

Recommendation(s) Status: Serious operational irregularity at Balham

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report



Report Title	Serious operational irregularity at Balham
Report Number	01/2020
Date of Incident	20/04/2019

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
01/2020/03	Open	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to improve the workplaces and equipment used by PICOPs, so that they work in locations and with facilities which give them the ability to manage the movement of trains and enhance their awareness of the situation during a possession.</p> <p>Network Rail should review its requirements for locations in which PICOPs are permitted to carry out their duties, so that they have adequate facilities, information and equipment to enable them to control train movements associated with possessions (paragraphs 138a, 138c, 139a).</p>	Implementation ongoing, revised standard expected by Jan 2022
01/2020/04	Open	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Network Rail to review and improve its arrangements for managing the competence of PICOPs to ensure that they have the necessary skills to ensure the safe movement of trains within a possession.</p> <p>Network Rail should review its standards, process and arrangements for managing the competency requirements and ongoing professional development of people who control engineering possessions in which train movements take place. This review should cover, but not be limited to, decision making, team working and communications between PICOPs and other operations staff (paragraphs 138a, 138c, 138e, 139a, 139c).</p>	ORR has reported that Network Rail has a proposed action plan and timescale for delivery to be taken in response to the recommendation. ORR will advise when the status of this recommendation changes.

Recommendation Status Report



01/2020/01	Open	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Network Rail to develop a strategy to make the use of standard safety critical communications become embedded in practice.</p> <p>Network Rail should develop and implement a strategy to bring about significant improvements in the standard of verbal safety critical communications adopted by its staff and contractors. This should address training and competence in communication skills, and effective monitoring of safety critical communications, between its own staff and contractors as well as understanding the underlying social, cultural and behavioural factors that inhibited the use of effective communications in this incident. The strategy should aim to ensure that such communications become embedded in normal, everyday practice (paragraphs 138a, 138c, 138d, 139c).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has a proposed action plan and timescale for delivery to be taken in response to the recommendation. ORR is not content with duty-holder response, further engagement ongoing / proposed. ORR will advise RAIB when actions to address this recommendation have been completed.</p>
01/2020/02	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is for Network Rail to develop a handover process that can be used by operational staff performing safety critical roles to improve shared situation awareness.</p> <p>Network Rail should review the process of handovers between signallers during and at the end of shifts, and develop a formal structure which will give the incoming signaller full awareness of all relevant information about the location and intended movement of trains and the wider operation of the railway in their area of control (paragraph 138c).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>