
Appeal Decision

by BA (Hons) MRICS		
an Appointed Person under the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 (as Amended)		
Valuation Office Agency		
Email: @voa.gov.uk		
Appeal Ref:		
Planning Permission Ref. granted by granted by		
Location:		
Development: Retrospective application for a two storey building and proposed conversion into a residential development comprising 2 self-contained flats including the creation of side entrance, rear amenity space, cycle storage, 2 car parking spaces associated soft landscaping; removal of boundary fence.		
Decision		
I determine that the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) payable in respect of the above development should be £ ().		
Reasons		
1. I have considered all the submissions made by (the appellant) and the Collectin Authority (CA), the information and opinions presented in the following documents:-		
(a) Decision notice relating to planning application (b) Regulation 113 decision issued by CA on (c) Decision notice relating to planning application (d) Liability Notice dated (e) The appellant's appeal form dated (f) Additional supporting documents submitted with the CIL Appeal by the appellant including:		
 (i) The appellant's grounds of appeal document dated (ii) Block and location plan (iii) Planning Committee report dated (iv) Evidence of residential occupation labelled Appendix E (v) Photographic evidence showing retained floor areas provided by the appellant labelled Appendix F 		



(b)	relation to the footprint of the property. Notwithstanding the departures from the permission, the areas that were demolished were in accordance with That with the exception of a period in occupied between and by the family of the appellant as a single family haves
(c)	family house. That the report to planning committee on stated that the development was liable for £ CIL.
(d)	That application was to remedy the deviation from rather than being a new planning application.
(e)	The retrospective application process suffered delays outside the appellant's control which have had knock on effects in respect of the lawful use tests.
(f) (g)	That the CA has incorrectly determined the dates relating to 'unlawful use'. That the retained floor space of the dwelling should be 'set off' in CIL calculations.
	ne CA submitted representations on The CA's representations can be narised as:-
(a)	That internal records evidence that planning enforcement became aware of a potential breach and opened an enforcement case on showing attempts to remedy the matter from onwards.
(b)	That in accordance with Regulation 68 of the CIL Regulations commencement should be deemed as the date that planning permission for the retrospective application was granted. That as the deemed commencement date for the 3 year period for consideration of the lawful use test is therefore between and the same and the
(c) (d)	That the 'in use test' is not met. That when planning control are involved in investigating a breach, CIL work is often
(e)	paused pending the outcome of the investigations That was commenced but not implemented. Rather than undertake remedial
(f)	works to implement the appellant decided to continue to implement the compliance period for enforcement of 1 has been extended until
(g)	That the CIL charge provided in the committee report was for indicative purposes. The CA acknowledge a better illustration could have been provided.
(h)	That the appellant can still implement rather than in which case the demand notice could be superseded.
11. Th as:	ne appellant submitted their comments on
(a)	The appellant and his family would face severe social and financial implications if the CIL charge shown on the liability notice remained unchanged.
(b)	The appellant reiterated that the property had only ever been occupied as a single family house and stated that there had been no change of use and that the 'in use dispensation' has been unfairly denied.
(c)	The appellant states that the property has been in residential use for over the required 6 months period preceding
(d)	That is close to being implemented.

12. There are some matters raised as part of this appeal that the appointed person is unable to consider. These include the appellant's complaint relating to the CIL charge shown in the planning committee documentation, the personal and financial hardship resulting from any

calculation of the chargeable amount in accordance with Regulation 40 and Schedule 1 of the CIL Regulations 2010 (as amended). 13. I find the photographic evidence submitted by the appellant showing that the footprint of the original dwelling to be retained as part of was indeed retained, rather than demolished, persuasive. The CA has provided no evidence to the contrary. 14. However, is a new permission granted under s.73A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The appellant states that application was to remedy the deviation from rather than being a new planning application. I find this incorrect, the permission granted is a distinct and separate planning permission in accordance with the Town and country Planning Act 1990. It makes no reference to the earlier permission and cannot be regarded as a variation of conditions attached to the earlier permission. also permits the conversion of the property into two self-contained flats. 15. This brings me to the crux of the appeal - should any 'set off' for retained in use buildings form part of the calculation in accordance with the formula contained in Schedule 1, Part 1 (6) of the CIL Regulations. 16. Within the formula, KR is said to be equal to (i) the aggregate of the gross internal areas of retained parts of in-use buildings and (ii) for other relevant buildings, retained parts where the intended use following completion of the chargeable development is a use that is able to be carried on lawfully and permanently without further planning permission in that part on the day before planning permission first permits the chargeable development. 17. In my view, (ii) in paragraph 16 above does not apply in this case as the property was subject to an enforcement notice the day before planning permission first permitted development, works had been carried out which did not have planning permission and the use of the property as it then existed required further planning permission. The intended use of the property as 2 self-contained flats was a use that would require planning permission. 18. I have therefore considered whether (i) in paragraph 16 above applies, i.e can a deduction be made for the aggregate of the gross internal areas of retained parts of in-use buildings. 19. An 'in use' building is defined in Schedule 1, Part 1, paragraph 1(10) of the CIL Regulations 2010 (as amended). There are two requirements. A relevant building firstly must be a building which is situated on the relevant land on the day planning permission first permits the chargeable development. The retained parts of the are therefore relevant buildings. However, the other requirement is that the property must have been in lawful use for a continuous period of at least six months within the period of three years ending on the day planning permission first permits the chargeable development. The question is whether the subject property has been in continuous lawful use for a 6 month period between and 20. The appellant tells us that the property wasn't occupied for a period between whilst disruptive works were undertaken (Appendix E of the documents submitted with his appeal). 21. In Hourhope V Shropshire CC (2015) it was stated that 'If a building has a more active

use, such as a factory office or shop, but that use is interrupted for a period, the question whether it thereby ceases to be "in use" must be one of assessment of the length of and

CIL liability and the delays experienced by the appellant. I must confine my considerations

and decision making to matters only relevant to the Regulation 114 appeal, i.e.the

reasons for the interruption, and the intentions of those who previously used and may in future use the building. No one would say that any of these uses ceased if the factory office or shop was temporarily closed on a non- working day, or for a holiday period. In those circumstances, generally the stock, furniture and any machinery used would remain in situ so that activity could resume after a short period. But it cannot be necessary that it does so in all circumstances- a shop would not cease to be used as a shop if it was closed and all the contents removed for a period of refurbishment for instance, as long as the owner intended to resume use as a shop when the work was complete.

intended to resume use as a shop when the work was complete. 22. In light of the above and the evidence provided by the appellant, I consider that the property was 'in use' throughout the period from to . However, the next question if whether that use was a lawful use having regard to the planning history. 23. In the Hourhope case, it was also stated that there was 'no relevant legislative definition of "in lawful use". There is no such definition in the regulations themselves. Although there is a partial definition of "use" in the Planning Act 2008, the definitions in that Act are expressly stated not to apply for the purposes of CIL Regulations. Further, it is agreed that "lawful use" means a use that is lawful for planning purposes. In these circumstances, the question is a normal one of statutory interpretation, starting with the ordinary meaning of the language used, considered in the context of the other provisions of the legislation itself, and the legislative purpose as shown by the terms of the legislation and such external material as it may be permissible for the court to have regard to'. 24. The Town and County Planning Act 1990 S191 (2) states that 'uses and operations are lawful if no planning enforcement action may be taken against them (whether because they did not involve development or require planning permission or because the time for enforcement action has expired or for any other reason) and they are not in any contravention of any enforcement notice that is in force'. 25. A contravention notice was issued on according to the appellant's timeline contained within his Appendix N. The notice was issued in order to establish whether a breach had occurred. It was later determined that a breach/breaches had occurred. It appears that enforcement action could have been taken from regard to S191(2) above I do not consider it correct that the date of the actual enforcement (issued) or (date notice upheld with modification) should be used as the date lawful use ceased. Enforcement action could be taken from the actual date of the breach. 26. I do not know the exact date the breach occurred but on the balance of evidence provided I consider it to be at some time prior to . According to the CA, it was on or before 27. The CA state that an enforcement case was opened on suggesting that the breach/breaches occurred prior to this date. The CA have not submitted evidence supporting date but the contravention notice (which the appellant states was issued on), is strong evidence that a breach had definitely occurred by that date. 28. In light of this, whilst I accept the property may have been in use, I do not consider that

the property was in lawful use for a continuous period of at least six months within the period

29. The GIA of the property is not a matter that is disputed by either party.

development. The required 6 month period starting on its not met.

of three years ending on the day planning permission first permits the chargeable

30. As is a s.73A permission, CIL should be calculated with reference to Schedule 1, Part 1, of Community Infrastructure Regulations 2010 (as Amended).	
31. The chargeable area is therefore $\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \$	
Conclusion	
32. Based on the facts of this case and the evidence submitted, I determine that the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) payable in respect of the above development should be £	
MRICS RICS Registered Valuer Valuation Office Agency	