Recommendation Status Report: Freight train derailment at Eastleigh, Hampshire

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open **(replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)**	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed **(replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)**	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report

Report Title	Freight train derailment at Eastleigh, Hampshire
Report Number	02/2021
Date of Incident	28/01/2020

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
02/2021/01	Closed - I	None	The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of failure of elevated cast iron shoulders, such as those on RT60 S&C layouts. Network Rail should develop a strategy to assess and control the risk of failure of track fastening systems incorporating elevated shoulders in RT60 switch and crossing layouts. It should also confirm that the failure mode identified in these shoulders does not apply to other elevated designs of track fastening system (paragraph 92a.ii).	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
02/2021/02	Open	None	The intent of this recommendation is that Network Rail considers how dynamic track gauge measurement is undertaken in the areas of its network that are not traversed by its track measurement trains. Network Rail should review its arrangements for the dynamic measurement of track geometry on the parts of its infrastructure not covered by its track measurement trains. The review should include the identification of high risk locations where additional safeguards are required (such as those subject to high lateral forces, or where there is an increased risk of track geometry faults). Consideration should be given to the number and routing of track measurement trains and alternative ways of measuring track geometry under dynamic conditions. Any additional safeguards identified by this review should be implemented by means of a risk-based programme (paragraph 92a.ii).	ORR has reported that (Dutyholder name) has a proposed action plan and timescale for delivery to be taken in response to the recommendation. ORR will advise RAIB when actions to address this recommendation have been completed.