

Recommendation(s) Status: Fatal accident at Waterloo Underground station, London

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

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Report Title	Fatal accident at Waterloo Underground station, London
Report Number	05/2021
Date of Incident	26/05/2020

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
05/2021/01	Closed - I	None	<p>The interface between platform and train (PTI) presents various risks to passengers and, although most are found on all platforms, some platforms present additional or enhanced risk because of specific features such as track curvature creating a significantly higher risk of a person falling below the platform level. The intent of this recommendation is to recognise and assess location-specific risks so they can be properly managed. Reference to RSSB guidance on risk management at the platform-train interface is likely to assist implementation of this recommendation.</p> <p>London Underground Limited should carry out and document a suitable risk assessment of each tightly curved platform on its network, and any other locations at which passengers are considered to be at particularly high risk due to characteristics of the platform. In each case, this should include consideration of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• the platform-train gap at all positions along the vehicle body;• the influence of low, normal and high passenger numbers;• the train operator's visibility of the PTI during despatch;• the safety of vulnerable passengers;• opportunities to expand the use of incident data to improve risk assessments;• potential engineering measures to prevent access to the gap, to reduce the gap, and/or to detect the presence of people in the gap; and• non-engineering measures to reduce the likelihood of people falling	ORR has reported that LU has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

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			into the gap and to mitigate the consequences if they do so. London Underground Limited should develop a timebound programme for the implementation of any additional control measures that are justified (paragraphs 100 and 101).	
05/2021/02	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to provide those who are responsible for managing risk with reliable risk assessment data that enables them to identify those locations on its network where the risk of harm is highest and to better inform their decisions on the need for additional risk mitigation measures</p> <p>London Underground Limited should review and update its quantified system risk model (LUQRA) to ensure that it is consistent with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • current good practice in the rail industry; • achieving a better understanding of how risk is distributed across its rail network; • identifying potentially high-risk locations that warrant more detailed risk assessment; • providing useful risk information to those with the responsibility for the safety of individual lines and stations; • understanding the entire risk of harm, including that associated with non-fatal injuries; and • the systematic evaluation of whether additional safety measures are justified. <p>In conjunction with any updates to its quantified system risk model, LUL should review and update its safety decision making standard to clarify how the model and other risk assessment processes should be applied in practice (paragraphs 101 and 102).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that LU has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
05/2021/03	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is that learning from previous accidents should be consistently actioned effectively to help prevent future accidents from occurring.</p> <p>LUL should review and improve its management processes for ensuring that appropriate actions are taken in response to the findings and</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless</p>

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			recommendations of its formal investigations (paragraph 101).	they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
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