



This publication provides information on the number of **Military Personnel** (defined as the **strength**), joining (**intake**) and leaving (**outflow**) the UK Armed Forces. Detail is provided for both the **Full-time Armed Forces (AF)** and **Reserves**. Further statistics can be found in the [Excel tables](#).

The recent trends in Reserve personnel numbers in this report relate to the targets outlined in the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) programme. Following the Integrated Review and Spending Review, the previous future workforce requirements for the Armed Forces are no longer applicable. We are currently undertaking a review of how this information will be presented in the future.

Some of the statistics previously published in the following publications can now be found in this release: [Monthly, Quarterly and Annual Personnel Reports, UK Reserve Forces and Cadets, Service Personnel Bulletin 2.01](#) and [Service and Civilian Bulletin 2.03](#).

Key Points and Trends

▲ 198,940	Strength of UK Forces Service Personnel at 1 October 2021 <i>An increase of 3,890 (2.0 per cent) since 1 October 2020</i>
▲ 137,130	Full-time Trained Strength (RN/RM & RAF) and Full-time Trade Trained Strength (Army) at 1 October 2021 <i>An increase of 2,930 (2.2 per cent) since 1 Oct 2020</i>
▲ 17,070	People joined the UK Regular Armed Forces in the past 12 months (1 October 2020 - 30 September 2021) <i>An increase of 2,490 (17.0 per cent) compared with the previous 12 month period</i>
▲ 13,850	People left the UK Regular Armed Forces in the past 12 months (1 October 2020 - 30 September 2021) <i>An increase of 890 (6.9 per cent) compared with the previous 12 month period</i>
▼ 32,070	Strength of the Trained Future Reserves 2020 at 1 October 2021 <i>A decrease of 610 (1.9 per cent) since 1 October 2020</i>
▲ 5,700	People joined the Future Reserves 2020 in the past 12 months (1 October 2020 - 30 September 2021) <i>An increase of 680 (13.6 per cent) compared with the previous 12 month period</i>
▲ 5,650	People left the Future Reserves 2020 in the past 12 months (1 October 2020 - 30 September 2021) <i>An increase of 890 (18.8 per cent) compared with the previous 12 month period</i>

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Background quality report: www.gov.uk/government/statistics/tri-service-personnel-bulletin-background-quality-reports

Would you like to be added to our **contact list**, so that we can inform you about updates to these statistics and consult you if we are thinking of making changes? You can subscribe to updates by emailing Analysis-Tri-Service@mod.gov.uk

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Introduction

This publication contains information on the **strength, intake, outflow and gains to trained strength** for the UK Armed Forces overall and each of the Services; **Royal Navy/Royal Marines (RN/RM), Army and Royal Air Force (RAF)**.

The Ministry of Defence (MOD) announced on 29 June 2016 that it was changing the Army trained, disciplined service personnel by changing the definition of Trained Strength to include those in the Army who have completed Phase 1 training. This affects some Tri-Service totals. This does not affect the Naval Service or the RAF in any way. The MOD held a public consultation on **SDSR Resilience: Trained strength definition for the Army and resultant changes to Ministry of Defence Armed Forces personnel statistics**, between 11 July and 21 January 2017. A consultation response was published on 7 November 2016. The changes outlined in the consultation and response have been incorporated into this publication from the 1 October 2016 edition onwards. This affects statistics in some of the accompanying Excel tables, specifically tables: 3a, 3e, 5a, 5b, 5c, 5d, 6a, 6b, 7a, 7b and 7c. Terminology has also been updated in Excel tables 3c and 4.

Detailed statistics, including unrounded figures, and historic time series can be found in the **Excel tables**. These include quarterly statistics on the number of **Service and Civilian Personnel, Separated Service** (the proportion of personnel breaching harmony guidelines), **Applications** to each of the Services and **Military Salaries**. Further historic statistics will be added in due course; in the meantime, historic statistics can be found in the following archived publications: **Monthly, Quarterly and Annual Personnel Reports, UK Reserve Forces and Cadets, Service Personnel Bulletin 2.01, Service and Civilian Bulletin 2.03, UK Armed Forces Maternity Report, Diversity Dashboard and Quarterly Location Statistics**. The **glossary** contains definitions of terminology used in this publication.

A calendar of upcoming MOD statistical releases can be found on [GOV.UK](https://www.gov.uk).

A National Statistics Publication

The United Kingdom Statistics Authority has designated these statistics as National Statistics, in accordance with the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007 and signifying compliance with the Code of Practice for Official Statistics. Designation can be broadly interpreted to mean that the statistics:

- meet identified user needs;
- are well explained and readily accessible;
- are produced according to sound methods; and
- are managed impartially and objectively in the public interest.

Once statistics have been designated as National Statistics it is a statutory requirement that the Code of Practice shall continue to be observed.

Policy background

The main factors affecting decisions about the size of the Armed Forces required by the MOD to achieve success in its military tasks include:

- An assessment of current and future threats to UK national security;
- The need for contingent / reactive capability – the requirement to be able to respond immediately to domestic or international crisis;
- Current operational and international obligations (e.g. NATO, UN);
- Changes in technology, the introduction of new equipment and restructuring that leads to equipment becoming obsolete or surplus to requirements;
- The need to deliver against the military tasks as efficiently as possible, maintaining a balanced, affordable defence budget.

The Service Personnel Statistics in previous versions of this publication are reported against the [2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review](#) (SDSR), released in November 2015. Prior to SDSR 2015, publications reported against the planned Future Force 2020, as set out in the SDSR 2010 which planned to reduce the size of the Armed Forces.

Army Trained Strength

On 29 June 2016, the MOD [announced](#) that the Army planned to use Regular and Reserve Phase 1 trained personnel in response to crises within the UK. Following this, the term 'Trained Strength' would include all Army personnel trained in the core function of their Service (i.e. those who have completed Phase 1 training). The MOD has [consulted](#) on these changes and the resultant impact they will have on this publication and a consultation response was published on 7 October 2016.

From the 1 October 2016 edition onwards, Army personnel who have completed Phase 1 training (basic Service training) but not Phase 2 training (trade training), are considered trained personnel. This change enabled the Army to meet the SDSR 15 commitment to improve support to UK resilience. The Trained Strength definition for the Royal Navy, RAF, Maritime Reserve and RAF Reserves has not changed, reflecting the requirement for their personnel to complete Phase 2 training to be able to fulfil the core function of their respective Services.

Army personnel who have completed Phase 2 training are now called 'Trade Trained'. This population aligns with the old definition of trained personnel, therefore maintaining the continuity of the statistical time series, and will continue to be counted against the historic workforce requirement.

The Army have undertaken a review of training requirements and Royal Engineers Other Ranks personnel joining from 1 July 2019 will become Trade Trained after Initial Trade Training (ITT) and will join the Full-time Trade Trained Strength (FTTTS), and therefore we may see a change in the trend.

Full-Time Armed Forces Personnel

In order to meet the personnel reduction targets set out in SDSR 2010, the [Three Month Exercise](#) (3ME) and [Army 2020](#) (A2020), a redundancy programme coupled with adjusted recruiting (intake) and contract extensions, were set. The redundancy programme is now complete.

On 23 November 2015, MOD published the National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015. SDSR 2015 outlined plans to uplift the size of the Regular Armed Forces, setting targets for a strength of 82,000 for the Army, and increasing the Royal Navy/Royal Marines and Royal Air Force by a total of 700

Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Programme

The Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) programme aimed to increase the size of the Reserve Forces. Further information on the growth of the Reserves can be found in the Policy Background section of previous [Monthly Service Personnel Statistics](#) publications.

As a result of the changes to Army Trained Strength (referred to above) and their impact on the Army Reserve, the MOD released a [Written Ministerial Statement](#) containing revised Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) strength growth profiles on 8 November 2016. Reporting of the growth of the Reserves will be based on strength profiles only.

There has been no formal announcement of new targets beyond 31 March 2019. However, the Ministry of Defence's recruitment campaign is a long-term programme and numbers continue to grow.

Reserve Forces 2030 (RF30) Programme

The Reserve Forces 2030 (RF30) Review does not include a target for additional personnel numbers beyond those in the Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) programme.

RF30 builds on the work carried out by FR20; the RF30 Review offers 18 recommendations grouped into four key areas in which the Reserves will need to continue to adapt in order to develop their utility. These are: redefining the Reserves' relationship with society; expanding the role of the Reserves; unlocking the potential of reservists; and transforming support to the Reserves.

The Ministry of Defence has established an implementation programme to consider the RF30 recommendations. A formal response, or responses, to the RF30 Review will follow the RF30 implementation programme's detailed analysis of the recommendations.

UK Service Personnel

UK Service Personnel comprise the total **strength** of the military personnel employed by the Ministry of Defence ([Excel tables](#), Table 1). The current strength of the UK Service Personnel is 198,940 which includes:

- All **UK Regular** personnel and all **Gurkha** personnel (which combined at 1 October 2021 comprised 77.2 per cent of UK Service Personnel);
- **Volunteer Reserve** personnel (which at 1 October 2021 comprised 18.6 per cent of UK Service Personnel);
- **Other Personnel** including the Serving Regular Reserve, Sponsored Reserve, Military Provost Guard Service, Locally Engaged Personnel and elements of the Full-time Reserve Service (FTRS) (which at 1 October 2021 comprised 4.2 per cent of UK Service Personnel).

Strength is the number of personnel.

UK Regulars are full-time Service personnel, including Nursing Services, excluding FTRS personnel, Gurkhas, mobilised Reservists, Military Provost Guarding Service (MPGS), Locally Engaged Personnel (LEP), and Non Regular Permanent Service (NRPS).

Volunteer Reserves voluntarily accept an annual training commitment and are liable to be mobilised to deploy on operations. They can be utilised on a part-time or full-time basis to provide support to the Regular Forces at home and overseas.

The total strength of the UK Forces¹ has increased between 1 October 2020 and 1 October 2021 by 2.0 per cent (3,890 personnel), as shown in Table 1. Since 1 October 2020, the total strength of the UK Regular Forces, Gurkhas and Other Personnel have all increased. The strength of the Volunteer Reserves has increased for Royal Navy/Royal Marines and RAF but slightly decreased for Army.

Table 1: Trends in UK Forces Strength¹

	1 Oct 18	1 Oct 19	1 Oct 20	01-Apr-21	01-Jul-21	01-Oct-21	% Change since 1 Oct 20
UK Forces Personnel	192,130	192,660	195,050	198,880	198,800	198,940	2.0%
UK Regular Forces	144,900	144,650	146,330	149,280	149,230	149,540	2.2%
Gurkhas	3,090	3,380	3,740	4,010	3,980	3,960	5.9%
Volunteer Reserve	36,310	36,830	37,040	37,420	37,290	37,060	0.0%
Other Personnel	7,840	7,790	7,940	8,170	8,290	8,380	5.5%
Royal Navy / Royal Marines	38,650	38,900	39,840	40,400	40,640	40,650	2.0%
UK Regular Forces	32,540	32,600	33,380	33,850	34,040	34,130	2.2%
Volunteer Reserve	3,750	3,910	4,000	4,080	4,130	4,040	0.9%
Other Personnel	2,360	2,390	2,450	2,480	2,470	2,480	1.0%
Army	116,610	116,730	117,810	120,660	120,180	120,300	2.1%
UK Regular Forces	79,640	79,330	80,040	82,230	81,820	82,040	2.5%
Gurkhas	3,090	3,380	3,740	4,010	3,980	3,960	5.9%
Volunteer Reserve	29,600	29,840	29,790	30,040	29,880	29,740	-0.2%
Other Personnel	4,270	4,180	4,240	4,380	4,500	4,560	7.7%
Royal Air Force	36,870	37,030	37,400	37,810	37,980	37,990	1.6%
UK Regular Forces	32,720	32,720	32,910	33,200	33,370	33,380	1.4%
Volunteer Reserve	2,960	3,090	3,240	3,300	3,280	3,280	1.0%
Other Personnel	1,200	1,220	1,250	1,310	1,330	1,340	6.8%

Source: Analysis (Tri-Service)

1. UK Forces comprises all UK Regular, Gurkha, Volunteer Reserve and Other personnel. The constituents of "Other personnel" are reported towards the top of this page.

Full-Time Trained Strength (RN/RM & RAF) and Full-Time Trade Trained Strength (Army)

The total Full-Time Trained Strength (RN/RM & RAF) and Full-Time Trade Trained Strength (Army) has increased between 1 October 2020 and 1 October 2021 by 2.2 per cent (2,930 personnel). The FTTS (RN/RM), FTTTS (Army) and FTTS (RAF) has increased by 2.3 per cent, 2.9 per cent and 0.2 per cent, respectively, as shown in Table 2.


Table 2: FTTS (RN/RM & RAF) and FTTTS (Army)

	1 Oct 18	1 Oct 19	1 Oct 20	1 Apr 21	1 Jul 21	1 Oct 21	% Change since 1 Oct 20
FTTS (RN/RM & RAF) and FTTTS (Army)	135,360	132,340	134,200	136,600	137,390	137,130	2.2%
RN/RM (FTTS)	29,160	29,010	29,030	29,460	29,710	29,690	2.3%
Army (FTTTS)	76,130	73,470	75,310	77,200	77,820	77,530	2.9%
RAF(FTTS)	30,070	29,860	29,850	29,940	29,860	29,910	0.2%

Source: Analysis (Tri-Service)

The Full-Time Trained Strength (RN/RM & RAF) and Full-Time Trade Trained Strength (Army) has been increasing since 1 July 2020 but has decreased since between 1 July 2021 and 1 October 2021, as shown below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: FTTS (RN/RM & RAF) and FTTTS (Army)



Full-time Trained Strength (RN/RM & RAF) and Full-time Trade Trained Strength (Army) includes all UK Regular personnel, Gurkhas and the relevant elements of the Full-time Reserve Service (FTRS) (see [glossary](#) for more detail).


Full-Time Trained and Trade Trained Strength (Army)

Table 3: Comparison of Full-Time Trained and Trade-Trained Strengths (Army)

	1 Oct 20	1 Jan 21	1 Apr 21	1 Jul 21	1 Oct 21
Full-Time Trained Strength	80,760	81,550	82,190	82,670	83,010
of which Trade Trained	75,310	76,350	77,200	77,820	77,530

Source: Analysis (Tri-Service)

Figure 2: FTTS & FTTTS in the Army since Trained Strength definition change in October 16



As can be seen from Figure 2 above, Army Trained strength (FTTS) has been increasing since April 2019. The Army Trade Trained strength (FTTTS) has been increasing between October 2019 until 1 July 2021 but has decreased since between 1 July 2021 and 1 October 2021. The Trained and Trade Trained strength is higher than at 1 October 2020 by 2.8 per cent and 2.9 per cent respectively.

Table 4: Army Officers and Other Ranks by Training Status

	1 Oct 18	1 Oct 19	1 Oct 20	1 Apr 21	1 Jul 21	1 Oct 21
Trained Officers	12,610	12,640	12,860	12,770	12,950	12,970
Trade Trained Officers	12,260	12,170	12,490	12,490	12,630	12,630
Trained Other Ranks	67,170	66,060	67,900	69,420	69,720	70,040
Trade Trained Other Ranks	63,870	61,300	62,820	64,710	65,190	64,900

Source: Analysis (Tri-Service)

Since 1 October 2020, the strength of the Trained and Trade Trained Officers has increased by 0.9 per cent and 1.1 per cent respectively. The strength of Trained Other Ranks has increased by 3.1 per cent and the strength of Trade Trained Other Ranks has increased by 3.3 per cent since 1 October 2020, as can be seen from Table 4 above.

UK Regular Personnel (excluding Gurkhas)

As at 1 October 2021, the Trained and Untrained Strength of the UK Regular Forces (which excludes Gurkhas) was 149,540. The Service split for this figure can be found in Table 5 below.

There are 11,600 untrained personnel in the UK Regular Forces (excluding Gurkhas), of which 4,760 are in the RN/RM, 3,300 in the Army and 3,540 are in the RAF. The Untrained Strength reflects the number of personnel who can potentially join the Trained Strength.

Table 5: UK Regular Forces by Service and Training Status

	1 Oct 20		1 Oct 21	
RN/RM	33,380		34,130	
of which Trained	28,710	86.0%	29,360	86.0%
Army	80,040		82,040	
of which Trained	76,680	95.8%	78,740	96.0%
of which Trade Trained	71,800	89.7%	73,780	89.9%
RAF	32,910		33,380	
of which Trained	29,800	90.5%	29,840	89.4%

Source: Analysis (Tri-Service)


Intake and Outflow

In the 12 months to 30 September 2021 there was a net intake of 3,230 personnel to the UK Regular Forces. This is higher than the net intake of 1,630 in the 12 months to 30 September 2020. Outflow has increased by 6.9 per cent and intake has increased by 17.0 per cent, since 30 September 2020.

Intake

- Intake into the trained and untrained UK Regular Forces was 17,070 in the 12 months to 30 September 2021, compared to 14,590 in the 12 months to 30 September 2020.
- In the 12 months to 30 September 2021, intake to the RN/RM, Army and RAF has increased by 4.3, 25.2 and 8.2 per cent, respectively compared with the 12 months to 30 September 2020.

Figure 3: Intake to and Outflow from the UK Regular Forces over rolling 12-month periods



UK Regular Personnel

Outflow

- Outflow from the trained and untrained UK Regular Forces was 13,850 in the 12 months to 30 September 2021; up from 12,950 in the 12 months to 30 September 2020.
- Across all Services, VO was the most common reason for outflow of Trained (RN/RM & RAF) and Trade Trained (Army) personnel, accounting for 56.5 per cent of outflow in the 12 months to 30 September 2021 (See Figure 4).
- In the 12 months to 30 September 2021, 5,390 Trained (RN/RM & RAF) and Trade Trained (Army) personnel left through VO; the VO rate was 4.1 per cent. The VO Rate for the RN/RM was 4.1 per cent, for the Army it was 4.2 per cent and for the RAF it was 3.7 per cent.
- In the 12 months to 30 September 2021, the VO rate amongst Other Ranks and Officers was 4.2 per cent and 3.4 per cent respectively.

Voluntary Outflow (VO) encompasses all trained (RN/RM & RAF) and Trade Trained (Army) personnel who voluntarily exit before the end of their agreed engagement or commission period.


Time Expiry is a term used to describe those in the Armed Services who reach the end of their engagement or commission and then leave.

Other includes outflow from the Trained (RN/RM & RAF) and Trade Trained (Army) strength due to, amongst others, medical reasons, misconduct, compassionate, dismissals and death.

VO Rate is the number of personnel voluntarily outflowing as a proportion of the average Trained Strength for the outflow period.

There is no single reason why personnel leave on Voluntary Outflow, but the personnel who completed the [Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey](#) indicated reasons for leaving the Armed Forces included the impact of Service life on family and personal life and opportunities outside the Armed Forces.

Figure 4: Outflow of Trained (RN/RM & RAF) and Trade Trained (Army) UK Regulars by exit reason (12 months to 30 September 2021)



UK Regular Personnel

Gains to Trained Strength and Trained Outflow


In the 12 months to 30 September 2021, there was a net gain of 3,100 personnel to the UK Regular Forces Trained (RN/RM & RAF) and Trade Trained strength (Army). Compared to 12 months ending 30 September 2020, the net gain was 1,900.

- Trained and Trade Trained direct entrants in the 12 months to 30 September 2021 was 620. This is a decrease of 17.1 per cent from the 12 months to 30 September 2020.
- Personnel completing Phase 2 training in the 12 months to 30 September 2021 was 12,020. This has increased by 11.5 per cent when compared against this period's equivalent a year ago (10,770).
- Compared to the 12 months to 30 September 2020, Gains to Trained Strength for the RN/RM, Army and RAF increased by 32.8 per cent, 4.6 per cent and 2.2 per cent respectively when compared against the same period a year ago.
- In comparison to the 12 months ending 30 September 2020, Trained outflow from the RN/RM increased by 6.7 per cent, Army Trade Trained Outflow decreased by 2.0 per cent and RAF Trained Outflow has decreased 5.2 per cent in the 12 months ending 30 September 2021.

Gains to Trained Strength (GTS) figures comprise all Regular personnel who complete Phase 2 training and those that enter directly into the Phase 2 Trained strength. It excludes those returning to the Phase 2 trained strength from Long Term Absence (LTA).

Trained Outflow figures show Phase 2 Trained outflow from UK Regular Forces, including personnel leaving the Services, deaths and recalled reservists on release. They do not include promotion from Ranks to Officers or flows between Services.

Figure 5: GTS and Outflow from the UK Trained Regular Forces 12 month ending across the Armed Forces



Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Programme Monitoring

Following consultation on changes to the Army Trained Strength definition and the removal of the FR20 intake targets, the MOD released Future Reserves 2020 Trained Strength growth profiles in a [Written Ministerial Statement](#) on 8 November 2016. Reporting of the growth of the Reserves will be based on Trained Strength profiles only.

Future Reserves 2020 includes Volunteer Reserves who are mobilised, High Readiness Reserves and those Volunteer Reserves serving on Full-time Reserve Service (FTRS) and Additional Duties Commitment (ADC). Sponsored Reserves who provide a more cost effective solution than Volunteer Reserves are also included in the Army Reserve FR20.

Future Reserves 2020 Strength

Following this, progress against FR20 population Trained Strength targets are reported in Table 6a of the [Excel tables](#).

The total **Trained and Untrained Strength** of the Tri-Service Future Reserves 2020 at 1 October 2021 was 37,070, an increase of 50 personnel or 0.1 per cent since 1 October 2020.

Figure 6: Maritime Reserve Trained Strength




Figure 6 shows that the Maritime Reserve Trained Strength was 2,870 as at 1 October 2021. This has remained stable since 1 October 2020.

The Maritime Reserve total strength as at 1 October 2021 was 4,040. This is an increase of 40 personnel (0.9 per cent) since 1 October 2020.

Figure 7: Army Reserve Trained Strength




Figure 7 shows that the Army Reserve Trained Strength was 26,350 as at 1 October 2021. This is a decrease of 600 (2.2 per cent) since 1 October 2020.

The Army Reserve total strength as at 1 October 2021 was 29,750. This has remained stable since 1 October 2020.

Figure 8: RAF Reserves Trained Strength




Figure 8 shows that as at 1 October 2021 the RAF Reserves Trained Strength was 2,850. This has remained stable since 1 October 2020.


The RAF Reserves total strength as at 1 October 2021 was 3,280. This is an increase of 30 personnel (1.0 per cent) since 1 October 2020.

Future Reserves 2020 (FR20) Programme Monitoring

FR20 Intake and Outflow statistics

Intake and outflow statistics report how many people have left or joined the Trained or Untrained Strengths. As well as leavers and new recruits, this can include personnel transferring to or from the Regular Forces, other Reserve populations, or Reserve re-joiners.


Figure 9: Total intake rate by Service



The total intake rates for each Service in the 12 months to 1 October 2021 are as follows:

- The Maritime Reserve total intake rate was **18.9 per cent**; a decrease of 1.4 percentage points since the 12 months to 1 October 2020.
- The Army Reserve total intake rate was **14.8 per cent**; an increase of 2.5 percentage points since the 12 months to 1 October 2020.
- The RAF Reserves total intake rate was **15.2 per cent**; a decrease of 1.9 percentage points since the 12 months to 1 October 2020.


Figure 10: Total outflow rate by Service



The total outflow rates for each Service in the 12 months to 1 October 2021 are as follows:

- The Maritime Reserve total outflow rate was **17.9 per cent**; an increase of 0.1 percentage points since the 12 months to 1 October 2020.
- The Army Reserve total outflow rate was **14.9 per cent**; an increase of 2.6 percentage points since the 12 months to 1 October 2020.
- The RAF Reserves total outflow rate was **14.2 per cent**; a decrease of 1.9 percentage points since the 12 months to 1 October 2020.

Figure 11: Intake to and Outflow from the FR20 Reserves over rolling 12-month periods



Separated Service

Separated service measures absence from normal place of duty. The time an individual experiences separated service is compared against each Service's "**Individual Harmony**" guidelines to ensure a balance between duty and leisure for all Service personnel.

A breach of individual harmony guidelines occurs when Service personnel experience separated service for longer than the period outlined in individual harmony guidelines, which are based on the structures and organisation of that Service. The guidelines are measured over a 36 month period and the limits are **660 days** away for the RN/RM; **498 days** for the Army; and **468 days** away for the RAF.

Separated Service concerns personnel who are serving away from their usual place of duty or are unable to enjoy leisure at their normal place of duty or residence at place of duty.

Individual Harmony is the freedom to enjoy leisure at the normal place of duty or residence at place of duty; this includes leave and adventurous training.

Using 1 April 2021 as an example, the formula for the breach rate is as follows:


Trained/Trade Trained UK Regular personnel breaching in the 36 months ending to 31 Mar 2021

Trained UK Regular personnel as at 1 Apr 2021

There is a fall in the percentage breaching harmony this quarter for both Army and RAF. The percentage breaching harmony for RN/RM has increased slightly since the previous quarter.

Separated service data can be found in Table 10 of the accompanying [Excel tables](#).

Figure 12: Percentage of UK Regular Forces breaching harmony (1 April 2014 - 30 June 2021)



Applications to the Armed Forces

The figures in this publication include applications to the UK Regular and Volunteer Reserve Forces. They are broken down by Service, and by Officers and Other Ranks.

Whilst application counts for each service are based on online applications submitted by an individual and accepted by Defence Recruitment System (DRS), work is ongoing to verify that application processes and definitions are consistent and we would recommend that numbers should not be aggregated to show Armed Forces totals (hence separate tables and graphs are provided).

The number of applications received does not directly relate to intake figures, since:

Figures relate to the number of **applications** received and not the number of **applicants**, as one applicant may submit several applications;

For successful applicants who accept an offer to join the Services, there is a substantial processing time between their application being received and the applicant joining the Services. Therefore, the intake figures for Dec 19 are not comparable with the number of applications received in Dec 19 as the numbers apply to different cohorts of people;

Applications will not result in intake if, for example, they are withdrawn by the applicant during the recruitment process, rejected by the Services, or if an offer to join the Services is declined by the applicant. **See below** for further information.

There is a break in the time series between 1 October 2017 and 1 July 2018 due to the change in recruiting systems from the Training Administration and Financial Management Information System (TAFMIS) to DRS and due to the need to ensure consistency of the start date for reintroduced data between the single Services.

Applications that do not result in intake

The main causes of **applicant** failure (i.e. no offer to join the Services given) include:

- Failing security clearance;
- Failing the medical scrutiny;
- Not having the required residency;
- Not achieving fitness entry standards;
- Not achieving the required recruiting test score for the desired branch/trade;
- Applicants withdraw for their own reasons (e.g. change of mind) during the process

The main causes of **application** failure (i.e. the applicant declines an offer to join):

- Applicants may have submitted other applications for employment (including multiple applications to join the Armed Forces) and accept another offer;
- Applications may be submitted with no intention to join (e.g. to satisfy the requirements of job seeking).

NOTE: Application numbers cannot be added together across the Services to show total Armed Forces applications due to differences in definitions.

Applications to the Armed Forces

Figure 13: Applications to the RN/RM split by UK Regular Forces and Volunteer Reserves



Figures from 12 months ending 30 June 2019 onwards define an application as an online application submitted by an individual and accepted by Defence Recruitment System (DRS). These figures are not comparable with the figures up until 12 months ending 30 September 2017, which define an application as a candidate who has submitted an AF Career Officer Form 4 and sat the Recruit Test, whether this was passed or failed.

Applications to the RN/RM Regular Forces in the 12 months to 30 June 2021 were 30,683, an increase of 1.0 per cent compared to the 12 months to 30 June 2020 (30,368). Over the same period, applications to the Volunteer Reserves have decreased by 15.2 per cent, from 2,941 in the 12 months to 30 June 2020 to 2,493 in the 12 months to 30 June 2021.

Figure 14: Applications to the Army split by UK Regular Forces and Volunteer Reserves



Figures from 12 months ending 30 June 2019 onwards define an application as an online application submitted by an individual and accepted by Defence Recruitment System (DRS). These figures are not comparable with the figures up until 12 months ending 30 September 2017, as the data is drawn from different databases and have differing definitions of an application. Figures for the period between the introduction of DRS in November 2017 and 30 June 2018 are not available as they are not of the required validity for publication.

Applications to the British Army Regular Forces in the 12 months to 30 June 2021 were 94,789, a decrease of 7.2 per cent compared to the 12 months to 30 June 2020 (102,104). Over the same period, applications to the Volunteer Reserves have decreased by 23.9 per cent, from 32,386 in the 12 months to 30 June 2020 to 24,655 in the 12 months to 30 June 2021.

Commonwealth Applicants are included in the number of applications. The commonwealth entry numbers are closely controlled. Applications may be refused if no commonwealth headroom is available. These applicants will then be withdrawn from the pipeline but the application number will still be counted in the overall volume of applications received.

Figure 15: Applications to the RAF split by UK Regular Forces and Volunteer Reserves



The increase in RAF applications since the introduction of DRS is due to the previous recruitment system having a separate frontend, this was used to assist the initial application processing team in filtering out RAF ineligible applications and non-productive enquiries prior to an official application being recorded. Therefore the figures presented here are not comparable with the figures up until 12 months ending 30 September 2017 presented in previous SPS publications.

Applications to the RAF Regular Forces in the 12 months to 30 June 2021 were 35,816, an increase of 0.6 per cent compared to the 12 months to 30 June 2020 (35,589). Over the same period, applications to the Volunteer Reserves have increased by 3.7 per cent, from 4,300 in the 12 months to 30 June 2020 to 4,457 in the 12 months to 30 June 2021.

Military Salaries

The Military Salaries indices are based on annual pay rates. Indices after Pay 16 are calculated using the number of service personnel at each rank at 1 April 2020, whereas before Pay 16, the number of personnel at 1 April 2015 is used. With the introduction of Pay 16, the strength profile no longer matches previous years, meaning it is not possible to directly compare the two indices. The old index is based against salaries in 2001/02 (the year the Pay 2000 system was introduced); and the new index based against

As can be seen in Table 12 (in the accompanying excel tables), the Military Salaries Index remained the same between 2011/12 and 2012/13 due to the public sector pay freeze. Between 2014/15 and 2017/18 all rates of base pay were uplifted by one per cent each year, as recommended by the Armed Forces Pay Review Body (AFPRB). In 2020/21, the rates of base pay were uplifted by 2.0 percent in line with AFPRB’s recommendation. The latest report from the AFPRB is available [here](#).


Table 6: Military Salaries Growth from 2000/01 to 2020/21

	2001/02	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
Military Salaries Index	100	133	133	135	136	138	100	101	103	106	108

Source: Analysis (Tri-Service)

Given the Office for National Statistics’ (ONS) advice against the Retail Price Index (RPI) being used as a measure of inflation, we have decided to use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) going forward. The ONS does not feel that the RPI is a good measure of inflation and believes there are much better measures available. The RPI tends to be higher than CPI, and the ONS believes this causes it to overstate inflation.

Figure 16: Real growth of Military Salaries and Average Earnings using CPI




1. Real growth in salaries is growth over and above inflation. It represents the increase in purchasing power between one year and the next. For example, if salaries grew by 2%, but prices rose by 1%, real salary growth would be about 1%, because someone earning that salary could purchase around 1% more goods and services. Real pay growth can be negative if inflation is outstripping salary growth. Values at 0% indicate an increase in line with inflation. The measure of inflation used here is growth in Consumer Price Index (CPI).
2. When calculating the real growth of average earnings the ONS Average Weekly Earnings index (K45U: whole economy, total pay including bonuses) has been employed. Military salaries do not include bonuses or allowances.

Military Salaries

Figure 16 highlights that real growth in military salaries and average earnings growth for the latest point available, 2020/21, were above the CPI measure of inflation. In 2020/21, the growth of military salaries was lower than the real growth of average earnings.

The real growth of military salaries relative to CPI (excluding bonuses) was 1.1 per cent during 2020/21, whereas the real growth in UK average earnings for the economy (total pay including bonuses) experienced a growth rate of 1.6 per cent relative to CPI in 2020/21.

Figure 17: Real growth of Military Salaries and Average Earnings using RPI



1. Real growth in salaries is growth over and above inflation. It represents the increase in purchasing power between one year and the next. For example, if salaries grew by 2%, but prices rose by 1%, real salary growth would be about 1%, because someone earning that salary could purchase around 1% more goods and services. Real pay growth can be negative if inflation is outstripping salary growth. Values at 0% indicate an increase in line with inflation. The measure of inflation used here is growth in Retail Price Index (RPI). From next year, the CPI will be the only index used to deflate the military salaries and average weekly earnings.
2. When calculating the real growth of average earnings the ONS Average Weekly Earnings index (K45U: whole economy, total pay including bonuses) has been employed. Military salaries do not include bonuses or allowances.

Figure 17 highlights that real growth in military salaries and average earnings for the latest point available, 2020/21, were both above the RPI measure of inflation. In 2020/21, the real growth of military salaries was lower than the real growth of average earnings.

The real growth of military salaries relative to RPI (excluding bonuses) was 0.5 per cent during 2020/21, whereas the real growth in UK average earnings for the economy (total pay including bonuses) experienced a growth rate of 1.0 per cent relative to RPI in 2020/21.

The growth rates for both the Military Salaries Index and the Average Weekly Earnings index were above inflation in 2020/21, for both CPI and RPI. The salaries themselves have not changed, but the relative growth rates are generally higher when compared against CPI than when compared to RPI. As mentioned earlier, the ONS believes the RPI to be a bad measure of inflation, so the CPI will be used in future iterations of the Military Salaries Index.

It should be noted that in the last published edition of the Military Salaries Index, the 2019/20 military salaries growth was higher than that of average earnings. Due to a correction in methodology, military salaries growth is now below average earnings. This can be seen in both Figure 16 and Figure 17.

Further Information

Rounding

Apart from the Applications section, all figures in this publication have been rounded to the nearest 10, though numbers ending in a “5” have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent the systematic bias caused by always rounding numbers upwards. For example; a value of “25” would be rounded down to “20” and a value of “15” would be rounded up to “20”.

Additionally, totals and sub-totals are rounded separately and so may not equal the sums of their rounded parts.

Percentages are calculated from unrounded data and presented to one decimal place.

The MOD Disclosure Control and Rounding policy is published on GOV.UK and we have applied this policy to the statistics in the accompanying Excel tables. The policy is available here: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defence-statistics-policies>.

Revisions

Corrections to the published statistics will be made if errors are found, or if figures change as a result of improvements to methodology or changes to definitions. When making corrections, we will follow the Ministry of Defence [Statistics Revisions and Corrections Policy](#). All corrected figures will be identified by the symbol “r”, and an explanation will be given of the reason for and size of the revision. Corrections which would have a significant impact on the utility of the statistics will be corrected as soon as possible, by reissuing the publication. Minor errors will also be corrected, but for efficient use of resource these corrections may be timed to coincide with the next release of this quarterly publication.

There has been a revision to the number of Royal Fleet Auxiliary personnel as at 1 July 2021 due to a processing error. This has affected tables 1, 2a, 8a and 8b.

In Table 5c, revisions have been made to the 31 March 2020 and 30 September 2020 quarter points for Royal Navy/Royal Marines, due to inputting errors.

In Table 9c there has been a revision to the RAF applications figures for the period 30 June 2019 to 31 Mar 2021, due to a processing error.

There have been corrections to figures within Table 12 due to a processing error. This has affected figures for 2009/10, 2014/15 and 2019/20. It has also affected all of the modal populations within the Other Ranks prior to Pay 16.

In Table 13 there has been revision to the number of Civilian (Level 0) personnel as at 1 April 2012, 1 April 2016, 1 April 2019 and 1 April 2020 as well as a revision to the number of Trading Funds personnel as at 1 April 2020 due to a processing error.

Further Information (cont.)

Symbols

	Discontinuity in time series
*	Not applicable
..	Not available
–	Zero
~	5 or fewer
p	Provisional
e	Estimate
r	Revised

Italic figures are used for percentages and other rates, except where otherwise indicated.

Contact Us

Analysis (Tri-Service) welcome feedback on our statistical products. If you have any comments or questions about this publication or about our statistics in general, you can contact us as follows:

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If you require information which is not available within this or other available publications, you may wish to submit a Request for Information under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 to the Ministry of Defence. For more information, see:

<https://www.gov.uk/make-a-freedom-of-information-request/the-freedom-of-information-act>

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