



Department  
for Education

# **Government Evidence to the STRB**

**March 2022**

# Contents

List of Tables	4
List of Figures	7
Summary	9
Introduction	11
Priorities for 2022/23 and 2023/24 awards	11
Current context	11
The case for change	15
Recruitment and retention in early career	15
Retention in later career	17
Subject and area level challenges	18
Recap: targeting uplifts at early career	19
Continuing delivery of the £30,000 commitment	25
Future remits	25
Conclusion	26
Proposed approach to the pay award	28
Affordability and wider school spending	28
Overall award	31
2022/23 pay award	34
2023/24 pay award	35
Pay awards for London pay areas	36
Options analysis/ conclusion	37
Maintaining a high-quality supply of teachers and leaders	38
Ensuring all teachers receive world-class training and development	39
Ensuring schools can recruit the high-quality teachers they need	42
Ensuring teachers are supported to stay and thrive in the profession	43
Promoting flexible working opportunities in schools	44
Equality in pay and progression	46
Context	46
Headline findings	47
Gender	48
Gender and leadership	50

Ethnicity	51
Ethnicity and leadership	51
Other protected characteristics	52
Annex A: Teacher Workforce Characteristics and Pay	53
Salaries of headteachers and other teachers in leadership positions	60
Annex B: Recruitment, Retention and the Teacher Labour Market	66
Retention	66
Retention by phase and subject	71
Regional recruitment and retention trends	75
Demand	79
Annex C: Recruitment to teacher training	81
ITT allocations 2021	85
Degree class of new recruits 2021/22	86
ITT financial incentives	86
Postgraduate training routes	88
Teaching schools and school-based ITT	89
School Direct	89
Teach First	90
Annex D: London pay options	91
Annex E: Technical Annex	96
Generating a new classroom teacher pay structure	96
Costing each proposal	97
Estimating the benefits of the new pay structure	100
Estimating recruitment benefits of the new structure	103
Annex F: Equality in pay and progression	105
Data and methods	105
Gender	108
Gender and leadership	114
Ethnicity	117
Ethnicity and leadership	121
Disability	123
Age	126

## List of Tables

Table 1: Proposed pay awards (2022/23), M1-U3, Rest of England .....	34
Table 2: Proposed pay awards (2023/24), M1-U3, Rest of England .....	35
Table 3: Resultant progression between pay points, M1-U3, Rest of England .....	36
Table A1: Full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) by grade and phase, state-funded schools (England, November 2020, in thousands with percentages of total workforce in brackets) .....	53
Table A2: Distribution of full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) by grade and ethnicity in state-funded schools. (England, November 2020) .....	57
Table A3: Average (median) salaries of school leadership teachers in primary schools	61
Table A4: Average (median) salaries of school leadership teachers in secondary school .....	61
Table A5: Use of pay flexibilities, by region (England, November 2020) .....	63
Table B1: Retention rates of teachers by year of gaining QTS (Source: Schools Workforce Census 2020) .....	68
Table B2: Retention rates of all newly qualified teachers in the years following qualification year .....	69
Table B3: Continuous retention rates of all newly qualified teachers in the years following qualification year .....	70
Table B4: Retention rates of all newly qualified primary teachers in the years following qualification year .....	71
Table B5: Retention rates of all newly qualified secondary teachers in the years following qualification year .....	72
Table B6: Continuous retention rates of all newly qualified primary teachers in the years following qualification year .....	72
Table B7: Continuous retention rates of all newly qualified secondary teachers in the years following qualification year .....	73
Table B8: Retention rates of all newly qualified secondary STEM teachers in the years following qualification year .....	73
Table B9: Retention rates of all newly qualified secondary non-STEM teachers in the years following qualification year .....	74

Table B10: Continuous retention rates of all newly qualified secondary STEM teachers in the years following qualification year .....	74
Table B11: Continuous retention rates of all newly qualified secondary non-STEM teachers in the years following qualification year .....	75
Table B12: Full time equivalent (FTE) leaver rates of teachers, by post and region .....	76
Table B13: Total FTE by Phase and Region (London combined and Rest of England, rounded) .....	78
Table C1: Recruitment to postgraduate primary stage ITT 2019/20-2021/22 .....	82
Table C2: Recruitment to postgraduate ITT courses for English Baccalaureate subjects – percentage of target.....	82
Table C3: Recruitment to postgraduate ITT courses broken down by gender, phase and route, for 2019/20-2021/22 .....	84
Table C4: Proportion of first year postgraduate trainees with a 2:1 or higher classified degree, 2019/20-2021/22 (selected subjects only) .....	86
Table C5: Bursaries and scholarships available to trainees in 2022/23 – Postgraduate Bursaries and Scholarships .....	86
Table C6: School Direct (salaried) grant funding for 2021/22 .....	87
Table C7: Postgraduate Teaching Apprenticeship grant funding for 2021/22.....	87
Table C8: Bursaries and scholarships available to trainees in 2021/22 – Undergraduate .....	87
Table C9: Bursaries and scholarships available to trainees in 2021/22– Troops to Teachers.....	88
Table C10: Proportion of trainees training through each ITT route 2019/20-2021/22 .....	88
Table D1: Comparison of existing pay structure to proposed for Inner London .....	91
Table D2: Pay increases between pay points, comparison for Inner London .....	92
Table D3: Comparison of existing pay structure to proposed for Outer London .....	93
Table D4: Pay increases between pay points: comparison for Outer London.....	93
Table D5: Comparison of existing pay structure to proposed for London Fringe .....	94
Table D6: Pay increases between pay points: comparison for London Fringe .....	95
Table E1: Teacher workforce by allocated spine point .....	96
Table E2: Change over time in proportions of classroom teachers on each spine point. ....	100

Table F1: Descriptives by Gender ..... 108  
Table F2: Descriptives by ethnic group..... 119  
Table F3: Descriptives by disability status ..... 123  
Table F4: Descriptives by age group ..... 128

## List of Figures

Figure A1: Full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) in state-funded schools by grade and age (England, November 2020).....	54
Figure A2: Age composition of full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) in state-funded schools (England, November 2010 and 2020).....	55
Figure A3: Full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) in state-funded schools by grade and gender (England, November 2020).....	55
Figure A4: Average (median) salaries of classroom teachers in state-funded schools, by age of teacher and pay region .....	58
Figure A5: Average (median) salaries of classroom teachers in schools by region and phase .....	59
Figure A6: Percentage of classroom teachers, split by School Phase in receipt of a TLR payment.....	64
Figure A7: Average (median) TLR payment for classroom teachers by region and school phase .....	65
Figure B1: Wastage rates of qualified teachers by experience bands .....	66
Figure B2: Qualified entrants as a share of the workforce, by Phase and Region (FTE; London combined and Rest of England).....	77
Figure B3: Qualified leavers as a share of the workforce, by Phase and Region (FTE; London combined and Rest of England).....	78
Figure B4: Pupil-Teacher Ratio by Phase and Region (London combined and Rest of England) .....	79
Figure C1: Year-on-year comparison of ITT applications by quarter .....	83
Figure D1: Comparison of existing pay structure to proposed for Inner London .....	92
Figure D2: Comparison of existing pay structure to proposed for Outer London .....	94
Figure D3: Comparison of existing pay structure to proposed for London Fringe .....	95
Figure E1: Leaver rates in early career for teachers in consecutive service since qualification, split by experience. Note: year used is last pre-pandemic. ....	102

Figure F1: Classroom teacher pay curves by experience, split by gender, working pattern and time period .....	109
Figure F2: “Progression rate” – percent progressing from one pay point to the next, for full-time classroom teachers by year, origin pay point and gender (not split by phase) .	110
Figure F3: Progression rates for full-time classroom teachers in secondary schools ....	111
Figure F4: Progression rates for full-time classroom teachers in primary schools .....	112
Figure F5: Progression rate for part-time classroom teachers by year, origin pay point and gender (not split by phase) .....	112
Figure F6: Progression rates for part-time classroom teachers in Secondary schools ..	113
Figure F7: Progression rates for part-time classroom teachers in primary schools .....	113
Figure F8: Pay curves by gender for all teachers including leaders, by working pattern and pre-/post-reform .....	115
Figure F9: Progression to and within leadership by gender .....	116
Figure F10: Proportion in each pay region by ethnic group .....	117
Figure F11: Pay curve by ethnic group, working pattern and period for classroom teachers (without adjusting for pay regions) .....	118
Figure F12: Pay curve by ethnic group for classroom teachers (after adjusting for pay region).....	118
Figure F13: Progression rates by ethnic group for full-time classroom teachers .....	120
Figure F14: Progression rates by ethnic group for part-time classroom teachers.....	120
Figure F15: Pay curves by ethnicity, including classroom teachers and leaders (adjusted for pay region).....	121
Figure F16: Progression rates into and within leadership by ethnicity .....	122
Figure F17: Pay curve by disability status.....	124
Figure F18: Progression rates by disability for full-time teachers.....	125
Figure F19: Progression rates by disability for part-time teachers .....	125
Figure F20: Pay curve by age group.....	126
Figure F21: Progression rates by age for full-time teachers .....	127
Figure F22: Progression rates by age for part-time teachers.....	127



## Summary

1. The Secretary of State wrote to Dr Mike Aldred, the Chair of the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB), on 17 December 2021. The remit letter requested the STRB's recommendations on the September 2022 and September 2023 pay awards, reiterating the government's commitment to a £30,000 starting salary for all new teachers and asking that the STRB considers its recommendations for the two pay awards in light of this. A two-year pay award will give the sector greater clarity over the roadmap to reaching a £30,000 starting salary, whilst also providing schools with knowledge of the next two pay awards to support better budget planning as we make the uplifts required to deliver this commitment. This document provides the Secretary of State's evidence to support the STRB's consideration of the 2022 and 2023 pay awards for teachers, headteachers and other teachers in leadership positions.
2. To best support teacher recruitment, retention and quality ambitions, a significant uplift in the starting salary of classroom teachers and overall improvement to the early career pay offer is needed. This uplift will capitalise on the school funding settlement secured at the 2021 Spending Review and ensure schools invest in what we know makes the biggest difference to pupil outcomes – a high-quality teaching workforce. As the department's 2020/21 evidence set out, the evidence supports targeting pay awards at the early career, plus this will ensure the pay offer better reflects the challenges experienced at this career stage, complementing the department's flagship policies to better support and prepare these teachers through revising the Initial Teacher Training (ITT) Core Content Framework and through roll-out of the Early Career Framework (ECF). However, uplifts to early career pay should be achieved alongside uplifts to the pay of more experienced teachers, recognising the value that they add to the classroom and the education system overall.
3. The opening chapter considers the wider context for these pay awards, including both challenges and opportunities. Targeting pay at early career remains a key priority in this context, and 'The case for change' chapter recaps key arguments from our 2020/21 evidence to support this. A £30,000 starting salary and improved early career pay offer, with a relatively less steep pay progression structure, will improve the competitiveness of a career in teaching, raise the status of the profession, and provide a pay offer that better reflects the challenges experienced at this career stage, improving recruitment and retention and thus educational outcomes for pupils.
4. The subsequent chapter, 'Proposed approach to the pay award', details the increases to core school funding in FY 2022-23 and 2023-24 and our view as to how spend on teacher pay should be considered alongside the range of resources and activities that schools may need to invest in to best support pupils and staff. It proposes significant uplifts to M1-M6 over the two years such that M1 reaches

£30,000 at the end of this period, with progression between each pay point at 5.5%. For teachers on the upper pay range and leadership ranges, it proposes a 3% pay award in 2022/23 would be appropriate. This would be the highest pay award for teachers since 2006. In 2023/24, an additional 2% pay award is deemed appropriate for this same group. Over the two-year period, this equates to a 5.1% increase in the total pay bill for these teachers, on top of the uplifts to M1-M6. This 3% plus 2% award profile frontloads the higher award into year 1, so that teachers benefit from the majority of the uplift sooner and for longer, with the additional uplift in the second year applied to the new, higher baseline.

5. These proposals sit within a wider context of the department's key policies and activity to support teachers to join and stay in the profession. The evidence updates the STRB on progress against commitments as well as new activity. This includes updates on delivery of our flagship reforms to weave a 'golden thread' throughout a teacher's career: revising the ITT Core Content Framework; delivering the ECF; and introducing a new and updated suite of National Professional Qualifications (NPQs).
6. The final chapter, 'Equality in pay and progression', provides departmental analysis into comparisons of the relative pay and progression of different groups, according to protected characteristics, before and after pay reforms were introduced in academic year 2013/14. Our analysis, using data from the Schools Workforce Census (SWC) and the Teacher Pension Scheme (TPS), is in response to calls within recent STRB reports which have noted concerns raised by teacher unions about the equalities impacts of the pay system.

## Introduction

### Priorities for 2022/23 and 2023/24 awards

7. Ensuring that we have a sufficient, high-quality supply of teachers in our education system is critical. Teachers are the single biggest in-school determinant of pupil outcomes and never has the role that teachers play in the lives and education of their pupils been more apparent than throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. Ensuring every child has access to high-quality teachers remains a top priority as we focus on education recovery and raising attainment.
8. Alongside our key policies to improve recruitment and retention, including our world-leading reforms to teacher training, pay and the pay system has a crucial role to play in ensuring that we have a sufficient and high-quality teacher workforce. It is central to positioning a career in teaching amongst the most competitive in the labour market, helping to attract top graduates whilst also motivating great teachers to stay. Investment in pay will therefore be critical to supporting this ongoing priority and enabling education recovery.
9. Evidence to the STRB in the 2020/21 pay round confirmed this government's ambition to raise teacher starting salaries to £30,000. This remains a priority, with the remit for this year's pay round reflecting this. It requests recommendations for adjustments that should be made to the salary and allowance ranges for classroom teachers, unqualified teachers and school leaders to promote recruitment and retention in light of this commitment, seeking a two year pay award (2022/23 and 2023/24 awards).
10. This evidence will set out how pay can play a particularly crucial role in addressing our recruitment and early career retention challenges, and why targeting pay awards at early career teachers through the £30,000 starting salary commitment therefore remains the best opportunity for supporting recruitment and retention overall. These arguments were set out in detail in our 2020/21 evidence; this continues to provide the case for change, and we recap and build upon key arguments in this evidence.

### Current context

11. The number of teachers in our schools remains high, with almost 20,000 more full-time equivalent (FTE) teachers in schools than in 2010.<sup>1</sup> Recent years have seen improvements to both recruitment and retention. 2020/21 saw an unprecedented

---

<sup>1</sup> Teacher numbers fell, however, between 2016 and 2017 (457,200 in 2016 to 451,900 in 2017).

increase (up 19% from the previous year) to new entrants to ITT.<sup>2</sup> Due to the pandemic, overall retention improved, with 7.8% leaving in the latest year of data compared to 9.4% the previous year.<sup>3</sup> However, challenges remain – we have missed recruitment targets in key subjects including mathematics, physics, geography, computing, and modern foreign languages (MFL), and there are signs that the initial boost to recruitment seen in response to the economic shock caused by the pandemic is subsiding (applications fell in the second half of the 2021/22 postgraduate recruitment cycle).<sup>4</sup> While retention rates in early career have stabilised or even improved in recent years, they continue to be challenging relative to historic benchmarks and are likely to worsen after the pandemic (and subsequent recession) subsides. For example, the percentage of teachers still teaching one year after qualification has been broadly stable for the last four years (85% in 2019), though is at a lower level than earlier in the decade.<sup>5</sup>

12. Against this recruitment and retention backdrop, targeting pay at the early career, including a higher starting salary of £30,000, is critical to addressing challenges where they are greatest and thereby ensuring good value for money for taxpayers. This is especially judicious given strong evidence to support the greater impact of pay amongst this group. Ensuring a memorable and competitive starting salary will not only help to maintain a healthy recruitment pipeline and ensure we are attracting top, high-quality graduates, especially in subjects in high demand elsewhere in the labour market (such as STEM), but an overall stronger early career pay offer is also key in ensuring we retain early career teachers and the significant expertise gained in those first few critical years. This is even more important given the need to retain the ‘bumper crop’ recruited in the past two recruitment cycles. These additional teachers may have previously been attracted by alternative career choices; they have also experienced a disrupted training and induction period during the pandemic. We have already seen a fall in the number entering the classroom after completing ITT in 2019/20, compared to pre-pandemic.<sup>6</sup> This is on top of the usual challenges we know exist and which often drive teachers out of the profession in their first few years.
13. Beyond pressures within the early years, teachers at all stages of their career have demonstrated their dedication to the profession and to their pupils throughout the pandemic. We recognise the challenges they have faced. Teachers have gone above and beyond to ensure that education can continue, being frontline in keeping

---

<sup>2</sup> [Statistics: initial teacher training, GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/statistics-initial-teacher-training).

<sup>3</sup> [Statistics: school workforce, GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/statistics-school-workforce).

<sup>4</sup> [UCAS Teacher Training statistical releases, Undergraduate, Postgraduate, Conservatoires, Teacher Training, UCAS](https://www.ucas.ac.uk/press-releases/2021/04/2021-04-20-ucas-teacher-training-statistical-releases-undergraduate-postgraduate-conservatoires-teacher-training).

<sup>5</sup> [School workforce in England: November 2020, GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/school-workforce-in-england-november-2020).

<sup>6</sup> State-funded classroom teachers, [Statistics: initial teacher training, GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/statistics-initial-teacher-training).

schools open as well as adapting and changing their practice to ensure remote education is in place where needed.

14. These changes have also brought opportunities. New ways of working provide the chance to rethink the constraints of the profession and think about how things might work differently to ensure teaching is a modern profession and sustainable career choice. Alongside an effective pay system, it is paramount that we ensure that teachers have the right conditions. We will continue to do this through initiatives such as the school workload reduction toolkit, Flexible Working Ambassador Schools, and the creation of an Education Staff Wellbeing Charter and new mental health and support package for school leaders. We will capitalise on new opportunities provided by the pandemic where relevant. This is discussed in greater detail in 'Maintaining a high-quality supply of teachers and leaders'.
15. At the 2021 Spending Review the Chancellor confirmed that all public sector workers will see pay rises over the next three years as the recovery in the economy and labour market allows a return to a normal pay setting process. We know that this will be welcome news following the difficult decision to temporarily pause headline pay awards in 2021/22 in the face of significant uncertainty due to COVID-19. This pay pause helped to protect jobs at a time of crisis and ensure fairness between the private and public sectors.
16. The return to a normal pay setting process ensures that teachers right across the board will see their pay uplifted year-on-year between 2022/23 and 2024/25 (subject to usual pay performance management processes). As part of delivering the £30,000 commitment, we want to ensure that pay awards are balanced across the profession, with all teachers able to receive increases. We know the value that experienced teachers add to the classroom and the education system overall – not only through their impact on pupils but the expertise that they share with more junior colleagues, paving the way for the next generation of teachers. Their time and expertise as mentors has been, and continues to be, invaluable in ensuring successful delivery of the ECF.
17. It is also important that overall pay awards reflect affordability across the school system. The government continues to deliver year on year real terms per pupil increases to school funding, increasing the core school budget by £7 billion in cash terms by 2024-25 compared with 2021-22. Future increases in funding have been frontloaded, so that in 2022-23 alone the total funding allocated to schools will see a 4% real terms per pupil boost in 2022-23, compared to the previous year. As well as future pay awards, this increased funding is to help schools meet wider pressures, such as general inflation and the costs associated with the Health and Social Care Levy from April 2022, as well as supporting schools' investment in those activities that will promote the best outcomes for their pupils and workforce, including broader investment in teachers such as continuing professional development (CPD).

18. It is therefore important to consider the appropriate balance of spend on teacher pay alongside schools' other priorities, securing good value for money for taxpayers, and securing the government's continued commitment to delivering a £30,000 starting salary. School spending on other priorities may include, but not be limited to: promoting educational recovery through, for example, their core curriculum and/or extra-curricular and enrichment activities; providing support for children and young people with SEND; modernising the workforce by, for example, facilitating time off timetable for teachers to participate in high-quality CPD and provision of mentoring; investing in additional workforce capacity to enable staff to be deployed to emerging priorities and pressures; and investing to secure the most impactful use of digital infrastructure. Additional investment in teacher pay beyond what is proposed as appropriate will result in headteachers having to reduce investment in such areas that they would otherwise have been able to make to drive the best outcomes for their staff and pupils.
19. Any assessment to consider the appropriate balance of spend on teacher pay will also want to consider the broader economic context. In December 2021, the Treasury published economic evidence to pay review bodies. This sets out how public sector earnings growth should retain broad parity with the private sector (with pay settlements providing the appropriate measure for earnings growth in the context of public sector pay settlements). It also sets out the competitive offer of the public sector remuneration package, benefits of which include substantially more generous pensions, plus greater job security as highlighted in the pandemic. With regard to inflation, which is expected to temporarily peak at its highest rate in over a decade, the government retains its ongoing objective for price stability (a 2 percent inflation (CPI) target), and the STRB will want to note this. If public sector pay increases were to exacerbate temporary inflationary pressure, for instance through spilling over into higher wage demands across the economy or contributing to higher inflation expectations, then the short-term pressures driving temporarily higher inflation would become more sustained, requiring significantly tighter monetary policy which would also harm economic growth. The Bank of England has warned that 'strong-for-longer [inflation] could embed a reinforcing price-wage dynamic', urging against this.
20. This evidence sets out the department's views on a pay award that considers and balances these factors. It proposes using the return to a normal pay setting process to deliver a £30,000 starting salary alongside awards for teachers and leaders across the profession. These pay awards should ensure good value for money by targeting the highest pay uplifts where there are the greatest recruitment and retention challenges, as well as by using the Spending Review settlement to also support broader investment in pupils and staff.

## The case for change

21. The number of teachers in our schools remains high, with more than 461,000 FTE teachers working in schools across the country – 20,000 more than in 2010. 2020/21 saw an increase of more than 7,000 FTE teachers in state-funded schools in England. This equates to a 1.6% growth on the year before, the largest observed in the last 10 years, and has resulted in the largest qualified teacher stock since the school workforce census began in 2010/11. The most recent available data (2020/21) suggests the overall vacancy rate remained low and relatively stable, at only 0.2% of all teachers. Recruitment has also seen a significant improvement in recent years, with an unprecedented increase in trainees in 2020/21, and although it fell in 2021/22, it remained above pre-pandemic levels. Overall retention has improved, with total teacher leaver rates decreasing.<sup>7</sup>
22. Yet challenges remain – and where they do, they are concentrated amongst certain career phases, subjects and/or areas of the country. We continue to miss recruitment targets particularly at secondary and in key subjects. Teachers also continue to leave the profession at a high rate and particularly in the first few years. Teacher recruitment shortages and challenging retention rates can lead to a deterioration in teacher quality which impacts on pupil outcomes. It is therefore judicious that we consider how pay awards can best support our efforts to address these challenges. Pay uplifts which improve starting salaries and the early career pay offer would target pay where retention challenges are most stark. They would also provide a strong starting and early career financial offer to improve the attractiveness of the profession and so improve recruitment.
23. Amongst the rest of the workforce (the majority of teachers, who are more experienced having been in the profession 5 or more years), retention is still challenging but the overall picture is more stable. Wastage rates are significantly less stark compared to those experienced in the early career. These teachers should be awarded uplifts to their pay, given the value they add to the classroom and beyond. However, given this overall better retention picture, awards should rightly be more in line with expected settlements across the wider economy than those proposed at early career. Awards must also be appropriate and affordable in the wider economic and funding context.

## Recruitment and retention in early career

24. With regards to recruitment, there were 37,069 new entrants to ITT in the academic year 2021/22. This number includes postgraduate and undergraduate trainees. This is down 8% from 40,377 new entrants in 2020/21, when we saw an unprecedented

---

<sup>7</sup> [School workforce in England: November 2020, GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/school-workforce-in-england-november-2020).

increase, likely a direct result of the impact of COVID-19 and the associated economic shock. However, when compared to the 2019/20 pre-pandemic benchmark, recruitment is up 10% (from 33,799). For PGITT alone, we provisionally recruited 31,233 new entrants starting or expecting to start postgraduate ITT in 2021/22 (plus 5,836 for undergraduate ITT), a 9% decrease from 34,394 in 2020/21, but an 8% increase from 2019/20.<sup>8</sup>

25. This means that, overall, we exceeded our PGITT target (2021/22), with 101% achieved against our overall target (secondary and primary combined). This breaks down to 82% of the secondary PGITT target, after exceeding the target (103%) in 2020/21, and 136% of the primary PGITT target. PGITT targets were exceeded in several critical English Baccalaureate (EBacc) subjects including history, English, biology, chemistry and Classics, but were missed for geography, MFL, mathematics, computing, and physics, though the latter three saw increases in PGITT new entrants when compared to 2019/20. This highlights that subject-specific recruitment pressures remain. This year's 2021/22 targets were set using the newly developed Teacher Workforce Model (TWM), which has replaced the previous Teacher Supply Model (TSM).<sup>9</sup>
26. There is a leaky pipeline between training and entering the classroom. Only 73% of those who were awarded Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) in 2019/20 went on to teach in a state-funded English school the following year. The impact of a recovering economy on recruitment and retention also remains to be seen. The most recent recruitment cycle indicated that we were already seeing the 'COVID-19 boost' subside and we know retention worsened when exiting the previous recession, following an initial boost. Despite recruitment in the most recent cycle being 10% up on the 2019/20 pre-pandemic benchmark, performance was not uniform across the year. In the third quarter of the 2021/22 PGITT recruitment cycle, there was a 12% drop in applications compared to the same quarter in the 2019/20 cycle, followed by a 26% drop in the fourth quarter compared to the same quarter in 2019/20.<sup>10</sup> This indicates that the boost to recruitment experienced during the pandemic, particularly the 2020/21 PGITT recruitment cycle, has started to subside as the economy recovers, and could indicate a decline in recruitment levels in the current cycle (2022/23).
27. As outlined in our previous evidence, the growing number of pupils of secondary age also means that we will need to recruit more teachers. By 2024/25 there are projected to be 7.6% more pupils in secondary schools than there were in

---

<sup>8</sup> [Statistics: initial teacher training, GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/statistics/initial-teacher-training).

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. See Figure C1 in Annex C.



2020/21.<sup>11</sup> The most recent version of the Teacher Workforce Model estimates that between 2020/21 and 2024/25, the number of secondary school teachers will need to grow by 5,000 FTE to meet the increased demand.<sup>12</sup> Further to this, as outlined in previous STRB reports, the graduate-age population from which a significant proportion of new teachers are recruited is forecast to shrink over coming years (with a projected decrease of 6 per cent in the number of 21-year-olds between 2020 and 2023).<sup>13</sup>

28. Further detail on ITT recruitment is set out in Annex C.
29. With regards to retention, we have seen some improvement, but the picture remains stark at early career, with high numbers of teachers exiting the profession in the first few years. 85% of teachers who qualified in 2019 were still teaching one year after qualification. Whilst this has been broadly stable for the last four years, it otherwise represents a decline in NQT retention since 2011. Retention of teachers who qualified two or more years ago has improved this year to 80.5%, following gradual declines seen in recent years. Overall, these low retention rates mean almost 20% of newly qualified teachers have left the profession within their first 2 years of teaching, and 31% within their first 5 years. As set out below, this stands in stark contrast to the more stable picture amongst more experienced teachers.<sup>14</sup>

## Retention in later career

30. At later career, the overall picture is challenging but relatively stable, and stronger when compared to the challenges seen at early career. Just over two thirds of teachers who started teaching five years ago are still teaching, and three in five (59%) teachers who qualified ten years ago are still teaching. Overall leaver rates have improved: 7.8% of all teachers (34,000 FTE) left the profession between November 2019 and November 2020, decreasing from 9.4% the previous year. This is now lower than the leaver rate of 9.9% between November 2010 and November 2011.<sup>15</sup>
31. Wastage rates are also significantly lower amongst experienced teachers compared to those with 5 or less years' experience, who have the highest leaver rates. In 2019/20, wastage rates stood at 9.6% amongst qualified teachers with 5 or less years' experience, compared to wastage rates of 5-6% amongst those groups with 6 or more years' experience. Leaver rates also start to level off as teachers move

---

<sup>11</sup> National Pupil Projections: July 2021 [National pupil projections, Reporting Year 2021, Explore education statistics, GOV.UK \(explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/explore-education-statistics).

<sup>12</sup> [Statistics: initial teacher training, GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/statistics-initial-teacher-training).

<sup>13</sup> ONS (2021), [Zipped population projections data files, England, Office for National Statistics](https://www.ons.gov.uk/people-in-the-uk/population-projections).

<sup>14</sup> [School workforce in England: November 2020, GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/school-workforce-in-england-november-2020).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

beyond the first 5 years of their career, presenting a more stable picture compared to the sharply reducing propensity to leave that we see as teachers progress through their early career years.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, whilst we know there is more to do to improve retention amongst more experienced teachers, it is right that pay awards are higher for early career teachers where the challenges are significantly greater and where evidence indicates higher pay can have the greatest impact on retention decisions. That is why we continue to focus on policies that improve the overall conditions that enable teachers to thrive (more detail provided in 'Maintaining a high-quality supply of teachers and leaders').

32. Amongst leaders, leaver rates (Annex B) have been on a consistently downward trend in recent years; the rate for assistant headteachers have reduced from 7.0% in 2016 to 5.1% in 2019; the rate for deputy headteachers is down from 6.8% in 2016 to 5.5% in 2019, and the rate for headteachers has gone down from 10.6% to 8.1% over the same period.<sup>17</sup> However, we understand that those positive figures may mask challenges on the ground, with some schools facing leadership recruitment and retention challenges. We also recognise the huge contribution that headteachers and leaders, alongside teachers, have made to the nation's efforts to respond to the challenges arising from the pandemic, maintaining education provision and ensuring the safety and wellbeing of their pupils and staff. This evidence later sets out the department's initiatives to support leaders, including a new and updated suite of NPQs, an additional support offer for new headteachers, and a new mental health and wellbeing support package delivered by Education Support (paragraphs 98-138). The government's previous pay reforms continue to give schools greater flexibility to reward exceptional leaders and attract strong leadership teams into the most challenging schools.

## Subject and area level challenges

33. As with recruitment, retention remains particularly challenging amongst certain subjects. STEM subjects tend to experience lower retention rates, with the latest data showing that 24% left the profession within their first two years of teaching and 40% within their first five years. This compares to 20% and 34%, respectively, for non-STEM secondary teachers.<sup>18</sup> MFL also has relatively low retention rates. We know that the STRB has previously shown an interest in pay differentiation (e.g. by geography, subject, or phase) and/or targeted financial incentives. Bursaries and financial incentives are central to our work addressing shortage subjects and we continue to adapt and develop our offer, including through the recently announced Levelling Up premium, worth up to £3,000 tax-free for teachers in select subjects in

---

<sup>16</sup> [Statistics: school workforce, GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/statistics/school-workforce). See Figure B1 in Annex B.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. See Table B12 in Annex B.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. See Tables B8 and B9 in Annex B.

years one to five of their careers. This targeted approach also aligns with the approach to pay put forward in this evidence – which is that the financial offer should be targeted at the greatest recruitment and retention challenges where it can have greater impact.

34. Recruitment and retention challenges also vary across the country and at school-level, with the targeted approach of the Levelling Up premium again reflecting this. Leaver rates continue to be highest in Inner and Outer London, at 10% and 8.7%, respectively. However, leaver rates have improved across the board in the five years from 2015 to 2019 and this is especially evident in Inner and Outer London, which have seen leaver rates fall by 3.0 and 3.6 percentage points, respectively, the largest drop in the country. Splitting the data into classroom teachers and leadership grades shows a consistent picture of falling leaver rates in all regions, across all grades.<sup>19</sup>

## Recap: targeting uplifts at early career

35. The greater recruitment and early career retention challenges set out above mean it is right to target pay awards at teachers in the first few years. In 2020 the department submitted evidence to the STRB which set out the government's view that teacher starting salaries should be raised to £30,000 and our rationale for targeting pay awards at early career to achieve this. Our rationale stands as per this evidence and we refer the STRB to this, namely 'The case for change' chapter (pages 6-17 inclusive of the 2020 written evidence).
36. This section is intended to recap key points made as part of that evidence and our overall theory of change for how a £30,000 starting salary will improve recruitment and drive improvements in teacher quality, with pay awards across the rest of the profession also supporting better retention. We update data or intelligence from 2020 evidence where relevant.
37. It is our view that a £30,000 starting salary and an overall less steep pay progression structure will improve teacher recruitment and retention by raising the status of the teaching profession and providing a pay offer that better motivates teachers to stay, especially at early career in which there are bigger challenges. The £30,000 starting salary commitment will do this in five key ways.
  - a) It will position **a career in teaching as more competitive relative to other options**. Teacher starting salaries compare less favourably to alternative graduate options, especially outside London. The STRB's 31st report referenced median starting salaries of £30,000 for graduates in the High Fliers

---

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. See Table B12 in Annex B.

survey and £29,667 in the Institute of Student Employers (ISE).<sup>20</sup> Latest data shows the ISE median has now increased just beyond £30,000.<sup>21</sup> These surveys are heavily weighted towards graduate jobs in London and the South East. The regional breakdown of 2020 ISE data shows that median starting salaries outside London ranged from £24,000 in Yorkshire and the Humber to £27,825 in the South East, highlighting that a £30,000 starting salary will position teacher pay amongst the most competitive in the graduate labour market outside London. The £31,000 ISE median starting salary in London indicates that teacher starting salaries, currently £32,157 in Inner London, are already relatively more competitive in London. This is supported by Graduate Outcomes survey data, which showed London as the only region in England that teachers' median pay 15 months after graduation was approximately equal to the median pay of their peers who entered other professional occupations.<sup>22</sup>

The data therefore continues to support the case that a £30,000 starting salary will still position teaching as amongst the most competitive in the labour market, improving its attraction to future graduates (especially those in high demand such as STEM) and so supporting recruitment. Final-year students said higher starting salaries were the thing that could most increase the attractiveness of teaching as a career.<sup>23</sup> Studies support this link between pay and improved recruitment to teaching (e.g. Falch, 2011)<sup>24</sup>, and economic theory would suggest that potential recruits will place extra weight on short-term salary offers rather than long-term progression. A higher starting salary may also appeal to career changers, who carefully consider the financial offer and for whom a substantial reduction in salary can act as a key barrier to entering the profession. Recent National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER) analysis found that the bursary offer for ITT was especially important to career changers, lending weight to this theory.<sup>25</sup>

- b) It will have **strong public impact, signalling investment in teachers** and creating a public perception of teaching as a **prestigious and financially rewarding** profession. This may help to shift the perception of teaching as not 'financially rewarding' (81% of all job hunters agree or strongly agree that a move into teaching would not reward them financially for their skills and experience; High Fliers research, 2021), which is important for improving recruitment.

---

<sup>20</sup> [School Teachers' Review Body 31st Report 2021 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/92812/school-teachers-review-body-31st-report-2021.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> ISE Recruitment Survey 2021, [ISE Reports, Institute of Student Employers, ISE](https://www.ise.org.uk/reports).

<sup>22</sup> Higher Education Graduate Outcomes Statistics, 2018/19, HESA. [Graduate Outcomes Data, HESA](https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/graduate-outcomes).

<sup>23</sup> The UK Graduate Careers Survey 2021, [High Fliers](https://www.highfliers.co.uk/research).

<sup>24</sup> [Falch \(2011\), Teacher Mobility Responses to Wage Changes: Evidence from a Quasi-natural Experiment](https://www.falch.com/research/teacher-mobility-responses-to-wage-changes-evidence-from-a-quasi-natural-experiment).

<sup>25</sup> Worth, J. and E. Hollis (2021), [Do bursaries change who applies to teacher training?, NFER](https://www.nfer.ac.uk/research/do-bursaries-change-who-applies-to-teacher-training/).

- c) A £30,000 salary provides **an offer that is memorable and impactful**. This is compared to the current perception that teachers earn a starting salary of ‘twenty-something thousand’, with final year students significantly under-estimating the salary potential of a new teacher, with the average expected starting salary undervaluing the actual starting salary by over £3,500. Almost two-thirds of final-year students thought the starting salary outside London was £21,000 or lower, and 86% thought it was below £25,000 (High Fliers, 2021). The £30,000 figure will make it easier to distinguish a career in teaching from other options and to ensure that the financial benefits of teaching are recognised.
- d) It will **support progression from ITT into the classroom**. Only 73% of postgraduates awarded QTS go on to teach in a state-funded English school the following year (down from 78% in the last set of pre-pandemic data).<sup>26</sup> A higher, more competitive salary – plus the overall better offer at early career – could encourage more trainees to enter the profession after qualifying.
- e) Higher starting salaries could **drive greater competition** for entry into the profession, enabling us to attract the very best into teaching and so driving up teacher quality. Higher starting salaries came top of the list of things that could make teaching more attractive as a possible career (High Fliers, 2021). International evidence supports this link between higher starting pay and teachers who are more effective at raising pupil attainment on average.<sup>27</sup>

38. To deliver a £30,000 starting salary, we continue to propose that proportionate uplifts are also made to the rest of early career pay (M1-M6), alongside pay awards across the rest of the profession. This means that teachers across all pay points will see uplifts, even though the overall pay award will be targeted towards early career teachers. As set out in the paragraphs above, there is a strong case for change for improving the starting salary and pay offer, but this is also a judicious approach given the recruitment and retention challenges we have set out (with early career retention particularly challenging). Furthermore, there is a strong evidence base to support the impact of pay at the early career, as the following paragraphs set out.

- a) **The start of any new career can be challenging, but for teachers this is particularly pronounced** – whilst still developing their teaching practice, they are constantly on show and in demand from multiple directions in each lesson. As we have set out, teacher retention remains particularly challenging in the first few years of a teacher’s career. The department’s flagship ECF and reforms to ITT will provide crucial support to teachers during this period to

---

<sup>26</sup> [Initial teacher training performance profiles, Academic Year 2019/20, Explore education statistics, GOV.UK \(explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/explore-education-statistics/service.gov.uk).

<sup>27</sup> [Nagler et al \(2019\), Weak Markets, Strong Teachers: Recession at Career Start and Teacher Effectiveness.](#)

tackle these issues; an early career pay offer that is commensurate with these challenges will also support teachers to stay and thrive.

- b) **International studies support this theory of change**, highlighting the positive impact of pay on retention and particularly in the early career. Hendricks (2014) estimates that early career teachers' turnover rates fall by approximately three times as much as more experienced teachers' in response to a 1% change in pay.<sup>28</sup>
- c) **Economic theory would also support this** higher sensitivity to pay when early career teachers are making decisions about whether to stay in the profession. This sensitivity is due to: their mobility in the labour market and thus susceptibility to relative pay of alternative career choices; they form a larger pool to target (and change minds) given their higher wastage rates; and pay increases may be more important to those starting from a lower baseline.
- d) **Pay is reported as a much bigger factor for teachers in their 20s** in choosing to leave the profession than for older teachers, who are more likely to be experienced (DfE survey data).<sup>29</sup>
- e) **Improving starting salaries would also bring the teaching profession in England more in line with EU23 and OECD counterparts.** Statutory starting salaries in England are comparatively low, below the OECD and EU23 averages plus all other G7 countries.<sup>30</sup> In contrast, progression of earnings is relatively more rapid, with statutory salaries after 15 years of experience comparing more favourably.<sup>31</sup> England also offers the highest premium for headteachers<sup>32</sup>, with average actual salaries more than twice that of teachers. This means that English starting salaries as a proportion of statutory salaries after 15 years are amongst the lowest in the OECD, with a wide gap between new teachers and headteachers. Proposed reforms to the pay system as part of delivery of a £30,000 starting salary (uplifts targeted at early career, a steadier and more even pay progression structure overall) would address this and bring England more in line with comparable nations.

---

<sup>28</sup> [Hendricks \(2014\), Does it pay to pay teachers more? Evidence from Texas.](#)

<sup>29</sup> [Analysis of school and teacher level factors relating to teacher supply \(Sept 2017\)](#), p.39

<sup>30</sup> OECD (2021), Education at a Glance 2021: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, Paris, <https://doi.org/10.1787/b35a14e5-en>.

<sup>31</sup> Starting salaries in these international comparisons are based on the minimum of our main pay range and we assume for these comparisons teachers reach the maximum of our upper pay range by the 15-year mark.

<sup>32</sup> Average actual salary comparisons include bonuses and allowances.

39. A £30,000 starting salary delivered through a pay system which better supports retention has **additional benefits alongside overall improved teacher supply and quality**. Benefits would include:
- Reducing the need to train new teachers to backfill a leaky pipeline, thereby reducing costs to taxpayers and schools (as well as burdens in the case of the latter). IFS (2016) estimated that the average trainee costs £23,000, calculating that this equated to £38,000 per teacher still in post five years after completing training.<sup>33</sup> As well as training, one estimate of the direct costs to schools of recruiting a permanent teacher via an agency puts these at approximately £4,600, alongside other implicit costs associated with the effort required to recruit.<sup>34</sup>
  - Additional quality gains of improving retention at early career such that we get teachers past the first few challenging years, as teacher effectiveness improves significantly over the early years of a teacher's career.<sup>35</sup>
  - Financial efficiencies of not having to reinvest in teachers lacking such experience.
  - Overall recruitment, retention and quality gains will also improve pupil outcomes, through driving up the quality of recruits and the retention gains mentioned above. This in turn raises productivity in the long-term, yielding economic benefits.
40. Given the evidence base and case for change set out above and the recruitment and early career retention data set out earlier in this chapter, it remains critical that pay awards are targeted. Targeting pay awards at early career will help to boost recruitment by improving the competitiveness of teaching in the labour market, whilst also addressing where retention challenges are most stark and pay awards are most impactful. This is not to say that pay does not play an important role amongst more experienced teachers. The department recognises this, proposing uplifts for teachers and leaders across the board. However, given the overall stronger and improving retention amongst teachers in the later career, it is right that the majority of teachers receive awards more in line with expected settlements across the wider economy than the targeted uplifts proposed to deliver the £30,000 commitment.

---

<sup>33</sup> Allen, R et al. (2016), The longer-term costs and benefits of different initial training routes, <https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/8368>.

<sup>34</sup> PwC (2021), Feeling The Squeeze: schools' responses to constraints in teacher recruitment. [teacher-recruitment-pwc-education-insight-23may2016.pdf](https://www.pwc.co.uk/education-insight-23may2016.pdf).

<sup>35</sup> [Kini, T. Podolsky, A. \(2016\), Does Teaching Experience Increase Teacher Effectiveness? A Review of the Research.](#)

41. Such awards must be appropriate and affordable as, within a finite envelope, it is necessary to balance spend on teacher pay alongside wider investment in education. As set out in the next chapter, a 3% award in 2022/23 and a 2% award in 2023/24 is deemed appropriate for the majority of teachers, especially given the need to avoid a wage-price spiral discussed earlier (paragraph 19), and with pay settlements providing the appropriate measure for earnings growth in the context of public sector pay settlements. The 3% award in 2022/23 would provide the highest teacher pay award since 2006.
42. We know there is further to go to address these challenges, ensure a healthy recruitment pipeline, and support those who have entered the profession to stay and to thrive. ‘Maintaining a high-quality supply of teachers and leaders’ (paragraphs 98-138) sets out our progress in delivering flagship policies since the publication of the [Recruitment and Retention Strategy](#) in 2019, and how we go beyond this to ensure our strategy remains relevant and effective. This includes initiatives to reduce teacher workload, improve opportunities for flexible working, and improve the overall conditions to enable teachers to thrive; a strong financial incentive package; and delivering a world-class training and development landscape by creating a ‘golden thread’ running from ITT through to school leadership. Many of these initiatives are also critical to improving the retention of more experienced teachers, for whom non-pay factors are often a significant influence on retention decisions.<sup>36</sup>
43. We continue to balance our policies between those aimed at bringing new entrants into the profession (recruitment), and those aimed at supporting existing teachers and leaders to stay and thrive (retention), by addressing the barriers and factors that cause teachers to leave the profession early or not join in the first place. This balance is an important part of our vision for teacher pay and delivery of the £30,000 starting salary commitment – we must not only create a competitive offer which attracts top graduates in, but a motivating and rewarding pay structure that encourages them to stay. Targeting pay awards at early career helps tackle these challenges where they are most acute and where we think pay uplifts can have greatest impact.
44. This year’s remit invites the STRB to consider how we can continue delivery of the £30,000 commitment following the progress made in 2020/21, through pay awards in both 2022/23 and 2023/24.

---

<sup>36</sup> [Analysis of school and teacher level factors relating to teacher supply \(Sept 2017\), p.39.](#)



## Continuing delivery of the £30,000 commitment

45. As part of the 2020/21 pay award, the STRB recommended the introduction of advisory pay points on the main and upper pay ranges. The government accepted this and the pay system in England now comprises of a statutory minima and maxima with advisory pay points in between. The department supported the introduction of advisory pay points in its 2020/21 evidence. Advisory pay points better support schools with ensuring that spend on pay is best directed at addressing recruitment and retention challenges, by creating a more transparent and coherent progression pathway, and by supporting implementation of the £30,000 starting salary commitment.
46. In addition, in the next chapter ('Proposed approach to the pay award') we set out our view on the uplifts that should be made to the advisory pay points to ensure an optimal progression pathway that best supports recruitment and retention. It remains our view that this can be achieved by moving towards a relatively flatter pay progression structure, with less steep increments in the early pay points and more uniform increments across the whole teacher pay pathway.
47. This would move away from the current structure, whereby teachers typically experience relatively large increases in the early years but have to await these gains from a low starting point. Within this period, around one-third of teachers leave the profession.<sup>37</sup> By lowering the percentage difference between each pay point but increasing starting and early career salaries, teachers will not only experience a strong financial offer from the offset (supporting recruitment) but will also no longer experience the double hit of 'holding out' for their pay to rise whilst simultaneously undergoing the significant challenges experienced at early career.
48. The 5.5% uplift to starting salaries delivered alongside the 2.75% award for the majority of other teachers and leaders in 2020/21 already made progress towards this reformed pay progression pathway. In considering its recommendations for the next two pay awards, in 2022/23 and 2023/24, the STRB will want to consider how we can continue to make progress towards this structure for the reasons set out above. A significant increase to the bottom of the pay range should be accompanied with an expectation of smaller incremental increases as teachers progress through the pay ranges. Our proposals in the next chapter reflect this.

## Future remits

49. Previous STRB reports have acknowledged additional matters which the review body would welcome for further consideration. For example, its 31st report raised concerns regarding the equalities impact of the pay system; highlighted the link

---

<sup>37</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/statistics-school-workforce> See Figure B1 in Annex B.

between teacher wellbeing and pay and the need to align remuneration with overall support; and suggested that future remits might want to provide the opportunity to review the classroom teacher and leadership pay structures.<sup>38</sup>

50. The department recognises the importance of these issues. This evidence responds to the first of these by publishing analysis of pay and progression comparisons broken down by protected characteristics. It observes trends in the data pre and post reforms to the pay system. Whilst this analysis enables us to observe trends in the data, the department's planned longitudinal study will enable us to better understand such trends by providing greater insight into how and why the experience and career progression of teachers varies (if it does) across different groups. This year's remit did not seek formal recommendations from the STRB on this matter, though we would welcome any reflections on the analysis, such as issues which may benefit from further exploration when we yield findings from the longitudinal study.
51. Teacher wellbeing is of course a critical priority and the later chapter on 'Maintaining a supply of high-quality teachers and leaders' sets out the department's activity in this space. Whilst the department recognises the role of pay on teacher's overall morale, a broad range of factors beyond pay affect this which is reflected in our policies.
52. Regarding other issues raised, should the department request the STRB to consider such matters as part of a future remit, we may consider these alongside a broader suite of pay-related matters and in the context of wider departmental priorities.

## Conclusion

53. Teacher recruitment has seen a significant improvement in recent years, but there are signs that the 'COVID-19 boost' may be starting to subside. Overall retention has improved slightly, but we continue to lose teachers especially in the first few years. There are ongoing challenges in certain phases, subjects, and areas.
54. A £30,000 starting salary and overall reform of the early career pay offer targets pay awards at the greatest recruitment and retention challenges, ensuring good value for money for taxpayers. It will improve the competitiveness of a career in teaching; have strong public impact to raise the status of the profession; provide a memorable and impactful offer; support progression from ITT into the classroom; and drive greater competition into teaching to improve teacher quality.
55. This targeted approach to pay aligns with other department policies, such as the Levelling Up premium. Targeting pay at early career is also supported by a strong

---

<sup>38</sup> [School Teachers' Review Body 31st Report 2021 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/942222/school-teachers-review-body-31st-report-2021.pdf).

evidence base – it is where career challenges are particularly pronounced; where pay is most impactful, as supported by international studies and economic theory; and where pay is likely to be a much bigger factor in recruitment and retention decisions. Improving early career pay will also bring teacher pay in England more in with line EU23 and OECD counterparts.

56. Wider benefits include reduced cost to taxpayers and schools; financial efficiencies from not having to reinvest in teachers lacking experience; additional quality gains of improved retention; and improvements to pupil outcomes.
57. The department remains of the view that we should move towards a relatively flatter pay progression structure, where teacher pay starts significantly higher than currently, but performance-based increases are at a steadier trajectory. This will ensure an optimal progression pathway that best supports recruitment and retention.
58. The department recognises the importance of wider issues previously raised by the STRB and will consider such matters for future remits where relevant. This year's remit focuses on pay awards for 2022/23 and 2023/24 and the next chapter sets out the department's proposed approach to these awards.

# Proposed approach to the pay award

## Affordability and wider school spending

59. The STRB has been asked to consider pay awards in both AY 2022/23 and 2023/24, so that schools can better plan their budgets over time, especially as the necessary uplifts are made to increase starting salaries to £30,000.
60. The most recent spending review announced that the core school budget will increase by over £7 billion by 2024-25, compared to 2021-22. In 2022-23 alone, the core school budget will increase by £4 billion, providing, on average a 5.8% or £300 cash increase to mainstream schools in funding per pupil compared to 2021-22. On top of the core funding uplift for schools, at SR21 the department announced a further £1.8 billion of new funding specifically for recovery for those we know will need it most. This takes overall investment specifically dedicated towards pupils' recovery to almost £5 billion.
61. The core school budget will increase by £5.6 billion by 2023-24 compared to 2021-22. The department has already published the annual [Schools' Costs note](#)<sup>39</sup> which estimates what mainstream schools could afford (on average, nationally) in new spending across FY 2022-23 and 2023-24 combined, before they would face a net pressure. Schools are required to plan their budgets over three years; it will be particularly important that schools plan with a clear view of future cost pressures given the front-loading of funding increases in the latest settlement into FY 2022 23. This may mean schools choosing to leave some of FY 2022 23's new spending uncommitted in the medium term to make it available for pay awards and other long-term spending priorities in 2023-24. It will therefore be important that the STRB consider the total cost of any awards over the two years of this remit, as set against the total planned funding increases in those years.
62. In making their recommendation, the STRB should also take account of the impact of the AY2023/24 pay award on school budgets in FY2024-25 where the flatter profile of the funding increase between FY 2023-24 and 2024-25 will limit schools' scope for additional expenditure, but into which 5 months of the AY 2023/24 pay award will fall. The STRB is also reminded that estimates in the Schools' Costs note are national averages. They do not account for differences in individual school budgets which will increase by different amounts each year depending on pupil numbers and characteristics; not all schools will experience the scope for additional expenditure illustrated in the overall Schools' Costs note analysis.
63. In addition to considering the distribution of funding and how this will impact on affordability of any pay award, the STRB should also consider how to ensure that

---

<sup>39</sup> [Schools' costs: technical note, GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](#).

pay awards strike an appropriate balance of priorities for school expenditure. At the October 2021 Spending Review, we announced that schools will be provided with a real terms funding boost over the next three years so that they can provide better support to their learners and their workforce in line with their own priorities and individual circumstances. Though a significant and highly valuable component of school expenditure, teacher pay is one of several spending priorities that schools will need to meet from their core budgets. It is therefore vital that any pay award leaves schools the scope to prioritise spending in line with those priorities, and in such a way that can adapt to the overarching priorities for the school system which will be set out in the Schools White Paper, due in Spring 2022.

64. In recommending an appropriate pay award, the STRB should particularly have a mind to the importance of funding for those activities that are integral to schools' capacity to drive up education standards and support children to recover from the impact of COVID-19. The following paragraphs set out a list of priorities that this may include, though spending is of course not limited to these activities, and will depend particularly on the discretion of school leaders, who have the flexibility and autonomy to prioritise spending that best reflects their individual circumstances.
65. COVID and its ongoing impact on the sector – and in particular on pupil and staff absence rates – has also emphasised how important workforce flexibility and deployment is. Going forwards, schools and trusts will want to be thinking about and investing in additional workforce capacity. Additional staffing resource will support individual teachers and leaders from having to take on additional workload, safeguard their wellbeing, and allow schools to continue responding to COVID-related challenges, thereby ensuring continuity of provision.
66. Recovery: at the 2021 Spending Review, the department announced a further £1.8 billion of new funding specifically for recovery, taking the overall investment in recovery specifically to almost £5 billion. Alongside this dedicated investment, schools will need to retain the flexibility in their core budgets to deliver the most appropriate mix of support to children as they recover from the impact of the pandemic, promoting recovery through their core curriculum offer, and continuing to promote the health and wellbeing of their pupils, whether through the school day, or through extra-curricular and enrichment activities. In particular, because we know that tutoring is one of the most effective ways to accelerate pupil progress, the department would expect schools to use their core budgets to continue investment in high-quality tuition, even as the subsidy for the National Tutoring Programme changes over time. Additionally, schools will want to consider the provision of additional teaching time or time spent on extra-curricular activities for pupils, especially those children with the least time left at school. This is especially the case for schools that currently operate a more limited offer.
67. Support for children and young people with SEND: the SEND review will shortly set out longer term reforms to the SEND system overall, but there will be an ongoing

and important role for mainstream schools in meeting the needs of children with SEND, especially in their capacity to identify emerging SEND needs, deliver the earliest and most appropriate level of support – and in doing so, potentially prevent those needs from becoming more complex and entrenched.

68. **Teacher Quality and Development:** as set out later in this evidence, the department is transforming teacher training for teachers and school leaders through the world-leading ECF and NPQ reforms, delivered by our new network of Teaching School Hubs together with other providers. To ensure the benefits of these reforms are realised, the department expects schools to use their core budgets to facilitate time off timetable where required for teachers and mentors to enable participation in high-quality CPD and provision of mentoring, particularly as part of these programmes.
69. **Investment in digital infrastructure:** over the course of the pandemic, the department has invested over £520 million to support remote education and online social care, providing over 1.85 million laptops and tablets to disadvantaged children and young people. Schools will want to consider how to get the best impact from this investment, both in terms of recovery and more broadly, in advancing their educational offer to children. The department anticipates that schools will want to continue to build their capacity for online and remote teaching and learning, incorporate high-quality digital resources into their core offer and enable greater access to assistive technology for children with SEND. Investment in digital infrastructure will also play an important role in improving workforce modernisation and managing workload pressures.
70. **Trade-offs:** as set out in the Schools' costs note<sup>40</sup>, for every 1 percentage point increase in pay for all staff in 2022, nationally, schools' scope for further expenditure will reduce by c.£250m in FY 2022-23, as well as a further c.£100m in FY2023-24. Similarly, every 1 percentage point increase in pay for all staff in 2023 will reduce schools' scope for further expenditure, nationally, by an additional c. £270m in FY2023-24. Investment in teacher pay beyond that which is proposed will therefore limit headteachers' ability to strike the right balance of investment for their schools, resulting in reduced investment in other priority areas that are also vital in driving the best outcomes for pupils and staff. It is therefore crucial that the recommended pay awards leave school leaders with sufficient flexibility to balance spending priorities in such a way that it is right for their individual circumstances, whether that be hiring additional staff to promote high-quality teaching school-wide, providing the right support for children and young people with SEND, or providing timely and targeted support to ensure children recover from the impact of the pandemic.

---

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

71. As part of its overall consideration of the most appropriate teacher pay award, the STRB should also consider the overarching imperative that the school system remain on a sustainable footing and is able to secure the best value from every pound spent to deliver a high-quality education for all children and young people. The department remains committed to working with schools to strengthen school resource management capability and believes that this will be best underpinned by a teacher pay award that acknowledges the balance of priorities that school leaders will need to achieve in the coming years.
72. The remainder of this chapter sets out the department's proposal for an appropriate teacher pay award that delivers the £30,000 starting salary commitment alongside uplifts across the profession, while ensuring that schools can continue to address other key priorities.

## Overall award

73. The previous chapter set out 'The case for change' and why it is this government's view that a significant uplift in the starting salary of classroom teachers is required, alongside uplifts to other early career pay points to create a relatively flatter pay structure overall. This is in line with the evidence base, addressing where recruitment and retention is most challenging, targeting the teachers who are most sensitive to pay, and tackling where pay is least competitive. Given this targeted approach, the total pay award will not be evenly split across all parts of the pay framework. Significantly higher awards are proposed for starting and early career salaries, with lower awards for the upper and leadership pay ranges where the evidence suggests pay is a lower relative priority in affecting decisions to stay, and where there are less acute supply challenges. This targeted approach will ensure good value for money for taxpayers.
74. Our central estimate is that this targeted approach will retain over 1,000 extra teachers per year from 2023/24, versus the counterfactual where these awards (including progress made as part of the 2020/21 pay award) had been untargeted. This represents a reduction in the overall number of teachers leaving the profession of approximately a quarter of a percentage point, compared to a counterfactual where the total award is distributed evenly across pay points and ranges. This is on top of any additional teachers recruited as a result of a higher starting salary and better early career pay offer.<sup>41</sup> Smaller gains would be seen in the transitional year (2022/23).

---

<sup>41</sup> The methodology underpinning retention methods is outlined in Annex E. There is significant uncertainty (large ranges to the effects found in the literature, no studies assessing a whole system reform of this type). It does not mean we will necessarily see leavers fall by over 1,000 teachers in 2023/24 compared to 2019/20; that will depend on wider economic and other factors impacting the teacher labour market in the interim.

75. To deliver the £30,000 starting salary we propose an 8.9% uplift to the statutory minimum (M1) for qualified teachers in 2022/23, followed by a further 7.1% increase in 2023/24 to reach £30,000 within two years. We propose commensurate uplifts to the remaining early career pay points (M2-M6, inclusive) to create the steady and even structure discussed in the previous chapter. These M2-M6 awards are also frontloaded, with the highest uplifts in 2022/23. Frontloading the awards maximises use of the schools funding settlement whilst also ensuring teachers benefit from higher pay sooner and for longer, with the second uplift building from the higher baseline.
76. Given the funding picture and wider spending priorities set out above, the department believes that, alongside these uplifts to deliver the £30,000 starting salary commitment, it would be appropriate to provide a 3% pay award in 2022/23, followed by an additional 2% uplift in 2023/24, for teachers on the upper pay range and above. Over the 2 years, this equates to a 5.1% total increase in the total pay bill per teacher on the upper pay range or above. The 3% award in the first year would constitute the highest pay award for teachers since 2006. Providing the 3% uplift in 2022/23 also frontloads the higher part of the award into year 1, meaning teachers benefit from most of the uplift sooner and for longer, with the additional 2% uplift in the second year then being applied to their new, higher baseline.
77. Together these awards will create a motivating career path for the whole profession. They will deliver a starting salary that will raise the status of the teaching profession; award significant uplifts to early career pay to best support recruitment and retention; and provide the highest pay award since 2006 for teachers on the upper pay range and leadership pay ranges.
78. The remainder of this chapter sets out further detail of these proposed uplifts and our rationale for this approach. We also provide proposals for uplifts in the London pay ranges. These proposals would deliver pay awards which are affordable and appropriate within the core schools' budget for FY 2022-23 and 2023-24, and which take account of the impact that the AY2023/24 award will have on FY 2024-25 affordability.
79. A single lead option is set out for each year and for each targeted group (i.e. M1-M6 or upper and leadership pay ranges). As set out above, the frontloaded nature of the core school funding settlement means that there is greatest affordability for higher pay awards in 2022/23. We encourage schools to look at multi-year affordability when planning their budgets to make best use of the funding increases across the FY 2022-23 and 2023-24 period. This approach enables us to propose the subsequent uplifts in 2023/24 detailed above. However, these awards have a knock-on impact on FY 2024-25. The proposals set out for the second year (2023/24) represent the upper limit for what we think would be appropriate if we are to also allow for sufficient funding for any future pay award in 2024/25, alongside wider cost pressures that schools will face. The department does not believe that it



would be appropriate to go higher in 2022/23 given the wider investment that schools will want to make to best support their pupils and staff.

80. Alternative options to that which is proposed would therefore require using the same total envelope but targeting spend differently. This would involve, for example, making lower awards to early career teachers, which would result in uneven increments between pay points and thereby not achieve the steady and even pay progression structure that is optimal for supporting recruitment and retention. Another alternative, for example, would be to deliver the £30,000 commitment more slowly, making less progress in 2022/23 and 2023/24. The department is strongly of the view that reaching this commitment in 2023/24 is best for recruitment and retention and to maximise the benefits of the policy. Its remit to the STRB asks that pay awards for 2022/23 and 2023/24 are considered in light of the government's view that this commitment is a key priority. Delivering it in the first two years of the Spending Review also makes best use of the total settlement by frontloading delivery where funding increases are highest. Pushing delivery back into 2024/25 would impact on FY 2024-25, consequently reducing what would be affordable for teachers on the upper pay range and above.
81. We discount options which involve such trade-offs. The lead option proposed below ensures that the £30,000 starting salary commitment is delivered optimally and timely whilst still allowing for substantial uplifts to the pay of other teachers. It is our view that this approach represents the best balance of priorities within the funding levels deemed appropriate for teacher pay, as set against the overall investment priorities schools will have in the coming years.

## 2022/23 pay award

**Table 1: Proposed pay awards (2022/23), M1-U3, Rest of England<sup>42</sup>**

	Existing Structure	22/23 Structure	Change (£)	Change (%)
M1	£25,714	£28,000	£2,286	8.9%
M2	£27,600	£29,800	£2,200	8.0%
M3	£29,664	£31,750	£2,086	7.0%
M4	£31,778	£33,850	£2,072	6.5%
M5	£34,100	£35,989	£1,889	5.5%
M6	£36,961	£38,440	£1,479	4.0%
U1	£38,690	£39,851	£1,161	3.0%
U2	£40,124	£41,328	£1,204	3.0%
U3	£41,604	£42,852	£1,248	3.0%

82. 2022/23 would see the sharpest rises in starting salaries and early career pay, followed by slightly lower awards in 2023/24 to reach £30,000 at M1.<sup>43</sup> Starting salaries would be uplifted by 8.9% to £28,000, while advisory early career pay points would also see very significant uplifts of between 8.0% and 4.0% across M2-M6 (inclusive). The percentage progression between each pay point on the main pay range would reduce to approximately 6.5%, taking a step towards a flatter pay structure (see table 3 below). This compares to current progression gaps between pay points on the main pay range of over 7%.
83. To ensure an affordable and appropriate total pay award, uplifts of 3.0% could be made to the upper pay range, leadership pay range and all other pay and allowance ranges.

<sup>42</sup> Note that all pay awards are presented rounded to the nearest 0.1%. We have set the cash values to ensure a fixed rate of progression between points, with the precise pay uplifts required to achieve this in percentage terms then determined. See technical annex for details of modelling.

<sup>43</sup> The modelling approach underpinning these options is outlined in Annex E.

## 2023/24 pay award

**Table 1: Proposed pay awards (2023/24), M1-U3, Rest of England**

	22/23 Structure	23/24 Structure	Change (£)	Change (%) <sup>44</sup>
M1	£28,000	£30,000	£2,000	7.1%
M2	£29,800	£31,650	£1,850	6.2%
M3	£31,750	£33,391	£1,641	5.2%
M4	£33,850	£35,227	£1,377	4.1%
M5	£35,989	£37,165	£1,176	3.3%
M6	£38,440	£39,209	£769	2.0%
U1	£39,851	£40,648	£797	2.0%
U2	£41,328	£42,154	£827	2.0%
U3	£42,852	£43,709	£857	2.0%

84. This second year would see further significant rises (though lower than 2022/23). Starting salaries (M1) would be uplifted by 7.1% to reach £30,000, thereby delivering the government's commitment, while advisory early career pay points would also see significant uplifts of between 6.2% and 2.0% across M2-M6 (inclusive). The percentage progression between each pay point on the main pay range would reduce to 5.5% for each, achieving a flatter pay structure with consistent increases between pay points (see table 3 below). This compares to current progression gaps between pay points on the main pay range of over 7%.
85. To ensure an affordable and appropriate total pay award, uplifts of 2.0% could be made to the upper pay range, leadership pay range and all other pay and allowance ranges.
86. The resultant progression between each pay point versus the existing percentage is set out in table 3 below. We also provide the progression percentage achieved in the transitional year, 2022/23.

---

<sup>44</sup> Percentage uplifts are presented rounded to one decimal place, for simplicity. To reach the exact cash values provided will require more precise uplifts to more than one decimal place. See Annex D for further explanation.

**Table 2: Resultant progression between pay points, M1-U3, Rest of England**

	Progression between each point		
	Existing	22/23	23/24
M1 to M2	7.3%	6.4%	5.5%
M2 to M3	7.5%	6.5%	5.5%
M3 to M4	7.1%	6.6%	5.5%
M4 to M5	7.3%	6.3%	5.5%
M5 to M6	8.4%	6.8%	5.5%
M6 to U1	4.7%	3.7%	3.7%
U1 to U2	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%
U2 to U3	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%

## Pay awards for London pay areas

87. Pay structures across London (Inner London, Outer London, and the London Fringe) are currently significantly different from the Rest of England, with higher starting salaries already closer to or above £30,000 (£32,157, £29,915, and £26,648 respectively) and lower typical progression pay increases in the first years of the career. This difference is most stark in Inner London. Given this, the London pay structures already better align with the aims of our reforms. The pay award will therefore involve slightly lower uplifts to pay points in the London pay areas compared to the Rest of England.
88. Annex D provides detailed tables of awards for the London pay areas in the 2022/23 and 2023/24 pay awards, which broadly mirror the approaches outlined above in relation to the national pay structures.
89. The first year's pay award (2022/23) would see the largest rise in starting and early career salaries, as per the profile suggested for the national pay structures, with starting salaries uplifted to £34,247 (+6.5%) in Inner London, to £32,308 (+8.0%) in Outer London and to £29,239 (+8.5%) in the London Fringe area. The percentage progression between each pay point on the main pay range would reduce to approximately 6% in London Fringe, to between 4.7% and 6.9% in Outer London, and to between 4.4% and 6.7% in Inner London, moving towards a flatter pay structure.
90. The second year's pay award (2023/24) would see further significant rises, though lower than 2022/23, again mirroring the uplifts proposed to the national pay structures. Starting salaries would be uplifted to £35,500 (+3.7%) in Inner London, to £33,700 (+4.3%) in outer London and to £31,000 (+6.0%) in the London Fringe pay area. The percentage progression between each pay point on the main pay

range would reduce to 5.4% in London Fringe, to 5.1% in Outer London and to 5.0% in Inner London, moving towards a flatter pay structure.

91. Within the affordable and appropriate total pay award, uplifts of 3.0% and 2.0% in 2022/23 and 2023/24 respectively could be made to the upper pay range, leadership pay range and all other pay and allowance ranges.

## Options analysis/ conclusion

92. Pay awards should ensure good value for taxpayers. Targeting pay awards more heavily at particular pay points (raising starting salaries to £30,000 alongside generous uplifts at early career), whilst still providing uplifts to teachers on the upper pay ranges and above, ensures this. It targets pay awards where recruitment and retention are most challenging, where teachers are most sensitive to pay, and where pay is least competitive. This targeted approach is estimated to retain over 1,000 extra teachers per year from 2023/24.
93. An 8.9% uplift to M1 in 2022/23 and a further increase of 7.1% in 2023/24, alongside commensurate uplifts for M2-M6, would ensure that a £30,000 starting salary is achieved within the two-year period of this remit whilst making best use of the schools funding settlement.
94. For teachers on the upper pay range and above, a 3% pay award in 2022/23 followed by an additional 2% uplift in 2023/24 would be appropriate. The 3% award would provide the highest pay award since 2006.
95. Higher awards would not be appropriate given the need to strike a balance of priorities for school expenditure. School leaders must have the flexibility to make their own decisions on how to prioritise spending to best support their staff and pupils, especially in the context of education recovery. Additional investment in teacher pay beyond what is proposed will result in headteachers having to reduce investment that they would otherwise have been able to make in other areas.
96. Pay structures across London (Inner London, Outer London, and the London Fringe) are currently significantly different from the Rest of England so the pay award will therefore involve slightly lower uplifts compared to the Rest of England.
97. The proposed awards will create a motivating career path for the whole profession whilst delivering the £30,000 starting salary over this two-year period. Alternative award options within the same envelope are discounted because they would involve trade-offs which result in a sub-optimal pay structure and/or do not prioritise delivery of the £30,000 commitment, which is best for recruitment and retention and to maximise benefits of the policy.

## Maintaining a high-quality supply of teachers and leaders

98. As previously set out at paragraphs 21-34, there has been some improvement to recruitment and retention but challenges remain. We recognise we need to maintain the success of recent years and ensure we continue to attract, retain and develop the highly skilled teachers that we need to inspire the next generation.
99. Central to this has been our focus on delivering a number of critical reforms to the teaching profession that go beyond the pay system. This work aligns with every stage of the teacher journey – from building the attractiveness of teaching and ITT through to retention of experienced teachers and leaders – ensuring that we develop and support high-quality teachers at every stage.
100. This chapter outlines the progress we have made across these areas over the past twelve months. Our work has continued to adapt to reflect the impact COVID-19 has continued to have on the teaching workforce. We will continue to support the sector with these challenges
101. The Schools White Paper, due to be published in Spring 2022, will set out our long-term vision for schools with a focus on achieving world-class literacy and numeracy. High-quality teaching is our single most powerful in-school lever to improve pupil outcomes, especially for disadvantaged and vulnerable groups. That is why excellent teachers will sit at the heart of this White Paper. We will ensure teachers at all stages of their career receive world-class training and we will deploy extra support to schools that need extra help to attract and retain great teachers.
102. Each of these initiatives is backed up by strong evidence of effectiveness in improving recruitment and retention: survey evidence confirms that teachers value working flexibly<sup>45</sup>; good leadership improves teacher morale and retention<sup>46</sup>; and workload is one of the factors that teachers consider most important in decisions to remain in the profession.<sup>47 48</sup>, Teachers who undertake high-quality, evidence based CPD show improved retention: improved access to CPD is associated with

---

<sup>45</sup> Over half (57%) of senior leaders surveyed reported that flexible working had helped to retain staff who would otherwise leave the role. Over a third (37%) strongly agreed that they would personally be more likely to remain in the profession long-term if they were able to work flexibly. CooperGibson Research (2019) 'Exploring Flexible Working Practices in Schools': interim report, available at: [Exploring flexible working practice in schools - interim report \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/824247/exploring-flexible-working-practice-in-schools-interim-report.pdf).

<sup>46</sup> TALIS 2018: teacher working conditions, turnover and attrition, DfE (2020), Teachers in primary and secondary schools: TALIS 2018, GOV.UK ([www.gov.uk](http://www.gov.uk)).

<sup>47</sup> Analysis of school and teacher level factors relating to teacher supply, DfE (2017), [Geographical school workforce trends \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/644247/geographical-school-workforce-trends.pdf).

<sup>48</sup> CooperGibson Research (2018), 'Factors affecting teacher retention', [Factors affecting teacher retention: qualitative investigation \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/744247/factors-affecting-teacher-retention-qualitative-investigation.pdf).

improved job satisfaction and intention to stay in teaching;<sup>49</sup> it was also seen as more important than pay increases in research asking participants to comment on suggested ways to improve retention.<sup>50</sup> The package of policies set out below will therefore tackle the obstacles to recruitment and retention from several angles.

## **Ensuring all teachers receive world-class training and development**

103. Teaching quality is the most important in-school factor in improving pupil outcomes.<sup>51</sup> As our 2021/22 evidence set out, it is one of the department's top priorities to raise the quality of teaching and school leadership. There is also evidence that high-quality CPD improves teacher retention. By putting in place world-class training and development, we will create a golden thread running from ITT through to school leadership, rooting teacher and leader development in the best available evidence.
104. In the Recruitment and Retention Strategy we committed to revising the ITT Core Content Framework, using the ECF as the starting point. Between May and September 2019, DfE worked with a panel of ITT experts to develop the framework. We also held multiple external stakeholder events and meetings with the sector to consider the framework and its implementation.
105. New teachers are now entitled to at least three years of evidence based professional development and support. They start their journey by completing ITT, based on the new ITT Core Content Framework (2019). The ITT Core Content Framework sets out a minimum entitlement of fundamental knowledge and skills that all trainees need, so they can enter the profession in the best position possible to effectively teach and support all children.
106. All ITT providers and their partnerships should use and incorporate the revised ITT Core Content Framework as they craft a coherent and well-sequenced ITT curriculum.
107. The government committed to reviewing the ITT market in the 2019 Recruitment and Retention strategy. The Review, led by Ian Bauckham CBE, Chief Executive of the Tenax Schools Trust and supported by an expert advisory group, was published

---

<sup>49</sup> Worth, J., & Van den Brande, J. (2020), Teacher Autonomy: How Does It Relate to Job Satisfaction and Retention?, National Foundation for Educational Research. Available at: <https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED604418.pdf>.

<sup>50</sup> Dawson et al (2018), This finding also stressed that teachers wanted increased autonomy of choice over their CPD, consistent with Worth & van den Brande (2020).

<sup>51</sup> Slater, H., Davies, N.M., & Burgess, S. (2009), Do Teachers Matter? Measuring the Variation in Teacher Effectiveness in England. CMPO working paper, [ippr paper 27feb 2009 \(bristol.ac.uk\)](http://ippr.paper.27feb.2009.bristol.ac.uk).

on 5 July 2021. The Review aimed to build on our reforms to date by improving the quality, consistency, and coherence of ITT.

108. The report's central recommendations were that a new set of Quality Requirements should be implemented by all ITT providers, accompanied by a robust accreditation process to ensure adherence to these requirements.
109. Alongside the publication of the Review, a 7-week public consultation was launched to give anyone with an interest in ITT an opportunity to share their views on the expert advisory group's recommendations and other aspects of the ITT market addressed in the report.
110. The government's response, published on 1 December 2021, fully considered views from the consultation and wider stakeholder engagement, and balanced these against the ambition to drive up the quality and consistency of ITT provision across the country. Due to concerns regarding the original timeline of implementation, the government elected to extend the timeline by one year from September 2023 to September 2024.
111. Most of the other recommendations proposed in the Review were accepted with some amendments and clarifications. These included a reduction of some of the proposed minimum time allocations and allowing providers more flexibility in how they deliver the proposed new intensive placement. Implementation of these reforms will be supported by £35.7 million funding.
112. The proposed accreditation process was accepted: whilst rigorous, the process will be proportionate and fair. The first accreditation application round began 1 December 2021 and ends 7 February 2022, with the second round running between 19 April and 27 June. DfE will carefully monitor the availability of ITT provision to safeguard the sufficiency of teacher supply in all areas of the country.
113. Following on from their training, early career teachers will continue their journey by completing a new two-year induction, based on the ECF reforms from September 2021.
114. The ECF provides the solid foundations for a successful career in teaching, backed by over £130 million a year in funding. It sets out what all early career teachers should learn about and learn how to do during the first two years of their careers.
115. New teachers now receive development support and training over two years instead of one. The offer for early career teachers includes:
  - two years of new, funded, high-quality training freely available high-quality development materials based on the Early Career Framework
  - additional funding for 5% time away from the classroom for teachers in their second year



- a dedicated mentor and support for these mentors
- funding to cover mentors' time with the mentee in the second year of teaching.

116. Beyond support at the early stages of a teacher's career, in autumn 2021 the department introduced a new and updated suite of NPQs to offer the best possible support to teachers and leaders right across the profession, to help them become more effective teachers and leaders inside and outside the classroom. The three existing NPQs in Senior Leadership, Headship and Executive Leadership have been refreshed, ensuring that they are underpinned by the latest evidence of what works. The existing Middle Leadership NPQ has also been replaced with three new specialist NPQs to best address the broad range of responsibilities of current and aspiring middle leaders. These specialist areas cover:

- National Professional Qualification for Leading Teacher Development: Supporting the training and development of others, including early career teachers.
- National Professional Qualification for Leading Teaching:
- Developing teachers who are subject leads or responsible for improving teaching practice in a subject or phase.
- National Professional Qualification for Leading Behaviour and Culture: Developing teachers who have responsibilities for leading behaviour and culture.

117. The frameworks underpinning each qualification have been developed in consultation with an expert advisory group with specialists from across the education system and clearly set out the content that participants should know and be able to do after completing an NPQ. Providers of NPQs are using these frameworks to design their courses.

118. To support delivery on NPQs and as part of the government's long-term education recovery plan, £184 million of new additional funding for NPQs was announced on 2 June 2021 to be spent over the course of this parliament. Teachers and leaders employed in state-funded schools and state-funded organisations that offer 16-19 places in England are able to access scholarships to undertake fully-funded NPQs from autumn 2021, to support teachers and pupils following the disruption to learning faced as a result of COVID-19.

119. Alongside the reformed suite of NPQs, the department introduced an additional support offer for new headteachers from autumn 2021. This is a targeted support package for teachers new to the role of headship. To ensure NPQs continue to offer the best possible support to teachers and leaders wanting to expand their knowledge and skills, we are introducing two additional NPQs which will be available from autumn 2022: the NPQ for Leading Literacy and the NPQ for Early Years Leadership. The specialist and leadership NPQs provide training and support for teachers and school leaders at all levels, from those who want to develop

expertise in high-quality teaching practice, such as behaviour management, to those leading multiple schools across trusts.

120. We will be undertaking a process and impact evaluation of the reformed NPQs commencing in March 2021 and running through to Spring 2026. The evaluation will examine participant recruitment and experiences of the course content, its delivery and completion. It will also outline participants' perspectives on outcomes and impacts, and link to workforce and pupil datasets to identify longer term impacts on teacher and leader retention and progression, and any improvements in outcomes for pupils.
121. The anticipated outcomes of the reformed suite of NPQs are increased job satisfaction; improvements in school culture; improved confidence and competence of teachers and leaders, including specialist knowledge and skills.

## **Ensuring schools can recruit the high-quality teachers they need**

122. We recognise that some schools face challenges with recruiting, especially to specific subjects. For ITT 2022/23 we have therefore put in place a range of financial incentives, including bursaries worth £24,000 tax-free and scholarships worth £26,000 tax-free, to encourage talented trainees to key subjects such as chemistry, computing, mathematics and physics. Additionally, we have announced a Levelling Up Premium worth up to £3,000 tax-free for maths, physics, chemistry and computing teachers in years one to five of their careers. This will support recruitment and retention of specialist teachers in these subjects and in the schools and areas that need them most.
123. We are also making it easier for great people to become teachers. This includes launching a new one-stop ITT application system: the Apply service was rolled out in October 2021. Apply is a new end-to-end recruitment journey. This has overhauled the process of becoming a teacher, from stimulating initial interest through world-class marketing through to the start of training.
124. This is a key milestone in the delivery of a more streamlined, user-friendly application route, which supports excellent candidates into teacher training, and allows schools and universities to easily identify the right people for their courses. New data and insight from our services will also drive innovation with a view to boosting recruitment in priority subjects.
125. [Teaching Vacancies](#) is a free, national job listing service that is saving schools money and delivering quality candidates. This service can help schools to list vacancies for both permanent and fixed-term teaching staff quickly and for free. Teaching Vacancies was developed in response to demand from headteachers' to address the expenditure of up to £75 million that was being spent on teacher

recruitment advertising. By using the service, schools can save money on recruitment advertising so that they can spend it where it counts most - in the classroom.

126. Teaching Vacancies is now the largest source of primary school jobs and the second largest source of secondary school jobs advertised by schools and trusts in England. Teaching Vacancies allows job seekers to filter roles based on criteria including location, job title, education phase, working pattern and Early Career Teacher (ECT) suitability. For the 2020/2021 academic year, our vacancies were viewed over 2.5 million times by job seekers.

## **Ensuring teachers are supported to stay and thrive in the profession**

127. We have taken action to improve teacher and leader workload, working with the profession to understand and address both longstanding issues around marking, planning and data management and the challenges presented by COVID-19.
128. The DfE [school workload reduction toolkit](#), developed alongside school leaders, is a helpful resource that is being used by schools to review and reduce workload in their unique context. We are working with the sector on an update to be published in the coming months. A [report](#) by the Education Development Trust shows the positive outcomes from schools using the toolkit. We have commissioned further school-based projects to explore workload issues experienced during the pandemic.
129. We ran a well-received series of online events for school leaders in October 2020 and July 2021 to showcase successful school-led workload reduction strategies. While we have made progress working alongside schools, we recognise there is still more to be done. We will continue to engage and work with leaders, teachers and their representatives to support workload reduction into the next stage of recovery.
130. Teacher and leader wellbeing is a crucial element of the commitment to recruit and retain more teachers and support teacher quality. In June 2020, the government announced a range of public commitments to protect and promote the wellbeing of staff in schools and colleges. These commitments are based on the advice of our expert advisory group on wellbeing, whose recommendations were accepted by the department.
131. Our flagship recommendation was to create an [Education Staff Wellbeing Charter](#). The charter was launched in November 2021 for schools and colleges to sign up to. It sets out the actions that government and other organisations, including Ofsted, will take to improve the wellbeing of staff. It includes commitments from government to measure staff wellbeing at regular intervals, improve access to online resources, and embed wellbeing and mental health into teacher training wherever appropriate.

The department is encouraging schools and colleges to sign up to the charter as a shared commitment to improving staff wellbeing.

132. To support the wellbeing of school leaders, in November 2021, we launched a new mental health and wellbeing support package, delivered by the charity Education Support. It is providing one-to-one counselling and peer support from experts to around 2,000 school leaders. Support is available for those at deputy head level and above in state-funded schools in England with their mental wellbeing. School leaders can access support by visiting [Education Support's website](#).
133. In June 2021, we announced more than £17 million of mental health funding to improve mental health and wellbeing support in schools and colleges. Through the department's Mental Health in Education Action Group, we are taking forward several key actions to ensure the right support for staff, children and young people's mental wellbeing is in place at this critical time and in the longer term. We are also offering schools and colleges a grant to pay for senior mental health lead training from autumn 2021. Grants will be available for up to a third of state-funded schools and colleges in England between September 2021 and March 2022, with the aim of all schools and colleges benefitting by 2025.
134. The department continues to review evidence and consult with stakeholders in shaping plans for staff mental health and wellbeing support. We regularly commission research to assess the wellbeing of leaders, teachers, and school staff (e.g. the [latest published wave](#) of the School Snapshot Survey), in addition to monitoring relevant emerging research in the field.

## Promoting flexible working opportunities in schools

135. The department has prioritised intervention to expand and promote flexible working opportunities in schools, recognising that this is a key driver of retention, as set out in the department's 2019 Recruitment and Retention Strategy.
136. To support school leaders and teachers to implement flexible working practices effectively, we have published a [suite of supportive resources](#) on GOV.UK. This collection was developed from 2019-2021 in collaboration with sector experts and includes non-statutory guidance, case studies, and research funded by the department. We will continue to expand the practical resources available to teachers and school leaders and have an ongoing programme of research designed to expand our knowledge of how schools implement flexible working, and how they can best be supported in doing so, to ensure specific policies are based on robust evidence.
137. Currently we are funding two projects to expand and promote flexible working in schools. We have appointed eight Flexible Working Ambassador Schools to act as champions of flexible working in schools at a local level. One school has been

appointed in each of the Regional Schools Commissioner regions. Our ambassador schools were competitively selected based on their proven track record of successfully implementing flexible working, to promote and share good practice in specific areas of expertise including timetabling in secondary schools, flexible hiring and implementing a policy and process for responding to requests. They are responsible for a range of activity, including:

- Recruiting at least five participant schools across their region to provide direct one-to-one, practical peer support from April 2021 to December 2022 (including one school considered 'most in need').
- Running at least five peer-to-peer training events over five terms to reach a minimum of 20 participants.
- Ensuring regular collection of feedback and case studies from the schools they work with.

138. In response to COVID-19, to support teachers working flexibly, the department partnered with Timewise Flexible Working Consultancy to deliver practical support on flexible working. We also awarded Timewise a contract of £57,000 in Spring 2021 to deliver training for school leaders on implementing flexible working. It includes a focus on developing a strategic, whole school approach to flexible working. This webinar-based training launched in Autumn 2021 and will take place until Spring 2022 with a minimum reach of 1000 participants via live and recorded webinars, Q&A sessions and drop-in clinics. It is being offered on a national scale to school leaders, including headteachers, MAT CEOs, school HR and business leads, governors and trustees. In 2019 we established a flexible working advisory group, which brings together experts in the sector including teaching unions, headteachers and MAT leaders with expertise in embedding effective practice. We have worked closely with the group when devising our strategy and will continue to consult the group to shape future intervention.

# Equality in pay and progression

## Context

139. The STRB's 21st report made recommendations to introduce 'differentiated performance-based progression on the main pay scale to enable teachers to progress at different speeds, with higher rewards and more rapid progression for the most able teachers'.<sup>52</sup> It was the STRB's view that uplifts should not be applied automatically to teachers and that any individual pay awards needed to take account of performance.
140. The 2013/14 pay round saw the introduction of a system that strengthened the link between teacher performance, productivity, and financial reward.<sup>53</sup> The intention was to create a pay system that incentivised teaching excellence, delivering a high-quality teacher workforce and levelling up standards in schools. School leaders were granted greater freedoms to make decisions about pay, so that they could reward their best teachers. These reforms ended the practice of automatic annual pay progression for teachers, linking all teachers' pay progression to performance, based on annual appraisals. Only those teachers on the statutory minima of the pay ranges would automatically receive the pay increase associated with the annual pay range uplifts.
141. The 2013 reforms saw the removal of threshold assessments when progressing from the main to upper pay range. While centrally defined guidance does provide suggested progression rates for teachers within the first five years of their teaching career,<sup>54</sup> progress from M6 to U1 is largely at the discretion of headteachers.
142. Within recent reports the STRB have noted concerns raised by consultees about the equalities impacts of the current pay system. These include concerns that the 2013 reforms are a source of discriminatory pay outcomes on grounds of gender, race and disability, particularly the introduction of performance related pay (PRP).
143. ASCL, NAHT, NEU and Voice have all noted 'strong evidence on the damage caused by PRP, its inherent unfairness and the need for it to be removed'.<sup>55</sup> NEU specifically note significant equalities issues resulting from PRP, highlighted within their 'Pay and Progression surveys'. They call on the department to utilise SWC data to 'publish a robust and comprehensive equality impact assessment of the

---

<sup>52</sup> [School Teachers' Review Body 21st Report 2012 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](#), p.47.

<sup>53</sup> The STPCD published in April 2013 set out that September 2013 would be the last time annual pay increments would be award based on length of service. Appraisal-based pay progression began thereafter, with the first such decisions made in September 2014.

<sup>54</sup> DfE (2018) [Implementing your school's approach to pay: Advice for maintained schools, academies and local authorities](#), p.15.

<sup>55</sup> STRB Report Statutory Consultation: NEU, ASCL, NAHT, Voice, p.5.

changes made to the pay structure since the dismantling of the national structure and imposition of PRP.<sup>56</sup> NASUWT reiterate their opposition to PRP and purported equalities implications. They note ‘a growing body of evidence that PRP was a source of discriminatory pay outcomes, particularly on grounds of gender, disability and race’.<sup>57</sup>

144. ASCL and NAHT highlight discriminatory outcomes linked to PRP, resulting from the current pay system, continuing their calls for a ‘comprehensive analysis by the Department for Education on the equality implications of the teachers’ and leaders’ pay system.’<sup>58</sup>
145. The STRB have urged the department to utilise SWC data to assess any potential inequalities within the pay system following the introduction of the 2013 reforms. The most recent (31st) STRB report stated: ‘We are pleased that the Department is planning a study covering issues of equality and diversity. As this will take some time to deliver its findings, we encourage the Department, in parallel, to make use of the detailed census data it collects annually on the teaching workforce.’<sup>59</sup>
146. In 2017 the department commissioned NFER to evaluate the impact of the teachers’ pay reforms. This concluded that there was ‘little evidence to suggest particular groups have been disadvantaged as a result of the reforms to teachers’ pay’,<sup>60</sup> but that this could not be stated conclusively without further research.
147. Since the report the department has undertaken an analysis of comparisons of the relative pay and progression of different groups, according to protected characteristics, before and after the pay reforms enacted in 2013. We have utilised the SWC and Teacher Pension Scheme records since 2010 to compare the pay and progression of teachers within these protected characteristic groups. To explore the impact of the 2013 reforms, our analysis has focused on comparative trends of the years immediately prior to and leading on from the 2013/14 academic year.
148. The key findings are detailed below.

## Headline findings

149. The data analysis shows trends within the pay and progression rates of teachers over time; it is not a comprehensive assessment of the 2013 reforms. While the analysis undertaken explores gaps in progression and pay by protected

---

<sup>56</sup> School Teachers’ Pay: the STRB’s 30th Report and the Government Response, NEU, 14 September 2020, p.2.

<sup>57</sup> [School Teachers’ Review Body 31st Report 2021 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/921111/school-teachers-review-body-31st-report-2021.pdf), p.18.

<sup>58</sup> [Closing the Gender Pay Gap in Education: A leadership imperative, ASCL, NAHT](https://www.ascl.org.uk/media/1000000/closing-the-gender-pay-gap-in-education-a-leadership-imperative.pdf), p.5.

<sup>59</sup> [School Teachers’ Review Body 31st Report 2021 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/921111/school-teachers-review-body-31st-report-2021.pdf), p.3.

<sup>60</sup> [Evaluation of Teachers’ Pay Reform Final Report October 2017, NFER](https://www.nfer.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Evaluation-of-Teachers-Pay-Reform-Final-Report-October-2017.pdf), p.55.

characteristics, it is not possible to conclude that the pay reforms caused gaps to remain, widen, or close. There are additional wider policy and economic factors that have coincided with the introduction of the reforms that could be attributed to these findings (e.g. this period has included pauses to headline pay awards, possible workload changes, and more). The findings are, however, helpful in highlighting areas of positive or negative change that may require further investigation and action.

150. While there is some evidence of variations in pay and progression rates for different protected characteristic groups, the findings suggest that the 2013 reforms were not accompanied by substantial changes to pay and progression gaps between protected characteristics, once data has been adjusted for variables such as wastage rates and working patterns. The exception to this overall picture is a small negative divergence between progression rates on the basis of ethnicity, which widened following the introduction of the reforms. However, this gap narrowed in more recent years.

151. Full analysis is set out at Annex F.

## Gender

152. The STRB and statutory consultees have previously suggested the pay system has resulted in discriminatory outcomes in relation to gender.<sup>61</sup> The STRB noted that ‘virtually none of the pay gap in teaching could be attributed to male teachers having higher average levels of those characteristics typically associated with higher pay such as age, tenure and occupation.’<sup>62</sup> NASUWT’s own research as well as analysis commissioned to Warwick University highlights a gender pay gap.<sup>63</sup> ASCL and NAHT have further strengthened calls for the department to analyse the equality implications of the teachers’ and leaders’ pay system, including considering the role of PRP in contributing towards the gender pay gap.<sup>64</sup>

153. There is no evidence of gender differences in base pay of classroom teachers and how it changes over a career (years of experience), once accounting for working patterns. This trend did not change between the pre and post reform period (see Figure F1).

---

<sup>61</sup> The SWC does not record biological sex, but self-reported gender. In the evidence, gender is used as a proxy for sex as a protected characteristic, but we refer to gender when discussing findings to align with the data source.

<sup>62</sup> [School Teachers’ Review Body 31st Report 2021 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/92421/school-teachers-review-body-31st-report-2021.pdf), p.74.

<sup>63</sup> [The impact of changes to teachers’ pay on equality in schools in England – between 2010– 2015](#), May 2017, NASUWT, p.28.

<sup>64</sup> [Closing the Gender Pay Gap in Education: A leadership imperative](#), ASCL, NAHT, p.5.



154. Progression rates (the rate of progress from one pay point to the next) over time generally declined for all classroom teachers (male and female, both full-time and part-time) on the main pay range after 2013. We would expect to see this trend as it most likely reflects the move away from automatic pay progression to performance-linked decisions. The overall decline in progression rates was more pronounced for part-time teachers. This warrants further investigation to understand the interaction between PRP decisions, working pattern, and the timing of progression.
155. At M1-M5, both pre and post reform, there were no gender gaps in rates of progression for full-time teachers, and no stable gaps for part-time teachers.
156. In contrast, we do find that there were progression gaps at the threshold from M6 to the upper pay range, and within the upper pay range. The gaps within the upper pay range were relatively stable pre and post reform, but the gap at the threshold grew from 2011 to 2019. However, breaking the analysis down further by school phase, reveals that within secondaries, gaps were small or non-existent, and within primaries gaps were also small. This implies that the apparent gap when averaging over phases is predominantly due to there being a larger proportion of female teachers in primaries, where the progression rates within the upper pay range are lower.
157. Part-time teachers were less likely than full-time teachers to progress from M6 to U1. This was true pre and post reforms (Figure F5). This trend was most pronounced at primary (Figure F7). Given there are a higher proportion of females making up the primary workforce, and females are four times more likely than men to work part-time (Table F1),<sup>65</sup> the negative impact on the progression of part-time workers could have served to disproportionately disadvantage female teachers. The 'Working Lives of Teachers and Leaders' (WLTL) survey will allow further analysis.<sup>66</sup>
158. Since 2013 the pay system has moved away from mandatory threshold assessments. It is possible that one consequence of this may have been additional requirements (or a perception of additional requirements) meaning greater responsibility or workload when progressing. This could disproportionately affect female teachers, who typically have greater caring responsibilities and/or work part-

---

<sup>65</sup> The 2020 school workforce census reports 29.2% of female teachers work part time, whereas this is only 8.6% for male teachers (Department for Education 2021, [School workforce census](#)).

<sup>66</sup> Previously referred to (including to the STRB in last year's evidence) as The Longitudinal Study of Teachers (LSoT). Name has been revised.

time.<sup>67</sup> We do not know whether this is a factor in the overall gender progression variance. We will seek to explore possible drivers through analysis of WLTL data.

159. Recent STRB reports highlight the need to increase opportunities for flexible working within teaching.<sup>68</sup> NAHT have cited 'systematic barriers to flexible working opportunities for all roles.'<sup>69</sup> The department recognises how expanding and promoting flexible working opportunities in schools can help to recruit, retain and motivate teachers, promote equality of opportunity and diversity in the workforce and play a central role in helping schools to deploy their staff effectively and efficiently. Supporting schools to implement flexible working, including part-time working, forms a core part of the DfE's 2019 [Teacher Recruitment and Retention Strategy](#). Further information on these initiatives can be found in the 'Maintaining a high-quality supply of teachers and leaders' chapter.

## Gender and leadership

160. Unions have expressed concerns about gender inequalities within leadership pay. ASCL and NAHT cite an average gender pay gap in 2021 of 12% for headteachers.<sup>70</sup> NASUWT state that 'being female is a powerful influence depressing earnings in each year.'<sup>71</sup>

161. Our analysis confirms that, during the period from 2010 to 2020, there was a pay gap between male and female teachers, once leadership grades were included in the analysis. The pay gap averaged 4% of full-time female teachers' base pay, and 3% for part-time. Male teachers were slightly more likely to progress into senior leadership roles from the classroom, but there was no gap in progression from senior leadership into headship roles. However, there is no evidence that the reforms increased the pay gap (Figure F8 and Figure F9).

162. Higher pay for male leaders could potentially be attributed to the increased likelihood of experienced female teachers taking career breaks and having additional caring responsibilities,<sup>72</sup> which may have negatively impacted progression rates to leadership and therefore overall career earnings. We will seek to explore this further through analysis of WLTL data.

---

<sup>67</sup> Census and survey data from the Office for National Statistics indicates that women are more likely than men to have caring responsibilities (Office for National Statistics, 2013, [The gender gap in unpaid care provision, section 3](#), Office for National Statistics, 2020, [Coronavirus and the impact on caring](#)). See Table F1 in Annex F for data on part time teachers by gender.

<sup>68</sup> [School Teachers' Review Body 31st Report 2021 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](#), p.4.

<sup>69</sup> [Closing the Gender Pay Gap in Education: A leadership imperative](#), ASCL, NAHT, p.5.

<sup>70</sup> [Closing the Gender Pay Gap in Education: A leadership imperative](#), ASCL, NAHT, p.4.

<sup>71</sup> [The impact of changes to teachers' pay on equality in schools in England – between 2010– 2015](#), May 2017, NASUWT, p.48.

<sup>72</sup> [Closing the Gender Pay Gap in Education: A leadership imperative](#), ASCL, NAHT, p.24.

## Ethnicity

163. The STRB and unions have raised concerns of possible discrimination on the basis of ethnicity. The 2017 NFER report into the pay reforms noted concerns raised by unions over unfair treatment of people from black and minority ethnic groups, although the report found little evidence to support this.<sup>73</sup> NASUWT have reported concerns that being an ethnic minority teacher results in lower hourly earnings relative to White British teachers, with the negative effect strongest for the Black-African ethnic group.<sup>74</sup> NAHT stated that leaders from a Black, Asian or minority ethnic backgrounds risk facing a “double hit” in relation to pay as a result of inequalities in the pay system.<sup>75</sup>
164. Once accounting for region, there was no notable variance in base pay rates for classroom teachers (part or full-time) based on ethnicity (Figure F12). It is important to note the differences in location and other demographics when accounting for reporting of pay and progression rates for teachers by ethnicity. Teachers from ethnic minority groups were disproportionately represented in the London workforce (Figure F10) who typically receive a higher relative pay rate than teachers in the rest of England through the London allowance (Figure F11).
165. There were some disparities within progression rates based on ethnicity. A gap is visible between White and Black or Black British teacher progression between M1 and M6 which grew around 2013, most notably at M6. Progression then began to converge at all pay points by 2016 (both the main pay range and upper pay range) (Figure F13). Some of this variation in progress rates could be explained by London areas typically having higher wastage rates relative to other areas in the country, resulting in a tendency for a younger workforce who were less likely to progress. We will explore this further through analysis of WLTL data.

## Ethnicity and leadership

166. The analysis of pay including leadership grades showed a small gap in pay in mid-career, from around five years’ experience, which then narrowed in later career. Differences in progression were small and not consistent: Black and Black British full-time teachers were slightly more likely to progress from the classroom to senior leadership by approximately the same margin as White full-time teachers were more likely to progress from senior leadership to headship. These small differences in pay and leadership progression based on ethnicity did not worsen post reforms

---

<sup>73</sup> [Evaluation of Teachers’ Pay Reform Final Report October 2017](#), NFER, p.57.

<sup>74</sup> [The impact of changes to teachers’ pay on equality in schools in England – between 2010– 2015](#), May 2017, NASUWT, p.48.

<sup>75</sup> [NAHT Comments on Ethnicity Pay Gap Day 2022](#), 8th Jan 2022, Paul Whiteman.

(Figure F15 and F16). Nevertheless, this is a concern and requires further analysis using the WLTL data.

167. We want to see these disparities addressed and the department is committed to understanding what the challenges are and how we can support improvements across the teacher journey from trainees through to leadership level. World-class programmes have been developed by the department to support the school workforce, for everyone whatever their background, including our ECF reforms for those at the beginning of their careers and NPQs, to develop our best teaching and leadership talent.

## Other protected characteristics

168. Given the relatively small group size and data quality issues, it is difficult to generalise from data on other protected characteristics, such as disability. The department is committed to addressing any inequalities within the pay system and is aware of concerns raised by unions, specifically NAHT, about the lack of good data on protected characteristics other than gender.<sup>76</sup>

169. The WLTL will commence in 2022. The study will allow us to follow the experiences and views of teachers over an extended period of time and strengthen our evidence base across a number of areas, including teacher diversity and flexible working.

---

<sup>76</sup> [School Teachers' Review Body 31st Report 2021 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/92848/school-teachers-review-body-31st-report-2021.pdf), p.18.

## Annex A: Teacher Workforce Characteristics and Pay

A1. In November 2020 there were 461,100 full-time equivalent (FTE) teachers in state-funded schools in England. Table A1 shows the proportion of these teachers split by grade and phase. The majority (85%) of teachers are classroom teachers (390,900 FTE). The remaining 15% consist of approximately 70,200 FTE leadership teachers. 77 Of all FTE teachers in state-funded schools in England, 3% (13,900 FTE) are unqualified teachers.<sup>78</sup>

**Table A1: Full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) by grade and phase, state-funded schools (England, November 2020, in thousands with percentages of total workforce in brackets)<sup>79</sup>**

	Nursery and primary	Secondary	Special	Centrally employed	Total
<b>Heads</b>	16.8 (4%)	3.7 (1%)	1.4 (0%)	0.1 (0%)	22.1 (5%)
<b>Deputy heads</b>	11.6 (3%)	5.3 (1%)	1.3 (0%)	0.1 (0%)	18.2 (4%)
<b>Assistant heads</b>	12.4 (3%)	14.5 (3%)	2.0 (0%)	1.0 (0%)	29.9 (6%)
<b>Classroom teachers</b>	181.7 (39%)	186.3 (40%)	20.3 (4%)	2.6 (1%)	390.9 (85%)
<b>TOTAL</b>	222.5 (48%)	209.8 (46%)	25.0 (5%)	3.7 (1%)	461.1 (100%)
<b>of which, unqualified</b>	4.9 (2%)	6.6 (3%)	2.2 (9%)	0.3 (7%)	13.9 (3%)


Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2020

<sup>77</sup> Defined as teachers with posts recorded as Executive Headteacher, Headteacher, Deputy Head, Assistant Head, or Advisory Teacher. Does not include classroom teachers with middle leadership responsibilities.

<sup>78</sup> An unqualified teacher in the LA maintained sector is either a trainee working towards QTS; an overseas trained teacher who has not exceeded the four years they are allowed to teach without having QTS; or an instructor who has a particular skill who can be employed so long as a qualified teacher is not available.

<sup>79</sup> Where totals appear not to sum, this is due to rounding.

**Figure A1: Full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) in state-funded schools by grade and age (England, November 2020)**




Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2020

A2. 18% of all FTE teachers in state-funded schools were aged 50 and over, whilst 22% of teachers were aged under 30. Unqualified teachers have the largest percentage of teachers under 30 at 35%. Age distributions by grade are shown in Figure A1.

A3. Figure A2 provides a comparison between the age composition of the FTE qualified teacher workforce in 2010 to 2020. From the chart it is clear that the age distribution has shifted leftwards since 2010, reflecting a younger workforce on average. However, this is not primarily due to a big increase in the youngest teachers – teachers under 30 years of age have remained a stable share of the workforce since 2010. Instead, the difference is driven by the 2020 workforce having a higher share of teachers aged 30 to 50, and fewer aged over 50, than in 2010. The bulge of late-career teachers in the 2010 workforce aligns with two big changes in the mid-to-late 1970s. Firstly, there were the 1975 reforms following the Houghton Report. This report recommended several reforms, including substantial changes to teachers' pay. The average pay rise in 1975 was 27%, though this was eroded over the following years, potentially causing any surge in interest in teaching to be short-lived. However, the main cause seems more likely to be the significant cuts to the number of initial teacher training places made available throughout the decade, in response to demographic changes, which would have reduced the number of teachers entering the profession. Teacher training places by the end of the decade were cut by 70% from almost 120,000 in

1972.<sup>80</sup> Teachers aged between 50 and 60 in 2010 most likely would have been around the point of choosing careers in the period affected by both of these changes (including the significant pay rise), with those closer to 50 more affected by the reduction in training places available.

**Figure A2: Age composition of full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) in state-funded schools (England, November 2010 and 2020)**




Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2010 and 2020

A4. Figure A3 shows the percentages of females and males for each grade. 74% of teachers at all grades are female. For classroom teachers the percentage is slightly higher at 75%. For the leadership group, the percentage of female teachers is 69%.

<sup>80</sup> [Education in England: a history, Chapter 14 \(educationengland.org.uk\)](https://www.educationengland.org.uk).

**Figure A3: Full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) in state-funded schools by grade and gender (England, November 2020)**



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2020

A5. Table A2 shows the ethnic background of teachers in England by grade. The percentage of teachers observed with a non-white ethnic background decreases at higher grades. The highest percentage of teachers with a non-white background is observed for unqualified teachers (17.5%) and the lowest percentage of teachers with a non-white background is observed for headteachers, though this has been increasing over time from 2.4% in 2010 to 3.1% in 2015 and now to 3.9%. During the same period (2010 to 2020), the share of all teachers with a non-white background rose from 6.6% to 9.7%.

A6. For the academic year 2021/22, the minimum salaries for classroom teachers in the Rest of England pay band (the lowest of the four regional pay bands) are £25,714 for a qualified teacher and £18,419 for an unqualified teacher.



A7. In November 2020, the average (median) gross<sup>81</sup> pay of regular classroom teachers in state-funded schools in England was £38,961. This was an increase of 3.1% compared to November 2019 (£37,795).

**Table A2: Distribution of full-time equivalent teachers (FTE) by grade and ethnicity in state-funded schools. (England, November 2020)<sup>82</sup>**

	Head	Deputy Head	Assistant Head	Classroom Teacher	Unqualified Teacher	Total
<b>White</b>	96.1%	94.8%	92.4%	89.9%	82.5%	90.3%
White - British	92.6%	91.0%	87.9%	84.4%	73.6%	84.9%
White - Irish	1.7%	1.8%	1.7%	1.5%	1.4%	1.5%
Any Other White Background	1.8%	2.1%	2.8%	4.0%	7.6%	3.9%
<b>Black</b>	1.1%	1.3%	2.0%	2.6%	6.3%	2.6%
Black - African	0.2%	0.3%	0.6%	1.1%	2.1%	1.0%
Black Caribbean	0.7%	0.8%	1.1%	1.1%	3.2%	1.2%
Any Other Black Background	0.1%	0.2%	0.2%	0.4%	1.0%	0.4%
<b>Asian</b>	1.6%	2.4%	3.8%	5.1%	6.7%	4.8%
Indian	0.9%	1.3%	1.9%	2.1%	2.8%	2.0%
Pakistani	0.4%	0.5%	0.9%	1.4%	1.8%	1.3%
Bangladeshi	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.8%	1.0%	0.7%
Any Other Asian Background	0.2%	0.4%	0.6%	0.8%	1.2%	0.8%
<b>Mixed</b>	0.9%	1.1%	1.3%	1.6%	2.8%	1.5%
White and Black African	0.1%	0.1%	0.1%	0.2%	0.3%	0.1%
White and Black Caribbean	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.9%	0.4%
White and Asian	0.3%	0.3%	0.3%	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%
Any Other Mixed Background	0.3%	0.4%	0.4%	0.6%	1.1%	0.6%
<b>Chinese</b>	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.2%
<b>Any Other Ethnic Group</b>	0.2%	0.3%	0.5%	0.6%	1.3%	0.6%


Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2020

<sup>81</sup> The gross pay is the base pay plus any allowances earned by the teacher. Part-time teachers are included with pay scaled up to the full-time equivalent rate.

<sup>82</sup> Percentages are out of a total of those with ethnicity information recorded in the School Workforce Census (over 90% of all teachers).

A8. Teachers' salaries are largely driven by the location of the school they work in and their level of experience. Figure A4 shows median salaries of classroom teachers by pay band and age. Classroom teachers in both primary and secondary state-funded schools typically see their salary rise much quicker in the beginning of their careers than in their later stages.

**Figure A4: Average (median) salaries of classroom teachers in state-funded schools, by age of teacher and pay region<sup>83</sup>**



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2020

<sup>83</sup> Excludes centrally employed teachers, unqualified teachers and teachers with unreliable salary.

**Figure A5: Average (median) salaries of classroom teachers in schools by region and phase<sup>84</sup>**



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2020

- A9. The average (mean) salary for a newly qualified teacher (NQT) in 2020 was £27,200, a rise of 4.6% on 2019 (£26,000). Teachers tend to see rapid pay progression in the early stages of their careers, especially compared to the rate in later years. For a teacher with five years' experience, the estimated mean salary in FTE terms is £37,700. This rises to £44,600 when considering only teachers in Inner London.<sup>85</sup>
- A10. Figure A5 shows overall median salaries for classroom teachers are higher in secondary schools than in primary schools. This could be due to a number of factors, such as variation in TLR payments (see Figure A6).

<sup>84</sup> Excludes special schools, free schools, City Technology Colleges (CTCs), University Technical Colleges (UTCs), studio schools, centrally employed staff and teachers with unreliable pay information.

<sup>85</sup> The five year salary includes only those teachers with five full years of teaching in the state funded sector since qualification, removing teachers with breaks in service.

## Salaries of headteachers and other teachers in leadership positions

- A11. The leadership group in the School Teacher Pay and Conditions Document (STPCD) covers headteachers and other teachers in leadership positions. There is a single leadership pay range which includes eight headteacher groups (HTGs) for each of the four regional pay bands. The minimum point on the Rest of England pay range is £42,195. The highest point on the Inner London pay range is £125,098.
- A12. The relevant body determines how the pay of leaders at its school relates to the leadership pay range by assigning the school to one of the eight HTGs, based on the number and age of the school's pupils, and then adopting the three-stage process recommended in the STRB's 23rd Report. In November 2020, the average (median) gross pay of regular headteachers and other teachers in leadership positions in publicly funded schools in England was £58,400. This was an increase of 3.2%<sup>86</sup> compared to November 2019 (£56,600).
- A13. Tables A3 and A4 show the average (median) primary and secondary leadership salaries by grade and pay region in primary and secondary schools. Leaders in secondary schools get paid significantly more than their counterparts in primary schools and the gap increases as leadership roles become more senior.
- A14. The average assistant head in a primary school earns £48,900 compared to an average salary of £58,100 in secondary schools. The average deputy head in a primary school earns £53,600 relative to £70,100 in a secondary school. The average head teacher earns £66,200 in a primary school relative to £94,400 in a secondary school. As expected, for both primary and secondary leaders the lowest average salaries are for those in the non-London regions and the highest average salaries are earned by those in schools in Inner London.

---

<sup>86</sup> Calculated using unrounded figures.

**Table A3: Average (median) salaries of school leadership teachers in primary schools<sup>87 88</sup>**

Primary	Assistant Head	Deputy Head	Head
Inner London	£59,400	£66,100	£82,300
Outer London	£54,300	£61,100	£77,400
London Fringe	£47,700	£52,600	£66,700
Rest of England	£47,700	£52,600	£64,100
<b>England</b>	<b>£48,900</b>	<b>£53,600</b>	<b>£66,200</b>

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2020

**Table A4: Average (median) salaries of school leadership teachers in secondary school**

Secondary	Assistant Head	Deputy Head	Head
Inner London	£67,300	£80,500	£108,300
Outer London	£62,400	£75,800	£100,600
London Fringe	£59,300	£70,600	£98,400
Rest of England	£56,700	£68,600	£92,400
<b>England</b>	<b>£58,100</b>	<b>£70,100</b>	<b>£94,400</b>

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2020

- A15. Teaching and learning responsibility (TLR) payments are the most widely used form of allowances, used in approximately 64% of schools. London schools make use of these payments most often and this pattern has been stable over time (since November 2010).
- A16. Recruitment and retention (REC) payments provide financial assistance, support or benefits to a teacher if such incentives are considered to be necessary for the recruitment of new teachers or the retention of existing teachers.
- A17. Table A5 shows that London schools use REC payments most often; this has long been the case. Given the competitiveness of the job market in London, schools may face more competition for teachers there than elsewhere, which may in turn drive the higher use of recruitment and retention payments.

<sup>87</sup> Excludes special schools, free schools, CTCs, UTCs, studio schools, centrally employed staff, advisory teachers and teachers with unreliable pay information.

<sup>88</sup> This is based on School Workforce Census data. This data may not include some executive leaders, e.g. executive heads and CEOs of academy trusts.

A18. London, the South East, East, and South West all have above average use of special educational needs (SEN) payments. All other regions in the Midlands and North have below average use. The same is true with 'Other payments', with the exception that the West Midlands is above average here. It could be that schools in some regions tend to record TLR / REC / SEN payments under 'Other payments'. These figures should therefore be interpreted with caution.

**Table A5: Use of pay flexibilities, by region (England, November 2020)**


Region	Total Number of Schools	Schools using REC payments		Schools using TLR payments		Schools using SEN payments		Schools using other payments		Schools using any payments	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
North East	1,134	68	6.0%	776	68.4%	182	16.0%	139	12.3%	842	74.3%
North West	3,179	161	5.1%	2,170	68.3%	554	17.4%	446	14.0%	2,465	77.5%
Yorkshire and the Humber	2,235	122	5.5%	1,263	56.5%	318	14.2%	405	18.1%	1,530	68.5%
East Midlands	2,055	112	5.5%	1,223	59.5%	341	16.6%	356	17.3%	1,400	68.1%
West Midlands	2,391	187	7.8%	1,654	69.2%	365	15.3%	710	29.7%	1,932	80.8%
East of England	2,558	313	12.2%	1,456	56.9%	668	26.1%	683	26.7%	1,946	76.1%
Inner London	1,025	187	18.2%	809	78.9%	251	24.5%	269	26.2%	882	86.0%
Outer London	1,564	250	16.0%	1,184	75.7%	385	24.6%	474	30.3%	1,341	85.7%
South East	3,341	439	13.1%	2,192	65.6%	929	27.8%	972	29.1%	2,735	81.9%
South West	2,364	110	4.7%	1,190	50.3%	538	22.8%	584	24.7%	1,686	71.3%
<b>England</b>	<b>21,846</b>	<b>1,949</b>	<b>8.9%</b>	<b>13,917</b>	<b>63.7%</b>	<b>4,531</b>	<b>20.7%</b>	<b>5,038</b>	<b>23.1%</b>	<b>16,759</b>	<b>76.7%</b>

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2020<sup>89</sup>

<sup>89</sup> Classroom teachers in publicly funded schools for whom data is provided. A school is counted if they are paying a pay flexibility to at least one classroom teacher. REC payments represent Recruitment and Retention payments.

A19. Figure A6 shows the percentage of classroom teachers in receipt of TLR payments each year between November 2010 and November 2020. Teachers in London (inner, outer, and London fringe) are more likely to be in receipt of a TLR than those in the rest of England, regardless of phase. This aligns with Table A5 showing that a higher proportion of schools in London use TLRs, compared to other regions. Secondary teachers are more likely to receive a TLR than those in other phases. The proportion of secondary teachers receiving a TLR has increased since 2010.

**Figure A6: Percentage of classroom teachers, split by School Phase in receipt of a TLR payment<sup>90</sup>**




Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2010 – November 2020

A20. Figure A7 shows the median TLR payment (rounded to the nearest £100) to classroom teachers, split by phase and region. Median payment sizes are largest in secondary schools than in other phases. But there is little difference between payment size in London compared to the rest of England, after controlling for phase.

<sup>90</sup> Excludes centrally employed teachers, unqualified teachers and leading practitioners.



Figure A7: Average (median) TLR payment for classroom teachers<sup>91</sup> by region and school phase



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2010 – November 2020


<sup>91</sup> Excludes centrally employed teachers, unqualified teachers, leading practitioners and classroom teachers without a TLR payment.

# Annex B: Recruitment, Retention and the Teacher Labour Market

## Retention

B1. Figure B1 shows that wastage rates<sup>92</sup> consistently grew from 2011 until reaching a peak in 2016. All groups have seen wastage rates fall over the two latest School Workforce Censuses, with the most notable improvements amongst the least experienced teachers – those with 1 – 5 years since achieving Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) – who have the highest leaver rates. These teachers are the most likely to be on the main pay range, which has been targeted with higher pay awards since 2017.

**Figure B1: Wastage rates of qualified teachers by experience<sup>93</sup> bands**



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2010 – November 2020

<sup>92</sup> 'Wastage' is defined as teachers leaving service in the state-funded sector for reasons other than retirement or death in service. As with all leaver data, it is only available with a 1-year lag, as it requires, for example, the collection of the 2020 SWC to determine which of the teachers from the 2019 SWC are no longer in service.

<sup>93</sup> Experience proxied by years since gaining Qualified Teacher Status. Breaks in service may mean that actual experience is lower.

B2. Table B1 shows yearly net retention rates for each cohort of newly qualified teachers (NQTs) – in primary, secondary, and special combined – going back to 1996. This table has been published regularly as part of the annual School Workforce Census (SWC) release. It includes all teachers in service in a given year, regardless of any prior breaks in service. For example, a teacher in the 2011 NQT cohort who left the state-funded school sector following the 2011/12 academic year, their first, but then returned in the 2016/17 academic year, would be counted as not retained in years 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the table below, but as retained again in year 5 onwards.



**Table B2: Retention rates of all newly qualified teachers in the years following qualification year**

Census Year	Percentage of teachers in service in state-funded schools in England after: (in years)							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2012	87%	82%	76%	72%	68%	66%	64%	63%
2013	87%	80%	75%	71%	68%	66%	64%	
2014	86%	79%	74%	70%	67%	66%		
2015	86%	79%	74%	70%	69%			
2016	85%	78%	73%	71%				
2017	85%	78%	76%					
2018	85%	81%						
2019	85%							

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2010 – November 2020

- B3. Table B2 is a replica of the data on the most recent NQT cohorts from Table B1, reformatted to make comparisons to the tables that follow easier.
- B4. Table B3 summarises similar data but with a different definition of retention; we refer to this as the continuous service retention rate for each cohort of NQTs. In Table B3, the count of teachers retained in any given year is restricted to only those who have remained in service continuously, with no breaks, up to that point. We only count a teacher as retained if they have stayed in the profession every year since their NQT year. This is a different definition to that included in the SWC publication and does not account fully for the aggregate teacher years provided by each cohort due to ignoring returners. It is relevant, though, when considering how many teachers leave the state-funded sector at some point in early career and the impact that returners have on Table B1.
- B5. The figures for retention after one year of beginning to teach are the same in tables B2 and B3 because at that stage there has only been an opportunity to leave, with no opportunity yet for teachers to return. However, from the second year onwards, the continuous rate in Table B3 is lower than the non-continuous rate in Table B2 for comparable points as returners are not included.
- B6. The difference between the continuous and standard retention grids grows at approximately 2 – 3 percentage points of the NQT cohort with each year of service. For example, for the 2012 NQT cohort, the difference is 3 percentage points after two years (81% retained in non-continuous grid vs. 78% retained in continuous grid) and rises steadily to 10 percentage points after the fifth year (69% retained in standard grid vs. 59% retained in continuous grid).

**Table B3: Continuous retention rates of all newly qualified teachers in the years following qualification year**

Census Year	Percentage of teachers in continuous service in state-funded schools in England after: (in years)							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2012	87%	78%	70%	64%	59%	55%	52%	49%
2013	87%	77%	69%	63%	58%	54%	52%	
2014	86%	76%	67%	62%	57%	54%		
2015	86%	75%	68%	62%	59%			
2016	85%	74%	67%	63%				
2017	85%	75%	70%					
2018	85%	78%						
2019	85%							

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2010 – November 2020

B7. These tables help to explain the sharp drop off in ‘net leaver’ rates every year for each cohort, as shown in Figure 10 of the STRB’s 30th Report<sup>94</sup>. These ‘net leaver’ rates are calculated from the standard retention grids, rather than the non-continuous retention grids, obscuring the underlying leaver rate. Figure B1 shows that wastage rates, ignoring the ‘netting’ off of returners, for early career teachers (those who qualified in the previous 5 years) are significantly higher than for more experienced teachers, with an average wastage rate of 9.6% in the latest year – the challenge is not confined to NQTs, as a net leaver measure might indicate. Leaver rates stabilise at around 6 – 7 percent for more experienced teachers in mid-career (qualified between 6 and 30 years previous).

<sup>94</sup> [School Teachers’ Review Body 30th report: 2020, GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/86222/school-teachers-review-body-30th-report-2020.pdf), p.44.

## Retention by phase and subject

- B8. Retention rates vary significantly between phases and subjects. We have included retention grids to allow for a comparison between primary and secondary phases in Tables B4 and B5, respectively, and a comparison between STEM and non-STEM secondary subjects in Tables B6 and B7, respectively. These provide an update on the subject level retention data published in TAD Compendium 4.<sup>95</sup>
- B9. Comparing the primary (Table B4) and secondary (Table B5) non-continuous retention grids shows that early career teachers in state-funded primary are more likely to remain teaching in the state-funded sector than those in secondary. At all comparable points in the first 8 years after qualification, and for all cohorts who began teaching between 2012 and 2019, primary retention is stronger than secondary. The difference has typically been around an extra 7 – 9 percentage points of each primary cohort remaining in service after five years, compared to the equivalent secondary cohort.

**Table B4: Retention rates of all newly qualified primary teachers in the years following qualification year**

Census Year	Percentage of primary teachers in service in state-funded schools in England after: (in years)							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2012	89%	83%	78%	75%	72%	69%	67%	66%
2013	88%	82%	78%	74%	71%	69%	68%	
2014	88%	82%	77%	73%	71%	70%		
2015	88%	81%	76%	73%	72%			
2016	86%	80%	76%	74%				
2017	86%	80%	78%					
2018	87%	83%						
2019	85%							

Source: **Schools Workforce Census**, November 2020

- B10. Continuous retention for primary teachers (Table B6) and secondary teachers (Table B7) diverges markedly from the equivalent non-continuous retention: after five years in service, retention under the continuous employment definition is 10 – 11 percentage points lower than under the non-continuous definition for primary and 8 – 9 percentage points lower for secondary. This indicates that a substantial proportion of teachers in service after five years in both phases have returned to the state-funded sector after a break in service; it also indicates that a smaller proportion return in secondary, despite the higher leaver rate in secondary creating a larger pool of potential returners.

<sup>95</sup> [Teachers Analysis Compendium 4 \(shinyapps.io\)](https://shinyapps.io/teachers-analysis-compendium-4/).

**Table B5: Retention rates of all newly qualified secondary teachers in the years following qualification year**

Census Year	Percentage of secondary teachers in service in state-funded schools in England after: (in years)							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2012	86%	79%	73%	68%	65%	63%	60%	59%
2013	85%	77%	71%	67%	63%	61%	60%	
2014	84%	75%	69%	65%	62%	60%		
2015	84%	75%	69%	66%	64%			
2016	83%	75%	70%	67%				
2017	83%	76%	72%					
2018	84%	78%						
2019	84%							

Source: **Schools Workforce Census**, November 2020

**Table B6: Continuous retention rates of all newly qualified primary teachers in the years following qualification year**

Census Year	Percentage of primary teachers in continuous service in state-funded schools in England after: (in years)							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2012	88%	79%	72%	66%	61%	57%	54%	52%
2013	88%	78%	71%	65%	61%	57%	54%	
2014	88%	78%	70%	64%	60%	57%		
2015	88%	77%	70%	64%	61%			
2016	86%	76%	69%	65%				
2017	86%	76%	71%					
2018	87%	80%						
2019	85%							



**Table B7: Continuous retention rates of all newly qualified secondary teachers in the years following qualification year**

Census Year	Percentage of secondary teachers in continuous service in state-funded schools in England after: (in years)							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2012	86%	76%	68%	61%	56%	52%	49%	47%
2013	85%	74%	66%	60%	55%	51%	49%	
2014	84%	73%	64%	58%	53%	50%		
2015	84%	72%	64%	59%	55%			
2016	83%	72%	65%	60%				
2017	83%	73%	67%					
2018	84%	75%						
2019	84%							

B11. There is also considerable variation in non-continuous retention between secondary subjects. One notable difference is between teachers of non-STEM subjects (Table B8) and STEM subjects (Table B9). The difference has typically been around an extra 3 – 6 percentage points of each non-STEM cohort remaining in service after five years, compared to the equivalent STEM cohort.

**Table B8: Retention rates of all newly qualified secondary STEM teachers in the years following qualification year<sup>96</sup>**

Census Year	Percentage of secondary STEM teachers in service in state-funded schools in England after: (in years)							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2012	84%	77%	70%	66%	61%	59%	57%	55%
2013	84%	75%	69%	64%	61%	58%	57%	
2014	82%	73%	67%	64%	60%	58%		
2015	81%	72%	66%	62%	60%			
2016	81%	71%	65%	63%				
2017	83%	74%	70%					
2018	83%	76%						
2019	82%							

Source: **Schools Workforce Census**, November 2020

<sup>96</sup> Subject defined based on whether a teacher taught a given subject in the curriculum data provided for the School Workforce Census. This data is not submitted by all secondary schools. Teachers may also teach more than one subject.

**Table B9: Retention rates of all newly qualified secondary non-STEM teachers in the years following qualification year**

Census Year	Percentage of non-STEM secondary teachers in service in state-funded schools in England after: (in years)							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2012	87%	81%	74%	70%	66%	64%	61%	59%
2013	87%	79%	73%	68%	64%	62%	62%	
2014	86%	77%	71%	67%	64%	62%		
2015	86%	77%	72%	68%	66%			
2016	85%	76%	72%	70%				
2017	84%	77%	74%					
2018	85%	80%						
2019	85%							

Source: **Schools Workforce Census**, November 2020

B12. Table B10 provides further detail on STEM retention challenges by looking at the continuous retention rate. This shows that almost half of STEM teachers have taken a break in service during their first 5 years (51% of the 2015 NQT cohort were retained continuously after 5 years). While some of these leavers return, boosting the equivalent non-continuous retention rate (60% of the 2015 NQT cohort were retained non-continuously after 5 years), reducing the incidence of breaks in service would boost supply at any given point, as well as reducing the reliance on returners, who evidence shows are more likely than average to leave again.

**Table B10: Continuous retention rates of all newly qualified secondary STEM teachers in the years following qualification year**

Census Year	Percentage of secondary STEM teachers in continuous service in state-funded schools in England after: (in years)							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2012	84%	73%	65%	59%	54%	50%	47%	45%
2013	84%	72%	64%	57%	53%	49%	46%	
2014	82%	71%	62%	56%	52%	49%		
2015	81%	68%	60%	54%	51%			
2016	81%	69%	61%	57%				
2017	83%	72%	66%					
2018	83%	74%						
2019	82%							

Source: **Schools Workforce Census**, November 2020

B13. For non-STEM teachers, Table B11 presents continuous retention rates, and again the continuous retention rates are 7 – 8 percentage points lower than the equivalent non-continuous rates, at 58% as opposed to 66% at five years for teachers achieving QTS in 2015, for example. This implies that around one in eight non-STEM teachers who are in teaching after the first five years have at some point had a break from teaching. There is no significant disparity between the differences in the continuous and non-continuous retention grids for non-STEM (7 – 8 percentage points) relative to STEM (7 – 9 percentage points).

**Table B11: Continuous retention rates of all newly qualified secondary non-STEM teachers in the years following qualification year**

Census Year	Percentage of secondary non-STEM teachers in continuous service in state-funded schools in England after: (in years)							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
2012	87%	77%	69%	63%	58%	54%	50%	48%
2013	87%	76%	68%	61%	57%	53%	50%	
2014	86%	75%	66%	60%	56%	53%		
2015	86%	74%	67%	61%	58%			
2016	85%	74%	67%	63%				
2017	84%	74%	68%					
2018	85%	77%						
2019	85%							

Source: **Schools Workforce Census**, November 2020

## Regional recruitment and retention trends

B14. The teacher labour market differs from area to area, with recruitment and retention challenges varying accordingly. In particular, there are substantial differences between recruitment and retention rates in London, compared to the Rest of England. This could be due a variety of factors. For example, differences between the economy in London and other regions. Or demographic differences, with teachers in London tending to be younger, on average, for example.

B15. Table B12 shows overall leaver rates in each region. London has a significantly higher leaving rate amongst classroom teachers than any other region. The picture is less clear for leaders, though these numbers will be more volatile due to smaller sample sizes.

**Table B12: Full time equivalent (FTE) leaver rates of teachers, by post and region<sup>97</sup>**


Year	Role	East Midlands	East of England	Inner London	North East	North West	Outer London	South East	South West	West Midlands	Yorkshire and the Humber	England
<b>2015</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>9.9%</b>	<b>10.1%</b>	<b>13.0%</b>	<b>9.3%</b>	<b>9.6%</b>	<b>12.3%</b>	<b>10.7%</b>	<b>9.6%</b>	<b>9.6%</b>	<b>10.6%</b>	<b>10.4%</b>
	Classroom Teacher	10.1%	10.5%	13.8%	9.4%	10.1%	13.0%	11.2%	9.9%	10.1%	11.0%	10.9%
	Assistant Head	8.4%	7.2%	9.0%	7.5%	6.1%	7.3%	6.6%	5.6%	6.5%	7.1%	7.0%
	Deputy Head	7.4%	5.7%	7.3%	8.7%	5.6%	8.4%	6.8%	7.7%	6.0%	7.6%	6.9%
	Head	9.9%	10.0%	8.9%	9.4%	9.2%	9.7%	10.7%	9.8%	9.1%	10.4%	9.8%
<b>2016</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>9.5%</b>	<b>10.2%</b>	<b>13.8%</b>	<b>9.3%</b>	<b>9.7%</b>	<b>11.9%</b>	<b>10.8%</b>	<b>10.2%</b>	<b>10.2%</b>	<b>10.5%</b>	<b>10.6%</b>
	Classroom Teacher	9.8%	10.5%	14.9%	9.6%	10.2%	12.5%	11.3%	10.4%	10.6%	10.8%	11.0%
	Assistant Head	5.9%	6.9%	8.0%	7.1%	6.1%	7.3%	7.1%	7.1%	6.7%	8.1%	7.0%
	Deputy Head	6.1%	6.9%	7.3%	6.4%	6.2%	7.4%	6.4%	7.7%	6.5%	7.5%	6.8%
	Head	10.2%	11.7%	10.3%	10.7%	9.3%	10.4%	10.0%	10.9%	11.2%	11.7%	10.6%
<b>2017</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>9.2%</b>	<b>9.8%</b>	<b>12.4%</b>	<b>8.4%</b>	<b>8.8%</b>	<b>11.2%</b>	<b>10.2%</b>	<b>9.7%</b>	<b>9.3%</b>	<b>9.9%</b>	<b>9.8%</b>
	Classroom Teacher	9.6%	10.2%	13.3%	8.6%	9.2%	11.9%	10.7%	9.9%	9.7%	10.2%	10.3%
	Assistant Head	5.6%	6.1%	7.7%	6.2%	5.9%	6.4%	5.8%	6.7%	6.3%	7.1%	6.3%
	Deputy Head	5.7%	6.2%	7.7%	5.6%	5.4%	7.1%	6.5%	6.7%	6.5%	7.0%	6.4%
	Head	9.9%	10.1%	8.3%	8.5%	7.6%	9.7%	9.5%	11.5%	9.1%	11.0%	9.6%
<b>2018</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>8.7%</b>	<b>9.0%</b>	<b>12.0%</b>	<b>8.3%</b>	<b>8.4%</b>	<b>11.0%</b>	<b>9.4%</b>	<b>9.3%</b>	<b>8.8%</b>	<b>9.6%</b>	<b>9.4%</b>
	Classroom Teacher	8.9%	9.3%	12.8%	8.5%	8.9%	11.5%	9.8%	9.4%	9.1%	10.0%	9.8%
	Assistant Head	6.6%	5.6%	7.5%	6.3%	5.0%	6.9%	5.8%	7.4%	6.0%	6.1%	6.2%
	Deputy Head	6.2%	5.6%	7.0%	4.7%	5.1%	6.9%	5.9%	6.6%	6.6%	6.2%	6.1%
	Head	9.6%	10.6%	8.6%	9.1%	8.0%	12.0%	8.9%	11.0%	9.8%	10.3%	9.7%
<b>2019</b>	<b>All</b>	<b>8.1%</b>	<b>7.7%</b>	<b>10.0%</b>	<b>6.2%</b>	<b>7.0%</b>	<b>8.7%</b>	<b>7.8%</b>	<b>7.4%</b>	<b>7.4%</b>	<b>7.7%</b>	<b>7.8%</b>
	Classroom Teacher	8.3%	8.0%	10.7%	6.5%	7.3%	9.2%	8.2%	7.6%	7.5%	7.9%	8.1%
	Assistant Head	6.5%	5.1%	5.9%	4.3%	4.3%	5.2%	4.7%	5.5%	5.1%	5.2%	5.1%
	Deputy Head	6.1%	5.1%	6.4%	4.7%	4.9%	5.8%	5.0%	5.4%	6.3%	5.6%	5.5%
	Head	8.6%	8.6%	7.6%	5.5%	7.4%	7.7%	8.1%	8.4%	9.1%	8.9%	8.1%

Source: **Schools Workforce Census**, November 2015 – November 2020

<sup>97</sup> Leaver rates include retirements, deaths in service, and teachers going out of service. Leaver rates of teachers where the region was not known have been excluded.


B16. However, teacher supply is determined by both retention and recruitment. Figure B2 shows qualified entrants each year as a proportion of the FTE qualified teacher workforce. Similarly, qualified leavers as a proportion of the FTE qualified teacher workforce are shown in Figure B3. These demonstrate that, relative to the rest of England, both the entrant and leaver rates of qualified teachers have been greater in London for all years since 2010. In the most recent year, both entrant and leaver rates were 2 – 3 percentage points higher in London than the Rest of England. In previous years, the entrant gap has outstripped the leaver gap, on average.

**Figure B2: Qualified entrants as a share of the workforce, by Phase and Region (FTE; London combined and Rest of England)**



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2010 - November 2020

**Figure B3: Qualified leavers as a share of the workforce, by Phase and Region (FTE; London combined and Rest of England)**



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2010 – November 2020

B17. Consequently, the total stock of qualified teachers in London has grown slightly faster since 2010 than in the Rest of England, as shown in Table B13. Figure B4 shows that the pupil teacher ratio in 2020 also remains lower in London than in the Rest of England for both Nursery & Primary (19.3 vs 20.9) and Secondary (15.8 vs 16.8), with the gap growing slightly since 2015 in Nursery & Primary.


B18. Teacher supply in London does not therefore appear to be any weaker than the Rest of England, on balance. While it is often noted that leaver rates are higher in London, higher entrant rates are an equally important factor.

**Table B13: Total FTE by Phase and Region (London combined and Rest of England, rounded)**

		2010	2015	2019	2020
Rest of England	Nursery & Primary	162,400	180,100	181,300	182,800
	Secondary	179,300	169,900	165,600	169,600
	Total	362,200	370,100	368,500	374,700
London	Nursery & Primary	30,500	35,200	34,700	34,800
	Secondary	30,900	32,900	32,500	33,700
	Total	65,800	71,800	71,000	72,500

Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2010 - November 2020

**Figure B4: Pupil-Teacher Ratio by Phase and Region (London combined and Rest of England)**



Source: **School Workforce Census**, November 2010 – November 2020

## Demand

- B19. The Department forecasts future teacher demand. Historically, this has been estimated by the Teacher Supply Model (TSM) which has now been replaced by the Teacher Workforce Model (TWM). The demand is estimated using projected Pupil Teacher Ratios (PTRs) based on teacher stock size data from the School Workforce Census<sup>98</sup> and future pupil number projections from the Pupil Projections Model<sup>99</sup>.
- B20. The 2021 update to the 2020 pupil projection model shows that the population in state-funded schools up to and including age 15 (at the start of the academic year, equivalent to the end of KS4) in 2019/20, was 7,778,000. This is projected to increase 1.1% by 2021/22 before starting to gradually decrease. The pupil population is projected to be 5.1% lower than in 2019/20, at 7,380,000, by 2029/30.
- B21. The numbers (in the same age range) in nursery and primary schools reached 4,647,000 in 2019/20. This figure is projected to continue falling across the whole

<sup>98</sup> The latest School Workforce Census can be found [here](#).

<sup>99</sup> The latest Pupil Projections Model can be found [here](#).

projection period, dropping 4.2% against 2019/20 by 2023/24 to 4,454,000, and by 10.3% to 4,169,000 by 2029/30.

- B22. The number in secondary school is increasing, and reached 3,003,000 in 2019/20. The projected peak in the secondary population is forecast to be in 2023/24 at 3,231,000 (a 7.6% increase on 2019/20). Figures are then projected to gradually drop to 3,080,000 in 2029/30 – still 2.6% higher than in 2019/20.
- B23. When pupil numbers increase, it is expected that future teacher demand will increase. This is taken into account when calculating future teacher need as part of the TWM.
- B24. Whilst the Department aims to estimate national future teacher demand, decisions taken at school level will determine the actual number of teachers required. Wider evidence of international experience shows that, even when supply and demand for teachers are in balance, many countries face shortages of specialist teachers and shortages in schools serving disadvantaged or isolated communities .<sup>100</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup> OECD, [Preparing Teachers and Developing School Leaders for the 21st Century: Lessons from Around the World](#), (2012), Ch. 3. p58.



## Annex C: Recruitment to teacher training

- C1. Each year the government estimates the number of new trainee teachers that will be required in the next training year to ensure there are enough teachers in the state-funded school system (in England). The estimates extend over the following decade, but it is the projection for the next year that is used in the Department's Initial Teacher Training (ITT) recruitment publications.<sup>101</sup>
- C2. Provisional recruitment data from DfE's ITT trainee census 2021/22, published in December 2021, show that we achieved 82% of the postgraduate target in all postgraduate secondary and 136% in primary programmes. In 2021/22 we have seen 31,233 new entrants to postgraduate ITT, this is 101% of the new postgraduate ITT target of 31,030 new entrants. Broadly, we have seen a fall in new entrants from the 2020/21 training year<sup>102, 103</sup>, but an increase from 2019/20. In 2020/21, we saw an unprecedented increase in new entrants to ITT compared to the previous year, which was likely to be a direct result of the impact of COVID-19.
- C3. PGITT targets for 2021/22 were selected using analysis from the Teacher Workforce Model (TWM). The TWM replaces the previous Teacher Supply Model (TSM) and is used by DfE to estimate the number of PGITT trainees needed each year; by estimating demand for teachers and modelling the number leaving and entering the workforce in the future. Caution should be taken when comparing the subject-level PGITT targets set for 2021/22 to previous targets produced by the TSM, as there are methodological changes between the two models. The most important difference is the uplift of PGITT targets to account for under-recruitment in the two PGITT recruitment cycles before 2021/22 (ITT2019 and ITT2020), not yet reflected in the School Workforce Census<sup>104</sup> data. This change is a key driver of the higher targets for physics, design & technology, business studies and the group of subjects categorised as 'other'<sup>105, 106</sup>.
- C4. Table C1 shows recruitment to primary phase against targets for the past three years. Overall, 136% of the PGITT target was achieved in primary. This target has

---

<sup>101</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/statistics-teacher-training>.

<sup>102</sup> The 2020/21 training year and recruitment cycle was atypical as it was impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, and lockdown in England. 2020/21 figures have now been revised.

<sup>103</sup> Some caution should be taken when comparing the 2021/22 PGITT targets with the 2020/21 PGITT targets due to the introduction of the TWM and change to the modelling methodology. See methodology sections for more details.

<sup>104</sup> The School Workforce Census is a key source of data used in the TWM, providing information on the current and historical number of teachers in the workforce, the number that leave and enter, and the subjects taught. The latest statistical release can be found here: National statistics overview: School workforce in England: November 2020, GOV.UK ([www.gov.uk](http://www.gov.uk)).

<sup>105</sup> 'Other' is comprised of a variety of subjects, including media and communication studies, social studies, psychology.

<sup>106</sup> For more information on the TWM, see the [2021 ITT census](#).

been exceeded in four of the last five years, with 2019/20 being the most recent year it missed the target at 94%.

**Table C1: Recruitment to postgraduate primary stage ITT 2019/20-2021/22**

	Entrants	Target	Recruitment rate
<b>2019/20</b>	12,216	13,003	94%
<b>2020/21</b>	14,380	11,467	125%
<b>2021/22 (provisional)<sup>107</sup></b>	14,662	10,800	136%

Source: DFE, ITT Census, 2 December 2021

- C5. Table C2 shows recruitment to secondary phase broken down for English Baccalaureate subjects.

**Table C2: Recruitment to postgraduate ITT courses for English Baccalaureate subjects – percentage of target**

Subject	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22 <sup>108</sup>
English	110%	124%	118%
Mathematics	65%	84%	95%
Physics <sup>109</sup>	42%	38%	22%
Chemistry	67%	76%	105%
Biology	163%	186%	117%
Languages <sup>110</sup>	64%	72%	73%
Geography	118%	129%	86%
History	115%	168%	199%
Computing	75%	96%	69%

- C6. While tables C1 and C2 indicate that recruitment across many subjects has been more robust during the previous two cycles, it is important to recognise that this improvement was substantially driven by the pandemic and associated economic downturn. Figure C1 shows the relative rate of applications across the previous three recruitment cycles, broken down into quarters, with pre-pandemic recruitment to the 2019/20 cycle indexed to 100 for each quarter, and recruitment for the equivalent quarters in the 2020/21 and 2021/22 cycles presented relative to

<sup>107</sup> Provisional 2021/22 figures are based on published ITT Census data which includes those ITT trainees who started their course by the census date (13 October 2021). Final data for the 2021/22 academic year will be reported in the next ITT census publication, which is due to be published in December 2022.

<sup>108</sup> 2021/22 data is provisional, revised figures will be published in December 2022 ITT census.


<sup>109</sup> Recruitment for physics includes courses designated as physics with mathematics.

<sup>110</sup> Languages, comprises modern foreign languages and classics.

this baseline. For example, recruitment in the first quarter of 2021/22 cycle was 22% higher than in the first quarter of 2019/20. In the fourth quarter it was 26% lower. Note that this does not mean cumulative applications for the whole cycle were lower by the fourth quarter, just that the number of applications received in those final three months alone were lower than the number of applications received in the final three months of the 2019/20 cycle.

- C7. This fall in application numbers below the 2019/20 baseline for the final two quarters of 2021/22 does not necessarily mean that the pandemic boost to recruitment had subsided completely – other factors could have been playing a role, including changes to bursaries since 2019/20 or the change in timing of when candidates chose to apply, owing to the pandemic, rather than if they would apply. However, it does indicate that we might expect recruitment to become more challenging for the current 2022/23 cycle, in line with expectations that the boost to recruitment owing to the pandemic was likely to be relatively short-lived.

**Figure C1: Year-on-year comparison of ITT applications by quarter<sup>111</sup>**



<sup>111</sup> <https://www.ucas.com/data-and-analysis/ucas-teacher-training-statistical-releases>.

C8. Table C3 shows recruitment to primary and secondary phase, split by gender and route for the past three years. The characteristics of postgraduate new entrants with respect to gender has remained broadly similar since 2015/16 with 28% being male and 71% female in 2021/22 .<sup>112</sup> Looking at the data by phase, 16% of primary postgraduate trainees were male compared to 39% of secondary postgraduate trainees in 2021/22, both similar to previous years.

**Table C3: Recruitment to postgraduate ITT courses broken down by gender<sup>113</sup>, phase and route, for 2019/20-2021/22<sup>114 115</sup>**

Gender breakdown by phase and route	Females on primary ITT programmes			Males on primary ITT programmes			Females on secondary ITT programmes			Males on secondary ITT programmes			Total new entrants to ITT <sup>41</sup>
	19/20	20/21	21/22	19/20	20/21	21/22	19/20	20/21	21/22	19/20	20/21	21/22	21/22
Higher Education Institution	82%	83%	83%	18%	17%	17%	60%	60%	59%	40%	40%	41%	13,915
School Direct (fee-funded)	83%	84%	84%	17%	16%	16%	62%	62%	60%	38%	38%	39%	9,464
School Direct (salaried) <sup>116</sup>	83%	83%	81%	17%	17%	18%	61%	60%	60%	38%	40%	38%	783
School Centred ITT	82%	84%	83%	18%	16%	16%	62%	61%	59%	38%	39%	40%	4,757
High Potential ITT	83%	81%	74%	16%	17%	13%	66%	63%	61%	33%	33%	31%	1,521
Postgraduate Teaching Apprenticeship	83%	86%	85%	17%	14%	14%	51%	62%	62%	49%	38%	34%	793
<b>Postgraduate Total</b>	<b>83%</b>	<b>83%</b>	<b>83%</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>61%</b>	<b>61%</b>	<b>60%</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>39%</b>	31,233

Source: DFE, ITT Census, 2 December 2021

<sup>112</sup> The 2021/22 ITT publication also publishes figures for other gender, other gender includes both unknown gender and those trainees who do not identify as male or female, but identify as other gender.

<sup>113</sup> Other gender is excluded from the table and so percentages may not sum to 100%. Other gender includes both unknown gender and those trainees who do not identify as male or female, but identify as other gender.

<sup>114</sup> Figures for 2021/22 are provisional and are subject to change. Figures for 2019/20 and 2020/21 have been revised.

<sup>115</sup> Due to technical complications, one provider submitted high-level, aggregated data only for the 2021/22 ITT Census, which did not include data on characteristics, and is therefore not included in this data extract. Final data, including these characteristics, will be published in a subsequent publication. Warning: percentages have been rounded and therefore may not sum to 100%.

<sup>116</sup> Schools direct salaried: includes salaried programmes i.e. Future Teaching Scholars Programme.

- C9. Between November 2019 and November 2020, 43,500 (FTE) teachers started a job in English state schools. Of these, just under half (20,100 - 46%) were newly qualified teachers (NQTs), just over a third (16,300 - 37%) were returning to teaching, just under one in ten (3,800 - 9%) qualified earlier but were working in the state sector for the first time, and 3,300 (8%) were new to the state sector.<sup>117</sup>
- C10. We do not assume that all trainees will complete their training successfully and/or teach immediately in a state school, and that is built into our estimates of the numbers required.

## ITT allocations 2021

- C11. The Department for Education (DfE) is responsible for regulating the volume of trainee teachers in England where training leads to the award of Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) and Early Years Teacher Status (EYTS). DfE aims to support recruitment across all ITT courses, with the objective of securing the right number of teachers to meet demand from schools in England against the TWM. We regulate recruitment to all subjects and routes by issuing permission to recruit to ITT courses to ITT providers and lead schools, while ensuring efficient use of public funds and minimising significant over-supply of teachers.
- C12. For the 2021 to 2022 recruitment cycle, we issued permission to recruit to ITT providers and lead schools, allowing them to list their courses as open for recruitment and to access any DfE funding associated with training courses. Recruitment to the majority of postgraduate ITT courses is unlimited, and ITT providers and schools have maximum flexibility to recruit to these courses. DfE has allocated places for postgraduate PE courses and early years courses leading to EYTS. ITT providers and lead schools must not recruit beyond the total number of places allocated for each course.
- C13. To formulate this approach, DfE has accounted for previous recruitment patterns, estimations provided from the TWM, sector feedback and the information supplied by ITT providers and lead schools during the request period in July 2021.<sup>118</sup>

---

<sup>117</sup> Source: DfE, School Workforce Census 17 June 2021.

<sup>118</sup> [ITT: requesting places and allocations methodology 2021 to 2022](#).

## Degree class of new recruits 2021/22

- C14. The provisional 2021/22 census data<sup>119</sup> show that the overall proportion of trainees with a 2:1 or higher is 77%. This is an increase from 75% in 2020/21. Just over one in four postgraduate teacher trainees had a first-class degree in 2021/22 (26%) – up from 18% in 2015/16, and 10% in 2010/11.

**Table C4: Proportion of first year postgraduate trainees with a 2:1 or higher classified degree, 2019/20-2021/22 (selected subjects only)**

Subject	2019/20	2020/21 (revised)	2021/22 (provisional)
English	80%	81%	83%
Mathematics	68%	72%	76%
Biology	74%	73%	78%
Chemistry	67%	72%	75%
Physics	67%	66%	71%
Modern Foreign Languages	73%	76%	78%
Geography	75%	81%	84%
History	82%	84%	88%
Total Secondary	75%	77%	79%
Primary	72%	73%	75%
<b>Total</b>	<b>74%</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>77%</b>

Source: **DfE ITT Census**, 2 December 2021

## ITT financial incentives

- C15. For 2022/23 we are offering a £24,000 tax-free bursary for all trainees with a 2:2 or higher in the highest priority subjects; chemistry, computing, mathematics, and physics. We are also offering a £15,000 tax-free bursary for languages trainees and a £10,000 tax-free bursary for biology trainees, both increases on the offer for 2021/22. We have also re-introduced a £15,000 tax-free bursary for geography and design and technology trainees (Table C5).

**Table C5: Bursaries and scholarships available to trainees in 2022/23 – Postgraduate Bursaries and Scholarships**

Subjects	Scholarship	Bursary (trainees with a 2:2 or higher)
Chemistry, Computing, Mathematics, Physics	£26,000	£24,000
Languages, Geography, Design and Technology		£15,000
Biology		£10,000

<sup>119</sup> Data includes High Potential ITT (HPITT) trainees, formerly known as Teach First.

- C16. We are continuing to offer prestigious scholarship schemes in four subjects for 2022/23: chemistry, computing, mathematics and physics. Successful scholars will receive £26,000 tax-free in all subjects.
- C17. We have aligned the funding available across all postgraduate routes into teaching by offering the same amount per subject. This means that schools offering School Direct (salaried) or the Postgraduate Teaching Apprenticeship routes can access funding equivalent to the bursary amount. (Tables C6 and C7)

**Table C6: School Direct (salaried) grant funding for 2021/22**

Subjects	Grant
Chemistry, Computing, Mathematics, Physics	£24,000
Languages, Geography, D&T	£15,000
Biology	£10,000

**Table C7: Postgraduate Teaching Apprenticeship grant funding for 2021/22**

Subjects	Grant
Chemistry, Computing, Mathematics, Physics	£15,000
Languages, Geography, D&T	£6,000
Biology	£1,000

**Table C8: Bursaries and scholarships available to trainees in 2021/22 – Undergraduate**

Subjects	Bursary <sup>120</sup>
Mathematics	£9,000
Physics	£9,000
Languages	£9,000
Computing	£9,000

---

<sup>120</sup> Trainees who are on a 4-year undergraduate course that leads to both the award of QTS and a Master's degree receive a £9,000 bursary in both the third and fourth years of their course.

**Table C9: Bursaries and scholarships available to trainees in 2021/22– Troops to Teachers**

Subjects	Bursary <sup>121</sup>
Biology	£40,000
Physics	£40,000
Chemistry	£40,000
Computing	£40,000
Mathematics	£40,000
Languages	£40,000

C18. Tables C8 and C9 show the bursaries for undergraduate teacher training courses, including the Troops to Teachers bursary. These are unchanged for 2021/22.

## Postgraduate training routes

C19. Table C10 shows the proportion of postgraduate trainees from 2019/20 to 2021/22 who came through the routes recorded in the ITT Census.

**Table C10: Proportion of trainees training through each ITT route 2019/20-2021/22**

	Number of new entrants			Proportion of total postgraduate trainees		
	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22
HEI	12,757	16,114	13,915	44%	47%	45%
SCITT	3,936	4,690	4,757	14%	14%	15%
School Direct (fee-funded)	7,907	9,469	9,464	27%	28%	30%
School Direct (salaried)	2,492	2,159	783	9%	6%	3%
PGTA	164	321	793	1%	1%	3%
High Potential ITT <sup>122</sup>	1,661	1,641	1,521	6%	5%	5%
Postgraduate Total	28,917	34,394	31,233	100%	100%	100%

Source: **DfE ITT Census**, 2 December 2021

<sup>121</sup> The £40,000 bursary is paid over the final two years of the course, with £20,000 payable in each year.

<sup>122</sup> Formerly reported as Teach First.



## Teaching schools and school-based ITT

- C20. The teaching school hub (TSH) programme is a network of 87 centres of excellence for teacher training and development that became fully operational in September 2021. They provide high-quality professional development to teachers at all stages of their careers. This programme replaces the previous teaching schools programme, which ended in August 2021. TSH are funded for 3 years (subject to confirmation) and are accessible to every school in the country.
- C21. Teaching school hubs receive an annual grant, subject to conditions, including demonstrating progress against key performance indicators. Each hub has its own defined area and must serve all schools within it, although this does not prevent hubs from working with schools outside their area.
- C22. Currently, most TSH are involved in ITT delivery either as an accredited provider or as a partner. As set out in the government's response to the ITT market review, from September 2024, we expect all TSH to be either accredited ITT providers, or as lead partners to accredited ITT providers as well as playing an additional strategic role in ITT across their local area.

## School Direct

- C23. School Direct was launched as a pilot with the School Direct Training Programme (tuition fee places) in February 2012. The School Direct (salaried) route was introduced in 2013/14, offering employment-based places to career changers.
- C24. In 2021/22, 10,247 trainee teachers commenced training through School Direct. Published data <sup>123</sup> shows that DfE provisionally estimate that of 2019/20 trainees awarded QTS, 74% on a School Direct (fee) course and 87% on a salaried course will be employed in state-funded schools in England within sixteen months of qualification. This compares to finalised employment rates, for 2018/19, of 81% and 89% respectively for School Direct (fee) and (salaried) routes.

---

<sup>123</sup> <https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/initial-teacher-training-performance-profiles/2019-20>.

## Teach First

- C25. We also continue to fund the High Potential Initial Teacher Training programme, currently delivered by Teach First. The programme is helping to recruit more teachers across England and place them in some of the most challenging schools, including in Opportunity Areas. Since 2015/16 <sup>124</sup> the programme has recruited over 10,300 teachers, with just over 1,500 starting in England in 2021/22.<sup>125</sup>

---

<sup>124</sup> DfE has published figures for HPITT since 2015/16, this does not cover the full programme recruitment history.

<sup>125</sup> DfE ITT Census.

## Annex D: London pay options

D1. For both the London regions and the proposals in the main body of the evidence for the rest of England, it is important to note that the proposals are for the specific cash values associated with each point, rather than the percentage uplifts as presented, which have been rounded. This is to support the move towards a smoother pay structure, with more consistent increases in pay between each advisory pay point. Some percentage uplifts are as per the rounded numbers presented. However, for some the rounding hides the precise award needed to achieve the structure. For example, in Table D1 below, the proposed uplifts to M1, M2, M3 in 22/23 are precisely as presented: 6.50%, 6.20%, 5.90%. However, in 23/24 the required uplifts for these points to achieve the desired cash values are more precise: 3.66%, 4.28%, 4.92%, respectively.

**Table D1: Comparison of existing pay structure to proposed for Inner London**


	Existing Structure	22/23	23/24	% increase 22/23	% increase 23/24
M1	£32,157	£34,247	£35,500	6.5%	3.7%
M2	£33,658	£35,745	£37,275	6.2%	4.3%
M3	£35,226	£37,304	£39,139	5.9%	4.9%
M4	£36,866	£38,967	£41,096	5.7%	5.5%
M5	£39,492	£41,585	£43,150	5.3%	3.8%
M6	£42,624	£44,329	£45,308	4.0%	2.2%
U1	£46,971	£48,380	£49,348	3.0%	2.0%
U2	£49,279	£50,757	£51,773	3.0%	2.0%
U3	£50,935	£52,463	£53,512	3.0%	2.0%

D2. Tables D1 and D2 show how the proposed settlement would affect pay and the progression structure for classroom teachers in Inner London. The starting salary would rise by 6.5% in the first year, and 3.7% in the second year, to £35,500. In 2022/23, pay increases would be largest in percentage terms at the beginning of teachers' careers, and would average 3.9% for all classroom teachers. Table D2 shows that this would have the effect of flattening the progression structure slightly. In the following year, pay rises would be designed to even out the progression structure to a uniform 5% increment per pay point on the main pay scale. Figure D1 shows this change visually.

**Table D2: Pay increases between pay points, comparison for Inner London**

	Progression between each point		
	Existing	22/23	23/24
M1 to M2	4.7%	4.4%	5.0%
M2 to M3	4.7%	4.4%	5.0%
M3 to M4	4.7%	4.5%	5.0%
M4 to M5	7.1%	6.7%	5.0%
M5 to M6	7.9%	6.6%	5.0%
M6 to U1	10.2%	9.1%	8.9%
U1 to U2	4.9%	4.9%	4.9%
U2 to U3	3.4%	3.4%	

**Figure D1: Comparison of existing pay structure to proposed for Inner London**



**Table D3: Comparison of existing pay structure to proposed for Outer London**


	Existing Structure	22/23	23/24	% increase 22/23	% increase 23/24
M1	£29,915	£32,308	£33,700	8.0%	4.3%
M2	£31,604	£33,816	£35,419	7.0%	4.7%
M3	£33,383	£35,553	£37,225	6.5%	4.7%
M4	£35,264	£37,380	£39,124	6.0%	4.7%
M5	£38,052	£39,955	£41,119	5.0%	2.9%
M6	£41,136	£42,370	£43,217	3.0%	2.0%
U1	£42,559	£43,836	£44,712	3.0%	2.0%
U2	£44,133	£45,457	£46,366	3.0%	2.0%
U3	£45,766	£47,139	£48,082	3.0%	2.0%

D3. Tables D3 and D4 show equivalent changes for Outer London. The starting salary would rise by 8% in the first year, and 4.3% in the second year, to £33,700. In 2022/23, pay increases would be largest in percentage terms at the beginning of teachers' careers, and would average 3.9% for all classroom teachers. Table D4 shows that this would have the effect of flattening the progression structure slightly. In the following year, pay rises would be designed to even out the progression structure to a uniform 5.1% increment per pay point on the main pay scale. The jump from M6 to U1 is 3.5%, compared to 8.9% for Inner London. Figure D2 shows this change visually.

**Table D4: Pay increases between pay points: comparison for Outer London**

	Progression between each point		
	Existing	22/23	23/24
M1 to M2	5.6%	4.7%	5.1%
M2 to M3	5.6%	5.1%	5.1%
M3 to M4	5.6%	5.1%	5.1%
M4 to M5	7.9%	6.9%	5.1%
M5 to M6	8.1%	6.0%	5.1%
M6 to U1	3.5%	3.5%	3.5%
U1 to U2	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%
U2 to U3	3.7%	3.7%	3.7%

**Figure D2: Comparison of existing pay structure to proposed for Outer London**



D4. Tables D5 and D6 show equivalent changes for London Fringe. The starting salary would rise by 8.5% in the first year, and 6.0% in the second year, to £31,000. In 2022/23, pay increases would be largest in percentage terms at the beginning of teachers' careers, and would average 3.9% for all classroom teachers. Table D6 shows that this would have the effect of flattening the progression structure slightly. In the following year, pay rises would be designed to even out the progression structure to a uniform 5.4% increment per pay point on the main pay scale. The jump from M6 to U1 is 3.9%, compared to 8.9% for Inner London. Figure D3 shows this change visually.


**Table D5: Comparison of existing pay structure to proposed for London Fringe**

	Existing Structure	22/23	23/24	% increase 22/23	% increase 23/24
M1	£26,948	£29,239	£31,000	8.5%	6.0%
M2	£28,828	£31,134	£32,674	8.0%	4.9%
M3	£30,883	£33,045	£34,438	7.0%	4.2%
M4	£32,999	£34,979	£36,298	6.0%	3.8%
M5	£35,307	£37,072	£38,258	5.0%	3.2%
M6	£38,174	£39,319	£40,324	3.0%	2.6%
U1	£39,864	£41,060	£41,881	3.0%	2.0%
U2	£41,295	£42,534	£43,385	3.0%	2.0%
U3	£42,780	£44,063	£44,945	3.0%	2.0%

**Table D6: Pay increases between pay points: comparison for London Fringe**

	Progression between each point		
	Existing	22/23	23/24
M1 to M2	7.0%	6.5%	5.4%
M2 to M3	7.1%	6.1%	5.4%
M3 to M4	6.9%	5.9%	5.4%
M4 to M5	7.0%	6.0%	5.4%
M5 to M6	8.1%	6.1%	5.4%
M6 to U1	4.4%	4.4%	3.9%
U1 to U2	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%
U2 to U3	3.6%	3.6%	3.6%

**Figure D3: Comparison of existing pay structure to proposed for London Fringe**



## Annex E: Technical Annex

E1. To support thinking on reform of the classroom teacher pay offer, DfE has developed a model that estimates the cost of proposed pay structures, as well as the potential retention benefits associated with them.

### Generating a new classroom teacher pay structure

- E2. The model begins by allocating teachers to one of nine advisory pay points, as published in the School Teachers Pay and Conditions Document. Teachers are allocated according to individuals' pay as reported in the School Workforce Census (SWC) of November 2020.
- E3. We make two adjustments to ensure we can allocate each teacher to a spine point:
- We remove from our calculations those teachers with salaries deemed unreliable, a methodology in line with the SWC publication.
  - We also allow for the fact that pay freedoms have led to some teachers' salaries lying between the spine points. In this case, we round a teacher up to the next point on the scale, or round down if within £200.

**Table E1: Teacher workforce by allocated spine point**

Advisory Pay Point	FTE teachers on each spine point in November 2020 (Rest of England) <sup>126</sup>	As a percentage of classroom teachers (FTE)	Base pay spending on each point, as % of the classroom teacher base paybill
M1	21,100	7.4%	5.2%
M2	18,200	6.4%	4.9%
M3	17,900	6.3%	5.1%
M4	16,900	6.0%	5.2%
M5	18,200	6.4%	6.0%
M6	41,500	14.6%	14.8%
U1	33,200	11.7%	12.4%
U2	27,900	9.9%	10.8%
U3	88,500	31.2%	35.5%
Total		100.0%	100.0%

E4. Separate versions of this table are calculated for the workforce in the Rest of England, London Fringe, Inner London and Outer London. In general, we find that London areas have a higher proportion of teachers on the lower end of the pay

<sup>126</sup> Totals will not match published figures due to exclusion of teachers with unreliable pay data.



range. This is in line with the workforce tending to be somewhat younger and less experienced in London, on average.

- E5. A target starting salary can then be input for each region for a given year. In our proposed scenario, this is £30,000 for Rest of England in AY 2023/23. It is set to £31,000 for London Fringe, £33,700 for Outer London, and £35,500 for Inner London in our example pay structures in this document.
- E6. A constant rate of increase across the main pay range advisory pay points is set. This is the percentage difference between any two pay points. In our central scenario, this is set to between 5.0% (Inner London) and 5.5% (Rest of England) in AY 2023/24.
- E7. The model applies uniform awards to teachers on the upper pay range, leadership pay range, and unqualified teachers pay range.
- E8. Finally, the model provides an option to ensure a minimum uplift for any pay point, if the parameters set for starting salary and progression would otherwise leave that pay point below a given level. This functionality is particularly important for M6 in all regions; and for a number of points in Inner London due to previous pay awards introducing 'kinks' in the progression pathway.
- E9. The model then generates the classroom teacher pay structure implied by these inputs. It does so by setting M1 to the selected starting salary and calculating the value of each of the other advisory pay points to ensure:
  - a. the constant rate of increase between any two points is applied to get the baseline structure;
  - b. a uniform award is instead applied to the upper pay range points;
  - c. the value of individual pay points is increased as much as necessary to ensure a minimum uplift, if this option has been selected (see paragraph E8) and the above calculations cause that point to have received an award lower than this floor.
- E10. Having set this end-state structure for AY 2023/24, the model then allows us to set the AY 2022/23 structure in transition to the end-state, by setting percentage uplifts for each pay point or setting cash values for each pay point. The model calculates the costs for each year individually, ensuring we can set an approach that best utilises the frontloaded Spending Review settlement.

## Costing each proposal

- E11. Once the model has generated the new structure according to the criteria set, it assesses how much more costly it is compared to the current pay structure.

- E12. It estimates the proportion of the classroom teacher paybill spent on each pay point, accounting for both the proportion of teachers on that point and the relative value of the salary attached to each spine point. In table E1 above, these estimated proportions are presented for Rest of England teachers. M1, for example, accounts for 7.4% of FTE teachers but just 5.2% of the qualified classroom teacher pay bill, due to the salary being below the classroom teacher average.
- E13. These proportions can then be multiplied by the proposed percentage change to the value of each spine point. In order to reach £30,000 by AY 2023/24, M1 would increase by 16.7% between September 2021 and September 2023. This means that the proposed change to M1 in isolation would increase the classroom teacher pay bill by 0.9 percentage points over the period.

*Impact on classroom teacher paybill of M1 increasing to £30,000:*

$$16.7\% * 5.2\% = 0.9\%$$

- E14. When this calculation is done for each pay point, the individual percentage point impacts can be added together to get the total increase in the qualified classroom teacher pay bill under the proposed new structure. For the proposed structure above, this would be a 6.9 percentage point increase over the two years to September 2023 in the qualified classroom teacher pay bill. This breaks down further to a 9.6 percentage point increase on the main pay range and a 5.1 percentage point increase on the upper pay range.
- E15. By multiplying a uniform award for non-classroom teacher pay ranges by the proportion of total pay bill spending on each range, we can calculate the total impact on the overall pay bill of a proposed package.
- E16. We estimate that just under 23% of the base pay bill goes to the leadership range teachers in Rest of England; just under 45% to upper pay range teachers<sup>127</sup>; just over 31% to main pay range teachers; and just over 1% to unqualified teachers. These proportions vary for the London areas.
- E17. In our proposed scenario for AY23/24, the leadership, upper, and unqualified pay ranges would receive a uniform 3% uplift in AY 2022/23 and a further 2% uplift in AY 2023/24<sup>128</sup>. This is equivalent to a 5.1% increase over two years, due to compounding.

---

<sup>127</sup> We include leading practitioners in this upper pay range group. It is difficult to accurately identify all leading practitioners in the School Workforce Census; including them in the upper pay range group as U3 teachers makes a negligible difference to our cost calculations.

<sup>128</sup> Awards for individual teachers will depend on performance.

E18. We can therefore calculate the overall pay bill increase as:

$$\text{Leadership: } 5.1\% * 23\% = 1.1\%$$

$$\text{Qualified classroom teachers: } 7.2\% * (45\% + 31\%) = 5.5\%$$

$$\text{Unqualified teachers: } 5.1\% * 1\% = 0.1\%^{129}$$

$$\text{Overall: } 1.1\% + 5.3\% + 0.1\% = 6.7\%$$

E19. This overall increase in the pay bill over two years can be broken down into a 3.9% average pay award in AY 2022/23 and a 2.6% average pay award in AY 2023/24.<sup>130</sup>

E20. This methodology is unchanged since the model used for the AY 2020/21 award, though the underlying data, such as the proportions of teachers on each pay point and the value of each pay point, has been updated. For the AY 2020/21 award, the model estimated that the recommendations of the STRB, which the Department accepted, would lead to a 3.1% increase in average pay per teacher between AY 2019/20 and AY 2020/21. This was borne out in the November 2020 School Workforce Census data, which showed a rise in average (mean) pay for teachers of 3.1%, rising from £40,527 to £41,799.

E21. An important assumption in this methodology is that the distribution of teachers along the pay ranges does not substantially change over time. Table E2 shows that the estimated distribution is relatively stable over time. There appears to have been a gradual shift towards the main pay range accounting for a greater proportion of classroom teachers. And while there is some volatility year-on-year in the proportion of teachers on any individual spine point – possibly driven in part by data quality issues in reported base pay, alongside changes in the composition of the workforce – this is limited to tenths of a percentage point. The possible exception to this is M6, where there appears to have been a more substantial shift over the last 2-3 years. The model is not especially sensitive to this shift.

E22. Moving forwards, we will continue to assess whether the pay reforms lead to changes in recruitment and retention trends that affect the underlying distribution of teachers along the ranges.

---

<sup>129</sup> Rounded to 1 decimal place. Unrounded numbers for all ranges used in model calculation.

<sup>130</sup> Does not add to 6.7% due to compounding over two years and rounding.

**Table E2: Change over time in proportions of classroom teachers on each spine point.**

	% FTE per point, 2020	Percentage point difference in proportion of FTE on each point, relative to 2020									
		2019	2018	2017	2016	2015	2014	2013	2012	2011	2010
M1	7.4%	0.3%	0.2%	0.5%	1.1%	1.4%	1.3%	-0.1%	0.0%	-1.0%	-0.8%
M2	6.4%	0.2%	0.3%	1.0%	1.1%	0.9%	0.6%	0.3%	-0.4%	-0.3%	-0.4%
M3	6.3%	0.1%	0.6%	0.7%	0.4%	0.2%	0.0%	-0.2%	-0.2%	-0.3%	0.0%
M4	6.0%	0.4%	0.6%	0.3%	0.1%	-0.2%	-0.3%	-0.2%	-0.4%	-0.1%	-0.1%
M5	6.4%	0.1%	0.3%	0.6%	0.9%	0.9%	1.0%	1.0%	0.9%	0.6%	0.9%
M6	14.6%	0.9%	2.0%	2.6%	3.0%	3.1%	3.0%	2.6%	1.9%	2.0%	1.8%
U1	11.7%	0.4%	0.1%	0.2%	0.4%	0.7%	1.3%	1.6%	2.1%	2.1%	1.3%
U2	9.9%	0.6%	0.4%	0.5%	0.7%	0.6%	1.0%	1.2%	1.0%	1.1%	1.0%
U3	31.2%	0.4%	0.0%	0.1%	0.0%	0.4%	0.2%	0.1%	0.7%	1.1%	1.7%

## Estimating the benefits of the new pay structure

- E23. There is support in the literature that pay has a greater impact on retention decisions for early career teachers than it does for more experienced teachers. For example, Hendricks (2014)<sup>131</sup> estimates that early career teachers' turnover rates fall by approximately three times as much as more experienced teachers' in response to a 1% change in pay.
- E24. There are likely to be a range of reasons for this, including:
- Increases to pay may be more important to teachers on relatively lower salaries, who tend to be early career teachers. This is in line with economic theory on the diminishing marginal utility of each extra pound an individual earns;
  - Early career teachers are likely to be more mobile in the labour market, making them more responsive to the relative pay of alternative career options outside teaching; and
  - Early career teachers have higher prevailing wastage<sup>132</sup> rates, meaning there is a larger pool of potential teachers' minds to be changed by an improved pay offer.
- E25. While pay is one factor that may particularly affect retention for early career teachers, the Department is actively addressing the full range of factors which affect teacher retention at all career stages. Full details on the Department's work to address recruitment and retention is included in the chapter on 'Maintaining a supply of high quality teachers and leaders'.
- E26. One way of measuring the responsiveness of wastage rates to higher pay is as an elasticity. This measures the percentage reduction in the wastage rate associated

<sup>131</sup> [Hendricks \(2014\), Does it pay to pay teachers more? Evidence from Texas.](#)

<sup>132</sup> 'Wastage' rates refer here to the percentage of teachers who leave the state-funded sector each year.

with a 1% change in pay. For example, if the wastage rate for a group of teachers was 10 percentage points per year and the group's elasticity of wastage with respect to pay was 1.0, a 10% increase in their pay should reduce wastage by 1 percentage point to 9 percentage points.

- E27. Estimates of the 'elasticity' of wastage in response to pay vary in the literature depending on the study designs, location of the study and types of teachers included.
- E28. Some international studies<sup>133</sup> looking at the response of shortage subject teachers to pay supplements find relatively high elasticities of around 2.5 – 3.8. These employ robust quasi-experimental study designs that are likely to be effective at accurately isolating the impact of the additional pay on wastage (or turnover in some cases). However, they assess the impact of highly targeted interventions aimed at groups that are most likely to be responsive to pay e.g. early career teachers in shortage subjects, who are likely to have competitive alternative labour market options and be mobile enough to access them. They are therefore likely to find a high end impact that is not representative of our proposed reforms to the pay structure, which would affect all teachers.
- E29. Studies that look at all teachers (or only early career teachers but across all subjects) tend to find smaller elasticities in the range of 1.0 – 1.5<sup>134</sup>. This is expected as they are not targeting the specific groups that we would expect to be especially responsive, as the earlier papers do. They exploit existing variations in actual pay or variations in earning opportunities outside teaching for teachers in different regions and subjects. It may therefore be that the designs of these studies have greater difficulty isolating the impact of pay on wastage. This set of studies includes the only published estimates we are aware of for elasticities based on UK data.
- E30. We lean towards the more conservative estimates found in the studies containing all (or most) teachers. These are likely to be more representative of the average response of all teachers affected by the proposed reforms, which are targeted at early career but not by subject. Our central estimate is an elasticity of 1.5.
- E31. We apply this elasticity uniformly across teachers at all stages of their career. There is support in the literature that elasticities are in fact higher in early career


---

<sup>133</sup> Bueno and Sass (2018 working paper), The Effects of Differential Pay on Teacher Recruitment and Retention; [Feng & Sass \(2017\), The impact of Incentives to Recruit and Retain Teachers in "Hard-to-Staff" Subjects](#); [Falch \(2011\), Teacher Mobility Responses to Wage Changes: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment](#); [Clotfelter et al \(2008\), Would higher salaries keep teachers in high-poverty schools? Evidence from a policy intervention in North Carolina.](#)

<sup>134</sup> [Hendricks \(2014\), Does it pay to pay teachers more? Evidence from Texas](#); [Dolton & Von der Klaauw \(1995\), Leaving Teaching in the UK: A Duration Analysis](#); [Allen et al \(2016\), The Longer-Term Costs and Benefits of Different Initial Teacher Training Routes.](#)

but estimating the exact differences in magnitude to use in the modelling would involve a significant amount of judgement. Instead, we are implicitly assuming that the greater responsiveness of wastage rates to pay amongst early career teachers is driven solely by the same elasticity being applied to a higher prevailing wastage rate – wastage rates are significantly higher in early career than later on (see Figure B1). Not directly accounting for other factors that might make early career teachers more responsive (e.g. those in paragraph E24, parts a. and b.) means our estimated retention benefits may be conservative.

**Figure E1: Leaver rates in early career for teachers in consecutive service since qualification, split by experience. Note: year used is last pre-pandemic.**



- E32. Based on this elasticity estimate, the model calculates the expected retention benefits of the new pay structure. For each pay point, the model:
- Calculates the percentage point change in pay;
  - Multiplies this by the elasticity of 1.5 to find the percentage to reduce the prevailing wastage rate by;
  - Applies this to the prevailing wastage rate for teachers on that pay point (estimated by experience) to get the reduction in the wastage rate;
  - Multiplies this reduction in the wastage rate by the proportion of classroom teachers on that pay point in FTE terms to calculate the expected extra retention as a percentage of all classroom teachers;
  - Multiplies this percentage by the total number of classroom teachers to estimate the extra teachers retained.
- E33. However, these steps alone would lead us to overestimate retention gains. While classroom teacher pay will be increasing, the rest of the economy will also be moving on and teacher pay would need to rise to a certain extent just to maintain

its competitiveness. Instead, we can consider retention gains relative to a uniform award. If we compare the estimate for retention gains generated using the methodology above for both our proposed structure and a uniform award that would cost the same amount, we can calculate the expected gains due purely to the more targeted approach to the pay award, rather than its overall magnitude.

- E34. Our central estimate for our proposed structures for the rest of England and London continues to be over 1,000 extra teachers retained per year by AY 2023/24, relative to AY 2019/20 before progress towards a £30,000 starting salary began. This would represent a reduction in the overall number of teachers leaving the profession of approximately  $\frac{1}{4}$  of a percentage point – the leaver rate for the last pre-pandemic year was 9.4 percentage points, according to the latest School Workforce Census. Smaller gains would be seen in AY 2022/23, as we transition towards reaching £30,000.
- E35. There is significant uncertainty around this estimate – as outlined above, there is a large range to the effects found in the literature, and no studies that assess a whole system reform of this type.
- E36. It also does not mean we will necessarily see the number of leavers from the profession fall by over 1,000 teachers. That will depend on a number of economic and other factors which impact on the teacher labour market in the interim, which are particularly unpredictable in the context of the pandemic and recovery.

## Estimating recruitment benefits of the new structure

- E37. Pay can attract a greater number<sup>135</sup> of more able<sup>136</sup> candidates to apply for individual jobs but much of this may be displacement of candidates who are already qualified / working in an industry. This is because firms in a particular industry or schools in a particular region could be considered to be in direct competition with each other for workers – they offer similar jobs where varying levels of pay are therefore likely to differentiate them significantly. In theory<sup>137</sup>, we would expect to see recruitment gains roughly equal retention gains from higher salaries offered by an individual firm. Falch (2011) finds some support for this in a study of pay rises offered in a subset of Norwegian schools.
- E38. However, increasing pay at a whole-profession level means trying to attract potential teachers working in other professions (or considering working in other

---

<sup>135</sup> [Falch \(2011\), Teacher Mobility Responses to Wage Changes: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment.](#)

<sup>136</sup> Nagler et al (2017), Weak Markets, Strong Teachers: Recession at Career Start and Teacher Effectiveness; [Finan, Bo and Rossi \(2013\), Strengthening State Capabilities: the Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service.](#)

<sup>137</sup> [Manning \(2011\), Imperfect Competition in the Labour Market; Handbook of Labour Economics](#) p.1013.

professions, in the case of new graduates). These professions are far more differentiated from teaching than the direct competition example, meaning that pay differentiation may not be quite as effective at increasing recruitment. We have found only limited evidence quantifying the profession-wide recruitment impacts of higher pay.<sup>138</sup>

- E39. Furthermore, we are interested not just in a simple overall increase to pay but to a change in the structure of the pay framework. It is not clear how potential teachers would view the changes to the structure as a whole. It is therefore extremely difficult to estimate the magnitude of any recruitment benefits.
- E40. We might reasonably expect that these reforms will improve recruitment to some unknown degree, though. As set out in more detail in paragraphs 19-26, reasons might include:
- a. Economic theory would suggest that potential new teachers will place a higher weight on starting salary than later career salary, so the move to increase starting pay significantly should have greater impact than a uniform pay rise;
  - b. We also know that graduates often underestimate the starting pay offer for teachers<sup>139</sup> meaning that the actual offer is not currently being incorporated into their decision making process when choosing a career. Introducing a memorable £30,000 starting salary may have the cut-through appeal to ensure graduates accurately assess the pay offer in teaching; and
  - c. A higher starting salary may particularly appeal to career changers, for whom the reduction in salary when moving from a previous job to become a Newly Qualified Teacher may act as a particularly substantial barrier.
- E41. We do not therefore attempt to estimate the magnitude of any recruitment gains but we believe there is a strong case that these reform proposals will in fact provide much needed support for both recruitment and retention.

---

<sup>138</sup> [Chevalier, Dolton and McIntosh \(2007\), Recruiting and Retaining Teachers in the UK: An Analysis of Graduate Occupation Choice from the 1960s to the 1990s.](#)

<sup>139</sup> High Fliers research for the Department.



## Annex F: Equality in pay and progression

- F1. In its 30th and 31st reports<sup>140, 141</sup>, the STRB noted concerns raised by consultees about the equalities impact of the pay system. The report cited evidence provided both by consultees, and wider independent research that suggested a need for further analysis of the relationship between pay, progression and teachers with protected characteristics.
- F2. This annex presents graphical and tabular descriptive analyses comparing the relative pay and progression of teachers in schools when broken down by protected characteristics: gender; ethnicity; disability; and age.<sup>142</sup>
- F3. Most concerns expressed by consultees, including NEU, NASUWT and Voice, related to the relationship between the implementation of Performance Related Pay Progression (PRPP) and a perceived increase in the vulnerability of the pay and progression system to systematic biases. The current system was introduced in September 2014 following the 21st report of the STRB.<sup>143</sup> The analyses in this annex focus on comparisons of equalities, before and after the pay reform was enacted.

### Data and methods

- F4. To track teachers' pay and progression in detail over time, we use two datasets in combination: the Schools Workforce Census (SWC); and the Teacher Pension Scheme (TPS) record. The TPS pay data is more accurate due to the reconciliation that occurs with this key administrative dataset. Of the nine statutory protected characteristics, the administrative data only records four: gender (as a proxy for sex); ethnicity; disability; and age. They do not contain sufficiently detailed information on the other characteristics: gender reassignment; marriage or civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; religion or belief; and sexual orientation.
- F5. This annex presents:
- a. *Pay curves*: Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) base salary as measured by the TPS, by protected characteristics. Teachers' effectiveness improves with experience and this is reflected in pay progression seen in the data: pay usually rises sharply in the first few years of a teacher's career. For this reason pay is presented visually as a pay curve, with experience along the

---

<sup>140</sup> [School Teachers' Review Body 30th Report 2020 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/86422/school-teachers-review-body-30th-report-2020.pdf).

<sup>141</sup> [School Teachers' Review Body 31st Report 2021 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/86422/school-teachers-review-body-31st-report-2021.pdf).

<sup>142</sup> The SWC does not record biological sex, but self-reported gender. In the evidence, gender is used as a proxy for sex as a protected characteristic.

<sup>143</sup> [School Teachers' Review Body 21st Report 2012 \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](https://publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/86422/school-teachers-review-body-21st-report-2012.pdf).

horizontal axis. This allows us to compare like-for-like, without differences in the average ages or experience of different groups leading to spurious differences in pay. A limitation of this approach is that experience is measured as years since attaining Qualified Teacher Status (QTS), with no adjustment for periods of absence from teaching, such as career breaks or maternity leave.

- b. *Progression rates*: the proportion of teachers on one pay point, who progress to the next pay point each year, by protected characteristics. Whereas the pay curves are purely cross-sectional, progression rate analysis takes a longitudinal approach, linking a specific teacher's pay in one year with the pay of the same teacher in the next year.

- F6. Because each approach illuminates different contrasts and has advantages and limitations, we combine both approaches in the annex to provide a balanced picture of pay and progression.
- F7. Analysis of progression rates assumes the existence of a structure of fixed pay points within the classroom teacher pay range. The status and salience of pay points has changed due to reforms to teacher pay and subsequent policy changes. Until 2013, the implementation of the national pay structure, including pay points, was compulsory for all state-funded, maintained schools. The pay reforms of 2014 removed compulsory pay points, and replaced them with statutory minima and maxima for the classroom teachers' main pay range and upper pay range. Initially DfE did not provide any guidance on pay progression within those bounds. During this period, pay points continued to be salient for most schools, as union-backed reference values. Since September 2020, DfE has published advisory pay points for qualified classroom teachers. Academies are not bound by the pay structure or the School Teachers Pay and Conditions Document (STCPD) and are free to set their own rates of pay; however, in practice most academies appear to approximately follow the pay structure set out for maintained schools.
- F8. For the progression rates analysis, we must then impute pay points from pay recorded in our admin data. Imputing pay points from raw pay data raises a couple of challenges. Firstly, recorded pay does not always exactly match known pay points in the STPCD, so imputation requires fuzzy matching to pay points. Second, measuring year-on-year progression is sensitive to the timing of yearly pay increases. The SWC provides a snapshot of pay taken at the same time each year; however, annual pay reviews for a given teacher are not as regular, and the data displays evidence that pay increases may not always be recorded in time for the snapshot, leading to the appearance of uneven pay growth. Using TPS mitigates this problem, as it records reconciled pay data, such that any pay rise a teacher received as part of a pay review that occurred after the SWC data was collected but that was backdated to the September, as is typical, is picked up. The

use of the data for administrative purposes in calculating pensions also means incentives to ensure its accuracy are much stronger.

- F9. Pay awards have led to increases in the level of nominal base pay since 2010. The pay curve analysis does not adjust nominal pay to take account of increases in pay, to allow direct pay comparisons between years. This is because proportional differences in pay between groups do not require pay to be standardised.
- F10. A remaining challenge is that TPS does not split pay into 'base pay' and 'allowances' (e.g. TLRs), whereas SWC does. To allow the comparison of base pay, we subtract the recorded allowances in SWC from the TPS reconciled pay figure, to generate a TPS-SWC hybrid base pay estimate. For the progression rates analysis we exclude those who leave the profession or are shown as inactive in the following year.
- F11. All analyses include all state-funded schools unless stated otherwise. This includes primary and secondary schools, LA-maintained schools, academies, and other governance types. As most academies conform to the pay structure, we include both maintained and non-maintained schools in the analyses set out below except where otherwise stated.
- F12. Teachers are further categorised by level of seniority: classroom teachers include all teachers on main and upper pay scales, including those holding middle-leadership posts such as Head of Department; senior leaders include all those on the leadership pay range; and finally head teachers in a separate category. 'Middle leaders' are not analysed as a separate category because the use of middle leadership posts, and the pay treatment of such posts, varies greatly and depends on the size of schools, the sizes of individual departments within schools, and the subjects taught.
- F13. For gender and ethnicity, pay and progression are analysed both for classroom teachers only, and separately for all teachers including leaders.
- F14. When analysing pay by ethnicity, the pay supplement for London and its peripheral pay regions, whose value changes year on year, makes comparisons between ethnic groups difficult. This is because there are proportionally more non-White teachers in London and periphery, attracting pay supplements. Inverse probability weighting is used to adjust pay to account for differences in geographical

distribution by ethnic group.<sup>144</sup> Where this adjustment is made it is clearly stated in the text.

## Gender

- F15. Table F1 shows that male and female teachers had different mean characteristics, especially for school phase, school type, and school size (which are largely driven by phase; many more primary schools are maintained). Female teachers were also slightly younger on average, with slightly more years' experience. Female teachers were about four times more likely to choose part-time working.


**Table F1: Descriptives by Gender**

Name	Male	Female
Mean age	34.9	34.3
Mean experience	7.6	8.1
% part-time	5.3	23.9
% in secondary	67.3	38.7
% in maintained	54.8	65.6
Mean school size	869.0	653.5

---

<sup>144</sup> Inverse probability weighting or inverse propensity score weighting is an established method for adjusting estimates of a difference in means between two populations, when both the variable of interest, and group membership, are correlated with a third 'confounder' variable. See: Imbens, G., & Rubin, D. (2015), *Causal Inference for Statistics, Social, and Biomedical Sciences: An Introduction*, Cambridge University Press.


**Figure F1: Classroom teacher pay curves by experience, split by gender, working pattern and time**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

- F16. Figure F1 plots pay curves with years of experience on the horizontal axis by gender and weighted by phase. This chart only includes classroom teachers, 83% of whom (80% of female and 96% of male) work full-time.
- F17. Figure F1 shows no evidence of differences in pay between male and female classroom teachers, accounting for working patterns and phase. This was true both before and after the introduction of the pay reforms, across different years of experience.

**Figure F2: “Progression rate” – percent progressing from one pay point to the next, for full-time classroom teachers by year, origin pay point and gender (not split by phase)**




Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

- F18. Progression rates: Figures F2 to F7 show progression rates as a time series. The first six pay points form the main pay range, and therefore at M6, progression is to upper pay range.
- F19. Figure F2 shows progression averaged over primary and secondary schools. At this aggregate level, we see that within the main pay scale there was very little difference between progression rates for full-time male and female teachers in all years, while full time male teachers were slightly more likely to progress into and within the upper pay range than female teachers. The differences between male and female teachers’ progression changed very little for most points on the pay range. However, the gender gap in progression from the top of the main pay range (M6) to the upper pay range grew.
- F20. However, the gaps in progression are smaller or reversed when we take phase into account: Figure F3 and F4 show that in secondary schools, female teachers were slightly more likely than male teachers to progress from M6 to the upper pay range in 2010 to 2014, but after accounting for school phase, progression gaps in the upper pay range were much smaller.


F21. Figure F4 shows that there was a small gender gap at the threshold (M6 to U1), and in upper pay range in primary schools, and progression has declined for all primary teachers at M3 to M6 over time.

**Figure F3: Progression rates for full-time classroom teachers in secondary schools**




Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

**Figure F4: Progression rates for full-time classroom teachers in primary schools**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census


**Figure F5: Progression rate for part-time classroom teachers by year, origin pay point and gender (not split by phase)**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census




**Figure F6: Progression rates for part-time classroom teachers in Secondary schools**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

**Figure F7: Progression rates for part-time classroom teachers in primary schools**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

- F22. Figures F5 to F7 present the same progression trends for part-time classroom teachers, both overall and split by phase. Unlike full-time progression trends, differences in part-time teachers' progression were variable and not consistently higher for one gender, with wide error bands indicating uncertainty due to small group sizes.<sup>145</sup> Again, the aggregate trends (Figure F5) show a gap in the upper pay range, but the gap disappears when accounting for school phase. In the case of secondary schools, the gap at M6 reverses; female part-time secondary teachers were consistently slightly more likely to progress to U1.
- F23. Since 2014, the proportion of both genders progressing each year on the main pay range declined from nearly 100%, to about 75%. The drop was especially marked for part-time teachers. However the decrease in progression rates was proportionate across genders after controlling for working pattern.


## Gender and leadership

- F24. So far, analyses have included only classroom teachers. The following analyses describe pay progression from classroom teaching to leadership, and within leadership grades, by gender.
- F25. The pay curve in Figure F8 reveals a pay gap averaging 4.2% of full-time female teachers' base pay, and 2.8% for part-time teachers. Although pay rose due to pay settlements, the average size of the pay gap did not increase between the two periods. Since the previous analysis depicts no apparent gap for classroom teachers controlling for working pattern and phase, this implies that the pay gap for all teachers is explained by differences in progression into and pay within leadership posts. Because the 'experience' variable is measured as years since QTS, it does not take into account gaps in experience such as parental leave, periods spent working reduced hours, or career breaks, which may have shown systematic differences between male and female teachers. The estimated pay curves also do not account for any systematic differences in school type and size, age or subject that might have affected differences in pay and progression.

---

<sup>145</sup> Error bands/bars on data points depict 95% confidence intervals for each estimated mean, based on theoretical sampling distributions. They provide a heuristic guide to the likely sampling variability in differences between groups. A difference between two groups smaller than the larger of the two margins of error, suggests that the difference may not generalise as evidence of an underlying stable pattern.


**Figure F8: Pay curves by gender for all teachers including leaders, by working pattern and pre-/post-reform**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

F26. Figure F9 plots the annual proportion promoted into leadership grades by gender, working pattern and period. It shows that male full-time teachers were slightly more likely to progress from the classroom to leadership roles each year, but there was no difference in the proportion progressing from senior leader to headship. Although annual differences in progression into leadership posts were small, these differences may have compounded over time, leading to widening differences in pay and composition of leadership groups. Since the introduction of pay reforms, the proportions of both male and female teachers progressing to senior leadership increased. Among part-time teachers, female classroom teachers were slightly more likely to progress to senior leadership roles than male part-time teachers in the post-reform period.

**Figure F9: Progression to and within leadership by gender**




Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

## Ethnicity

F27. When analysing pay by ethnicity, it is important to control for pay region. As Figure F10 shows, non-White teachers were more likely to work in London and surrounding areas, compared to White teachers.

**Figure F10: Proportion in each pay region by ethnic group**




Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

F28. Figure F11 shows the curve of pay over experience for White, Asian or Asian British, and Black or Black British teachers, but Figure F12 adjusts for pay region using inverse probability weighting, so that the pay of different ethnic groups can be directly compared. While there initially appear to be significant differences between the pay trajectories of teachers of different ethnic backgrounds, this actually reflects the differences in regional pay between those groups. As demonstrated in Figure F12, differences in pay by ethnicity disappear after controlling for region.

**Figure F 11: Pay curve by ethnic group, working pattern and period for classroom teachers (without adjusting for pay regions)**



**Figure F12: Pay curve by ethnic group for classroom teachers (after adjusting for pay region)**




- F29. Although pay charts in this section adjust for pay differences between regions, there are multiple ways in which the uneven geographic distribution of teachers by ethnicity makes direct comparisons of careers difficult. Geography not only affected pay (through pay regions) but different geographies were also associated with different types of and sizes of school, and different labour markets. We cannot adjust for all of these differences, which means that, for any apparent differences between pay and progression for different ethnic groups, it is difficult to make causal claims.
- F30. Table F2 shows that the three largest ethnic groups differed on several characteristics, apart from geography: Black teachers were four years older on average than White teachers, and almost five years older than Asian teachers, but they had less experience than White teachers, which implies that they tended to join teaching later; a greater proportion of Black teachers were male, whereas a greater proportion of Asian teachers were female, compared to White teachers; both Black and Asian teachers were more likely to work in larger schools, were more likely to work in secondaries, and were less likely to work part-time, compared to White teachers.

**Table F2: Descriptives by ethnic group**

	Black or Black British	White	Asian or Asian British
Mean age	38.4	34.4	33.6
Mean experience	7.6	8.1	7.2
% female	70.5	77.6	79.0
% part-time	8.8	20.5	15.5
% in secondary	62.2	43.8	53.6
% in maintained	59.1	64.1	61.3
Mean school size	881.5	682.9	868.1


- F31. The existence of differences on multiple characteristics underlines the difficulty of making causal claims about differences in pay and progression between ethnic groups, as it is infeasible to control for all of these differences at once.
- F32. Figures F13 and F14 show progression rates for three of the five ethnic groups. The ethnic groups “Any other mixed background” and “Any other ethnic group” are not included because sample sizes are too small for analysis at this level of detail.

**Figure F13: Progression rates by ethnic group for full-time classroom teachers**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

**Figure F14: Progression rates by ethnic group for part-time classroom teachers**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census




- F33. Figure F13 shows a small but persistent gap between the progression rates of White/Asian, and Black full-time classroom teachers, and this was particularly evident at M6. At other progression points on the main pay range, there was a consistent pattern of small gaps between White teachers and Asian/Black teachers, which in general grew during the period between 2013 and 2016, and were closing in the second half of the period. In contrast, the progression gap at the upper pay range threshold was largest in 2010-2011 and has decreased since then.
- F34. Figure F14 shows no persistent differences in progression by ethnicity for part-time teachers. However, there are considerable error margins around the analysis, due to small populations involved, making conclusions difficult.

## Ethnicity and leadership

- F35. As with gender, the preceding section considered only classroom teachers; this section presents analyses of pay and progression into and within leadership roles by ethnicity. Figure F15 shows the pay curve for leaders, adjusted for pay region.

**Figure F15: Pay curves by ethnicity, including classroom teachers and leaders (adjusted for pay region)**




Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

Note: data points with a sample size fewer than ten teachers are not plotted

- F36. On pay, there was a small pay gap between White, Asian and Asian British, and Black and Black British teachers that opened up in mid-career, when leaders are included in the analysis. In later career, after 20 years' experience, the gap narrowed again, although the data is noisy in later career due to small group sizes, which makes drawing conclusions difficult. This mid-career gap might reflect the slightly higher proportion of White teachers entering headship roles, or may be an artifact of different distributions of experience and age. As before, the existence of multiple possible confounders, especially pay region and the uncertainty added by the adjustment method, makes comparison difficult.
- F37. Figure F16 shows that White full-time teachers were slightly less likely to progress from classroom into senior leadership roles than Black/Black British and Asian/British Asian colleagues but this difference was small. Conversely, White full time teachers were slightly more likely to progress from senior leadership into headship roles than Black/Black British and Asian/British Asian teachers. Both patterns were evident before and after pay reforms.

**Figure F16: Progression rates into and within leadership by ethnicity**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census


## Disability

- F38. In the SWC, schools are asked to provide information on teachers that record themselves as disabled. However, information on disability was not obtained by schools for 52% of teachers in the November 2020 census. Given the large amount of missing data, it is not possible to rule out that the characteristics of the full population of disabled teachers differed materially from the characteristics and progression of those for whom we have data. Therefore, analysis included in this section should be treated with caution.
- F39. Even where we hold the data, data quality is a particular issue for the analysis of disability, as we rely on routinely-collected administrative data, which is not always entered by the teacher themselves into the system. Our data may then under-count teachers with “hidden” disabilities.
- F40. It is also worth noting that teachers with a stated disability were more likely to work in larger secondary schools, and were slightly more likely to work part-time, compared to teachers without a disability (see Table F3).

**Table F3: Descriptives by disability status**

	Not disabled	Disabled
Mean age	34.7	35.7
Mean experience	8.3	8.4
% Female	78.0	77.3
% part-time	20.7	21.3
% in secondary	44.0	49.6
% in maintained	64.2	64.1
Mean school size	687.0	733.1


**Figure F17: Pay curve by disability status**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census


- F41. Figure F17 depicts pay curves by working pattern pre- and post-pay reform by disability. There were no systematic patterns of pay difference when controlling for experience.
- F42. Figures F18 and F19 show the comparison of progression rates for teachers declaring a disability, and those not declaring a disability. Among full-time teachers, the figures show slightly lower progression rates, especially during the period 2013-2016. However small group sizes of disabled teachers mean that this is not conclusively indicative of generalisable patterns due to wide error bands.

**Figure F18: Progression rates by disability for full-time teachers**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

**Figure F19: Progression rates by disability for part-time teachers**




Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

## Age


- F43. Of the protected characteristics, analysing patterns of pay and progression by age is more challenging, because progression and experience are themselves highly correlated with age. In addition, there may be unobservable factors correlated with both the age of a teacher at a certain point in their progression, and their probability of further progression. For example, an older teacher at a lower grade may have entered teaching later in life, which might mean they have complementary non-teaching experience that would help them to progress. In contrast, older teachers on a given pay point may have had career breaks or performance issues which hindered them from progressing in the past, and might also affect their probability of progression in the present.
- F44. Figure F20 shows the pay trajectories of classroom teachers, split by binary age category: under 40; and 40 and over. Older teachers progressed more rapidly through the classroom teacher pay range but earned approximately the same wage thereafter.

**Figure F20: Pay curve by age group**




Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

**Figure F21: Progression rates by age for full-time teachers**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

**Figure F22: Progression rates by age for part-time teachers**



Source: Teacher Pension Scheme and School Workforce Census

- F45. Figures F21 and F22 depict progression rates for teachers by age. The younger group were slightly more likely to progress through the main pay range, except at M5, where there was a small progression gap in favour of older teachers. Progression through the upper pay range was slower for older teachers.
- F46. Although there were differences in progression by age group, and progression declined overall from 2012 to 2019, there was no obvious pattern of widening progression gaps post-reform.
- F47. Table F4 presents other key differences in the characteristics of teachers split by age.

**Table F4: Descriptives by age group**

	Over 40	Under 40
Mean age	46.4	30.4
Mean experience	12.1	6.6
% Female	75.6	78.0
% part-time	27.5	17.1
% in secondary	47.1	44.5
% in maintained	63.7	62.9
Mean school size	708.8	699.2





Department  
for Education

© Crown copyright 2022

This publication (not including logos) is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned.

To view this licence:

visit [www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3](http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3)

email [psi@nationalarchives.gsi.gov.uk](mailto:psi@nationalarchives.gsi.gov.uk)

write to Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London, TW9 4DU

About this publication:

enquiries [www.education.gov.uk/contactus](http://www.education.gov.uk/contactus)

download [www.gov.uk/government/publications](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications)



Follow us on Twitter:  
[@educationgovuk](https://twitter.com/educationgovuk)



Like us on Facebook:  
[facebook.com/educationgovuk](https://facebook.com/educationgovuk)