

Recommendation(s) Status: Collision and derailment at Neville Hill

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

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Report Title	Collision and derailment at Neville Hill
Report Number	13/2020
Date of Incident	13/11/2019

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
13/2020/01	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that LNER's procedures and training material are based on a correct interpretation of the documentation provided by Hitachi.</p> <p>LNER, with support from Hitachi, should review the Train Operation Manual and Train Management System documentation that Hitachi has provided, to confirm that it has correctly interpreted it in all areas which could impact the safe operation of its IETs (paragraph 141.2.a).i). This recommendation may be applicable to other Train Operating Companies with IETs.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
13/2020/02	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to make sure that LNER drivers can correctly interact with the TMS on the IETs.</p> <p>LNER should review, and make any necessary changes to, its procedures, training, and associated materials and aids (including the TMS app and simulator) to confirm that they prepare drivers to correctly interact with the TMS on its IETs. It should also review the TMS touch screen displays to make sure that they clearly reinforce the correct processes. In particular, these activities should include consideration of the method of entering a headcode and any issues raised by Recommendation 1 (paragraph 141.2.a).i).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that LNER has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
13/2020/03	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to confirm compliance of the IET design with the requirements of EN 15227.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Hitachi has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes</p>

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			Hitachi should revisit its assessment of the performance of the IET against the requirements of EN 15227 using a refined 3D model. This model should include, as a minimum, the modelling changes demonstrated by this investigation to be necessary to predict the train behaviour with sufficient accuracy. The assessment should be subject to a review by an independent third-party, as defined in RIS-2700 (paragraphs 143 and 145). If applicable, Hitachi should inform LNER, any other operators of IETs and ORR of any area of non-compliance with EN 15227 identified during the re-assessment.	to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
13/2020/04	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for LNER to ensure that the risks resulting from a low speed collision of an IET are acceptable.</p> <p>LNER, with support from Hitachi, should assess the risk associated with derailment of an IET following collision at low speeds, and take any necessary actions to demonstrate an acceptable risk. It should take into account the likelihood of occurrence of a derailment and the possible consequences, including the potential to foul an adjacent running line (paragraph 144).</p> <p>LNER should share the findings of its assessment with other operators of IETs.</p>	ORR has reported that LNER has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
13/2020/05	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that the designers of future trains adequately consider the risk from low speed collisions.</p> <p>RSSB should consider whether the findings of this investigation indicate that there is merit in proposing revisions to standard EN 15227 and associated guidance, in the following respects:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> I To make it clear that the intention of the standard is for the safety performance to be demonstrated to be acceptable up to and including the design speed I To include specific requirements against which to assess the derailment performance in a collision I To include the effects of braking, where appropriate. <p>If it considers there is merit in any of the above, RSSB should actively</p>	ORR has reported that RSSB has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

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			lobby the relevant national and international bodies to raise the issues for consideration in future updates of EN 15227 (paragraphs 142 and 144).	
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