

Recommendation Status Report: Collision between mobile elevating work platforms at Rochford, Essex

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

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Report Title	Collision between mobile elevating work platforms at Rochford, Essex
Report Number	08/2020
Date of Incident	25/01/2020

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
08/2020/01	Open	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of confusion arising among staff responsible for operating and controlling the movement of on-track plant, and leading to the adoption of unofficial systems of work.</p> <p>Network Rail, in consultation with RSSB, the M&EE networking group, the Machine Controller Competence Working Group and the Plant Operations Scheme Review Panel, should review and clarify the roles and responsibilities of those responsible for plant operations and movements in possessions and work sites, with the objective of identifying ways of avoiding the duplication of responsibilities and minimising the possibility of confusion between roles. This should involve consideration of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> the relevant rules and standards that apply to the control of plant movements, particularly Handbooks 12 and 15; the roles of engineering supervisor, person in charge/safe work leader, site supervisor, POS representative and machine controller; and the factors affecting the working relationship between staff from different employers working on the same site, in particular the extent of understanding and appreciation of each person's role. <p>The implementation of any changes resulting from this review should be co-ordinated to avoid confusion between existing and revised rules and working arrangements (paragraphs 159(a) to 159(d)), and 160(a) to 160(c)).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail is taking suitable actions to address the recommendation although an accurate plan for full implementation has not been formulated. ORR will advise when the status of this recommendation changes.</p>
08/2020/02	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to improve the operation of the Sentinel scheme so that the scheme's ability to influence safe behaviours is more effectively managed.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this</p>

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			<p>Network Rail, in co-operation with other participating organisations (including the National Skills Academy for Rail), should undertake a review of the way that the Sentinel scheme is managed to identify any improvements that are necessary, with particular attention to the following areas:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. resources, organisation and processes for managing engagement with primary sponsors in respect of investigation of incidents in which staff competence is an issue; and b. review how the Sentinel scheme oversees and manages the way in which training providers and primary sponsors assess the English language skills of safety critical staff whose task requires effective communication when working on the railway infrastructure. <p>Network Rail should then establish a programme to implement any areas of improvement identified during the review (paragraph 162(c)).</p>	<p>recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
08/2020/03	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to improve Network Rail Anglia Route's process for capturing the facts of an incident or accident, so that a clear picture of the event is quickly obtained, and evidence is properly managed by those tasked with investigating the event.</p> <p>Network Rail Anglia Route should revise its reporting and response process for accidents and incidents, so that all relevant information that is needed to enable an effective and co-ordinated response is captured. This review should include the management of the competence and suitability of staff who are on-call and required to attend site following incidents (paragraph 161).</p> <p>This recommendation may also apply to other Network Rail routes.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
08/2020/04	Closed - I	White	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to improve the methods of alerting staff within a possession or work site to potentially dangerous acts or situations.</p> <p>Network Rail, in conjunction with its contractors, RSSB and other stakeholders, should review the means of warning currently used to alert staff to a dangerous situation on or near the track, and consider whether</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the</p>

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			suitable equipment should be issued to those in all relevant roles (paragraphs 159(a) and 159(b) and 160(b).	information provided becomes inaccurate.
08/2020/05	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to improve the safety culture within OCR, and its internal and external (contractor / agency) working relationships.</p> <p>In parallel to the findings and any actions taken in response to recommendation 1, Network Rail should commission an independent review of OCR internal culture and working practices, with the aim of identifying effective measures to promote compliance with rules and company standards and establishing good working relationships and mutual respect between all grades of staff working on site (paragraphs 159(c) and 159(d) and 160(a) to 160(c)).</p>	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.