



CIVIL NUCLEAR CONSTABULARY

Email

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The Executive Office

Civil Nuclear Constabulary

Building F6 Culham Science Centre

Abingdon

Oxon

OX14 3DB

Tel: 03303 135400

Website: <https://www.gov.uk/cnc>

23rd December 2021

Dear [REDACTED]

I am writing in response to your request for information regarding the below. Your request has been handled under Section 1(1) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. In accordance with Section 1(1) (a) of the Act I hereby confirm that the CNC/CNPA does hold information of the type specified.

I am writing to make an open government request for all the information to which I am entitled under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.

Please forward responses to the attached questions below.

1. Do you have a formal IT security strategy? (Please provide a link to the strategy)

A) Yes

B) No

2. Does this strategy specifically address the monitoring of network attached device configurations to identify any malicious or non-malicious change to the device configuration?

A) Yes

B) No

C) Don't know

3. If yes to Question 2, how do you manage this identification process – is it:

A) Totally automated – all configuration changes are identified and flagged without manual intervention.

B) Semi-automated – it's a mixture of manual processes and tools that help track and identify configuration changes.

C) Mainly manual – most elements of the identification of configuration changes are manual.

4. Have you ever encountered a situation where user services have been disrupted due to an accidental/non malicious change that had been made to a device configuration?

A) Yes

B) No

C) Don't know

5. If a piece of malware was maliciously uploaded to a device on your network, how quickly do you think it would be identified and isolated?

A) Immediately

B) Within days

C) Within weeks

D) Not sure

6. How many devices do you have attached to your network that require monitoring?

A) Physical Servers: record number

B) PC's & Notebooks: record number

7. Have you ever discovered devices attached to the network that you weren't previously aware of?

A) Yes

B) No

If yes, how do you manage this identification process – is it:

A) Totally automated – all device configuration changes are identified and flagged without manual intervention.

B) Semi-automated – it's a mixture of manual processes and tools that help track and identify unplanned device configuration changes.

C) Mainly manual – most elements of the identification of unexpected device configuration changes are manual.

8. How many physical devices (IP's) do you have attached to your network that require monitoring for configuration vulnerabilities?

Record Number:

9. Have you suffered any external security attacks that have used malware on a network attached device to help breach your security measures?

A) Never

B) Not in the last 1-12 months

C) Not in the last 12-36 months

10. Have you ever experienced service disruption to users due to an accidental, non-malicious change being made to device configurations?

A) Never

B) Not in the last 1-12 months

C) Not in the last 12-36 months

11. When a scheduled audit takes place for the likes of PSN or Cyber Essentials, how likely are you to get significant numbers of audit fails relating to the status of the IT infrastructure?

A) Never

B) Occasionally

C) Frequently

D) Always

1. B) No

2. B) No

3. B0 Semi-automated

4. B) No

5. A) Immediately

6. Exempt under S24 National Security and S38(1) Health and Safety.

7. Exempt under S24 National Security and S38(1) Health and Safety.

8. Exempt under S24 National Security and S38(1) Health and Safety.

9. A) Never

10. A) Never

11. Exempt under S24 National Security and S38(1) Health and Safety.

We are unable to supply the answers to questions 6, 7, 8 and 11 as we are exempting this information under S24 National Security and S38(1) Health and Safety.

The threat from terrorism cannot be ignored. It is generally recognised that the international security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Since 2006 the UK Government has published the threat level based upon current intelligence and that threat is currently at "severe". The release of this level of detail into the public domain is likely to assist potential terrorists, thus seriously threatening national security. Members of the criminal fraternity are also likely to benefit from the disclosure as it will increase the publicly available knowledge of the capabilities of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, potentially making it easier to commit offences. Disclosure of the information would also assist with the disruption and avoidance of any police response to an unlawful activity, whether that activity is terrorist related or not.

The disclosure would therefore be likely to make it easier to commit offences and would also inevitably endanger the safety of those persons working at the sites, members of surrounding communities and also police officers.

Public Interest Test

Considerations favouring disclosure under Section 24

Disclosure of the information requested would enable the public to gauge the efficiency and effectiveness of the plans in place to prevent and detect potential terrorist activity. The public are entitled to know how the police service undertakes its duties to be reassured that forces are doing as much as possible to combat terrorism.

Factors favouring non-disclosure under Section 24

Disclosure would enable the Constabulary to demonstrate awareness of potential issues that may impact upon the community and provide reassurance to the public that the police have the ability and resources in place to prevent and detect any such criminality. Better public awareness may reduce crime or lead to more information from the public as they may become more observant in reporting suspicious activity.

Considerations favouring disclosure under Section 38

The public are entitled to know what areas of criminal activity the police service allocate public funds to, therefore by disclosing this information would lead to better informed public awareness and debate. Disclosure of the information would assist communities to be more aware of the level of protection afforded to them.

Considerations favouring non-disclosure under Section 38

Public safety is of paramount importance to the police service and its partner agencies. In this case the disclosure of information may assist terrorists to further their aims by violent means, thus putting the safety of members of the public and police officers at risk. Whilst wishing to embrace the ethos of information disclosure, this cannot take precedence over public safety.

The disclosure of information designed to safeguard the public is also likely to lead to a loss of confidence in the Constabulary's ability to protect the well-being of the community.

Balance Test

Whilst I acknowledge that there is a legitimate public interest in disclosing the information requested, the Police Service will not divulge information if

to do so will prejudice national security or place the safety of any individual at risk. Whilst there is a public interest in the transparency of policing operations and in this case providing assurance that the police service is appropriately and effectively engaging with the threat posed the risk of terrorism and other more common forms of criminality, there is a strong public interest in safeguarding the integrity of the police in this highly sensitive area.

Having weighed up the competing arguments, I have concluded that on this occasion the public interest is best served by maintaining the exemptions afforded by Sections 24 and 38.

The Civil Nuclear Constabulary is a specialist armed police service dedicated to the civil nuclear industry, with Operational Policing Units based at 10 civil nuclear sites in England and Scotland and over 1600 police officers and staff. The Constabulary headquarters is at Culham in Oxfordshire. The civil nuclear industry forms part of the UK's critical national infrastructure and the role of the Constabulary contribute to the overall framework of national security.

The purpose of the Constabulary is to protect licensed civil nuclear sites and to safeguard nuclear material in transit. The Constabulary works in partnership with the appropriate Home Office Police Force or Police Scotland at each site. Policing services required at each site are agreed with nuclear operators in accordance with the Nuclear Industries Security Regulations 2003 and ratified by the UK regulator, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR). Armed policing services are required at most civil nuclear sites in the United Kingdom. The majority of officers in the Constabulary are Authorised Firearms Officers.

The Constabulary is recognised by the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) and the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS). Through the National Coordinated Policing Protocol, the Constabulary has established memorandums of understanding with the local police forces at all 10 Operational Policing Units. Mutual support and assistance enable the Constabulary to maintain focus on its core role.

We take our responsibilities under the Freedom of Information Act seriously but, if you feel your request has not been properly handled or you are otherwise dissatisfied with the outcome of your request, you have the right to complain. We will investigate the matter and endeavour to reply within 3 – 6 weeks. You should write in the first instance to:

Kristina Keefe
Disclosures Officer
CNC
Culham Science Centre
Abingdon
Oxfordshire
OX14 3DB

E-mail: FOI@cnc.pnn.police.uk

If you are still dissatisfied following our internal review, you have the right, under section 50 of the Act, to complain directly to the Information Commissioner. Before considering your complaint, the Information Commissioner would normally expect you to have exhausted the complaints procedures provided by the CNPA.

The Information Commissioner can be contacted at:

FOI Compliance Team (complaints)
Wycliffe House
Water Lane
Wilmslow
Cheshire
SK9 5AF

If you require any further assistance in connection with this request please contact us at our address below:

Kristina Keefe
Disclosures Officer
CNC
Culham Science Centre
Abingdon
Oxfordshire
OX14 3DB
E-mail: FOI@cnc.pnn.police.uk

Yours sincerely
Kristina Keefe
Disclosures Officer