they were therefore able to share learnings with housing services and improve joint processes. For example, Salford delivery staff reported that they had worked closely with Homeless and Housing Services in the local authority and consequently decided to take over responsibility for undertaking inductions for newly recognised refugees. Home and property visits were predominantly the responsibility of the support worker from the Homeless and Housing Services team. LAASLOs in this area also ran joint drop-ins with the homeless team, trialling between one and four per week and subsequently reducing this to two based on the level of attendance and to ensure the most effective use staff time.

A “peer-to-peer support network” was set up for the LAASLOs across Greater Manchester, where an internal stakeholder described LAASLOs meeting regularly to network and share best practice. They described how the meetings provided mutual support for delivery staff and the opportunity to discuss issues and concerns, particularly valuable for LAASLOs in local authorities with only one funded LAASLO position. At some of these meetings, partners (such as Migrant Help and the Home Office) were also present to provide relevant information to LAASLOs about wider processes.

**The available evidence indicates that the project contributed towards increasing expertise within the local authorities and improved some of the processes for refugees to access local services, including housing. Key enablers were prior experience of delivery staff and the embedded position in, or close working relationship with, the local authority.**

***Intermediate outcome 2: Improved signposting and referral services, and  
Intermediate outcome 3: Improved coordination between agencies***

The project aimed to improve signposting and referral services for newly recognised refugees to wider support services, through LAASLOs developing connections to local authority departments and establishing partnerships with local VCS organisations. The LAASLOs’ role was also intended to improve the referral and signposting of newly recognised refugees to local authority housing services to ensure support was accessed within the 28 day move-on period. Available evidence of this outcome draws on data from qualitative interviews with staff, stakeholders and project beneficiaries.

Being based in the local authority or working closely with the local authority (in the case of Manchester) allowed delivery staff to build connections within the local authority, coordinate services and improve joint working. For example, staff in Salford and Oldham reported that they worked closely with the local authority housing services (Bed Every Night, Rough Sleepers and Housing Options) who were located in the same building. Wider stakeholders considered the

LAASLOs' position to facilitate communication and improve coordination between the different housing services.

*"Manchester is a really good example, the LAASLOs there are commissioned through the housing team so the LAASLO service is the housing service. I think it would be a lot trickier if you went back to how it was with a lack of coordination between agencies" Wider stakeholder, interview*

The LAASLOs' network also included wider local authority services. In complex cases, delivery staff reported using multi-agency working to bring together different services, such as Children's and Adult social care and health services. According to delivery staff and stakeholders, these connections with wider statutory services enabled the LAASLOs to streamline internal referrals and signposting. Beneficiaries stated that they had received LAASLO support to register with GPs and access mental health and dentistry services. Safeguarding processes were in place in each area, and in one area, delivery staff stated that safeguarding approaches were in place with other agencies, including a 24-hour emergency line to other services as part of their organisational emergency cover.

A wider stakeholder from a housing team reflected that they benefited from the LAASLOs' guidance and flexible support, and in turn they supported the LAASLOs through giving project beneficiaries specialist housing support and referring refugees to the LAASLOs and other services.

*"Within the wider Supported Tenancy team that the LAASLOs are based in, it's a whole team effort. Our sister service Housing Options are in the same building, those connections we build on and are very strong, we try ensure we're supporting everybody." Wider stakeholder, interview*

Building connections with other local authority services was cited by delivery staff and stakeholders as allowing the LAASLOs to improve communications regarding support available to refugees and act as a key point of contact within the local authority. It was widely reported that this streamlined support for beneficiaries, particularly those with multiple needs.

*"I've noticed agencies have plugged into the LAASLOs now. Before the [refugee housing support providers] may have got stuck contacting different parts of the local authority. They've just helped to coordinate it, with the way they are set up with a Greater Manchester thing, not just dealing with [different services] in isolation. For many issues people deal with, they deal with it, then the next one, then the next one, whereas having that coordination helps give the regional picture and helps drive some change in policy and process" Wider stakeholder, interview*

However, there was evidence that the LAASLOs were not always fulfilling this role. In one area, a wider stakeholder reported that they were seeing newly recognised refugees requesting housing support who had not been supported by the LAASLOs to register with GPs or open bank accounts. In these cases, it took longer for the stakeholder to give housing support. It was not clear from the available evidence what was driving these gaps.

*"It affects our service as we can be chasing information quite a lot, any assistance in that sense is kind of vital for us, helping with signposting. I do know we've had to chase some information but [that] doesn't mean LAASLOs aren't providing support." Wider stakeholder*

In Manchester, delivery staff described how they had established good coordination with other agencies through the previous refugee housing project. However, staff highlighted that new links had been built through the CMF funded project. A stakeholder described how the LAASLOs' close communication with these agencies served to improve referral processes and minimise duplication of work.

Strong coordination with external agencies was also formed through the project. Salford delivery staff stated that their partnership building was the most effective activity in the project to date and described meeting with different local VCS organisations that provided support to refugees (such as homeless charities and food banks). Delivery staff described sustaining these relationships through regular catch ups and meetings to discuss and plan improvements to LAASLO support and support offered by wider services. Staff also described hosting joint drop-ins and surgeries for refugees with local VCS Organisations. Delivery staff considered a clear understanding of the wider support landscape to improve the services they offered and minimise confusion among beneficiaries and wider stakeholders.

According to delivery staff, relationships with external agencies tended to improve the coordination of support and signposting and referral systems (both from the LAASLOs to the wider support and vice versa). Stakeholders also reported that the LAASLOs' coordination of support and understanding of wider services available to refugees was beneficial in helping project beneficiaries navigate services, particularly as these services were often changing and could be time consuming to identify (for example, the timing of ESOL classes could change weekly). This ensured that project beneficiaries were less likely to face issues and delays accessing other services.

*"The LAASLOs being that one point of contact in a locality, to have those relationships locally to be almost a depository for what services are available is really helpful and increases the places refugees can be referred to" Internal stakeholder, interview*

Delivery staff in the three areas explained that they provided a leaflet or directory of available services for beneficiaries with contact information for the services. They went through this during a one-to-one appointment, during which staff could also make direct referrals. In one area, an internal stakeholder stated that the list of services was also used by a multi-agency forum to provide local intelligence and identify gaps in support. A wider stakeholder in another area reported that delivery staff regularly made new connections with services, meaning the directory of services was constantly expanding. Delivery staff reported that they also shared support options for refused asylum seekers when they were approached, but that these were more limited.

As outlined in Chapter 3, all three areas lacked a clear referral pathway into the project for refugees from NASS and AIRE support providers. Gaps in the referral process, highlighted by staff, suggests that this would be beneficial. Monitoring information provided by Oldham delivery staff indicated that they worked with Serco at the pre-decision stage to plan support for a small number of complex cases, for example where there were safeguarding concerns or other risks identified, and that they occasionally attended Serco's team meetings to develop joint working practices. This relationship was considered to work well and staff in other areas suggested a closer relationship with Serco would be beneficial. An



external stakeholder reported that the LAASLOs' relationship with the local authority simplified data sharing with Serco. Serco shared information on individual cases and positive decisions with the Greater Manchester Combined Authority, who then passed the information on to the relevant local authority, including the commissioned Manchester delivery team. The stakeholder described how this information could not have been shared with a VCS organisation if they were running a similar service due to data protection considerations. This was considered to save vital time within the constraints of the 28-day window.

*"We get the information [on newly recognised refugees] and pass it on to the local authority. That's when the clock starts ticking [to support refugees into housing]... Through Greater Manchester coordinating the LAASLO service together, that information is a lot easier... There are some areas where I'm not sure the [local authorities] speak to each other, whereas with Greater Manchester it comes from a central point." Wider stakeholder, interview*

However, referral processes with AIRE providers were widely considered to be less effective and in need of improvement (as outlined in chapter 3).

The evidence outlined above indicates that LAASLOs have made positive steps in developing relationships with a range of internal and external agencies, which improved signposting and referral procedures for refugees to wider support services. Key enablers were LAASLOs' internal position or close relationship with the local authority, the relevant previous experience of delivery staff, initial scoping work undertaken early on in the project to identify service providers and built relationships and a proactive approach to establishing connections. However, referral processes of refugees into the project (particularly from AIRE and NASS providers) appeared inconsistent between areas, with room for improvement apparent.

## **CMF fund-level migrant outcomes**

### ***Intermediate outcome 4: Increased understanding of and access to public services***

The LAASLO pilot aimed to increase beneficiaries' understanding and access to public services (such as benefits, health and social services) as well as linking them into community services which could help them with their social integration. A key element of this CMF outcome was the role of LAASLOs in helping beneficiaries to set up a bank account and access benefits, which were both necessary for beneficiaries to access private rental sector housing. Evidence comes from project level monitoring data, quantitative surveys with beneficiaries and qualitative interviews with beneficiaries, staff and stakeholders. It should also be noted that quarterly monitoring reporting differed across local authorities, so comparisons should be treated with caution and seen as indicative only. Due to the low number of responses to questionnaires (12), these results are presented as illustrative only.

Using the accumulative quarterly monitoring data provided, all three local authorities reported supporting beneficiaries with accessing services. While not directly comparable, Manchester reported a higher proportion of beneficiaries who had been supported to access to these services, whereas there were lower proportions in Salford and Oldham. Figures from the quarterly monitoring data are provided at figure 8.1 in the appendix. Survey responses also indicate that beneficiaries understood where and how to access services. 10 out of 12 beneficiary survey respondents stated they would know where to get

help to set up a bank account, while the same proportion said they would know where to get help to access benefits (see figure 4.1 below).

**Figure 4.1 Beneficiary survey, number who agreed they knew where to get support with opening a bank account and accessing benefits**



As above, a key part of the LAASLO role across all three areas was signposting to wider organisations and agencies providing support, rather than necessarily providing direct support themselves. This was particularly important when individuals had more complex needs requiring the involvement of another agency. Qualitative evidence with beneficiaries provided examples where the LAASLOs played a role in helping beneficiaries understand who to contact for support on a particular issue and provide relevant information. For example, two beneficiaries described how LAASLOs explained that they needed to apply for Universal Credit and referred them to a Jobcentre contact to support them with the application and discuss routes to employment where relevant.

One stakeholder felt that the role of LAASLO in helping beneficiaries access wider services was crucial for the local authority housing team to support clients into accommodation. This was because of the different processes that needed to be in place for beneficiaries to be eligible for accommodation. The stakeholder felt it was valuable to have one person with relevant skills and experience coordinating this.

*"I wouldn't know how to navigate it so wouldn't expect someone not from the country to be able to do so. BRP card [Biometric Residents Permit], benefits... if any of these things are missing the relevant agencies don't have the time to start digging it out, so they [beneficiaries] just get pushed back when they've got incomplete information." Wider stakeholder*

However, there was evidence that the LAASLOs' signposting was not reliably reaching all project beneficiaries. One wider stakeholder in one area reported that they were seeing newly recognised refugees requesting housing support but who had not been supported by the LAASLOs to register with GPs or open bank accounts, indicating gaps in LAASLO support and/ or some beneficiaries not being reached by the LAASLOs.

All three local projects reported supporting beneficiaries to engage with wider public services (see figure 8.2 in the appendix for full details). This included community services, local support networks and physical or mental health services. However, project staff reported that it was sometimes challenging to engage beneficiaries with these services due to language barriers, low confidence and self-esteem, and the prioritisation of more immediate needs, such as accommodation.

Interviews provided examples of creative solutions used by LAASLOs in order to help beneficiaries increase their understanding of and access to wider public services. One beneficiary in Oldham described how the LAASLO provided a map of the local area identifying key public services (including GPs surgeries and local support services). This beneficiary reported increased confidence in navigating the local area as a result of being provided with the map. Another beneficiary felt the advice and support of the LAASLO to access services made them feel more organised and in control of their life.

*"It makes me feel like I am... stronger to start my life because I am starting a new life now. More confident. Starting a new life is not that easy, especially at my age."* **Project beneficiary**

In addition, delivery staff in Salford described providing an induction and an information pack containing a list of services to all new beneficiaries, in order to increase their awareness of wider public services. Through providing written information, staff hoped beneficiaries would be able to access services independently in future. This is reflected in the higher proportion of beneficiaries supported to access wider community services in Salford. The monitoring data shows that the majority of refugees that the project was in contact with (including some who did not go on to receive full support i.e. with securing accommodation and activities to support integration), received this information.

*"We connect them with services quicker. Their access is improved as we connect them straight away"* **Delivery staff**

The LAASLOs also provided some project beneficiaries with support accessing specific health services. Registering with GPs, accessing mental health services, and dental health services were cited by beneficiaries and delivery staff. For example, delivery staff described referring project beneficiaries who had children with autism and severe food allergies to health and social services for specialist support. Delivery staff in one area reported that they promoted healthy lifestyles through local and national initiatives, such as discounted active clubs and services. All project beneficiaries interviewed who reported that they needed support accessing health services had received this. However, many project beneficiaries had already accessed GPs as asylum seekers and did not need any further signposting to health services. LAASLOs also described proactively contacting specialist services where necessary, such as helping to book emergency medical appointments for beneficiaries who were not able to communicate over the phone.

The monitoring information reveals that less than a fifth of project beneficiaries in each area were supported to register with a GP or supported to access physical health services. As above, this may reflect the finding from interviews with staff and beneficiaries that some beneficiaries had already received this support as asylum seekers, prior to becoming engaged with the project. A small proportion of project beneficiaries were supported to access mental health services (ranging between 2% and 8% across the three projects). This may reflect barriers to accessing mental health support for some refugees due to different ways of expressing mental health difficulties, and fear of discrimination<sup>20</sup>. Project staff highlighted a challenge in ensuring that the advice and guidance about local services provided to project beneficiaries was consistent between different service providers. To address this, GMCA undertook a local project with Serco to ensure their

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<sup>20</sup> Mental health promotion and mental health care in refugees and migrants, World Health Organisation, p.22, [https://www.euro.who.int/\\_data/assets/pdf\\_file/0004/386563/mental-health-eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1](https://www.euro.who.int/_data/assets/pdf_file/0004/386563/mental-health-eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1)

housing officers provided accurate and consistent information on public services to asylum seekers in NASS accommodation.

Some beneficiaries did not feel that LAASLOs could support with the issues they were facing or the services they needed. For example, one beneficiary felt that because the LAASLO role was primarily advisory, there was a limit to how far they could facilitate access to services.

*"I felt that his job is just to advise, he has nothing in his hand, he is not a decider... not his problem [inaudible]... He has a good heart, he wants to help, but nothing in his hands."*

**Project beneficiary**

Other beneficiaries expressed that the LAASLOs were too busy to help with all of the problems they were facing, or that they didn't want to bother them too much with requests for additional support beyond what had already been provided to them. Other beneficiaries described wanting to exercise their independence in making their own arrangements, such as booking medical appointments or organising personal finances. It should also be noted that some beneficiaries had been in the UK for a considerable period of time prior to their grant of refugee status (e.g. over five years) and may therefore have felt settled into a local area and require less support from LAASLOs.

Providing LAASLO services across all the local authorities in Greater Manchester meant that newly recognised refugees could access support locally. Previously, staff reported that newly recognised refugees had to travel to the city centre to access services due to a lack of refugee VCS organisations in areas such as Oldham and Trafford. Staff indicated that the availability of support from local LAASLOs meant refugees could receive support to access services in the local authorities they lived in, minimising their need to travel. This also meant that support services were more evenly distributed across Greater Manchester, as opposed to being provided in only a few locations. Delivery staff in Manchester reported that having LAASLO provision across Greater Manchester reduced the "pull factor" into Manchester city centre for newly recognised refugees seeking support with housing and other services. This reportedly led to a reduction in pressure on the Manchester-based LAASLOs, VCS organisations and council services.

**While at different stages of delivery, all three projects demonstrated proactive work in supporting beneficiaries to understand and access the public services available to them. This worked particularly well in one area where beneficiaries were provided with an induction setting out the parameters of the LAASLO support on offer. Beneficiaries also found written information about local services useful.**

***Intermediate outcome 5: Access to labour market skills, training and accreditations and Intermediate outcome 6: Access to ESOL provision***

The pilot project sought to help beneficiaries to access education and/ or employment opportunities (including training courses and accreditations) and ESOL provision, with the ultimate aim of supporting beneficiaries to become contributing members of society. Evidence comes from monitoring data, quantitative surveys with beneficiaries and qualitative interviews with beneficiaries, staff and stakeholders.

Using analysis of the quarterly monitoring data provided by each pilot project, all three areas supported beneficiaries to access employment and training to some extent (detailed further in figure 8.3 in the appendix). Again, these data are not directly comparable. In

Salford, LAASLOs reported every instance of support provided, instead of the total number cases supported (for example, if advice was given to a person to go to the Jobcentre on more than one occasion, then each occasion was counted separately). Additionally, LAASLOs in Salford offered support to refugees who approached them but lived outside of Greater Manchester, for instance if they heard about the service through a friend. Therefore, the data shows the number of people getting advice to increase employability is greater than the total number of target beneficiaries.

Monitoring data demonstrates that much of the support provided by LAASLOs involved helping beneficiaries to improve their prospects for employment, such as identifying volunteering opportunities, referring them to the Jobcentre or providing general advice and tips to support future employment. Monitoring data shows that small numbers of beneficiaries across all three local areas were supported into paid employment. However, staff reported that paid employment was often not an appropriate outcome for beneficiaries during the support period, as they would often have more pressing requirements, such as ensuring they have somewhere permanently to live.

There were some specific examples provided by beneficiaries that exemplify the range of support provided: one beneficiary described being given **interview practice**, while others said their LAASLO helped by **reviewing their CV**.

*"[The LAASLO] offered to meet me to do [practice interviews] together and look at my applications before I send it to see if there's anything I could add [and] to give me advice."*  
**Project beneficiary**

Other beneficiaries cited employability related support on a more informal basis. For example, some reported that the LAASLO had talked to them about what job they were interested in and possible career options. Another beneficiary said that they felt more confident to apply for a job, thanks to the advice and encouragement they received from the LAASLO.

Both project staff and beneficiaries reported challenges finding appropriate employment opportunities for beneficiaries with previous qualifications. Staff from all three local authorities highlighted examples of highly qualified beneficiaries who had held professional jobs and accreditations in their country of origin, which were not recognised in the UK. In Salford, LAASLOs asked questions during the induction meeting to identify beneficiaries who held existing qualifications or relevant skills that may not be recognised in the UK. These beneficiaries were referred to a local career service that offered courses and recognised qualifications for people in disadvantaged situations. Delivery staff in Manchester also provided examples where beneficiaries were supported to identify a similar career path, such as a doctor who was employed by a local authority as a mental health worker. However, monitoring data (figure 8.4 in the appendix) showed low proportions of beneficiaries identified as highly skilled who had been supported into a suitable career pathway, despite staff reporting that there were many individuals in this situation. Similarly, some beneficiaries expressed frustration that they were not able to get their qualifications recognised, and therefore were not employed or were doing a job that they did not consider suited to their skillset.

Project staff and stakeholders considered access to ESOL provision to be a crucial element of the support plan for many beneficiaries and highlighted how language barriers could interfere with beneficiaries achieving other integration outcomes, such as communication with the wider community or getting into employment. One stakeholder

reported that LAASLOs were well-placed to help beneficiaries access ESOL courses as they had relevant information and knowledge about the different types of courses available due to their position within the local authority.

*“ESOL is difficult. We do our best, it comes back to having that central person to coordinate and direct people. Having a centralised person where they can refer to your options, which ones have free entry or whatever, it’s great just having that coordination.”* **Wider stakeholder**

As evidenced by project monitoring data, much of the support provided by all three local authorities was around securing **pre-entry or entry level ESOL support** (see figure 8.4 in the appendix). While some variation in the figures between areas may be due to different interpretations of the monitoring information forms, they provide a useful overall barometer.

Project staff in Manchester reported that they worked directly alongside a separately funded ESOL advice service in the local authority. LAASLOs in Manchester supported beneficiaries to access this service where appropriate, and staff reported this was useful in helping beneficiaries identify and access appropriate courses. This additional service, which also covered possible employment opportunities and rights to available benefits, did not exist in Oldham and Salford. Staff in these areas felt beneficiaries seemed more likely to come across difficulties enrolling on ESOL courses, for example due to long waiting lists or not being able to find a class appropriate to their level of English. As English language acquisition was identified as a crucial area of support, this suggests that similar roles may be beneficial to other areas in Greater Manchester.

**There were some specific examples in the qualitative fieldwork that showed LAASLOs had helped beneficiaries to access employability support and prepare for employment, as well as accessing ESOL. There were specific challenges identified in all areas to support highly skilled individuals into appropriate career pathways. Projects may also benefit from sharing learning on how to enhance ESOL provision and referrals.**

***Project level outcome 1: Client refugees feel supported to find appropriate housing through creative solutions provided by LAASLO officers, and***

***Project level outcome 2: Reduced risk of homelessness and destitution amongst refugee service users***

The project aimed to prepare newly recognised refugees to move into permanent housing and find housing suited to their needs. The intention was that LAASLOs would be able to identify creative solutions to identify temporary and longer-term housing solutions for beneficiaries within the 28-day move-on period to minimise the risk of homelessness and destitution. This involved delivery staff providing information to prepare project beneficiaries for the process of leaving NASS accommodation (communicating the timeframe for leaving NASS accommodation; the process of finding accommodation; available benefits and grants for deposits and rent; and information about paying rent and bills). LAASLOs also intended to keep project beneficiaries updated during the process of finding temporary or permanent accommodation. Evidence comes from qualitative interviews with project beneficiaries, delivery staff and stakeholders, quantitative monitoring data and quantitative data collected through project beneficiary questionnaires.

These outcomes are closely linked to the CMF fund-level outcomes ‘*Housing issues identified*’ and ‘*Housing issues resolved*’<sup>21</sup>.

LAASLOs reported that they supported the Housing Options team<sup>22</sup> in the initial homelessness assessment to identify needs as early as possible and allow more time to find accommodation during the 28-day window. In some cases, LAASLOs were accompanied by a member of the wider local authority housing team, which staff reported gave more credibility to the LAASLOs’ advice and encouraged beneficiaries to engage in the process. The monitoring information from Manchester showed that referrals received from Serco were given a full assessment within five working days. However, a wider stakeholder in one area reported that the LAASLOs were not qualified to carry out accommodation entitlement assessments, as they lacked the specialist knowledge related to homelessness required, and instead should focus on providing more general support to find accommodation.

In the initial assessments and other conversations, the LAASLOs reiterated the process of acquiring housing and answered beneficiaries’ questions about the process. Monitoring information showed that more than half of project beneficiaries in Oldham received housing related support (55% equating to 98 households). In Salford, 204 households received support (see figure 8.5 in the appendix)<sup>23</sup>.

This personalised, face-to-face guidance was considered by internal and wider stakeholders to work well to provide reassurance to project beneficiaries during a stressful period. According to wider stakeholders, the LAASLO role was particularly helpful in providing relevant information to beneficiaries, as they felt that the local authority housing teams often did not possess the same level of expertise regarding supporting refugees. By providing this specialist support, a wider stakeholder reported that it also relieved pressure on the wider housing teams.

*“It’s a useful tool when you’ve got limited time and limited resource and housing officers are dealing with time critical issues. It’s really useful having that point of contact [the LAASLO officer] within the local authority to say ‘I’ve got this service user, what can you do to help?’”*

**Wider stakeholder, interview**

*“[The LAASLO was] very supportive. I could turn to her if I had a problem and she would do her best to help”* **Project beneficiary, interview**

Qualitative consultations with beneficiaries suggested that, in some cases, LAASLOs had not spent enough time explaining housing processes to the service users. Some participants stated that they had not had the opportunity to discuss the process of finding housing in adequate detail, their options, or their housing needs. Some beneficiaries appeared not to have fully understood the discussions with LAASLOs. In one case, a project beneficiary described receiving a text saying they were on ‘the waiting list’, without any further information provided, and therefore were not sure what this meant in relation to their housing search. These gaps in communications and understanding may indicate that

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<sup>21</sup> The CMF fund-level outcomes were not included in the project logic model as it was the view of project staff that a range of external factors meant the LAASLOs would not have the ability to resolve housing issues.

<sup>22</sup> Housing Options are based within the local authorities and responsible for providing housing where there is statutory duty and run the homelessness service.

<sup>23</sup> Salford counted giving individual instances of support for other newly recognised refugees in addition to those counted as project beneficiaries, and therefore the data is not directly comparable with other local authorities

LAASLOs did not always have enough time to have detailed conversations with project beneficiaries and ensure all the information was fully understood. However, this could also be due to language barriers and difficulty recalling conversations, while some project beneficiaries were concerned about being a burden on their LAASLO and did not ask for further support or information.

The quantitative survey asked project beneficiaries whether they felt they could go to the LAASLOs for help (for example with their physical or mental health) when they first accessed LAASLO support. In total, nine strongly agreed, two agreed, and one was not sure. Although base sizes are low and not representative across the three areas, the findings indicate that beneficiaries generally felt comfortable going to the LAASLOs for support and identified the LAASLOs as a source of advice.

**Figure 4.2 Beneficiary survey, number who agreed that when their LAASLO started supporting them, they felt they could go to them for help if they had a problem**



For beneficiaries who felt they had not had adequate conversations with their LAASLO, there was a sense of stress as they were concerned that they would not find suitable housing. This particularly affected those with poor mental health, who described feeling distressed.

*"We don't know what to do as we don't know anything... every night [my wife is] crying [saying] 'I don't know what to do'"* **Project beneficiary, interview**

An additional consequence of inadequate conversations was that not all project beneficiaries understood that they needed to accept the accommodation they were offered, or risk being suspended from the local authority waiting list for one year. One project beneficiary who had refused an offer of accommodation because they did not wish to move their child to a different school described feeling very stressed as they faced becoming homeless as a result. Delivery staff described attempting to address this by explaining more clearly the limited availability of housing stock and local housing allocation policy, in order to manage expectations.

An additional barrier to preparing beneficiaries and reducing the risk of homelessness and destitution was the 28-day window. In reality, this period was often shorter due to a range of issues, explored in more detail in chapter 3. Delivery staff reported that extensions to the 28-day window could be granted by the Home Office for extenuating circumstances. Examples included complex cases involving social services, the need for accommodation to be adapted to meet the needs of disabled project beneficiaries, and delays to receiving biometric resident permits (which provided newly recognised refugees with proof of identity and of the right to study or work or access to public services and benefits). For project beneficiaries who were not referred in time and therefore did not access LAASLO support



within the 28-day window, Salford delivery staff described how they could offer rapid, intensive support involving opening a bank account and allocating grants to reduce the risk of these beneficiaries becoming homeless.

Once the LAASLOs had provided initial information and guidance, they offered support to identify temporary accommodation. The monitoring information (figure 8.5 in the appendix) reveals that 103 households in Manchester were supported into temporary accommodation, 36 households in Oldham and 148 households in Salford. The variation is due to varying approaches to recording monitoring information, different approaches to services, and variation in how the services linked into wider services.

Delivery staff and stakeholders viewed the Bed Every Night scheme, in place across Manchester, as essential in reducing the number of newly recognised refugees (and asylum seekers who had received a negative decision) who were rough sleeping, sofa surfing, or at risk of exploitation. Staff in Manchester reported being able to use on-site emergency housing operated by Riverside Housing (the commissioned delivery provider), which they felt was a key factor to preventing homelessness, as services could be mobilised quickly.

There were also barriers to identifying temporary housing. The introduction of the Manchester Access and Support (MAS) gateway system (an online assessment and referral system operated by Manchester City Council) meant the Manchester LAASLOs could not contact hostels directly. Delivery staff stated that they did not use the new system as it was time consuming, and consequently this reduced the number of temporary housing options that LAASLOs could utilise for beneficiaries.

While the use of temporary accommodation was often unavoidable, a number of project beneficiaries described the challenges this posed (for example, due to having to move multiple times, and the practical issues of living in a hotel such as not having cooking facilities). Delivery staff also reported a lack of mother and baby units for mothers aged over 25 in Manchester, which they felt left some beneficiaries with children more vulnerable to homelessness.

The LAASLOs also supported some beneficiaries to identify permanent accommodation, for example through working closely with the internal housing team (as outlined above). The monitoring information (see figure 8.6 in the appendix) showed that LAASLOs in Oldham supported the highest number beneficiaries into permanent accommodation (61 households), although it is not clear from the available data what level of support this includes. While the Manchester LAASLOs supported a greater number of beneficiaries overall, the LAASLOs supported fewer people into permanent accommodation (39 households). This links to qualitative evidence from staff and stakeholders regarding a lack of suitable permanent housing options in Manchester. Oldham supported 25 households into permanent accommodation. Evidence from the three areas indicates that project beneficiaries were more likely to be supported into temporary accommodation than permanent accommodation which was supported by qualitative evidence from delivery staff.

In one area, a choice-based letting scheme was in place, with beneficiaries assigned a bidding number to bid for a house weekly. Some project beneficiaries described how they had liaised with private landlords directly, with guidance from LAASLOs. However, this

was more challenging for project beneficiaries who had low levels of English. Some beneficiaries described the advice from LAASLOs during this process as an important factor in securing a property.

*“It was a bit difficult because not all landlords accept housing benefits. I was trying to explain [that] I need to look for work, I need to develop myself. So, finally, I found one landlord that accepts [housing benefit]... [The LAASLO] has been in touch [with me] in every single step. Every day I can text her, I can email her saying this happened or this happened, the next day she’ll ask the next step or what I can do. I’ve [now] got this house and she’s still helping me with advice”* **Project beneficiary, interview**

Delivery staff in two areas described reaching out to landlords in order to expand the availability of housing for project beneficiaries. These relationships were built through the LAASLOs demonstrating a proactive and helpful approach, according to feedback from a landlord to delivery staff. By building landlords’ trust, delivery staff stated that they were more likely to rent to refugees in the future. For example, in some cases, delivery staff reported guaranteeing landlords that the LAASLOs would provide three months’ “floating support”<sup>24</sup> to new tenants to maintain the tenancy and pay rent. However, this was not widely offered due to the associated time commitment required. An internal stakeholder described an example of a good practice, in which the LAASLOs identified a three-bedroom house for three young men. By supporting them into permanent housing within the 28-day window, their other needs could be addressed sooner and wider support offered. Another internal stakeholder stated that private sector leasing schemes were a good option as they were leased through the local authority or a social housing provider, meaning landlords would be guaranteed monthly rent.

Nevertheless, the barriers to accessing permanent housing impacted the number of project beneficiaries who could be granted this. These included:

- Across Greater Manchester, there were **widely reported shortages of available and affordable housing**. Manchester in particular reportedly had no available council housing and rent levels that often exceeded local housing allowance rates and the housing benefit cap. As a result, when project beneficiaries were allocated permanent housing they often had to move to another area. An internal stakeholder reported that housing staff across Manchester City Council were having to rehouse clients in other local authorities, causing frustration amongst staff in these other local authorities. Staff considered large families especially hard to place due to a lack of larger housing stock, while Salford staff struggled to find one-bedroom properties for singles or couples. Where housing was identified further away from where beneficiaries were currently living, this could present further challenges. For example, staff described how families with children settled in schools in particular did not want to move area. This was another key stress factor and a cause of frustration for beneficiaries, evident from interviews with delivery staff and project beneficiaries;

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<sup>24</sup> Floating Support: Accommodation is provided privately (i.e. a Landlord) however support is given by the local authority to help the service user (such as setting up and maintaining rent, budgeting, life skills, avoiding offences / violation of tenancy agreements), typically to someone who has moved on from supported accommodation.

- **Private landlords could refuse to take project beneficiaries as tenants;** this was mainly through not accepting housing benefit or requiring a tenant to provide a guarantor (which could be mandatory in the landlord’s mortgage requirements); and
- **Personal preferences for housing among project beneficiaries** meant some did not want to accept shared housing. Some had been living in shared accommodation for a long period of time and wanted to live alone. Project staff reported that many single men hoped to eventually be joined by family members in the UK, and therefore did not want to live in a shared flat. Oldham delivery staff acknowledged that there was a need to work with the British Red Cross to better understand the process and timescales for family reunification to plan housing and manage expectations.

In terms of the suitability of housing, delivery staff reported that properties were checked thoroughly by local authority housing teams to ensure they were appropriate and met housing standards. The questionnaire distributed to some project beneficiaries asked whether their current accommodation (which could have been permanent or temporary) had everything they needed to live (with furniture, electricity and hot water provided as examples). In total, four strongly agreed, one agreed, one disagreed, one strongly disagreed and one preferred not to say, indicating some variation in accommodation standards. A further three respondents did not say that the LAASLO had supported them to find accommodation and one did not respond.

**Figure 4.3 Beneficiary survey response to the question “my current accommodation has everything I need to live”**



The questionnaire also asked whether the current accommodation was suitable, to which four strongly agreed, one agreed, one disagreed and one preferred not to say (a further three were not eligible as they did not say that the LAASLO had helped them find the place they were living). This also indicates that the suitability of housing varied.

**Figure 4.4 Beneficiary survey, number who agreed that their current accommodation was suitable for them/their family**

# 5/7



**Strongly agreed or agreed that their current accommodation was suitable for them/their family**

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Delivery staff also described supporting beneficiaries to make applications for grants from the local authority for deposits, rent, furniture and appliances, which was also mentioned by some beneficiaries. Some project beneficiaries reported receiving support liaising with landlords (for example, to request repairs). However, evidence suggests that not all beneficiaries received this support, or were not aware they could ask for it, and others described wanting more support with this.

**The available evidence demonstrates that the LAASLOs provided a valuable support service to some beneficiaries to improve their understanding of the housing market and address challenges they faced accessing housing. Due to the lack of housing stock and the limitations of the 28-day window, LAASLOs had more success identifying temporary accommodation than permanent accommodation. There was also evidence of creative solutions to identify permanent accommodation within the 28-day window.**

### ***Project level outcome 3: Increased physical and mental wellbeing amongst supported refugees***

The LAASLO project intended to increase the physical and mental wellbeing of project beneficiaries through providing them with emotional reassurance, leading on from the security of facilitating access to housing and other services. While increased mental and physical wellbeing is a longer-term CMF outcome, it was expected to be seen in the lifetime of the project. Progress towards this outcome comes from qualitative interviews with project beneficiaries, delivery staff and stakeholders, quantitative monitoring data and quantitative data collected through project beneficiary questionnaires.

LAASLOs provided emotional support to prevent mental health crises. This was identified by delivery staff and beneficiaries as having provided significant stress relief for beneficiaries at a time where they could feel overwhelmed, particularly those with low English language skills. As discussed above, project beneficiaries had a single point of contact through the LAASLOS who provided a 'personal touch'. Project beneficiaries also described how the LAASLO had provided valuable emotional support.

*"She really did more than I expected. I saw her as a friend, a very good emotional support. She was really, really helpful."* **Project beneficiary**

Nevertheless, some project beneficiaries who suffered from poor mental health reported that this had worsened due to the uncertainty around finding housing beyond the 28-day window. In these cases, project beneficiaries also reported feeling socially isolated, indicating that they would have benefited from signposting to wider community services

and receiving support integrating into their local community as an additional support network.

**The available evidence suggests that LAASLOs played a role in reducing stress for some beneficiaries, which could reduce the risk of worsened mental health. However, this was sometimes contingent on beneficiaries feeling reassured that they would receive suitable housing during the 28-day move-on period, linking to them receiving support from the LAASLOs to understand housing processes and identify housing. There is not enough evidence to conclude whether all project beneficiaries with poor mental health conditions or other wellbeing needs were provided with suitable support.**

## **Unintended outcomes**

### ***Asylum related support***

While not a widespread practice due to barriers receiving information about asylum seekers, monitoring information indicates that the LAASLOs were able to give advice to asylum seekers on their rights in the case of a positive decision (232 in Manchester, 142 in Salford and 70 in Oldham). This suggests that in these cases, they were in a better position to plan LAASLO services and prepare asylum seekers. For example, this would have provided more time to manage expectations on housing and understand their housing needs.

The monitoring information also indicates that the LAASLOs provided general asylum-related support when approached by asylum seekers (106 in Manchester, 15 in Salford and 55 in Oldham). Examples of support included referring asylum seekers to the Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit to access support in appealing decisions and reinstating their right to AIRE provided accommodation during the appeals process. This ensured that asylum seekers had a service to support them with housing, and prevented homelessness in between decisions and at times of uncertainty. If all asylum seekers could be referred to the LAASLO services, and the LAASLOs had additional capacity and resource, more asylum seekers could be supported.

### ***Support to participate in civic society***

As identified above, LAASLOs also supported beneficiaries to access local community services, which may lead to the CMF intermediate outcome of increased opportunities for social mixing.

## **Progress towards longer-term outcomes**

This section gives an overview of whether projects activities are likely to contribute towards intended longer-term outcomes in the future. This is informed by the intended direction of travel as depicted in the project logic model (Figure 1.1) and is valid given the assumptions of the logic model are met.

The intermediate local authority outcomes indicate that the LAASLO pilot project made positive progress towards **greater integrated working within the council and with delivery partners** and **strengthening the network to support refugees**. This is particularly evident in Salford and Oldham where the partnerships were not already in place. However, there were limitations to measuring the success of the intermediate

outcomes, as there was insufficient stakeholder evidence regarding the success of partnership working, and interviews with some delivery staff took place early on in the project, meaning they had limited experience to draw on. As the projects progress, and if they receive longer term funding, it is likely that delivery staff will continue to benefit from a growing network and strengthened partnerships within the local authority and with external delivery partners. This is dependent on the LAASLOs continuing to take a proactive approach to ensure they have up to date contacts and information, and the partners continuing to contribute to integrated working. Evidence from one stakeholder suggested that greater clarity could have been provided on the LAASLOs' roles. This indicates a potential barrier to achieving this longer-term outcome.

Regarding the longer-term outcome of **increased English proficiency and labour market skills**, there was evidence of some progress towards the intermediate outcome of beneficiaries having improved access to labour market skills, training and accreditations and ESOL provision. If beneficiaries go on to access these, it is expected that their English language and labour market skills would improve. Data collected from beneficiaries suggests the projects contributed positively to supporting them with ESOL and speaking English more generally. From the quantitative surveys collected, half of the surveyed beneficiaries 'strongly agreed' that the support they received from the LAASLO helped them speak better English. This was reflected in some of the qualitative interviews conducted; one beneficiary attributed improvements in her English directly to the support she received from the LAASLO. This demonstrates that in some cases this outcome has already been met in relation to increased English proficiency.

The evidence towards improved labour market skills, training and accreditations also indicates that in the longer term, these beneficiaries would be better placed to **contribute to British society** as it may have provided relevant skills for project beneficiaries to access employment and volunteering, as well as decreasing reliance on welfare and increasing social mobility. One of the unintended outcomes identified that the LAASLOs had connected some beneficiaries to local community organisations, services and events, however some beneficiaries reported feeling socially isolated and had not received support with this. This indicates that some beneficiaries were supported to contribute to British society however beneficiaries would also need to be supported to build links within communities where they received permanent accommodation.

# 5 Value for Money

## Introduction

The LAASLO pilot project was selected for a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA), based on the available data on quantitative and monetizable outcomes. For more information on the methodology, see Chapter 2 and Appendix 1. The CBA used project data and secondary data to monetise the benefits accrued by the project. In addition to the cost-benefit analysis an additional secondary data search was made to further inform the value for money assessment.

## Value for money assessment

### Cost-benefit analysis

Cost-Benefit analysis was conducted in order to assess value for money of the CMF funds granted to the LAASLO project. The assessment weights the project's total economic costs against its monetizable social benefit.

The analysis used project data and secondary data to monetise the benefits accrued by each project strand. As there was no control (counterfactual) group against which to assess the impact of the project, artificial baselines were constructed (outlined in more detail below). Given the nature of the data used in the construction of the cost benefit and cost effectiveness models, the accuracy of results produced by the models should be interpreted with caution<sup>25</sup>.

In addition to the cost-benefit analysis an additional secondary data search was undertaken to further inform the value for money assessment. This assessment is supplemented by perceptions regarding value for money gathered through qualitative consultations with staff, stakeholders and beneficiaries.

For more information on the methodological approach, see Chapter 2 and Appendix 1. This assessment does not take into account non-monetizable benefits of project outcomes, which are explored in Chapter 4.

For the LAASLO pilot project, the social benefits are captured through two domains: cost savings through **housing interventions** reducing the public service cost of homelessness and **improved health and wellbeing** resultant from homelessness avoided. As such, the outcomes of interest were the **number of people that have been supported to secure permanent accommodation**. This outcome was selected on the basis that there is a logically sound and well-evidenced link between reductions in homelessness and monetizable social benefits<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>25</sup> The Maryland scientific methods scale scores methods for counterfactuals construction on a scale of one to five (with five representing the most robust method). Due to the use of measures of additionally in the construction of the counterfactual, the approach taken for this analysis cannot be attributed a score. Therefore, the accuracy of results produced by the models should be interpreted with a high degree of caution. For more information, see: [https://whatworksgrowth.org/public/files/Methodology/Quick\\_Scoring\\_Guide.pdf](https://whatworksgrowth.org/public/files/Methodology/Quick_Scoring_Guide.pdf)

<sup>26</sup> The Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA, formerly New Economy) Unit Cost Database, 2019.

Over the lifetime of the project, 192 people were estimated to have been supported into permanent accommodation in Manchester, 272 in Salford and 16 in Oldham. Secondary data suggests that in the absence of the programme, a proportion of these individuals would have fallen into homelessness<sup>27</sup>. Based on these sources it is estimated that in the without the intervention there would have been a net increase of 85 individuals falling into homelessness (a proportion of which rough sleeping and a proportion in sheltered accommodation)<sup>28</sup>.

An evidence review from the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government<sup>29</sup> provides estimates on the social cost associated with homelessness (rough sleeping and sheltered accommodation). These estimates have been inflated to 2020 prices to provide an estimate of £61 per rough sleeper per night an £12 per individual in sheltered accommodation per night. These costs include the impact on public services including health, mental health services and costs incurred by the criminal justice system as well as the mental health cost for the homeless individual.

Table 5.1 below summaries the monetised value of the estimated benefits resulting from the LAASLO project.

**Table 5.1 Monetizable benefits from the LAASLO project**

Benefit	Value
Public service cost saving from avoidance of homelessness	£194,624
Improved wellbeing resultant from avoidance of homelessness	£54,479
Total economic benefit from project delivery	£249,103

The costs associated with achieving the £249,103 economic benefit to society involved the salary, training and expenses of two full time LAASLOs on fixed term contracts (2 years) and IT kits and other necessary equipment. Costs totalled an estimated £300,000, a breakdown of the isolated and attributed costs involved in generating the economic benefit to society can be found in table 5.2 below.

**Table 5.2 Costs associated with the LAASLO project**

Cost	Value
CMF funding: Manchester (estimated)	£100,000
CMF funding: Oldham (estimated)	£100,000
CMF Funding: Salford (estimated)	£100,000
Total cost of project delivery	£300,000

Dividing the total benefits of project delivery by the by the total costs presented above derives a **cost-benefit ratio of 0.83**. This assessment suggests that **every £1 of CMF funding returned on average £0.83 of monetizable economic benefit to society**.

<sup>27</sup> [https://naccomm.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/NACCOM-Homelessness-Report\\_2018-05-20\\_EMAIL.pdf](https://naccomm.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/NACCOM-Homelessness-Report_2018-05-20_EMAIL.pdf)

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, <https://www.capitalmass.org.uk/perch/resources/files/jrs-uk-out-in-the-cold-homelessness-among-destitute-refugees-in-london.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/7596/2200485.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7596/2200485.pdf)



Although the estimated ratio of 0.83 infers that the projects costs outweigh its measurable benefits there are several key points that should be considered alongside this figure.

- 1) **Only monetizable benefits have been included within the analysis of benefits:** Estimated benefits were assessed based on measured and monetizable outcomes. Therefore, some direct and indirect social benefits may not have been captured through the CBA modelling (see secondary data section below for further discussion).
- 2) **Attention must be paid not just to the ratio itself, but to whom the benefits and costs are accruing:** The benefits in this analysis accrue to a vulnerable minority population (newly recognised refugees). From a social perspective, the intervention is thus acting to reduce inequality, and as such may be preferred to alternative intervention with a marginally higher Cost-Benefit ratio, but where the benefits accrue to a less vulnerable population.

## Secondary data analysis

In addition to the outcomes presented above, there is evidence that the project contributed to outcomes that were not possible to monetise in the cost-benefit analysis due to a lack of available data on beneficiary outcomes, but that have the potential to increase the economic benefit to society of the project interventions. Analysis of secondary data therefore provides wider context to the CBA presented above.

The available evidence outlined in chapter 4 suggests the project contributed towards **access to labour market skills, training and accreditations** and **access to ESOL provision**. While there was no evidence of the accreditations gained as a result of the project, secondary sources can provide estimates of the monetary benefits associated with various qualifications. The Manchester New Economic Unit cost database provides estimates for the annual fiscal and economic benefits of NVQ qualifications. For instance, a Level 2 NVQ is associated with £665 of annual fiscal and economic benefit per person per year while an NVQ Level 3 qualification is associated with £1,071 of annual fiscal and economic benefit per person per year.

Evidence surrounding the cost-benefit of ESOL provision in the UK is mixed. A 2013 study by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills found slight increases in employment rates and receipt of benefits following ESOL courses<sup>30</sup>. However, econometric analysis found no significant returns for individuals in terms of subsequent time in work, of earnings, or of reduced time on benefits, suggesting that the economic benefit of these courses was negligible. However, these findings may be mitigated by the fact that the benefits may take longer to achieve than the study period examined.

Another project outcome was the **increased physical and mental well-being amongst supported refugees**. Secondary from the data provides estimates of the Manchester New Economic Unit cost database provides estimates for the cost of improved children's well-

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<sup>30</sup> Department for Business Innovation & Skills, 2013, Evaluation of the Impact of Learning Below Level 2. Available at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/253585/bis-13-1261-evaluation-of-the-impact-of-learning-below-level-2.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/253585/bis-13-1261-evaluation-of-the-impact-of-learning-below-level-2.pdf)

being positive functioning relating to autonomy, control and aspirations of £3,500 which provides an indication of the scale of benefits associated with increases in mental well-being.

### **Qualitative assessment of project costs and benefits**

Delivery staff stated that they participated in quarterly monitoring discussions regarding delivery, which included financial oversight. They also reported that the projects did not encounter financial issues, suggesting the amount of funding was sufficient. However, delivery staff and an internal stakeholder reported that additional funding was required to fund wider aspects, particularly interpreter costs. This funding was sourced from the local authority teams in which the LAASLOs were placed.

In terms of the added value of the project, an internal stakeholder reported that the LAASLO project had increased understanding and built intelligence on newly recognised refugees and their needs, enabling stakeholders to plan improvements to processes and partnership working with other local authority services and the Home Office. The opportunity to make these improvements was considered valuable as the accommodation of asylum seekers was identified as a significant cost to local authorities.

Regarding the value added of the CMF funding, delivery staff and stakeholders cited:

- Single asylum seekers who were vulnerable due the council not having a duty to re-house them had a single point of contact for essential support, reducing the pressure on other local authority housing services. Through the LAASLOs they could access temporary or permanent accommodation to prevent destitution amongst this group, and be accurately signposted to other key services such as support into employment. In the longer term, they would be in a better position to be self-sufficient;
- Ensuring project beneficiaries were aware of the need to accept discharge of duty offers of permanent accommodation, as the rejection of an offer requires a review, the involvement of courts, and significant staff time;
- Improvements to health and wellbeing: minimising the unnecessary use of health services through clearer referral pathways (for example this could involve addressing mental health issues before reaching crisis point or ensure primary care is accessed appropriately rather than A&E);
- Supporting project beneficiaries to understand and apply for benefits provided them with an income to pay rent. Delivery staff suggested that without the project, many newly recognised refugees would have received Universal Credit sanctions as they would not been aware of the Claimant Commitment; and
- Preparing project beneficiaries for employment through employability activities such as volunteering meant project beneficiaries received additional, tailored support to the support they received at the Jobcentre which was less likely to be tailored to their specific needs.

*"The additional funding that came with the LAASLOs gave us the opportunity to do something a lot better, that wider work, it's been a real benefit in that regard" Delivery staff, in-depth interview*

## 6 Conclusions and lessons learned

This final section provides summary conclusions and lessons learned from the evaluation. It includes a summary of overall progress made towards intended outputs and outcomes, highlighting key successes, as well as learnings about areas for improvement. This is followed by discussion of the lessons learned from the project in terms of what works, for whom and in what circumstances, as well as consideration of the replicability and sustainability of project delivery and outcomes.

### What works?

This evaluation found that the main components that worked for this project included:

- 1) The skills and experience of delivery staff (relating to experience supporting refugees, local area knowledge, existing networks, language skills and knowledge of the housing landscape)
- 2) LAASLOs worked flexibly, in terms of their hours, location, and mode of support, meaning they were more accessible to project beneficiaries. This provided project beneficiaries with a sense of security, as they knew where they could access support on a range of issues in a way that was convenient to them. This appeared to be very effective in two of the areas.
- 3) At a strategic level, the LAASLO project allowed internal stakeholders and delivery staff to gather intelligence on the numbers and needs of newly recognised refugees, which enabled them to plan improved support.
- 4) Being positioned in the local authority (or working closely as a partner in the case of Manchester) enabled a more holistic approach to understanding the needs of project beneficiaries and how these fitted into the wider context. In turn, delivery staff were well placed to bring together different local authority services. The LAASLOs' position in the local authority also aided initial referral processes.
- 5) In one area in particular, strong partnership work with VCS organisations enabled joined-up working to improve referral processes and improve the accessibility of support. Partnership working with a range of services (local authority and external) also aided the improvement of processes and services.
- 6) The use of creative solutions to find permanent housing provided some successes in the face of limited or no council or social housing stock.
- 7) The Bed Every Night scheme in Greater Manchester was essential to preventing destitution among beneficiaries due to the barriers posed by the lack of available permanent housing and the restrictions of the 28-day window. This is an example of how the pilot benefited from working alongside other funding schemes with similar objectives to achieve its outcomes.

There were also barriers to delivery and progress towards outcomes, including:

- 1) Necessary improvements were identified to the referral process for newly recognised refugees, particularly with AIRE providers. A more coordinated approach across delivery areas may address gaps.
- 2) The 28-day window to find housing for newly recognised refugees was a key barrier to delivery. Even without delays to referrals, preparing project beneficiaries to move out of NASS accommodation was challenging, particularly for complex cases. Extensions granted by the Home Office in some complex cases were helpful to improve support, but these were applied for on an individual basis. A change to Home Office policy to extend the 28-day move-on period move out of NASS accommodation would have provided more time to prepare project beneficiaries and identify appropriate housing solutions.
- 3) Delivery staff and stakeholders would have benefited from receiving more regular referrals regarding asylum seekers awaiting a decision, in order to plan resource allocation and use a pathway plan to prepare asylum seekers.
- 4) Shortages of available and affordable housing stock made finding permanent housing time consuming and often not possible within the areas refugees had previously lived. This caused distress for some beneficiaries. Other barriers to securing housing for project beneficiaries included landlords refusing tenants who did not meet their requirements.
- 5) Some inconsistencies in the level and intensity of support provided to project beneficiaries, both during the process of identifying housing and once they had been allocated permanent accommodation, contributed to stress and confusion among some beneficiaries. Ensuring a clear process for communicating support to beneficiaries (as seen in the Salford induction) may overcome these barriers.
- 6) Evidence indicated that not all project beneficiaries understood that they needed to accept discharge of duty offers of permanent accommodation. Salford delivery staff reported this was a key issue, which they were attempting to address through better communications with beneficiaries.

## For whom?

- The LAASLO project sought to support newly recognised refugees. By intervening at this stage, the LAASLOs prevented destitution among newly recognised refugees, particularly young, single males who lacked housing options.
- There is evidence to suggest that asylum seekers who are yet to receive a decision on their claim, or have received a negative decision, also benefited from the LAASLO support. However, this was in smaller numbers due to the lack of a clear referral pathway for LAASLOs to obtain case information.
- The local authority also benefited from clearer referral pathways and acquired expertise regarding support for asylum seekers.

## In what circumstances?

- The LAASLO delivery staff's position working alongside the local authority housing teams enabled close working, a holistic understanding of services, and facilitated improvements to services.
- The presence of other organisations and agencies offering support for refugees facilitated referral and signposting and community integration, particularly in Salford where the LAASLOs drove partnership building.
- The high number of asylum seekers dispersed in the North West (and Manchester specifically) created high demand for LAASLO services, beyond expectations in some cases.
- The Bed Every Night scheme across Greater Manchester was a key contextual factor improving the delivery and outcomes of the LAASLO project relating to homelessness.

## Could the project be replicated?

The project could be replicated in other local authorities for the following reasons:

- All newly recognised refugees have similar needs and requirements for support that could be aided by a liaison officer within a local authority;
- Housing need and destitution amongst refugees is a nationwide problem that every local authority will have to contend with, and therefore learning from the pilot could be applied elsewhere; and
- It could work in other areas with large numbers of newly recognised refugees, or indeed other new arrivals who require similar support to integrate (such as resettled refugees).

However, there are some important aspects of the project that would contribute to how successful the replicability would be in other areas:

- Where replication was taking place across multiple local authorities, sufficient planning is required to ensure the distribution of funding appropriately reflects need. The experience of delivery staff and project beneficiaries in Manchester (and partly in Salford) demonstrates that LAASLOs in areas with higher asylum dispersal rates and limited housing availability may require additional resource to address these issues.
- Being placed alongside local authority housing teams was a key enabler to successful delivery and contribution towards outcomes. It would therefore appear important for LAASLOs in other areas to be placed in similar teams, or in a position where a close working relationship is possible.
- Clear referral pathways between NASS and AIRE providers are necessary to prevent newly recognised refugees not receiving support.

- Clarity on roles is needed amongst local authority housing teams to minimise duplication and aid partnership working.

LAASLOs with the right skills and experience need to be recruited. Beneficial skills include relevant language skills; experience working with refugees; and knowledge of housing and the support landscape, to aid provision of support and promote engagement of beneficiaries.

## Could the project be scaled up?

The project could be scaled up to provide wider support to project beneficiaries beyond housing, such as integration in the wider community. An alternative approach to scaling up the project would be to widen the eligibility criteria for project beneficiaries. Delivery staff and stakeholders wanted to work with asylum seekers before they received a decision to prepare them for either decision.

## Is there evidence of sustainability beyond the lifetime of the project?

Several project outcomes are likely to be sustainable beyond the project. Project beneficiaries who have been placed in permanent housing are less likely to become homeless or destitute and are better placed to focus on other support needs, such as learning English and accessing employment. However, outcomes for those supported into temporary accommodation may be less sustainable. It was unclear at the time of the evaluation what proportion of beneficiaries would be moved on from temporary accommodation, due to the limited housing options.

# 7. Appendix 1: Methodology and technical note

## Evaluation Methodology

### Qualitative evidence

There were three research audiences interviewed: project staff, stakeholders (including delivery partners), and beneficiaries. All three audiences were identified through the project lead.

- Interviews with project staff and stakeholders took place either face-to-face or over the phone between November 2019 and March 2020.
- Beneficiary interviews took place face-to-face between February and March 2020.

The interviews were conducted by a Senior Research Executive and a Research Executive at Ipsos MORI, and a freelancer who had experience interviewing refugees.

### Quantitative evidence

- A questionnaire was designed by Ipsos MORI with input from LAASLO project staff for use with beneficiaries (see appendix 3).
- The questionnaire was piloted. However, due to logistical and budgetary constraints, project staff were unable to administer the questionnaire.

### Secondary data and monitoring information

- Monitoring data was collected by the local authority quarterly to share with DLUHC. It included some key outcomes relating to the project:
  - Total number of beneficiaries;
  - Change in immigration status amongst project beneficiaries;
  - The number of beneficiaries supported into temporary / permanent housing;
  - The number of beneficiaries given housing related support;
  - Number of people supported to open a bank account;
  - Number of people supported to access benefits;
  - Number of people supported into paid employment;
  - Number of people supported to engage with other employability support services/agencies;
  - Number of people in activities to increase employability (e.g. training, volunteering, work experience);
  - Number of people with high levels of skills and overseas qualifications supported into appropriate employment and career pathways;
  - Number of people given other employability related support by LAASLOs;
  - Number of people receiving pre-entry level or entry level (1, 2 or 3) ESOL support;
  - Number of people enrolled on accredited ESOL language courses at level 1 or 2;

- Number of people receiving other English language related support (particularly in informal settings);
- Number of people receiving or enrolled in IELTS tuition and support (particularly for high skilled individuals);
- Number of people supported to register or re-register with a GP;
- Number of people given support to access physical health services;
- Number of people given support to access mental health services;
- Number of successful school / college admissions applications made this quarter;
- Number of children and young people awaiting admissions decisions this quarter;
- Number of children and young people not in education and reasons e.g. due to SEN;
- Number of people receiving information and advice about local policing and community safety;
- Number of families connected to, sign-posted or referred to children and young people specific services such as children's centres and youth services;
- Number of people connected to, sign-posted or referred to community services, activities and facilities such as libraries, parks, community leisure centres, arts and cultural;
- Number of people connected to, sign-posted or referred to voluntary and community sector organisations, groups and networks to support their new arrivals status.

#### Value for money assessment

In order to assess the feasibility of a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) or cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) each of the 14 projects were assessed using the 8-step process below.

Based on this assessment, each project was triaged to one of three methodological groupings:

- 1. Cost benefit analysis (CBA):** Where data on quantitative and monetizable outcomes was available, a cost-benefit analysis was conducted;
- 2. Cost effectiveness analysis (CEA):** Where quantitative measures for outcome(s) existed, but no data (primary or secondary) was available to monetize the outcomes, cost effectiveness analysis was conducted; or
- 3. No feasibility for quantitative analysis:** Where there was no quantitative measure of outcomes available to the evaluation, neither cost benefit analysis nor cost effectiveness analysis could be conducted. In this case, a qualitative assessment of project costs and benefits was undertaken based on analysis of staff, stakeholder and beneficiary perceptions from qualitative consultations. Secondary data on potential monetizable benefits was also reviewed.



## Eight step model for reviewing project outputs and outcomes

The process for conducting the cost-benefit analysis follows the 8 key steps outlined below.



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
Ipsos MORI 

Cost-benefit analysis followed an eight-step process:

- 1. Identify the projects outputs** (e.g. number of individuals provided with housing support)
- 2. Identify the achieved projects outcomes** and the outcomes which are monetizable
- 3. Identify monetary values for each outcome** from existing data sources
- 4. Assign a counterfactual case for the outcomes** to estimate the number of outcomes achieved in the absence of the project; derived through primary information collection or secondary data analysis
- 5. Monetize the outcomes** by multiplying the monetary value of each outcome by the number of additional outcomes achieved
- 6. Estimate the persistence of the outcome** (i.e. is this a one-off benefit or ongoing, and how long does the benefit persist for into the future?)
- 7. Calculate the total monetary benefits (cost savings)** by summing the total benefit for each outcome (including fiscal savings, public sector efficiency savings and public value benefits), accounting for any duplication of benefits across different categories.
- 8. Compared the total estimated monetary benefits to the total costs** of the project, to estimate the estimated Benefit to Cost Ratio (BCR).

**Cost effectiveness analysis followed a six-step process, outlined below:**

The process for conducting the cost-effectiveness analysis follows the six key steps outlined below.



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1. Identify the projects outputs
2. Identify the achieved projects outcomes
3. Identify quantifiable values for each outcome
4. **Assign a counterfactual case for the outcomes** to estimate the number of outcomes achieved in the absence of the project. This is derived through primary information collection or secondary data analysis.
5. **Attribute costs** using a breakdown of the project costs. Costs that are related to the outcomes identified in Step 3 can be isolated and attributed to the relevant outcomes.
6. **Calculate the cost-effectiveness figure** of the project outcome, by dividing the outcome by the cost attributed to it to derive the cost per unit of that outcome.

Two models were developed using Excel. The CBA model calculated costs relative to the monetizable benefits. The CEA model calculated costs relative to the quantifiable outcomes achieved from each of the CMF interventions (without attempting to monetize these outcomes).

As there was no robust control (counterfactual) group against which to assess impact, artificial baselines were constructed. Where possible, input from project leads was used to inform the assessment of the counterfactual and in the cases that this was not available, conservative estimates were made. A hierarchy of counterfactual options are outlined below. Given the nature of the data used in the construction of the cost benefit and cost effectiveness models, the accuracy of results produced by the models should be interpreted with a high degree of caution.

## Counterfactual development: hierarchy of counterfactual options

### Counterfactual development

#### Assigning a counterfactual

In order to assess value for money for a project we must compare the project's outcomes against a baseline or counterfactual scenario. The aim of the counterfactual is to replicate--as close as possible-- the outcomes that would have been achieved in the absence of the project. A hierarchy of counterfactual options are presented below:

1. **Randomised, blinded control group.** Individuals are randomly assigned to two groups at the start of an intervention. This is the gold standard in trial design.
2. **Matched comparator group.** Individuals receiving the intervention are matched with non-participants, and the outcomes of participants and non-participants are compared. Matching methodologies include Propensity Score Matching. This aims to imitate, as far as possible, the random allocation of an RCT.
3. **Historical baseline.** Using the same outcomes over the period prior to the intervention to form a counterfactual case. However, this method does not control for temporal variation.
4. **Baseline proxied by secondary data.** Using published evidence such as researched measures of additionality, or other identified data points, to represent the baseline scenario.

#### Analysis / synthesis of findings

Secondary data and monitoring data shared by the project was analysed to extract key findings related to achievement of outputs and outcomes.

Interview notes were systematically inputted into an analysis grid for each research encounter, allowing for more in-depth analysis of findings. There was one grid for each type of audience consulted. The grids follow the structure of the topic guide enabling the identification of relevant quotes for each element of the outcomes and process evaluation. A thematic analysis approach was implemented in order to identify, analyse and interpret patterns of meaning (or "themes") within the qualitative data, which allowed the evaluation to explore similarities and differences in perceptions, views, experiences and behaviours. Once all data had been inputted, evidence for each outcome and key delivery themes was brought together in a second analysis matrix to triangulate the evidence and assess its robustness.

Qualitative approaches explore the nuances and diversity of perceptions, views, experiences and behaviours, the factors which shape or underlie them, and the ideas and situations that can lead to change. In doing so, it provides insight into a range of perceptions, views, experiences and behaviours that, although not statistically representative, it nonetheless offers important insight into overarching themes.

Project-level evaluation framework (as detailed in the evaluation plan)

Output / Outcome / Impact (from logic model)	Who will measure it?	When will it be measured?	Target	MI	Surveys with beneficiaries <i>Note where using the Questionnaire Toolkit.</i>	Interviews with beneficiaries	Interviews with project staff / stakeholders
<b>Outputs</b>							
<i>LAASLO staff and delivery partners report increased knowledge to support service users and deal with local integration challenges</i>	<i>Ipsos MORI</i>						
<i>Increase in the number of newly stated refugees at risk of homelessness supported by LA's</i>	<i>GMCCA</i>						
<i>Increase in the number of refugees who are referred to appropriate public services</i>	<i>GMCA</i>						
<i>Referral systems in place to link refugees to training, employment opportunities and ESOL</i>	<i>GMCA</i>						
<b>Outcomes</b>							
<i>Acquired expertise and structures in place to deal with local integration challenges and barriers to reaching clients</i>	<i>Ipsos MORI</i>						
<i>Client refugees feel supported to find appropriate housing</i>	<i>Ipsos MORI</i>						
<i>Reduced risk of homelessness and destitution amongst refugee service users</i>	<i>GMCA/ Ipsos MORI</i>						
<i>Refugees have increased understanding and access to public services</i>	<i>GMCA/Ipsos MORI</i>						
<i>Refugees have increase access to skills, training, accreditations and ESOL</i>	<i>GMCA/Ipsos MORI</i>						
<i>Improved signposting and referral services</i>	<i>Ipsos MORI</i>						
<i>Increased physical and mental wellbeing amongst supported refugees</i>	<i>GMCA/Ipsos MORI</i>						
<b>Long term outcomes</b>							
<i>Increased integrated working within the Council and delivery partners to support refugees in GrMan</i>							

<i>Decreased reoccurring homelessness and destitution, amongst refugees/ <b>increased living standards</b></i>							
<i><b>Increased English proficiency and labour market skills amongst refugee groups</b></i>							
<i>More refugees are settled and contributing members of society in GrMan, decreased reliance on social welfare - <b>increased social mobility</b></i>							
<i><b>Expanded / strengthened network / partners to support refugees</b></i>							
<i><b>Increased civic society participation / integration</b></i>							
<b>Impacts</b>							
Support model & integrated working provides wider learnings for service transformation and strategy across the Council services (and wider)							
Reduced costs to public services, local and central government and wider social benefits							
Increased knowledge and understanding of the barriers that refugees face, enablers to integration							
Accessible public services to all							
Successful social mixing amongst refugees and wider communities							

## Outputs achievements


Ipsos MORI undertook an assessment of the project's success in achieving its intended outputs based on consideration of the evaluation evidence generated. There are five measures that this assessment can take and that have been consistently applied throughout the individual project evaluations. These measures are based on the definitions below.

**Table 7.1: Definitions of achievement measures**

<b>Achievement measure</b>	<b>Definition</b>
Not achieved	The evidence indicates that the output has not been achieved
Partially achieved	There is some evidence to infer some of the output may have been achieved
Partially achieved (on track)	The output has not been achieved at the time of the evaluation, however there is evidence to suggest that the output will be achieved within the time frame of the project
Achieved	There is evidence to conclude that the output has been achieved
Exceeded	This refers to output where monitoring information shows projects exceed their target outputs
Inconclusive	There is not sufficient evidence to provide a robust assessment of progress towards project outputs
No target	There was no quantifiable target identified for the output

# Appendix 2: CMF Overall Theory of Change

## Controlling Migration Fund Overall fund-level Theory of Change



1. Conservative Manifesto <https://www.bond.org.uk/data/files/Blog/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf#p31>

2. An additional £40m is investing in direct enforcement action against people in the UK illegally and is not within the scope of this evaluation

CMF Evaluation Timeframe

----- Indirect Outcomes

## **Overall CMF logic model**

Rationale is linked to activities and these are linked to outputs, outcomes and impacts.

### **Rationale**

Context:

- There was a Conservative Manifesto Commitment to ease pressures on local areas and public services; There was a public perception that there were changes in the use of local public services due to high or unexpected migration; Local of data and evidence on local level migration patterns and subsequent local impacts.

Fund inputs:

- £100 million from MHCLG disbursed to Local Authorities; MHCLG staff support LAs to develop and submit bids; MHCLG provides impact assessment framework to LAs; Central direction on UASC, LAASLOs

Partners:

- Inputs from partner organisations (training, expertise and materials etc); RSMP provides coordination and support across the region.

Local Authorities:

- Analysis of knowledge on local issues and resources available; LAs conduct consultation activities to develop bid; LAs develop bid independently, or on strategic collaboration; LAs appoint a project lead; LAS develop delivery and evaluation plans.

### **Activities:**

Bid management:

- Staff visits and calls between MHCLG and LAs; Year 1 check-ins before year 2 fund sent through; Monitoring and analysis of LAs monitoring reports; Provision of impact assessment frameworks



Project development:

- Developing English language skills (ESOL and EAL); Reducing rough sleeping; Identifying and mitigating the effects of rogue landlords; Data collection approaches to understand migration; Service integration and coordinating (building synergy within LA and with agencies); Promoting integration and social mixing; Supporting Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Children; Recruiting local authority asylum support liaison officers; Supporting victims of modern day slavery; Other activities (recruitment of specialists, promoting social norms and social media campaigns)

## **Outputs**

Local Authority:

- Project teams/ taskforces; data collection/ monitoring information; increased analysis and review of local issues; coordination and delivery of events to share and disseminate best practice

Project set up and management:

- Ongoing management; investments made and projects started; staff trained; volunteers engaged and recruitment; liaising and networking with local and regional agencies

Project delivery:

- Volunteers in post and networks of partners established; target groups sign posted to relevant projects; project materials and resources developed; target groups reached; sessions attended and activities completed.

## **Intermediate outcomes**

Local authority:

- Increased insights into local migration patterns and community impacts; Expanded and strengthened network partners; increased coordination and cooperation between agencies; acquired expertise and structures in place to deal with local issues; improved sign posting and referral systems

Residents:

- Perceptions of reduced pressure on local public services; increased access to public services; increased involvement in community led integration activities; increased opportunities for social mixing; improved quality of public space; increased confidence that concerns are being listened to

#### Migrant groups:

- Increased understanding of and access to public services; housing issues identified; housing issues resolved; access to ESOL and EAL provision; access to labour market, skills and training, and accreditation; increased understanding of British culture and social norms, increased civic participation.

#### **Long term outcomes:**

##### Local Authority:

- Reduced cost of public services; evidence for future service planning and resourcing; building the evidence base of work works locally; increased revenue from enforcement of civil penalties

##### Residents:

- Perceived faster access to services; reduced public concern on access to public services; increased level of social mixing; increased sense of ownership; improved cleanliness and quality of local areas; reduced crime and anti-social behaviour; improved perceptions of recent migrants to local area.

##### Migrants groups:

- Increased well-being (mental health) levels of confidence; increased living standards; increased contributions to British Society; Increased English proficiency; Reduction in exploitation

#### **Impacts:**

##### Evidence and dissemination:

- Evidence base of what works in what contexts and shared between LAs and partners; evidence influence mainstream policies and service provision

##### Capability and capacity:

- Increased LA capabilities to address local migration issues through delivery of evidence collection; Increased knowledge of local hyper local migration patterns and what works to address migration pressures.

Access to local services:

Accessible public services to all; adequate and relevant services to address specific local issues; resources better targeted and directed

Perceptions on migration:

- Residents most affected can see difference that has been made; successful social mixing; improved perceptions of local impact of immigration.

# Appendix 3: Research tools

## CMF qualitative tools

**Table 7.2: Qualitative tools for different participant groups**

Participant	Research method	Outcomes measured
Delivery staff	Interview	All intermediate outcomes
Stakeholders	Interview	All intermediate outcomes
Project beneficiaries	Interview	Migrant intermediate outcomes and project level migrant outcomes



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**12. How many people did you speak with last week using English?**

PLEASE TICK  ONE BOX ONLY

- 0 to 4 people
- 5 to 10 people
- 11 to 20 people
- 21 or more people
- Don't know/ prefer not to say

**13. The help I received from my support officer (for example attending English language courses) helped me speak English better.**

- |   |   |   |   |   |                                      |
|---|---|---|---|---|--------------------------------------|
|  |  |  |  |  | DON'T KNOW /<br>PREFER NOT<br>TO SAY |
| STRONGLY<br>AGREE   | AGREE   | NOT SURE  | DISAGREE  | STRONGLY<br>DISAGREE  |                                      |
| <input type="checkbox"/>  | <input type="checkbox"/>  | <input type="checkbox"/>  | <input type="checkbox"/>  | <input type="checkbox"/>  | <input type="checkbox"/>             |

**14. Which of the following applies to you? Please tick all that apply.**

- Working full time (30+ hours/week)
- Working part time (under 30 hours/week)
- Looking after the home and/or children
- Retired
- Not working and looking for a job
- Not working due to sickness or disability
- In education
- On a training scheme or course e.g. English language course
- Don't know/ prefer not to say

**15. How would you describe yourself...?**

PLEASE TICK  ONE BOX ONLY:

- Male     Female     Other     I would prefer not to say

Please add any other thoughts or comments about the support you have received in the box below, for example things that you liked, or things you did not like:

**Thank you very much for your help!**

+

+

## Secondary data analysis

**Figure 7.1 LAASLO support with access to services by local authority**

n= number of units supported	Local project		
	Manchester	Oldham	Salford
Supported to open a bank account	158 units	34 units	59 units
Supported to access benefits	196 units	50 units	148 units

Source: Monitoring information submitted to DLUHC

**Figure 7.2 ignposting/referrals into wider public services**

n= number of units supported	Local project		
	Manchester	Oldham	Salford
Connected to, sign-posted or referred to voluntary and community sector organisations, groups and networks to support their new arrivals status	16 units	14 units	211 units
Connected to, sign-posted or referred to community services, (such as libraries, parks, community leisure centres)	66 units	23 units	204 units
Provided information and advice about local policing and community safety	147 units	12 units	184 units

Supported with access to physical health services	28 units	8 units	40 units
Supported with access to mental health services	12 units	7 units	11 units

Source: Monitoring information submitted to DLUHC

**Figure 7.3 LAASLO signposting to training and employability support**

n= number of units supported	Local project		
	Manchester	Oldham	Salford
Number of supported beneficiaries in paid employment	3 units	1 unit	22 units
Number of people supported to engage with other employability support services/agencies	134 units	36 units	114 units
Number of people in activities to increase employability (e.g. training, volunteering, work experience)	112 units	18 units	195 units
Number of people with high levels of skills and overseas qualifications supported into appropriate employment and career pathways	8 units	22 units	33 units
Number of people given other employability related support by LAASLO	164 units	33 units	76 units

Source: Monitoring information submitted to DLUHC



**Figure 7.4 LAASLO signposting to ESOL support**

n= number of units supported	Local project		
	Manchester	Oldham	Salford
Receiving pre-entry level or entry level (1, 2 or 3) ESOL support	246 units	16 units	89 units
Number of people enrolled on accredited ESOL language courses at level 1 or 2	138 units	10 units	19 units

Source: Monitoring information submitted to DLUHC

**Figure 7.5 LAASLO support with housing related support / information by local authority<sup>31</sup>**

	Local project		
	Manchester	Oldham	Salford
Number of households given other housing related support or information e.g. advocacy, advice on tenant's rights	17 units	98 units	204 units

Source: Monitoring information submitted to DLUHC

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<sup>31</sup> Monitoring information shared with DLUHC, detailed in Appendix 1. This data has been taken from Quarterly Monitoring Reports submitted by each Local Authority. This data is self-reported by the Local Authority and therefore has not been validated by Ipsos MORI. 1 unit = one single person, or one family, if a whole family has been supported.

**Figure 7.6 LAASLO support with access to permanent/temporary housing by local authority**

	Local project		
	Manchester	Oldham	Salford
Supported into temporary accommodation	103 units	36 units	148 units

Source: Monitoring information submitted to DLUHC

	Local project		
	Manchester	Oldham	Salford
Supported into permanent accommodation	39 units	25 units	61 units