



Department for
International Trade

Global Trade Outlook

September 2021

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PREFACE

The Department for International Trade's new *Global Trade Outlook* explores the long term trends that will shape the global economy and international trade in the coming decades.

The long term projections in the *Global Trade Outlook* (henceforth referred to as the *Outlook*) are not predictions of what will happen, nor what HM Government (HMG) would like to happen the *Outlook* does not include any judgements about the future efficacy of HMG policy. Rather, the projections are one possible future that could emerge based on an informed analysis and neutral extrapolation of the trends we observe today. The projections are a rough guide to how the world could evolve – not a definitive road map it will follow.

There are many economic, political, technological, and environmental risks and uncertainties that could materialise over the coming decades that could cause global trade to diverge from the projections in the *Outlook*. A key uncertainty in the near term is how countries will recover from the coronavirus crisis. Since the *Outlook* is focused on the longer term, we abstain from making judgements about the near term by tying our 2021–2026 projections to the International Monetary Fund's April 2021 World Economic Outlook forecasts. In addition, all UK projections are consistent with the independent Office for Budget Responsibility's March 2021 forecasts in the near term and long term projections out to 2050 to avoid making any judgements about HMG policy.

The *Outlook* has been produced to help inform policymakers and strategists and contribute to the wider debate about the future of trade. But it is just one source among many. The Department for International Trade continues to draw on a wide range of analysis and information when formulating its strategy.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Economic Backdrop

Trade Outlook

Global GDP will continue to expand over the coming decades, but at a slowing rate. Slower population growth and ageing workforces will weigh on growth.




Global trade is projected to grow broadly in line with global GDP over the next 30 years – doubling in real terms and quadrupling in dollar terms to reach \$100tn by 2050.

The world's economic centre of gravity will continue to shift eastward. The 7 largest emerging economies are projected to overtake the G7 in economic size during the 2030s.



Emerging economies are also likely to account for a growing share of trade as economic power shifts east. The 7 largest emerging economies are projected to match the G7's import market size by 2050.

The industrial structure of the global economy is expected to gradually become more services-oriented, as rising incomes in emerging markets shift spending patterns. By 2030, service sectors are expected to account for 77% of global GDP, up from 75% in 2019.



The industrial structure of global trade is very different to GDP – goods sectors dominate trade. But trade is also expected to gradually become more services-oriented over time. By 2030, service sectors are expected to account for 28% of global trade, up from 25% in 2019.

As living standards rise, the number of high-income countries could go up from 60 in 2019 to 70 by 2030. The world's growing middle class will also be a key source of demand. By 2050, there could be 2 billion more middle class consumers on the planet.



Global trade is concentrated among high-income countries. In 2019, two thirds of global import demand came from the world's 60 high income countries. By 2030, as 10 more countries graduate to high-income status, this share could rise to four-fifths of global import demand.

The UK was the 6th largest economy in the world in 2019 and is projected to remain broadly in that position out to 2050. As living standards rise overseas – particularly in emerging markets – the UK's share of global GDP is projected to fall from 3.3% in 2019 to around 2.7% by 2050. As the rest of the world grows richer, the UK's relative economic weight will tend to fall but the opportunities for the UK to grow via trade will increase.



The UK should remain one of the top 10 trading nations in the world out to 2050. UK exporters are well-placed to capitalise on the growth of the global middle class as richer populations tend to buy more of the high-value goods and services that UK businesses specialise in. Nevertheless, rapid trade growth in other regions means that, assuming past trends continue and absent policy changes, the UK's share of global exports is likely to fall – from 3.6% in 2019 to around 2.6% by 2050.



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
Global Economic Backdrop

Global GDP will continue to expand over the coming decades, but at a slowing rate

- Global GDP matters for trade.** The larger the global economy, the more goods and services available for trade.
- Global GDP grew by around two-thirds in real terms between 2000 and 2020 – or 2.6% per year on average.** The past two decades have been a volatile period in the world’s economic history, punctuated by the 2008/9 financial crisis and the coronavirus pandemic (Chart 1). Excluding crisis years, growth averaged 3.5% per year in the 2000s (2000-2007) and 2.9% per year in the 2010s (2011-2019). This declining trend reflects a range of factors, including slower growth in the world’s population; a slower pace of catch-up of emerging markets to the technological frontier; and weaker economic dynamism at the frontier itself – likely reflecting a slower pace of globalisation.
- Global GDP is expected to rebound in the near term from its pandemic-induced low.** The 2021-2026 projections in this report are conditioned on the IMF’s April 2021 forecasts, which anticipate a rapid but partial recovery from the pandemic (see Section 3).
- Over the coming decades, the underlying pace of global growth is expected to slow – averaging 2.3% per year in the 2030s and 2.0% in the 2040s.** These projections assume the factors that have caused global growth to slow in the first twenty years of this century will persist in the decades ahead. However, these projections are subject to wide bands of uncertainty both to downside risks (if further economic shocks materialise) and upside surprises (if technological progress accelerates) – as discussed in Section 3.
- In dollar terms, the global economy is expected to be worth around \$380tn by 2050, up from \$87tn in 2019 (and \$84tn in 2020).** This more than 300% increase partly reflects real economic growth (which accounts for around a third of the overall increase), with the rest reflecting significant changes in prices and market exchange rates over the same period (Chart 2).

Global economic growth is expected to slow in the decades ahead

Chart 1: Global GDP growth in real terms




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021 and DIT calculations

Notes: Data refer to real GDP growth for the world economy in 2019 prices converted using 2019 market exchange rates – not Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). As discussed in Section 3, all projections in this report are expressed in market exchange rates (either 2019 exchange rates for real GDP or time varying exchange rates for nominal GDP) unless stated otherwise because market exchange rates are the more relevant metric for international trade. The uncertainty band represents one standard deviation around growth projection based on 2001-2019 GDP outturns.

In dollar terms, global GDP is expected to increase by more than 300% over the next 30 years

Chart 2: Global GDP in nominal terms



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021 and DIT calculations

Notes: Data refer to nominal GDP (inclusive of inflation and converted using time-varying exchange rates). The uncertainty bands represent one standard deviation around nominal GDP growth outturns for the 2001-2019 period.

The world's economic centre of gravity will continue to shift eastward in the decades ahead

Rapid growth in the Indo Pacific region will pull the world's centre of economic gravity further east

Chart 3: Global economic centre of gravity, 2000-2050




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021 and DIT calculations

Notes: The global centre of economic gravity has been calculated by taking the geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) of 190+ countries and weighting them by nominal GDP figures expressed at market exchange rates for each year shown above.

- The world's centre of economic gravity has been shifting eastward for decades – causing trade patterns to shift as it moves (Chart 3).** This eastward shift is due to rapid growth in the Indo Pacific. Between 2000 and 2019, the Indo Pacific accounted for 50% of global economic growth in real terms. By contrast, the EU contributed only 10% of growth and over the same period (Chart 4).
- This eastward shift in global demand is projected to continue out to 2050.** Between 2019 and 2050, 56% of global growth is expected to come from the Indo Pacific, compared with a quarter from the EU and North America combined (Chart 4). Growth within the Indo Pacific is also expected to rebalance over time, with South Asia's contribution (driven by India) rising over time.

The Indo-Pacific region is expected to continue to account for more than half of global growth

Chart 4: Regional drivers of global economic growth in real terms




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021 and DIT calculations

Notes: Figures show the contribution of different regions to global GDP growth in real terms (expressed in constant 2019 prices and exchange rates). The Indo Pacific region is defined as three DIT HM Trade Commissioner regions: South Asia, Asia Pacific and China & Hong Kong. 'Rest of world' includes the UK, non-EU Europe, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Latin America, Middle East and Africa.

DIT organises its operations into nine overseas regions and the United Kingdom.


Each region will see significant growth over the next 30 years, but at markedly different rates.

GDP TRENDS BY REGION




The 9 overseas regions of the world around which DIT organises its international operations. Note: the UK is always treated separately from Europe in the Outlook.

SHARE OF GLOBAL GDP




Fast-growing emerging markets will account for a growing share of the global economy in the years ahead. South Asia's share will more than double by 2050, while Africa and China's share will also grow quickly. By contrast, more developed regions will see their share decline.

REGIONAL RANKINGS



By the mid-2030s China will have leapfrogged Europe and North America to become the largest region in the world, while South Asia will have overtaken Latin America to become the 5th largest region. Africa is expected to outgrow E. Europe and C. Asia to become the 7th largest region by 2050.

GROWTH RATES




Emerging markets in Africa and South Asia with fast-growing populations, high catch-up potential and low relative prices will grow the fastest in real and nominal terms. By contrast, stable markets in the North Atlantic that are close to the technological frontier will grow more modestly.

The world's largest emerging economies will be a growing source of economic power

- Economic power is expected to continue to shift from the G7 to the largest emerging economies.** In the first two decades of this century, labour productivity growth (the main driver of higher living standards) was three times faster on average across the seven largest emerging economies than across the G7. As a result, the G7's share of global GDP fell from 65% in 2000 to 46% in 2020, while the 'E7's' share rose from 11% to 28% (Chart 5). Over the next thirty years, labour productivity growth across the E7 is expected to grow at roughly twice the rate of the G7, with the E7 overtaking the G7 in economic size during the 2030s. This shift in economic power is likely to mean emerging economies will play a growing role in the global trading system (see Section 2).
- China is a major driver of this economic shift as it is expected to become the world's largest economy by 2030.** China already displaced the US in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms (which account for differences in local prices) in the mid-2010s. But based on market exchange rates, which are more relevant for trade (as discussed in Section 3), the overtake is expected to happen around 2030 (Chart 6). At that point both countries will account for around 22% of global GDP.
- Other emerging economies, particularly those with large populations like India and Indonesia, are also expected to rise up the economic rankings.** Emerging economies are generally expected to grow faster than more established markets as they can rapidly raise productivity by adopting best practice techniques from overseas. However, while emerging economies have significant 'catch-up' potential, they also face major challenges – including the need to shift from imitation to innovation to escape the middle-income trap, tackle indebtedness, and rebound from the pandemic. Given these challenges, the long-term projections in this report are subject to high degrees of uncertainty – particularly the relative rankings of emerging economies in 2050 (Chart 7).

The 7 largest emerging economies are expected to overtake the G7 in economic size during the 2030s

Chart 5: G7 and 'E7' share of global GDP




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021 and DIT calculations

Notes: Chart shows nominal GDP (converted into US dollars at time-varying market exchange rates) for the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) and the E7 set of largest emerging markets in 2050 (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey).

China is expected to become the world's largest economy by 2030

Chart 6: US and Chinese GDP in dollar terms




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021 and DIT calculations

Notes: Data are for nominal GDP converted into US dollars at time-varying market exchange rates. The uncertainty bands represents one standard deviation around growth projection based on 2001-2019 GDP outturns.

The ranking of the world's 30 largest economies will shift over the next 30 years as heavily populated emerging economies like China, India and Indonesia leapfrog more established markets

Chart 7: The world's largest economies, 2019-2050




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021 and DIT calculations

Notes: Rankings are based on nominal GDP expressed in percentage of global nominal GDP at time-varying market exchange rates. Totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.

The world's growing population will continue to boost economic growth but by less than in the past

The world's population will continue to grow but at a slowing rate – rising by 2bn between 2020 and 2050

Chart 8: Changes in the world's population, 1980-2050




Sources: UN World Population Prospects (2019) and DIT calculations

Notes: Global figures exclude population estimates for countries with limited data including Cuba, North Korea and some small island states.

- The world's population is expected to rise from 7.8bn in 2020 to 8.5bn by 2030.** This $\frac{3}{4}$ billion rise is substantial, but it will be the smallest decade-long rise since the 1960s. Global population growth has been slowing for decades as populations in advanced economies have plateaued and birth rates in emerging markets have tapered. Slower population growth tends to result in slower economic growth (after 15-20 years) as there are fewer new workers, entrepreneurs and consumers to drive economic activity and demand. Global population growth is expected to continue to ease out to 2050 – when there should be 9.7 billion people on the planet or 2 billion more than today (Chart 8).
- Most of the world's population growth is likely to come from lower income countries in Africa and Asia.** Countries with per capita incomes of less than \$4,045 in 2019 (the World Bank threshold for lower-middle income countries), will account for over 75% of global population growth in the 2020s and over 90% during the 2040s (Chart 9). Some of these lower income countries may capitalise on their demographic booms and grow quickly, but others may be hampered by gaps in education, infrastructure and employment opportunities. So, while population growth will continue to support global GDP, it is likely to provide less of a boost than when populations in high-productivity countries were growing quickly.

Most of the growth in the world's population will be driven by lower and lower-middle income countries

Chart 9: Sources of global population growth by country-income grouping



Sources: UN World Population Prospects (2019), IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021 and DIT calculations


Notes: Figures show the contribution of different country-groups to global population growth based on their per capita income level in 2019 compared with the World Bank's income thresholds.

Ageing workforces will hold back growth, while urbanisation will continue to provide a tailwind

- By 2030, there will be 1 billion people over the age of 65 (Chart 10).** This grey billion will have different consumption preferences to the rest of society, creating new opportunities (e.g. for healthcare and leisure services) as well as risks for trade.
- Ageing societies will face economic headwinds that could hold back economic growth and trade.** As countries age and their populations decline, a shrinking workforce must shoulder the welfare costs of more people. As the dependency ratio rises there will be less disposable income for consumption. Around 30 countries are expected to see their populations shrink in the 2020s (including Germany, Russia, South Korea, Japan) while others – notably China – will see their populations peak around 2030. At a regional level, workforces are expected to shrink in Europe and China, weighing on growth in both regions (Chart 11).
- The urbanisation of the global economy is expected to continue, with an additional 800 million people living in cities by 2030.** In 2020, 4.4 billion people lived in urban areas – 56% of the world’s population. By 2030, this figure could reach 5.2 billion (60%) and by 2050 6.7 billion (68%). This assumes that the long-term urbanisation trend continues and that the COVID-induced flight from cities seen in some countries is temporary (Chart 12). Urbanisation is linked to higher productivity and higher living standards as cities offer economies of scale, agglomeration benefits and act as hubs for trade. So rising urbanisation rates are expected to continue to provide a tailwind to economic growth in the decades ahead.

The world is growing older – by 2050 1 in 6 people will be over the age of 65


Chart 10: World population by age group, 2000-2050



Sources: UN World Population Prospects (2019) and DIT calculations

Ageing populations will see workforces shrink in Europe and China in the coming decades

Chart 11: Change in workforce by region, 2020-2030




Change in size of working age population: 2020-2030

Sources: UN World Population Prospects (2019) and DIT calculations

Notes: The workforce is defined as the population aged 15-64.

The global urbanisation wave is expected to continue out to 2050


Chart 12: Global urbanisation rate, 1950-2050



Sources: UN World Population Prospects (2019), UN Urbanization Population Prospects (2019) and DIT calculations


REGIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

Each region will see significant changes to the size, age structure and location of their populations over the coming decades.



The 9 overseas regions of the world around which DIT organises its international operations. Note: the UK is always treated separately from Europe in the *Outlook*.


POPULATION




Global population growth will be dominated by Africa over the next 30 years. By 2050, there are expected to be an extra 2 billion people on the planet – over half of whom will be African. By contrast, populations in Europe and China are expected to shrink slightly over the same period.

Average ages differ widely across regions – from 19 in Africa to 43 in Europe. All regions will see their populations age over the next thirty years, but at different rates – China’s population will rise by 9 years on average, compared with just 5 years in North America.

AGEING POPULATIONS



URBANISATION




Urbanisation rates are expected to rise in all regions. As cities recover from the pandemic they are expected to return as a driver of economic growth and draw in workers with higher wages. Urban populations are expected to rise fastest in Africa and Asia as their economies develop and shift away from primary industry.

Advances at the technological frontier and ‘catch-up’ potential will boost global growth

- Productivity growth at the technological frontier is expected to rise by 1.4-1.5% per year out to 2050.** One of the fundamental drivers of global economic growth is how fast innovation at the technological frontier – typically proxied by labour productivity growth in the United States – is advancing. New technologies could see productivity growth surge forward in the decades ahead, while other factors – such as rising inequality, public indebtedness, and lower R&D spending could all weigh on growth.¹ Given the wide bands of uncertainty, the projections in the *Outlook* take a neutral view and assume that US real GDP per worker will average 1.5% per year in the 2020s before edging down to 1.4% between 2030 and 2050. This gradual easing reflects an anticipated plateau in educational attainment – average years of schooling are not rising as quickly as in the past and cannot keep rising indefinitely.
- Living standards in emerging markets will rise much more quickly than in advanced economies but the pace of convergence is expected to slow (Chart 13).** Today’s advanced economies will remain by far the world’s richest countries on a per capita basis, but the gap with emerging economies will shrink as emerging economies adopt cutting edge technologies from the frontier and benefit from ‘catch-up’ potential. In nominal terms, per capita incomes in the United States in 2050 could remain more than double those in China, four times those in the Asia Pacific region, ten times those in South Asia, and twenty times those in Africa (Chart 14). However, the extent of this convergence is highly uncertain. Some countries may struggle to switch from imitation-led growth to innovation-led growth and get caught in the middle-income trap, while others may be successful in developing cutting edge-technologies that enable them to grow even faster.

Living standards in emerging markets are expected to rise twice as fast as in advanced economies

Chart 13: Growth in real GDP per capita growth




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UN World Population Prospects (2019) and DIT calculations

Notes: Data are for real GDP converted into US dollars at constant 2019 prices and exchange rates and divided by aggregate population of the respective group. The classification used for advanced, emerging and developing economies are as of 2020 and are aligned with the IMF WEO’s definitions.

Living standards in emerging markets will see some catch-up to the technological frontier but will remain well below those in the US even by 2050

Chart 14: Regional living standards relative to the United States



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UN World Population Prospects (2019) and DIT calculations


Notes: Data are for nominal GDP converted into US dollars at time-varying market exchange rates and divided by total population.

¹ See Rachel and Smith (2015) ‘Secular drivers of global real interest rates’ for a discussion.

The number of 'high-income' countries will rise over time, increasing demand for trade

By 2050, there could be 90 'high income' countries, up from 60 in 2019

Chart 15: Income per capita in 2019 and changes in the number of high income countries, 2019-2050



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UN World Population Prospects (2019), World Bank World Development Indicators and DIT calculations

Notes: Data are for nominal GDP converted into US dollars at time-varying market exchange rates and divided by total population. Income thresholds refer to income per capita levels on a GNI basis and are based on the World Bank's low, lower middle, upper middle and high income categories for 2019. These thresholds values are assumed to grow by 2.3% each year out to 2050 (in line with the average annual growth rate in GDP deflators for advanced economies). The 'very high' income category is not an official World Bank threshold but is defined as having a per capita income greater than \$40,000 in 2019 prices, which is in line with per capita income in the UK in recent years.


- GDP is not the only thing that matters for trade – income levels also matter.** Low-income countries with big populations can have large economies (high GDP), but still represent only small sources of import demand due to their limited purchasing power, different consumption preferences and limited role in global value chains.
- In 2019, over two-thirds of global import demand was concentrated among the world's 60 high-income countries (blue-shaded countries in Chart 15).** The richest 26 of these markets had average per capita incomes over \$40,000 - on a par or richer than the UK. Global import demand is particularly concentrated among these 'very high' income countries, who accounted for 54% of imports in 2019.
- The number of high-income countries is likely to increase to around 70 by 2030 and these countries could account for over four-fifths of global import demand.** Newly classified high-income countries are likely to include China, Malaysia, Russia and Turkey that will all see significant increases in living standards.
- By 2050, there could be 90 high-income countries, while a handful of countries could become as rich as the UK is today (in real terms).** South Korea, Taiwan and a smattering of Eastern European countries could see their per capita incomes rise above \$40,000 (in 2019 prices) by 2050 – providing a further crop of 'very-high' income markets to spur demand for imports.

The world's growing middle class will be a key source of global demand

- A country's average income per capita can mask significant variations in income within a country.** In countries where income inequality is high (such as South Africa) the top 10% of earners can account for over 50% of the country's income (Chart 16). Income inequality affects the size of the middle class in each market, and hence the level of demand for high-value traded consumer goods and services.
- In 2019, there were around 1.7 billion 'middle class' consumers in the world – equivalent to one in every five people** (Chart 17). The size of the global middle class is calculated by analysing income distributions within countries and calculating the number of individuals within each country with an annual income of at least \$12,535 (the World Bank's definition of 'high income'). As living standards rise and households have more disposable income, their consumption patterns tend to shift away from necessities towards more luxury goods and services. Low-income households tend to spend most of their income on food and clothing, whereas high income households tend to spend significantly more on housing, transport, leisure services and high value consumption goods. So as the world becomes richer, demand for higher-value traded goods and services is likely to rise.
- By 2030, the size of the global middle class could reach 2.3 billion – equivalent to one in every four people.** Between 2019 and 2030, China is expected to account for the bulk (0.4bn) of the 0.6 billion increase in the global middle class, while four other regions – Asia Pacific, South Asia, Europe, and Eastern Europe/Central Asia – are each expected to add a further 35-40 million.
- By 2050, the global middle class could reach 3.5 billion people – equivalent to one in every three people.** Over half of these middle-class consumers are likely to live in China and the Indo Pacific (see overleaf).

Average per capita incomes can mask significant differences in incomes within countries

Chart 16: Income inequality within countries




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UN World Population Prospects (2019), UN World Income Inequality Database and DIT calculations

Notes: Data on income distributions are for the latest year available (usually 2016-2018) for 180+ countries.

There could be almost 2 billion more middle class consumers on the planet by 2050


Chart 17: World population by income threshold



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UN World Population Prospects (2019), UN World Income Inequality Database, World Bank World Development Indicators and DIT calculations

Notes: Figures are calculated by applying current income distributions within each country to projections for nominal GDP per capita and population. Income thresholds are extrapolated forward from the World Bank's income thresholds in 2019 and are increased by 2.3% each year. In 2019, the thresholds were: high income = \$12,535+, upper middle income = \$4,045 - \$12,535, lower middle income = \$1,035 - \$4,045; and low income = \$0 - \$1,035. 'Very high' income is not a World Bank category but is defined as having income greater than \$40,000 in 2019 – broadly in line with UK per capita income.

REGIONAL TRENDS IN THE SIZE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS



Proportion of regional populations with a per capita income above \$12,535 per year (in 2019 prices)

	2019	2030	2050
Africa	2%	2%	4%
South Asia	2%	4%	15%
Middle East	11%	11%	12%
E. Europe & C. Asia	18%	27%	52%
Latin America	17%	18%	28%
Asia Pacific	27%	29%	45%
North America	94%	95%	96%
China & Hong Kong	24%	52%	91%
Europe (exc. UK)	81%	89%	94%
WORLD	22%	27%	37%

‘Middle class’ individuals – defined as those earning at least \$12,535 per year (in 2019 prices) – are expected to account for a growing share of regional populations across the world. In Europe and North America the majority of people are already classified as part of the global middle class. By contrast, China is expected to see its middle class population rise from less than 24% of its 2019 population to above 90% by 2050 – on a par with the shares seen in North America and Europe.

SIZE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS

	2019	2030	2050
China & Hong Kong	350	770	1285
Asia Pacific	250	285	455
Europe (exc. UK)	395	430	440
North America	345	370	410
South Asia	30	70	285
E. Europe & C. Asia	65	105	210
Latin America	100	120	200
Africa	20	35	90
Middle East	50	60	85
UK	65	65	70
WORLD	1670	2305	3535

Millions of people with a per capita income above \$12,535 per year in 2019 prices, rounded to nearest 5 million

Over 90% of the growth in the global middle class out to 2050 will come from outside North America and Europe, driven by emerging markets with large populations where living standards are rising quickly. China alone is expected to account for half of the global increase between 2019 and 2050.

‘VERY HIGH’ INCOME POPULATIONS

	2019	2030	2050
China & Hong Kong	30	90	410
North America	220	255	325
Europe (exc. UK)	160	205	270
Asia Pacific	90	120	170
South Asia	<5	<5	55
UK	25	40	55
Latin America	20	20	35
E. Europe & C. Asia	5	10	30
Middle East	15	15	20
Africa	<5	<5	10
WORLD	570	765	1385

Millions of people with a per capita income above \$40,000 per year in 2019 prices, rounded to nearest 5 million

Within the global middle class there is a group of individuals on very high incomes above \$40,000. This group is expected to more than double in size by 2050 and be a significant driver of high-value trade. This group is concentrated in four regions: Europe, North America, China and Asia Pacific.

Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UN World Income Inequality Database, World Bank World Development Indicators and DIT calculations.


Notes: Middle class populations are defined as people within each country earning above the World Bank’s ‘high income’ threshold of \$12,535 per year in 2019 prices (equivalent to \$16.1k in 2030 and \$25.4k in 2050 in nominal dollar terms adjusted for inflation of 2.3% per year). ‘Very high’ income populations are those earning above \$40,000 per year in 2019 prices.

The industrial structure of the global economy is likely to become more services-oriented

- **Shifts in spending patterns are expected to gradually change the industrial structure of the global economy.** All sectors will grow over the next decade (Chart 18), but rising incomes, changing consumer preferences and technological advances will mean some sectors grow faster than others (Chart 19).
- **Rising incomes should see demand for services grow quickly and their share of global GDP rise from 75% to 77% between 2019 and 2030.** As living standards rise and middle-class populations expand (mostly in Asia) demand for service sectors – including intellectual property recreation & media, financial, digital and transport services – should all rise quickly.
- **Other sectors will see their share of global GDP fall, either as shifts in consumer preferences reduce demand or technology reduces prices.** The oil and gas sector is projected to grow relatively slowly this decade as the green transition accelerates. Meanwhile, high productivity growth and technological progress are expected to drive down prices in some manufacturing sectors – reducing their share of nominal GDP despite growing rapidly in real terms. This trend is already evident in the clothing and footwear, machinery and equipment, and automotive sectors.

All sectors of the global economy will expand in the decade ahead, but at different rates

Chart 18: Global GDP by sector, 2019-2030




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD, Oxford Economics and DIT calculations

Notes: Data are for nominal GDP in US dollars at time-varying market exchange rates. Sectors are defined in Section 3. NIE means 'Not Included Elsewhere'.

The sectoral mix of the global economy will shift only gradually over the next decade

Chart 19: Change in sectoral shares of global GDP between 2019 and 2030



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD, Oxford Economics and DIT calculations.


Notes: Data show the change in each sector's share of global GDP in US dollars converted at time-varying market exchange rates. Sectors are defined in Section 3. NIE means 'Not Included Elsewhere'.

The US and EU's share of global GDP is expected to fall in almost all sectors

- Different regions have markedly different industrial structures – due to variations in local demand, factor endowments, and sectors of comparative advantage (left panel, Chart 20).** The EU and North America are more specialised in service sectors and some hi-tech manufacturing sectors (such as aerospace), while economies in the Indo Pacific tend to be more specialised in manufacturing and primary production.
- Rapid growth in the Indo Pacific should see the US and EU's share of global production fall in almost all sectors out to 2030 (right panel, Chart 20).** The Indo Pacific's share of global GDP is expected to rise in industrial sectors as its share of global manufacturing continues to expand, as well as in some service sectors – including travel, financial and recreational services – as the rising purchasing power of Asia's growing middle class increases demand.

The US and EU's share of global production is expected to fall in almost all sectors out to 2030

Chart 20: Sectoral shares of global GDP by region in 2019 and expected change to 2030



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD, Oxford Economics and DIT calculations.


Notes: Data are for nominal GDP in US dollars at time-varying market exchange rates. Sectors are defined in Section 3. NIE means 'Not Included Elsewhere'. The Indo Pacific region is defined as three DIT HM Trade Commissioner regions: South Asia, Asia Pacific and China & Hong Kong. 'Rest of world' includes the UK, non-EU Europe, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Latin America, Middle East and Africa.

The UK should remain one of the world’s largest economies despite a falling share of global GDP

- The UK was the 6th largest economy in the world in 2019 and is projected to remain broadly in that position out to 2050.** All UK projections in the *Outlook* are based on the Office for Budget Responsibility’s March 2021 forecasts in the near term and long-term projections out to 2050. These suggest the UK economy will grow by around 15% in real terms between 2019 and 2030 and by over 50% between 2019 and 2050. In nominal dollar terms – including inflation and the IMF’s exchange rate forecasts – the UK economy could increase from \$2.8tn (£2.2tn) in 2019 to around \$5tn (£3.2tn) by 2030 and around \$10tn (£6.8tn) by 2050 (Chart 21).
- The UK’s share of global GDP is expected to continue to edge lower, from 3.3% in 2019 to around 2.7% by 2050.** The UK’s share of global activity has been on a falling trend for decades (Chart 22). This reflects a positive phenomenon – rising living standards overseas. As the rest of the world becomes richer, the UK’s relative economic weight will tend to fall but the economic opportunities for the UK to grow via trade will increase.
- The UK still punches above its weight in economic terms given that less than 1% of the world’s population live in the UK.** The UK’s share of the global population is expected to decline from 0.9% in 2019 to around 0.7% by 2050. Despite that, the UK’s share of global GDP, at 2.7%, is expected to remain almost four times its population weight. That reflects the UK’s high level of per capita income, which remains more than double the global average out to 2050. UK per capita incomes are expected to grow by around 1% in real terms on average per year between 2019 and 2030. This relatively slow rate of growth partly reflects the negative impact of the coronavirus pandemic. By contrast, between 2030 and 2050, growth in UK per capita incomes is expected to average 1.4% per year. These figures equate to a real term increase in UK average incomes from £33k in 2019, to £37k by 2030 and almost £50k by 2050 (in 2019 UK prices).

In nominal US dollar terms, the UK economy could rise to almost \$5tn by 2030 and \$10tn by 2050

Chart 21: UK Nominal GDP in US dollar terms




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, Office for Budget Responsibility Economic and Fiscal Outlook March 2021 and Long-Term Economic Determinants and DIT calculations

Notes: Data refer to nominal GDP from the Office for Budget Responsibility’s forecasts and projections, converted into US dollars using the IMF’s forecasts out to 2026 and then holding the 2026 US-GBP exchange rate fixed over the 2027-2050 period. The uncertainty bands represent one standard deviation around nominal GDP growth outturns for the 2001-2019 period.

The UK’s economic weight in the world is expected to continue its gradual long-term decline

Chart 22: UK share of global GDP and population



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UN World Population Prospects (2019), Office for Budget Responsibility Economic and Fiscal Outlook and Long-Term Economic Determinants (March 2021) and DIT calculations

Notes: The uncertainty bands represent one standard deviation around growth outturns for the 2010-2019 period.



2


The Future of Global Trade

Global trade is expected to grow broadly in line with global GDP growth

- Global trade growth is closely related to GDP growth.** The faster the world economy grows the faster trade tends to grow. However, trade is also more volatile than GDP (Chart 23). This is partly because most trade flows involve manufactured goods, which tend to vary more over the business cycle than the service sectors that dominate global GDP. The outlook for global trade is therefore even more uncertain than for GDP.
- The IMF estimate world trade volumes fell by 8.5% in 2020 and will rebound by a similar amount in 2021.** The IMF's April 2021 forecasts – on which the near-term projections in the *Outlook* are based – assume trade will rebound from COVID-19 more slowly than global GDP (Chart 23).
- During the 2030s and 2040s, global trade volumes are projected to grow in line with global GDP growth.** There are many factors that could cause trade to grow faster or slower than GDP. These include: stability of the global trading system; political appetite for cross-border integration; business attitudes towards global value chains; and technological change. The projections in the *Outlook* take a neutral view of these factors and assume the status quo is maintained over the next 30 years. For example, in the case of the trading system, there is neither a further wave of globalisation – as happened before the global financial crisis – nor a turn inward. Different scenarios are clearly possible, so figures in the *Outlook* should be treated with wide bands of uncertainty. See Section 3 for more on projection assumptions and alternative scenarios.
- By 2050, the value of global trade in dollar terms is expected to be worth around \$100tn, up from \$24tn in 2019 (Chart 24).** That 300% increase is broadly in line with the rise in global GDP over the same period, with imports accounting for around a quarter of global GDP. Data quality and coverage mean that the *Outlook* focuses on gross trade. For more on value-added trade see [Boxes A & B](#).

After rebounding from the COVID-19 shock, global trade is expected to grow in line with global GDP

Chart 23: Global trade growth vs global GDP growth (in real terms)




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD and DIT calculations

Notes: Data are for real GDP and imports converted into US dollars at constant 2019 market exchange rates. The uncertainty band represents one standard deviation around growth projection based on 2010-2019 outturns.

In dollar terms, global trade is expected to increase by over 300% over the next 30 years

Chart 24: Global imports in nominal dollar terms



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD and DIT calculations


Notes: Data are for nominal imports (inclusive of price changes) converted into US dollars at time-varying market exchange rates. The uncertainty band represents one standard deviation around the projection based on 2010-2019 outturns.

Global trade will continue to be dominated by four regions of the world

- Four regions – Europe, North America, China and the Asia Pacific – dominate global trade.** In 2019, these four regions accounted for 78% of global imports and GDP (Chart 25).
- But unlike GDP, it is not North America and China that are the biggest regions for trade – that honour falls to Europe and Asia Pacific.** This is because of cross-border supply chains. While a region’s GDP gives a sense of its importance as a source of global demand, a region’s importance for trade also depends on how often goods and services cross its borders. Differences in comparative advantage, resource endowments and demographics all create incentives for regional supply chains to develop across Europe and the Asia Pacific.
- By 2050, the four biggest regions will continue to dominate global import demand, but South Asia will also play a growing role.** Europe is still likely to be the world’s largest import market in 2050 but its share of global trade is expected to fall due to its slow pace of GDP growth. By contrast, rapid economic growth in the Indo Pacific – including in South Asia (led by India) – should see Asia’s share of global trade rise and the axis of global trade shift further East (Charts 25 & 26).
- These trends will also affect the relative size of regional trade agreements over time.** For example, the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership’s (CPTPP) import market size (based on its existing 11 members) could reach 54% of the EU-27 market by 2050 – up from 48% in 2019 (see following pages).


Import demand will remain unevenly distributed across the world - four regions will continue to dominate global trade

Chart 25: Regional shares of global GDP and global imports in 2019 and 2050



Over four-fifths of the growth in global import demand is expected to come from outside the EU

Chart 26: Regional drivers of global import growth



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD and DIT calculations

Notes: Figures show the contribution of different regions to global import growth in real terms (expressed in constant 2019 prices and exchange rates). The Indo Pacific region is defined as three DIT HM Trade Commissioner regions: South Asia, Asia Pacific and China & Hong Kong. ‘Rest of world’ includes the UK, non-EU Europe, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Latin America, Middle East and Africa.


REGIONAL TRADE TRENDS

Each region will see significant growth in import market size in the coming decades, but growth will be unevenly distributed. This will cause global trading patterns to shift over time.




The 9 overseas regions of the world around which DIT organises its international operations. Note: the UK is always treated separately from Europe in the *Outlook*.

IMPORT MARKET SIZE




Global import demand is expected to increase by a factor of 4 between 2019 and 2050. Import growth is expected to be below this global average in Europe and North America. By contrast, imports could increase by a factor of 5 in China and Africa by almost 9 in South Asia.

IMPORT INTENSITY



In some regions, particularly those with regional trade agreements like the EU, import growth will partly be driven by further integration into regional value chains. By contrast, import intensity is expected to fall in regions dominated by large emerging markets (China and South Asia) as their economies grow richer and rebalance towards domestic demand.

SHARE OF GLOBAL IMPORTS



Fast growing emerging markets are expected to account for a growing share of global imports. By 2050, China, South Asia and the Asia Pacific are expected to account for around 40% of global imports, up from 32% in 2019. By contrast, Europe and North America's share of global imports is expected to fall from 48% in 2019 to 40% by 2050.

Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD and DIT calculations

Notes: All trade figures above are in nominal dollar terms and include both intra- and extra-regional trade (i.e. the sum of a country's trade with all other trading partners)

Comprehensive & Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership


- 11 signatories, founded Mar 2018
- Rising levels of integration into global value chains keeps CPTPP members' share of global trade high

Share of global imports

2019 \$3.5tn 2030 \$5.5tn 2050 \$13.3tn



Nominal share of global GDP




European Union


- 27 signatories, founded Nov 1993
- The EU's high and rising levels of trade integration mean EU members still account for a high share of global trade in 2050 despite slow GDP growth

Share of global imports

2019 \$7.3tn 2030 \$11.8tn 2050 \$24.3tn



Nominal share of global GDP



Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership


- 16 signatories, founded Nov 2020
- RCEP economies are expected to grow quickly and account for a rising share of global GDP and trade

Share of global imports


2019 \$6.0tn 2030 \$10.7tn 2050 \$29.1tn



Nominal share of global GDP



REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS



Many countries belong to regional trade agreements. The six blocs shown here are some of the broadest agreements in the world.

Mercosur*


- 4 current members, founded Mar 1991
- Mercosur members are expected to account for a stable share of global trade despite slow GDP growth as members become more open to trade

Share of global imports

2019 \$0.4tn 2030 \$0.6tn 2050 \$1.5tn



Nominal share of global GDP



African Continental FTA*


- 54 signatories, founded Mar 2018
- After a partial recovery from Covid-19 AfCFTA members are expected to grow rapidly and account for a rising share of global GDP and trade

Share of global imports

2019 \$0.7tn 2030 \$1.1tn 2050 \$3.9tn



Nominal share of global GDP



Gulf Cooperation Council


- 6 signatories, founded May 1981
- GCC members are expected to account for a stable share of global trade even as their share of global GDP falls as members become more open to trade

Share of global imports

2019 \$0.7tn 2030 \$1.0tn 2050 \$2.6tn



Nominal share of global GDP




Emerging economies are likely to account for a growing share of trade as economic power shifts East

- Global trade is concentrated – the top 30 markets accounted for over 80% of global import demand in 2019.** Within this group, the 10 largest importers accounted for over half of global import demand.
- Growth in global imports is expected to be similarly concentrated in the coming decades.** More than three-quarters of the growth in global import demand out to 2030 and to 2050 is expected to come from the current 30 largest markets. This includes two countries – the US and China – whose import markets are expected to grow by well over a trillion dollars this decade (Chart 27).
- Over the next decade, China is expected to overtake the US to become the world’s largest importer despite China gradually becoming less reliant on trade.** China is already the world’s largest exporter, and its share of global trade is expected to keep growing as its economy expands. However, as Chinese consumers become wealthier and Chinese production becomes more advanced, China’s economic structure is expected to shift – with more domestically produced goods and services consumed at home. As a result, import demand is expected to fall as a share of China’s GDP from 17% in 2019 to 14% in 2050 – similar to the US’s current level of openness.
- The role of emerging economies in the trading system will rise over time, consistent with their growing weight in the global economy.** The ‘E7 group’ of the 7 largest emerging economies – China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey – are expected to equal the G7’s share of global import demand by 2050 (Chart 28). However, while the E7 are the biggest emerging markets in terms of GDP, they are not the biggest importers in the emerging world. Other economies – such as Vietnam and the Philippines – are expected to grow more rapidly in the coming decades and rise up the global import rankings as they become more integrated into global value chains (Chart 29).

The top 30 import markets are expected to account for more than three-quarters of global import growth

Chart 27: Growth in nominal import market size between 2019, 2030 and 2050 in US dollar terms




Sources: IMF WEO April 2021, UNCTAD and DIT calculations

Notes: Data are for nominal imports (inclusive of price changes) converted into US dollars at time-varying market exchange rates.

The 7 largest emerging economies are expected to match the G7’s import market size by 2050

Chart 28: G7 and ‘E7’ share of global import demand




Sources: IMF WEO April 2021, UNCTAD and DIT calculations

Notes: Nominal imports (converted into US dollars at time-varying market exchange rates) for the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and US) and the E7 largest emerging economies in 2050 (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia and Turkey).

The world's top 30 import markets in 2030 and 2050 are expected to be similar to the largest import markets in 2019, albeit with some changes in ranking as emerging Asian economies rise up

Chart 29: The world's largest importers, 2019-2050



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD, Office for Budget Responsibility and DIT calculations


Notes: Rankings are based on nominal imports converted into US dollars terms using time-varying market exchange rates and prices. 2019 figures for all countries (except the UK) are calculated by summing UNCTAD's balance of payments data for goods (which were released in December 2020), and UNCTAD's international trade in services data (released in July 2021). UK figures have been converted from the Office for Budget Responsibility's March 2021 near term forecast and long-term projection figures into US dollars.

The sectoral structure of global trade is currently dominated by goods sectors, unlike global GDP

- The sectoral mix of global trade is very different to GDP.** In 2019, goods sectors accounted for 25% of GDP but 75% of trade flows (Chart 30). This difference partly reflects data definitions – GDP is measured on a value-added basis while most trade data refer to gross flows, which include the cost of inputs as well as value added (see Box A). This difference over-weights the role of goods, whose supply chains cross borders many times, and under-weights the value of services embedded in goods trade.
- The goods-heavy mix of global trade partly reflects differences in tradability and market access barriers for services.** As well as data definitions, some services (e.g. hairdressers) are inherently less tradable than goods, which reduces their share in global trade. In addition, trade liberalisation efforts have historically tended to favour goods sectors. The WTO estimates that in 2019, barriers to goods trade were around half those of services.

Differences in tradability mean that the sectoral mix of global GDP is very different to global trade

Chart 30: Sectoral composition of global GDP and global trade in 2019



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, Oxford Economics, UNCTAD and DIT calculations

Notes: Sectors are defined in Section 3. * indicates 'Not Included Elsewhere'. Figures show share of global GDP (left panel) and imports (right panel) in dollar terms in 2019. Sectors not displayed on chart include: (a) Life Sciences, 1.1%; (b) Advanced Manufacturing, 1.0%; (c) Clothing & footwear, 0.6%; (d) Aerospace & Other Transport, 0.5%; (e) Aerospace & Other Transport, 2.2%; (f) Construction, 1.9% (g) Private Services NIE, 0.8%; (h) Construction, 0.4%; (i) Public Services, 0.4.

Box A: How global trade differs when measured on a value-added basis

- Conventional ('gross') trade statistics can give a distorted view of global trading system by masking the effect of Global Value Chains (GVCs).**² This can lead to double counting of trade flows, which can over-estimate the importance of some countries or sectors that are at the end of value chains.
- Trade in Value Added (TiVA) is an innovative OECD dataset that makes it possible to examine the role of GVCs in global trade.** The novelty of the TiVA dataset is that it regards trade as flows of value added rather than gross flows of final goods and services. This has many advantages in terms of analysing trade, particularly as the role of GVCs has grown. But the TiVA dataset also has key limitations, including: its timeliness (as of September 2021, the latest full estimates were for 2015); coverage (latest estimates cover 64 countries); and robustness (TiVA estimates are still experimental and based on several assumptions). Given these drawbacks, the *Outlook* relies on conventional trade statistics as the basis for its projections but uses TiVA data as a complementary source to understand the role of GVCs.
- TiVA data suggest around a fifth of the value of gross global trade consists of intermediate inputs that are double counted as they cross-borders in GVCs (Chart A1).**
- Services account for almost half of global trade when measured on a value-add basis, versus a quarter based on conventional statistics. (Chart A2).** This reflects the value of embedded services in goods trade, which are not easily captured in gross trade measures.
- The world's top 20 exporters differ materially when measured on a value-added basis (Chart A3).** Trading hubs – such as Singapore, Hong Kong and the Netherlands – drop down the list due to the high proportion of their exports made up of re-exported inputs, while primary commodity producers – such as Russia and Saudi Arabia – rise up the rankings due to the high value-added content of their exports.

Chart A1: Share of value-added in gross global trade




Chart A2: Role of goods and services in trade, 2015




Chart A3: Difference in top 20 exporters in 2015 between value added and gross trade measures



Sources: UNCTAD, OECD [Trade in Value Added](#) & DIT calculations

Notes: All data refer to 2015. In panel A2, the share of services in global exports is higher in the OECD's TiVA dataset than UNCTAD's gross export data for methodological and coverage differences, in particular: 1) the value of embedded services in goods trade is significant; 2) the TiVA dataset only covers 64 of the largest countries in the world, many of which are more service-oriented than the global average; 3) gross exports in the TiVA dataset are valued at basic prices, not producer prices, so domestic distribution margins (inherent in exports at producer prices) are reallocated to exports of services.


² Traditional (gross) trade data are recorded in gross value terms (i.e. the entire value of a product is recorded as an export, including the value of intermediate inputs embodied in its production). By contrast, TiVA records as an export only the value a country/sector has added in the production of this export (i.e. it nets out the value of intermediate inputs embodied in the production of the export).

The sectoral structure of global trade is likely to become more service-oriented over time

- As with global GDP, the industrial structure of global trade is expected to evolve gradually over time.** The sectoral projections in the *Outlook* are based on extrapolations of historical trends and assume a steady evolution of the economic, political and technological forces that have shaped global trade. However, there are risks to the sectoral outlook, particularly from disruptive technologies that could change what we trade and how it is traded. Uncertainty scales with time so we do not present sectoral projections beyond 2030.
- All sectors are expected to grow over the next decade, but rising incomes, changing consumer preferences and technological advances will see some sectors grow faster than others (Charts 31 and 32).** Rising incomes should see global trade become more service-oriented, with the service sector’s share of trade rising from 25% to 28% by 2030. As middle-class populations expand, demand for discretionary services – including travel and digital services – should rise particularly quickly. By contrast, demand for oil and gas is expected to be sluggish as the green transition takes hold. The clothing and advanced manufacturing sectors should also see their share of global trade fall as high productivity growth drives down prices and hence lowers the dollar value of output in those sectors.

All sectors of global trade will expand in the decade ahead, but at different rates

Chart 31: Global imports by sector, 2019-2030




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD, Oxford Economics and DIT calculations

Notes: Data are for nominal imports in US dollars at time-varying market exchange rates. Sectors are defined in Section 3. NIE = ‘Not Included Elsewhere’.

The sectoral mix of global imports will shift gradually towards services over the next decade

Chart 32: Change in sectoral shares of global imports, 2019-2030



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD, Oxford Economics and DIT calculations


Notes: Data show the change in each sector’s share of global imports in US dollars converted at time-varying market exchange rates. Sectors are defined in Section 3. NIE = ‘Not Included Elsewhere’.

The US and EU's share of most import sectors is expected to decline out to 2030

- Different regions account for markedly different shares of global imports – due to variations in income, factor endowments, comparative advantage, and positions in global value chains (left panel, Chart 33).** While the EU and North America tend to import a higher share of the world's finished goods and services, emerging markets tend to import more industrial inputs, reflecting their role as global manufacturing hubs.
- The US and EU's share of most import sectors is expected to decline out to 2030 as the growing purchasing power of Asia's middle class accounts for a rising share of global import demand (right panel, Chart 33).** This change is particularly marked in the food, travel and digital services sectors where larger and increasingly wealthy populations in the Indo Pacific are expected to consume more discretionary goods and services.

The Indo Pacific's share of global imports is expected to rise in most sectors over the coming decade

Chart 33: Sectoral shares of global imports by region in 2019 and expected change by 2030



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD, Oxford Economics and DIT calculations


Notes: Data are for nominal imports in US dollars at time-varying exchange rates. Sectors are defined in Section 3. NIE = 'Not Included Elsewhere'. The Indo Pacific region is defined as three DIT HM Trade Commissioner regions: South Asia, Asia Pacific and China & Hong Kong. 'Rest of world' includes the UK, non-EU Europe, Eastern Europe & central Asia, Latin America, Middle East and Africa.

The UK is specialised in a number of fast-growing service sectors and high-tech goods sectors

- The UK has several sectors of comparative advantage.** The UK is particularly specialised in exporting services (Chart 34). The UK's strengths in services are even more marked when trade is measured in value-added terms (see Box B) due to the high services-content of goods exports. This suggests the UK should be well placed to capitalise on the global shift to more service-oriented trade over time.
- Import demand for the UK's specialist sectors is expected to grow faster than the global average in the coming decade.** Though subject to uncertainty, global import demand for UK specialist sectors is expected to grow from \$7.7tn (£6tn) in 2019 to \$14tn (£9.2tn) by 2030. This 81% increase is faster than global import growth across all sectors (67%). Among the UK's sectors of specialism, demand for life sciences (82%), financial services (84%), IP, media and recreation (86%), travel services (90%), aerospace (99%), and particularly digital services (117%) are all expected to grow faster than the global average (Chart 35).
- Over 80% of the growth in global import demand for the UK's specialist sectors is expected to come from just 29 countries.** These 29 markets – marked in shades of red on Chart 36 – are predominately located in North America, Europe, and the Asia Pacific as well as the emerging giants of China and India.

Demand growth is expected to be concentrated in large emerging markets and advanced economies

Chart 36: Growth in import demand for UK sectors of comparative advantage, 2019-2030




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD Statistics, UN World Income Inequality Database and DIT calculations

Notes: Figures show growth in nominal imports in US dollar terms at time-varying exchange rates and prices.

The UK has several sector specialisms

Chart 34: UK sectors of comparative advantage




Sources: UNCTAD, Office for National Statistics and DIT calculations

Notes: Sectors are defined in Section 3. NIE = 'Not Included Elsewhere'. Comparative advantage is calculated by comparing the UK's share of global exports for a sector with its total share of global exports. Sectors in which the UK's share of global exports exceeds 3.5% (UK export share in 2017-19) are sectors of revealed comparative advantage (RCA). That rearranges the typical equation for RCA, where a sector is of RCA if that sector's share in a country's exports exceeds its share in global exports.

Global import demand for UK specialist sectors is expected to grow relatively quickly

Chart 35: Global import demand growth for UK sectors of comparative advantage



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, Oxford Economics, UNCTAD Statistics and DIT calculations

Notes: Projections are for nominal imports converted into US dollars at time-varying market exchange rates. Bubbles indicate 2019 sector size.

Box B: How UK trade differs when measured on a value-added basis

- Conventional measures of UK exports are affected by the UK's participation in Global Value Chains (GVCs).** This reflects the UK's role both as a user of foreign inputs (backward linkages in GVCs) and a supplier of inputs to foreign businesses (forward linkages).
- Relative to most countries, the UK's use of foreign inputs in its own exports is low.** In 2015 only 15% of the value of the UK's gross exports was from foreign inputs (Chart B1), below the OECD average (26.5%). The UK's relatively low backward linkages to GVCs partly reflects its specialisation in services exports which tend to have lower import content relative to manufacturing exports.
- By contrast, the role of UK inputs in foreign exports via GVCs is relatively high.** In 2015, 24% of UK gross exports were used as inputs in overseas production to make exported goods and services (Chart B1), above the OECD average (19%). UK service sectors – such as business and financial services firms – are the main suppliers of UK inputs to foreign exports in value terms.
- The importance of service sectors to the UK's export performance is amplified in value-added terms.** In 2015, service sectors accounted for around two thirds of the value-added content of UK gross exports, compared with less than half the value of gross exports when measured using conventional statistics (Chart B2). This is partly due to the high level of UK services content embodied in the UK's goods exports. For example, a third of the value added of UK manufacturing exports is from embodied services content, the majority of which is supplied domestically by UK service sector firms (Chart B3).
- For more information on the structure of UK trade on a value added basis, see recent [DIT Research on Trade in Value Added](#).**

Chart B1: The UK's forward and backward linkages in global value chains as a share of gross UK exports




Chart B2: Role of goods and services in UK exports





Chart B3: Services content of UK exports by sector



Sources: UNCTAD, OECD [Trade in Value Added](#) & DIT calculations.


Notes: All data in charts B1-B3 refer to 2015. In chart B2, the share of services in global exports is higher in the OECD's TiVA dataset than UNCTAD's gross export data for three reasons: 1) the value of embedded services in goods trade is significant; 2) the TiVA dataset only covers 64 of the largest countries in the world, many of which are more service-oriented than the global average); 3) gross exports in the TiVA dataset are valued at basic prices, not producer prices, so domestic distribution margins (inherent in exports at producer prices) are reallocated to exports of services.

Rising incomes overseas and the growth of the middle class should create further opportunities for UK trade

- UK export opportunities are closely related to the size of populations on ‘very high’ incomes in other countries.** Since most of the UK’s population is already classified as ‘very high’ income (per capita income above US\$40,000), UK businesses tend to be more specialised at producing goods and services that are tailored to high income markets. The more people earning over US\$40,000 in a country, the higher the share of imports for the UK’s sectors of comparative advantage tends to be (Chart 37).
- The world’s growing middle class should create new opportunities for UK businesses.** Notwithstanding considerable uncertainty, the number of people with per capita income above US\$40,000 (in 2019 prices) is projected to expand by around 200 million between 2019 and 2030 and by a further 600 million by 2050. Most of the increase over the next decade is expected to come from the four regions that dominate global trade – China, Europe, North America, and the Asia Pacific (Chart 38). However, by 2050, rising prosperity in other regions – particularly in South Asia (driven by growth in India) – should create an additional centre of demand for high-value consumer goods and services.

Richer populations tend to buy relatively more goods and services that the UK specialises in exporting

Chart 37: Correlation between very high-income populations and UK sectors of specialism




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UNCTAD Statistics, UN World Income Inequality Database and DIT calculations

Notes: Figures show correlation between the share of imports in the UK’s sectors comparative advantage and the share of the population earning over US\$40k in 2019 in 30 OECD countries. The R-squared value shows the proportion of the variation in imports (y-axis) that can be explained by differences in very high-income populations (x-axis).

The number of people on very high incomes – earning above \$40k (in 2019 prices) - is expected to grow in the coming decades, creating new opportunities for UK exporters

Chart 38: Regional populations on ‘very high incomes’



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, UN World Population Prospects (2019), UN World Income Inequality Database, World Bank World Development Indicators and DIT calculations

Notes: Figures are calculated by applying current income distributions within each country to projections for nominal GDP per capita and population. ‘Very high’ income is defined as having a per capita income greater than US\$40k in 2019 prices – broadly in line with UK per capita income.


The UK should remain one of the world's largest trading nations despite rapid growth elsewhere

- The UK projections in the *Outlook* are conditioned on the Office for Budget Responsibility's (OBR) forecast, which imply only a partial rebound from COVID-19. The OBR produce UK export projections out to 2025, which suggest that UK exports in 2025 will be 10% lower in real terms than their 2019 level. That is a slower rate of recovery than the 4% real term decline predicted by the IMF's forecasts (on which all other near-term country-projections are based). The OBR does not publish export projections beyond 2025, but they do publish long-term GDP projections. To create a neutral UK export forecast that avoids any judgement about the efficacy of UK policy, the projections in the *Outlook* assume UK exports grow in line with the OBR's long-term GDP projections. This means the UK's export-to-GDP ratio remains flat at around 25% from 2025 onwards (Panel A, Chart 39).
- These projections imply that UK nominal exports could reach £0.8tn by 2030, and £1tn by the mid-2030s (Panel B, Chart 39). There is a wide band of uncertainty around these figures. A key source of uncertainty is the impact of UK policy – these projections assume the status quo continues, but UK trade policy and DIT's trade promotion activity could unlock faster growth. Another source of uncertainty is UK business behaviour – if UK firms are able to capitalise on some of the favourable trends in income growth overseas and the gradual shift in global import demand towards UK sectors of comparative advantage, UK exports could be higher than anticipated. Equally, if UK businesses fail to innovate quickly enough or fail to adapt to shocks, exports could be lower.
- Absent any changes in UK policy, the UK's market share of global exports is expected to continue its gradual decline – falling from 3.6% in 2019 to 2.6% by 2050 (Panel C, Chart 39). The UK's export share in 2050 is expected to be broadly in line with its weight in world GDP (2.7%), and almost four times its share of the global population (0.7%). Moreover, the UK is expected to remain one of the world's top 10 traders out to 2050.


The outlook for UK exports is uncertain

Chart 39: UK export projections


A) UK export-to-GDP ratio



B) UK nominal exports (in British pounds)



C) UK share of global exports



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, Office for Budget Responsibility Economic and Fiscal Outlook March 2021 and Long-Term Economic Determinants, UNCTAD and DIT calculations

Notes: Data to 2025 refer to nominal exports (and GDP) from the Office for Budget Responsibility's forecasts. From 2026, UK nominal exports are assumed to grow in line with nominal GDP. The UK's share of global exports is calculated by converting the OBR's export forecast into dollars using the IMF's dollar-pound exchange rate projection out to 2026 and then assuming the exchange rate remains stable from 2026 onwards. US\$/£ exchange rate is 0.78 in 2019, and 0.66 in 2030 and 2050. The uncertainty bands are DIT calculations and represent one standard deviation around nominal growth outturns for the 2010-2019 period.



3

Analytical Approach

An overview of our analytical approach

- **The *Global Trade Outlook* (GTO) is designed to provide a neutral set of long-term projections to help inform policymakers.** Having a long-term view of the global economy is particularly useful for trade policymakers as trade agreements often take years to negotiate and even longer for their effects to be fully felt.
- **Other external forecasters have produced similar long-term projections in the past, but the main innovations of this report are:**
 - 1) Its near-global coverage – it includes economic projections for 185 countries³
 - 2) It includes projections for trade as well as GDP out to 2050
 - 3) It provides sector projections for both GDP and trade out to 2030
 - 4) It is timely and so includes estimates (from the IMF) of the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.
- **The projections in the *Outlook* are underpinned by a wide range of assumptions, methodological choices and historical data.** This section runs through the key elements underpinning the analysis. First, it sets out the conditioning assumptions that have been used to remove politically sensitive judgements from the analysis – this includes matching our near-term projections to the IMF’s forecasts and matching all UK projections to the Office for Budget Responsibilities near-term forecast and long-term projections. Second, it sets out our methodology for projecting long-term GDP and trade, the importance of exchange rates in the calculations, and how other external forecasters compare with the figures in the *Outlook*. Third, it sets out our methodology for mapping those projections onto sector level projections for GDP and trade out to 2030. Finally, it highlights the wide bands of uncertainty around the *Outlook*’s projections and outlines some of the potential risks that could materialise in the decades ahead that could lead to very different outcomes for trade.

Structure of this section

Conditioning assumptions

Conditioning on the IMF’s forecast: 2021-2026

Conditioning on the Office for Budget Responsibility’s forecasts for the UK

Projecting GDP and Trade out to 2050

Method for projecting GDP out to 2050

Measuring GDP: Market Exchange Rates versus Purchasing Power Parity

Method for projecting trade out to 2050

The Global Trade Outlook compared with other external projections

Sector projections out to 2030

Method for projecting sector GDP and trade out to 2030

Sector definitions

Uncertainty and risks

Uncertainty driven by future shifts and shocks

Examples of potential shifts and shocks


³ Countries that are missing from the analysis are those that lack historic data either for GDP or trade, often those experiencing a period of conflict. For example, missing countries include Libya, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and North Korea.

Conditioning on the IMF’s forecasts: 2021-2026

- The *Global Trade Outlook* is conditioned on the IMF’s forecasts in the near term.** The IMF’s forecasts are the most comprehensive available. They cover virtually every country in the world and include a range of macroeconomic variables, including GDP and trade. The IMF’s forecasts also take into account the latest economic indicators available and incorporate detailed analysis of likely recovery trajectories from COVID-19 as well as broader business cycle dynamics. The *Global Trade Outlook* draws on this expertise and abstracts from making judgements about the efficacy of policy by matching our projections to the IMF’s April 2021 World Economic Outlook forecasts from 2021-2026.
- The IMF expect a divergent recovery from the pandemic with stark differences in economic prospects between regions.** The near-term outlook is heavily shaped by the recovery from COVID-19, which remains highly uncertain. The IMF expect global GDP and trade to rebound from their 2020 slump and grow above their long-term trends in both 2021 and 2022. However, recovery prospects are not expected to be even across countries. In 2020, most regions of the world experienced sharp slumps in GDP (top panel, Chart 40). By 2024, advanced economies in Europe, North America and Asia are expected to have recovered most of the lost ground suffered during the pandemic. By contrast, emerging markets – particularly those in the Global South – are predicted to experience long-term economic scarring from the pandemic and a persistent loss in economic output relative to pre-pandemic forecasts (lower panel, Chart 40). These divergent economic prospects have a key bearing on the projections in the *Global Trade Outlook* as they set back growth prospects for emerging markets by several years. Although there is a high degree of uncertainty over the near-term trajectory, the fact that the IMF’s forecasts are closely aligned to other reputable forecasters (Chart 41).

The impact of COVID-19 is expected to be longer-lived in the global south

Chart 40: Differences in real GDP in 2020 and 2024: pre-COVID forecast versus current forecast



Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021 and October 2019 and DIT calculations

Notes: Each country’s GDP has been rebased to equal 100 in 2019 and then grown forward by the IMF’s pre- and post-COVID forecasts for real GDP growth and compared.

Global GDP and trade are expected to rebound

Chart 41: IMF, OECD and WTO forecasts

	2019	2020	2021	2022
Global GDP (Purchasing Power Parity)				
OECD	2.7	-3.5	5.8	4.4
IMF	2.8	-3.3	6.0	4.4
Global GDP (Market Exchange Rates)				
WTO	2.4	-3.8	5.1	3.8
IMF	2.4	-3.6	5.8	4.1
Global Trade Volumes (Good and Services)				
OECD	1.3	-8.5	8.2	5.8
IMF	0.9	-8.5	8.4	6.5
Global Trade Volumes (Good only)				
WTO	0.2	-5.3	8.0	4.0
IMF	0.3	-5.1	9.5	5.6

Sources: [IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021](#), [OECD Economic Outlook May 2021](#), [WTO Trade Statistics & Outlook March 2021](#)


Conditioning on the Office for Budget Responsibility's forecasts for the UK

- The UK projections in the *Outlook* are based on the Office for Budget Responsibility's (OBR) near-term forecasts and long-term projections out to 2050.** This is to avoid making independent judgements on the UK outlook, including the impact of UK policy. As with other forecasts, the OBR's forecasts are subject to an unusually high degree of uncertainty due to the impact of COVID-19.
- The OBR's near-term forecasts align closely with other forecasters for GDP, but they differ more on trade.** The OBR's near-term forecasts predict a rapid rebound in UK GDP growth in 2021 and 2022 followed by a return to its trend rate from 2023 onwards. This forecast is broadly in line with the IMF's and OECD's UK forecasts (Panel A, Chart 42). The OBR also expect a rebound in UK trade in 2021 and 2022, but then predict little growth in import or export volumes from 2023 onwards (Panels B and C, Chart 42). This forecast differs from the IMF who predict UK import and export growth will settle close to their historic average from 2023 onwards (as is the case for the IMF's forecasts for other similar countries). This difference means the UK's share of global trade falls slightly faster than its historic trend in the first five years of the *Outlook* (see Panel C, Chart 39, Section 2).
- The OBR does not produce long-term forecasts for UK trade, so imports and exports are assumed to grow in line with the OBR's long-term projections for UK GDP growth.** The OBR produce two sets of forecasts – detailed near-term forecasts out to 2025 and long-term projections for a more limited set of variables out to 2070. As the OBR's long-term projections do not include forecasts for imports and exports, both are assumed to grow in line with the OBR's long-term GDP projections (in real and nominal terms). That means the UK's export-to-GDP ratio and import-to-GDP ratio stay flat out to 2050. This is a neutral conditioning assumption, not a forecast of what is expected to happen.


The OBR, IMF and OECD broadly agree on the shape of the recovery in UK GDP growth, but take different views on trade prospects

Chart 42: Comparison of IMF, OECD and OBR forecasts for the UK


a) Real GDP Growth



b) Real export growth



c) Real import growth




Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021, OECD Economic Outlook May 2021, Office for Budget Responsibility Economic and Fiscal Outlook March 2021, and DIT calculations

Projecting global GDP in the long term

- The long-term GDP projections in the *Outlook* are based on a simple supply-side model of the real economy.** From 2020-2026, the GTO's projections follow the IMF's forecasts, which account for fluctuations in demand and the business cycle. Beyond 2026, the *Outlook* assumes that GDP is mainly determined by three supply side factors – 1) labour; 2) capital; and 3) Total Factor Productivity (TFP) (Chart 43). The latter is a measure of technical progress or the efficiency with which labour and capital are combined to produce output. Land as a factor of production is assumed to remain stable, though this is a key uncertainty given climate change.
- Capital is assumed to grow in line with trends in investment, depreciation, and the capital intensity of production.** The *Outlook* takes Oxford Economics' estimate of the capital stock for individual countries and projects it forward based on investment growth offset by depreciation. Investment growth is determined by a range of factors, including the rate of return on capital and cross-country estimates of the equilibrium capital intensity of production. Depreciation rates are based on historic averages. In general, investment growth tends to be higher in rapidly industrialising countries, and more subdued in advanced economies.
- Labour supply projections are based on demographic and educational trends.** The *Outlook* assumes that the size of the workforce in each country will grow in line with the size of the population aged 15-64 (based on the UN's 2019 population projections). The proportion of this working-age population available for work (the participation rate) is assumed to remain broadly stable so that demographic trends are the key driver of labour inputs. The quality of labour – human capital – is assumed to improve over time – in line with historic trends in average educational attainment. For advanced economies like the US, which already have a high proportion of degree-educated young workers, human capital growth is expected to provide a dwindling contribution to potential growth as average educational attainment plateaus.
- Finally, TFP growth is mainly determined by historic productivity trends and catch-up potential.** For advanced economies, TFP is mainly driven by assumptions about the pace of technical progress, which is influenced by recent trends in productivity growth as well as levels of financial market development, the quality of institutions and openness to trade. Emerging economies are also assumed to benefit from 'catch-up' potential – where they can adopt best-practice techniques from the technological frontier. The rate of convergence is assumed to depend on both a country's state of development (the further from the frontier, the more catch-up potential) and historical trends in each country's ability to convert catch-up potential into actual growth. These factors are processed through Oxford Economics' Global Economic Model.

Chart 43: Components of potential growth and their drivers




Exchange rate assumptions

- All the projections in the *Outlook* have been converted into US dollars at Market Exchange Rates (MER), not Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). This distinction is important and has a significant impact on the relative size of economies (Chart 44). Emerging markets account for a much higher share of global GDP in PPP terms than MER.
- Purchasing Power Parity is the more common metric used for measuring global GDP, as it is more stable over time and accounts for differences in the cost of living. PPP adjusts for the cost of living between countries by converting GDP into US dollars based on the relative cost of a comparable basket of goods in a country relative to the US. Since it is cheaper to buy the same basket of goods in low-income countries (where wage costs are lower) PPP gives a better sense of relative living standards between countries. PPP is also more stable over time because the price of the comparable basket of goods is only measured in a single year and all GDP figures for other years are converted at that same rate. By contrast, market rates fluctuate continuously.
- Market exchange rates are the more relevant metric for trade, investment and UK businesses. Market exchange rates are the rates at which exporters sell overseas and the rates at which foreign investments are converted back into domestic currency. As such, all nominal figures in the *Outlook* are expressed in time varying market exchange rates.
- Exchange rate projections in the *Outlook* are conditioned on the IMF's forecasts in the near term and estimates of equilibrium exchange rates in the longer-term. The IMF produce market exchange rate projections out to 2026 – these underpin our projections in the near-term. From 2026 onwards, exchange rates are extrapolated forwards based on various structural factors, including trends in relative prices between countries (high rates of inflation are typically associated with exchange rate depreciations); and trends in relative income growth (high-growth countries tend to attract more foreign capital and see their exchange rate appreciate over time).⁴

Exchange rate assumptions can have a significant impact on the relative size of economies

Chart 44: Share of global GDP by region in 2019 – Market Exchange Rates vs Purchasing Power Parity



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021 and DIT calculations

⁴ In advanced economies, exchange rates are generally assumed to be stable from 2026 onwards and prices are assumed to rise broadly in line with central bank inflation targets. In emerging economies, prices are generally assumed to rise faster than in advanced economies, partly due to rising living standards. Any increases in prices not based on structural improvements in purchasing power are assumed to be offset by a depreciating exchange rate. As a result, all GDP deflators – when expressed in US dollar terms – are assumed to rise by around 2-3% per year in all countries.

How does the *Global Trade Outlook* compare with other long-term projections?

- The long-term projections for global GDP in the *Global Trade Outlook* (GTO) are similar to other studies.** Annual real GDP growth (measured on a purchasing power parity basis for comparability) is projected to be 2.5% on average during 2030-2050 in the GTO versus a 2.3%-2.8% range from other similar long-term studies (Panel A, Chart 45).
- The GTO's projections for advanced economies are a little lower than other studies.** Different assumptions about trends in productivity growth are the main driver of these differences. Most external studies assume that productivity growth in the G7 will return to its pre-Global Financial Crisis pace – a buoyant period in economic history. By contrast, the GTO takes more recent history into account and uses average growth in GDP per capita over the past 25 years as a core anchor for its projections. This period includes major booms and busts as well as more recent experience of sluggish growth during the 2010s. The GTO also assumes that productivity growth at the technological frontier (the United States) slows slightly over time as the contribution of human capital is expected to continue to plateau. These two factors mean the GTO's GDP per capita projections for the G7 are typically lower than other studies, but close to historic averages (Panel B, Chart 45).
- By contrast, the GTO's projections for large emerging economies are broadly in line with other studies.** The GTO and other external studies expect economic growth in emerging markets to slow relative to the recent past (Panel B, Chart 45). This reflects a broader maturing in those economies, less catch-up potential, and lessons from the development trajectories of other newly industrialised countries. Where differences between the GTO and other studies do exist, these are typically driven by different assumptions about the pace of catch-up and – in the GTO's case – additional data on economic trends in more recent years.


Global GDP and trade are expected to rebound

Chart 45: Comparison of long-term projections

Panel A: Global GDP and GDP per capita growth

Global Trade Outlook (2021)	2.5%	1.9%
OECD (2018)	2.3%	2.2%
PWC (2017)	2.6%	
CEPII (2012)	2.7%	2.8%
HSBC (2011)	~2.8%	

Panel B: GDP per capita growth - G7 and 'E7'



Sources: [IMF World Economic Outlook April 2021](#), [OECD Economic Outlook No 103 - July 2018](#), [CEPII, Working Paper No 2012-03](#), [PWC The Long View: How will the global economic order change by 2050?](#), [HSBC The World in 2050](#), and DIT calculations.

Notes: Projections for global GDP are converted into US dollars at time-varying PPP exchange rates, except for CEPII projections which are converted at fixed exchange rates. CEPII long-term projections are for the period 2025-2050, all other projections are 2030-2050.

Projecting global trade in the long term

- The trade projections in the *Global Trade Outlook* take UNCTAD's import and export data as their starting point.** UNCTAD's data cover all 185 countries in the *Outlook* and are reported in line with the IMF's Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, Sixth Edition (BPM6). These data were downloaded on 31 July 2021. Historic data are used up until 2019. Provisional figures for 2020 are available for some countries but are not used given the partial coverage and high likelihood of data revisions. All data are reported in US dollars.
- UNCTAD's historic data are then grown forward by the IMF's trade forecasts out to 2026.** The IMF publish forecasts for import and export volumes in their April 2021 World Economic Outlook. These growth rates are applied to UNCTAD's 2019 data to generate real trade forecasts for all countries out to 2026. The IMF do not publish nominal trade forecasts, so to generate nominal trade projections we calculate import and export deflators based on analysis of recent historic trends and the IMF's forecasts for the GDP deflator and current account balance (both of which are published).
- Beyond 2026, import projections are determined by trends in domestic demand and economic openness.** The faster domestic demand is rising, the more imports are typically required. However, trends in economic openness – specifically, the import-to-GDP ratio – also have a key bearing on import demand. Economic openness is partly determined by historic trends. For example, trade integration in the EU is assumed to continue, so the import-to-GDP ratio continues to rise in EU countries. Import intensity is also assumed to vary based on a country's size and stage of development.
- The openness of small economies is assumed to increase as incomes rise. But in large emerging markets, such as China, reliance on imports is expected to fall over time as the economy matures and domestic production expands. A key uncertainty around these trade projections is the extent to which economic openness evolves in line with recent trends and historical experience.
- Export projections are determined by prospects for overseas demand.** Beyond 2026, each country's export projection is based on two factors: 1) the existing geographic distribution of its exports to other countries; and 2) relative growth rates of GDP in those trading partners. This means that the geographic distribution of a country's exports will evolve gradually over time solely because of differences in the rate of GDP growth of its trading partners. The projections do not make any assumptions about the likelihood of new trade agreements being agreed, nor any unwinding of existing arrangements. As such these projections should be interpreted as a baseline against which potential changes in trading arrangements can be assessed.
- Finally, export and import projections are constrained to align at the global level.** Global imports should match exports, but in practice measurement issues mean that there are discrepancies in the historic data. To ensure these statistical discrepancies do not get any larger, the *Outlook* constrains global exports to grow in line with global imports (in dollar terms) This constraint is applied by proportionately adjusting the size of exports in all countries and by interrogating trade balances for individual countries to ensure they evolve sensibly.


Chart 46: Overview of the Global Trade Outlook's method of producing trade projections



Projecting GDP and trade by sector

- The sectoral projections in the Global Trade Outlook are based on a mix of historic data from Oxford Economics (for GDP) and UNCTAD (for trade).** Constructing a consistent dataset of sector data for GDP and trade is a non-trivial task given stark differences in data availability. Data on sector GDP is obtained from Oxford Economics' industry database, which is classified on a NACE2 basis. Historic data on the sectoral structure of trade is obtained from UNCTAD, which is based on Standard Industrial Classification Codes (SITC revision 4) for goods and Extended Balance of Payments Services (EBOPS) classification for services.⁵ Given the different classification systems, we have mapped the NACE2 and SITC4 and EBOPS datasets onto one another to create a consolidated dataset of 23 industrial sectors for GDP and trade (see following pages for sector definitions). Data constraints mean that this mapping is imperfect for some sectors.
- Sectoral projections for GDP are based on the expenditure components of GDP and input-output linkages between sectors.** We use Oxford Economics' Global Industry Model to decompose our aggregate GDP projections into sector-specific GDP. Growth for individual sectors is largely driven by the importance of GDP expenditure components: consumer spending, investment, government spending
- and exports. The sensitivity of each sector to these components varies – for example, prospects for consumer-facing sectors (such as food & beverages) are closely tied to trends in consumer spending. Estimates of sector GDP also factor in demand between sectors – based on historic input-output relationships.
- Sectoral projections for imports are mainly driven by changes in the industrial structure of GDP.** Import projections are constructed in a three-stage process. First, historic import-to-GDP ratios are constructed at the sector level for each country. Second, these ratios are extrapolated forward based on a continuation of recent historic trends. Finally, sector import projections are scaled so that they sum to the level of aggregate imports for each country. This produces a set of sector import projections that evolve based on how the industrial structure of GDP is shifting and based on recent changes in import intensity of production.
- Sector projections are only produced out to 2030.** While past trends are a helpful guide for the path of sectoral trade, they are likely to be less reliable in the long-term when the impact of new technologies and shifting consumer preferences is likely to alter the industrial composition of GDP. As such, we do not produce sector projections beyond 2030.

Chart 47: Overview of the Global Trade Outlook's method of producing sector projections



⁵ Service sector data are available from UNCTAD on a consistent BPM6 basis – the same basis used for aggregate import and export data. However, goods sector data are not widely available on a BPM6 basis, only based on International Merchandise Trade Statistics (IMTS). So we have constructed a proxy measure for goods sector data on a BPM6 equivalent basis, by applying the sector shares from the IMTS dataset to the aggregate import and export goods BPM6 series. This allows us to produce a breakdown of BPM6 trade across goods and services sectors. However, it is an imperfect proxy as BPM6 data are constructed on a residency basis, while IMTS data are based on a territorial basis.

SECTOR DEFINITIONS: GOODS SECTORS

Advanced Manufacturing*SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)*

75	Office machines & automatic data processing machines
763	Sound recorders or reproducers
764	Telecommunication equipment, n.e.s.; & parts, n.e.s.
772	Apparatus for electrical circuits; board, panels
776	Cathode valves & tubes

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

26.1	Electronic components & boards
26.2	Computers & office equipment
26.3	Telecommunications equipment

Aerospace & Other Transport*SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)*

714	Engines & motors, non-electric; parts, n.e.s.
79	Other transport equipment

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

30.3	Aerospace
30-30.9	Ships, rail, motorcycle & military vehicles

Agriculture*SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)*

00	Live animals other than animals of division 03
041	Wheat (including spelt) and meslin, unmilled
042	Rice
043	Barley; unmilled
044	Maize (not incl. sweet corn), unmilled
045	Cereals, unmilled (excl. wheat, rice, barley, maize)
08	Feedstuff for animals (excl. unmilled cereals)
21	Hides, skins and furskins, raw
22	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits
231	Natural rubber & similar gums, in primary forms
244	Cork, natural, raw & waste (incl. blocks, sheets)
245	Fuel wood (excl. wood waste) and wood charcoal
247	Wood in the rough or roughly squared
261	Silk
263	Cotton
264	Jute, other textile bast fibre, n.e.s., not spun; tow
265	Vegetable textile fibres, not spun; waste of them
268	Wool and other animal hair (incl. wool tops)
29	Crude animal and vegetable materials n.e.s.

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

01+02+03	Agriculture, forestry & fisheries
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Automotive*SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)*

714	Internal combustion piston engines, parts, n.e.s.
78	Road vehicles

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

29	Motor vehicles & parts
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Chemicals*SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)*

232	Synthetic rubber
51	Organic chemicals
52	Inorganic chemicals
53	Dyeing, tanning and colouring materials
56	Fertilizers other than those of group 272
57	Plastics in primary forms
59	Chemical materials and products, n.e.s.

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

20.1	Basic chemicals & fertilisers
20.2	Pesticides & agrochemicals
20.3	Paints, varnishes, coatings & ink
20.5	Explosives, glues & photographic

SECTOR DEFINITIONS: GOODS SECTORS

Clothing and Footwear

SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)

85	Footwear
84	Articles of apparel & clothing accessories
613	Furskins, tanned or dressed, excluding those of 8483

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

14	Wearing apparel & furs
15	Leather goods

Consumer Goods (Not Included Elsewhere)

SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)

12	Tobacco and tobacco manufactures
55	Essential oils for perfume materials and cleaning prep.
696	Cutlery
697	Household equipment of base metal, n.e.s.
761	Television receivers, whether or not combined
762	Radio-broadcast receivers, whether or not combined
775	Household type equipment, electrical or not, n.e.s.
82	Furniture and parts thereof
83	Travel goods, handbags, etc.
88	Photo apparatus, optical goods, watches and clocks
892	Printed Matter
893	Articles, n.e.s., of plastics
894	Baby carriages, toys, games & sporting goods
895	Office & stationery supplies, n.e.s.
896	Works of art, collectors' pieces & antiques
897	Jewellery & articles of precious materia., n.e.s.
898	Musical instruments, parts; records, tapes & similar
899	Miscellaneous manufactured articles, n.e.s

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

12	Tobacco
18	Printing & recorded media
20.4	Soaps, polish & detergents
26.4	Consumer electronics
27.5	Domestic appliances
31	Furniture manufacturing
32	Medical/dental, jewellery, music & games

Food & Beverages

SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)

01	Meat and meat preparations
02	Dairy products and birds' eggs
03	Fish, crustaceans, molluscs and preparations thereof
046	Meal and flour of wheat and flour of meslin
047	Other cereal meals and flour
048	Cereal preparations, flour of fruits or vegetables
05	Vegetables and fruits
06	Sugar, sugar preparations and honey
07	Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof
09	Miscellaneous edible products and preparations
11	Beverages
4	Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

10	Food
11	Beverages

Life Sciences

SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)

541	Medicinal and pharmaceutical products
774	Electro-diagnostic appa. for medical sciences, etc.
87	Professional and scientific instruments, n.e.s.

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

21	Pharmaceuticals
26.6	Medical & surgical equipment
26.5+26.7+26.8	Measuring, testing navigation & optical

SECTOR DEFINITIONS: GOODS SECTORS

Machinery & Equipment*SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)*

72	Specialised machinery
73	Metal working machinery
741	Heating & cooling equipment & parts thereof, n.e.s.
742	Pumps for liquids
743	Pumps (exc. liquid), gas compressors & fans; centr.
744	Mechanical handling equipment, & parts, n.e.s.
745	Other non-electr. machinery, tools & mechan. appar.
749	Non-electric parts & accessor. of machinery, n.e.s.
773	Equipment for distributing electricity n.e.s.
778	Electrical machinery & apparatus, n.e.s.

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

28.2	Ovens, lift/handling, HVAC, power tools
28.3	Agricultural machinery
28.4	Machine tools
28.9	Machines for mining & construction
27.2-4	Electric fittings & batteries
27.9	Other electrical equipment incl. capacitors & resistors

Manufactured materials (Not Included Elsewhere)*SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)*

25	Pulp and waste paper
248	Wood simply worked, and railway sleepers of wood
266	Synthetic fibres suitable for spinning
267	Other man-made fibres suitable for spinning
269	Worn clothing & other worn textile articles
58	Plastics in non-primary form
611	Leather
612	Manufactures of leather, n.e.s.; saddlery & harness
62	Rubber manufactures, n.e.s.
63	Cork & wood manufactures (excl. furniture)
64	Paper and paper manufactures
65	Textile yarn and related products
661	Lime, cement, fabrica. constr. mat. (excl. glass, clay)
662	Clay construction, refracto. construction materials
663	Mineral manufactures, n.e.s.
664	Glass
665	Glassware
666	Pottery
691	Structures & parts, n.e.s., of iron, steel, aluminium
692	Metal containers for storage or transport
693	Wire products (excluding electrical) and fencing grills
694	Nails, screws, nuts, bolts, rivets & the like, of metal
699	Manufactures of base metal, n.e.s.
746	Ball or roller bearings
747	Appliances for pipes, boiler shells, tanks, vats, etc.
748	Transmis. shafts
811	Prefab. buildings, sanitary, heating & lighting fixtures
891	Arms & ammunition

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

13	Textiles
16	Wood & wood products
17	Pulp & Paper
22	Rubber & plastics
20.6	Man-made fibres
23.1	Glass
25	Structural metal incl. tanks, boilers & weapons
23.2+23.3+23.4	Ceramic, clay & refractory products
23.5 – 23.9	Cement, plaster, abrasives & masonry

Mining & Metals*SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)*

27	Crude fertilizers other than division 56 & crude minerals
28	Metalliferous ores and metal scrap
32	Coal, coke and briquettes
667	Pearls, precious & semi-precious stones
67	Iron and steel
68	Non-ferrous metals

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

5	Coal & lignite mining (part of extraction)
24.4	Non-ferrous metals
24.5	Castings
07+08+09	Metals mining, quarry & related svcs.
24.1+24.2+24.3	Iron & steel

SECTOR DEFINITIONS: GOODS SECTORS

Oil & Gas

SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)

33	Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials
34	Gas, natural and manufactured

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

6	Oil & natural gas extraction
19	Coke & refined petroleum products

Power & Heat

SITC sub-sector codes (for trade)

35	Electric current
711	Vapour generating boilers, auxiliary plant; parts
712	Steam turbines & other vapour turbin., parts, n.e.s.
716	Rotating electric plant & parts thereof, n.e.s.
718	Other power generating machinery & parts, n.e.s.
771	Electric power machinery, and parts thereof

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

27.1	Motors, generators & transformers
28.1	Turbines, engines, fluidics, pumps & gears
35.1	Electric power generation & distribution
35.2	Gas, steam, cooling, ice manufacture & 35.3 distribution

SECTOR DEFINITIONS: SERVICE SECTORS

Business Services

EBOPS codes (for trade)

10	Other business services
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NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

68	Real estate activities
69	Legal and accounting activities
70	Activities of head offices; management consultancy
71	Architecture; engineering; technical testing & analysis
72	Scientific research and development
73	Advertising and market research
74	Other professional, scientific and technical activities
75	Veterinary activities
77	Rental and leasing activities
78	Employment activities
79	Travel agency, tour operator and related activities
80	Security and investigation activities
81	Services to building and landscape activities
82	Office administration & other business support activities

Construction

EBOPS codes (for trade)

5	Construction
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NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

41	Construction of buildings
42	Civil Engineering
43	Specialised construction activities

Digital Services

EBOPS codes (for trade)

9	Telecommunications, computer & information services
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NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

61	Telecommunications
62	Computer programming, consultancy & related activities
63	Information service activities

SECTOR DEFINITIONS: SERVICE SECTORS

Financial Services*EBOPS codes (for trade)*

6 Insurance and pension services

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

64 Financial Services, except insurance and pension funding

65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding

66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance

Intellectual Property, Recreation and Media*EBOPS codes (for trade)*

8 Charges for the use of intellectual property n.i.e.

11 Personal, cultural and recreational services

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

58 Publishing activities

59 Motion pictures, video & TV programme production, sound recording & music publishing activities

60 Programming & broadcasting activities

90 Creative, arts & entertainment activities

91 Libraries, archives, museums & other cultural activities

92 Gambling & betting activities

93 Sports activities & amusement & recreation activities

94 Activities of membership organisations

95 Repair of computers and personal and household goods

96 Other personal service activities

97 Activities of households as employers of domestic personnel

98 Undifferentiated goods- & services-producing activities of private households for own use

99 Activities of extraterritorial organisations and bodies

Public Services*EBOPS codes (for trade)*

12 Government goods & services n.i.e.

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

36-39 Water, sewerage & waste management

84 Public admin. and defence; compulsory social security

85 Education

86 Human health activities

87 Residential care activities

88 Social work activities without accommodation

Private Services (Not Included Elsewhere)*EBOPS codes (for trade)*

1 Manufacturing services on physical inputs owned by others

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles

46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles

47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles

68 Real estate activities

Transport Services*EBOPS codes (for trade)*

3 Transport Services

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

49 Land transport and transport via pipelines

50 Water transport

51 Air transport

52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation

53 Postal and courier activities

Travel Services*EBOPS codes (for trade)*

3 Travel Services

NACE sub-sector codes (for GDP)

55 Accommodation

56 Food and beverage service activities

Drivers of uncertainty: shocks and shifts

- The uncertainties surrounding the *Outlook* stem not just from methodological choices and modelling assumptions, but also from future shifts and shocks to the trading environment.** The projections in the *Outlook* are based on an informed extrapolation of historical trends, but a range of factors could disrupt these trends and put the world on a different path (Chart 48).
- Shifts – fundamental changes in geopolitical, environmental, technological and other trends – could lead to a very different outlook for trade** (blue line Chart 48). For example, the global trading system is assumed to remain broadly unchanged in the *Outlook's* projections, but other scenarios are possible. A renewed wave of globalisation or rising protectionism could lead to very different paths for global trade – as discussed in the risks table overleaf.
- Shocks – unexpected events with positive or negative consequences – could also disrupt trade.** Physical (natural disasters, diseases), economic (financial crises) and political (revolutions, wars) shocks could all have an outsized and unpredictable impact on trade. The interconnectedness of the global economy means that even localised shocks can spread beyond national borders. For example, the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake led to stark falls in output across East Asia as the disruption was transmitted through cross-border supply chains.
- The degree to which a shock matters for the long-term outlook for trade will depend on the size and persistence of its impact.** Some shocks to the global trading system can be large but transient (green line, Chart 48). For example, the eruption of Iceland's Eyjafjallajökull volcano in 2010, led to widespread disruption to air travel in Europe, but the effects were temporary. By contrast, other shocks – such as the Global Financial Crisis – led to permanent economic scarring and losses that were never recovered (red line, Chart 48). The extent to which the coronavirus pandemic proves to be a transient blip or permanent shock is a key source of uncertainty. The IMF's April 2021 forecast assume only a partial recovery from the pandemic and some permanent economic scarring to both GDP and trade (Charts 49 & 50).

Chart 48: Illustration of how different shifts and shocks can impact trends in trade






Chart 49: Impact of COVID-19 on global GDP



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook October 2019 & April 2021.

Chart 50: Impact of COVID-19 on global trade



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook October 2019 & April 2021.



Geopolitical risks

Potential shifts

- **A new wave of globalisation** – The world has already experienced several waves of trade liberalisation and integration. In the post-war period, major liberalisation events included: the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 and integration of the Eastern Bloc into the global trading system; the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957, European Union in 1993 and euro in 1999; the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 and China’s accession to it in 2001. In the decades ahead, a further wave of globalisation could materialise. This could take many forms, including: a new multilateral trade agreement through the WTO (or other international organisation); the creation of new or expanded plurilateral trade agreements; or the proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements. All these routes could lower the cost of trade and encourage further integration of international global value chains (GVCs), increasing trade growth and GDP growth relative to the projections in the *Outlook*.
- **Fragmentation** – Geopolitical events could also threaten existing levels of trade integration and lead to a period of de-globalisation. For example, if public support for trade wanes, protectionist policies may rise to the fore – as happened in the United States in 1930 with the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. Tensions between economies could also escalate into a trade war – as happened between China and the US during 2018 – which could undermine the stability of the global trading system, increase the costs and risks of trade, and incentivise firms to reduce their reliance on global value chains. In an extreme scenario, the global trading system could even fracture into separate blocs – as was the case during the Cold War. Geopolitical tensions also reduce the likelihood of new trade agreements being successively concluded – particularly at the multilateral level – and reduce the effectiveness of key institutions that drive trade integration over time, such as the WTO. All of these scenarios would lower trade and GDP growth relative to the projections in the *Outlook*.

Potential shocks

- **Conflict** – Wars, terrorism, blockades and other sanctions can have large and persistent effects on global trade. These effects are particularly devastating for the countries directly impacted but can also cause wider disruption to trade if the countries concerned are major importers or exporters.
- **Changes of government** – Election cycles can bring in different administrations that have very different policy stances on trade. This can lead to temporary or permanent shifts in prospects for trade, for example if a new government favours bilateral agreements over multilateral agreements, or actively supports re-shoring production.
- **Trade distortions and remedies** – Trade can also be distorted by unfair trade practices (such as industrial subsidies), which undermine market forces and warp trade flows. If such measures become prevalent, they can prompt other countries to impose trade remedies - such as countervailing duties - to level the playing field, which can further affect trade flows.



Environmental risks

Potential shifts

- **Climate change** - Climate change will contribute to structural shifts in the global economy and reshape trade patterns that could put the global trading system under strain. Under a scenario where global average temperatures rise by 2.6°C above pre-industrial levels, the world economy could be 10% smaller by 2050 than if the Paris temperature target is achieved.⁶ These losses are unlikely to be evenly distributed – OECD economies could be 5% smaller on average by 2050 while economies in South East Asia could be up to 25% smaller. Unequal impacts could stoke tensions between countries, raising the risk that trade is increasingly used as a policy lever to gain strategic advantage.
- **Green revolution** – In a more optimistic scenario, the threat of climate change could provide more impetus to mitigate its effects and accelerate the shift towards a greener economy. This would see an acceleration in demand for renewable energy and other green technologies. These green industries will require a different mix of imported inputs to existing industries, which could reshape global trade towards new advanced materials and minerals (like cobalt and lithium), creating new areas of strategic competition. The green transition could also spark wider shifts in consumer preferences. For example, a shift towards vegan diets could materially alter agricultural trade patterns. In addition, the transition poses a competitive challenge for countries and businesses that are reliant on carbon-intensive exports. As demand for fossil fuels eases, producers with the highest production costs will be the most exposed to transition risks.

Potential shocks

- **Climate-related natural disasters** – Natural disasters caused almost \$3 trillion of economic losses worldwide between 2000 and 2019 – nearly double the losses incurred during the previous 20 years (adjusted for inflation).⁷ Individual events are also becoming more costly – for example in 2016 a tropical cyclone wiped out more than a third of Fiji’s GDP in 36 hours.⁸ These trends pose serious risks of more frequent and severe shocks to maritime shipping (which accounts for 80% of global trade volumes), international supply chains, and trade infrastructure.⁹ A sustained increase in natural disasters may encourage businesses to move supply chains to less vulnerable regions to offset rising costs and greater uncertainty. That could slow or even reverse the integration of those areas into the global economy, pushing down GDP and trade relative to our projections.
- **Spread of zoonotic diseases** - As climate change accelerates and human activity continues to expand into natural habitats, the risk that diseases jump from animals to humans is likely to increase. That could lead to large and long-lasting shocks to economic activity and trade – as the coronavirus pandemic has clearly shown.

⁶ Swiss Re (2021); ‘The economics of climate change’

⁷ UNDRR (2020) ‘The Human Cost of Disasters 2000-2019’

⁸ World Resources Institute (2020) ‘Navigating converging shocks from a pandemic and a cyclone’

⁹ UNCTAD (2020) ‘Review of Maritime Transport’



Technological risks

Potential shifts

- **Digital revolution** - Technological developments can reduce trade costs, improve production practices, and create markets for new goods and services, all of which affect trade patterns. For example, a more rapid adoption of digital technologies could increase the tradability of services and reduce the role of distance. The OECD estimate that a 10% increase in digital connectivity between 2 countries, raises services trade by over 3%.¹⁰
- **Tech-enabled reshoring** – Faster adoption of new technologies, such as additive manufacturing (3D printing), advanced robotics, and artificial intelligence could reshape trade flows, by reducing the incentive to offshore production to countries with low labour costs. For example, McKinsey estimate that as the cost of advanced robotics fall, businesses may re-shore production close to centres of demand, which could reduce global goods trade by 5-10% by 2030. AI, virtual agents and service bots could also substitute for cheap offshore labour in the service sector, which could reduce business services trade by 5-9%.¹¹ Moreover, if autonomous technologies substitute for labour, this could amplify income inequality within and between countries. Rising income inequality would reduce the growth of the global middle class and potentially undermine trade growth, particularly for discretionary consumer goods.

Potential shocks

- **Tech disruption** – The creation of new technologies can transform global industries and entire economies. For example, the development of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling technologies enabled the United States to tap into its vast reserves of shale gas and oil. This led to the US shale revolution, which has transformed the US into the largest producer of oil and gas in the world.¹² The US has switched from being a net importer to a net exporter, which has redrawn patterns of global energy trade and the US's energy security. In the future, frontier technologies have the potential to produce even more disruption. Indeed, Kurzweil argues that at some point in the decades ahead, computers – enabled by Artificial Intelligence – could overtake humans in their ability to innovate.¹³ At that point – known as the singularity – productivity could rise exponentially (machines making machines) and disrupt economies across the world.

¹⁰ OECD (2019) 'Trade in the digital era'

¹¹ McKinsey Global Institute (2019) 'Globalization in transition: The future of trade and value chains'

¹² IEA (2019) 'Energy Policies of IEA countries: United States 2019 review'

¹³ Kurzweil R (2005) 'The singularity is near: when humans transcend biology', Published by the Penguin Group



4

Projection Tables

GDP Projections

	2019		2030		2050		Growth: 2019-30				Growth: 2019-50			
	Nominal GDP (\$bn)	Share of world GDP	Nominal GDP (\$bn)	Share of world GDP	Nominal GDP (\$bn)	Share of world GDP	In real terms		In nominal terms		In real terms		In nominal terms	
							Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative
World	87050	100.0%	149348	100.0%	380057	100.0%	2.5%	32%	5.0%	72%	2.3%	103%	4.9%	337%
Advanced Economies	51870	59.6%	79750	53.4%	164840	43.4%	1.5%	17%	4.0%	54%	1.4%	54%	3.8%	218%
Emerging Market & Developing Economies	35180	40.4%	69598	46.6%	215217	56.6%	4.3%	59%	6.4%	98%	3.4%	181%	6.0%	512%
Regions														
Africa	2388	2.7%	4962	3.3%	16771	4.4%	3.4%	44%	6.9%	108%	3.6%	198%	6.5%	602%
Asia Pacific	12284	14.1%	20194	13.5%	46443	12.2%	2.1%	25%	4.6%	64%	1.9%	78%	4.4%	278%
China & Hong Kong	14761	17.0%	32828	22.0%	102595	27.0%	4.9%	70%	7.5%	122%	3.6%	202%	6.5%	595%
E. Europe & Central Asia	3063	3.5%	5310	3.6%	14209	3.7%	2.5%	32%	5.1%	73%	2.3%	104%	5.1%	364%
Europe	17312	19.9%	27108	18.2%	53598	14.1%	1.3%	15%	4.2%	57%	1.2%	44%	3.7%	210%
Latin America	5128	5.9%	7480	5.0%	17969	4.7%	1.8%	21%	3.5%	46%	1.8%	72%	4.1%	250%
Middle East	2805	3.2%	4232	2.8%	10116	2.7%	2.2%	28%	3.8%	51%	2.0%	82%	4.2%	261%
North America	23175	26.6%	35072	23.5%	77659	20.4%	1.7%	20%	3.8%	51%	1.7%	69%	4.0%	235%
South Asia	3299	3.8%	7293	4.9%	30316	8.0%	5.6%	82%	7.5%	121%	4.9%	339%	7.4%	819%
United Kingdom	2833	3.3%	4869	3.3%	10380	2.7%	1.3%	15%	5.0%	72%	1.4%	56%	4.3%	266%
Individual Economies														
Algeria	171	0.2%	175	0.1%	454	0.1%	1.0%	11%	0.2%	2%	1.6%	66%	3.2%	165%
Angola	90	0.1%	115	0.1%	368	0.1%	2.5%	32%	2.3%	29%	2.9%	146%	4.7%	310%
Argentina	444	0.5%	583	0.4%	1274	0.3%	1.0%	12%	2.5%	31%	1.3%	51%	3.5%	187%
Australia	1392	1.6%	2423	1.6%	5760	1.5%	2.1%	26%	5.2%	74%	2.1%	90%	4.7%	314%
Austria	445	0.5%	700	0.5%	1340	0.4%	1.3%	16%	4.2%	57%	1.1%	40%	3.6%	201%
Azerbaijan	48	0.1%	70	0.0%	155	0.0%	1.3%	15%	3.5%	46%	1.2%	45%	3.8%	222%
Bahrain	38	0.0%	58	0.0%	153	0.0%	2.3%	29%	3.9%	52%	2.2%	95%	4.6%	299%
Bangladesh	302	0.3%	791	0.5%	3558	0.9%	6.4%	98%	9.1%	161%	5.5%	420%	8.3%	1077%
Belarus	64	0.1%	85	0.1%	187	0.0%	1.2%	14%	2.6%	32%	1.3%	50%	3.5%	191%
Belgium	533	0.6%	806	0.5%	1625	0.4%	1.1%	13%	3.8%	51%	1.2%	45%	3.7%	205%
Bolivia	41	0.0%	79	0.1%	224	0.1%	2.6%	33%	6.1%	93%	2.4%	112%	5.6%	443%
Bosnia & Herzegovina	20	0.0%	35	0.0%	99	0.0%	2.3%	28%	5.1%	73%	2.5%	112%	5.3%	389%
Brazil	1877	2.2%	2645	1.8%	5631	1.5%	1.6%	19%	3.2%	41%	1.2%	47%	3.6%	200%
Bulgaria	69	0.1%	129	0.1%	298	0.1%	2.4%	30%	5.9%	88%	1.8%	73%	4.9%	335%
Cambodia	27	0.0%	55	0.0%	256	0.1%	5.3%	77%	6.8%	107%	5.4%	404%	7.6%	858%
Canada	1742	2.0%	2931	2.0%	6489	1.7%	1.5%	18%	4.8%	68%	1.6%	66%	4.3%	273%
Chile	279	0.3%	490	0.3%	1206	0.3%	2.2%	27%	5.3%	76%	2.2%	94%	4.8%	332%
China	14341	16.5%	32148	21.5%	100917	26.6%	5.0%	71%	7.6%	124%	3.7%	205%	6.5%	604%
Colombia	323	0.4%	500	0.3%	1370	0.4%	2.6%	33%	4.0%	55%	2.4%	109%	4.8%	324%
Congo (DR)	50	0.1%	100	0.1%	479	0.1%	4.3%	59%	6.4%	98%	4.9%	346%	7.5%	850%
Costa Rica	64	0.1%	102	0.1%	305	0.1%	2.4%	30%	4.4%	60%	2.6%	119%	5.2%	377%
Croatia	61	0.1%	110	0.1%	232	0.1%	2.1%	26%	5.6%	82%	1.7%	67%	4.4%	281%
Cyprus	25	0.0%	41	0.0%	84	0.0%	1.8%	22%	4.6%	64%	1.5%	58%	4.0%	235%
Czechia	251	0.3%	430	0.3%	922	0.2%	2.2%	27%	5.0%	72%	1.8%	71%	4.3%	268%
Denmark	350	0.4%	578	0.4%	1259	0.3%	1.4%	17%	4.7%	65%	1.6%	61%	4.2%	260%
Dominican Republic	89	0.1%	159	0.1%	596	0.2%	3.9%	52%	5.4%	78%	4.1%	250%	6.3%	569%
Ecuador	108	0.1%	139	0.1%	313	0.1%	1.3%	15%	2.3%	28%	1.6%	64%	3.5%	189%
Egypt	302	0.3%	831	0.6%	2878	0.8%	5.3%	76%	9.6%	175%	4.4%	280%	7.5%	852%
El Salvador	27	0.0%	37	0.0%	74	0.0%	1.3%	15%	2.8%	35%	1.3%	48%	3.3%	174%
Estonia	31	0.0%	60	0.0%	149	0.0%	2.6%	33%	6.0%	89%	2.3%	105%	5.1%	374%
Ethiopia	93	0.1%	209	0.1%	1337	0.4%	7.3%	118%	7.7%	125%	7.0%	707%	9.0%	1343%
Finland	269	0.3%	408	0.3%	793	0.2%	1.0%	12%	3.9%	52%	1.0%	38%	3.5%	195%
France	2717	3.1%	4000	2.7%	7814	2.1%	1.1%	12%	3.6%	47%	1.1%	39%	3.5%	188%
Germany	3862	4.4%	5950	4.0%	11632	3.1%	1.0%	11%	4.0%	54%	1.0%	38%	3.6%	201%
Ghana	67	0.1%	140	0.1%	592	0.2%	4.8%	68%	6.9%	109%	4.7%	319%	7.3%	783%
Greece	205	0.2%	290	0.2%	495	0.1%	1.0%	12%	3.2%	41%	0.6%	20%	2.9%	141%
Guatemala	77	0.1%	140	0.1%	403	0.1%	3.1%	40%	5.6%	82%	2.7%	129%	5.5%	425%

Notes: For brevity, this table (and the one overleaf) includes individual economy projections for the 100 largest importers only (economies with nominal imports greater than \$11 billion in 2019). 'Advanced economies' include all 39 countries categorised as 'advanced' by the IMF, while 'Emerging and Developing economies' includes all other economies.

	2019		2030		2050		Growth: 2019-30				Growth: 2019-50			
	Nominal GDP (\$bn)	Share of world GDP	Nominal GDP (\$bn)	Share of world GDP	Nominal GDP (\$bn)	Share of world GDP	In real terms		In nominal terms		In real terms		In nominal terms	
							Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative
<i>Individual Economies</i>														
Honduras	25	0.0%	44	0.0%	128	0.0%	2.7%	34%	5.4%	78%	2.8%	134%	5.4%	415%
Hong Kong SAR	366	0.4%	587	0.4%	1410	0.4%	2.1%	26%	4.4%	60%	1.8%	74%	4.4%	286%
Hungary	163	0.2%	293	0.2%	620	0.2%	2.4%	30%	5.4%	79%	1.7%	68%	4.4%	279%
India	2870	3.3%	6267	4.2%	25946	6.8%	5.6%	82%	7.4%	118%	4.9%	337%	7.4%	804%
Indonesia	1120	1.3%	2195	1.5%	7424	2.0%	4.4%	61%	6.3%	96%	3.8%	214%	6.3%	563%
Iran	581	0.7%	969	0.6%	2083	0.5%	2.0%	25%	4.8%	67%	1.5%	58%	4.2%	258%
Iraq	222	0.3%	327	0.2%	934	0.2%	2.2%	26%	3.6%	47%	2.4%	108%	4.7%	320%
Ireland	398	0.5%	753	0.5%	1552	0.4%	3.0%	39%	6.0%	89%	1.9%	81%	4.5%	290%
Israel	395	0.5%	688	0.5%	1849	0.5%	3.0%	38%	5.2%	74%	2.8%	134%	5.1%	369%
Italy	2005	2.3%	2708	1.8%	4331	1.1%	0.4%	5%	2.8%	35%	0.2%	6%	2.5%	116%
Ivory Coast	59	0.1%	145	0.1%	696	0.2%	5.8%	85%	8.6%	148%	5.4%	411%	8.3%	1089%
Japan	5149	5.9%	7364	4.9%	11793	3.1%	0.5%	6%	3.3%	43%	0.2%	7%	2.7%	129%
Jordan	45	0.1%	76	0.1%	231	0.1%	2.7%	34%	4.9%	70%	2.7%	131%	5.4%	417%
Kazakhstan	182	0.2%	333	0.2%	1221	0.3%	3.5%	47%	5.7%	83%	3.8%	221%	6.3%	572%
Kenya	95	0.1%	204	0.1%	702	0.2%	5.5%	80%	7.2%	114%	4.5%	294%	6.6%	635%
Kuwait	135	0.2%	180	0.1%	324	0.1%	1.2%	14%	2.7%	34%	0.9%	31%	2.9%	141%
Latvia	34	0.0%	62	0.0%	169	0.0%	2.8%	35%	5.6%	83%	2.8%	134%	5.3%	398%
Lithuania	55	0.1%	92	0.1%	187	0.0%	2.1%	25%	4.9%	69%	1.5%	58%	4.0%	242%
Luxembourg	71	0.1%	131	0.1%	319	0.1%	2.4%	30%	5.7%	84%	2.3%	102%	5.0%	349%
Macao SAR	55	0.1%	93	0.1%	267	0.1%	2.5%	31%	4.8%	68%	2.5%	115%	5.2%	385%
Malaysia	365	0.4%	746	0.5%	2229	0.6%	4.2%	57%	6.7%	105%	3.4%	185%	6.0%	511%
Malta	15	0.0%	29	0.0%	59	0.0%	3.2%	41%	6.0%	91%	2.0%	83%	4.5%	289%
Mexico	1269	1.5%	1789	1.2%	4307	1.1%	1.4%	16%	3.2%	41%	1.6%	62%	4.0%	239%
Morocco	120	0.1%	203	0.1%	576	0.2%	2.7%	34%	4.9%	70%	2.9%	141%	5.2%	381%
Myanmar (Burma)	69	0.1%	145	0.1%	581	0.2%	3.2%	41%	7.0%	111%	3.8%	222%	7.1%	745%
Nepal	34	0.0%	72	0.0%	254	0.1%	4.2%	57%	7.0%	110%	3.8%	219%	6.7%	642%
Netherlands	907	1.0%	1408	0.9%	2832	0.7%	1.3%	15%	4.1%	55%	1.3%	47%	3.7%	212%
New Zealand	210	0.2%	377	0.3%	896	0.2%	2.1%	26%	5.5%	79%	2.1%	89%	4.8%	326%
Nigeria	448	0.5%	1309	0.9%	3887	1.0%	2.1%	25%	10.2%	192%	2.6%	122%	7.2%	767%
Norway	406	0.5%	590	0.4%	1295	0.3%	2.0%	25%	3.5%	46%	1.8%	73%	3.8%	219%
Oman	76	0.1%	104	0.1%	232	0.1%	1.7%	21%	2.8%	36%	1.4%	56%	3.7%	204%
Pakistan	276	0.3%	486	0.3%	1789	0.5%	4.0%	54%	5.3%	76%	4.0%	233%	6.2%	548%
Panama	67	0.1%	110	0.1%	410	0.1%	3.3%	42%	4.7%	65%	3.9%	226%	6.0%	514%
Paraguay	38	0.0%	64	0.0%	180	0.0%	3.2%	41%	4.8%	67%	2.7%	131%	5.1%	372%
Peru	231	0.3%	357	0.2%	1000	0.3%	2.6%	32%	4.0%	55%	2.8%	136%	4.8%	333%
Philippines	377	0.4%	811	0.5%	3247	0.9%	4.8%	67%	7.2%	115%	4.4%	278%	7.2%	762%
Poland	596	0.7%	1165	0.8%	2528	0.7%	2.4%	30%	6.3%	96%	1.7%	70%	4.8%	324%
Portugal	240	0.3%	370	0.2%	651	0.2%	1.3%	15%	4.0%	54%	0.8%	29%	3.3%	172%
Qatar	176	0.2%	239	0.2%	544	0.1%	1.8%	21%	2.8%	36%	1.4%	56%	3.7%	210%
Romania	250	0.3%	512	0.3%	1117	0.3%	2.9%	38%	6.7%	105%	1.8%	73%	5.0%	347%
Russia	1689	1.9%	2336	1.6%	5396	1.4%	1.8%	22%	3.0%	38%	1.6%	62%	3.8%	219%
Saudi Arabia	793	0.9%	1169	0.8%	2376	0.6%	2.2%	27%	3.6%	47%	1.5%	61%	3.6%	200%
Serbia	51	0.1%	110	0.1%	365	0.1%	3.6%	48%	7.2%	115%	3.4%	186%	6.5%	608%
Singapore	374	0.4%	558	0.4%	1177	0.3%	2.0%	24%	3.7%	49%	1.6%	66%	3.8%	214%
Slovakia	105	0.1%	188	0.1%	362	0.1%	2.3%	28%	5.4%	79%	1.4%	56%	4.1%	245%
Slovenia	54	0.1%	92	0.1%	182	0.0%	2.1%	25%	4.9%	69%	1.5%	58%	4.0%	236%
South Africa	351	0.4%	481	0.3%	1123	0.3%	0.8%	10%	2.9%	37%	1.3%	49%	3.8%	220%
South Korea	1647	1.9%	2592	1.7%	4846	1.3%	2.0%	25%	4.2%	57%	1.3%	48%	3.5%	194%
Spain	1394	1.6%	2075	1.4%	3474	0.9%	1.1%	12%	3.7%	49%	0.6%	19%	3.0%	149%
Sri Lanka	84	0.1%	148	0.1%	505	0.1%	3.4%	44%	5.3%	77%	3.4%	185%	6.0%	501%
Sweden	531	0.6%	967	0.6%	2125	0.6%	1.7%	21%	5.6%	82%	1.7%	69%	4.6%	300%
Switzerland	732	0.8%	1215	0.8%	2498	0.7%	1.3%	16%	4.7%	66%	1.3%	50%	4.0%	241%
Taiwan	612	0.7%	1144	0.8%	2567	0.7%	2.5%	32%	5.9%	87%	2.0%	87%	4.7%	319%
Thailand	544	0.6%	862	0.6%	1825	0.5%	2.6%	32%	4.3%	58%	1.9%	77%	4.0%	235%
Tunisia	39	0.0%	62	0.0%	126	0.0%	1.1%	12%	4.3%	59%	1.2%	43%	3.9%	223%
Turkey	761	0.9%	1758	1.2%	4975	1.3%	3.6%	47%	7.9%	131%	3.0%	151%	6.2%	554%
Ukraine	154	0.2%	357	0.2%	901	0.2%	3.1%	39%	7.9%	132%	2.3%	104%	5.9%	486%
United Arab Emirates	421	0.5%	553	0.4%	1210	0.3%	1.7%	21%	2.5%	31%	1.5%	58%	3.5%	187%
United Kingdom	2833	3.3%	4869	3.3%	10380	2.7%	1.3%	15%	5.0%	72%	1.4%	56%	4.3%	266%
United States	21433	24.6%	32141	21.5%	71170	18.7%	1.7%	20%	3.8%	50%	1.7%	69%	3.9%	232%
Uruguay	62	0.1%	79	0.1%	205	0.1%	1.7%	21%	2.3%	28%	1.9%	80%	3.9%	229%
Uzbekistan	58	0.1%	144	0.1%	607	0.2%	5.0%	72%	8.7%	150%	4.7%	315%	7.9%	951%
Vietnam	330	0.4%	809	0.5%	3489	0.9%	6.2%	95%	8.5%	145%	5.2%	387%	7.9%	959%

Import Projections

	2019		2030		2050		Growth: 2019-30				Growth: 2019-50			
	Nominal imports (\$bn)	Share of world imports	Nominal imports (\$bn)	Share of world imports	Nominal imports (\$bn)	Share of world imports	In real terms		In nominal terms		In real terms		In nominal terms	
							Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative
World	24100	100.0%	40171	100.0%	99954	100.0%	3.1%	40%	4.8%	67%	2.5%	113%	4.7%	315%
Advanced Economies	15292	63.5%	23959	59.6%	50976	51.0%	2.5%	31%	4.2%	57%	1.8%	76%	4.0%	233%
Emerging Market & Developing Economies	8808	36.5%	16212	40.4%	48978	49.0%	4.1%	56%	5.7%	84%	3.3%	178%	5.7%	456%
Regions														
Africa	687	2.9%	1110	2.8%	3878	3.9%	5.7%	85%	4.5%	62%	4.3%	269%	5.7%	464%
Asia Pacific	3897	16.2%	6241	15.5%	15941	15.9%	3.4%	44%	4.4%	60%	2.7%	127%	4.6%	309%
China & Hong Kong	3137	13.0%	5883	14.6%	16679	16.7%	3.8%	50%	5.9%	88%	2.9%	142%	5.5%	432%
E. Europe & Central Asia	832	3.5%	1547	3.9%	4463	4.5%	4.5%	62%	5.8%	86%	3.3%	177%	5.6%	437%
Europe	7956	33.0%	13200	32.9%	27740	27.8%	2.6%	33%	4.7%	66%	1.8%	76%	4.1%	249%
Latin America	1242	5.2%	1889	4.7%	5069	5.1%	2.2%	27%	3.9%	52%	2.3%	100%	4.6%	308%
Middle East	970	4.0%	1530	3.8%	3974	4.0%	1.8%	22%	4.2%	58%	2.1%	92%	4.7%	310%
North America	3692	15.3%	5642	14.0%	12581	12.6%	2.7%	34%	3.9%	53%	2.1%	90%	4.0%	241%
South Asia	773	3.2%	1760	4.4%	6713	6.7%	6.5%	99%	7.8%	128%	4.9%	342%	7.2%	769%
United Kingdom	915	3.8%	1367	3.4%	2915	2.9%	0.6%	7%	3.7%	49%	1.2%	45%	3.8%	218%
Individual Economies														
Algeria	54	0.2%	41	0.1%	96	0.1%	-3.7%	-34%	-2.5%	-24%	-0.4%	-10%	1.9%	79%
Angola	22	0.1%	24	0.1%	65	0.1%	0.4%	5%	0.7%	8%	1.6%	65%	3.5%	190%
Argentina	66	0.3%	95	0.2%	211	0.2%	2.7%	35%	3.3%	43%	2.0%	86%	3.8%	219%
Australia	296	1.2%	461	1.1%	1062	1.1%	2.4%	30%	4.1%	56%	2.1%	89%	4.2%	259%
Austria	233	1.0%	376	0.9%	761	0.8%	1.7%	20%	4.5%	62%	1.4%	54%	3.9%	227%
Azerbaijan	18	0.1%	20	0.1%	44	0.0%	-0.4%	-4%	1.3%	15%	0.6%	20%	3.0%	151%
Bahrain	25	0.1%	38	0.1%	107	0.1%	2.7%	34%	3.8%	50%	2.5%	117%	4.7%	321%
Bangladesh	64	0.3%	123	0.3%	528	0.5%	4.9%	68%	6.1%	91%	4.8%	323%	7.0%	723%
Belarus	42	0.2%	59	0.1%	129	0.1%	0.8%	9%	3.0%	39%	1.2%	43%	3.7%	206%
Belgium	434	1.8%	686	1.7%	1444	1.4%	3.1%	40%	4.3%	58%	2.0%	87%	4.0%	233%
Bolivia	12	0.0%	22	0.1%	63	0.1%	4.9%	69%	5.8%	87%	3.2%	169%	5.5%	427%
Bosnia & Herzegovina	11	0.0%	19	0.0%	53	0.1%	3.0%	39%	4.8%	67%	2.7%	130%	5.1%	374%
Brazil	255	1.1%	409	1.0%	1100	1.1%	1.8%	22%	4.4%	60%	2.1%	91%	4.8%	332%
Bulgaria	40	0.2%	71	0.2%	180	0.2%	3.2%	41%	5.3%	76%	2.3%	104%	4.9%	345%
Cambodia	25	0.1%	54	0.1%	251	0.3%	5.7%	83%	7.1%	112%	5.5%	422%	7.7%	886%
Canada	584	2.4%	948	2.4%	2093	2.1%	2.6%	33%	4.5%	62%	2.0%	86%	4.2%	259%
Chile	80	0.3%	123	0.3%	301	0.3%	1.8%	22%	3.9%	53%	2.0%	87%	4.4%	276%
China	2474	10.3%	4891	12.2%	14318	14.3%	4.0%	54%	6.4%	98%	3.1%	157%	5.8%	479%
Colombia	65	0.3%	95	0.2%	256	0.3%	1.7%	20%	3.6%	47%	2.0%	86%	4.5%	296%
Congo (DR)	18	0.1%	44	0.1%	210	0.2%	7.0%	110%	8.3%	142%	5.9%	485%	8.2%	1056%
Costa Rica	20	0.1%	35	0.1%	104	0.1%	3.7%	49%	5.4%	78%	3.0%	151%	5.5%	430%
Croatia	31	0.1%	73	0.2%	160	0.2%	5.1%	72%	8.0%	133%	2.8%	138%	5.4%	409%
Cyprus	18	0.1%	29	0.1%	59	0.1%	2.7%	34%	4.3%	59%	1.8%	74%	3.9%	224%
Czechia	171	0.7%	274	0.7%	602	0.6%	2.0%	25%	4.4%	60%	1.8%	73%	4.1%	251%
Denmark	176	0.7%	296	0.7%	668	0.7%	1.9%	24%	4.8%	68%	1.9%	77%	4.4%	279%
Dominican Republic	25	0.1%	48	0.1%	180	0.2%	4.9%	70%	6.3%	95%	4.5%	292%	6.6%	635%
Ecuador	26	0.1%	29	0.1%	65	0.1%	0.1%	1%	1.0%	12%	1.2%	45%	3.0%	152%
Egypt	79	0.3%	153	0.4%	552	0.6%	2.8%	35%	6.2%	94%	3.7%	205%	6.5%	600%
El Salvador	13	0.1%	19	0.0%	39	0.0%	2.8%	36%	3.7%	49%	1.8%	75%	3.6%	203%
Estonia	22	0.1%	37	0.1%	101	0.1%	4.2%	57%	5.0%	70%	3.2%	164%	5.1%	364%
Ethiopia	17	0.1%	36	0.1%	232	0.2%	6.2%	93%	7.0%	111%	6.5%	615%	8.7%	1247%
Finland	107	0.4%	157	0.4%	305	0.3%	1.5%	17%	3.6%	47%	1.2%	44%	3.4%	185%
France	917	3.8%	1341	3.3%	2736	2.7%	2.0%	24%	3.5%	46%	1.5%	61%	3.6%	198%
Germany	1587	6.6%	2473	6.2%	5149	5.2%	2.6%	32%	4.1%	56%	1.8%	75%	3.9%	224%
Ghana	27	0.1%	42	0.1%	178	0.2%	8.8%	153%	4.1%	56%	6.1%	528%	6.3%	559%
Greece	83	0.3%	137	0.3%	253	0.3%	2.5%	31%	4.6%	65%	1.4%	53%	3.7%	204%
Guatemala	22	0.1%	36	0.1%	104	0.1%	3.8%	50%	4.8%	68%	2.9%	144%	5.2%	383%

Notes: For brevity, this table (and the one overleaf) includes individual economy projections for the 100 largest importers only (economies with nominal imports greater than \$11 billion in 2019). 'Advanced economies' include all 39 countries categorised as 'advanced' by the IMF, while 'Emerging and Developing economies' includes all other economies.

	2019		2030		2050		Growth: 2019-30				Growth: 2019-50			
	Nominal Imports (\$bn)	Share of world imports	Nominal Imports (\$bn)	Share of world imports	Nominal Imports (\$bn)	Share of world imports	In real terms		In nominal terms		In real terms		In nominal terms	
							Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative
Individual Economies														
Honduras	12	0.0%	21	0.1%	60	0.1%	4.2%	57%	5.5%	80%	3.3%	174%	5.5%	419%
Hong Kong SAR	644	2.7%	966	2.4%	2287	2.3%	2.9%	37%	3.8%	50%	2.0%	86%	4.2%	255%
Hungary	129	0.5%	252	0.6%	550	0.6%	4.8%	68%	6.3%	96%	2.6%	125%	4.8%	327%
India	665	2.8%	1567	3.9%	5943	5.9%	6.8%	106%	8.1%	136%	5.0%	354%	7.3%	794%
Indonesia	204	0.8%	346	0.9%	1333	1.3%	3.8%	50%	4.9%	70%	4.0%	234%	6.2%	553%
Iran	79	0.3%	133	0.3%	281	0.3%	1.5%	18%	4.9%	69%	1.3%	47%	4.2%	258%
Iraq	72	0.3%	197	0.5%	468	0.5%	2.5%	31%	9.5%	173%	2.1%	89%	6.2%	547%
Ireland	449	1.9%	764	1.9%	1597	1.6%	2.2%	27%	5.0%	70%	1.7%	68%	4.2%	256%
Israel	108	0.4%	231	0.6%	672	0.7%	5.1%	73%	7.1%	113%	3.8%	217%	6.1%	520%
Italy	570	2.4%	922	2.3%	1557	1.6%	2.0%	25%	4.5%	62%	0.9%	34%	3.3%	173%
Ivory Coast	12	0.1%	28	0.1%	135	0.1%	6.3%	97%	7.7%	127%	5.6%	443%	8.0%	987%
Japan	900	3.7%	1359	3.4%	2468	2.5%	2.7%	34%	3.8%	51%	1.4%	54%	3.3%	174%
Jordan	19	0.1%	29	0.1%	89	0.1%	2.4%	29%	3.8%	51%	2.6%	123%	5.0%	359%
Kazakhstan	50	0.2%	83	0.2%	305	0.3%	2.8%	36%	4.8%	67%	3.6%	197%	6.0%	511%
Kenya	20	0.3%	47	0.1%	140	0.1%	7.2%	115%	8.0%	134%	4.6%	309%	6.5%	596%
Kuwait	59	0.2%	83	0.2%	156	0.2%	1.4%	17%	3.1%	40%	1.1%	41%	3.2%	165%
Latvia	20	0.1%	37	0.1%	101	0.1%	3.1%	40%	5.4%	79%	2.9%	145%	5.3%	391%
Lithuania	39	0.2%	71	0.2%	143	0.1%	3.2%	41%	5.5%	80%	1.9%	78%	4.3%	264%
Luxembourg	114	0.5%	223	0.6%	551	0.6%	3.4%	44%	6.3%	96%	2.7%	126%	5.2%	385%
Macao SAR	18	0.1%	26	0.1%	74	0.1%	0.8%	9%	3.1%	40%	1.9%	78%	4.6%	300%
Malaysia	211	0.9%	363	0.9%	964	1.0%	3.2%	41%	5.1%	72%	2.7%	128%	5.0%	358%
Malta	18	0.1%	27	0.1%	54	0.1%	1.2%	14%	3.7%	49%	1.2%	44%	3.6%	197%
Mexico	493	2.0%	708	1.8%	1877	1.9%	1.7%	20%	3.3%	44%	2.0%	83%	4.4%	281%
Morocco	54	0.2%	99	0.2%	305	0.3%	4.7%	66%	5.7%	83%	3.9%	223%	5.7%	462%
Myanmar (Burma)	17	0.1%	26	0.1%	105	0.1%	4.3%	59%	4.1%	56%	4.3%	264%	6.1%	527%
Nepal	14	0.1%	21	0.1%	75	0.1%	1.2%	14%	3.9%	53%	2.7%	131%	5.6%	437%
Netherlands	742	3.1%	1218	3.0%	2552	2.6%	2.3%	28%	4.6%	64%	1.7%	71%	4.1%	244%
New Zealand	58	0.2%	91	0.2%	208	0.2%	2.2%	27%	4.2%	58%	2.0%	84%	4.2%	261%
Nigeria	101	0.4%	124	0.3%	462	0.5%	1.5%	18%	1.9%	23%	3.2%	163%	5.0%	359%
Norway	141	0.6%	197	0.5%	433	0.4%	1.4%	16%	3.1%	40%	1.5%	61%	3.7%	208%
Oman	34	0.1%	49	0.1%	159	0.2%	1.6%	19%	3.4%	45%	2.6%	123%	5.1%	371%
Pakistan	57	0.2%	104	0.3%	449	0.4%	4.6%	64%	5.6%	83%	4.7%	316%	6.9%	690%
Panama	27	0.1%	45	0.1%	166	0.2%	3.8%	50%	4.5%	63%	4.1%	245%	6.0%	508%
Paraguay	13	0.1%	24	0.1%	67	0.1%	4.1%	56%	5.5%	79%	3.1%	155%	5.4%	408%
Peru	51	0.2%	83	0.2%	240	0.2%	2.5%	31%	4.4%	61%	2.9%	140%	5.1%	366%
Philippines	128	0.5%	298	0.7%	1289	1.3%	7.4%	119%	8.0%	132%	5.6%	436%	7.7%	906%
Poland	299	1.2%	558	1.4%	1303	1.3%	3.3%	43%	5.8%	87%	2.3%	101%	4.9%	336%
Portugal	104	0.4%	171	0.4%	302	0.3%	3.3%	42%	4.6%	65%	1.5%	60%	3.5%	191%
Qatar	67	0.3%	72	0.2%	163	0.2%	-0.8%	-9%	0.7%	8%	0.5%	17%	2.9%	144%
Romania	111	0.5%	253	0.6%	581	0.6%	5.8%	86%	7.8%	129%	2.9%	146%	5.5%	425%
Russia	353	1.5%	520	1.3%	1229	1.2%	2.7%	34%	3.6%	47%	1.9%	82%	4.1%	248%
Saudi Arabia	211	0.9%	269	0.7%	577	0.6%	0.1%	1%	2.2%	28%	1.0%	35%	3.3%	174%
Serbia	33	0.1%	83	0.2%	274	0.3%	6.7%	104%	8.9%	154%	4.5%	296%	7.1%	743%
Singapore	551	2.3%	812	2.0%	1890	1.9%	3.2%	41%	3.6%	47%	2.4%	107%	4.1%	243%
Slovakia	99	0.4%	191	0.5%	378	0.4%	3.9%	52%	6.2%	93%	2.1%	90%	4.4%	282%
Slovenia	41	0.2%	80	0.2%	159	0.2%	3.8%	51%	6.3%	96%	2.1%	90%	4.5%	289%
South Africa	103	0.4%	146	0.4%	371	0.4%	2.3%	29%	3.2%	42%	2.1%	90%	4.2%	259%
South Korea	612	2.5%	927	2.3%	1898	1.9%	3.0%	39%	3.9%	52%	1.9%	80%	3.7%	210%
Spain	446	1.9%	709	1.8%	1292	1.3%	2.1%	25%	4.3%	59%	1.2%	45%	3.5%	190%
Sri Lanka	25	0.1%	41	0.1%	140	0.1%	4.2%	57%	4.8%	68%	3.7%	212%	5.8%	472%
Sweden	232	1.0%	377	0.9%	849	0.8%	2.4%	30%	4.5%	62%	2.0%	86%	4.3%	265%
Switzerland	394	1.6%	802	2.0%	1732	1.7%	3.2%	41%	6.7%	104%	2.1%	93%	4.9%	340%
Taiwan	330	1.4%	464	1.2%	1108	1.1%	2.0%	24%	3.1%	41%	2.1%	88%	4.0%	236%
Thailand	266	1.1%	464	1.2%	1097	1.1%	3.2%	42%	5.2%	74%	2.4%	112%	4.7%	312%
Tunisia	23	0.1%	35	0.1%	102	0.1%	2.2%	27%	3.6%	48%	2.8%	136%	4.9%	336%
Turkey	227	0.9%	590	1.5%	1886	1.9%	7.7%	125%	9.1%	160%	4.8%	334%	7.1%	731%
Ukraine	76	0.3%	143	0.4%	362	0.4%	1.5%	18%	5.9%	88%	1.8%	72%	5.2%	375%
United Arab Emirates	329	1.4%	534	1.3%	1449	1.4%	2.8%	35%	4.5%	62%	2.6%	119%	4.9%	340%
United Kingdom	915	3.8%	1367	3.4%	2915	2.9%	0.6%	7%	3.7%	49%	1.2%	45%	3.8%	218%
United States	3108	12.9%	4695	11.7%	10488	10.5%	2.7%	34%	3.8%	51%	2.1%	90%	4.0%	237%
Uruguay	13	0.1%	27	0.1%	84	0.1%	5.1%	73%	6.7%	104%	3.7%	211%	6.1%	534%
Uzbekistan	27	0.1%	64	0.2%	267	0.3%	9.2%	163%	8.3%	140%	6.1%	536%	7.7%	906%
Vietnam	272	1.1%	533	1.3%	2142	2.1%	6.5%	100%	6.3%	96%	5.1%	367%	6.9%	687%

Export Projections

	2019		2030		2050		Growth: 2019-30				Growth: 2019-50			
	Nominal exports (\$bn)	Share of world exports	Nominal exports (\$bn)	Share of world exports	Nominal exports (\$bn)	Share of world exports	In real terms		In nominal terms		In real terms		In nominal terms	
							Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative
World	24748	100.0%	40800	100.0%	100412	100.0%	2.9%	37%	4.6%	65%	2.3%	105%	4.6%	306%
Advanced Economies	15573	62.9%	24705	60.6%	52612	52.4%	2.4%	29%	4.3%	59%	1.8%	73%	4.0%	238%
Emerging Market & Developing Economies	9175	37.1%	16094	39.4%	47800	47.6%	3.7%	50%	5.2%	75%	3.1%	158%	5.5%	421%
Regions														
Africa	569	2.3%	923	2.3%	3298	3.3%	3.5%	46%	4.5%	62%	3.7%	207%	5.8%	479%
Asia Pacific	4213	17.0%	6757	16.6%	16851	16.8%	3.2%	41%	4.4%	60%	2.5%	117%	4.6%	300%
China & Hong Kong	3377	13.6%	6062	14.9%	17170	17.1%	3.7%	48%	5.5%	80%	2.8%	138%	5.4%	408%
E. Europe & Central Asia	975	3.9%	1580	3.9%	4461	4.4%	3.4%	45%	4.5%	62%	2.8%	137%	5.0%	357%
Europe	8603	34.8%	14374	35.2%	29917	29.8%	2.5%	32%	4.8%	67%	1.8%	72%	4.1%	248%
Latin America	1220	4.9%	1899	4.7%	5056	5.0%	2.5%	31%	4.1%	56%	2.3%	105%	4.7%	315%
Middle East	1210	4.9%	1638	4.0%	3918	3.9%	2.5%	32%	2.8%	35%	2.0%	84%	3.9%	224%
North America	3082	12.5%	4937	12.1%	11517	11.5%	2.6%	32%	4.4%	60%	2.2%	95%	4.3%	274%
South Asia	618	2.5%	1413	3.5%	5631	5.6%	6.1%	92%	7.8%	129%	4.9%	344%	7.4%	811%
United Kingdom	880	3.6%	1216	3.0%	2593	2.6%	-0.3%	-3%	3.0%	38%	0.9%	31%	3.5%	195%
Individual Economies														
Algeria	38	0.2%	30	0.1%	68	0.1%	-1.6%	-16%	-2.2%	-22%	0.3%	9%	1.9%	78%
Angola	35	0.1%	28	0.1%	59	0.1%	1.2%	14%	-1.9%	-19%	1.0%	37%	1.7%	67%
Argentina	79	0.3%	111	0.3%	242	0.2%	2.6%	32%	3.1%	40%	1.9%	79%	3.7%	205%
Australia	342	1.4%	500	1.2%	1121	1.1%	1.8%	22%	3.5%	46%	1.8%	73%	3.9%	227%
Austria	248	1.0%	405	1.0%	814	0.8%	1.6%	19%	4.6%	63%	1.3%	51%	3.9%	229%
Azerbaijan	24	0.1%	21	0.1%	47	0.0%	-0.1%	-1%	-0.9%	-9%	0.7%	23%	2.2%	97%
Bahrain	30	0.1%	44	0.1%	120	0.1%	3.0%	38%	3.6%	47%	2.5%	115%	4.6%	301%
Bangladesh	45	0.2%	91	0.2%	421	0.4%	4.9%	69%	6.6%	102%	5.0%	352%	7.5%	830%
Belarus	42	0.2%	60	0.1%	133	0.1%	2.0%	24%	3.4%	44%	1.6%	63%	3.8%	216%
Belgium	433	1.7%	687	1.7%	1455	1.4%	2.9%	36%	4.3%	59%	2.0%	83%	4.0%	236%
Bolivia	8	0.0%	15	0.0%	47	0.0%	3.2%	42%	5.3%	76%	3.0%	149%	5.7%	450%
Bosnia & Herzegovina	8	0.0%	13	0.0%	41	0.0%	3.2%	42%	4.7%	65%	3.1%	154%	5.4%	408%
Brazil	260	1.1%	443	1.1%	1192	1.2%	3.7%	49%	5.0%	70%	2.7%	132%	5.0%	358%
Bulgaria	44	0.2%	77	0.2%	189	0.2%	2.9%	36%	5.2%	75%	2.1%	92%	4.8%	329%
Cambodia	21	0.1%	51	0.1%	235	0.2%	6.6%	101%	8.3%	141%	5.8%	468%	8.1%	1015%
Canada	554	2.2%	906	2.2%	2010	2.0%	2.5%	31%	4.6%	64%	2.0%	84%	4.2%	263%
Chile	79	0.3%	140	0.3%	325	0.3%	2.4%	30%	5.3%	77%	2.0%	86%	4.7%	311%
China	2682	10.8%	5029	12.3%	14704	14.6%	3.9%	52%	5.9%	87%	3.0%	151%	5.6%	448%
Colombia	52	0.2%	76	0.2%	200	0.2%	2.6%	33%	3.5%	46%	2.3%	100%	4.4%	282%
Congo (DR)	12	0.0%	31	0.1%	161	0.2%	6.4%	99%	9.0%	157%	5.9%	499%	8.7%	1236%
Costa Rica	21	0.1%	36	0.1%	106	0.1%	3.5%	46%	4.8%	68%	2.9%	145%	5.3%	400%
Croatia	31	0.1%	71	0.2%	157	0.2%	4.6%	65%	7.6%	125%	2.7%	130%	5.3%	400%
Cyprus	18	0.1%	29	0.1%	59	0.1%	2.3%	28%	4.4%	60%	1.6%	66%	3.9%	229%
Czechia	186	0.8%	301	0.7%	662	0.7%	2.2%	27%	4.5%	62%	1.8%	75%	4.2%	256%
Denmark	204	0.8%	337	0.8%	760	0.8%	1.7%	20%	4.7%	66%	1.7%	71%	4.3%	273%
Dominican Republic	19	0.1%	35	0.1%	144	0.1%	4.5%	62%	5.8%	87%	4.6%	302%	6.8%	659%
Ecuador	26	0.1%	30	0.1%	69	0.1%	1.3%	15%	1.4%	17%	1.6%	64%	3.2%	164%
Egypt	54	0.2%	111	0.3%	507	0.5%	5.8%	85%	6.8%	107%	5.5%	427%	7.5%	847%
El Salvador	8	0.0%	12	0.0%	28	0.0%	2.4%	30%	3.9%	52%	2.1%	88%	4.1%	246%
Estonia	23	0.1%	36	0.1%	99	0.1%	2.9%	37%	4.2%	57%	2.7%	131%	4.8%	331%
Ethiopia	8	0.0%	23	0.1%	167	0.2%	7.0%	111%	10.7%	205%	7.2%	773%	10.5%	2090%
Finland	108	0.4%	163	0.4%	325	0.3%	1.5%	18%	3.8%	51%	1.3%	49%	3.6%	201%
France	890	3.6%	1324	3.2%	2731	2.7%	2.1%	26%	3.7%	49%	1.6%	64%	3.7%	207%
Germany	1811	7.3%	2800	6.9%	5715	5.7%	2.2%	27%	4.0%	55%	1.6%	63%	3.8%	216%
Ghana	25	0.1%	41	0.1%	176	0.2%	3.5%	47%	4.6%	64%	4.3%	265%	6.5%	596%
Greece	81	0.3%	127	0.3%	238	0.2%	1.4%	17%	4.1%	56%	1.1%	38%	3.5%	193%
Guatemala	14	0.1%	20	0.0%	65	0.1%	2.4%	30%	3.4%	45%	2.9%	141%	5.2%	380%

Notes: For brevity, this table (and the one overleaf) includes individual economy projections for the 100 largest importers only (economies with nominal imports greater than \$11 billion in 2019). 'Advanced economies' include all 39 countries categorised as 'advanced' by the IMF, while 'Emerging and Developing economies' includes all other economies.

	2019		2030		2050		Growth: 2019-30				Growth: 2019-50			
	Nominal exports (\$bn)	Share of world exports	Nominal exports (\$bn)	Share of world exports	Nominal exports (\$bn)	Share of world exports	In real terms		In nominal terms		In real terms		In nominal terms	
							Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative	Per Year	Cumulative
Individual Economies														
Honduras	7	0.0%	13	0.0%	41	0.0%	3.9%	52%	5.4%	78%	3.6%	201%	5.9%	486%
Hong Kong SAR	650	2.6%	965	2.4%	2294	2.3%	2.8%	36%	3.7%	49%	2.0%	85%	4.2%	253%
Hungary	134	0.5%	264	0.6%	575	0.6%	4.0%	53%	6.4%	97%	2.3%	103%	4.8%	329%
India	546	2.2%	1272	3.1%	5022	5.0%	6.3%	96%	8.0%	133%	4.9%	347%	7.4%	820%
Indonesia	200	0.8%	316	0.8%	1233	1.2%	6.7%	104%	4.2%	58%	5.0%	356%	6.0%	516%
Iran	142	0.6%	240	0.6%	409	0.4%	5.3%	76%	4.9%	69%	1.8%	75%	3.5%	187%
Iraq	89	0.4%	97	0.2%	234	0.2%	-0.6%	-7%	0.8%	9%	0.8%	29%	3.2%	163%
Ireland	502	2.0%	1042	2.6%	2063	2.1%	4.3%	59%	6.9%	108%	2.2%	99%	4.7%	311%
Israel	115	0.5%	237	0.6%	705	0.7%	4.4%	61%	6.8%	106%	3.6%	200%	6.0%	514%
Italy	632	2.6%	998	2.4%	1678	1.7%	1.9%	23%	4.2%	58%	0.9%	31%	3.2%	165%
Ivory Coast	13	0.1%	30	0.1%	146	0.1%	6.7%	104%	7.8%	129%	5.8%	473%	8.1%	1024%
Japan	905	3.7%	1371	3.4%	2513	2.5%	2.1%	26%	3.9%	52%	1.2%	45%	3.4%	178%
Jordan	16	0.1%	28	0.1%	86	0.1%	2.7%	34%	5.0%	70%	2.8%	134%	5.5%	427%
Kazakhstan	65	0.3%	101	0.2%	358	0.4%	3.2%	41%	4.0%	54%	3.6%	198%	5.6%	446%
Kenya	12	0.0%	27	0.1%	82	0.1%	6.6%	103%	8.1%	137%	4.4%	286%	6.5%	608%
Kuwait	72	0.3%	74	0.2%	144	0.1%	0.0%	0%	0.2%	2%	0.7%	24%	2.2%	99%
Latvia	20	0.1%	35	0.1%	95	0.1%	2.4%	30%	4.9%	70%	2.7%	125%	5.1%	366%
Lithuania	42	0.2%	71	0.2%	143	0.1%	2.4%	30%	4.7%	66%	1.6%	64%	4.0%	237%
Luxembourg	136	0.6%	268	0.7%	638	0.6%	3.3%	43%	6.3%	96%	2.5%	115%	5.1%	368%
Macao SAR	45	0.2%	68	0.2%	172	0.2%	2.4%	30%	3.8%	51%	2.0%	85%	4.4%	279%
Malaysia	238	1.0%	395	1.0%	1043	1.0%	3.2%	42%	4.7%	66%	2.7%	127%	4.9%	338%
Malta	21	0.1%	31	0.1%	61	0.1%	1.3%	15%	3.9%	52%	1.1%	42%	3.6%	197%
Mexico	493	2.0%	715	1.8%	1864	1.9%	1.5%	18%	3.4%	45%	1.8%	76%	4.4%	279%
Morocco	44	0.2%	80	0.2%	253	0.3%	3.6%	48%	5.6%	83%	3.5%	193%	5.8%	475%
Myanmar (Burma)	17	0.1%	28	0.1%	112	0.1%	2.8%	35%	4.8%	67%	3.7%	205%	6.3%	563%
Nepal	3	0.0%	7	0.0%	35	0.0%	7.6%	124%	8.3%	140%	6.4%	582%	8.6%	1176%
Netherlands	830	3.4%	1321	3.2%	2714	2.7%	2.1%	25%	4.3%	59%	1.6%	63%	3.9%	227%
New Zealand	57	0.2%	87	0.2%	201	0.2%	1.9%	23%	4.0%	53%	1.9%	79%	4.1%	252%
Nigeria	70	0.3%	76	0.2%	253	0.3%	1.9%	23%	0.7%	8%	2.9%	143%	4.2%	261%
Norway	145	0.6%	201	0.5%	444	0.4%	2.7%	34%	3.0%	38%	2.0%	86%	3.7%	205%
Oman	44	0.2%	59	0.1%	180	0.2%	2.6%	33%	2.8%	35%	2.8%	133%	4.7%	312%
Pakistan	31	0.1%	57	0.1%	277	0.3%	4.9%	69%	5.8%	86%	5.2%	381%	7.4%	805%
Panama	27	0.1%	48	0.1%	177	0.2%	3.8%	51%	5.4%	78%	4.0%	242%	6.3%	558%
Paraguay	13	0.1%	24	0.1%	68	0.1%	3.8%	50%	5.6%	83%	2.9%	143%	5.4%	413%
Peru	55	0.2%	93	0.2%	269	0.3%	2.7%	34%	4.9%	69%	2.9%	145%	5.2%	387%
Philippines	93	0.4%	220	0.5%	1076	1.1%	5.7%	84%	8.1%	135%	5.4%	405%	8.2%	1051%
Poland	328	1.3%	625	1.5%	1448	1.4%	2.8%	36%	6.0%	91%	2.1%	89%	4.9%	342%
Portugal	105	0.4%	169	0.4%	301	0.3%	3.0%	38%	4.5%	62%	1.4%	55%	3.5%	187%
Qatar	92	0.4%	104	0.3%	208	0.2%	1.4%	16%	1.1%	13%	0.9%	31%	2.7%	126%
Romania	101	0.4%	240	0.6%	553	0.6%	5.6%	81%	8.2%	137%	2.9%	140%	5.6%	448%
Russia	481	1.9%	607	1.5%	1343	1.3%	1.6%	20%	2.1%	26%	1.3%	52%	3.4%	179%
Saudi Arabia	286	1.2%	307	0.8%	601	0.6%	1.7%	21%	0.7%	8%	1.2%	47%	2.4%	110%
Serbia	28	0.1%	75	0.2%	255	0.3%	6.9%	108%	9.3%	166%	4.7%	313%	7.4%	806%
Singapore	658	2.7%	967	2.4%	2219	2.2%	3.1%	40%	3.6%	47%	2.3%	102%	4.0%	237%
Slovakia	100	0.4%	195	0.5%	387	0.4%	3.9%	52%	6.3%	96%	2.1%	89%	4.5%	288%
Slovenia	45	0.2%	84	0.2%	166	0.2%	3.3%	43%	5.8%	85%	1.9%	79%	4.3%	265%
South Africa	105	0.4%	149	0.4%	380	0.4%	2.0%	25%	3.3%	42%	2.0%	84%	4.2%	262%
South Korea	661	2.7%	1018	2.5%	2060	2.1%	3.2%	42%	4.0%	54%	1.9%	81%	3.7%	212%
Spain	486	2.0%	778	1.9%	1407	1.4%	1.9%	24%	4.4%	60%	1.1%	41%	3.5%	189%
Sri Lanka	19	0.1%	33	0.1%	120	0.1%	3.9%	52%	5.0%	72%	3.8%	217%	6.0%	516%
Sweden	249	1.0%	404	1.0%	915	0.9%	2.4%	29%	4.5%	63%	2.0%	85%	4.3%	268%
Switzerland	469	1.9%	910	2.2%	1962	2.0%	3.0%	39%	6.2%	94%	2.1%	88%	4.7%	319%
Taiwan	383	1.5%	605	1.5%	1349	1.3%	2.1%	25%	4.3%	58%	1.8%	76%	4.1%	252%
Thailand	316	1.3%	492	1.2%	1109	1.1%	2.9%	38%	4.1%	56%	2.2%	95%	4.1%	251%
Tunisia	19	0.1%	29	0.1%	95	0.1%	2.4%	30%	3.8%	51%	3.2%	166%	5.3%	395%
Turkey	246	1.0%	579	1.4%	1862	1.9%	6.0%	90%	8.1%	135%	4.3%	266%	6.7%	657%
Ukraine	64	0.3%	107	0.3%	291	0.3%	5.8%	85%	4.8%	68%	3.5%	191%	5.0%	357%
United Arab Emirates	406	1.6%	623	1.5%	1618	1.6%	2.9%	37%	4.0%	53%	2.4%	112%	4.6%	298%
United Kingdom	880	3.6%	1216	3.0%	2593	2.6%	-0.3%	-3%	3.0%	38%	0.9%	31%	3.5%	195%
United States	2529	10.2%	4030	9.9%	9507	9.5%	2.6%	32%	4.3%	59%	2.2%	97%	4.4%	276%
Uruguay	15	0.1%	19	0.0%	72	0.1%	1.8%	21%	1.9%	23%	3.2%	165%	5.1%	366%
Uzbekistan	17	0.1%	47	0.1%	213	0.2%	7.2%	115%	9.7%	178%	5.7%	456%	8.5%	1156%
Vietnam	291	1.2%	658	1.6%	2441	2.4%	5.8%	86%	7.7%	126%	4.6%	300%	7.1%	739%



Department for International Trade

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