



Ministry  
of Defence

**JSP 985**  
**Human Security in Defence**

**Volume 1: Incorporating Human  
Security in the way we Operate**

# Foreword

We live in a world of rapid change, with technological advances, cultural shifts and the degradation of our natural environment impacting the world around us at a speed we have never seen before. As the world has changed, so too has the character of conflict. Human Rights violations, the targeting of civilians and the destruction of cultural property are being increasingly weaponised in armed conflict and used to create instability. Universal threats to the population continue to compromise the prospects of sustainable development, peace and stability. As these threats overlap and multiply, the cumulative effect of insecurity can be catastrophic for individuals, communities, nations and regions. UK Defence must keep pace to address these changing threats and, to do this, we must adopt a Human Security approach.

Human Security is an approach to national and international security which places the emphasis on human beings, rather than the traditional focus on the security of the state. Moving the security agenda beyond state security does not mean replacing it; rather, it complements and builds on it. It is applicable to situations above and below the threshold of armed conflict, across all domains and surpasses geographical boundaries. This pervasiveness of Human Security means that it is vital that it is considered across the spectrum of UK Defence.

UK Defence's Human Security approach is governed by international and domestic law and is underpinned by United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), NATO policies and the National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security. This JSP directs the UK Armed Forces to implement those UNSCRs which relate to Human Security considerations. It explains why and how UK Defence must incorporate Human Security considerations in all that it does, from strategic planning through to the activity performed at the operational and tactical levels. In doing this, we will be able to better plan conflict sensitive outcomes by understanding the impacts on the human environment, minimising harm to civilians and reducing Human Rights' violations, ultimately improving the conditions for stability.

This policy reinforces the direction of the Integrated Operating Concept and recognises that the implementation of Human Security requires a whole of government approach, with military objectives integrated within a broader cross government strategy. By coordinating with other actors, we can shape the discourse on the security of human beings on the global stage and increase the prospects for long term peace and stability.

JSP 985 is rightly ambitious and, to achieve its objectives and maximise its potential, will require support from leadership at all levels across UK Defence.

**Admiral Sir Tim Fraser KCB ADC  
Vice Chief of the Defence Staff**

# Preface

## How to use this Joint Service Publication (JSP)

1. JSP 985 is the authoritative tri-Service Human Security (HS) policy that provides direction on a HS approach. This policy, direction and guidance applies to the development, planning and execution of military operations and activity across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. This JSP has been developed based on lessons and experience gained on operations and exercises. Applying the direction and guidance within this JSP will make the Armed Forces more effective, more able to achieve our National Security and Foreign Policy Objectives and better placed to uphold our international commitments. This JSP will be formally reviewed annually, with any interim changes and policy development endorsed through the formal HS governance structures within UK Defence.

The policies contained within this JSP have been equality and diversity impact assessed in accordance with Departmental policy.

## Coherence with other Policy and Guidance

2. Where this document contains references to policies, publications and other JSPs which are published by other Functions, these Functions have been consulted in the formulation of the policy and guidance detailed in this publication.

Related Publication	Title
JSP 345	Applying Prevent within Defence
JSP 381	Aide Memoire on the Law of Armed Conflict
JSP 383	Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004 Edition)
JSP 398	United Kingdom Manual of National Rules of Engagement
JSP 465	Defence Geospatial Intelligence Policy
JSP 510	International Defence Training
JSP 763	The MOD Behaviours and Informal Complaints Resolution Policy
JSP 822	Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education
JSP 830	Manual of Service Law
JSP 834	Safeguarding

## Further Advice and Feedback – Contacts

3. The owner of this JSP is the MOD central HS team. For further information, advice or feedback on the content of this publication, please contact: [SPOGE-STRAT-HS-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk](mailto:SPOGE-STRAT-HS-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk).

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# Glossary

Term	Description/definition	Source
Actor	An individual, group or entity whose actions are affecting the attainment of the end state.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Adversary	An individual, group or entity whose intentions or interests are opposed to those of friendly parties and against which legal coercive political, military or civilian actions may be envisaged and conducted.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Audience	An individual, group or entity whose interpretation of events and subsequent behaviour may affect the attainment of the end state. (Note: The audience may consist of publics, stakeholders and actors)	Official NATO Terminology Database
Child	A human being below the age of 18 years.  <i>A person below the age of 18 is a <b>child</b> (unless the laws of a particular country set the legal age for adulthood younger), this can be further broken down to those 15, 16 or 17 are <b>juveniles</b> and those less than 15 <b>children</b></i>	United Nations <a href="#">Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)</a> . Please note: The UK continues to recruit into the armed forces at 16. We have a declaration to the <a href="#">Optional Protocol (OP) to the CRC on children in armed conflict</a> stating that we will endeavour not to deploy them into armed conflict before they reach 18, in accordance with Article 1 of the OP.  Joint Doctrine publication 1-10;
Civil Society	Civil society encompasses a spectrum of actors with a wide range of purposes, constituencies, structures, degrees of organisation, functions, size, resource levels, cultural contexts, ideologies, membership, geographical coverage, strategies and approaches.	<i>The Future Role of Civil Society</i> , World Economic Forum (2013)
Conflict	A political-military situation between peace and war, distinguished from peace by the introduction of organized political violence and from war by its reliance on political methods. It shares many of the goals and characteristics of war, including the destruction of governments and the control of territory.	Official NATO Terminology Database

Conflict sensitive	Conflict sensitivity means understanding the context in which you are operating, understanding the interaction between your engagement and the context, and taking action to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of HMG engagement on conflict and stability.	<a href="https://publishing.service.gov.uk">CS Guidance (publishing.service.gov.uk)</a>
Conflict Prevention	A peace support effort to identify and monitor the potential causes of conflict and take timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV)	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence as rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict.  Any sexual and/or gender-based violence against an individual or group of individuals, used or commissioned in relation to a crisis or an armed conflict.	NATO CRSV Policy endorsed May 2021 aligns with United Nations Secretary General, June 2020  Official NATO Terminology Database
Disaggregation	In modelling and simulation usage, the action to decompose an aggregated entity into multiple entities representing its components.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Early Warning	Early notification of the launch or approach of unknown weapons or weapons carriers.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Environment	The surroundings in which an organization operates, including air, water, land, natural resources, flora, fauna, humans, and their interrelations.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Fragmentary Order	An operation order, issued as required, that eliminates the need for restating information contained in a basic operation order. It may be issued in sections.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Gender	The social differences and relations between women and men, which are learned through socialization and determine a person's position and value in a given context.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Gender Advisor	Provides guidance and advice to commanders and planning staff on how to integrate gender perspectives into operations and missions, crisis and conflict analysis, concepts, doctrine, procedures, and education and training.	Official NATO Terminology Database

Gender Analysis	The systematic gathering and examination of information on gender differences and on social relations between men and women in order to identify and understand inequities based on gender.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Gender Dynamics	Gender dynamics include the relationships and interactions between and among boys, girls, women, and men. Gender dynamics are informed by socio-cultural ideas about gender and the power relationships that define them. Depending upon how they are manifested, gender dynamics can reinforce or challenge existing norms.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Gender Mainstreaming	A strategy used to achieve gender equality by assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, in all areas and at all levels, in order to assure that the concerns and experiences of both sexes are taken into account.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Gender Perspective	The consideration of gender-based differences between women and men as reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and the access to resources.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Gender-Based Violence	Gender-based violence can include sexual, physical, mental and economic harm inflicted in public or in private. It also includes threats of violence, coercion and manipulation. This can take many forms such as intimate partner violence, sexual violence, child marriage, female genital mutilation and so-called 'honour crimes'.	UNHCR
Human Security International Framework	An integrated approach for the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals and the priority areas of the international community and the United Nations system.	United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security - <a href="#">HS-Handook_rev-2015.pdf (un.org)</a>
Information	Unprocessed data of every description which may be used in the production of intelligence.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Intelligence	The product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information regarding the environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Objective	A clearly defined and attainable goal for a military operation, for example seizing a terrain feature, neutralizing an adversary's force or capability or achieving some other desired outcome that is	Official NATO Terminology Database

	essential to a commander's plan and towards which the operation is directed.	
Obligation	A legal, contractual or other binding duty or responsibility to act or perform in a certain way.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Operation Order	A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of coordinating the execution of an operation.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Operational Plan	A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Planning	The process of deciding beforehand the manner and order of applying actions in order to reach a desired goal.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Result	An entity produced by the performance of an operation.	Official NATO Terminology Database
Sex	Refers to the biological aspects of an individual as determined by their anatomy, which is produced by their chromosomes, hormones and their interactions. Generally male or female and something that is assigned at birth.	UK Government
Sexual Abuse	Any actual or threatened physical act of sexual nature either by force or other coercive conditions conducted by individuals sent to protect and assist communities.	NATO BI-SCD 40-1
Sexual Exploitation	Any actual or attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power or trust for sexual purposes, including profiting monetarily, socially or politically.	NATO BI-SCD 40-1
Stakeholder	An individual, group or entity who can affect or is affected by the attainment of the end state.	Official NATO Terminology Database
UK Human Security Adviser	UK military service person responsible for assisting planning functions in incorporating HS considerations and SADD into military planning.	
UK's Human Security Approach	To gain a heightened understanding of the human environment, potential conflict drivers and dynamics to improve integrated planning and entrench HS in the way Defence operates. This enables the UK Armed Forces to act as a 'force for good', minimising harm to civilians and maintaining legitimacy.	JSP 985 dated Dec 21



# Acronyms, Initialisms and Abbreviations<sup>1</sup>

AOR	Area of Operational Responsibility
ACDS	Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff
ASCOPE	Area, Structure, Capabilities, Organisation, People, Event
BI	Building Integrity and Countering Corruption
CAAC	Children Affected by Armed Conflict
CCT	Cross-Cutting Themes
CMG	Commitments Management Group
CMI	Civil Military Interaction
CPACC	Counter Proliferation and Arms Control
CPP	Cultural Property Protection
CRSV	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
CS	Civil Society
CSSF	Conflict Stability and Security Fund
DI	Defence Intelligence
FCDO	Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office
GENAD	Gender Advisor (used in NATO and the UN)
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
HN	Host Nation
HS	Human Security
HSA	Human Security Adviser
IHL	International Humanitarian Law (also known as LOAC)
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
IOs	International Organisations
IPS	International Policy and Strategy
JEF	Joint Expeditionary Force
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict (also known as IHL)
MACA	Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
MSHT	Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OGD	Other Government Departments
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OSW	Operational Staff Work
PCVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
PDT	Pre-Deployment Training
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters
PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure
POC	Protection of Civilians
RFI	Requests for Information
SASE	Safe and Secure Environment
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SJFHQ	Standing Joint Force Headquarters
SME	Subject Matter Expert

<sup>1</sup> Only lists acronyms, initialisms and abbreviations with multiple entries which are relevant to this policy.

SRO	Senior Responsible Officer
sS	Single Services
TRA	Training Requirements Authority
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

# 1 Context of Human Security in UK Defence

## 0101. International Framework of Human Security.

The concept of HS integrates three freedoms: 'Freedom from Fear' (denoting violent threats to populations), 'Freedom from Want' (meaning poverty and absence of basic needs) and 'Freedom from Indignity' (which includes human rights abuses and limits on democratic participation). These have been developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to include all threats to the wellbeing of human beings and everything that affects the security of human beings.<sup>2</sup> HS is an approach to national and international security which places emphasis on human beings, rather than the traditional focus on the security of the state. Moving the security agenda beyond state security does not mean replacing it. Instead, it complements and builds on it.

This concept has continued to evolve. Threats such as natural disasters, conflicts, chronic and persistent poverty, health pandemics and international terrorism continue to compromise the prospects of sustainable development, peace and stability. When these threats overlap, they become insecurity multipliers, exacerbating existing issues. The cumulative effect of this insecurity can be catastrophic, for individuals, but also for communities, nations and regions.<sup>3</sup>

This HS concept is now an international framework<sup>4</sup> that considers pre, inter and post conflict phases, examines early warning mechanisms and responds to violent and destabilising situations.

## 0102. National Policy and Strategy.

The UK's HS approach is governed by domestic and international law and is complementary to the following UK Government strategies:

- a. [Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict](#);
- b. [UK National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security 2018-2022](#);
- c. [Modern Slavery Strategy](#);
- d. [UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2017-2022](#);
- e. [Building Stability Overseas and the CONTEST Strategy](#).

## 0103. UK Defence's Human Security Approach.

Individual and community security is the foundation for long term stability, economic and infrastructure development, political settlement, better societal relationships, good governance and the rule of law. In recognition of this, the UK MOD has embedded several security themes under the term HS. By monitoring and improving the security of these areas the UK seeks to mitigate the most harmful effects of conflict and increase the chance of a sustainable and

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<sup>2</sup> From conflict and crime to both physical and psychological suffering.

<sup>3</sup> United Nations (January 2016). *Human Security Handbook*. P5. New York: United Nations.

<sup>4</sup> UN HS handbook.

peaceful outcome. This method requires a whole of government approach, with military objectives and activity integrated within a broader cross government strategy and reinforces direction in the Integrated Operating Concept (IOpC).<sup>5</sup>

UK Defence will consider HS in all that it does, be that on operations or conducting other activity. This HS approach is essential for a compelling narrative, maintaining the legitimacy and campaign authority of the UK, its Allies and its partners. It will assist in the identification of security risks to affected populations, ensuring that UK Defence is a force for good but is also more likely to achieve its mission. In tandem, the MOD must also recognise human insecurity is increasingly weaponised by our adversaries and thus should consider malign actions related to HS.<sup>6</sup>

The HS approach considers how structural<sup>7</sup> factors affect populations through cultural, social and gender dynamics and will be relevant to operations across the integrated operating framework. A HS approach will enhance our ability to work across government, better enabling the UK to shape the discourse on the security of human beings on the global stage and achieve its National Security Objectives.

UK Defence's **HS approach** has been defined at the strategic level as:

*“To gain a heightened understanding of the human environment, potential conflict drivers and dynamics to improve integrated planning and entrench HS in the way Defence operates. This enables the UK Armed Forces to act as a ‘force for good’, minimising harm to civilians and maintaining legitimacy.”*

To support this, the MOD's HS governance have endorsed the following strategic objectives:

- a. Objective 1: to ensure UK Defence personnel have the capability, understanding and training to incorporate HS considerations in their approach to military activity and planning;
- b. Objective 2: to embed a HS approach into the way we operate, achieving greater effect by coordination with partners across government, Allies and partners, International Organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Civil Society Organisations (CSO) and the commercial sector;
- c. Objective 3: to understand how emerging root causes of crises and instability will cause HS issues, enabling better identification of opportunities for prevention and protection, mitigation of harm and enduring solutions.

#### 0104. **UK Defence Legal Position.**

Consideration of the range of actions under HS requires an appreciation of the UK and MOD's formal position and understanding of our obligations under domestic and international law. This JSP is not a legal manual and should not be used to interpret the UK's or an individual's legal obligations. JSP 383 provides the current authority on obligations under International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also known as the [Law of Armed Conflict](#) (LOAC), including the Geneva Conventions. International Human Rights Law (IHRL) may also be relevant to the

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<sup>5</sup> Understanding the drivers of conflict and insecurity, such as HS factors, and counter-acting them.

<sup>6</sup> HS issues that have been generated to test our resolve or cohesion; for example in areas such as migration.

<sup>7</sup> Defined as the broader political, economic, social and organisational environments that structure the context in which risk production occurs.

activities which come within the scope of HS. For decision making on the provision of security and justice assistance, or support to other states, reference should be made to the [Overseas Security and Justice Assistance process](#). Legal and policy advice should be sought routinely in respect of the application of international and domestic legal obligations for specific operations or activities. The legal framework for HS activities and concerns comes from a large variety of sources. Domestic law sources include the Modern Slavery Act 2015<sup>8</sup>, the ‘Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017’<sup>9</sup> and the ‘Bribery Act 2010’<sup>10</sup>, amongst others. Sources of international legal obligations and policy commitments include the requirements and prohibitions contained in treaties such as the ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’ and the ‘Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’, and in binding United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) together with non-binding UNSCR and United Nations General Assembly Resolutions. In addition, general comments and reports of the United Nations Treaty Monitoring Bodies should be considered.

This JSP has taken full account of this legal background when developing its HS approach. Where personnel have specific concerns about the application of obligations they must engage with legal and policy advisors. This supports the intent of [The Good Operations Guide](#) (pp33 – 41). A formal consideration of any legal and policy implications of proposed actions is necessary throughout operational and strategic planning and should also occur at the tactical level. When referring to legal or policy requirements, staff officers must be clear before phrasing statements in terms of ‘obligation’, ‘aspiration’ or ‘intent’ in order to ensure that commanders and decision makers are not inadvertently or inaccurately constrained in appropriate decision making.

The ability of UK Defence to act on HS related policy aspirations will always be qualified by the unique individual circumstances of each operation, including the legal mandate, mission & tasks and military resources available at the time.

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<sup>8</sup> [Modern Slavery Act 2015 \(legislation.gov.uk\)](#).

<sup>9</sup> [Cultural Property \(Armed Conflicts\) Act 2017 \(legislation.gov.uk\)](#).

<sup>10</sup> [Bribery Act 2010 \(legislation.gov.uk\)](#).

# 2 Understanding of the Strategic Environment

## Strategic Context Setting

### 0201. The Changing Operating Environment.

War and armed conflict pose challenges and impediments to human development. These can take many forms but are often chronic and intractable; fuelled by identity politics and globalised, illegitimate forms of financing. Moreover, they are frequently exacerbated by the drugs and arms trades, human trafficking, the exploitation of natural resources and financial remittances.

The strategic context is increasingly complex, dynamic and competitive and the character of warfare is changing rapidly, driven by the pace and pervasiveness of information and technological change. Distinctions between peace and war; public and private; foreign and domestic; state and non-state; and virtual and physical are blurred. The UK, our Allies and partners, and the multilateral system that has assured our security and stability for several generations all face diversifying, intensifying, persistent and proliferating threats. These threats are from resurgent and developing powers and from non-state actors such as violent extremists. This changing threat will likely worsen the range of issues relating to HS from climate, corruption, crime, energy, globalisation, population growth and urbanisation.

### 0202. Coordinate with other actors to gain wider understanding of audiences.

HS requires a deep understanding of theatre audiences and actors. Working with other government departments (OGD), the host nation (HN), IOs, NGOs, CSOs, academia and the commercial sector should provide a means to understand these issues and mechanisms in depth, as well as the means to affect them. The extent of this collaboration will depend on the character of the conflict, mission mandate and security situation. There are three primary facets to be considered when working with partners:

- a. to understand at the strategic, operational and tactical levels what other actors and organisations are already delivering and consider how UK Defence can fuse planned military actions with existing activity, defining military parameters for tactical actions;
- b. to understand how Civil Military Interaction (CMI) supports how we deliver operations and assess their effectiveness;
- c. to engage effectively<sup>11</sup> with the civilian population to ensure that mission outcomes are informed by nuanced information.

## Human Security Considerations

0203. The UK's HS approach is a methodology that considers a broad range of security and protection challenges that individuals and groups of people face in situations of conflict, instability and insecurity. UK Defence describes these challenges as HS considerations.

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<sup>11</sup> At the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

When compromised, these are drivers of instability. In analysing HS considerations, it is useful to consider HS factors and cross cutting themes (CCT).

UK Defence recognises ‘seven plus one’ HS factors; seven are drawn from a development paradigm that focusses on issues that affect the wellbeing of the individual, and ‘information’ has now been added. These factors can also be expressed as ‘types of insecurity’. They are interdependent and do not operate in isolation from each other. Several of these HS factors are considered through PMESII/ASCOPE<sup>12</sup>. Reflected in paragraphs 0204 and 0205 are those additional considerations to be applied.

#### 0204. **Overview of HS Factors.**

The Human Development Report 1994<sup>13</sup> describes seven factors associated with HS. These are economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political. UK Defence have included an additional factor, ‘information’, to ensure planners include this and consider the wider impacts on military activity. Climate is covered under the factor ‘environment’, acknowledging those risks arising, directly or indirectly, by changes in climate patterns. Detailed descriptions are given below:

- a. **Personal / Physical insecurity** refers to a state in which people do not feel protected from physical violence, whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals and sub-state actors, from domestic violence, or from other actors;
- b. **Political insecurity** defines the condition in which people live in a societal system that does not honour their basic human rights. Along with repressing individuals and groups, governments may try to exercise control over ideas, information and freedom of expression;
- c. **Economic insecurity** describes the risk of a decrease in an individual’s quality of life, now and in the future, given their economic and financial circumstances;
- d. **Cultural / Community insecurity** refers to the state in which individuals’ traditional relationships and values alongside their tangible and intangible cultural heritage are not protected and are threatened by sectarian and ethnic violence;
- e. **Health insecurity** includes illnesses and diseases across a complex environment, touching on many different issues such as access to safe water, living in a safe environment, access to health services<sup>14</sup> and gender specific services, prevention of disease and provision of basic knowledge to live a healthy life;
- f. **Food insecurity** includes both physical and economic access to food that meets people’s dietary needs;
- g. **Environmental / Climate insecurity** concerns the threats that environmental events and trends pose to individuals, communities or nations, as well as the adverse impact of human activities on the environment. Human induced environmental degradation<sup>15</sup>, inequitable access to natural resources or industrialization (which are all

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<sup>12</sup> Refer to AJP 5.9

<sup>13</sup> UNDP 1994 Human Development Report 1994: New Dimensions of Human Security.

<sup>14</sup> Include - physical and mental/psychological support.

<sup>15</sup> This can refer to man-made threats or threats exacerbated by human action. For example, deforestation, pollution, forest fires and drought or heat waves.

human induced), could increase the probability of conflict and thereby pose a risk to human and national security;

h. **Information insecurity.** Access to information empowers individuals but can also be used to manipulate or control. Denial of information constrains progress, education, employment and opportunities for development. This also recognises the dependence on information flow for modern societies to operate, and the rapid destabilisation if data is suddenly inaccessible.

## 0205. **Overview of Cross-Cutting Themes (CCTs).**

CCTs specify a range of different topics which ordinarily fall outside of the military's primary responsibilities, but which could affect an operation in a number of ways due to their deep links to local societies and interaction with the core HS factors. These CCTs map onto one or more of the HS factors and are thematically categorised consequences of insecurity that exacerbate, perpetuate or entrench conflict/instability.

Listed beneath are descriptions of endorsed CCTs, which highlight UK Defence's commitments and directed actions. Due to their nature, they apply throughout UK Defence activity and are not applied solely to particular situations.

a. **Protection of Civilians (POC).** UK Defence contributes to the POC by integrating related measures in the planning and conduct of its operations and missions. POC includes all efforts taken to avoid, minimise and mitigate negative effects that might arise from conditions of insecurity, as well as our own military operations. It is a vital aspect of our HS approach and failure to conduct these activities can undermine other political and strategic objectives. In UK Defence this includes:

- (1) considering POC as central to the HS approach and integral to all military operations;<sup>16</sup>
- (2) continuing to consider measures to reduce the risks posed to civilians when conducting operations and missions. Planning should involve measures to avoid placing civilians in harm's way;
- (3) understanding, considering and, when required, planning to deliver specific protection needs for children, women, men and vulnerable groups;<sup>17</sup>
- (4) continuing to protect and promote the humanitarian space and principled humanitarian action by civilian actors, seeking to avoid any politicisation or militarisation of aid provision;
- (5) seeking to address communities' key protection concerns assessed through context-relevant, meaningful engagement;
- (6) understanding and mitigating further harm to civilians through inappropriate conduct, including when spending power attracts criminal or unethical activity.

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<sup>16</sup> Refer to UK Joint Defence Doctrine with regards to fighting power.

<sup>17</sup> Use protected characteristics to identify these groups.



b. **Women Peace and Security (WPS) which includes Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV).** WPS policy stresses the specific impact of conflict on women and girls, the vital importance of ensuring women's full, equal and meaningful participation in all aspects and at all levels of peace and security, and the importance of incorporating gender perspectives in all that we do.

The WPS agenda serves to prevent conflict and sexual and gender based violence, protect women's and girls' safety and human rights, support women's participation in conflict resolution and peace processes, and ensure the particular needs of women and girls are addressed in relief and recovery processes. For UK Defence:

(1) CRSV is rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked to a conflict;<sup>18</sup>

(2) CRSV is frequently, deliberately, and strategically used to target civilians. It inflicts long-term trauma on individuals and families, destroys the social fabric of communities, triggers displacement, fuels armed actors' activities and fosters prolonged conflict and instability. When used or commissioned as a deliberate tactic of war, or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, CRSV can significantly exacerbate situations of instability, crisis, or armed conflict, and may impede the restoration of peace and security.

The UK's approach to WPS is covered in its WPS National Action Plan (NAP) and the [Tackling Violence Against Women and Girls Strategy](#)<sup>19</sup>. UK Defence has a role to help deliver WPS against the NAP Strategic Objectives alongside other partners. There are 4 pillars within the NAP that UK Defence support. These are: **Prevention, Participation, Protection and Relief and Recovery.**

The integration of gender is an essential factor in creating peace and security and continues to be developed. UK Defence will align with NATO guiding principles for WPS,<sup>20</sup> applied through external and internal elements. To ensure the guiding principles are followed and reinforced, this includes:

(1) conducting gender analysis, through Sex and Age Disaggregated Data (SADD),<sup>21</sup> as part of the initial understand and situational awareness process to develop a broad understanding of how gender norms and roles shape the effects, causes and drivers of conflict;

(2) incorporating gender perspectives into all planning levels and in implementation of all UK military operations;

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<sup>18</sup> NATO Policy on Preventing and Responding to Conflict Related Sexual Violence, June 2021.

<sup>19</sup> A UK Government strategy produced in 2021, led by the Home Office.

<sup>20</sup> a) Integration: ensuring that gender perspectives are considered as an integral part of policies, programmes and projects guided by effective gender mainstreaming practices;

b) Inclusiveness: promoting an increased representation of women across UK Defence and in international forces to enhance operational effectiveness and success;

c) Integrity: enhancing accountability with the intent to increase awareness and implementation of the WPS agenda in accordance with the UK NAP.

<sup>21</sup> This will enable commanders to identify how males or females are impacted differently by conflict and what can be done to mitigate harm and maximise positive opportunities on each of these groups.

- (3) using our relevant resources and available legal powers to take appropriate action to prevent and respond to CRSV incidents, including potential, impending and ongoing CRSV threats whilst deterring perpetrators, protecting the vulnerable and responding to and referring victims;
- (4) understanding and ensuring women's and girls' needs are more effectively addressed in humanitarian action, including Humanitarian Assistance Disaster Relief (HADR) deployments;
- (5) remaining committed to preventing sexual harassment and promoting the highest standards of professional and personal conduct. UK Defence has a zero-tolerance approach to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and will take immediate action to investigate any allegations of misconduct and to provide support to survivors. A new SEA JSP is forecasted to be published in Apr 22;
- (6) supporting women's meaningful mobilisation and participation in mediation, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict processes;<sup>22</sup>
- (7) supporting and encouraging meaningful representation of all women in decision making processes;
- (8) continuing to work on tackling the obstacles to women's leadership, inflow, throughflow and meaningful participation throughout UK Defence;
- (9) continuing to work towards the targets set out in the UN Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy<sup>23</sup> and equality in UK Defence.

c. **Children Affected by Armed Conflict (CAAC) / Youth Peace & Security.** IHL and IHRL make special provision for children and youth. Non combatants are often the main victims of armed conflicts, with children among the groups most affected. The UK recognises that protecting children from the effects of armed conflict is a moral, legal and strategic imperative and an essential element to break the cycle of violence. To protect children and youth, UK Defence should:

- (1) incorporate understanding of those elements affecting children and youth, in particular the [Six Grave Violations against Children During Armed Conflict](#)<sup>24</sup>, in all planning levels and implementation of UK military operations;
- (2) continue to take action to prevent and respond to issues of CAAC and proactively prevent incidents and deter perpetrators. This includes reporting any violations of the protected status of children in armed conflict as well as the wider impact of operations on children and refer any victims;
- (3) take all reasonable steps to ensure we do not undertake training or partnering with units employing children in active combat roles or those that detain children solely for membership, perceived or actual, of armed groups;
- (4) continue to monitor the conduct of partner forces to ensure their compliance

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<sup>22</sup> Note that FCDO lead on planning women's participation/empowerment.

<sup>23</sup> [Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy](#).

<sup>24</sup> Killing and maiming of children; Recruitment or use of children as soldiers; Sexual violence against children; Abduction of children; Attacks against schools or hospitals; Denial of humanitarian access for children.

with IHL and IHRL, to assess potential risks to children and to respond to reports of any grave violations against children;

(5) whilst on deployments, unless absolutely unavoidable, not use functioning schools, universities or places of learning for any purpose or to carry out any security tasks in close proximity to their buildings or grounds, and not use evacuated or abandoned schools, universities or places of learning except in extenuating circumstances with no viable alternative, in line with the '[Safe Schools Declaration](#)';

(6) ensure all reasonable options available have been explored when a school is being used by an adversary, making it a military objective, before attacking it;

(7) where requested to deliver training of partner nations, work towards ensuring all elements of CAAC are included;

(8) work on geospatial information to identify regions of concern regarding CAAC and, where practical, draw on the expertise of IOs and NGOs involved with the protection of children before, during and after military operations.

d. **Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking (MSHT).** MSHT is likely to be encountered by UK Defence personnel and is a factor to consider in wider defence management activities.<sup>25</sup> Human trafficking is a violation of international and domestic law; it undermines HS, affects society at the individual, local and national levels and weakens family and community bonds. It is usually facilitated by organised crime and terrorist networks, with women and girls the likeliest victims.

Within the UK, human trafficking is the responsibility of the Home Office, the Joint Slavery and Trafficking Analysis Centre (JSTAC) (or its Modern Slavery Human Trafficking Unit (MSHTU)) and national and regional police forces. Although tackling MSHT is not primarily a military responsibility, UK Defence should:

(1) continue to coordinate with other nations' activities to implement UN Protocols against Transnational Organised Crime and Trafficking in Persons as well as relevant UNSCRs such as UNSCR 2331 on trafficking persons in armed conflict;

(2) seek to recognise and support the work being done by national police forces and by other IOs such as the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) with its Action Plan for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings in the area of operations;

(3) ensure that anti-trafficking responses are systematically included in military planning and execution of operations;

(4) ensure that UK Defence personnel and economic activity within an operational or deployed environment is compliant with UK domestic rules concerning human trafficking (HT) in the supply chain. Thus seek to identify and prevent the use of trafficked persons;

(5) raise awareness of the issues connected to MSHT and the means to combat

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<sup>25</sup> This will be covered in Vol 2 of JSP 985.

it, recognise and respond to victims of trafficking and slavery and be conversant with the relevant reporting procedures. It should be included in exercises to test planning procedures and responses;

(6) work to improve the collection of data, monitoring and analysis of trafficking in the context of crises, including protective and risk factors, to support stronger responses.<sup>26</sup>

e. **Preventing & Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE).** Although violent extremism is not a new phenomenon, it has become a growing challenge over recent years.

There is a growing recognition that counterterrorism, with its dependence on military, law enforcement and intelligence responses, cannot manage the problem alone. PCVE has emerged as a paradigm that seeks to complement counterterrorism with non-coercive measures, particularly using preventative approaches which seek to address the causes, drivers and enablers of terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>27</sup> There are a range of PCVE programmes that aim to support communities to resist recruitment into extremist organisations.

Although PCVE is not primarily a military responsibility, UK Defence should note that our behaviour towards the population, including foreign armed forces, can act as a driver of violent extremism and result in vulnerability to violent radicalisation. Therefore, UK Defence should:

(1) understand what limitations have been placed on the population's rights, including restrictions on their freedom of movement and freedom of expression, and highlight those early warning signs of rising extremism;<sup>28</sup>

(2) support and encourage the unique position women have in influencing community and family values, identify early signs of radicalisation, support religious tolerance and create counter narratives that provide a female perspective;

(3) enhance engagement activities to consider engaging key members of the local population in dialogue and conflict prevention approaches. This is critical to ensure that these actions are holistic and effective. Engaging religious leaders to provide a platform for intra and inter-faith dialogue is essential to effectively engage with communities to promote peace and tolerance. Youth leaders should also be part of any engagement strategy;

(4) promote good governance and the rule of law, including through providing support to the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators as applicable and appropriate;

(5) seek to counter violent extremism through strategic communications, which will include a recognition of how violent extremists utilise the internet, social media

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<sup>26</sup> Existing anti-trafficking prevention and protection models and related policies and guidance, such as referral mechanisms and indicators for the identification of trafficked people, can be adapted to, and used in, conflict and post conflict setting.

<sup>27</sup> Countering Violent Extremism is part of counter terrorism and is a strand of the CONTEST strategy under Prevent.

<sup>28</sup> Minority and women's rights are often suppressed by extremist ideologies.

and communications technology. Narratives should feature both men and women and be tailored to both audiences for them to take real effect.<sup>29</sup>

f. **Building Integrity and Countering Corruption (BI).** Conflict fosters corruption, and corruption can foster and sustain conflict and become an objective of conflict actors. Corruption can cause states to become unstable and weaken their economic governance systems. Corruption exists at different levels in every conflict, driving war economies and serious and organised crime, feeding cycles of violence and instability, as well as creating grievances and enabling armed actors to mobilise. Exploitation and support of corruption is a tool used by third party countries to exploit vulnerable states<sup>30</sup>.

Some individuals may engage in corrupt practices merely to survive, others to gain control over their populations, while others seek affluent lifestyles.<sup>31</sup> In many states almost every aspect of the economy and security sector can be affected. Thus the root cause of many states' failure to respond to insecurity is often down to corruption. Unmitigated corruption has five consequences for military operations:

- (1) undermines the desired end state;
- (2) promotes instability;
- (3) perpetuates conflict;
- (4) wastes resources and effort;
- (5) damages credibility.

UK Defence deployments such as stabilisation missions, peacekeeping operations and security assistance deployments will likely take place in environments affected by corruption and conflict. Countercorruption cuts across military and political lines of activity and UK actions need to be aligned with the efforts of international and regional organisations.

UK Defence personnel are not immune to corruption risks and as a result UK Defence should:

- (1) raise military forces' awareness on this topic to ensure personnel are able to recognise and support efforts to tackle corruption for the benefit of long term stability, security, legitimacy and development;<sup>32</sup>
- (2) give commanders the skills to recognise the need to deter, detect and disrupt illegal activities, such as illegal natural resource extraction, contraband smuggling, drug cultivation, or prostitution, and the threats and risks these pose to the local economy;

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<sup>29</sup> A variety of stakeholders should be used to reach a diverse audience through art, comics, film, humour and music.

<sup>30</sup> Corruption networks can and often repurpose during conflict to facilitate the transport of arms and war materials, sometimes from vulnerable states facilitating or exacerbating future conflicts.

<sup>31</sup> While it is important to note that conflict weakens governance and can engender corruption, it should not be assumed that corrupt practices are inherently cultural and cannot be changed. JDP 05 explores this in more detail.

<sup>32</sup> The Defence Academy at Shrivenham deliver a MOD Funded BI UK course.

- (3) take corruption risks into account during planning and ensure that mitigating measures are taken to prevent corruption being exacerbated by the activities or behaviours of UK armed forces, such as in processes around contracting or hiring local personnel on UK operations and in service procurement;<sup>33</sup>
- (4) explore indicators and warnings that can form the basis of a corruption risk management strategy and include mission deployment directives, specific guidance on corruption risk, measures and capabilities required to mitigate;
- (5) encourage and support military partners to strengthen integrity as it is crucial for public legitimacy and capability;
- (6) support other actors in the development of realistic, legitimate livelihood alternatives, which is important for reducing illegal activity. Forces must be sensitive to the fact that the dismantling of illegal economic streams may deprive communities of their most viable means of livelihood, thus damaging the relationship. Attention must focus on the responsibility to help start reconstruction.

To support these tasks UK Defence should continue to include experts and programme resources through the Building Integrity programme in the Defence Academy and the Transparency International Defence & Security Programme.

**g. Cultural Property Protection (CPP).** The devastating effects of armed conflict on cultural heritage are well documented.<sup>34</sup> Cultural property (CP) is the tangible, visual and totemic cultural expression of a community, a society, a nation and, ultimately, of humankind. It is an expression of cultural identity and emblematic of rights of cultural self determination and community cohesion. It is a reality that armed conflict may result in the destruction of cultural heritage. The protection of CP will preserve and enhance our reputation locally and globally, maintain our ability to influence those amongst whom we operate and contribute to our force protection and freedom of manoeuvre.

The HN, if a functioning sovereign state, is responsible for the safeguarding of all CP in its territory. If a HN is unable to fulfil its obligations for CPP, it may request assistance.

The law obliges UK Defence to conduct CPP during armed conflict and (belligerent) occupation. UK Defence aims to deliver the same standards of CPP during counterinsurgency, stabilisation and disaster relief operations. Specific situations should seek legal advice about the framework that applies.

For UK Defence this includes:

- (1) through the MOD Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre (CPACC) maintaining policy and strategy, in conjunction with the CPP Unit, and via engagement with the Military CPP Working Group. The CPACC is also responsible for the development and maintenance of Memoranda of Understanding and Joint Declarations of Intent with OGDs, devolved administrations and relevant statutory national and international bodies on CPP matters;
- (2) ensuring CPP is adequately understood and represented in targeting training,

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<sup>33</sup> More can be found in Vol 2 to JSP 985 when published late 2022.

<sup>34</sup> e.g. the destruction of Palmyra by ISIS; the shelling of the Old Bridge in Mostar, Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the destruction of the two giant Buddha statues in Afghanistan by the Taliban.

policy and permissions;

(3) applying any amendments to UK doctrine, education and training, which may be required to further incorporate CPP following the ratification by Parliament of The Hague Convention (1954) and its two Protocols;

(4) in accordance with Customary International Law and IHL/LOAC and other relevant rules, conducting CPP across all types of military operations;

(5) continuing to ensure military commanders at all levels understand that they bear operational responsibility for ensuring that forces under their command abide by the LOAC and follow appropriate policy and practice for the protection of CP;

(6) include cultural understanding as part of force preparation, including identification of any significant CP sites within the relevant Area of Operations. Once deployed, force elements should interact with local communities wherever possible in order to further understand and appreciate their culture, including CP;

(7) working towards prevention of adversary funding. The prohibition, prevention and stopping of CP looting can contribute to counter-threat finance efforts and can enhance the understanding of threat finance networks to enable exploitation, target development and delivery of Joint Effects;

(8) produce and promulgate CP geospatial information and intelligence to enable military forces to deliver CPP. To work with Allies, academia, institutions and other sources, on the collection, assimilation, management and sharing of CP data;

(9) working with Allies, academia, institutions and other sources on the collection, assimilation and management (including sharing) of data, to include sites and articles of cultural importance.

0206. Table 1 below highlights how we can relate the factors and CCTs considered as part of the UK's HS approach.

0207. Where any UK Defence personnel commit any violations of international or domestic criminal and/or service law or fail to exercise adequate control over forces under their command, necessary and appropriate action will be taken.

Table 1: HS Factors mapped against HS CCTs

HS FACTOR (TYPE OF INSECURITY)	DESCRIPTION	LINKED CCTs
<b>PERSONAL/ PHYSICAL</b>	Personal / physical insecurity refers to a state in which people do not feel protected from physical violence, whether from the state or external states, from violent individuals and sub-state actors, from domestic abuse, or from other actors.	Protection of Civilians. Women Peace and Security, which includes Conflict Related Sexual Violence. Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking. Preventing & Countering Violent Extremism. Children Affected by Armed Conflict.
<b>POLITICAL</b>	Political insecurity defines the condition in which people live in a societal system that does not honour their basic human rights. Along with repressing individuals and groups, governments may try to exercise control over ideas, information and freedom of expression.	Building Integrity. Countering Corruption. Women Peace and Security.
<b>ECONOMIC</b>	Economic insecurity describes the risk of a decrease in an individual's quality of life, now and in the future, given their economic and financial circumstances.	Building Integrity. Countering Corruption. Women Peace and Security.
<b>CULTURAL/ COMMUNITY</b>	Cultural / Community insecurity refers to the state in which individual's traditional relationships and values alongside their tangible and intangible cultural heritage are not protected and are threatened by sectarian and ethnic violence.	Cultural Property Protection.
<b>INFORMATION</b>	Access to information empowers individuals but can also be used to manipulate or control. Denial of information constrains progress, education, employment and opportunities for development. This also recognises the dependence on information flow for modern societies to operate and the rapid destabilisation if data is suddenly inaccessible.	These sources of insecurity are not explicitly addressed by the CCTs covered in the MOD's HS policy, but they are included for awareness, as their impacts and manifestations will be experienced during operations.  These HS Factors need to be understood as both potential drivers of conflict and as a consequence of conflict. Failure to take account of them could impede freedom of manoeuvre and de-rail the mission.
<b>HEALTH</b>	Health insecurity includes illnesses and diseases across a complex environment, touching on many different issues such as access to safe water, living in a safe environment, access to health services and gender specific services, prevention of disease and provision of basic knowledge to live a healthy life.	
<b>FOOD</b>	Food insecurity includes both physical and economic access to food that meets people's dietary needs.	
<b>ENVIRONMENTAL/ CLIMATE</b>	Environmental / Climate insecurity concerns the threats that environmental events and trends pose to individuals, communities or nations, as well as the adverse impact of human activities on the environment. Human induced environmental degradation, inequitable access to natural resources or industrialization (which are all human induced), could increase the probability of conflict and thereby pose a risk to human and national security.	



# 3 Planning Framework for Human Security

## 0301. What operational benefits are there?

By applying a HS approach, UK Defence aims to achieve the following:

- a. improve effectiveness on operational delivery and mission success;
- b. gain a heightened understanding of conflict drivers / dynamics, community dynamics, needs, grievances, motivations and narratives;
- c. improved integrated planning and action;
- d. become a military instrument of power that can plan conflict sensitive outcomes by understanding the negative and linked impacts to the human and natural environment, to minimise harm to civilians, reduce Human Rights' violations, reduce long term destabilisers and feedback loops and maintain our legitimacy;
- e. set an example to other allies and partners on operations and help them learn from best practice delivered through defence assistance, capacity building and Security Sector Reform.

## 0302. UK Strategic Planning.

From the outset of UK Defence activity, either domestic or overseas, HS considerations should be incorporated. Whether the cause for the demand is intentional, situational or adversary behaviour, there will be impacts on the security of the population. As a result, Defence will work collaboratively with OGDs through strategic planning processes.

On receipt of direction by the PM or National Security council, UK Defence, assisted by OGDs, will ensure that:

- a. International Policy and Strategy (IPS) will ensure that their nominated HS focal point (ref. para 0406) or advocate becomes integral to the military strategic estimate. Additional support can be sought from established Jt Comd Human Security Advisor (HSAs) or focal point planners embedded in most functional areas;
- b. the Commitments Management Group (CMG) should ensure, through coordination, that HS considerations are incorporated and that liaisons with or inclusion of a member of the integrated team from the Office of Conflict, Stabilisation and Mediation (OCSM) be included to ensure full understanding of any in country projects and impact of Defence options;
- c. the CMG, where appropriate, incorporate HS considerations, through direction to Joint Commands in the form of a Chief of the Defence Staff planning directive, planning guidance or verbal guidance;

d. UN gender targets are considered and directed, through the Defence Tasking Function, that will apportion and direct the generation of forces for UN peacekeeping and stability operations;<sup>35</sup>

e. HS risk and mitigations should be identified, as well as HS success indicators, and incorporated, where relevant, in monitoring and evaluation processes.

On receipt of strategic military direction, operational analysis begins whereby HS considerations should continue to be drawn through the planning process and incorporated in Operational Staff Work (OSW).

### 0303. **UK Operational Planning.**

The application of HS considerations in the planning and execution of operations will be integral to the Operational Level Planning Process throughout Understand (including HN and Partner forces intent), Plan, Execute and Assess, requiring thorough staff branch engagement. This action will not only drive operational imperatives but also build service personnel awareness and acceptance. This application will be aided by trained HSAs whilst it is embedded into Defence.<sup>36</sup>

### 0304. **Understanding the Human Environment, Situation and Problem.**

Planning staff must be able to understand the civil environment and the potential impact that military operations and adversary actions might have on the civilian infrastructure and population. PMESII/ASCOPE and human terrain analysis should be built upon through HS considerations. Obtaining the opinions and analysis of a diverse array of stakeholders, including hard to reach groups, is critical to its success. This requires staff to be able to carry out population centric POC, gender, CAAC analyses amongst others to identify potential risks to all parts of society and identify ways of mitigating harm.

When regional or maritime operations are being planned, it is important to seek to identify regional HS themes rather than a specific focus on a particular population.<sup>37</sup> To inform directives and mission planning, an enhanced understanding of the human environment is required. The following activities should be included:

a. early engagement with Partners across Government and OGDs, including obtaining recent copies of country relevant assessments and estimates;<sup>38</sup>

b. identifying and understanding how and why individuals and groups are discriminated<sup>39</sup> against, by society (for long standing social/political/economic reasons), by the adversary or as a result of conflict. This action will assist commanders to identify how conflict impacts men, women, boys and girls differently and what can be done to mitigate this;

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<sup>35</sup> A UK Armed Forces Gender Barrier study is underway to identify challenges and opportunities.

<sup>36</sup> MOD endorsed HS Strategy 2020-2032.

<sup>37</sup> The regional planning frameworks should include HS priorities. The Operational Advantage Centre also has a role through engagement.

<sup>38</sup> E.g. JACS explicitly; sense maker and humanitarian protection assessments.

<sup>39</sup> Consider vulnerable groups, protected characteristics and analysis through SADD.

- c. inclusion of gender sensitive indicators through analysing measurements, numbers, facts, narratives, opinions or perceptions in order to reveal gender related changes over time;
- d. inclusion of participation data collection in order to recognise the local community stakeholders and networks of central importance to in country actions and planning for in country engagement to reinforce this understanding;
- e. lessons from previous operations and both historical and operational analyses should be examined where available;
- f. if operational security permits, then relevant (and willing) IOs, humanitarian NGOs and women's groups should be engaged with to further inform conflict analysis and to support operational planning;
- g. any initial briefings and Receipt of Mission Briefs should include a summary of the civil environment, critical infrastructure and key civil actors;
- h. submission of clear and concise HS Requests for Information (RFI) through the in unit Intelligence process.
- i. seek advice from the HSA in unit, HS advocate planners and subject matter experts (SMEs) from Outreach Group (77 Bde / re-subordinating to 11 SFA Bde by Aug 22).

#### 0305. **Understanding Conflict Sensitivity.**

Conflict sensitivity is acting with the understanding that any initiative conducted in a conflict effected environment will interact with that conflict and that such interaction will have consequences that may have positive or negative effects. It is a deliberate and systematic approach to ensuring we understand and minimise these negative effects (risks) and maximise positive effects of our actions (opportunities). To be conflict sensitive, individuals need to:

- a. understand the context;
- b. understand the interaction between their engagement and the context;
- c. act upon this understanding in order to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts.

#### 0306. **Operations and Targeting Process.**

The UK Armed Forces operate under a legal basis and robust Rules of Engagement that govern the use of force during armed conflict, ensuring that authorities are consistent with policy concerns and comply with IHL. By broadening and deepening the understanding of the civilian environment, we will better inform our planning. However, it should be recognised that even tactical precautions (timing, tempo, tactics, effects, weapons, ammunition) and mitigation of harm (including prevention and rapid learning) may not prevent issues from arising during the operation. Where incidents, genuine or otherwise, are alleged, it is important that the UK engage appropriately in order to maintain public support. Losing their support can directly or indirectly impact the mission.

0307. UK Doctrine will inform the reader on how HS considerations are applied during planning and where HS considerations should be included in OSW for UK operations. Where analysed to be key to mission success, HS considerations will be included in the Operational Plan, Operational Order, Fragmentary Orders and assessment reports. When required, a detailed annex<sup>40</sup> will cover CMI and HS considerations relevant to the context of the mission. Some operational and tactical planning will require HN support during the planning process.

When UK personnel operate under a joint or other framework they are to adopt relevant planning processes.<sup>41</sup>

### **0308. Planning Staff Responsibilities.**

To fully incorporate HS into strategic and operational planning it should be part of the mindset of all members of the battle staff and included by all functional groups. Most important functional groups include J2/N2/G2/A2 (intelligence) to carry out the analysis of the civilian environment and with the J5/N5/G5/A5 (future plans) staff, to ensure that HS considerations are incorporated in all stages of planning. Planning staff will receive training so that they can apply HS considerations appropriate to their level of planning, role and environment. Further advice can be sought from the in unit HSA, HS advocates and SMEs from Outreach Group (77 Bde / re-subordinating to 11 SFA Bde by Aug 22), deployed alongside or as a part of an established reachback mechanism.

In addition to planners, individuals will be posted to singleton jobs where they will deliver HS at the operational and strategic level, these personnel will complete relevant UK Defence HS training (refer to chapter 5 of this JSP).

It must also be noted that access to legal and policy advisors is critical for context-specific guidance.

### **0309. Collaborative planning and coordinating with other actors.**

Other departments, agencies and organisations will have their own culture, priorities, ways of working and approach to risk and these must be considered to avoid frictions and misunderstandings. Responsibilities are usually clearly defined by capabilities, but Defence may sometimes have to assume responsibility for non-military lines of operation if the security or political situation precludes delivery by other agencies. Unity of purpose to achieve an agreed outcome, through collaboration and shared practices, can be easier to achieve and can be enhanced by co-location.

The reasons for UK Defence's commitment to operations are varied but the following aspects remain constant. Sovereign interests are put first, which is why we have defined our own approach to HS. However, operations are frequently conducted bilaterally, multilaterally or as part of a coalition, which requires working with others with aligned interests. UN and NATO are prime examples of where we will work as collective organisations. In other examples, the UK will work directly with other nations, such as the US, France or Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) nations.

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<sup>40</sup> Annex W CIMIC and Annex RR Gender, in NATO drafted by J9.

<sup>41</sup> Further information on planning can be found in JDP 01 UK Operational Doctrine, AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine, AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning and the ACO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) (NATO).

Having an approach for the UK is key for sovereign operations, but we must remain flexible in our thinking and application to enable us to work with others who have similar but not identical interpretations.

#### **0310. Cooperation with NATO.**

There is significant commonality between the NATO cross cutting topics and the UK's HS approach. NATO is committed to ensuring that all efforts are made to avoid, minimise and mitigate any potential negative effects on civilians arising from their missions or activities, as underscored in their policy for the POC.

NATO has included HS into its most recent version of AJP 01 Allied Joint Doctrine and has identified eight cross-cutting topics.<sup>42</sup> PCVE is not shared by NATO<sup>43</sup>.

NATO's Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence has produced fact sheets for the cross-cutting topics currently recognised by NATO and applied in operational HQs led by the J9 functional area.

NATO and its partners have also recognised the importance of ensuring women's meaningful participation in decision-making and in security institutions. They remain committed to contributing to the full implementation of the agenda outlined in UNSCR 1325 on WPS. In the UK we do this through the HS approach and not through a separate Gender Advisory framework.

#### **0311. United Nations (UN).**

The UN calls for a people-centred, context-specific and prevention-oriented response to strengthen the protection and empowerment of human beings. The discourse on HS has emerged in concert with this evolution and there is a causal relationship between the pillars of peacebuilding (institution building and economic development), and the two core elements of HS (political security and economic security).

As the UN has a wider remit than UK Defence, it aims to address situations of insecurity through collaborative, responsive and sustainable measures. The UN's role in peace building, in peace operations (i.e. peacekeeping and special political missions) and in humanitarian operations will all apply a HS framework. For the UK, most UN Peacekeeping missions have mandates on POC where it is essential for HS considerations to be applied.

The basis for the UN's approach to the role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction is encapsulated in UNSCR 1325 (2000) and those Resolutions that came after it.

#### **0312. Other UK Government Departments (OGD).**

The 2021 Integrated Review indicates the growing importance and increasingly engaged nature of UK Defence in the modern geostrategic environment. OGDs have specific remits in times leading up to, or during, conflict or when there is a need to contribute to humanitarian or stabilisation operations. The MOD central HS team, IPS, Security Policy

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<sup>42</sup> Including: POC, children and armed conflict, cultural property protection, women, peace and security, CRSV, trafficking in human beings, sexual exploitation and abuse and building integrity.

<sup>43</sup> UK is an implementing partner of the NATO Building Integrity initiative and CRSV.

and Operations (SPO) staff and the Defence Global Engagement network will work with OGDs at the strategic level. Operational level staff will need to interact and plan on specific operations freely, and on some missions deployed civilians will be embedded in the Headquarter framework to support the commander and staff as an advisor.

The key OGDs that the MOD will work with include:

- a. Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO);
- b. Home Office;
- c. National Crime Agency;
- d. Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport.

## 4 Execution of Human Security in how UK Defence ‘Operates’

0401. When it comes to the practical execution of activities and the realisation of effects, it is environments that should be the focus of integration. Given the increasing state and non-state threats to the UK and the ongoing rise in domestic hazards and threats, the integration of a HS approach should be considered across the whole spectrum of military activity (including warfighting) and be applied from the pre-planning stage, through operations, to operational conclusion. It is critical to acknowledge that a HS approach is recognised throughout all activities in the IOpC.

### 0402. **Incorporating HS into Global Engagement.**

Military engagement activities support UK Defence proactively and reactively. Through engagement across the operating levels, UK Defence will seek to increase understanding, pre-empt threats and build those partnerships and capability. Persistent engagement will increase the UK’s ability to pre-empt and manage crises before they escalate and minimise the opportunities for state and non-state actors to undermine international security. Whilst the Defence Command Paper<sup>44</sup> outlines UK Defence’s role in conflict resolution and prevention, the following elements are those actions related to applying a HS approach towards persistent global engagement:

- a. ensure that the MOD HS central policy team works with the MOD’s IPS teams to better integrate UK Defence efforts towards global HS challenges and existing gender action plans, including through collaborative work funded by the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF);
- b. ensure, where context-relevant, specified tasks are included in strategic direction as a result of analysis of HS considerations;
- c. ensure the professionalised cadre of permanently deployed personnel delivering defence diplomacy receive training in HS and the MOD central HS team work with Defence Sections through the IPS to coordinate activity related to HS considerations across regions;
- d. ensure forward based service personnel who are at readiness receive HS training and that those with an enhanced presence delivering overseas training and exercise programmes are guided on HS requirements and challenges;
- e. ensure that HS considerations are built into building partners’ capacity, when we train, advise, assist and, when necessary, accompany them;
- f. ensure the MOD HS central team support the wider government approach to conflict and instability.

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<sup>44</sup> [Defence in a competitive age.](#)

#### 0403. **Crisis Response.**

Objective three<sup>45</sup> of the MOD HS strategy supports the Defence Command paper on seizing the initiative, seeking to prevent and manage crises before they escalate and minimising the opportunity for our adversaries to exploit conflict and instability. UK Defence has the will and capability to apply hard power when the threat demands it, but will only do so having analysed HS considerations and applying them. This will ensure that we plan and operate in a smarter way.

#### 0404. **Generic military functions.**<sup>46</sup>

a. **Providing a safe and secure environment (SASE).** The primary, and often immediate, role of the UK military may be to contribute to providing a SASE. This can be achieved directly or facilitated through regional indigenous forces. This will depend on the permissiveness of the operating environment and the capabilities of the indigenous security forces. A SASE is essential for protecting citizens, creating an environment in which they have freedom of movement to pursue livelihoods and access essential services, and in which political processes can be undertaken. The following elements should be considered by UK Defence:

(1) who, whether formal (state), traditional/customary or non-state groups, plays a role in providing, or undermining, safety and security;

(2) the main threats and issues regarding safety and security, not only from the state's perspective, but also from the perspective of different communities (disaggregated by location, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, disability, sexuality, etc);

(3) what these communities think about existing security and justice providers, including their effectiveness.

b. **Extent of military involvement.** The inclusion, cooperation and coordination of other actors becomes scalable. Regardless of conditions the military will be required to **RECOGNISE, RESPOND, REPORT** and **REFER** (to HN, IOs/NGOs and others, as appropriate) those learnt HS factors and CCTs.

#### 0405. **HS contribution to Global Britain in a Competitive Age.**

HS has a place in UK Defence's contribution to Global Britain and, where relevant, should be explicit in higher directives. UK Defence should:

a. continue to work with NATO on shaping HS and WPS, noting the UK is the implementing partner of BI and CRSV policy;

b. work with the JEF through Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) to ensure HS and WPS are incorporated into JEF activity;

c. build on the relationship with the US and Five Eyes community on sharing HS best practice and lessons learnt;

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<sup>45</sup> To understand how emerging root causes of crises and instability will cause HS issues, enabling better identification of opportunities for prevention and protection, mitigation of harm and enduring solutions.

<sup>46</sup> Extract from JDP 05.



- d. work through IPS HS focal points and thematic teams to plan HS coordinated activities and outcomes with our European partners and Allies and explicit in higher directives where relevant;
- e. work through IPS focal points to plan HS activities and outcomes with Saudi Arabia and all six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council;
- f. work through IPS focal points to plan HS activities and outcomes in the Indo-Pacific region;
- g. ensure MOD Strategic Frameworks have HS considerations included in their effects based planning priorities;
- h. in the UN, the UK must meet the required troop contribution numbers and ensure the UK deploys experts to missions and headquarters on UN Peacekeeping missions to demonstrate our commitment to international peace and security.

## Organisational Responsibilities

### 0406. Strategic.

The Minister for the Armed Forces leads on HS in UK Defence. The Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS) is the military champion. The Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) for HS is the Assistant Chief of Defence Staff (ACDS) Military Strategy and Global Engagement, within SPO. Internal Facing elements of WPS are the responsibility of the Chief of Defence People.

- a. MOD HS policy and plans are the responsibility of the MOD central HS team, who work directly to the SRO and VCDS. The team are comprised of civilian and military representatives. The military SO1 is the Gender Advisor (GENAD) for UK Defence at the MOD. The team are responsible for:
  - (1) all elements of HS policy and support HS planning outputs within SPO;
  - (2) setting direction and coordinating work with the subordinate organisational HS champions, advocates and SMEs to ensure that HS is incorporated across UK Defence through the HS Governance structures in line with the HS strategy;
  - (3) internal, cross government and external engagement that relates to all CCTs;
  - (4) the provision of the MOD's input into UK government, NATO and UN policy, plans, theory of change work, guidance notes, projects and programmes;
  - (5) translating international and government strategies and policy into UK Defence activity;
  - (6) acting as the focal point for IOs and multilateral forums such as the UN, the EU and NATO, individual states, regional groupings, OGDs, agencies and forces, and the rest of the MOD;
  - (7) preparing, reacting and responding to Parliamentary reports, Ministerial briefings and enquiries;

(8) facilitating and delivering the assistance of military expertise on panels, external training or events relating to HS CCTs.

b. Key to the success of incorporating HS resides in the wider activities of SPO members. All involved in planning have a responsibility to ensure a HS approach is considered and where appropriate incorporated.

c. IPS teams and Military Strategic Effects hold many of the skills and keys to unlocking the incorporation of a HS approach across the globe and through planning. To that end, the IPS Directorate teams in the MOD Head Office will have at least one HS focal point per region. Those nominated for the role will work with the MOD central policy team on forecasting HS into country plans and projects linked to conflict, crisis, peace and stability. IPS HS focal points are responsible for:

(1) ensuring HS considerations are incorporated in both enduring and short notice commitments, at home and overseas, across the UK's operations. In addition, where relevant, HS should be incorporated into strategic OSW and military activity;

(2) demonstrate in annual country plans how UK Defence seeks to implement UNSCRs, with consideration given towards gender perspectives;

(3) ensuring HS is incorporated in activities as defined in paragraph 0405 to this JSP;

(4) HS is incorporated in strategic planning and the outputs as directed in paragraph 0302. Particular attention should be given to the inclusion of HS in formal directives to Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ);

(5) ensuring the initial force generation request considers and directs more diversity where appropriate, which reflects the population or training audience to be able to deliver on all aspects of HS as outlined in this JSP;

(6) where deployed personnel are being considered for UN or PK missions, direction is given to deploy mixed patrols / engagement troops working towards the UN uniformed parity strategy. This applies for troop and staff appointments;

(7) seeking opportunities to meet with members of CS in the UK and in countries in which the military is deployed or conducting training on a regular and ad hoc basis to better understand the concerns of civilians in the areas where the military is deployed or trans international militaries are deployed;

(8) ensure they work with the Defence Attaché networks, global network and MOD central HS team on shaping the formal requirement and input through ESCAPADE.

d. The Defence Attaché / Defence Advisers Network will continue to ensure that the UK's NAP on WPS continues to be implemented, through International Engagement and country plans. Guidance should be sought from the MOD central HS team, where appropriate. This includes:

- (1) allocating 15% of International Tier 1 UK-funded course places to international officers, with priority given to women officers where appropriate;
- (2) including WPS through HS into discussion and training with international militaries, emphasising the participation of women at all levels;
- (3) seeking opportunities through the CSSF, and other funding, for HS inclusion in conflict, mediation and stability projects or programmes where UK Defence can assist;
- (4) working with other HMG colleagues in embassies<sup>47</sup> on wider HS issues such as BI.

#### 0407. **Strategic Command Headquarters.**

Strategic Command holds the key to many of the assets and capabilities that will widen reach for planned HS activities, ensuring UK Defence has the right resources, processes and training to incorporate HS considerations. Strategic Command will:

- a. ensure appropriate representation and attendance at the HS governance meetings, including having a nominated HS champion (at 1\*/2\* rank or grade) and a HS Advocate (1\*/OF5 rank or grade at the HS steering group);
- b. retain HS policy and plans posts for both Strategic Command HQ and PJHQ to support policy delivery and analysis;
- c. to establish deployable HSAs in both SJFHQ and Joint Force Headquarters to integrate HS considerations in planning and OSW;
- d. foster a HS culture throughout Strategic Command HQ in all daily outputs, where context-appropriate;
- e. assist UK Defence Intelligence (DI) in inculcating HS into Intelligence to deepen the understanding of situational awareness, contribute to identifying transnational challenges resultant from interventions and strengthen reputational resilience;
- f. DI will:
  - (1) develop the Intelligence Picture for HS so that it can be incorporated into the military planning process to enrich understanding for Planners;
  - (2) further evaluate operational reach back mechanisms to establish a more permanent model that will support deployed assets with HS RFIs;
  - (3) appoint a HS lead in DI Operations;
  - (4) appoint a standing member from Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR) to attend the HS governance groups and boards;

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<sup>47</sup> Such as governance advisers where they are in place.

(5) inculcate HS RFIs into the current Information requirement management structure;

(6) to train a HS Advisor in all three regional centres of the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence AOR.

g. ensure that UK Defence Medical Services continue to build their capability in respect of CRSV and responding to victims of sexual violence (on deployments in extremis), in line with their endorsed CRSV actions paper. Where appropriate, deliver training on women's health to civilians in AORs whilst on deployment;

h. in line with the HS strategy assume responsibility of the HS Training Requirements Authority (TRA) from August 2022, with the UK Defence Academy remaining as the training delivery unit. This role will also lead the HS Training and Doctrine Working Group which ensures the golden thread of HS through training in UK Defence;

i. ensure all Joint Warfare exercise development and delivery include HS considerations that can be addressed by the training audience. Joint Warfare sponsored courses should include HS;

j. through JFD work towards allocating 15% of Tier 1 UK-funded course places to international officers, with priority given to women officers where appropriate.

#### 0408. **Operational - Single Service Commands.**

Responsibility for incorporating HS into the single Services (sS) rests with the Naval, General and Air Staffs. The sS exercise control through Navy Command, Army HQ, and Air Command respectively. Each sS will:

a. appoint a HS Champion at 2\* who attends the VCDS-chaired HS Decision Board;

b. appoint a HS Advocate at 1\* or OF5 who attends the ACDS MS&GE-chaired HS Steering Group;

c. appoint a HS policy, technical and plans lead who represents at the HS Implementation Working Group to assist with strategy, policy and incorporating HS considerations into training, analysis, planning and OSW;

d. establish Service-level understanding of HS so that all planners are able to apply HS principles throughout Service activity;

e. establish sS HS training and doctrine plans;

f. establish sS community of interest and HS Working Group to progress actions from policy and plans. Any measures of achievements should be briefed through the HS governance structures;

g. ensure all deployments have received relevant PDT on HS;

- h. ensure Suitability, Qualified Experienced Person HSA(s), deploy when appropriate and in accordance with PJHQ Standing Operating Procedure for deployments;
- i. ensure directed tasks in paragraphs 0404 - 0408 are incorporated in HQ directives, planning and operational outputs;
- j. ensure Service Police (Royal Military Police, Royal Navy Police, RAF Police, and, in due course, the Defence Serious Crime Unit) are prepared to assist HS policy objectives through the investigation of adversaries, partners and own force legal violations related to HS including MSHT, SEA and other violations of applicable IHRL and/or IHL / LOAC.

#### 0409. **External Advisory Group.**

The MOD central HS team will create and coordinate an external advisory group. These will be HS CCTs' interested parties who can consult with the military on its HS approach, through a formal group. As this group develops please direct:

- a. any expressions of interest to be included in this advisory group;
- b. requests of UK Defence personnel for events, delivering training or forum inclusion;
- c. any requests of UK Defence relating to HS;

to the following central mailbox: [SPOGE-STRAT-HS-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk](mailto:SPOGE-STRAT-HS-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk), where someone from the MOD central HS team will assist you with your enquiry.

#### 0410. **Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).**

UK Defence aims to work more closely with the OSCE as we progress HS. Respect for human rights and HS, including fundamental freedoms, are key to the OSCE's comprehensive security model. The OSCE monitors the human rights situation in its 57 participating states, all of which have recognised that human rights are inalienable and guaranteed by law.

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) provides advice, assistance and supports CSO with targeted training and education. ODIHR covers a broad spectrum of issues, ranging from the fundamental freedoms of religion or belief, movement, assembly and association, to reporting on the use of the death penalty, monitoring trials, and preventing torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Several OSCE field operations are closely aligned to HS and human rights.

# 5 Integrating Human Security into Training

0501. To ensure UK Defence personnel have the capability, understanding and training to incorporate HS considerations in their approach to military activity, a through-career HS education and training pathway needs to be implemented.

0502. Internal Training will be designed and delivered in line with JSP 822, Defence Direction and Guidance for Training and Education. The lead TRA will be Strategic Command HQ for UK Defence level requirements. sS will lead for Service level training. They must aim to ensure that inclusion of HS is in command and leadership training and ensure, where relevant, that deployed personnel have HS training appropriate for the region and context to which they are deploying. sS must develop staff understanding of HS issues and more tri-service and Joint roles likely to be undertaken as leaders progress through their career.

## 0503. **International Training.**

The delivery of HS training overseas will continue<sup>48</sup> and should be considered in line with JSP 510, International Defence Training.

IPS and Defence sections should consider promoting the HS in Defence course to nations, run by the Defence Leadership School at the Defence Academy. Although not listed in JSP 510, the TRA reserve up to 20 places for International Students to attend on two courses a year, which supports UK Defence's commitment to UNSCR 1325. Applications can be made in accordance with the HS Defence Information Note and students from the published NAP focus countries will be UK funded<sup>49</sup>. Thereafter, it is the discretion of the demand signal and the MOD central HS team as to whether the UK funds the place. Consideration to funding will be given to each place on its own merit, with particular focus on how it supports UK Defence global engagement objectives and IPS priority frameworks. Where doubt over the basis of agreement exists, clarification and guidance on ESCAPADE entries can be sought from the MOD central HS team. Moreover, places on the UK delivered BI course for Senior Leaders and BI Train the Trainer courses should be bid for, also delivered by Defence Academy.

## 0504. **Individual training.**

Will be structured such that all personnel have the appropriate level of awareness, that those putting it into practice can do so and that there are experts available to support specific operations and plans. Specialist training for specified roles should be developed where required. As a baseline, all service personnel must receive HS awareness training which should include understanding of HS considerations and actions on preventing, recognising, responding, and referring. Specialist training will include:

- a. **Human Security in Defence Course<sup>50</sup> (Defence TRAD).** Pre employment training for individuals working in roles at the operational and strategic level, UK, or exchange, which require HS integration or delivery. sS and Front-Line Commands are

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<sup>48</sup> Generally, through Short Term Training Team and qualified staff, but also through RMAS.

<sup>49</sup> Use of the CSSF, ODR or Defence Assistance Funds should be considered.

<sup>50</sup> Already being taught at the Defence Academy to qualify HSA's.

to identify individual posts, training requirement to the TRAD annually. This course is also for those individuals selected to deploy in the role of HSA or Advocate;

b. **Defence Human Security in planning<sup>51</sup> (Defence TRAD)**. Pre employment training for individuals in roles at the Joint and Operational battle planning staff. This includes those directly involved in planning in MOD SPO, who require the basics of how to incorporate HS into planning;

c. **Defence Human Security practitioner (sS responsibility)**. Pre employment training for individuals prior to taking up their role, e.g. Information Activities & Outreach posts. This is to meet a bespoke requirement defined by sS;

d. **sS Commanders and Career Leadership courses**. A baseline of appropriate awareness should be in phase 1 and 2 training. Specific training must be delivered to those on command courses as appropriate for Non Commissioned Officers and Officers. Where relevant, performance statements should be updated. This ensures that commanders understand their responsibilities and drive the incorporation of HS. Operational Role Performance Statements should be updated to reflect the requirement for all ranks to understand HS dynamics and to represent them to their subordinates.

#### 0505. **Collective training.**

HS should be included in:

a. all relevant PDT. The degree to which service personnel are instructed will be in line with sS training strategy and direction, prioritised against mission relevance;

b. all major exercise planning, scenario development, pre-exercise briefs and exercise delivery. Exercise leads should work with sS HS focal points, HSAs, key civilian advisors<sup>52</sup> and CS members of the advisory group to help shape relevant material. The white cell on joint exercises is a great source for support and guidance;

c. PDT / Reception, Staging and Onward Integration to include theatre specific HS issues;

d. briefs for those service personnel deploying on MACA and HADR where relevant;

e. Defence Attaché training delivery and to those deploying in engagement roles.

#### 0506. **External individual training.**

UK defence personnel will continue to support courses being delivered by the UN, NATO, OGDs and wider associations both as students and presenters, on request. Student bids and selection for NATO courses should come through the MOD central HS team to prioritise attendance. Formal requests for training should be directed to the [SPOGE-STRAT-HS-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk](mailto:SPOGE-STRAT-HS-Mailbox@mod.gov.uk) central mailbox, in the first instance.

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<sup>51</sup> Course to be financed and developed.

<sup>52</sup> STABADS, GENADS, or HSA's.

**0507. Governance for HS training and Doctrine.**

A HS Training and Doctrine Working Group is already established against an approved Terms of Reference. The MOD central HS team chairs this group, which occurs quarterly. There must be regular attendance from all sS, TLBs, key internal training establishments and, if required, SMEs.

**0508. Training repository.**

A training repository will ensure that training materials remain up to date and are used consistently across Defence. A central repository will be designed, developed and maintained at the Defence Academy hosted by the Defence Leadership Centre.

**0509. Continuous Professional Development.**

Will be explored to include annual seminars, think piece events and defence-accredited tertiary academia opportunities.



## 6 Assessment of the Delivery of Human Security in Military Operations

0601. This chapter highlights that UK Defence must seek to address the following two questions: “How does Defence know HS is being used in military operations?” and “How is HS measured within military operations?”. The approaches at the strategic and operational levels will vary but the end state is similar. In considering these questions it should be borne in mind that Defence reporting will feed into wider UK government reporting for the strategies mentioned in para 0102 and is consistent with the language used by those departments.

0602. The MOD central HS team is working to deliver a strategic outcome investigating ‘incorporating HS in the way we operate, in particular on military operations’. It will look across all operations for evidence of HS. It should be based on a theory of change<sup>53</sup> assuming that people are available with their specialist knowledge who will inform and influence the change(s). It should consider that, if informing and influencing takes place, then operational lessons will be generated and engagement plans will be made that relate to HS. A results framework<sup>54</sup> should then capture data against a set of indicators or measures, be that qualitative or quantitative. This will be developed and included in the updated version of the JSP in 2022.

0603. As this is under development, TLBs are requested to provide a six monthly return on incorporating HS into operations, submitted to MOD central HS team within two weeks of the snapshot generation dates; 1 April and 1 October each year.

0604. Any measurement of effect at the operational level will be contextual to the operation and developed through the planning process.

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<sup>53</sup> Explains how a group of early and intermediate accomplishments sets the stage for producing long-range results. MOD Central HS Team will lead for UK Defence at the request of OGDs, to provide input.

<sup>54</sup> Sets out how much change we should expect to see at set points in time and how we will manage that change. Key elements are impact, outcomes and outputs for UK defence. This can be found in the endorsed HS Strategy.