

## Recommendation Status Report: Signal passed at danger and subsequent near miss, Chalfont & Latimer station

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

### Key to Recommendation Status

<b>Open</b> (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
<b>Closed</b> (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
<b>Insufficient response:</b>	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
<b>Superseded:</b>	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
<b>Awaiting response:</b>	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

**Red** – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

**Blue** – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

**White** – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

# Recommendation Status Report



<b>Report Title</b>	Signal passed at danger and subsequent near miss, Chalfont & Latimer station
<b>Report Number</b>	04/2021
<b>Date of Incident</b>	21/06/2020

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
04/2021/01	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risks arising from human performance by improving Chiltern Railways' management of drivers.</p> <p>Chiltern Railways should review its driver management processes and introduce improved processes based on the review findings. The review should include consideration of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• providing drivers with adequate training and assessment of tripcock reset procedures on both Network Rail and London Underground infrastructure</li> <li>• identifying conditions such as sleep apnoea during periodic medical examinations</li> <li>• sharing the key findings of the route risk assessment process with drivers and driver managers</li> <li>• adopting ORR fatigue guidance when designing driver rosters</li> <li>• how to promote good quality working relationships within the driver management function</li> <li>• resourcing, training and ongoing support for those managing drivers</li> <li>• periodic assessment and retraining in assessment techniques for staff undertaking competence assessments</li> <li>• providing guidance on driver assessment methods, frequency, duration and time of day, which covers: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o an appropriate range of routine and unusual activities on both London Underground and Network Rail infrastructure; and</li> <li>o the identification of situations such as loss of attention due to fatigue and/or other causes.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• how best to highlight important information in operational documents</li> </ul>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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			to draw drivers' attention to rules that are critical to safe train operation. (paragraphs 154a, 154b, 154c, 155, 156b and 156c)	
04/2021/02	Closed - I	None	<p>This recommendation is intended to improve the understanding and management of risk at the interface between the national rail network and London Underground operations.</p> <p>Chiltern Railways and London Underground Ltd should jointly establish an effective process for the management of safety at the interfaces between their respective operations. This should include further assessment of the risk associated with operation of Chiltern Railways trains on London Underground Ltd's infrastructure and the implementation of any further risk controls deemed necessary (paragraph 156a).</p> <p>This recommendation may also apply to other passenger and freight train operators working onto London Underground Ltd infrastructure.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Chiltern Railways and London Underground have reported that they have completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
04/2021/03	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the likelihood of a collision with another train due to a driver resetting tripcock equipment and proceeding without authority.</p> <p>Chiltern Railways and London Underground Ltd (LUL) should jointly review the design of train protection equipment with the objective of reducing the risk associated with resetting of train protection equipment after activation due to a SPAD on LUL infrastructure. The review should consider:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ways of discouraging the immediate resetting of train protection equipment following its activation (known as 'reset and go')</li> <li>• the need for limiting the speed of train movements after train protection equipment has been activated (similar to SCAT); and</li> <li>• ways of minimising unnecessary brake activations on non-LUL lines.</li> </ul> <p>The review should take into account any planned upgrades of signalling equipment on LUL lines. Any additional measures found to be</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Chiltern Railways and London Underground have reported that they have completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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			<p>justified should be implemented in accordance with a timebound plan agreed between Chiltern Railways and London Underground Ltd (paragraph 154b).</p> <p>This recommendation may also apply to other passenger and freight train operators working onto London Underground Ltd infrastructure.</p>	
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