



Policy Legacy FOI Team
Headquarters 38 (Irish) Brigade
British Forces Post Office 825

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Reference: FOI 2021/05593

Date: 24 August 2021

Dear [REDACTED]

**REQUEST FOR INFORMATION – INFORMATION RELATING TO THE GUN ATTACK ON
NEWTOWNHAMILTON RUC STATION ON 26 SEPTEMBER 1990**

I can confirm that your request has been considered under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOI (A)), and the process is now complete.

You stated the following:

“For information, data and details on an IRA attack on us using GPMG 7.62 & Dusker AA gun .50 cal on the RUC Station at Newtownhamilton Northern Ireland 1990 the regiment based with the RUC during the attack was 1st BN 22nd Cheshire Regiment of which I was a serving soldier, I request details of the attack and details of how many soldiers injured and interviewed by Special investigation branch.”

I can confirm that the MOD holds some information relating to the gun attack on Newtownhamilton RUC Station. This information has been located in a range of documents and relevant extracts of these have been provided at Annex A. Also attached are the WISREP and Serious Incident Report. Please note that all information that is redacted using a black box represents information that has been redacted under a Freedom of Information exemption.

Some of the information you have requested could be exempt under Section 23(1) of the Freedom of Information Act, which relates to the bodies dealing with security matters, although it is also possible that the information relates to none of the bodies dealing with security matters. Sections 23(1) and 24(1) are being cited in the alternative as it is not appropriate, in the circumstances of the case, to say which of the two exemptions is actually engaged so as not to undermine national security or reveal the extent of any involvement, or not, of the bodies dealing with security matters. Section 23 is an absolute exemption and, if it were engaged in this material, the MOD would not be required to consider whether the public interest favours disclosure of this information.

Any information that is not exempt from disclosure under Section 23(1) could be exempt under Section 24(1) of the FOI(A), which exempts information from disclosure if its exemption is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security. We cannot say which of the two exemptions is actually engaged, but to the extent that S24(1) might be engaged. We acknowledge the public interest in openness and transparency, but we consider that there is a stronger public interest in protecting national security.

Some of the information located falls within the scope of Section 26 (Defence) of the FOI(A) as its release would or would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness, or security of any relevant forces.

Section 26 is a qualified exemption and we have conducted a public interest test to determine whether the information should be released or withheld. The factors for this public interest have

determined that whilst disclosure would demonstrate openness and transparency this is outweighed by the detrimental effect disclosure would have in revealing the capabilities of military operational planning by compromising the methodologies and practices employed in the gathering and analysis of information. I have therefore concluded that the public interest supports withholding some information under Section 26.

All Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) cases remain open and if new evidence comes forward the PSNI will reinvestigate. Release of these documents must be carefully considered under Section 31 (Law Enforcement) of the FOI(A).

I have completed this consideration through a public interest test including consultation with the PSNI who have advised that release of some of the information could adversely impact on any investigative process and may jeopardise any future prosecutorial process. On this basis I am withholding some of the information under Section 31 of the FOI(A).

Section 38 is a qualified exemption and we have conducted a public interest test to determine whether the information should be released or withheld. The factors for this public interest have determined that whilst disclosure would demonstrate openness and transparency this is outweighed by the detrimental effect disclosure could have on those mentioned in the documents, or their family members and friends. I have concluded that whilst disclosure may be of historical interest, the health and safety of individuals must be taken into account. Some information has therefore been redacted under Section 38 of the FOI(A).

Additionally, some of the information contained within the disclosure constitutes personal information, such as names and addresses. Under FOI(A) this information is exempt under Section 40 (2) by reason of the first condition under Section 40 (3) (a) (i), as disclosure would contravene data protection principles under the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018). This is an absolute exemption and does not require a public interest test to be conducted in order for this information to be exempt from disclosure. Therefore, all personal information has been redacted.

I appreciate that this incident took place 30 years ago and the passage of time can be a factor in diminishing the applicability of exemptions to information. However, in this instance the passage of time is less relevant as the PSNI continue to investigate Troubles-related murders and the overall balance is in favour of partial exemption.

If you have any queries regarding the content of this letter, please contact this office in the first instance

If you wish to complain about the handling of your request, or the content of this response, you can request an independent internal review by contacting the Information Rights Compliance team, Ground Floor, MOD Main Building, Whitehall, SW1A 2HB (e-mail CIO-FOI-IR@mod.gov.uk). Please note that any request for an internal review should be made within 40 working days of the date of this response.

If you remain dissatisfied following an internal review, you may raise your complaint directly to the Information Commissioner under the provisions of Section 50 of the FOI(A). Please note that the Information Commissioner will not normally investigate your case until the MOD internal review process has been completed. The Information Commissioner can be contacted at: Information Commissioner's Office, Wycliffe House, Water Lane, Wilmslow, Cheshire, SK9 5AF. Further details of the role and powers of the Information Commissioner can be found on the Commissioner's website at <https://ico.org.uk/>.

Yours sincerely

38 (Irish) Brigade FOI Team

Enc:
Annex A Verbatim Extracts
Copy of the Serious Incident Report
Copy of the WISREP

Verbatim Extracts from Various Documents – Gun Attack on Newtownhamilton RUC Station – 26 September 1990

Daily Operation Brief - 26-27 Sep 90

3 INF BDE

1. 262205A SHOOTING ATTACK, NEWTOWNHAILTON (1 CHESHIRE)

An unknown number of gunmen engaged soldiers who were guarding the helicopter landing site at Newtownhamilton, GR [H930278] as a Lynx helicopter approached the site. Two single shots were fired by the terrorists followed by several bursts of automatic fire. One soldier sustained a gunshot wound [Redacted] and was flown to Musgrave Park Hospital. The Lynx was not damaged. Twenty-two rounds were returned but no hits were claimed. A follow up operation is in progress.

Daily Operation Brief – 27-28 Sep 90

3 INF BDE

1. 271124A FOLLOW UP TO SHOOTING ATTACK, NEWTOWNHAMILTON (1 CHESHIRE). In the follow up to the shooting attack the firing point was located at GR [Redacted]. After EOD action the following munitions were recovered:
- a. [Redacted]
 - b. [Redacted]

RMP GAZETTE – 05 OCT 90

439. (A/98) **ALLEGED ATTEMPTED MURDER OF SECURITY FORCES**

SHOOTING BY SECURITY FORCES

About 2300 hrs on Wed 27 Sep 90 (**sic**), information was received from the Watchkeeper, 175 Pro Coy RMP, BFPO 801, that about 2205 hrs that day, at the helicopter landing site (HLS), Newtownhamilton SF base, Co Armagh Grid Reference H930278, member of the [Redacted], 1 Cheshire, BFPO 811, had come under fire from an unknown number of terrorist gunmen whilst in the process of being extracted from the base by Lynx helicopter. The gunmen fired two single shots immediately followed by five two-second bursts of automatic gunfire, from a firing point [Redacted]. As a result of the shooting [Redacted] 1 Cheshire, sustained a single gunshot wound to [Redacted]. The soldier was immediately treated at the scene by [Redacted], 1 Cheshire, a qualified medical orderly and moved in a civilian ambulance to Drumadd Bks, Armagh, BFPO 803 for evacuation by helicopter to the Military Wing, Musgrave Park Hospital, Belfast. There is no danger to life.

PSNI INTELLIGENCE REPORTS

NTH Weekly INTSUM for period 20 – 26 September 1990

1 Cheshire Cell

Newtownhamilton

NTH Weekly INTSUM

Major Incident

3. On 27 Sept 90 (**sic**) at 2205 hrs as a Lynx helicopter was on the external pad unloading an internal load, the pad came under automatic fire. The rounds impacted on and around the pad scattering members of the handling party and the Shadow multiple waiting to unload and emplane the helicopter. A member of the QRF securing the pad returned 22 x 5.56 mm rounds in the direction of the firing point, no hits claimed. It later transpired that the rear sangar man identified single shots being fired prior to the automatic bursts and that prior to this still, a number of witnesses heard a loud bang.

4. One casualty was incurred that being [Redacted] HQ Coy 1 Cheshire who received 1 x gunshot wound [redacted]. The casualty was moved to Drumadd Bks Armagh by civilian ambulance and then by heli onto MPH. Following surgery [Redacted] was described as being in a stable

condition and expected to make a full recovery. A follow up operation is to be carried out at first light 27 Sep 90 to identify and clear firing point(s). An initial appreciation of the slat marks indicates beside the heli-pad, the front of the sangar and the RUC station appear to have been targets/in the beaten zone.

5. Once all parties involved have been debriefed and the follow up operation completed; a full incident report will be compiled.

6 – 9 [Redacted]

10. The types of incident described have long been prophesised. The attempted helishoot was particularly elaborate and manpower intensive and the fact that the "Gunteam" has claimed another success can only give the opposition more confidence. With this in mind the threat is bound to remain high but as yet no specific intelligence exists to make the threat more specific.

[Redacted]

for OC

SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT SHOOT HELI/SF 26 SEPT 90 NTH

26/09/1990 22:05 BST

NTH/INT/G2/IN/016

SP COY

1 CHESHIRE

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

See Distr 23 Sep 90

SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT NO. /90.

1. TYPE OF INCIDENT. Shooting heavy calibre weapon against helicopter and SF.

2. LOCATION. External HLS Newtownhamilton SF Case off Newry St Newtownhamilton.

a. Contact Point [Redacted]

b. Firing Point [Redacted]

3. TIME OF INCIDENT. Contact at 262205A SEP 90

Incident closed at 27 1600A SEP 90

IN CONTACT

a. C/S E31C/31D. Shadow Multiple (HQ Coy 1 CHESHIRE)

b. C/S T50A QRF [Redacted]

c. C/S D33A [Redacted]

d. C/S D14 [Redacted]

e. C/S Lynx 5

IN FOLLOW UP

a. C/S E10

b. C/S E20

c. ATO

d. RUC

e. SOCO

f. WID

g. CID

h. RESA

i. [Redacted]

5. RUC INVOLVEMENT

[Redacted] RUC NTH coordinated RUC assistance

6. IRISH SF INVOLVEMENTS

a. Time Garda informed 26 2220 SEP 90

b. Involvement NIL

c. Action by Irish SF. Vehicle check BCP 48.

7. CASUALTIES

a. SF 1 x Casualty [Redacted] HQ COY 1 CHESHIRE received 1 x gunshot wound [Redacted].

CASEVAC by civilian ambulance to DRUMMAD BKS ARMAGH then by helicopter to MPH Belfast. Condition was stable and was expected to make a full recovery.

b. TERRORIST. NIL

c. CIVILIAN. NIL

8. DETAILS OF INCIDENT. (CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER)

TIME EVENT

26 2157 SEP 90 OPS NTH receive a warning that a helicopter is inbound in 3 minutes. The QRF (T50A) are alerted to deploy to the HLS to secure it. The Shadow multiple, having covered the defence of NTH whilst C/S were deployed [Redacted] were waiting in the guard room to deploy to the HLS for extraction to BBK. As the QRF were moving towards the Gd Room the SHADOW multiple received the order to deploy to the HLS. To add to the general confusion the guard at the time was undergoing a handover/takeover. In the ensuing confusion the Shadow QRF and a 4-man handling party for an internal load all moved to the HLS at the same time.

22 2203 SEP [Redacted], the QRF Comd, was first on the scene and occupied the Comd/Buzzard sangar. The next person behind him was [Redacted] who moved to the pad. After him came along another member of the QRF who deployed to his post facing up towards Newry St and the Ballymoyer Pub.

26 2204 SEP AT this stage the Ops had been told that the QRF had deployed to cover the HLS and the Lynx was making its final approach to the pad. For reasons as yet explained two members of the QRF attached themselves to the handling party and did not occupy the sangars. The remaining members of the QRF, as the Heli was landing, occupied a fire position next to the breeze block protective wall. At this stage the SHADOW multiple manoeuvred around the pad to approach the heli which had just landed. The Lynx signalled, using its light, to indicate it was clear for loading and [Redacted] approached the heli and began unloading stores with two of the QRF. Simultaneously [Redacted] led the Shadow to the heli to start emplaning.

26 2206 SEP CONTACT! At this point recollections differ but certain points are consistent. The two soldiers in the back sangar were still changing over and one was halfway down the ladder from the sangar when they heard single shots being fired as they believed at their sangar. Both soldiers were adamant that these shots came from the area to the North of the base on the high ground to the West of the Markethill Rd. Account must be taken of the fact that neither soldier was in a position to observe the origin of these shots and had to rely on the sound of the crack and thump to identify the firing point. These initial shots were followed by two distinct bursts of automatic fire. One of the soldiers described looking out of the sangar to the South, over the base and seeing two distinct arcs of tracer one green and the other red. The green came from the area of [Redacted] whilst the red came from the area to the East of the Dundalk Rd. These two bursts were followed by a mass of fire he could differentiate between regular low dull report of possibly 2 x heavy calibre weapons and other automatic weapons.

Reports from people on the helipad tend to confirm at least the form of the bursts but only one firing point was identified. [Redacted] shouted "CONTACT!" as the first rounds were fired. A number of people remember a loud bang at some stage in the contact. This was most probably a [Redacted] round hitting a fire extinguisher on the Heli pad. The initial single rounds appear to have passed well over everybody's heads and most presumed someone had had an ND. The first concentrated burst appears to have come in low but was sufficiently close to cause all on

the pad to scramble for cover. The second burst impacted on the road to the starboard side of the Lynx. It was probably at this stage that [Redacted] was hit attempting to make his way back to the cover of the comd sangar. The Lynx effected a hasty exit without being hit. The scene on the pad was described as havoc with people bomb bursting everywhere looking for cover. At one stage there were four people in the sangar lying on the floor as rounds impacted on it. [Redacted] attempted to regain control but the noise and confusion were too great. At some stage with rounds impacting all around the HLS a rifle of one of the QRF was hit and the hand guard smashed. At the initial contact took place [Redacted] was halfway up the steps heading back from the HLS having been despatched by the new Gd Comd, [Redacted] to confirm that the QRF had secured the sangar. Having seen [Redacted] in the comd sangar he presumed this to be the case and was returning to the gd room. Through the gap in the corrugated iron fencing he identified the Firing Point of the first burst. He then ran back down the steps making ready and releasing his safety catch as he did so. He occupied a fire position on the Western edge of the HLS and returned 22 x 5.56mm rounds aiming at the oppositions (*sic*) origin of the tracer. Shortly after this the firing ceased

On the HLS confusion continued to reign as actual casualties were ascertained and [Redacted] was administered immediate first aid. A number of personnel inside the base, on hearing the contact made their way down to the pad to help out. Amongst these were the Comd of E20B and the [Redacted] who took comd of the situation and ensured all weapons and items of equipment were recovered from the HLS along with the casualty.

[Redacted] was CASEVAC'D by civilian ambulance which appeared within minutes. [Redacted] to the HLS at Drummad Bks ARMAGH and then by helicopter to MPH.

The SF Base was brought to immediate readiness and [Redacted] in case of an enemy follow on attack.

9. FOLLOW UP OPERATION

27 0626 SEP C/S deployed to isolate what was originally three possible firing points, one in the North and two in the South of the SF Base. The clearance concentrated on the [Redacted] feature led by search teams under D33A.

27 1044 SEP E0 informed of a poss find of a belt of ammo, clothes and a plastic bag at [Redacted] [Redacted] outhouses.

27 1126 SEP D32A clearing towards the [Redacted] identified a possible belt of [Redacted] green jacket and 1 x balaclava.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

27 1348 SEP Findrep [Redacted]

1 x Balaclava

1 x Green Jacket

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

27 1418 SEP SOCO at incident point.

*27 1426 hrs SEP RUC NTH received a report from the owner of the [Redacted], that [Redacted] had 4 x bullet holes in the rear of [Redacted] pub. Also another resident in Dundalk Rd had a bullet hole in their house.

27 1845 SEP SOCO and all agencies have left NTH. Incident closed.

10. INT COMMENT

A very elaborate and well coordinated attack no doubt designed to take on a heli on the ground loaded with troops. The use of at least one [Redacted] tends to indicate a large formation attack designed as a spectacular. Information received by the RUC in post incident investigation indicated that immediately following the incident a number of things occurred. [Redacted]

INCIDENTS IN 3 BDE TAOR DURING SEPTEMBER 1990

Incidents in this report have been taken from 3 Bde NIREPS and must not be taken as the full report on the incidents. This report is for internal use only.

72. 26 Sep CONTACT NEWTOWNHAMILTON Contact shooting at 2205-hrs

NEWTOWNHAMILTON HLS, whilst Lynx was landing two rounds and a number of bursts of auto fire HLS. 1 times casualty [Redacted] Lynx not hit. 22 rounds returned no hits claimed. [Redacted] Follow up in due course.

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G3/SE/96/8015



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Your reference

Our reference 3390/1 G3(Ops)

Date 15 Oct 90

HQ 3 INF BDE SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT 70/90
SHOOTING AT HELICOPTER, NEWTOWNHAMILTON, S ARMAGH - 26 SEP 90

Reference:

- A. Unit Incident Report 1 CHESHIRE 24 dated 01 Oct 90.
- B. WISREP 3WIS/BORDER (E)/S/42/90 dated 26 Sep 90.

OUTLINE

1. At 262205A SEP 90 a LYNX helicopter was on the helipad at NEWTOWNHAMILTON (R552) unloading stores. Troops on the edge of the pad were unloading stores and preparing to embark on the helicopter.

2. As the first soldier was about to embark the area came under fire from a firing point somewhere in the area of [REDACTED]. Two single shots were followed by 4 sustained bursts of automatic fire.

3. The helicopter lifted and flew clear of the area and the soldier that had been preparing to embark took hard cover. [REDACTED] The sanga sentry returned 22 rounds.

4. The firing point was found on 271044A SEP 90 when [REDACTED] finding a bag containing clothes and ammunition at [REDACTED] and action the following items of forensic interest were recovered:

- a. [REDACTED]
- b. [REDACTED]
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. 1 x hessian bag containing:
 - (1) 3 x balaclavas, 2 black/1 green.
 - (2) 1 x German Army Parka (green).

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5. [REDACTED] that the terrorists used a vehicle with a flat bed to mount the weapons in the back. After opening fire on the helipad it would appear that the terrorists made their escape by driving towards BELLEEK.

DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT

6. Full details of the incident are contained in References A and B.

COMMENT

7. The commanding Officers comments are enclosed and endorsed by this HQ.

[REDACTED]
Capt
for Comd

Enclosures:

1. Unit Incident Report 1 CHESHIRE 24 dated 01 Oct 90.
2. WISREP 3WIS/BORDER(E)/S/42/90 dated 26 Sep 90.

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ARB OPS 28

1 CHESHIRE
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HQ 3 Inf Bde
Drumadd Bks
BFPO 803

1 Oct 90

SERIOUS INCIDENT REPORT NO 24
SHOOTING AT HELICOPTER - NEWTOWNHAMILTON 26 SEP 90

1. At 2205 hrs a Lynx Helicopter was on the HLS at Newtownhamilton (R552) unloading stores and preparing to embark six members of the Shadow Multiple. As the leading member of the Shadow multiple approached the helicopter it came under fire. The engagement consisted of two single shots followed by four bursts of automatic fire. The main firing point was thought to be [REDACTED], on [REDACTED]. However several soldiers believed that there was a second firing point to the South, close to the Dundalk Rd.

2. The helicopter took off almost immediately while the soldiers moved behind the nearest hard cover. [REDACTED] received a gunshot wound [REDACTED]. The sanger sentry returned 22 rds of 5.56mm ammunition at the firing point.

3. Due to the perceived threat to helicopters, the casualty was moved by a civilian ambulance to Drumadd Bks, Armagh and then on to MPH by helicopter. The alert state of the base was raised and the number of mortar base plate patrols increased during the night.

4. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
balaclavas and 1 green jacket were recovered.

5. Details of the Incident. The details of the incident were:

a. 262157. NTH was informed that a helicopter was due in 3 minutes. The QRF was deployed to secure the HLS. The Shadow Multiple moved down to the HLS to fly back to BBK..

b. 262204. The Lynx landed and began unloading rations. The Shadow multiple approached the helicopter.

c. 262205. 2 single shots followed by 4 - 5 bursts of automatic fire. The helicopter took off almost immediately while the soldiers scrambled for hard cover. Fire was observed coming from [REDACTED] it included red and green tracer. A sanger sentry returned 22 rds of 5.56mm ammunition. [REDACTED] was requested.

d. 262215. The BBK QRF was deployed to protect against a possible attack on the BBK HLS and NTH deployed its QRF on a mortar base plate check.

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- e. 262216. A civilian ambulance was deployed from NWY by RUCLO at BBK. The ambulance was instructed to take the casualty from NTH to Armagh. The casualty would then be flown to MPH.
- f. 262226. Possible firing point given as [REDACTED] although there was some confusion and a belief that there was a second firing point.
- g. 262230. Civilian ambulance arrived at NTH.
- h. 262235. Bde informed Bn Ops that [REDACTED] was transiting between ALD and BBK. ETA at BBK 2300 hrs.
- i. 262250. Ambulance left NTH for Armagh.
- j. 262252. [REDACTED] arrived and provided top cover for the ambulance as far as the ARB rear boundary.
- k. [REDACTED]
- l. 262315. The ambulance arrived at Drumadd Barracks, Armagh. Casualty transferred to a helicopter and flown to MPH.
- m. 262317. NTH informed Bn Ops that they believed there was a second firing point to the South of the HLS.
- n. 270030. Bn Ops instructed NTH to continue the follow up at first light. ATO and RESA had been warned off.
- o. 270645. Two multiples deployed to identify three possible firing points, one North of the SF base and two to the South.
- p. 271044. A local reported finding a bag containing clothes and ammunition, while visiting [REDACTED] out buildings, to the RUC at NTH. GR [REDACTED]
- q. 271126. A search team from NTH cleared a route to the find while another multiple secured a HLS. The ICP was established at GR [REDACTED].
- r. [REDACTED]. ATO arrived at the ICP and moved forward to clear the find.
- s. [REDACTED] ATO declared the find clear. Area confirmed as firing point GR [REDACTED]
- t. 271426. The RUC at NTH [REDACTED] the Forge Bar, Newry Street, that there were four bullet holes in the rear of the pub. A resident of Dundalk Rd also found a bullet hole in his house.

6. The following items were recovered:

[REDACTED]
3 Balaclava hats
1 Green jacket

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7. Agencies Involved. The following agencies were involved:

ATO
RUC
SOCO
WIS
CID
RESA
[REDACTED]

8. CO's Comments.

a. There was no obvious flying pattern into NTH. The previous flight was at 1830, the contact flight at 2205. It has been considered that the terrorist might be able to predict a possible reshuffle of troops from base to base after a major operation. This is possible but I believe, unlikely.

b. It has been the practice to have the HLS lights on all night at NTH. This is because of the difficulty of night landing there. It is possible to land with HVG and the practice of using the lights has ceased. The lights only serve to illuminate the target area and distract the protection party.


c. Because of the risk of a secondary aspect to the shoot, a civilian ambulance was tasked rather than using a helicopter. The condition of the casualty was checked first.



Lt Col
CO

Annex:

- A. Map of Incident.



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Page 3

ARMAGH WISREP

3 SECTION WIU

INCIDENT:

SHOOTING: [REDACTED] SHOOT AT
HELICOPTER/TROOPS EMBARKATION.

WISREP REF NO:

3WIS/BORDER(E)/S/42/90.

REPORT DATE:

26 SEP 90.

REFERENCES:

A. Briefing WISREP, Doc No: [REDACTED]. Dated 26 Sep 90.

B. Briefing WISREP, Doc No: [REDACTED]. Dated 27 Sep 90.

1. DATE & TIME: Wednesday 26 Sep 90 at about 2205 hrs.

2. LOCATION & GRID: Firing Point - [REDACTED]

Newtownhamilton,
SOUTH ARMAGH.
GR: [REDACTED]

Contact Point - Helicopter Landing Site,
Newtownhamilton SF Base,
Newry St.,
Newtownhamilton,
SOUTH ARMAGH.
GR: H930278.

3. TYPE OF INCIDENT: SHOOTING [REDACTED]

4. CASUALTIES: [REDACTED]

5. ARRESTS: Nil to Date.

6. INVESTIGATORS: [REDACTED]

DETAILS OF INCIDENT.

7. On Wednesday 26 Sep 90 at about 2205 hrs as an Army Lynx helicopter had landed on the NTH HLS and was unloading stores before picking up troops (the HLS is located outside the confines of the SF base), the helicopter and troops were subjected to 2 rounds followed by an automatic burst of gunfire. [REDACTED] sustained GSW and was CASEVAC'd to Drummadd Bks by civilian ambulance before being conveyed to MPH by helicopter. Next of Kin were informed by the wounded party from the HLS at NTH. The helicopter was not hit during the contact. One soldier at the HLS returned 22 rounds towards a possible FP at GR: [REDACTED].

EOD CLEARANCE/FOLLOW-UP SEARCH.

8. During the morning of Thursday 27 Sep 90, ATO was deployed to the area of a possible FP, where [REDACTED] had discovered a hessian type sack and empty cases at the corner of [REDACTED]. The following items of forensic interest were recovered:

a. [REDACTED]

b.

c.

d. 1 x hessian type plastic sack, containing:

1. 3 x balacalavas, 2 black/1 green.
2. 1 x German Army parka (green). With a "Schmidt" name tag.

From the Contact Point the following was recovered:

e.

f.

g.


All of the above items were retained by SOCO for his initial examination and subsequent onward transmission to NIFSL/WERC.

INVESTIGATORS COMMENTS

9. At the time of the contact the helicopter was on the ground unloading pallets/stores before troop embarkation was to take place. There appears to have been at least 2 people unloading the stores with a brick of 6 people waiting to board the helicopter, further troops were securing the HLS and corner sangers. Eyewitnesses stated that the helicopter had been stationary for about a minute.

10. Distance from FP to CP is [REDACTED] with excellent line of sight from the terrorist fire position of the overall area. The terrorists would have been obscured from view as they were hidden by trees and [REDACTED]. The HLS has no screen from view, and the HLS lights were on all night.

11.



12.



13. The numbers of strike marks around the SF base and surrounding civilian property is estimated at around 20 due to double and triple stikes by some of the rounds fired. The PH next to the SF base recovered 2 x metal cores of [redacted] from the ladies toilet. A house holder on the Dungormley Estate reported damage to their property.

14.



15. [REDACTED]

16. [REDACTED]

17. [REDACTED]

18. [REDACTED]


INITIAL ATTRIBUTION: PIRA.

MILITARY UNIT: 1 CHESHIRE (ARB).

ATO: L32 (BBK Det).

RUC STATION: Bessbrook. H Div.

SOCO DEALING: Newry. [REDACTED]



Captain
OC

Annexes:

- A. Map of Area.
- B. Photographic Supplement.

