

# Impact Assessment, The Home Office

**Title:** Introducing Public Health Measures IA 2020

**IA No:** HO0345

**RPC Reference No:** N/A

**Other departments or agencies:** Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, Department of Health and Social Care, Department for Education

**Date:** 16 December 2020

**Stage:** Final

**Intervention:** Domestic

**Measure:** Primary Legislation

**Enquiries:**  
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**RPC Opinion:** Not Applicable

**Business Impact Target:** Non-qualifying provision

## Cost of Preferred (or more likely) Option (in 2020/21 prices)

<b>Net Present Social Value NPSV (£m)</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>Business Net Present Value BNPV (£m)</b>	<b>-12.5</b>	<b>Net cost to business per year EANDCB (£m)</b>	<b>1.4</b>
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### What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?

Serious violence is extremely costly to society and instils fear within communities. It has increased since 2014. For example, knife crime rose by 84 per cent between the year end June 2014 and June 2020. The Government's Serious Violence Strategy recommended a multi-agency approach involving a range of partners, and several studies have shown marked crime-reduction effects when these kinds of partnerships have been implemented. However the success of the existing partnerships is mixed and so government intervention to ensure improved and continued partnership working through a duty is necessary.

### What are the policy objectives and the intended effects?

The objectives of the duty are to: **1)** improve the current multi-agency approach involving partners and agencies such as education, health, justice, social services, housing, youth and victim services. **2)** increase the effectiveness of partnerships at preventing/tackling serious violence **3)** to share data, intelligence and knowledge to generate evidence-based analysis of the problem and solutions. The intended effect is two-fold: to increase effective collaboration across agencies and ultimately to reduce the number of serious violence offences.

### What policy options have been considered, including any alternatives to regulation? Please justify preferred option (further details in Evidence Base)

**Option 0:** (Do Nothing) the current partnership arrangements would continue with different levels of success and sometimes poor responses. This does not meet the Government's objectives.

**Option 1:** Enact primary legislation to place a statutory duty on specified authorities to ensure organisations collaborate and communicate regularly to take effective coordinated action to prevent and tackle serious violence. This is **the Government's preferred option**. Non-regulatory and other options were considered but did not meet the objectives.

<b>Main assumptions/sensitivities and economic/analytical risks</b>	<b>Discount rate (%)</b>	<b>3.5</b>
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It is assumed that only partnership organisations not currently tackling/preventing serious violence effectively are impacted. It is estimated, based on published evaluations, that through a combination of interventions benefits will be approximately 3.5 times higher than intervention costs. There is a risk that not all partners are motivated to adopt a multi-agency approach, or interventions have a high failure rate, so crime-reduction benefits are lower than past evaluations. Sensitivity analysis has been conducted. This updated final IA considers newly available data.

**Will the policy be reviewed?** It will not be reviewed. **If applicable, set review date:** N/A

*I have read the Impact Assessment and I am satisfied that, given the available evidence, it represents a reasonable view of the likely costs, benefits and impact of the leading options.*

Signed by the responsible minister:



Date: 1 March 2021

# Summary: Analysis & Evidence

# Policy Option 1

## Description:

### FULL ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

Year(s):	Price Base	2022/23	PV Base	2022/23	Appraisal	10	Transition	1
Estimate of Net Present Social Value NPSV (£m)						Estimate of BNPV (£m)		
Low:	143	High:	300	Best:	222	Best BNPV	-13	

COSTS, £m	Transition Constant Price	Ongoing Present Value	Total Present Value	Average/year Constant Price	To Business Present Value
Low	34	100	135	15	4
High	21	181	202	23	22
Best Estimate	27	141	168	19	13

#### Description and scale of key monetised costs by 'main affected groups'

Costs occur in 71 per cent (223) of community safety partnerships. 10-year costs (present value) include ongoing labour, set-up/equipment and intervention and are in a range of £135 to £202 million, with a central estimate of £168 million. In the central scenario, main costs fall to the police (£51m), local authorities (£35m), health services (£28m) and education (£27m).

#### Other key non-monetised costs by 'main affected groups'

None

BENEFITS, £m	Transition Constant Price	Ongoing Present Value	Total Present Value	Average/year Constant Price	To Business Present Value
Low	N/A	277	277	33	0
High	N/A	502	502	60	0
Best Estimate	N/A	390	390	47	0

#### Description and scale of key monetised benefits by 'main affected groups'

These are calculated using published evaluations. Total benefits are estimated at £277 to £502 million (10-year PV, central estimate £390m). 61 per cent of benefits are estimated to be reductions in serious violence. In the central scenario, this leads to reductions of £22 million (7 offences) in homicide, £179 million (13,200 offences) in violence with injury and £37 million in robbery (3,400 offences).

#### Other key non-monetised benefits by 'main affected groups'

Evidence suggests successful partnership working can reduce fear of crime as well as numbers of offences. This has not been monetised.

### BUSINESS ASSESSMENT (Option 1)

Direct impact on business (Equivalent Annual) £m:									
Cost, £m	1.5	Benefit, £m	0.0	Net, £m	1.5				
Score for Business Impact Target (qualifying provisions only) £m:					N/A				
Is this measure likely to impact on trade and investment?					N				
Are any of these organisations in scope?		Micro	Y	Small	Y	Medium	Y	Large	Y
What is the CO <sub>2</sub> equivalent change in greenhouse gas emissions? (Million tonnes CO <sub>2</sub> equivalent)				Traded:	N/A	Non-Traded:	N/A		

### PEOPLE AND SPECIFIC IMPACTS ASSESSMENT (Option 2)

Are all relevant Specific Impacts included?	Y	Are there any impacts on particular groups?	N
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# Evidence Base (for summary sheets)

## A. Strategic Overview

### A.1 Background

Since 2014, certain types of serious violence have increased markedly in England and Wales. Offences involving knives increased by 84 per cent between the year to June 2014 and the year to June 2020<sup>1</sup>. Homicides increased by around 38 per cent and gun crime rose by 28 per cent between year to June 2014 and year to June 2020.

Responding to this increase, the Government published the Serious Violence Strategy in April 2018. The strategy made it clear that a successful approach depends not only on the work of law enforcement but also on harnessing the value of cross-sector partnerships including education, health, social services, housing, youth services and victim services in tackling serious violence.

To enshrine this approach, it is proposed to introduce a new duty through new primary legislation. This would place a duty on specific organisations to plan and collaborate to prevent and tackle serious violence.

### A.2 Groups Affected

The proposed duty would affect the following groups:

- Police.
- Local authorities (including responsibilities such as housing, youth offending teams and public health).
- Criminal Justice organisations (including probation services and prisons).
- Health and social care bodies (for example, clinical commissioning groups; and children's care homes).
- Education authorities (representatives of schools, alternative provision providers and higher education organisations).
- Fire authorities / Chief Fire Officer

The proposed authorities subject to the duty are listed at Annex A.

A previous version of this Final IA was published on 4 July 2019<sup>2</sup>. Since then the proposed role of certain organisations have changed. Fire authorities/the Chief Fire Officer have been added as a full duty holder and the education sector and prison service now have a reduced role. Rather than being a full duty holder, these organisations will have a co-operation role. They will only be required to undertake serious violence prevention activity if asked by one of the duty holder organisations.

In the case of the education sector, it is expected that a strategic education representative for the local area should be nominated by the partnership to provide a link between the responsible authorities/duty holders and individual institutions. The strategic education representative will represent the voice of the local education providers. They will also share collective responsibility within the partnership by assisting the partnership to better understand the risk factors and vulnerabilities experienced by young people. In doing so they will feed in evidence-based analysis in support of the formulation and implementation of the local problem profile/strategic needs assessment as well as ensuring that relevant education providers deliver any solutions that come from the local serious violence strategy (subject the partnership's agreed assessment of affordability).

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<sup>1</sup> Police recorded crime publication : <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables>

<sup>2</sup>[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/816905/20190715\\_PH\\_Impact\\_Assessment.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/816905/20190715_PH_Impact_Assessment.pdf)

## A.3 Consultation

### Within Government

A number of government departments agencies were consulted as part of the development of the consultation including:

- Department for Education (DfE).
- Department for Health & Social Care (DHSC).
- Ministry of Justice (MoJ).
- Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).
- Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government (MHCLG) including a New Burdens Assessment (NBA).
- Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS).
- Department for Work and Pensions (DWP).

### Public Consultation

A full public consultation opened on 1 April 2019 to seek views on the introduction of a new legal duty to support a multi-agency approach to preventing and tackling serious violence. The consultation closed on 28 May 2019. Responses were particularly welcomed from those with expertise in working with young people at risk of criminal involvement and/or re-offending or victimisation, those involved in law enforcement and, more generally, the communities affected by serious violence including the voluntary and community sector. This included relevant professionals, such as those working in social care, education, law enforcement, local government, community safety, youth services, offender management, victims' services, public health and healthcare. In recognition of multi-agency approaches outside England and Wales, responses were also welcomed from across the UK.

The consultation sought views on three options:

- a) A new duty on specific organisations to collaborate and plan to prevent and reduce serious violence.
- b) A new duty through legislating to revise Community Safety Partnerships.
- c) A voluntary non-legislative approach to preventing and tackling serious violence.

On 15 July, the Government published its response to the consultation on a new legal duty to support a multi-agency approach to preventing and reducing serious violence. The majority of those responding to the consultation agreed that some form of legislative approach is required to support a multi-agency approach to prevent and reduce serious violence. Some respondents pointed to the positive outcomes a duty would bring, including consistency for prioritisation of serious violence and accountability across England and Wales.

## B. Rationale for intervention.

**The problem: serious violence has increased and though partnership working is an evidence-based response, only a small proportion of partnerships are currently tackling serious violence effectively.**

Serious violence has increased markedly since 2014. Although the latest figures show a 1 per cent decrease in knife offences in the year ending June 2020, this can be wholly attributed to decreases in the Covid lockdown period. Knife offences have otherwise been rising since the year ending March 2014, and some types of knife offences continue to show a marked rise, with "Threats to kill" offences involving a knife or sharp instrument increasing by 22 per cent in the year ending June 2020<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup> Sourced from Crime in England and Wales publication: year ending June 2020. Lockdown period caused by Covid-19 defined as April to June 2020. Available at:

Evidence shows that partnership working is an evidence-based response. For example, a Home Office review of partnership working<sup>4</sup> that looked at nine studies, six of which were evaluations of initiatives designed to tackle serious violence, concluded that:

*“...on balance, the evidence suggests that the principle of applying partnership working as a component of initiatives to tackle complex crime and disorder problems is effective”.*  
(piii).

A recent systematic review tested the effectiveness of one partnership approach known as focussed deterrence or ‘pulling levers’. This targets serious offenders with offers of help from a range of services with the threat of enforcement if none of these offers are accepted. The review of 24 evaluations found that the approach was associated with an overall statistically significant, moderate crime reduction effect.<sup>5</sup> As a result of these and other studies, the World Health Organization (WHO) has advocated a ‘public health approach’ to be taken to violence.<sup>6</sup>

**Legislation is needed to ensure that serious violence is prioritised. Evidence suggests the response to serious violence is mixed under the current framework.**

The 2016 review of partnership working to tackle community safety and crime conducted by the Local Government Association (LGA)<sup>7</sup> found that only about 20 per cent of Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) and County Safety Groups (CSGs) listed serious violence as a priority<sup>8</sup>. Only 29 per cent of partnerships stated they were ‘very confident’ in delivering on their priorities. The summary of the report<sup>9</sup> also highlighted the variable quality of partnership working:

*“...variations were reported regarding the strength of local authority relationships with other statutory CSP partners. In some areas there are excellent relationships in place; representation at (and chairing of) meetings is consistent, allowing relationships to flourish; communication is good across partners, and information is shared. However it is clear this is not universal; in other places some partners may be more engaged than others, and there continue to be concerns in some areas about silo working and core issues such as data sharing – which are critical in efforts to ensure public safety. Working with partners who do not share coterminous boundaries presents additional challenges. Given limited resources and pressured budgets across partners, it is even more important to address these concerns.”* (p9)

## C. Policy objective

The aim is for local areas to take a multi-agency approach to understand the causes and consequences of serious violence, focused on prevention and early intervention, and informed by evidence and rigorous evaluation of interventions. This is often referred to as a ‘public health’ approach. It requires a range of bodies and organisations to work together to tackle this issue including law enforcement agencies, education partners, local authorities, offender management

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<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingjune2020#knife-or-sharp-instrument-offences>

<sup>4</sup> Berry, G., Briggs, P., Erol, R., & Van Staden, L. (2011). The effectiveness of partnership working in a crime and disorder context. A rapid evidence assessment, 1. Accessed on 19/06/19 at:

[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/116549/horr52-report.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116549/horr52-report.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> Braga, A. A., Weisburd, D., & Turchan, B. (2018). Focused deterrence strategies and crime control: An updated systematic review and meta-analysis of the empirical evidence. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 17(1), 205-250.

<sup>6</sup> See: [https://www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/public\\_health/en/](https://www.who.int/violenceprevention/approach/public_health/en/)

<sup>7</sup> See:

<https://www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/10.22%20-%20LGA%20review%20of%20the%20future%20of%20community%20safety%20services.pdf>

<sup>8</sup> The survey found that 21 per cent of partnerships stated that reducing violence was a priority and a (non-mutually exclusive) 18 per cent stated that ‘gangs/county lines/youth violence’ was a priority. County Lines is a method of drug dealing that has been linked to the increases in serious violence in the Serious Violence Strategy. (The survey results can be accessed here: <https://www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/download-survey-report-e34.pdf>)

<sup>9</sup> See: <https://www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/10.22%20-%20LGA%20review%20of%20the%20future%20of%20community%20safety%20services.pdf>

services including youth offending services and health care and public health professionals taking joint action. It would also be expected that those partners look for opportunities to draw in support and wider expertise in their communities, including those in the voluntary and charitable sector.

Briefly summarised, the approach advocated is:

- Focused on a defined population, often with a health risk in common.
- With and for communities.
- Not constrained by organisational or professional boundaries.
- Focussed on generating long-term as well as short-term solutions.
- Based on data and intelligence to identify the burden on the population, including any inequalities.
- Rooted in evidence of effectiveness to tackle the problem.

A multi-agency preventative approach is already being taken forward through the Government's Serious Violence Strategy. The aim of this legislation is to reinforce that approach and ensure that the partnerships that are currently not functioning as they should, take an active role in reducing serious violence via an evidence-based approach.

The duty requires organisations to work together to prevent and reduce serious violence. It is not the Government's intention that the duty will result in the creation of new multi-agency structures. It is expected that local senior leaders will use existing local structures to ensure that agencies and bodies are working together to prevent and reduce serious violence in their local areas.

Partnerships across England and Wales will be expected to undertake an evidence-based analysis of the causes of serious violence within their area; and following the analysis and development of the problem profile/strategic needs assessment, partnerships will be expected to formulate and implement a plan/strategy containing bespoke solutions to prevent and reduce serious violence in their area and will need to review this annually.

The duty will create the right conditions for relevant agencies and partners to collaborate and communicate regularly, to use existing partnerships and to share information and take effective coordinated action in their local areas.

## **D. Options considered and implementation.**

**Option 0** is to make no changes and is the do-nothing option. This would involve no legislative changes and no duty on authorities to prevent and tackle serious violence. This does not achieve the Government's objectives as it does nothing to tackle the increase in serious violence and goes against the Government's serious violence strategy.

**Option 1** is to legislate. This would create a new statutory duty on authorities (set out in proposed duty holder list at Annex 1) to plan and collaborate to prevent and tackle serious violence. The duty will be underpinned by guidance to relevant authorities issued by the Secretary of State. The duty requires organisations to work together to prevent and reduce serious violence. Partnerships across England and Wales will be expected to undertake an evidence-based analysis of the causes of serious violence within their area; and following the analysis and development of the problem profile/strategic needs assessment, partnerships will be expected to formulate and implement a plan/strategy containing bespoke solutions to prevent and reduce serious violence in their area and will need to review this annually. This is **the Government's preferred option** as aims to achieve the Government's objective of stopping serious violence from increasing.

## E. Appraisal.

A previous version of this Final IA was published on 4 July 2019<sup>10</sup>. This section has been altered and improved to account for the differing role of some organisations and the addition of the Fire sector. The methodology in this section is more analytically robust as costs are now presented in a range, and the methodology accounts for new data from Violence Reduction Units (VRUs) and data published in the Florence et al (2014)<sup>11</sup> paper, outlining costs from a successful violence reduction partnership in Cardiff. This methodology has been used across all six organisations in-scope of the duty to ensure a consistent approach to costings. The change in the duty since the last IA means the consultation responses and the 'Prevent Strategy: Equality Impact Assessment'<sup>12</sup> IA are no longer appropriate proxies for the costs in this IA. The calculation of benefits has also been adjusted to account for additional evaluation evidence.

The legislation in this IA forms part of the legislative package within the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill (PCSC Bill). This IA has been completed separately to provide a full economic appraisal of the public health/serious violence duty aspect. The PCSC bill IA (HO0383) will include the costs and benefits from this appraisal within it. However, the total costs, benefits and net present social value (NPSV) used will be different to those within this IA. This is because the PCSC bill IA appraisal uses a 20/21 price and PV base year throughout, and a 10-year appraisal period from 20/21 to 29/30. As the measures in this IA begin in 22/23, they have been appraised over 10 years from this point on in this IA using a 22/23 price and PV base year (20/21 prices on the front page). Therefore, the totals in this IA will differ from those in the PCSC bill IA. The PCSC bill IA only includes the first 8 years of the appraisal in this IA. These differences mean that the central total net present social value (NPSV) for the duty in the PCSC bill falls to £144 million<sup>13</sup>, the business net present value (BNPV) is -£9.8 million, and the net cost to business per year (EANDCB) is £1.2 million.

**The Government's preferred option** (Option 1 above) is to impose legislation that would create a new statutory duty on authorities to plan and collaborate to prevent and tackle serious violence.

### General assumptions and data

This policy is appraised over a 10-year period in line with HM Treasury (2018) Green Book guidance. A social discount rate of 3.5 per cent is used to discount future values to give present values (PV) over the period with 2022/23 used as the present value base year (PVBV) as this is when the policy is expected to commence. All other costs and benefits are in 2022/23 prices unless stated otherwise. Transition/set-up costs are assumed to occur in year 1 only and ongoing costs are expected to occur in all 10 years.

The concept of present value (PV) considers that a set sum of money is not as valuable to people at some point in the future as it would be today, reflecting in part, time preference and in part, an assumption that the economy is expected to grow over time. Therefore, the marginal utility of each additional pound diminishes in the future. Future costs and benefits therefore must be discounted in order to be comparable to today's costs and benefits.

The other main assumptions are:

- 1) Of the 314 Community Safety Partnerships<sup>14</sup>, 29 per cent (91) are currently tackling/preventing serious violence successfully. This is taken from the 2016 Local Government Association Report which found that 29 per cent partnerships were very confident in delivering on their priorities<sup>15</sup>. These currently successful partnerships are assumed to be unaffected by the new duty so incur no costs and benefits.

<sup>10</sup>[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/816905/20190715\\_PH\\_Impact\\_Assessment.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/816905/20190715_PH_Impact_Assessment.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.bmj.com/content/342/bmj.d3313>

<sup>12</sup> [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/97979/prevent-review-eia.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97979/prevent-review-eia.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> Based upon costs of £129m and benefits of £273m (PV terms, 8 years of duty, 20/21 prices and base year),

<sup>14</sup> Sourced from the ONS – Available at: <http://geoportal.statistics.gov.uk/datasets/local-authority-district-to-community-safety-partnerships-to-police-force-areas-december-2018-lookup-in-england-and-wales>

<sup>15</sup> The survey results for the report, including the 71% figure (Table 8, page 11), can be accessed here:

<https://www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/download-survey-report-e34.pdf>

- 2) However, the counterpart of assumption 1) is that 71 per cent (223) of partnerships are assumed to be not as effective as they should be. They are therefore assumed to be affected by the duty and hence incur costs. This same 71 per cent assumption is applied to police force areas when applicable. This assumption is tested in section G.
- 3) Benefits are calculated using multiple published evaluations, to account for an array of possible interventions as a result of the duty. It is unknown the exact interventions that will occur in each area, and so an average benefit cost ratio (see table 14), of 3.5 has been calculated to proxy their impact. It is assumed that benefits accrue over the three years following costs, and benefits are only calculated off ongoing spend as opposed to transition spend. It is assumed that 61 per cent of benefits accrue directly to serious violence reduction. The rationale for these assumptions is explained in the benefits section of this IA, specifically table 14.
- 4) It is assumed that successfully tackling/preventing serious violence does not increase downstream costs on the Criminal Justice System (CJS). While it is possible that some interventions may increase police detection capability, which would lead to a greater proportion of offenders being caught and hence requiring court and custodial costs, most proposed interventions are preventative which should reduce downstream costs. It is assumed the latter effect dominates.<sup>16</sup>

It is assumed that all activity driven by the new duty is *additional*. In other words, organisations do not cut back resources in other areas in order to tackle/prevent serious violence

## Appraisal

### COSTS

The proposed legislation places a duty on organisations from five sectors (police, health, fire and rescue, the criminal justice system and local government) and a requirement to co-operate on organisations from the education sector and the prison service. The costs of the policy are therefore the additional burdens that these organisations will face in order to discharge their duties in relation to working together to prevent and tackle serious violence. These costs fall into two broad categories:

1. Labour costs: Additional personnel/gross salary costs of individuals required to fulfil the duty. These are generally annually recurring and include all familiarisation costs.
2. Non-labour costs (for example, additional equipment, IT, building space, training etc). These are the costs of intervening to fulfil the duty. These costs vary between annually recurring and transitional set-up costs.

There is no definitive source of data to estimate these costs. To obtain a best estimate, two alternative methodologies have been used to present the range of costs of the duty. These two approaches are outlined below along with details of how they were combined to provide low, high and central estimates for the duty.

#### Approach 1: The Cardiff model

This approach uses an economic evaluation by Florence et al. (2014) of a successful violence reduction partnership model in Cardiff, published in the British Medical Journal.<sup>17</sup> The Cardiff partnership included police, health and local authority partners and involved a data and information sharing model that was used as the basis for policing interventions. It is not expected that all areas

<sup>16</sup> This is in line with other successful partnership approaches like the Cardiff model and the VRU in Scotland where the number of crimes fell sufficiently such that even a modest rise in detection rates still meant fewer cases flowing through to the Criminal Justice System overall.

<sup>17</sup> <https://www.bmj.com/content/342/bmj.d3313>



would adopt this exact model in order to fulfil the serious violence duty. The Cardiff model is simply used as a method to proxy the costs and benefits of a successful approach.

In the evaluation of the Cardiff model the costs for each sector were split between labour and non-labour, and set-up and ongoing. These are published in the Florence et al. (2014) economic evaluation and are reproduced in Table 1 below. This shows a total set-up cost of £107,769 and a total annual recurring cost of £48,789, implying a total year one cost of £156,567. The table has been reproduced exactly as published except the last column, which has been added. It shows how costs have been apportioned by sector for this Impact Assessment.

**Table 1: Costs from the Cardiff Model, 2003, £ and hours.**

Partnership resource type	Hourly costs (2003 £)	Set-up time commitment (hours)	Set-up cost (2003 £)	Recurring annual time commitment (hours)	Annual recurring costs (2003 £)	ORG
<b>Labour</b>						
A&E receptionist	7.19			87.60	629.84	Health
Junior IT staff	9.47	3	28.41	32.00	303.04	Health
Senior IT staff	11.44	148	1,693.12	151.00	1,727.44	Health
IT manager	13.80	15	207.00	15.00	207.00	Health
A&E consultant	39.97			16.00	639.52	Health
A&E senior consultant	45.36			104.00	4,717.44	Health
Police analyst	34.60			60.30	2,086.38	Police
Licensing sergeant	45.29			16.00	724.64	Police
Chief Inspector	43.53			16.00	696.48	Police
Licensing officer	18.67			16.00	298.72	Police
Victim support manager	14.52			16.00	232.32	Police
NTE coordinator	13.63			16.00	218.08	Police
Council workers	14.70			832.00	12,230.40	Local authority
<b>Total (2003 £)</b>			<b>1,929</b>		<b>2,4711</b>	
<b>Non-Labour</b>						
Barriers and signage					276.67	Local authority
Glassware replacements					10200.00	Local authority
CCTV installation and maintenance (4 cameras)			105,840.30		13530.12	Police
A&E consultant travel expenses						Health
<b>Total (2003 £)</b>			<b>105,840</b>		<b>24,087</b>	
<b>Total set-up costs (2003 £)</b>			<b>107,768.83</b>			
<b>Total annual recurring costs (2003 £)</b>					<b>48,798.09</b>	

Source: Florence et al. (2014) with Home Office additions in final column.

Note: Using the final column, costs were grouped by sector and converted to 2022 prices.

**Table 2: Cardiff costs by sector, 2003 prices.**

	Set-up		Annual recurring		Total year 1	Annual cost thereafter
	Labour	Non-labour	Labour	Non-labour		
Police		£105,840	£4,257	£13,530	£123,627	£17,787
Health	£1,929		£8,224	£80	£10,233	£8,304
Local authorities			£12,230	£10,477	£22,707	£22,707
<b>Total</b>	<b>£1,929</b>	<b>£105,840</b>	<b>£24,711</b>	<b>£24,087</b>	<b>£156,567</b>	<b>£48,798</b>

Source: Florence et al. (2014) with additional Home Office calculations.

**Table 3: Cardiff costs per sector, 2022 prices, £.**

	Set-up		Annual recurring		Total year 1	Annual cost thereafter
	Labour	Non-labour	Labour	Non-labour		
Police		£156,600	£6,300	£20,000	£182,900	£26,300
Health	£2,900		£12,200	£100	£15,100	£12,300
Local authorities			£18,100	£15,500	£33,600	£33,600
<b>Total</b>	<b>£2,900</b>	<b>£156,600</b>	<b>£36,600</b>	<b>£35,600</b>	<b>£231,600</b>	<b>£72,200</b>

Source: Florence et al. (2014) with additional Home Office calculations. Rounded to the nearest 100.

These were scaled up from one CSP area (Cardiff) to an estimated national cost, taking into consideration the counterfactual assumption (assumption 1 above). This states that a proportion (29%) of local areas are already fulfilling the duty and hence require no additional costs. The number of in-scope CSPs was calculated as 223 by multiplying 314 (number of CSPs in England and Wales) by 71 per cent, the number of partnerships not as effective as they should be. The costs for Cardiff were therefore multiplied by 223 to scale up to national total.

**Table 4: National estimated costs of Cardiff approach, per sector**

	Set-up		Annual recurring		Total year 1	Annual cost thereafter
	Labour	Non-labour	Labour	Non-labour		
Police		£34,909,900	£1,404,000	£4,462,700	£40,776,600	£5,866,700
Health	£636,100		£2,712,700	£26,400	£3,375,100	£2,739,000
Local authorities			£4,034,000	£3,455,600	£7,489,600	£7,489,600
<b>Total</b>	<b>£636,100</b>	<b>£34,909,900</b>	<b>£8,150,700</b>	<b>£7,944,700</b>	<b>£51,641,300</b>	<b>£16,095,300</b>

Source: Florence et al. (2014) with additional Home Office calculations. Rounded to the nearest 100.

This provides a total estimated cost split by three sectors. However, the duty falls on six sectors to varying degrees. Police, health, local government and fire/rescue organisations are full duty holders whereas education have a co-operation role and criminal justice organisations are split between the two.

To account for the additional sectors, costs have not been calculated on an additive basis but a scaled basis. An additive model assumes extra sectors bring extra benefits but also extra costs. A scaled perspective assumes the same overall benefit as Cardiff but with costs spread over more sectors.<sup>18</sup> This was done by assuming:

- That the additional duty responsibility of children's care homes doubles the labour and non-labour share of health costs. This is based on the fact that children in care, or who have been in care, are disproportionately likely to become involved in serious violence either as victims or perpetrators. So closer partnership working between children's care homes and the other sectors, particularly through sharing of knowledge and data is an important aim of the duty.
- That the education sector will face a similar non-labour cost to other duty holders but a reduced labour cost due to their lesser co-operation role. Unlike other duty holders, education organisations only need to attend duty-related meetings and work on a serious violence strategy for their area if asked by other organisations. For that reason, labour costs for these organisations have been estimated as half the equivalent police costs. By contrast, it is expected that the non-labour cost to the education sector will be reasonably high. Currently a large amount of proposed interventions by Violence Reduction Units (VRU) occur in schools and education establishments as these are often the best places to reach

<sup>18</sup> This approach keeps the benefit-to-cost ratio for Cardiff the same. There are arguments that adding more sectors could both increase or decrease the ratio. Having more sectors may make action harder to co-ordinate, reducing the ratio. But more sectors also bring a wider range of expertise and skills which could increase the ratio. As there is no firm evidence either way, the Cardiff ratio has been maintained, and the impact of larger overall costs is tested in section G.

young and vulnerable people. These costs are therefore assumed to be the same as a full duty holder: local authorities.

- That criminal justice will face similar labour costs to a full duty holder but that their non-labour costs will be small. As probation and youth justice teams are full duty holders, they will be required to play a role in meetings and developing a serious violence strategy. These costs have therefore been assumed to be the same as other full duty holders: local authorities. For non-labour costs, the consultation responses indicated that there weren't likely to be many interventions involving the criminal justice sector as partnerships are being advised to take a preventative approach. The non-labour costs were therefore assumed to be the same as those for the lowest duty holder: health.
- That fire and rescue service (FRS) organisations will face low labour and non-labour costs. The FRS will be involved in the same activities as the other duty holders (they will need to attend meetings and help develop strategy profiles), however the duty is not expected to be especially time-intensive for the fire service and few interventions are likely to involve them directly. Therefore, the low estimate for labour costs (police) and non-labour costs (health) in the Cardiff model is used to proxy the fire service's labour costs.

These assumptions are all based on limited evidence. However, it is important to recognise that their accuracy only affects the breakdown of the total cost between sectors, not the size of the total cost itself, which is taken directly from the actual figures published in the Cardiff evaluation. The total cost of Cardiff from Table 4 was scaled, using the assumptions above to apportion out costs between the six sectors.

**Table 5: National estimated costs of Cardiff approach, split by the six sectors relevant for the duty**

	Set-up		Annual recurring		Total year 1	Other years
	Labour	Non-labour	Labour	Non-labour		
Police		£34,296,100	£673,000	£3,074,400	£38,043,600	£3,747,400
Health	£1,249,800		£2,600,700	£36,400	£3,886,800	£2,637,000
Local authorities			£1,933,700	£2,380,600	£4,314,300	£4,314,300
CJS			£1,933,700	£36,400	£1,970,100	£1,970,100
Fire			£673,000	£36,400	£709,400	£709,400
Education			£336,500	£2,380,600	£2,717,100	£2,717,100
<b>Total</b>	<b>£1,249,800</b>	<b>£34,296,100</b>	<b>£8,150,700</b>	<b>£7,944,700</b>	<b>£51,641,300</b>	<b>£16,095,300</b>

Finally, the costs were modelled over time to show the total cost over the 10-year appraisal period by sector in present value terms.

**Table 6: National estimated costs of Cardiff approach, split by labour and non-labour costs, over 10 years.**

		Year 1	Annually recurring	Total cost	Total cost (PV terms)
<b>Police</b>	Labour	0.7	0.7	6.7	5.8
	Non-labour	37.4	3.1	65.0	60.8
	<b>Total</b>	<b>38.0</b>	<b>3.7</b>	<b>71.8</b>	<b>66.6</b>
<b>Health</b>	Labour	3.9	2.6	27.3	23.6
	Non-labour	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>2.6</b>	<b>27.6</b>	<b>23.9</b>
<b>Local authorities</b>	Labour	1.9	1.9	19.3	16.6
	Non-labour	2.4	2.4	23.8	20.5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>43.1</b>	<b>37.1</b>
<b>CJS</b>	Labour	1.9	1.9	19.3	16.6
	Non-labour	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>19.7</b>	<b>17.0</b>
<b>Fire</b>	Labour	0.7	0.7	6.7	5.8
	Non-labour	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3
	<b>Total</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>6.1</b>
<b>Education</b>	Labour	0.3	0.3	3.4	2.9
	Non-labour	2.4	2.4	23.8	20.5
	<b>Total</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>27.2</b>	<b>23.4</b>
<b>Total</b>	Labour	<b>9.4</b>	<b>8.2</b>	<b>82.8</b>	<b>71.4</b>
	Non-labour	<b>42.2</b>	<b>7.9</b>	<b>113.7</b>	<b>102.7</b>
	<b>Total</b>	<b>51.6</b>	<b>16.1</b>	<b>196.5</b>	<b>174.1</b>

## Approach 2: Bottom-up calculations using VRU data.

The second set of data used to estimate costs was the spending plans from Violence Reduction Units (VRUs). £35 million was committed in 2019/20 to the creation of VRUs to deal with serious violence. As part of the set-up phase, the 18 police force areas covered by VRU funding have submitted data and information on the likely labour and non-labour costs associated with a VRU. As these structures have similar aims to the duty and offer a way for multiple organisations to abide by duty, they can be used to proxy the requirements on each police force area to meet the duty.<sup>19</sup>

The data has been used as a proxy for costing the duty and as a comparison to the Cardiff model. Costs to VRUs have been included within the economic cost of the duty because funding for VRUs has not been guaranteed beyond 2020/21 and the duty is not scheduled to begin until 2022/23.

The labour costs of the duty were split into the costs of regular meetings, the cost of familiarisation with the new guidance, and the development of problem profiles/strategies outside of the meeting time. These time costs were calculated using the average salaries of duty holders<sup>20</sup> and the number of people from each duty who were expected to attend meetings and be involved (taken from VRU data). It also used the following assumptions:

- Familiarisation takes 52 minutes, based on our estimate that the guidance will be about 12,500 words and that the average person reads at 240 word per hour<sup>21</sup>.
- Meeting time (including travel) is four and a half hours.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>19</sup> VRUs may undertake additional activities beyond the duty and some areas may require additional costs on top of VRU funding if they have a number of local areas that need attention (VRUs operate at the force level, rather than at the CSP level).

<sup>20</sup> Obtained from ONS ASHE table of earnings (Table 14.5 – Gross pay Mean ASHE earnings). Available at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/datasets/occupation4digitsoc2010ashtable14>

<sup>21</sup> Readingsoft.com. Average reader on paper.

<sup>22</sup> Estimate from speaking to those involved with VRUs and the duty.

- 12 meetings are held each year.
- The time required to produce a strategy is 3 times the meeting time, equivalent to 162 hours over the course of the year.<sup>23</sup> This is tested in the sensitivity analysis (section G).
- Hourly wages increased by 22% to account for non-wage costs<sup>24</sup>

These were combined to produce the following results.

**Table 7: VRU approach – labour cost for one area (2022 prices), £.**

	Number of people	Hourly wage	Familiarisation cost	Meetings (inc. travel) cost	Strategy time cost	Total cost
<b>Health</b>	3	£32.82	£90	£5,300	£16,000	£21,400
<b>Police</b>	3	£50.49	£130	£8,200	£24,500	£32,800
<b>Local Authority</b>	6	£17.73	£90	£5,700	£17,200	£23,100
<b>Education</b>	2	£43.36	£80	£4,700	£14,000	£18,800
<b>CJS</b>	3	£29.31	£80	£4,700	£14,200	£19,100
<b>Fire</b>	1	£29.31	£30	£1,600	£4,700	£6,400
<b>Total</b>			£490	£30,300	£90,800	<b>£121,500</b>

Sources: VRU information and data; Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) with additional Home Office calculations.

This was converted into a national, annual cost using the counterfactual assumption (assumption 1 above). This states that 29 per cent of the 43 police force areas are already fulfilling the duty and therefore do not incur costs.

**Table 8: VRU approach – total national labour cost (2022 prices), £**

	Familiarisation cost	Meetings (inc. travel) cost	Strategy time cost	Total time (year 1)
<b>Health</b>	£2,700	£162,300	£487,000	£652,000
<b>Police</b>	£3,900	£249,700	£749,100	£1,002,700
<b>Local Authority</b>	£2,900	£175,400	£526,300	£704,600
<b>Education</b>	£2,300	£143,000	£428,900	£574,200
<b>CJS</b>	£2,400	£145,000	£434,900	£582,300
<b>Fire</b>	£800	£48,300	£145,000	£194,100
<b>Total</b>	£15,000	£923,700	£2,771,200	<b>£3,709,900</b>

Sources: VRU information and data; Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) with additional Home Office calculations.

All these labour costs are assumed to be annually recurring except the familiarisation costs. The costs for the ten-year period are shown in present value terms in Table 9.

<sup>23</sup> Estimate from speaking to those involved with VRUs and the duty.

<sup>24</sup> In line with RPC guidance and EuroStat publication, available at [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/827926/RPC\\_short\\_guidance\\_note\\_-\\_Implementation\\_costs\\_August\\_2019.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/827926/RPC_short_guidance_note_-_Implementation_costs_August_2019.pdf)

**Table 9: VRU approach – total labour cost over time (2022 prices, £ millions)**

Organisation	Year 1 cost	Annually recurring	Total cost	Total cost (PV terms)
Health	£0.65	£0.65	£6.50	£5.59
Police	£1.00	£1.00	£9.99	£8.60
Local Authority	£0.70	£0.70	£7.02	£6.04
Education	£0.57	£0.57	£5.72	£4.92
CJS	£0.58	£0.58	£5.80	£4.99
Fire	£0.19	£0.19	£1.93	£1.66
<b>Total</b>	<b>£3.71</b>	<b>£3.69</b>	<b>£36.96</b>	<b>£31.82</b>

Sources: VRU information and data; Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) with additional Home Office calculations.

The non-labour/intervention cost to VRUs encompasses the costs of completing the intervention that has been discussed and agreed at the meetings as part of the response to serious violence in the area. VRU data from 2019/20 showed that approximately £23 million of the £35 million VRU funding was spent on interventions, and that approximately 175 interventions were completed within the 18 police force areas which have VRU funding<sup>25</sup>.

The VRU funding only covers 18 of the 44 police force areas, although these account for 65 per cent of the resident population in England and Wales, 80 per cent of the police recorded knife crime and 87 per cent of the hospital admissions. On that basis, it is estimated that between 35 per cent (high estimate) and 13 per cent of (low estimate) intervention costs would not be covered by VRUs. This gives a central estimate of 24 per cent. The £23 million cost was therefore scaled up to account for this and converted to 2022 prices, giving a figure of £32.3 million in year one.

This total £32.3 million cost was split between sectors on the following basis. Police, health, education and local authorities account for 20 per cent and fire/rescue and the Criminal Justice System account for 10 per cent. The latter is to account for the fact that these sectors are likely to be less involved in interventions given that duty holders are being advised to take a preventative approach.

As with the Cardiff model, interventions will have set up and recurring costs. It is assumed that 40 per cent of year 1 intervention cost (£12.9 million) would recur for the entirety of the 10-year appraisal period. These assumptions are tested in Section G.

**Table 10: VRU approach – total non-labour cost (2022 prices, £ millions)**

Organisation	Year 1 cost	Recurring cost	Total cost (10 years)	Total cost (PV)
Health	£6.5	£2.6	£29.7	£26.1
Police	£6.5	£2.6	£29.7	£26.1
Local Authority	£6.5	£2.6	£29.7	£26.1
Education	£6.5	£2.6	£29.7	£26.1
CJS	£3.2	£1.3	£14.9	£13.1
Fire	£3.2	£1.3	£14.9	£13.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>£32.3</b>	<b>£12.9</b>	<b>£148.6</b>	<b>£130.6</b>

Sources: VRU information and data; Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) with additional Home Office calculations.

Combining the labour and non-labour costs gives Table 11.

<sup>25</sup> This is the best estimate of annual VRU intervention spend, although it is potentially an overestimation as a number of VRUs noted that they had to reprofile spend towards intervention activities in 19/20, meaning the cost may be lower in later years. The impact of this is outlined in the risks section G.

**Table 11: VRU approach – total cost over 10 years (2022 prices, £ millions)**

Organisation	Year 1 cost	Recurring cost	Total cost (10 years)	Total cost (PV terms)
Health	£7.1	£3.2	£36.2	£31.7
Police	£7.5	£3.6	£39.7	£34.7
Local Authority	£7.2	£3.3	£36.7	£32.2
Education	£7.0	£3.2	£35.4	£31.0
CJS	£3.8	£1.9	£20.7	£18.1
Fire	£3.4	£1.5	£16.8	£14.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>£36.0</b>	<b>£16.6</b>	<b>£185.5</b>	<b>£162.4</b>

Sources: VRU information and data; Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) with additional Home Office calculations.

### Combining the two approaches to produce high, low and central estimates

The two methodologies have been used to account for the varying possible responses to the duty. Whilst these can proxy the cost of successful interventions, it is not expected that all areas undertake the exact same interventions or use the exact same partnership model. These examples are just used as the best estimates for costs, whatever model is ultimately adopted.

The duty may be met by activity based at a local CSP level, or, in some areas, it may be more appropriate to adopt strategies and run interventions at a larger police force area level. As the VRU bottom-up approach assumes representatives from the duty holder organisations meet on a larger geographic scale (by police force area), this forms the low labour cost estimate. Less time is required for meetings and strategy plans if they are completed on a larger scale. The Cardiff approach operates at a smaller geographic scale and therefore forms the high labour estimate.

As well as labour costs, the two data sources also have non-labour cost information. Largely, this is the cost of providing interventions aimed at reducing serious violence. These costs were larger in the VRU data than in Florence et al (2014)<sup>26</sup> Cardiff approach. So the latter forms the low non-labour cost estimate and the former the high-cost estimate.

The central estimate combines the mid-point from the labour and non-labour costs for the two methods. This is summarised below (all costs in present value terms, £ million):

Method 1: Labour cost **£71.4** Non-labour/Intervention cost: **£102.7**

Method 2: Labour cost **£31.8** Non-labour/Intervention cost **£130.6**

Central: Labour cost **£51.6** Non-labour/Intervention cost **£116.6**

Total central estimate = **£168.2**

The low and high estimate were calculated by combining the two low or two high labour and non-labour estimates. The *low estimate* was £134.5 million (**£102.7m + £31.8m**) and the **high estimate** was £202.0m (**£71.4m + £130.6m**). These can be split out by sector as follows.

<sup>26</sup> <https://www.bmj.com/content/342/bmj.d3313>



**Table 12: Central estimate split out by sector (£ million PV terms)**

Organisation	Low	Central	High
Police	69.4	50.6	31.9
Health	5.9	27.8	49.7
Local authorities	26.5	34.6	42.8
CJS	5.3	17.5	29.7
Fire	2.0	10.4	18.9
Education	25.4	27.2	29.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>134.5</b>	<b>168.2</b>	<b>202.0</b>

Sources: Florence et al. (2014); VRU information and data; Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE) with additional Home Office calculations.

**Central costs are estimated to be £168 million (of which £52 million is labour and £117 million is non-labour) in present value (PV) terms over the 10-year appraisal period. The average cost per year is estimated to be £19.1 million, of which £13.1 million is non-labour cost, and £6.0 million is labour cost.**

### Total set-up costs

Table 13 shows the central estimate by year of spend.

**Table 13: Central total cost estimate over 10 years (2022 prices, £ millions)**

Organisation	Year 1 cost	Transition/Set-up cost	Recurring annual cost	Total cost (10 years)	Ongoing cost (PV)	Total cost (PV)
Police	22.8	19.1	3.7	55.7	31.5	50.6
Health	5.5	2.6	2.9	31.9	25.3	27.8
Local Authority	5.7	1.9	3.8	39.9	32.7	34.6
CJS	2.9	1.0	1.9	20.2	16.5	17.5
Fire	2.1	1.0	1.1	11.9	9.4	10.4
Education	4.9	1.9	2.9	31.3	25.3	27.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>43.8</b>	<b>27.5</b>	<b>16.4</b>	<b>191.0</b>	<b>140.8</b>	<b>168.2</b>

**The central estimate is that there will be £27.5 million of transition/set-up costs in year 1, of which £0.6 million is labour cost and £26.8 million is non-labour cost.** The equivalent figure in the low scenario is £34.3 million, and in the high scenario it is £20.6 million<sup>27</sup>.

### Total ongoing costs

It is estimated that there is approximately £16.4 million of annually recurring cost in the central scenario, of which £5.9 million is labour cost and £10.4 million is non-labour cost. This is equivalent to £140.8 million in present value terms over 10 years. The average total cost per year is £19.1 million.

In the high scenario, there is approximately £21.1 million of annually recurring cost, equivalent to £181 million in present value terms over 10 years. The average cost per year is £23.1m. In the low scenario, there is approximately £11.6 million of annually recurring cost, equivalent to £100.2 million in present value terms over 10 years. The average cost per year is £15.1 million.

It is expected that many of these costs will be met by funding already committed. For example, funding to the police to expand their workforce and tackle serious violence, the diversion of existing budgets and funding for the VRUs. One of their stated aims is the adoption of multi-agency partnership working, so it is expected that in participating fully in and with the VRU, costs to

<sup>27</sup> Low total (10 year) cost scenario has a higher transition/set-up cost than the high or central estimate due to a different profile of spend, with a much higher proportion of overall cost occurring in year 1.

organisations subject to the duty will be met through that participation. Committed funding for VRUs currently covers until 2020/21 and future funding for VRUs will be determined via the Spending Review. If organisations which are subject to the duty incur costs *outside* of participation with the VRU, those costs should be met by the organisation and not through VRU funding.

## **BENEFITS**

There is good evidence to show that successful multi-agency approaches can reduce violence, including the most serious types of street violence that have been rising since 2014 in England and Wales, like knife/gun crime. For example:

- A Home Office review of partnership initiatives concluded that the approach was effective. Six out of nine studies, on which this conclusion was based, were aimed at a serious violence.<sup>28</sup>
- A systematic review of one particular multi-agency approach, known as 'focused deterrence' showed that it has a moderate crime reduction effect.<sup>29</sup>
- Home Office analysis of the multi-agency approach to violence taken in Scotland in the mid-2000s finds that it is likely to partly explain the lower levels of violence in Scotland relative to England and Wales since 2005. See Annex 2 for details.

None of the above studies used cost-benefit analysis (CBA). However, other studies such as the partnership approach to violence reduction, followed in Cardiff, have monetised benefits associated with their interventions. As there are likely to be a wide-range of interventions undertaken as a result of the duty, these are used to proxy the benefits from the proposed option.<sup>30</sup>

In order to calculate the benefits associated with the duty, seven possible interventions, which all could be undertaken as a result of the duty were proposed as potential sources of benefits. To account for the uncertainty in terms of what areas may do, the average benefit cost ratio of these possible interventions was taken and used for the purposes of this IA. Table 14 shows the variety of possible interventions modelled.

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<sup>28</sup> Berry, G., Briggs, P., Erol, R., & Van Staden, L. (2011). The effectiveness of partnership working in a crime and disorder context. A rapid evidence assessment, 1. Accessed on 19/06/19 at:

[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/116549/horr52-report.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116549/horr52-report.pdf)

<sup>29</sup> Braga, A. A., Weisburd, D., & Turchan, B. (2018). Focused deterrence strategies and crime control: An updated systematic review and meta - analysis of the empirical evidence. *Criminology & Public Policy*, 17(1), 205-250.

<sup>30</sup> Not all partnerships are expected to do interventions in this list. Many will likely follow a new and different approach. These benefit cost ratios are just used as an estimation.

**Table 14: Possible interventions as a result of the duty and their associated benefit cost ratio (BCR), n and %.**

Possible intervention	BCR	Success rate %	Adjusted BCR	Benefits accruing to serious violence %	Source
Problem oriented policing or multi-agency solutioneering	82	7.5	6.15	100	Cardiff model and POP systematic review <sup>31</sup>
Hot spot capability	5.6	90.0	5.0	58	Peterborough RCT <sup>32</sup> ; and systematic review: Multiple Justice Lab evaluation studies <sup>33</sup>
Skills, mentoring or employment training	5.4	50.0	2.7	23.5	Cary et al (2013): Economic Evaluation of Multisystemic Therapy <sup>34</sup> .
Therapeutic interventions (Multi-systemic or cognitive behavioural therapy, drug treatment)	8.5	31.5	2.67	23.5	Knapp (2011) – Impact of parenting programmes <sup>35</sup>
Early interventions	8	44.0	3.5	23.5	US RCT evidence <sup>36</sup>
Teachable moments	n/a	n/a	2.9	100	McMillen et al (2019) <sup>37</sup>
Safe Passage	n/a	n/a	1.4	100	
<b>Average</b>			<b>3.48</b>	<b>61</b>	

Using the meta-analysis completed in Table 14, the average benefit cost ratio to be applied to the duty spend was calculated to be approximately 3.48. This is based off the assumption that any area was equally likely to choose any of these interventions to deal with their serious violence problem, and therefore on average, the total BCR of the duty would be the average of all the interventions above. This assumption is tested in section G.

It was also assumed that benefits began to be accrued the year after spending occurred, and that the benefit profile was 40 per cent 1 year after the spend, 40 per cent two years after the spend, and 20 per cent three years after the spend to account for the persistence of benefits. This was assumed because most of the activities above are preventative, and almost all the studies above found evidence of persistent benefits up to about three years after the intervention. The one year lag is a central estimate, used because some interventions (hot-spot capability and safe passage for example) are likely to incur benefits as soon as they begin, however others (early interventions) involve much younger individuals and so will not lead to benefits until many years after the intervention, when young individuals reach the age where they are more likely to offend. To be conservative, the benefit cost ratio is only applied to ongoing spend as opposed to transition/set-up. The low and high benefit estimates are calculated using the same benefit cost ratio but applied to the low/high total spends.

The benefit calculations are summarised in Table 15.

<sup>31</sup> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5779858/#!po=25.0000> and <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/cl2.1089>

<sup>32</sup> <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-016-9260-4> and <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-019-09372-3>

<sup>33</sup> Including Justice Data Lab analysis: Reoffending behaviour after support from HMPPS CFO, (2019)

Justice Data Lab Re-Offending Analysis: Working Chance (2016)

Justice Data Lab analysis: reoffending behaviour after receiving treatment from Key4Life. (2018),

Justice Data Lab analysis: Reoffending behaviour after support from ICO (2019).

Justice Data Lab analysis: Reoffending behaviour after support from P3 Link Worker (2020)

<sup>34</sup> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3632567/>

<sup>35</sup> [https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/39300/1/Mental\\_health\\_promotion\\_and\\_mental\\_illness\\_prevention%28author%29.pdf](https://eprints.lse.ac.uk/39300/1/Mental_health_promotion_and_mental_illness_prevention%28author%29.pdf)

<sup>36</sup> <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0735675705002603> and

<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3560393/>

<sup>37</sup> [https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eejuecon/v\\_3a110\\_3ay\\_3a2019\\_3ai\\_3ac\\_3ap\\_3a1-25.htm](https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eejuecon/v_3a110_3ay_3a2019_3ai_3ac_3ap_3a1-25.htm)

**Table 15: Estimated costs and benefits for Option 1, England and Wales (£ million, 2022 prices)**

Year	22/23	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	31/32	TOTAL
Year of Programme	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
<b>Low estimate</b>											
Costs	46.0	11.6	11.6	11.6	11.6	11.6	11.6	11.6	11.6	11.6	<b>150.7</b>
Benefits	0	16.2	32.4	40.6	40.6	40.6	40.6	40.6	40.6	40.6	<b>332.6</b>
<b>Benefits (PV)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>15.7</b>	<b>30.3</b>	<b>36.6</b>	<b>35.3</b>	<b>34.2</b>	<b>33.0</b>	<b>31.9</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>277.5</b>
<b>Central estimate</b>											
Costs	43.8	16.4	16.4	16.4	16.4	16.4	16.4	16.4	16.4	16.4	<b>191.0</b>
Benefits	0	22.8	45.6	57.0	57.0	57.0	57.0	57.0	57.0	57.0	<b>467.3</b>
<b>Benefits (PV)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>22.0</b>	<b>42.6</b>	<b>51.4</b>	<b>49.7</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>46.4</b>	<b>44.8</b>	<b>43.3</b>	<b>41.8</b>	<b>389.9</b>
<b>High estimate</b>											
Costs	41.7	21.1	21.1	21.1	21.1	21.1	21.1	21.1	21.1	21.1	<b>231.3</b>
Benefits	0	29.4	58.7	73.4	73.4	73.4	73.4	73.4	73.4	73.4	<b>602.0</b>
<b>Benefits (PV)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>28.4</b>	<b>54.8</b>	<b>66.2</b>	<b>64.0</b>	<b>61.8</b>	<b>59.7</b>	<b>57.7</b>	<b>55.8</b>	<b>53.9</b>	<b>502.3</b>

Source: Home Office, own calculations.

**The central benefits are estimated to be £47 million on average annually. This is £390 million (PV) over 10 years.** In the low scenario benefits are expected to be £33 million on average annually and £277 million over 10 years (PV). In the high scenario benefits are expected to be £60 million on average annually and £502 million over 10 years (PV). These benefits are not financial cost savings for the Home Office or another government department, instead they relate mostly to physical and psychological well-being benefits from reduced crime. All benefits are classed as public ongoing benefits

Based on the analysis in Table 14, the majority of benefits (61%) are expected to fall directly to serious violence prevention. This was calculated by first assessing each study to see what proportion of benefits accrued to serious violence offences<sup>38</sup>. When this data wasn't available, a proxy study was used<sup>39</sup>. As it was assumed that any area was equally likely to choose any of the seven interventions to deal with their serious violence problem, the average proportion of benefits accruing to serious violence across the seven interventions was used. The remainder are expected to fall outside of violence either as wider crime reduction benefits, given that most offenders are non-specific in their offending and commit a wide range of different offences<sup>40</sup>, or as wider monetisable benefits (for example from employment). If it is assumed that benefits are attributed out to serious violence reductions in line with the current total cost of serious violence<sup>41</sup>, the annual reduction in crime as a result of the duty can be estimated.

<sup>38</sup> Homicide, knife and gun crime, robbery and violence with injury

<sup>39</sup> Skills, mentoring or employment training and early interventions assumed to have same proportion of benefits accruing to serious violence as therapeutic interventions.

<sup>40</sup> Brame, R., Mulvey, E. P., Piquero, A. R., & Schubert, C. A. (2014). Assessing the nature and mix of offences among serious adolescent offenders. *Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health*, 24(4), 254-264.

<sup>41</sup> Serious violence defined as homicide, violence with injury and robbery and the most recent publication (year to June 2020) used. 725 homicides, 510,000 violence with injury offences, and 80,000 robberies recorded. After accounting for published multipliers (HO Cost of Crime publication), and adjusting for inflation, the total cost of these are estimated at £2.7bn (9%), £21.8bn (75%), and £4.5bn (16%) respectively. These proportions have been used to attribute the total serious violence benefits into crime reductions.

Crime figures : <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/police-recorded-crime-open-data-tables>

Cost of crime publication :

[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/732110/the-economic-and-social-costs-of-crime-horr99.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/732110/the-economic-and-social-costs-of-crime-horr99.pdf)

**Table 16: Estimated serious violence benefits and number of crimes reduced of Option 1, central estimate, £ million, 2022 prices and number (n).**

Year	22/23	23/24	24/25	25/26	26/27	27/28	28/29	29/30	30/31	31/32	TOTAL
Year of Programme	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
<b>Benefit estimate, £m</b>											
Central	0	22.8	45.6	57.0	57.0	57.0	57.0	57.0	57.0	57.0	<b>467.3</b>
Central (SV)	0	14.0	27.9	34.9	34.9	34.9	34.9	34.9	34.9	34.9	<b>286.1</b>
<b>Central (SV, PV)</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>26.1</b>	<b>31.5</b>	<b>30.4</b>	<b>29.4</b>	<b>28.4</b>	<b>27.4</b>	<b>26.5</b>	<b>25.6</b>	<b>238.7</b>
<b>Benefits, £m, PV</b>											
Homicide reduction	0	1.3	2.6	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	<b>22.3</b>
Violence with injury	0	10.5	21.0	26.2	26.2	26.2	26.2	26.2	26.2	26.2	<b>179.3</b>
Robbery	0	2.2	4.3	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4	<b>37.1</b>
<b>Offence reduction, n</b>											
Homicide	0	0.3	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.9	<b>7</b>
Violence with injury	0	642	1,284	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,605	<b>13,159</b>
Robbery	0	165	330	412	412	412	412	412	412	412	<b>3,378</b>

Source: Home Office, own estimates, 2020.

**Table 16 indicates the central serious violence benefits are estimated to be £29 million on average annually, and £239 million (PV) over 10 years.** This can be broken out by crime type. It is expected the duty will lead to a reduction of about seven homicides over 10 years (about 1 per year) equivalent to £22 million in PV terms over 10 years (£27m total undiscounted benefit used for offences calculation). There will also be a total reduction of 13,200 violence with injury offences (about 1,300 a year), equivalent to £179 million PV over 10 years (£215m total undiscounted benefit). It is also estimated that there will be a 3,400 reduction in robberies (340 a year), equivalent to £37 million PV over 10 years, £44 million total undiscounted benefit<sup>42</sup>.

### Non-monetised costs and benefits

Evidence generally suggests that partnership working can reduce fear of crime as well as actual numbers of offences.<sup>43</sup> This benefit has not been monetised.

### NPSV, BNPV, EANDCB

The total cost of Option 1 in present value terms is equivalent to around £135 to £202 million (central estimate £168 million) with associated benefits of £277 to £502 million (central estimate £390 million) over 10 years.

The Net Present Social Value (NPSV) of a policy is the present value of benefits minus the present value of costs and so the overall current monetary value of a policy option. In this case the low NPSV value has been calculated by comparing the low-cost estimate to the associated low benefit estimate, the high NPSV value has been calculated by comparing the high cost estimate to the high benefit estimate and the central NPSV value has been calculated by comparing the two central estimates. The undiscounted benefit cost ratio of the policy has been held constant in each of these three scenarios.

The NPSV of Option 1 is therefore estimated to be £143 to £300 million (central estimate £222 million). The benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of the policy is estimated to be 2.1 to 2.5 (central estimate 2.3<sup>44</sup>).

The total monetised costs to business of Option 1 are estimated to be £13.1 million (PV over 10 years), see section H. No benefits to business have been monetised so the estimated Business

<sup>42</sup> Undiscounted benefits used to calculate crime reduction, using Home Office cost of crime publication updated to 22/23 prices. Homicide costs £3.7m, a violence with injury offence costs £16,300 and a robbery offence costs £13,200. Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-economic-and-social-costs-of-crime>

<sup>43</sup> Berry, G., Briggs, P., Erol, R., & Van Staden, L. (2011). The effectiveness of partnership working in a crime and disorder context. A rapid evidence assessment, 1. Accessed on 19/06/19 at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/116549/horr52-report.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116549/horr52-report.pdf)

<sup>44</sup> Benefit cost ratio is calculated by dividing the total discounted benefits by the total discounted costs. In the central scenario this is £390/168 = 2.3.

NPV is -£13.1 million over 10 years. The Equivalent Annual Net Direct Cost to Business (EANDCB) – the cost per year to business - is estimated to be £1.5 million (PV).

### Impact on small and micro-businesses

The impact on small and micro-businesses is full assessed in the SaMBA in section I.

## F. Proportionality.

The analysis in this IA contains best estimates for the cost and benefits of the proposed policy. Every effort has been made to ensure the analysis presents the best possible estimate of the likely impact of the preferred option, given the time, resource and data available. These have been quantified where data is available, and the main assumptions have been tested in the sensitivity analysis section (G). Therefore, this is a proportionate effort to appraise the proposed policy change.

## G. Risks.

### Economic impacts of policy risks

There is a risk that not all partners are motivated to adopt a multi-agency approach. The consultation showed that certain sectors were less supportive of the preferred option than other sectors. If not all sectors engage, this could result in the benefits being lower than estimated and hence a lower NPV and BCR. Equally, if all partners engage the benefits could be greater, and the success rate of each intervention undertaken as a result of the duty could be higher.

Analysis has been undertaken to account for different levels of engagement occurring, and differing success rates. The central benefit assumption is that there will be 3.48 BCR when comparing undiscounted total ongoing cost to total benefits. Table 17 shows the benefits of the policy with differing BCRs, and the impact this has on overall NPV. There would have to be a significant fall in the BCR in order for the policy to no longer have a positive NPV.

**Table 17: Total benefit and NPV of duty with a differing BCR (PV, £ million)**

Benefit-cost ratio (BCR)	1.5	2	3	3.48	4	6	8	9
Total discounted benefit	168	224	336	<b>390</b>	448	671	895	1,007
Total NPV of policy	0	56	167	<b>222</b>	279	503	727	839

Source: Home Office, own calculations. Bold value is central estimate. Central total cost (£168m) used.

Guidance and support will be provided to mitigate the risk of a lower BCR caused by disengagement or an increased intervention failure rate. In the central scenario estimated benefits are currently over 2.3 times as large as the costs<sup>45</sup>. Sensitivity analysis shows that benefits would have to reduce by almost 57 per cent for the costs to outweigh them.<sup>46</sup>

There is also a risk that rather than obtaining additional resources to fulfil the serious violence duty, organisations will reduce activity in other areas and outcomes in those areas will decline, or that having a specific duty for serious violence will reduce the prioritisation of other crime types. This would result in costs to the policy that have not been captured here, driven by worse outcomes in

<sup>45</sup> Does not match 3.48 figure due to lag in benefits accumulation. Benefits achieved for the 3 years following spend. As the appraisal period is 10 years, benefits as a result of year 8-10 spend which would have been achieved in years 11-13 are not included. This is therefore a conservative estimation of benefits, as if they are achieved faster, the 10-year present value would be higher.

<sup>46</sup> The sensitivity analysis involved calculating the amount that the central benefits would have to reduce by to equal the central costs, which are estimated to be £168 million PV over 10 years. The central benefits are estimated to be £390 million.  $(£390m - £168m) / 390m = 57\%$ . So the benefits would have to decrease by more than 57% to produce a negative NPV.

the activities reduced. However, as shown above costs would have to rise markedly for the costs to outweigh the benefits.

New legislation around data sharing, particularly the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) may have compounded the perception that organisations are prevented from sharing data and information (or make that more costly to achieve). The Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) have confirmed with similar information sharing, that the GDPR and the Data Protection Act 2018 do not prevent data sharing for law enforcement purposes and provides mechanisms to achieve this (this can include broader safeguarding schemes to stop vulnerable people falling into crime), but it does require organisations to use those mechanisms appropriately. If they do not, this would likely reduce the estimated benefits. The ICO are currently working on an updated data sharing code of practice which should provide greater clarity to the organisations involved.

Some of the other assumptions in this analysis have been tested as part of sensitivity analysis. The high non-labour costs were estimated using the 2019/20 actual VRU spend and the assumption that non-VRU areas represented 24 per cent of the country and that costs recurred at 40 per cent annually. This assumption has been tested assuming recurring costs are between 10 to 100 per cent of first year costs, and that non-VRU areas represent 13 per cent (based upon hospital admission data) or 35 per cent (based upon population data) of the country. The lower estimate also accounts for the potential overestimation of 19/20 intervention spend, caused by VRUs having to reprofile their spending over the year to place greater emphasis on intervention spending as they had been unable to deliver some of their intended strategic activities. 20/21 intervention spend is more recent, so could be an alternative proxy in this analysis, however this represents year 2 spend as opposed to year 1 spend, and it has been impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic. The 2019/20 spend is therefore seen as the most accurate proxy for year 1 duty intervention spend, however the sensitivity analysis in table 18 accounts for it being potentially higher or lower.

**Table 18: Non-labour costs of the policy assuming varying number of interventions and recurring cost per year. Total cost, PV terms over 10 years (2022 prices). VRU method.**

Assumed recurring cost per year (%)	Number of interventions		
	201 (13%)	230 (24%)	269 (35%)
10	50	57	66
20	71	81	95
30	93	106	124
40	114	131	153
50	136	155	181
60	157	180	210
70	178	204	239
80	200	229	268
90	221	253	296
100	243	278	325

Source: Home Office, own estimates, 2020.

Combining this with the high labour cost estimate gives the following.

**Table 19: High cost estimate of the policy assuming varying number of interventions and recurring cost per year. Total cost, £ million, PV terms over 10 years (2022 prices)**

Assumed recurring cost per year (%)	Number of interventions		
	201 (13%)	230 (24%)	269 (35%)
10	121	128	138
20	143	153	167
30	164	177	195
40	185	<b>202</b>	224
50	207	227	253
60	228	251	282
70	250	276	310
80	271	300	339
90	293	325	368
100	314	349	396

Source: Home Office, own calculations. Bold value used in high cost estimate, 2020.

The highest cost estimate for the policy under this sensitivity scenario is £396 million. This is the only scenario in Table 19 where costs exceed the central scenario (£390 million), demonstrating that this policy is very likely to still lead to a positive NPV. If using the high benefit estimate (£502 million) every scenario leads to a positive NPV.

**Table 20: NPSV estimate assuming central benefits and varying number of interventions and recurring cost per year. £ million, PV terms over 10 years (2022 prices)**

Assumed recurring cost per year (%)	Number of interventions		
	201 (13%)	230 (24%)	269 (35%)
10	269	262	252
20	247	237	223
30	226	212	195
40	204	<b>188</b>	166
50	183	163	137
60	161	139	108
70	140	114	80
80	119	90	51
90	97	65	22
100	76	40	-7

Source: Home Office, own calculations.. Assumes benefits of £390 million (central scenario)

In the low labour estimate, an assumption was made regarding the additional labour time above regular meetings which would be needed to encompass the time to think and enact strategies, prepare for meetings and familiarise themselves with the duty. There was no data available which outlined exactly how long this time was likely to take, and so a central estimate of four times as long as the meetings was used<sup>47</sup>. This assumption was tested.

**Table 21: Low cost estimate of the policy assuming different additional labour time above regular meetings. (2022 prices)**

Time required (as multiple of meeting time)	Labour cost estimate (2022 prices)	Labour cost estimate (PV)	Total low-cost estimate (PV)
2	18.5	15.9	118.6
4	<b>37.0</b>	<b>31.8</b>	<b>134.5</b>
6	55.4	47.7	150.4
8	73.9	63.6	166.3
10	92.4	79.5	182.2

Source: Home Office, own calculations. All numbers in £ million. Bold value used in low cost estimates.

<sup>47</sup> Note: This time is inclusive of the meetings. 4 times as long means the cost of a meeting was multiplied by 4 to reach the total labour time required.



The low-cost estimate is impacted by the time assumption used, however this change does not make a large change to the total low-cost estimate. It still falls within the range presented in this analysis and remains substantially lower than the low benefit estimate (£277 million in PV terms).

A final assumption that should be tested in this sensitivity analysis is that 71 per cent (223) of partnerships are assumed to be not as effective as they should be. They are therefore assumed to be affected by the duty and hence incur costs (and be in scope for benefits). As some areas may have improved (or worsened) since 2016, there may be a different level of partnerships in-scope of the duty.

Table 22 shows different percentages of in-scope partnerships, and the relevant cost, benefits and NPV.

**Table 22: Estimated cost, benefits and NPSV if differing percentages of partnerships are in scope of the duty (PV terms, £ million, %)**

Successful Partnerships (%)	Total cost	Total benefit	NPSV
40	123.3	286.9	163.6
50	137.8	320.1	182.3
60	152.3	353.3	201.0
71	<b>168.2</b>	<b>389.9</b>	<b>221.6</b>
80	181.3	419.8	238.5
90	195.8	453.0	257.2
100	210.3	486.2	275.9

Source: Home Office, own calculations. Bold value in line with central cost and benefit estimates. All estimates based on central costs and central benefits.

### Analytical risks

The evidence base for partnership working has few high-quality evaluations. Although a meta-analysis of multiple different published evaluations has been used to mitigate this issue, some uncertainty remains. Given that randomised control trials generally show smaller effects than quasi-experimental designs, and this impact assessment relies heavily on the latter, it is possible that the benefits could be over-stated.

There is also a risk that certain partnerships could pursue an investigative rather than preventative approach to serious violence. This would lead to more offenders entering the CJS. This would increase downstream costs, irrespective of the effect on crime.

There is another risk that having six organisations could increase costs without getting additional benefits. It is possible that it could be harder to organise meetings and co-ordinate a strategy with more organisations than Cardiff used. This has not been explicitly tested, but the possible increase in costs or reduction in benefits is modelled as part of this sensitivity analysis.

The costs in this analysis have been based off the best available proxies. These are the Florence et al. (2014) paper which monetises the costs of a primarily health-based intervention in Cardiff and VRU application data. The total cost of the duty can be accurately calculated from this proxy, however the costs to each duty holder may be interchangeable in reality. For example, if the chosen interventions as a result of the duty were more police or local authority based, these sectors may accrue a higher proportion of the total cost. This uncertainty has not been mitigated against in this analysis, as the purpose of this duty is for a multi-agency approach in which different duty holders in different areas come together to decide on interventions which are most relevant to them. The make-up of these interventions is very difficult to predict, and excessive attempts to estimate them, or legislate on specific interventions, may undermine the ability for CSPs to choose the intervention that works best for them. This analysis has also not attempted to calculate how or by whom the interventions have been financed.

## H. Direct costs and benefits to business calculations

As described in section E, some of the costs for the proposed option fall upon businesses. These are summarised in Table 23.

**Table 23: Estimated central costs to business of preferred option (2022 prices, £ million)**

Business	Year 1	Annually recurring	Total cost (10 years)	Total cost (PV)
Private children's care homes	2.2	1.2	12.9	11.3
Privately funded schools	0.3	0.2	2.1	1.8
<b>Total costs</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>13.1</b>

Source: Home Office, own calculations.

Of the £168 million central total cost of the duty (PV prices), it is estimated that £27.2 million falls on the education sector and £27.8 million falls on the health and social care sector. Some of these costs will fall to businesses or privately run institutions.

Some of the education costs are likely to fall on private schools and privately-run alternative provision providers. Higher and further education establishments are not bound by the duty, although may take part in interventions on a voluntary basis. Statistics from the Department of Education show that in England in January 2018 there were 580,995 children attending independent schools (those that don't receive funding from DfE)<sup>48</sup>. This represents 6.6 per cent of all school children (8,819,765)<sup>49</sup>. To estimate the cost to business, this percentage is used to estimate the split of costs between the public and private sector<sup>50</sup>. This implies a total of approximately £1.8 million over 10 years (PV terms), and an average cost per year of approximately £210,000.

Section E assumes that the health care costs are split equally between the health sector (CCGs) and children's care homes. As 81 per cent of children's care homes are privately run, 81 per cent of the latter cost is assumed to fall on business<sup>51</sup>. For simplicity, it is assumed the cost of children's homes all falls within the health and social care duty holder, however some of this cost may be accrued or financed by local authorities (who have a duty to children in care) or criminal justice organisations (such as secure care homes). Under these assumptions, the total cost to private care homes is estimated to be £11.3 million (PV over 10 years) and the average cost per year is approximately £1.3 million.

**The total cost to business is estimated at £13.1 million (PV) over the 10-year appraisal period. The average cost to business per year (and EANDCB) is estimated at £1.5 million (2022 prices).**

No benefits to business have been monetised. This is because benefits arising from reduced offences fall to public sector organisations like police and the health sector as well as to the physical and mental health/wellbeing of victims. However, it is possible that there are non-monetised benefits to business, for example through a reduction in fear of crime leading to improved business conditions in previous hot-spot areas.

<sup>48</sup> National tables of Schools, Pupils and their Characteristics, Table 1a: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/schools-pupils-and-their-characteristics-january-2019>

<sup>49</sup> National tables of Schools, Pupils and their Characteristics, Table 1a: <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/schools-pupils-and-their-characteristics-january-2019>

<sup>50</sup> To be conservative, and because there is no better available data, this assumes children in privately and publicly funded schools are equally likely to contribute to serious violence.

<sup>51</sup> Ofsted: developments in children's social care, see: <https://socialcareinspection.blog.gov.uk/2018/08/22/the-changing-picture-in-the-childrens-homes-sector/>

## I. Wider impacts

A New Burdens Assessment is currently being completed.

### **Small and Micro-Sized Business Assessment (SaMBA)**

Several different types of business will be subject to the new duty. These include private schools, private alternative provision providers and private children's care homes. Some of these will be small and micro sized businesses, for example, many of the alternative provision providers.

Small and micro-businesses (SMBs) have not been exempted from this legislation. It is vital that these small and micro-organisations are included within the scope of the proposed duty to ensure that individuals vulnerable to involvement with serious violence are identified and supported, regardless of the size of the educational (or other) establishment they are associated with. Additionally, the small and micro-business's expertise at 'ground-level' would be highly beneficial as there are strong links between alternative provision establishments, children's care homes and involvement in serious violence offences, so it would not make sense to exclude these organisations from data and information sharing networks even though some will be small and micro businesses.

Section H monetises the direct costs to business, which arise from the actions required to fulfil the duty: familiarisation with new legislation, taking part in meetings and strategy formulation etc. However, section H does not split out small and micro businesses. The total business cost was estimated at £13.1 million (PV), which, as a percentage of the total estimated cost of the duty is around 8 per cent.

It is difficult to quantify how much of that cost to business would fall onto the 'small and micro' category as there is little data available<sup>52</sup>. Attempts were made to obtain data from the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Social Care. Each department advised that it remains difficult currently to split the relevant businesses by employee size-band.

Breaking down the estimated total cost to business reveals that the majority of these costs fall on private children's care homes as they bear around 86 per cent of the direct cost to business (£11.3m PV). Private schools make up the remaining 14 per cent and 4 per cent respectively. The reason that private school costs to business are much lower is because they will play a lesser, 'co-operative' role in the duty, and these sectors are predominantly publicly run.

According to an Ofsted report<sup>53</sup> just under half of private children's care homes are run by 'large' providers, which would mean the estimated cost on SMB care homes would be approximately £5.6 million (PV over 10 years) and £0.6 million annually. However, caution should be taken as the Ofsted definition of 'large' is different to the SaMBA guidance. In the report 'large' providers are defined by those who own ten or more homes whereas the SaMBA guidance suggests any businesses that have more than 49 FTE's is by definition medium or large. Even so, this is probably an upper bound estimate. In reality, representatives from SMB care homes may not necessarily be required to attend meetings as this role may be taken up by local government administrators on behalf of the care homes.

Overall, this evidence suggests that the burden on small and micro-businesses is relatively low. There is not expected to be any additional burdens imposed on small and micro-businesses that wouldn't fall on larger businesses. However, it is recognised that the same level of cost might be a greater burden for SMBs due to their size. To mitigate this, SMBs in the education sector have a lesser role and are therefore likely to face lower costs. The main cost on SMBs will be to children's care homes, which has been estimated as £0.6 million annually (excluding the 'larger' providers according to the Ofsted report). It should be acknowledged that proxies have been used in this section, due to a lack of precise data.

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<sup>52</sup> This includes the latest business population data (BEIS) and Annual Survey Hours and Earnings.

<sup>53</sup>[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/761606/29523\\_Ofsted\\_Annual\\_Report\\_2017-18\\_041218.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/761606/29523_Ofsted_Annual_Report_2017-18_041218.pdf) Table 9

## Statutory Equalities Duties

Some of the interventions as a result of this policy may disproportionately indirectly impact the Black, Male and young population, as we know these groups are more likely to be suspects of serious violence. According to the most recent Ministry of Justice publication (year to March 2020)<sup>54</sup> 70 per cent of offenders convicted and cautioned for knife and offensive weapon possession offences were White, 18 per cent were Black and 7 per cent were Asian. However when looking at rates, it is clear that Black people were disproportionately convicted or cautioned, with the rate being 186 per 100,000 for Black individuals, 34 for Asian individuals, and 28 for White individuals<sup>55</sup>. Using the same publication, 93 per cent of those convicted and cautioned for knife and offensive weapon possession offences were male. This means that any intervention that aims to reduce serious violence by targeting those who are more likely to offenders, may disproportionately target this group.

However, the aim of the legislation is as much about preventing people with these protected characteristics from becoming victims as it is about them becoming offenders. Data indicates that Black and male individuals are more likely to be victims of serious violence<sup>56</sup> and there is also often a disproportionate impact of certain knife crime offences on young people. Therefore, benefits could disproportionality fall to those with certain characteristics. The aim of the is policy is the reduction of violence amongst those most likely to be involved. If the benefits of the policy were to outweigh the costs, as currently estimated, this policy would have positive, not adverse, treatment and be objectively justified.

## Family test

A family test has been completed for this legislation. The duty has no direct impact on families but will hopefully have an indirect impact through the reduction in serious violence. There is good evidence that serious violence can have large detrimental effects on the minority of families affected.

Of homicides in 2018/19, 14 per cent involved intimate partners and a further 8 per cent involve other family members (ONS, 2020<sup>57</sup>). While similar data is not available for other types of serious violence – like knife crime and gun crime – as these have similar drivers to homicide, it is likely that the proportions would be similar. Furthermore, even serious violence cases that are not between family members are likely to have large impacts on the families involved, both for victims and perpetrators. One study of the impacts on homicide victims' families found that 80 per cent had trauma-like symptoms (Casey, 2011). This can have very large long-term impacts on children. The same study found that 35 per cent of the families affected by homicide had dependent children.

In response to the questions in the family test.

- 1. What kinds of impact might the policy have on family formation?**  
Not applicable.
- 2. What kind of impact will the policy have on families going through key transitions such as becoming parents, getting married, fostering or adopting, bereavement, redundancy, new caring responsibilities or the onset of a long-term health condition?**  
Not applicable.

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<sup>54</sup> Pivot table analytical tool for previous knife and offensive weapon offences. Based off all offenders convicted and cautioned for possession offences. All offenders used. 19,307 offenders, 13,580 are White, 3,468 are Black and 1,291 are Asian. Rest are other or unknown. Available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/knife-and-offensive-weapon-sentencing-statistics-year-ending-march-2020>

<sup>55</sup> Uses NOMIS 2011 Census data available at [https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/DC2101EW/view/2092957703?rows=c\\_sex&cols=c\\_ethpuk11](https://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/DC2101EW/view/2092957703?rows=c_sex&cols=c_ethpuk11) .

<sup>56</sup> See: Home Office: Trends and drivers of homicide: Main findings. Research Report 113 (March 2020). Page 7. [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/870188/trends-and-drivers-of-homicide-main-findings-horr113.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/870188/trends-and-drivers-of-homicide-main-findings-horr113.pdf) and NHS admissions data for assault by sharp object <https://digital.nhs.uk/data-and-information/find-data-and-publications/supplementary-information/2019-supplementary-information-files/hospital-admissions-for-assault-by-sharp-object>

<sup>57</sup> Office for National Statistics (2020). Homicide in England and Wales: year ending March 2019.

**3. What impacts will the policy have on all family members' ability to play a full role in family life, including with respect to parenting and other caring responsibilities?**

To the extent that the duty contributes to lower serious violence rates in the future, the policy should improve the quality of family life for that minority of families that become involved in a homicide. This could be achieved through the prevention of an offender having to serve a prison sentence, which can create a huge disruption to family life. It could also be achieved via the additional life years or quality of life accruing to victims, allowing them to play an active family role.

**4. How does the policy impact families before, during and after couple separation?**

There is a large body of evidence to suggest that separation can be a trigger for domestic violence and in extreme cases domestic homicide (Ellis and Stuckless, 2006<sup>58</sup>). So to the extent that the policy reduces serious violence rates, it should improve family life in this context.

**5. How does the policy impact those families most at risk of deterioration of relationship quality and breakdown?**

Evidence shows a statistical correlation between violence and quality of marital or family relationships (Schwartz, 2006<sup>59</sup>; Cavanagh, & Cauffman, 2017<sup>60</sup>). There is also good evidence that homicide and serious violence occurring within a family can put further strain on existing relationships, leading to family breakdown (Costa et. al, 2017<sup>61</sup>). So to the extent that this policy can reduce serious violence rates it should improve family and marital and family relationship quality within that minority of families that are impacted.

## **J. Trade Impact.**

This policy will not have any impact upon trade.

## **K. Monitoring and evaluation (PIR if necessary), enforcement principles.**

Implementation will occur from 1<sup>st</sup> April 2022 when the legislation has been passed in Parliament and receives Royal Assent.

Monitoring and evaluation of the policy is subject to future funding settlement.

## **L. Annexes.**

Annex 1: New Duty – Proposed duty holders

Annex 2: Further evidence on the effectiveness of the partnership approach in Scotland.

Annex 3: Table of duty holders wage costs by profession

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<sup>58</sup> Ellis, D., & Stuckless, N. (2006). Separation, domestic violence, and divorce mediation. *Conflict Resolution Quarterly*, 23(4), 461-485.

<sup>59</sup> Schwartz, J. (2006). Family structure as a source of female and male homicide in the United States. *Homicide Studies*, 10(4), 253-278.

<sup>60</sup> Cavanagh, C., & Cauffman, E. (2017). The longitudinal association of relationship quality and reoffending among first-time juvenile offenders and their mothers. *Journal of youth and adolescence*, 46(7), 1533-1546

<sup>61</sup> Costa, D. H. D., Njaine, K., & Schenker, M. (2017). Repercussions of homicide on victims' families: a literature review. *Ciência & Saúde Coletiva*, 22, 3087-3097.

## Annex 1: New Duty - Proposed Duty Holders

### Law Enforcement

1. A chief officer of police for a police area in England and Wales

### Health

2. The National Health Service Commissioning Board, established by section 1H of the National Health Service Act 2006 ('NHS England')
3. Clinical Commission Groups, established by section 11 of the National Health Service Act 2006
4. Monitor, re-named and continued by section 61 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012
5. the NHS Trust Development Authority, a Special Health Authority established under section 28 of the National Health Service Act 2006
6. [A Local Health Board established under section 11 of the National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006]
7. [A Community Health Council in Wales]
8. [The Board of Community Health Councils in Wales or Bwrdd Cynghorau Iechyd Cymuned Cymru]

### Local Government

9. A county council or district council in England
10. The Greater London Authority
11. A London borough council
12. The Common Council of the City of London in its capacity as a local authority
13. The Council of the Isles of Scilly
14. A county council or borough council in Wales
15. [A person carrying out a function of an authority mentioned in section 1(2) of the Local Government Act 1999 by virtue of a direction made under section 15 of that Act.]

### Criminal Justice

16. The governor of a prison in England and Wales (or, in the case of a contracted-out prison, its director).
17. The governor of a young offender institution or secure training centre (or, in the case of a contracted out young offender institution or secure training centre, its director).
18. The governor, director or monitor of a secure training centre
19. The principal of a secure college.
20. The manager of a secure children's home
21. A provider of probation services within the meaning given by section 3(6) of the Offender Management Act 2007.
22. Youth Offending Teams established under section 39 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998

### Education, child care

23. The proprietor of:
  - (a) a school that has been approved under section 342 of the Education Act 1996,
  - (b) a maintained school within the meaning given by section 20(7) of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998,
  - (c) an independent school registered under section 158 of the Education Act 2002,
  - (d) an independent educational institution registered under section 95(1) of the Education and Skills Act 2008, or
  - (e) an alternative provision Academy within the meaning given by section 1C of the Academies Act 2010.

24. A person with whom arrangements have been made for the provision of education under section 19 of the Education Act 1996 or section 100 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006 (cases of illness, exclusion etc).
25. A provider of education or training to which Chapter 3 of Part 8 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006 applies
26. The Governing body of an educational establishment maintained by a local authority in Wales.
27. The governing body or proprietor of an institution (not otherwise listed) at which more than 250 students, excluding students undertaking distance learning courses, are undertaking –
  - a) Courses in preparation for examinations related to qualifications regulated by the Office of Qualifications regulated by the Office of Qualifications and Examinations, or to qualifications awarded by bodies in respect of the award of which they are recognised by Qualifications Wales under Part 3 of the Qualifications Wales Act 2015;
  - b) Courses of a description mentioned in Schedule 6 to the Education Reform Act 1988 (high education courses)

## **Fire**

28. A fire and rescue authority constituted by a scheme under section 2 of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 or a scheme to which section 4 of that Act applies
29. A fire and rescue authority created by an order under section 4A of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004
30. A metropolitan county fire and rescue authority
31. The London Fire Commissioner
32. A combined authority established under section 103 of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 which is a fire and rescue authority for the purposes of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004, in the exercise of its functions as a fire and rescue authority.

## Annex 2: Scotland's approach to violence reduction – details, evidence and comparisons with England and Wales

Scotland introduced a multi-agency violence reduction programme in Strathclyde in 2005 and extended it nationally in 2006. The unit's broad-based approach involved three strands – criminal justice enforcement measures, short and long-term preventative work, and efforts to change attitudes to violence in Scottish society. This paper examines the effectiveness of the Scottish approach in light of increases in serious violence in England and Wales since 2014.

Violent crime trends in Scotland fell after the introduction of the programme:

- Homicide rates, police recorded serious assault numbers, robberies, and knife possession offences all fell by around a half between 2006/07 to 2014/15.
- Common assaults declined by 26% from 2006/07 to 2014/15.
- The Scottish Crime Survey recorded a 46% fall in violent crime against adults from 2008/09 to 2017/18.
- Hospital admissions for assault with a sharp object fell by 28% from 2007/08 to 2017/18.

This cannot automatically be taken as a sign of effectiveness for the programme for three reasons. Firstly, many other nations, including England and Wales, that did not implement a violence reduction programme at the same time, also experienced marked drops in violence in the decade up to 2014. Secondly, there has been relatively little robust evaluation of the Scottish approach. Thirdly, like England and Wales, there is evidence that the downward trend has ended for some (but not all) of the violent offence-types in Scotland:

- Police recorded serious assaults increased 32% from 2014/15 to 2017/18,
- Police recorded robberies increased by 17% from 2015/16 to 2017/18,
- Police recorded knife possession increased by 24% from 2014/15 to 2017/18.
- Hospital admissions for assault with a sharp object have risen by 4% from 2014/15 to 2017/18.

However, while Scotland's trends share the same overall shape as England and Wales, the magnitude of the violent crime decline in Scotland was larger up to 2014, and the magnitude of the violent crime rise since then has been smaller. Furthermore, some offence types, including homicide, have not risen at all since 2014 in Scotland. In other words, based purely on an analysis of crime trends, there is some evidence of a potential crime reduction effect for the Scottish programme of activity.

These findings are in line with a recent academic report, which took a different approach to studying effectiveness. Rather than comparing to England and Wales, the authors found that the falls in different types of violent crime were particularly concentrated in the types of violent crime and homicides targeted by policies. They concluded that "*it is clear that the largest declines in homicide and violence are in line with the policies and intervention strategies put in place during the mid-2000s to tackle gang violence and knife crime*" (Skott and McVie, 2019, p. 5).<sup>62</sup> The authors still urged caution, given the lack of robust evaluation evidence, and it is important to recognise that there were other differences between Scotland and England and Wales that could explain the better trends in Scotland.

For example, while England and Wales had a 22 per cent rise in fixed-term exclusions from school and a 29 per cent rise in permanent school exclusions from 2014/15 to 2016/17, Scotland's trend in exclusions has continued downwards. It more than halved the number of temporary exclusions between 2006/07 and 2016/17 (44,546 to 18,376) and permanent exclusions fell from 248 to just 5 over the same period. Scotland also had a different trend in police numbers. For example, whereas officer numbers have fallen 15 per cent between 2010 and 2018 in England and Wales, they fell only by less than 1 per cent in Scotland over the same period.

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<sup>62</sup> Skott, S., & McVie, S. (2019). Reduction in homicide and violence in Scotland is largely explained by fewer gangs and less knife crime. See: <https://blogs.sps.ed.ac.uk/aqmen/files/2019/01/S-Skott-Types-of-Homicide-28.1.19.pdf>



Changes in drug markets or use, by contrast, show more similarity to England and Wales. Crack-cocaine use in particular has increased since 2014 in Scotland.<sup>63</sup> However, there is some evidence that 'County Lines' models for selling drugs are less developed in Scotland than England, and London in particular, possibly calling in to question the transferability of interventions from Scotland to the English context.<sup>64</sup>

Finally, while Scotland's 'public health approach' to violence has been widely praised, the breadth of the approach and lack of robust evaluation makes it difficult to assess the impact of the individual strands.

### Annex 3, Table of duty holders wage cost by profession

Duty Holders	Job Title attending
Health	Health and social services managers and directors
Police	Internal Home Office estimates <sup>65</sup>
Local authority	Local government administrative occupations
Education	Senior professionals of educational establishments
CJS	Senior officers in fire, ambulance, prison and related services
Fire	Senior officers in fire, ambulance, prison and related services

Source: *Earnings and hours worked, occupation by four-digit SOC: ASHE Table 14. 2020 provisional estimates, table 14.5a.*<sup>66</sup>

<sup>63</sup> For a more detailed analysis, see Annex: other factors.

<sup>64</sup> See for example Robinson, Grace, McLean, Robert and Densley, James (2019) Working County Lines: Child Criminal Exploitation and Illicit Drug Dealing in Glasgow and Merseyside. *International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology*, 63 (5). pp. 694-711. ISSN 0306-624X

<sup>65</sup> Home Office internal estimates on police hourly costs. Hourly cost for Sergeant and below, includes salary, expenses, regional allowance, training and employer contributions to pension and national insurance. The estimates were calculated using the Annualised Survey of Hours Earnings (ASHE), Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accounting (CIPFA) Police Actuals and The National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) Mutual Aid Rates. Estimates use the latest figures available for the various inputs.

<sup>66</sup> Available at <https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/datasets/occupation4digitsoc2010ashtable14>

## Impact Assessment Checklist

<b>Mandatory specific impact test - Statutory Equalities Duties</b>	<b>Complete</b>
<p><b>Statutory Equalities Duties</b></p> <p>The public sector equality duty requires public bodies to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, advance equality of opportunity, and foster good relations in the course of developing policies and delivering services. [<a href="#">Equality Duty Toolkit</a>]</p>	<b>Yes</b>
<p>This has been completed, and a summary is presented in Section I.</p> <p>The SRO has read and agreed the findings of the Public Sector Equality Duty test.</p>	

Any test not applied can be deleted except **the Equality Statement**, where the policy lead must provide a paragraph of summary information on this.

The Home Office requires the **Specific Impact Test on the Equality Statement** to have a summary paragraph, stating the main points. **You cannot delete this and it MUST be completed.**

## Economic Impact Tests

Does your policy option/proposal consider...?	Yes/No (page)
<p><b>Business Impact Target</b></p> <p>The Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (<a href="#">s. 21-23</a>) creates a requirement to assess the economic impacts of qualifying regulatory provisions on the activities of business and civil society organisations. [<a href="#">Better Regulation Framework Manual</a>] or [Check with the Home Office Better Regulation Unit]</p>	N/A

<p><b>Small and Micro-business Assessment (SaMBA)</b></p> <p>The SaMBA is a Better Regulation requirement intended to ensure that all new regulatory proposals are designed and implemented so as to mitigate disproportionate burdens. The SaMBA must be applied to all domestic measures that regulate business and civil society organisations, unless they qualify for the fast track. [<a href="#">Better Regulation Framework Manual</a>] or [Check with the Home Office Better Regulation Unit]</p>	Yes
A SaMBA has been completed and is located in section I	

<p><b>New Burdens Doctrine</b></p> <p>The new burdens doctrine is part of a suite of measures to ensure Council Tax payers do not face excessive increases. It requires all Whitehall departments to justify why new duties, powers, targets and other bureaucratic burdens should be placed on local authorities, as well as how much these policies and initiatives will cost and where the money will come from to pay for them. [<a href="#">New burdens doctrine: guidance for government departments</a>]</p>	Yes
A new burdens assessment has been completed to account for the impact on local authorities.	

## Social Impact Tests

<b>Justice Impact Test</b> The justice impact test is a mandatory specific impact test, as part of the impact assessment process that considers the impact of government policy and legislative proposals on the justice system. [ <a href="#">Justice Impact Test Guidance</a> ]	Yes
A Justice impact test has been completed to account for the financial impact on the criminal justice system.	

<b>Family Test</b> The objective of the test is to introduce a family perspective to the policy making process. It will ensure that policy makers recognise and make explicit the potential impacts on family relationships in the process of developing and agreeing new policy. [ <a href="#">Family Test Guidance</a> ]	Yes
A family test has been completed and a summary is included in Section I	