

Recommendation(s) Status: Runaway and derailment of a wagon at Clitheroe, Lancashire

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has failed to provide a response; or has provided a response that does not adequately satisfy ORR that sufficient action is being taken to properly consider and address a recommendation.
Progressing:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Closed - carry forward:	ORR intends to take no further action as it has been superseded by another recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report



Report Title	Runaway and derailment of a wagon at Clitheroe, Lancashire
Report Number	16/2020
Date of Incident	09/03/2020

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
16/2020/01	Progressing	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of a stabled vehicle running away from industrial premises.</p> <p>GB Railfreight, working in conjunction with the owners of industrial premises that it operates trains to or within, should improve its risk assessment process for runaway vehicles so that it considers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. any factors that could increase the likelihood of a runaway vehicle occurring (such as loading condition, the prevailing gradients at stabling locations or reliance on the handbrake on a single vehicle) b. any factors that could increase the severity of consequence should a vehicle run away, both within and beyond the boundary of the industrial premises (such as areas where employees or members of the public could come into contact with a runaway vehicle). <p>It should use these assessments to identify appropriate risk control measures and ensure that these controls are implemented. It should also implement a robust assurance process to check that these risk assessments are updated following any changes and that any control measures identified within them continue to be implemented successfully (paragraphs 120a, 120b, 120c and 122).</p> <p>This recommendation may apply to other freight operating companies and the owners of industrial premises which trains operate to and within.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that GB Railfreight is taking suitable actions to address the recommendation although an accurate plan for full implementation has not been formulated. ORR will advise when the status of this recommendation changes.</p>
16/2020/02	Progressing	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risks related to rail operations on railway infrastructure owned by Hanson UK.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Hanson UK is taking suitable actions to address the recommendation</p>

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			Hanson UK, working with its contractors, should assure itself that suitable and sufficient risk assessment has been undertaken for all rail operations taking place on the railway infrastructure it is responsible for (paragraphs 122 and 123a).	although an accurate plan for full implementation has not been formulated. ORR will advise when the status of this recommendation changes.
16/2020/03	Progressing	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of a vehicle stabled on a gradient from running away.</p> <p>Freight operating companies should review the adequacy of the processes documented in industry standards and company local instructions for stabling vehicles on a gradient using handbrakes, particularly if a laden vehicle is to be left on its own. The review should consider:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. how the effectiveness of the vehicle’s handbrake on the gradient is assured if it is applied at the same time as the air brake, and over time as the air brake releases (for example as air leaks out of the braking system) b. how the risk of a vehicle running away while being stabled on a gradient, and the associated risks to staff working around a vehicle, are managed if the vehicle’s air brake is released before its handbrake is applied. <p>Freight operating companies should address any inadequacies that are found in these processes by making changes to their local instructions and/or by proposing changes to industry standards (paragraphs 120d and 124).</p>	ORR has reported that Freight Operating Companies are taking suitable actions to address the recommendation although an accurate plan for full implementation has not been formulated. ORR will advise when the status of this recommendation changes.