COUNTER TERRORISM POLICING

HEADQUARTERS

NaCTSO

National Counter Terrorism Security Office

WITHDRAWN

National Stakeholder Menu

of

Tactical Options

Background

This document outlines a set of options which can be used by the private sector and security industry to enhance the wider national security posture at times of raised threat levels or in response to a terrorist incident.

They can work independently or in support of the police service National Menu of Counter Terrorism Tactical Options. They can be implemented independently by an organisation or can be deployed at the request of police following an extraordinary Security Review Committee (SRC (E)).

The tactical options included in this document are not exclusive and it is anticipated that this document will be reviewed periodically to ensure it is fit for purpose in meeting the ongoing and ever changing threat from international terrorism to the UK.

This document has been developed in partnership with the assistance and guidance of a number of security experts within the private sector and the authors would like to thanks all of them for their assistance.

Introduction

Since 2006, information about the national threat level has been available on the MI5 and Home Office websites. In September 2010 the threat levels for Northern Ireland-related terrorism were also made available.

In July 2019 changes were made to the terrorism threat level system, to reflect the threat posed by all forms of terrorism, irrespective of ideology. There is now a single national threat level describing the threat to the UK, which includes Islamist, Northern Ireland, left-wing and right-wing terrorism.

The three UK Government Response levels broadly equate to the 5 National Terrorism threat levels as shown in the table below.

As Response levels are the result of detailed assessments of risk, changes in the National Threat level may not necessarily produce a change in Response level.

THREAT LEVEL		RESPONSE	
Critical	An attack is highly likely in the near future	EXCEPTIONAL	Maximum protective security measures to meet specific threats and to minimise vulnerability and risk.
Severe	An attack is highly likely	HEIGHTENED	Additional and sustainable protective security measures reflecting the broad nature of the threat combined with specific business and geographical vulnerabilities and judgements on acceptable risk.
Substantial	An attack is a likely		
Moderate	An attack is possible, but not likely	NORMAL	Routine protective security measures appropriate to the business concerned.
Low	An attack is highly unlikely		

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MI5 maintain a history of threat levels: -

Date	National Threat Level	Northern Ireland-related Threat Level to __Northern Ireland__
4-Nov-2019	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE
23-Jul-2019	SEVERE	SEVERE

Threat levels prior to July 2019

Date	Threat from international terrorism	Threat from Northern Ireland-related terrorism	
		In Northern Ireland	In UK mainland
1-Mar-18	SEVERE	SEVERE	MODERATE
17-Sep-17	SEVERE	SEVERE	SUBSTANTIAL
15-Sep-17	CRITICAL	SEVERE	SUBSTANTIAL
27-May-17	SEVERE	SEVERE	SUBSTANTIAL
23-May-17	CRITICAL	SEVERE	SUBSTANTIAL
11-May-16	SEVERE	SEVERE	SUBSTANTIAL
29-Aug-14	SEVERE	SEVERE	MODERATE
24-Oct-12	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	MODERATE
11-Jul-11	SUBSTANTIAL	SEVERE	SUBSTANTIAL
24-Sep-10	SEVERE	SEVERE (first published)	SUBSTANTIAL (first published)
22-Jan-10	SEVERE		
20-Jul-09	SUBSTANTIAL		
4-Jul-07	SEVERE		
30-Jun-07	CRITICAL		
13-Aug-06	SEVERE		
10-Aug-06	CRITICAL		
1-Aug-06	SEVERE (first published)		

In general, where the threat level has been raised it has been post-incident and because of something happening which has impacted on mainland UK. However, in August 2014, the threat level was raised because of a combination of factors (both Internationally & UK based). These compelled the threat level to rise to Severe.

It should be noted that an increase to 'Critical' has a significant impact on the UK, the resources across all agencies and potentially business and industry. It is therefore unlikely to remain in place for long periods of time.

It should also be noted that the tactical options included in this document do not just become employable post a rise to Critical.

Attack Methodology

Under the Protective Security Improvement Activity (PSIA) introduced by NaCTSO in 2014, six methods of attack have been identified and remain current: -

- Non penetrative vehicle attack
- Penetrative vehicle attack
- PBIED- Person borne Improvised Explosive device (suicide) attack
- Firearms/Weapons attack including close quarters (Marauding Terrorist Attack)
- Postal device attack including courier and hand deliveries
- Placed IED.

The tactics outlined in this document reflect the options for response to these types of threat.

Overall Strategy

The overall business strategy in dealing with an increase in threat level to 'Critical' or in response to an attack is:

To understand the type of threat posed (why did the threat level increase? What was the attack methodology) and to consider the appropriate level of response and range of tactical options that are best suited to continue 'business as usual', within the parameters of this heightened state of alert.

Operational Requirement

The operational requirement to consider when planning for an increase in threat level to 'Critical' is: -

- To agree a menu of site specific tactical options that are suitable for your organisation that can be considered if the threat level increases to 'Critical',
- Regularly exercise the plan for 'Critical' to ensure that key stakeholders and staff are aware of the impact on their area of work should a change be necessary,
- Ensure that staff have been consulted and agreements in place if options impact on staff working practices (terms and conditions).

OFFICIAL   March 2020

The Operational Requirement to consider when <u>reacting</u> to an increase in threat level to 'Critical' is: -

- To escalate and quickly engage with key stakeholders to react when the threat level increase to 'critical',
- To consider a range of options relevant to mitigate the threat posed,
- To continually review the tactical options to ensure they remain suitable to meet the Threat under consideration,
- Ensure that any change to tactical options will provide reassurance to staff rather than cause for alarm,
- Implement communication strategy that provides advice to staff around changes to planned events/deliveries/changes to access points and
- Only react to information from Official sources such as Government Security Services and Police as there is a lot of misinformation available through unsubstantiated sources
- To have an immediate holding plan available to allow a more permanent solution to be found,
- Consider implementing a command and control strategy using the Strategic, Tactical and Operational (formerly Gold/Silver/Bronze system) which will mirror that of the emergency services / responders and aid communication should it be required,

  - **STRATEGIC** is in overall control of the organisation's resources at the incident and will formulate the strategy for dealing with the incident,

  - **TACTICAL** manage tactical implementation following the strategic direction given by Gold and makes it into sets of actions that are completed by Bronze,

  - **OPERATIONAL** directly controls an organization's resources at the incident and will be found with their staff working at the scene,

- Minimise disruption to business and promote recovery at the earliest time.

Menu of Tactical Options

The following list of tactical options should be considered now to support an increase in threat level to 'Critical' or following an incident or attack.

This is not an exhaustive list and there may be other site specific options which are relevant to your site. The key to any change is that security patrols should remain unpredictable. Feedback from security services has proved that this is a real deterrent when planning an attack.

A   Agree strategy and document all decisions (to include rationale regarding for change or preserving status quo).

B   Ensure lock down procedures are tried and tested.

C   Implement emergency change to shift patterns (extended shift patterns, changes to rotation etc. – Agree plan with staff in advance).

D   Review patrol strategy (be unpredictable). Adopt high visibility clothing. (Deployment in Hi-vis will be dependent on the intelligence available and the perceived risk to the site and staff).

E   Brigade resources with neighbouring contracts (rotate and share external patrols with other security companies and widen patrol area).

F   Report any suspicious activity in a timely manner.

G   Implement communication links with surrounding premises to pass on information about suspicious activity/behaviour.

H   Consider closing non-essential access and egress points.

I   Focus CCTV on all communal areas and vulnerable points.

J   Ensure CCTV is suitable for the task for which it is being utilised.

K   Review immediate parking areas and access to them.

L   All visitors must give 24 hours' notice.

M   Implement search regimes (people, vehicles, baggage, etc.)

      100% staff ID checks (*challenge ALL staff).*

O   All staff and visitors to wear ID (if this is not usual practice).

P   Visitors to be accompanied at all times.

Q   Security officers must check all personnel and vehicles including emergency services – do not assume they are who they say they are!).

S   Consider cancelling or postponing events.

T   Cancellation of all non-essential training ensuring staffing levels are maintained.

U   Staff are briefed on response and threat levels.

V   Restrict deliveries to essential deliveries only (out of hours only).

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W   Couriers – Essential deliveries only.

X   Post:
- Where possible 100% scan
- Ensure postal procedures are robust

Remember, there is evidence to support that strong, robust and vigilant 'communities' provide a hostile environment for terrorists/criminals to operate in.
Useful Links

The following links provide additional useful information that may assist when deploying the tactical options:

http://www.cpni.gov.uk
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/stay-safe-film
http://www.nactso.gov.uk
http://www.mi5.gov.uk
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/crowded-places-guidance