The Orchestration of Military Strategic Effects
The Orchestration of Military Strategic Effects

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is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff

Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations and Commitments)

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Foreword

This guide will inform how the Ministry of Defence collaborates with partners across government and allies to create audience-centric effects that will achieve the outcomes we seek. It should be used as a benchmark, but it is not to be followed dogmatically. The orchestration of military strategic effects across all domains and levels of warfare, in conjunction with multiple stakeholders is inherently complex; it has too many nuances and subtleties to be boiled down to only a few principles.

This guide may be simple, but the changes to our behaviour and culture that will be necessary to achieve this better orchestration will be hard. This process of improvement will be a journey, there is no finite end. There will always be more we can do to integrate better with our partners and allies, but by striving for this integration we can maintain a position of advantage against our competitors.

The bulk of the guide has been written by Security Policy and Operations and the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. They have been assisted by a great number of others. I am grateful to them all for the time they have dedicated to this useful and informative piece of work.

Major General Charles Stickland CB, OBE
Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operations and Commitments)
The Orchestration of Military Strategic Effects

Preface

Purpose

1. This guide describes the principles of the Ministry of Defence’s (MOD) orchestration of military strategic effects change programme. These principles are a benchmark against which Defence’s behaviours and language, and any new function, process or organisational structure should be modelled and evaluated. Once successfully enshrined in the culture and practices\(^1\) of Defence they will enhance how direction, synchronisation and effects generation is conducted in support of Fusion Doctrine,\(^2\) thereby contributing to best achieving the UK’s National Security Objectives.\(^3\)

2. This guide has been produced as a collaboration between the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre and Security Policy and Operations within MOD Head Office. These principles have been identified and refined by key stakeholders and reflect the distilled wisdom of those at the heart of this endeavour. They are drawn from best practice and are authoritative; however, they are not an exhaustive and exclusive checklist.

Audience

3. This guide is relevant to a broad Civil Service and military readership. It provides guidance for those military personnel and civil servants designing, cohering and implementing military strategic effects both within MOD and other government departments.

\(^1\) Practices such as the Strategic Effects Management Process and Operational Effects Management Process. See Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (JTTP) 3-81, Integrating Joint Effects for further details.
\(^2\) Fusion Doctrine was introduced in the National Security Capability Review (NSCR), 2015, page 10. The NSCR describes the UK’s collective approach to national security and provides the rationale and purpose of Fusion Doctrine, but does not explain its practical application.
Structure

4. The guide consists of two chapters and a lexicon. They are outlined below.

   a. **Chapter 1 – Context.** This chapter describes the security landscape. It outlines the UK government’s approach to strategic competition and shows how Defence nests within this.

   b. **Chapter 2 – The design principles.** This chapter outlines the key principles and behaviours required to successfully orchestrate military strategic effects. These are enduring and are a guide for designing and implementing military strategic effects.

   c. **Lexicon.** The lexicon contains definitions relevant to the orchestration of military strategic effects.
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Chapter 1

Context

An era of persistent competition

1.1. The strategic context is increasingly complex, dynamic and competitive. The UK, its allies and partners, and the multilateral system that has assured its security and stability for several generations faces diversifying, intensifying, persistent and proliferating threats, from resurgent and developing powers, and from non-state actors such as violent extremists.

1.2. The pervasiveness of information and the pace of technological change are transforming the character of warfare. Traditional distinctions between ‘peace’ and ‘war’, between ‘public’ and ‘private’, between ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ and between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ are increasingly out of date. The UK’s adversaries employ an expanding, diverse and largely unregulated set of information tools and weapons to influence target audiences’ attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. These capabilities and methods are increasingly employed above and below the threshold of warfighting. They challenge international norms and restrict the response options available. They work in the seams of the UK’s institutions, exacerbating societal divisions and prejudices, leading people to cooperate, wittingly or unwittingly, in undermining democracy.

1.3. The triumph of the narrative increasingly determines victory or defeat, and hence the importance of information operations. These operations can be used to support conventional military action and those using proxies and deniable paramilitary forces, military coercion, offensive cyber operations and, of course, lawfare. The combined effect is designed to force the UK and its allies to become politically cowed, achieving their objectives without the need to escalate above the threshold of warfighting.
1.4. The UK is therefore in an era defined by complexity and volatility, where relationships between national governments, between groups and factions within a state, and between state and non-state actors, is persistent and intensifying. This competition can span a spectrum of cooperation, competition, confrontation and warfighting. Relationships of this nature are inherently complex and multifaceted. The degree of competition at any given moment will dictate the position of a relationship. The boundaries between them are complex and dynamic; the progression between each is neither linear nor easily defined. Interstate relations are typically sectoral: two or more states may cooperate in one sector, be in confrontation in another and potentially in conflict or crisis in another.

**Fusion Doctrine**

1.5. To respond effectively to these threats, the UK must employ all of its instruments of national power. Fusion Doctrine, illustrated in Figure 1.1, is the UK’s whole of government approach to ‘orchestrating the national security capabilities, from economic levers, through cutting-edge military resources to its wider diplomatic and cultural influence’ to achieve its desired national security objectives. At the strategic level, it ensures the UK’s response is greater than the sum of its parts and enables policy and strategy makers to formulate better, more timely decisions and for the UK to adopt a proactive posture.

5 The instruments of national power are: diplomatic, information, military and economic. See Royal College of Defence Studies (RCDS), *Getting Strategy Right (Enough)*, 2017, Section 3.
Defence’s contribution

1.6. To contribute to this whole of government response, Defence must create multiple dilemmas that unhinge an adversary’s understanding, decision-making and execution. This requires a different way of thinking that shifts Defence’s behaviour, processes and structures to become more dynamic and pre-emptive, information-led and selectively ambiguous. In effect, a change in mindset and posture to one of continuous campaigning in which all activity, including training and exercising, has an operational end.

1.7. The Integrated Operating Concept 2025 (IOpC 25) is Defence’s conceptual approach to creating these dilemmas. The central idea of this concept is to drive the conditions and tempo of strategic activity, rather than responding to the actions of others. To achieve this position
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Context

of advantage Defence must be integrated nationally and across all five operational domains; it must be engaged internationally and it must be postured more assertively to demonstrate the UK’s political will and lethal and non-lethal capability. This advantage will offer a breadth of political choice; a number of credible response options that can be threatened or used to break the will of the UK’s adversaries.

1.8. The IOpC 25 applies not only to warfighting or discretionary expeditionary operations; it requires commanders at all levels to routinely operate (protect, engage and constrain) and episodically war fight across the continuum of competition. Persistent competition requires a campaign posture that includes operating on our terms and in places of our choosing. To succeed in this scenario, Defence must be optimised to achieve ‘comparative advantage’ across the widest possible range of adversaries and scenarios amidst an arduous set of concurrency demands.

1.9. Defence has planning, training and operational capabilities that are unique in government and can help to energise and optimise the use of non-military levers. In the ‘operate’ function, many of these assets are employed as part of a strategic communication approach, often to enable and amplify partners’ activities or narratives rather than achieving Defence-specific objectives.7

1.10. By adopting a fusion mindset Defence contributes to a broader, whole of government discourse on the drivers of instability. Where and when Defence identifies drivers of instability driven by socio-economic, governance or malign influence factors, it can advocate for the pre-emptive deployment of wider cross-government capabilities while maximising the role of Defence Engagement and institutional capability and capacity building (including in the area of countering disinformation) as part of a proactive, preventative approach.8

7 See Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2/19, Defence Strategic Communication: an Approach to Formulating and Executing Strategy for further details on strategic communication.
8 Ibid., page 4.
Integrated action

The proposed definition of integrated action is: the use of the full range of military and non-military capabilities to change, or maintain, the understanding and behaviour of audiences necessary to achieve a successful outcome.9

1.11. Integrated action is a doctrine that applies both above and below the threshold of warfighting and it has audiences as its major consideration. It is outcome focused and requires sophisticated understanding to implement. Critically, integrated action needs information advantage (a relative position that must be maintained) to be effective. It will ensure the military instrument is better integrated across all operational domains, vertically through the levels of warfare (strategic, operational and tactical), and horizontally across government and with the UK’s allies and partners. Integrated action will enable Defence to compete more effectively in an era of persistent competition. How integrated action contributes to the security element of Fusion Doctrine is illustrated in Figure 1.2.

Figure 1.2 – Integrated action contributing to Fusion Doctrine

9 This definition is pending ratification. Clarification will be provided on the publication of JDN X/21, Integrated Action.
1.12. Integrated action is a central idea of the orchestration of military strategic effects (OMSE) programme. It is a doctrine that recognises people are at the heart of conflict; it is their decisions and behaviours that determine how conflict is conducted and resolved. Foremost, it requires commanders and staff to be clear about the outcome they are seeking and to analyse the audiences relevant to achieving their objectives. Commanders will then have to identify the effects that they wish to impart on that audience, and those capabilities and actions that are available to change, or maintain, the understanding and behaviour of these audiences to achieve a successful outcome. These military and non-military capabilities may be organic, belong to another domain or to intra-governmental, inter-agency, non-governmental, private sector and multinational actors involved in the operation. Cohering these capabilities and activities in support of the agreed strategic narrative is fundamental to influencing audiences’ perceptions, behaviours, actions and decision-making.

1.13. A critical element of integrated action is the concept of multi-domain integration (MDI). MDI describes the posturing of military capabilities in concert with other instruments of national power, allies and partners, configured to sense, understand and orchestrate effects at the optimal tempo, across the operational domains and levels of warfare.\(^\text{10}\) It seeks to apply combinations of capabilities across the operational domains to pose adversaries multiple dilemmas, thereby revealing vulnerabilities and generating an advantage. To achieve this, MDI is centred on four core tenets: information advantage; strategically postured; configured for environments; and creating and exploiting synergy. The MDI model is illustrated at Figure 1.3. It is envisaged that achieving MDI will change the way Defence operates and war fights, and how capability is developed. MDI will move beyond ‘joint’, amplifying and optimising integrated action.

\(^{10}\) Joint Concept Note 1/20, *Multi-Domain Integration*. 
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1.14. The OMSE guide has principles that will aid Defence to deliver outputs up to the UK government, out to allies, across to partners and down throughout Defence.¹¹ The military strategic effects it describes are inherently joint, must be increasingly integrated and are rooted within Defence policy. Applying these principles through the OMSE programme will help the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Head Office design and refine the processes¹² that operationalise the doctrine of integrated action at the strategic level. The OMSE principles described in Chapter 2

¹¹ A military strategic effect is any effect created primarily (but not exclusively) at the strategic level in support of National Security Objectives and any subordinate military strategic objectives set by the Ministry of Defence.
¹² Such as the Strategic Effects Management Process.
encapsulate the thinking, behaviours and functions required to ensure coherent and timely audience-centric military strategic effects are created that contribute toward National Security Objectives. Successful orchestration can ensure that Defence is better configured to contribute to Fusion Doctrine, but it must be undertaken with an understanding and awareness of the mindset, perspective and potentially complementary and supportive capabilities that exist across government.

1.15. Defence recognises that within Fusion Doctrine it must derive its part in the overall UK plan, which might be as a supporting or supported actor with partners across government. To that end, everything Defence does should further the overall National Security Objectives and be integrated within the Fusion Doctrine framework. In some circumstances Defence will have to deliver on objectives where it is the lead department, whilst in other situations when it is not the lead department, it will be required to support other departments and partners where it can, or where it is inferred. This set of tasks must be transmitted and understood across the strategic, operational and tactical levels (to be executed by whichever level holds the appropriate authority) and progressed at a rate commensurate with the overall cross-government efforts in an integrated fashion while still allowing scope for mission command and military judgement.

1.16. The OMSE principles seek to empower the MOD Head Office and the operational-level commander. In some instances, when considered in isolation, these principles can be constraining; this is necessary and reflects the complexity of modern, multi-domain, pan-government operations. However, they should be considered in their totality, for as a guiding body they provide a framework that ensures the joint force remains synchronised, integrated and cohered with all the other effectors in this competition.

1.17. The OMSE programme seeks to ensure that Defence is optimised to achieve comparative advantage despite the scale of the challenge and the concurrency demands on the department. It also seeks to ensure that Defence is configured to achieve information advantage and that understanding the audience is central to decision-making.
Chapter 2

The design principles

The heart of orchestration

2.1. **Principle 1 – The focal point of the Defence contribution to UK Fusion Doctrine is Whitehall.** The government is focused on integrating strategic effects to deliver a fused result by making the best use of all available resources at its disposal. It seeks to achieve this through combined problem solving, analysis and strategy development, together with more accountable national security governance structures. Collectively, all government departments are increasingly focused upon collaborative working, shared understanding and common goals. The Defence contribution to Fusion Doctrine is currently delivered primarily by Ministry of Defence (MOD) Head Office at the political-military level. Notwithstanding this, wider Defence has a significant contribution to make to Fusion Doctrine at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. MOD Head Office determines how these contributions are managed, policy boundaries are set and permissions are delegated.

**Operation Gritrock – supporting a whole of government response**

In 2014, Defence participated in the whole of government, Department for International Development (DFID)-led, response to the Ebola crisis in west Africa. This was a return to contingent operations that had several challenging aspects, not least: a lack of a coherent international and national perspectives on the scale of the outbreak; the number of stakeholders; and the scope of its security implications. However, by contributing to a coordinated cross-Whitehall effort, Defence was able to bring medical and command capabilities to bear that helped contain this outbreak and stabilise the region.

Over the first half of 2014, the scale of an emerging Ebola outbreak in west Africa became increasingly apparent. The disease, recorded first
in Guinea, was observed rapidly spreading to Liberia and Sierra Leone. The international community was initially slow to respond, with the World Health Organization only declaring it an emergency on 8 August 2014, seven months after ‘patient zero’ presented. Nonetheless, this declaration helped galvanise action, with the UK subsequently adopting the lead crisis response for Sierra Leone.

As events began to unfold Defence provided crucial planning capability across government that enabled stakeholders to frame the problem and work through response options. Defence’s initial military planning effort focused on two areas: providing the means to repatriate infected UK nationals; and increasing the in-country treatment capacity. This planning involved close coordination with other departments, an area that was sometimes challenging for the military given the different organisational cultures and structures of those involved.

As the crisis rapidly developed the decision was made to deploy significant military medical and command and control capabilities within a DFID-led, 2* joint inter-agency task force. Forming this operational-level headquarters and its associated capabilities was crucial to deliver the vital aid needed in country and ensuring that departmental objectives were aligned and synchronised. Establishing this headquarters and delivering the aid within a tolerable risk envelopment would not have been possible had it not been for this cross-Whitehall integration.

Key points

- The primary Defence contribution to Fusion Doctrine is currently delivered by MOD Head Office at the political-military level.

- Other areas of Defence can make a significant contribution to Fusion Doctrine at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

- MOD Head Office determines how these contributions are managed, policy boundaries are set and permissions are delegated.
2.2. **Principle 2 – Information advantage is key to the orchestration of military strategic effects and integrated action.** Information advantage is not a static state but a relative position that must be maintained. It recognises that connectivity and data will underpin economic and military power in the Information Age; the side that gains the upper hand in the information battle, both above and below the threshold of warfighting, is likely to possess significant advantage. Information advantage is critical to integrated action and the orchestration of military strategic effects (OMSE) and it includes: using information as an enabler improves understanding, decision-making execution and assessment; denying information to the UK’s adversaries; and ensuring systems are resilient protects any position of advantage achieved. Moreover, information advantage is essential to effective integration between Defence, its partners and its allies. Without high quality, timely information to assist in understanding audiences it will be impossible to identify fleeting but crucial opportunities across all the operational domains. Deciding which bearers and systems Defence obtains, and how it analyses, validates, protects and shares information, must be at the heart of the department’s functions, processes and organisational design.

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**Information advantage and winning the narrative**

On the 4 March 2018, Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia were taken seriously ill in Salisbury, Wiltshire. Upon investigation it was discovered that they had been poisoned using an unidentified nerve agent. On the 12 March 2018, the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May identified the nerve agent used in the attack as Russian-developed and gave Vladimir Putin’s administration until midnight the following day to respond, stating otherwise she would conclude it was an ‘unlawful use of force’ by the Russian state against the UK. This accusation was then submitted to the United Nations Security Council, with the UK resubmitting its evidence to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Thereafter followed a series of Russian state denials claiming that the UK government were unwilling to cooperate and that the Salisbury
incident was a blatant provocation by UK authorities aimed at discrediting Russia. This disinformation was aimed at discrediting the UK’s position and obfuscating the facts.

On the 5 September 2018, the UK Security Services were able to identify Alexander Petrov and Ruslan Boshirov entering the UK and provided proof that they were in the vicinity of the Skripals’ residence on the day of the poisoning. On the 26 September 2018, Bellingcat (an investigative journalism website) exposed Boshirov as a Russian intelligence colonel. The totality of this persuasive evidence wrested the initiative from the Russian authorities, highlighting both the ineptitude of the operation and the Russian state’s efforts to mask their clandestine activities. The speed and quality of information obtained about these suspects enabled the UK authorities to discredit Russian denials and galvanise international opinion in favour of its version of events. This is an example of information advantage, successfully wresting the narrative and initiative from an adversary.

Key points

• Information advantage (albeit local, temporal and continually in competition) is crucial to synchronising the right effects across the five operational domains at the right time.

• Achieving information advantage requires us to use information as an enabler and an effector, while concurrently ensuring our own information resilience and denying information to our adversaries.
2.3. **Principle 3 – Audiences must be better understood.** Orchestration must involve a better understanding of audiences, actors, adversaries and allies, and must place them at the centre of Defence’s thinking and planning. This orchestration must focus on those effects that shape an audience’s behaviour to our advantage (be that through change or maintaining the status quo) and how Defence activity delivers this. The OMSE programme will concentrate on language, behaviours, functions, processes and organisations, ensuring they become more audience-centric. Understanding an audience is a persistent and iterative process as new actors become involved. One way of developing an understanding of which actors are likely to be especially important is to try and assess each actor’s ‘power’ within the system and the ‘interest’ that they are likely to have in the issue you are seeking to resolve.13

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**Key points**

- Orchestration must focus on those effects that shape an audience’s behaviour to our advantage.

- The OMSE programme will concentrate on language, behaviours, functions, processes and organisations, ensuring they become more audience-centric.

2.4. **Principle 4 – Integrated action.** Defence must be able to apply integrated action across the force. This extends beyond information sharing, prioritisation or synchronisation; it must strive toward a shared understanding of the adversary and the effects required to achieve the desired outcome. The priority for integration with partners may change depending on where in the continuum of competition the UK is at a specific time. Operations above the threshold of warfighting may see more effort dedicated to integrating with allies, whilst below-threshold operations might shift the emphasis towards cross-government integration. This agile integration cannot be achieved without cohering lexicons, aligning capabilities and establishing agreed practices early.

### Integrated action and multi-domain operations

In April 2015, General John Hyten, Chief of the United States (US) Air Force Space Command, told the American public on the television show *60 Minutes*, that if the US is “threatened in space, we have the right of self-defense, and we’ll make sure we can execute that right”. Asked if that meant using force, General Hyten replied: “That’s why we have the military. You know I am not from NASA”.\(^{14}\) The inference in this remark is that if the US is threatened in space, it will retain the right to reply in whatever domain, and with whatever means it chooses.

Postulating into the future, it is credible to envisage a scenario where the US would seek to dissuade another state or non-state actor from disrupting their satellite network by employing ‘conventional’ weapons in another domain. Ambiguity about the intent of peer/near peer competitors in this domain, such as China, and a finite amount of space in key orbits increases the likelihood of such conflict.\(^{15}\)

A response to this competition in space might elicit activity across multiple domains. For instance, high energy lasers, generated from sea-based platforms and refracted using mirrors held in high altitude unmanned dirigibles, could be used to degrade or destroy specific

\(^{15}\) Ibid., pages 39 and 32.
land-based, command and control capabilities. The adversary’s capabilities that are affected could be unrelated to their space ambitions – if General Hyten’s remarks are extant, then such a US response would be part of an overall deterrence posture based on the imposition of cost model.

Such a scenario would require integration between land, maritime, air, space and, probably, cyber and electromagnetic domains to ensure that activity in these diverse areas was designed and executed in a manner likely to achieve behaviour change in space. It would require integration across the levels of warfare, coordinating and synchronising the dirigible with other air assets and the laser platform. Finally, it would necessitate intra-government understanding and alignment because space is not a domain where the military has a monopoly and deterrence is a whole of government endeavour that requires all the instruments of national power.

Key point

- Integration with partners across government and allies requires mutual understanding about capabilities and effects. Achieving this synergy with others whose processes and cultures will differ from Defence’s requires investment in education and relationships.

16 Doug Beason, Ph.D, The E-Bomb. How America’s new directed energy weapons will change the way future wars will be run, 2005, page 158.
2.5. **Principle 5 – Agility through simplicity.** Defence must be agile by design rather than good at delivering in an ad hoc manner. It must strive for simplicity wherever possible, not least in terms of language, command and control, function and form, whilst recognising the need for clarity of ownership, authority and permissions. Layers of complexity may offer greater control and oversight but rarely lead to agility and Defence must be prepared to accept risk to allow a greater degree of responsiveness.

**Key points**

- Assurance and oversight can stifle agility. To enable integration and responsiveness, Defence must accept a greater degree of risk.

- Training and rehearsals, across all levels of warfare, are the way that Defence manages this risk.

2.6. **Principle 6 – Delegation.** Defence must routinely delegate authority as far as possible whilst articulating unambiguously at what level responsibility has been retained. Simpler and flatter command and control structures are a key enabler of orchestration. When delegation is not possible, Defence must ensure it understands the risks of retaining control, permission or authority, and mitigate the impacts of doing so. MOD Head Office must have systems in place to rapidly delegate as the situation demands.

**Key points**

- Successful delegation builds tempo.

- Intervention may well be necessary to exploit opportunities, but unnecessary intervention can create a culture of risk aversion and dependency if unchecked.¹⁷

¹⁷ Joint Doctrine Publication 01, *UK Joint Operations Doctrine*. 
2.7. **Principle 7 – Transitions and adaptive posture.** Defence must be capable of seamless, coherent and rapid transitions into and out of warfighting. This could be via national, bilateral, multinational or alliance structures and arrangements. This activity is not linear, the UK may war fight and operate concurrently, with the emphasis on these functions changing rapidly between the two. All commands, at all levels, must have enough resilience and agility to shift in to and out of a warfighting role, wherever there is a greater than negligible risk of a rapid escalation in hostilities.

### Key points

- Transitioning between operate and war fight will be complex. Areas such as authorities and command and control will change as the competition escalates and de-escalates above the threshold of warfighting.

- The UK may transition between operate and war fight on multiple occasions, but the necessity to operate (protect, engage and constrain) will endure throughout.

- The degree of emphasis between operate and war fight will depend on the situation and the level of warfare. Strategic and operational commands will have to balance operate and war fight, whilst tactical units may be more likely to transition between the two in a more linear manner.

‘A government must prepare for a range of scenarios, not just the best case, and should not assume that it will be able to improvise.’

*The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary*,

UK Cabinet Office

2.8. **Principle 8 – Change to a campaign mindset.** To achieve these outcomes OMSE must change the way Defence thinks. MOD Head Office and the operational level of command must think, decide and design within a campaign mindset that is focused around outcomes and risk. The department must be capable of working across a continuum of competition, from a sub-threshold, regional contest to global warfighting at scale and pace, and then back again. Being comfortable with 24/7/365 operating, with the ability to superimpose\textsuperscript{19} warfighting is critical to the UK seizing and retaining the initiative. Crisis response should aim to address unregulated risk within a broader strategy, rather than ameliorating a time-specific policy problem in isolation. The concurrency assumptions that are made, and the plans for routine activity must clearly link with and lead to the plans for warfighting. This orchestration must be designed around the fact that hard power underpins the UK’s deterrence posture.\textsuperscript{20}

**Key points**

- Defence must continuously conduct the functions of protect, engage and constrain to deter, but must be geared to war fight alongside where necessary.

- Defence foremost provides the hard power that underpins deterrence.

\textsuperscript{19} In this context ‘superimpose’ refers to the addition of combat operations above the threshold of warfighting in addition to the ongoing operate activity.

2.9. **Principle 9 – Proactive not just reactive.** This orchestration is organised around a tenet of ‘proactivity by design’ and is reactive only when necessary. Defence’s emphasis should be on maintaining the initiative through policy, strategy, plans and execution first, only falling back to crisis response and management (although both will continue to be required) when necessary.

**Key points**

- Policy (ends) is influenced by strategy.
- Good strategy seizes the initiative by producing viable options and makes Defence and the UK government ‘proactive by design’.
- The balance of deliberate and dynamic activity represents the degree of initiative the UK holds.
- The initial strategy is just the start point; it needs to be kept under constant review and adapted, or even discarded and replaced, as events unfold.\(^{21}\)

2.10. **Principle 10 – Resilience and consistency.** Defence must be resilient, without being too rigid or restrictive, at every level of warfare and across all the operational domains. Confidence in functions, processes, systems and organisations offers greater choice in terms of risk appetite and risk management. The department must be consistent in its use of known procedures and practices to increase tempo and common understanding.

**Key points**

- Resilience requires capacity, systems that are 100% efficient in operate may not have the growth room to transition to war fight.

- Systems must be able to manage both operate and war fight. Having distinct processes and systems for each will build in fractures and weaknesses.

- Having the ability to rapidly divest permissions and authorities will enable the system to cope with rapid or unexpected ability.
Lexicon

Section 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations

AJP  Allied joint publication
COED  Concise Oxford English Dictionary
DCDC  Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre
DFID  Department for International Development
JDN  joint doctrine note
JDP  joint doctrine publication
JTTP  joint tactics, techniques and procedures
MDI  multi-domain integration
MDICP  MDI Change Programme
MOD  Ministry of Defence
NSCR  National Security Capability Review
OMSE  orchestration of military strategic effects
RCDS  Royal College of Defence Studies
RUSI  Royal United Services Institute
UK  United Kingdom
US  United States
Section 2 – Terms and definitions

command
The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, coordination, and control of military forces. (NATOTerm)

Defence strategic communication (in UK Defence)
Advancing national interests by using Defence as a means of communication to influence the attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of audiences. (JDN 2/19)

deterrence
The convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act. (NATOTerm)

directive
A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered. (NATOTerm)

hostile state activity
Overt or covert action orchestrated by foreign governments that undermines or threatens the UK’s national security, the integrity of its democracy, its public safety, reputation or economic prosperity, short of armed conflict.
(Hostile State Activity Strategy, National Security Council endorsed)

hybrid threat
A type of threat that combines conventional, irregular and asymmetric activities in time and space. (NATOTerm)

hybrid warfare
Hybrid warfare is the synchronised use of multiple instruments of power tailored to specific vulnerabilities across the spectrum of societal functions to achieve strategic effects.
(Multinational Capability Development Campaign, Countering Hybrid Warfare Project)
integrated action
The use of the full range of military and non-military capabilities to change, or maintain, the understanding and behaviour of audiences necessary to achieve a successful outcome. (Proposed definition – JDN X/21, Integrated Action)

joint effects
A command-led, whole of headquarters activity that considers all available capabilities that could be used, to achieve directed end states across all lines of headquarters-directed activity. Subsequently apportioned capabilities are monitored, coordinated and synchronised throughout the targeting cycle across the whole headquarters, to ensure that the desired effects are achieved and undesired effects mitigated. (JTTP 3-81)

joint commander
The commander who exercises the highest level of operational command of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployment, sustainment, and recovery. (NATOTerm – Not NATO Agreed)

joint targeting
The process of determining the effects necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives, identifying the actions necessary to create the desired effects based on means available, selecting and prioritising targets, and the synchronisation of fires with other military capabilities and then assessing their cumulative effectiveness and taking remedial action if necessary. (AJP-3.9, Not NATO Agreed)

joint operations area
A temporary area within a theatre of operations defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint force commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level. (NATOTerm)

national resilience
Ability of the community, services, areas or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges. (Cabinet Office)
orchestrate
Direct (a situation) to produce a desired effect. (COED)

operational level
The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. (NATOTerm)

pace
For ground forces, the speed of a column or element regulated to maintain a prescribed average speed. (NATOTerm)

policy
Agreed principles, approach and general objectives, set out in a document, to guide the achievement of specific outcomes. Notes: 1. In NATO, a policy is normally developed on the basis of a given concept. 2. A policy implementation plan may also be developed. (NATOTerm)

strategy
The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theatre, national and/or multinational objectives. (NATOTerm – Not NATO Agreed)

strategic communications (NATO)
In the NATO military context, the integration of communication capabilities and information staff function with other military activities, in order to understand and shape the information environment, in support of NATO strategic aims and objectives. (NATOTerm)

synchronise
Cause to occur or operate at the same time and rate. (COED)

target audience analysis
The systematic study of people to enhance understanding and identify accessibility, vulnerability, and susceptibility to behavioural and attitudinal influence. (JDP 0-01.1)
targeting
The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate responses to them, taking account of the operational requirements and capabilities. (NATOTerm)

tempo
The rate of military action relative to the enemy. (NATOTerm)

transition
The process or a period of changing from one state or condition to another. (COED)