



# UK Armed Forces Quarterly Service Personnel Statistics 1 January 2022

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This publication provides information on the number of **Military Personnel** (defined as the **Strength**), joining (**Intake**) and leaving (**Outflow**) the UK Armed Forces. Detail is provided for both the **Full-Time Armed Forces (AF)** and **Reserves**. Further statistics can be found in the **Excel tables**.

The recent trends in Reserve personnel numbers in this report relate to the targets outlined in the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) programme. Following the Integrated Review and Spending Review, the previous future workforce requirements for the Armed Forces are no longer applicable. We are currently undertaking a review of how this information will be presented in the future.

Some of the statistics previously published in the following publications can now be found in this release: Monthly, Quarterly and Annual Personnel Reports, UK Reserve Forces and Cadets, Service Personnel Bulletin 2.01 and Service and Civilian Bulletin 2.03.

#### **Key Points and Trends**

▲ 197,140 Strength of UK Forces Service Personnel

at 1 January 2022

An increase of 1,000 (0.5 per cent) since 1 January 2021

▲ 137,070 | Full-Time Trained Strength (RN/RM & RAF) and Full-Time Trade Trained Strength (Army)

at 1 January 2022

An increase of 1,620 (1.2 per cent) since 1 January 2021

▼ 15,140 People joined the UK Regular Armed Forces

in the past 12 months (1 January 2021 - 31 December 2021)

A decrease of 750 (4.7 per cent) compared with the previous 12 month period

▲ 14,160 People left the UK Regular Armed Forces

in the past 12 months (1 January 2021 - 31 December 2021)

A increase of 1,460 (11.5 per cent) compared with the previous 12 month period

▼ 31,920 Strength of the Trained Future Reserves 2020

at 1 January 2022

A decrease of 730 (2.2 per cent) since 1 January 2021

▲ 5,400 People joined the Future Reserves 2020

in the past 12 months (1 January 2021 - 31 December 2021)

An increase of 520 (10.7 per cent) compared with the previous 12 month period

▲ 5,880 People left the Future Reserves 2020

in the past 12 months (1 January 2021 - 31 December 2021)

An increase of 1,220 (26.2 per cent) compared with the previous 12 month period

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Background quality report: www.qov.uk/qovernment/statistics/tri-service-personnel-bulletin-background-quality-reports

Would you like to be added to our **contact list**, so that we can inform you about updates to these statistics and consult you if we are thinking of making changes? You can subscribe to updates by emailing <a href="mailto:Analysis-Tri-Service@mod.gov.uk">Analysis-Tri-Service@mod.gov.uk</a>

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## Introduction

This publication contains information on the **Strength**, **Intake**, **Outflow** and **Gains to Trained Strength** for the UK Armed Forces overall and each of the Services; **Royal Navy/Royal Marines (RN/RM)**, **Army** and **Royal Air Force (RAF)**.

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) announced on 29 June 2016 that it was changing the Army Trained, disciplined service personnel by changing the definition of Trained Strength to include those in the Army who have completed Phase 1 training. This affects some Tri-Service totals. This does not affect the Naval Service or the RAF in any way. The MOD held a public consultation on **SDSR Resilience: Trained Strength definition for the Army and resultant changes to Ministry of Defence Armed Forces personnel statistics**, between 11 July and 21 January 2017. A consultation response was published on 7 November 2016. The changes outlined in the consultation and response have been incorporated into this publication from the 1 October 2016 edition onwards. This affects statistics in some of the accompanying Excel tables, specifically tables: 3a, 3e, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 6a, 6b, 7a, 7b and 7c. Terminology has also been updated in Excel tables 3c and 4.

Detailed statistics, including unrounded figures, and historic time series can be found in the Excel tables. These include quarterly statistics on the number of Service and Civilian Personnel, Separated Service (the proportion of personnel breaching harmony guidelines), Applications to each of the Services and Military Salaries. Further historic statistics will be added in due course; in the meantime, historic statistics can be found in the following archived publications: Monthly, Quarterly and Annual Personnel Reports, UK Reserve Forces and Cadets, Service Personnel Bulletin 2.01, Service and Civilian Bulletin 2.03, UK Armed Forces Maternity Report, Diversity Dashboard and Quarterly Location Statistics. The glossary contains definitions of terminology used in this publication.

A calendar of upcoming MOD statistical releases can be found on GOV.UK.

#### **A National Statistics Publication**

The United Kingdom Statistics Authority has designated these statistics as National Statistics, in accordance with the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007 and signifying compliance with the Code of Practice for Official Statistics. Designation can be broadly interpreted to mean that the statistics:

- meet identified user needs;
- are produced according to sound methods; and
- are well explained and readily accessible;
- are managed impartially and objectively in the public interest.

Once statistics have been designated as National Statistics it is a statutory requirement that the Code of Practice shall continue to be observed.

## Policy background

The main factors affecting decisions about the size of the Armed Forces required by the MOD to achieve success in its military tasks include:

- An assessment of current and future threats to UK national security;
- The need for contingent / reactive capability the requirement to be able to respond immediately to domestic or international crisis;
- Current operational and international obligations (e.g. NATO, UN);
- Changes in technology, the introduction of new equipment and restructuring that leads to equipment becoming obsolete or surplus to requirements;
- The need to deliver against the military tasks as efficiently as possible, maintaining a balanced, affordable defence budget.

The Service Personnel Statistics in previous versions of this publication are reported against the **2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review** (SDSR), released in November 2015. Prior to SDSR 2015, publications reported against the planned Future Force 2020, as set out in the SDSR 2010 which planned to reduce the size of the Armed Forces.

#### **Army Trained Strength**

On 29 June 2016, the MOD <u>announced</u> that the Army planned to use Regular and Reserve Phase 1 Trained personnel in response to crises within the UK. Following this, the term 'Trained Strength' would include all Army personnel Trained in the core function of their Service (i.e. those who have completed Phase 1 training). The MOD has <u>consulted</u> on these changes and the resultant impact they will have on this publication and a consultation response was published on 7 October 2016.

From the 1 October 2016 edition onwards, Army personnel who have completed Phase 1 training (basic Service training) but not Phase 2 training (trade training), are considered Trained personnel. This change enabled the Army to meet the SDSR 15 commitment to improve support to UK resilience. The Trained Strength definition for the Royal Navy, RAF, Maritime Reserve and RAF Reserves has not changed, reflecting the requirement for their personnel to complete Phase 2 training to be able to fulfil the core function of their respective Services.

Army personnel who have completed Phase 2 training are now called 'Trade Trained'. This population aligns with the old definition of Trained personnel, therefore maintaining the continuity of the statistical time series, and will continue to be counted against the historic workforce requirement.

The Army have undertaken a review of training requirements and Royal Engineers Other Ranks personnel joining from 1 July 2019 will become Trade Trained after Initial Trade Training (ITT) and will join the Full-Time Trade Trained Strength (FTTTS), and therefore we may see a change in the trend.

## **Full-Time Armed Forces Personnel**

In order to meet the personnel reduction targets set out in SDSR 2010, the Three Month Exercise (3ME) and Army 2020 (A2020), a redundancy programme coupled with adjusted recruiting (Intake) and contract extensions, were set. The redundancy programme is now complete.

On 23 November 2015, MOD published the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015. SDSR 2015 outlined plans to uplift the size of the Regular Armed Forces, setting targets for a Strength of 82,000 for the Army, and increasing the Royal Navy/Royal Marines and Royal Air Force by a total of 700 personnel. The SDSR 2015 Defence Key Facts booklet announced new targets for 2020 for each of the Services.

#### Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Programme

The Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) programme aimed to increase the size of the Reserve Forces. Further information on the growth of the Reserves can be found in the Policy Background section of previous **Monthly Service Personnel Statistics** publications.

As a result of the changes to Army Trained Strength (referred to above) and their impact on the Army Reserve, the MOD released a <u>Written Ministerial Statement</u> containing revised Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Strength growth profiles on 8 November 2016. Reporting of the growth of the Reserves will be based on Strength profiles only.

There has been no formal announcement of new targets beyond 31 March 2019. However, the Ministry of Defence's recruitment campaign is a long-term programme and numbers continue to grow.

#### Reserves Forces 2030 (RF30) Programme

The Reserve Forces 2030 (RF30) Review does not include a target for additional personnel numbers beyond those in the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) programme.

RF30 builds on the work carried out by FR20; the RF30 Review offers 18 recommendations grouped into four key areas in which the Reserves will need to continue to adapt in order to develop their utility. These are: redefining the Reserves' relationship with society; expanding the role of the Reserves; unlocking the potential of reservists; and transforming support to the Reserves.

The Ministry of Defence has established an implementation programme to consider the RF30 recommendations. A formal response, or responses, to the RF30 Review will follow the RF30 implementation programme's detailed analysis of the recommendations.

## **UK Service Personnel**

**UK Service Personnel** comprise the total **Strength** of the military personnel employed by the Ministry of Defence (<u>Excel tables</u>, Table 1). The current Strength of the UK Service Personnel is 197,140 which includes:

- All UK Regular personnel and all Gurkha personnel (which combined at 1 January 2022 comprised 77.2 per cent of UK Service Personnel);
- Volunteer Reserve personnel (which at 1 January 2022 comprised 18.6 per cent of UK Service Personnel);
- Other Personnel including the Serving Regular Reserve, Sponsored Reserve, Military Provost Guard Service, Locally Engaged Personnel and elements of the Full-Time Reserve Service (FTRS) (which at 1 January 2022 comprised 4.2 per cent of UK Service Personnel).

**Strength** is the number of personnel.

**UK Regulars** are Full-Time Service personnel, including Nursing Services, excluding FTRS personnel, Gurkhas, mobilised Reservists, Military Provost Guarding Locally Service (MPGS), Engaged Personnel (LEP), and Non Regular Permanent Service (NRPS).

**Volunteer Reserves** voluntarily accept an annual training commitment and are liable to be mobilised to deploy on operations. They can be utilised on a parttime or Full-Time basis to provide support to the Regular Forces at home and overseas.

The total Strength of the UK Forces<sup>1</sup> has increased between 1 January 2021 and 1 January 2022 by 0.5 per cent (1,000 personnel), as shown in Table 1. Since 1 January 2021, the total Strength of the UK Regular Forces, Gurkhas and Other Personnel have all increased, however the Strength of the Volunteer Reserves has decreased.

Table 1: Trends in UK Forces Stre	ngth <sup>1</sup>						
							% Change
	1 Jan 19	1 Jan 20	1 Jan 21	1 Jul 21	1 Oct 21	1 Jan 22	since 1 Jan 21
UK Forces Personnel	190,750	192,160	196,140	198,800	198,940	197,140	0.5%
UK Regular Forces	143,430	144,030	147,250	149,230	149,540	148,220	0.7%
Gurkhas	3,070	3,370	3,720	3,980	3,960	3,950	6.0%
Volunteer Reserve	36,430	36,940	37,100	37,290	37,060	36,600	-1.4%
Other Personnel	7,820	7,830	8,060	8,290	8,380	8,370	3.9%
Royal Navy / Royal Marines	38,550	38,980	39,990	40,640	40,650	40,270	0.7%
UK Regular Forces	32,380	32,640	33,520	34,040	34,130	33,920	1.2%
Volunteer Reserve	3,780	3,920	4,020	4,130	4,040	3,920	-2.6%
Other Personnel	2,380	2,420	2,450	2,470	2,480	2,440	-0.4%
Army	115,270	116,030	118,640	120,180	120,300	118,920	0.2%
UK Regular Forces	78,360	78,620	80,810	81,820	82,040	80,980	0.2%
Gurkhas	3,070	3,370	3,720	3,980	3,960	3,950	6.0%
Volunteer Reserve	29,600	29,860	29,790	29,880	29,740	29,400	-1.3%
Other Personnel	4,230	4,180	4,310	4,500	4,560	4,600	6.6%
Royal Air Force	36,940	37,150	37,510	37,980	37,990	37,940	1.2%
UK Regular Forces	32,690	32,770	32,920	33,370	33,380	33,320	1.2%
Volunteer Reserve	3,040	3,160	3,290	3,280	3,280	3,280	-0.3%
Other Personnel	1,210	1,220	1,300	1,330	1,340	1,340	3.3%
					S	ource: Analy	sis (Tri-Service)

<sup>1.</sup> UK Forces comprises all UK Regular, Gurkha, Volunteer Reserve and Other personnel. The constituents of "Other personnel" are reported towards the top of this page.


## Full-Time Trained Strength (RN/RM & RAF) and Full-Time Trade Trained Strength (Army)

The total Full-Time Trained Strength (RN/RM & RAF) and Full-Time Trade Trained Strength (Army) has increased between 1 January 2021 and 1 January 2022 by 1.2 per cent (1,620 personnel). The FTTS (RN/RM), FTTTS (Army) increased by 2.0 per cent, 1.4 per cent, and the FTTS (RAF) has remained stable as shown in Table 2.

Table 2: FTTS (RN/RM & RAF) and FTTTS (Army)							
							% Change
	1 Jan 19	1 Jan 20	1 Jan 21	1 Jul 21	1 Oct 21	1 Jan 22	since 1 Jan 21
FTTS (RN/RM & RAF) and FTTTS (Army)	134,990	132,360	135,440	137,390	137,130	137,070	1.2%
RN/RM (FTTS)	29,100	28,890	29,140	29,710	29,690	29,720	2.0%
Army (FTTTS)	75,880	73,670	76,350	77,820	77,530	77,380	1.4%
RAF(FTTS)	30,010	29,800	29,960	29,860	29,910	29,970	0.0%
					S	Source: Analy	sis (Tri-Service)

The Full-Time Trained Strength (RN/RM & RAF) and Full-Time Trade Trained Strength (Army) gradually increased between 1 July 2020 and 1 July 2021 but has been decreasing since, as shown below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: FTTS (RN/RM & RAF) and FTTTS (Army)




Full-Time Trained Strength (RN/RM & RAF) and Full-Time Trade Trained Strength (Army) includes all UK Regular personnel, Gurkhas and the relevant elements of the Full-Time Reserve Service (FTRS) (see glossary for more detail).

## Full-Time Trained and Trade Trained Strength (Army)

Table 3: Comparison of Full-Time Trained and Trade-Trained Strengths (Army)						
	1 Jan 21	1 Apr 21	1 Jul 21	1 Oct 21	1 Jan 22	
Full-Time Trained Strength	81,550	82,190	82,670	83,010	82,580	
of which Trade Trained	76,350	77,200	77,820	77,530	77,380	
				Source: Analysis	(Tri-Service)	

Figure 2: FTTS & FTTTS in the Army since Trained Strength definition change in October 16



As can be seen from Figure 2 above, Army Trained Strength (FTTS) saw an increase between 1 April 2019 and 1 October 2021, but decreased between 1 October 2021 and 1 January 2022. The Army Trade Trained Strength (FTTTS) increased between 1 October 2019 and 1 July 2021 but has seen a decrease between 1 July 2021 and 1 January 2022. The Army Trained and Trade Trained Strength at 1 January 2022 is higher than at 1 January 2021 by 1.3 per cent and 1.4 per cent respectively.

Table 4: Army Officers and Other Ranks by Training Status								
	1 Jan 19	1 Jan 20	1 Jan 21	1 Jul 21	1 Oct 21	1 Jan 22		
Trained Officers	12,630	12,660	12,950	12,950	12,970	13,020		
Trade Trained Officers	12,210	12,080	12,550	12,630	12,630	12,590		
Trained Other Ranks	66,530	66,200	68,600	69,720	70,040	69,560		
Trade Trained Other Ranks	63,670	61,580	63,800	65,190	64,900	64,790		
Source: Analysis (Tri-Service)								

Since 1 January 2021, the Strength of the Trained and Trade Trained Officers has increased by 0.5 per cent and 0.4 per cent respectively. The Strength of Trained Other Ranks has increased by 1.4 per cent and the Strength of Trade Trained Other Ranks has increased by 1.5 per cent since 1 January 2021, as can be seen from Table 4 above.

## **UK Regular Personnel (excluding Gurkhas)**

As at 1 January 2022, the Trained and Untrained Strength of the UK Regular Forces (which excludes Gurkhas) was 148,220. The Service split for this figure can be found in Table 5 below.

There are 10,560 Untrained personnel in the UK Regular Forces (excluding Gurkhas), of which 4,510 are in the RN/RM, 2,620 in the Army and 3,420 are in the RAF. The Untrained Strength reflects the number of personnel who can potentially join the Trained Strength.

Table 5: UK Regular Forces by Service and Training Status						
	1 Jan 2	1	1 Jan 22			
RN/RM	33,520		33,920			
of which Trained	28,820	86.0%	29,400	86.7%		
Army	80,810		80,980			
of which Trained	77,480	95.9%	78,360	96.8%		
of which Trade Trained	72,640	89.9%	73,530	90.8%		
RAF	32,920		33,320			
of which Trained	29,890	90.8%	29,900	89.7%		
			Source: Analysis	(Tri-Service)		


#### Intake and Outflow

In the 12 months to 31 December 2021 there was a net Intake of 980 personnel to the UK Regular Forces. This has decreased compared to the net Intake of 3,190 in the 12 months to 31 December 2020. Outflow has increased by 11.5 per cent and Intake has decreased by 4.7 per cent, since 31 December 2020.

#### Intake

- Intake into the Trained and Untrained UK Regular Forces was 15,140 in the 12 months to 31 December 2021, compared to 15,890 in the 12 months to 31 December 2020.
- In the 12 months to 31 December 2021, Intake to the RN/RM and Army has decreased by 2.5 and 8.7 per cent respectively compared with the 12 months to 31 December 2020. Intake to the RAF has increased by 9.0 per cent.

Figure 3: Intake to and Outflow from the UK Regular Forces over rolling 12-month periods



## **UK Regular Personnel**

#### **Outflow**

- Outflow from the Trained and Untrained UK Regular Forces was 14,160 in the 12 months to 31 December 2021; up from 12,700 in the 12 months to 31 December 2020.
- Across all Services, VO was the most common reason for Outflow of Trained (RN/RM & RAF) and Trade Trained (Army) personnel, accounting for 56.8 per cent of Outflow in the 12 months to 31 December 2021 (See Figure 4).
- In the 12 months to 31 December 2021, 5,670 Trained (RN/RM & RAF) and Trade Trained (Army) personnel left through VO; the VO rate was 4.3 per cent. The VO Rate for the RN/RM was 4.3 per cent, for the Army it was 4.5 per cent and for the RAF it was 3.6 per cent.
- In the 12 months to 31 December 2021, the VO rate amongst Other Ranks and Officers was 4.4 per cent and 3.6 per cent respectively.

**Voluntary Outflow (VO)** encompasses all Trained (RN/RM & RAF) and Trade Trained (Army) personnel who voluntarily exit before the end of their agreed engagement or commission period.


**Time Expiry** is a term used to describe those in the Armed Services who reach the end of their engagement or commission and then leave.

**Other** includes Outflow from the Trained (RN/RM & RAF) and Trade Trained (Army) Strength due to, amongst others, medical reasons, misconduct, compassionate, dismissals and death.

**VO Rate** is the number of personnel voluntarily Outflowing as a proportion of the average Trained Strength for the Outflow period.

There is no single reason why personnel leave on Voluntary Outflow, but the personnel who completed the <u>Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey</u> indicated reasons for leaving the Armed Forces included the impact of Service life on family and personal life and opportunities outside the Armed Forces.

Figure 4: Outflow of Trained (RN/RM & RAF) and Trade Trained (Army) UK Regulars by exit reason (12 months to 31 December 2021)



## **UK Regular Personnel**

## **Gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow**


In the 12 months to 31 December 2021, there was a net gain of 1,910 personnel to the UK Regular Forces Trained (RN/RM & RAF) and Trade Trained Strength (Army). This is compared to a net gain of 3,110 in the 12 months ending 31 December 2020.

- Trained and Trade Trained direct entrants in the 12 months to 31 December 2021 was 410. This is a decrease of 51.8 per cent from the 12 months to 31 December 2020.
- Personnel completing Phase 2 training in the 12 months to 31 December 2021 was 11,480. This has increased by 0.5 per cent when compared against this period's equivalent a year ago (11,420).
- Compared to the 12 months to 31 December 2020, in the 12 months to 31 December 2021 there is an increase to the Gains to Trained Strength for the RN/RM by 26.4 per cent, whereas the RAF gains has decreased by 5.1 per cent. In addition, the Army Gains to Trained Strength has decreased by 11.7 per cent when comparing the 12 months ending 31 December 2021 to the 12 months ending a year ago at 30 December 2020.
- In comparison to the 12 months ending 31 December 2020, Trained Outflow from the RN/RM increased by 14.0 per cent, Army Trade Trained Outflow increased by 11.7 per cent and RAF Trained Outflow has decreased by 3.8 per cent in the 12 months ending 31 December 2021.

Gains to Trained Strength (GTS) figures comprise all Regular personnel who complete Phase 2 training and those that enter directly into the Phase 2 Trained Strength. It excludes those returning to the Phase 2 Trained Strength from Long Term Absence (LTA).

**Trained Outflow** figures show Phase 2 Trained Outflow from UK Regular Forces, including personnel leaving the Services, deaths and recalled reservists on release. They do not include promotion from Ranks to Officers or flows between Services.

Figure 5: GTS and Outflow from the UK Trained Regular Forces 12 month ending across the Armed Forces



## **Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Programme Monitoring**

Following consultation on changes to the Army Trained Strength definition and the removal of the FR20 Intake targets, the MOD released Future Reserves 2020 Trained Strength growth profiles in a <u>Written Ministerial Statement</u> on 8 November 2016. Reporting of the growth of the Reserves will be based on Trained Strength profiles only.

Future Reserves 2020 includes Volunteer Reserves who are mobilised, High Readiness Reserves and those Volunteer Reserves serving on Full-Time Reserve Service (FTRS) and Additional Duties Commitment (ADC). Sponsored Reserves who provide a more cost effective solution than Volunteer Reserves are also included in the Army Reserve FR20.

### **Future Reserves 2020 Strength**

Following this, progress against FR20 population Trained Strength targets are reported in Table 6a of the **Excel tables**.

The total **Trained and Untrained Strength** of the Tri-Service Future Reserves 2020 at 1 January 2022 was 36,620, a decrease of 480 personnel or 1.3 per cent since 1 January 2021.

**Figure 6: Maritime Reserve Trained Strength** 



Figure 6 shows that the Maritime Reserve Trained Strength was 2,860 as at 1 January 2022. This is an increase of 20 (0.7 per cent) since 1 January 2021.

The Maritime Reserve total Strength as at 1 January 2022 was 3,920. This is a decrease of 100 personnel (2.6 per cent) since 1 January 2021.

Figure 7: Army Reserve Trained Strength




Figure 7 shows that the Army Reserve Trained Strength was 26,170 as at 1 January 2022. This is a decrease of 750 (2.8 per cent) since 1 January 2021.

The Army Reserve total Strength as at 1 January 2022 was 29,430. This is a decrease of 370 (1.2 per cent) since 1 January 2021.

Figure 8: RAF Reserve Trained Strength




Figure 8 shows that as at 1 January 2022 the RAF Reserve Trained Strength was 2,890. This has remained stable since 1 January 2021.


The RAF Reserve total Strength as at 1 January 2022 was 3,280. This is a decrease of 10 personnel (0.3 per cent) since 1 January 2021.

## Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Programme Monitoring

#### FR20 Intake and Outflow statistics

Intake and Outflow statistics report how many people have left or joined the Trained or Untrained Strengths. As well as leavers and new recruits, this can include personnel transferring to or from the Regular Forces, other Reserve populations, or Reserve re-joiners.

Figure 9: Total Intake rate by Service



The total Intake rates for each Service in the 12 months to 1 January 2022 are as follows:

- The Maritime Reserve total Intake rate was 16.5 per cent; a decrease of 3.8 percentage points since the 12 months to 1 January 2021.
- The Army Reserve total Intake rate was **14.1 per cent**; an increase of 2.1 percentage points since the 12 months to 1 January 2021.
- The RAF Reserves total Intake rate was 16.3 per cent; an increase of 0.3 percentage points since the 12 months to 1 January 2021.


Figure 10: Total Outflow rate by Service



The total Outflow rates for each Service in the 12 months to 1 January 2022 are as follows:

- The Maritime Reserve total Outflow rate was **19.1 per cent**; an increase of 1.3 percentage points since the 12 months to 1 January 2021.
- The Army Reserve total Outflow rate was 15.3 per cent; an increase of 3.3 percentage points since the 12 months to 1 January 2021.
- The RAF Reserves total Outflow rate was 16.6 per cent; an increase of 4.8 percentage points since the 12 months to 1 January 2021.

Figure 11: Intake to and Outflow from the FR20 Reserves over rolling 12-month periods ending



## **Separated Service**

**Separated service** measures absence from normal place of duty. The time an individual experiences separated service is compared against each Service's "**Individual Harmony**" guidelines to ensure a balance between duty and leisure for all Service personnel.

A breach of individual harmony guidelines occurs when Service personnel experience separated service for longer than the period outlined in individual harmony guidelines, which are based on the structures and organisation of that Service. The guidelines are measured over a 36 month period and the limits are **660 days** away for the RN/RM; **498 days** for the Army and RAF (was 468 days prior to 1 April 2021 for the RAF).

**Separated Service** concerns personnel who are serving away from their usual place of duty or are unable to enjoy leisure at their normal place of duty or residence at place of duty.

**Individual Harmony** is the freedom to enjoy leisure at the normal place of duty or residence at place of duty; this includes leave and adventurous training.

Using 1 April 2021 as an example, the formula for the breach rate is as follows:


Trained/Trade Trained UK Regular personnel breaching in the 36 months ending to 31 Mar 2021

### Trained UK Regular personnel as at 1 Apr 2021

The percentage breaching harmony has remained stable for the RN/RM (0.2 per cent), decreased for the Army (1.0 per cent) and increased for the RAF (0.3 per cent) as at 1 October 2021 compared to the previous quarter 1 July 2021.

Separated service data can be found in Table 10 of the accompanying **Excel tables**.

Figure 12: Percentage of UK Regular Forces breaching harmony (1 April 2014 - 30 Sep 2021)



## **Applications to the Armed Forces**

The figures in this publication include applications to the UK Regular and Volunteer Reserve Forces. They are broken down by Service, and by Officers and Other Ranks.

Whilst application counts for each service are based on online applications submitted by an individual and accepted by Defence Recruitment System (DRS), work is ongoing to verify that application processes and definitions are consistent and we would recommend that numbers should not be aggregated to show Armed Forces totals (hence separate tables and graphs are provided).

The number of applications received does not directly relate to Intake figures, since:

Figures relate to the number of **applications** received and not the number of **applicants**, as one applicant may submit several applications;

For successful applicants who accept an offer to join the Services, there is a substantial processing time between their application being received and the applicant joining the Services. Therefore, the Intake figures for Dec 19 are not comparable with the number of applications received in Dec 19 as the numbers apply to different cohorts of people;

Applications will not result in Intake if, for example, they are withdrawn by the applicant during the recruitment process, rejected by the Services, or if an offer to join the Services is declined by the applicant. **See below** for further information.

There is a break in the time series between 1 October 2017 and 1 July 2019 due to the change in recruiting systems from the Training Administration and Financial Management Information System (TAFMIS) to DRS and due to the need to ensure consistency of the start date for reintroduced data between the single Services.

### Applications that do not result in Intake

The main causes of **applicant** failure (i.e. no offer to join the Services given) include:

- Failing security clearance;
- Not having the required residency;
- Not achieving the required recruiting test score for the desired branch/trade;
- Failing the medical scrutiny;
- Not achieving fitness entry standards;
- Applicants withdraw for their own reasons (e.g. change of mind) during the process


The main causes of **application** failure (i.e. the applicant declines an offer to join):

- Applicants may have submitted other applications for employment (including multiple applications to join the Armed Forces) and accept another offer;
- Applications may be submitted with no intention to join (e.g. to satisfy the requirements of job seeking).

NOTE: Application numbers cannot be added together across the Services to show total Armed Forces applications due to differences in definitions.

## **Applications to the Armed Forces**


Figure 13: Applications to the RN/RM split by UK Regular Forces and Volunteer Reserves



Figures from 12 months ending 30 June 2019 onwards define an application as an online application submitted by an individual and accepted by Defence Recruitment System (DRS). These figures are not comparable with the figures up until 12 months ending 30 September 2017, which define an application as a candidate who has submitted an AF Career Officer Form 4 and sat the Recruit Test, whether this was passed or failed.

Applications to the RN/RM Regular Forces in the 12 months to 30 September 2021 were 27,460, a decrease of 15.3 per cent compared to the 12 months to 30 September 2020 (32,414). Over the same period, applications to the Volunteer Reserves have decreased by 19.5 per cent, from 3,026 in the 12 months to 30 September 2020 to 2,436 in the 12 months to 30 September 2021.

Figure 14: Applications to the Army split by UK Regular Forces and Volunteer Reserves




Figures from 12 months ending 30 June 2019 onwards define an application as an online application submitted by an individual and accepted by Defence Recruitment System (DRS). These figures are not comparable with the figures up until 12 months ending 30 September 2017, as the data is drawn from different databases and have differing definitions of an application. Figures for the period between the introduction of DRS in November 2017 and 30 June 2019 are not available as they are not of the required validity for publication.

Applications to the British Army Regular Forces in the 12 months to 30 September 2021 were 85,491, a decrease of 17.7 per cent compared to the 12 months to 30 September 2020 (103,907). Over the same period, applications to the Volunteer Reserves have decreased by 30.1 per cent, from 32,764 in the 12 months to 30 September 2020 to 22,903 in the 12 months to 30 September 2021.

Commonwealth Applicants are included in the number of applications. The Commonwealth entry numbers are closely controlled. Applications may be refused if no Commonwealth headroom is available. These applicants will then be withdrawn from the pipeline but the application number will still be counted in the overall volume of applications received.

Figure 15: Applications to the RAF split by UK Regular Forces and Volunteer Reserves



The increase in RAF applications since the introduction of DRS is due to the previous recruitment system having a separate frontend, this was used to assist the initial application processing team in filtering out RAF ineligible applications and non-productive enquiries prior to an official application being recorded. Therefore the figures presented here are not comparable with the figures up until 12 months ending 30 September 2017 presented in previous SPS publications.

Applications to the RAF Regular Forces in the 12 months to 30 September 2021 were 29,678, a decrease of 23.9 per cent compared to the 12 months to 30 September 2020 (39,013). Over the same period, applications to the Volunteer Reserves have decreased by 17.6 per cent, from 4,660 in the 12 months to 30 September 2020 to 3,838 in the 12 months to 30 September 2021.

## **Further Information**

## Rounding

Apart from the Applications section, all figures in this publication have been rounded to the nearest 10, though numbers ending in a "5" have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent the systematic bias caused by always rounding numbers upwards. For example; a value of "25" would be rounded down to "20" and a value of "15" would be rounded up to "20".

Additionally, totals and sub-totals are rounded separately and so may not equal the sums of their rounded parts.

Percentages are calculated from unrounded data and presented to one decimal place.

The MOD Disclosure Control and Rounding policy is published on GOV.UK and we have applied this policy to the statistics in the accompanying Excel tables. The policy is available here: <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-statistics-policies">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-statistics-policies</a>.

#### Revisions

Corrections to the published statistics will be made if errors are found, or if figures change as a result of improvements to methodology or changes to definitions. When making corrections, we will follow the Ministry of Defence Statistics Revisions and Corrections Policy. All corrected figures will be identified by the symbol "r", and an explanation will be given of the reason for and size of the revision. Corrections which would have a significant impact on the utility of the statistics will be corrected as soon as possible, by reissuing the publication. Minor errors will also be corrected, but for efficient use of resource these corrections may be timed to coincide with the next release of this quarterly publication.

There has been a revision to the number of Army Volunteer Reserve personnel as at 1 October 2018 due to a processing error. This has affected tables 1, 2b, 8a and 8c.

There has been a revision to the number of Royal Air Force Reserve FR20 personnel as at 1 October 2021 due to a processing error. This has affected tables 1 and 6a.

There has been a revision to the number of Army UK Regular Forces Gains to the Officers Trained Strength from Other Ranks as at 1 October 2021 due to a processing error in table 5b.

## **Further Information (cont.)**

#### **Symbols**

- || Discontinuity in time series
- \* Not applicable
- .. Not available
- Zero
- ~ 5 or fewer
- p Provisional
- e Estimate

r Revised

Italic figures are used for percentages and other rates, except where otherwise indicated.

#### **Contact Us**

Analysis (Tri-Service) welcome feedback on our statistical products. If you have any comments or questions about this publication or about our statistics in general, you can contact us as follows:

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If you require information which is not available within this or other available publications, you may wish to submit a Request for Information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to the Ministry of Defence. For more information, see:

https://www.gov.uk/make-a-freedom-of-information-request/the-freedom-of-information-act

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