



Home Office

Serious and organised crime: Home Office research priorities

2018/19 – 2020/21

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Foreword

The continued growth of serious and organised crime (SOC) is a national security threat, requiring a whole of Government response. Serious and organised criminals have a daily, corrosive impact on society and our public services, with an estimated cost to the UK of at least £37 billion each year.¹

The threat from SOC continues to increase in both volume and complexity, creating a challenging environment for the UK response. Criminal networks are increasingly resilient and adaptable, exploiting technology and becoming involved in almost every type of crime. The *2018 National Strategic Assessment*,² produced by the UK's National Crime Agency (NCA), presents a complex picture, highlighting the threats posed by:

- the **non-geographic locus** of many threats;
- criminal use of encryption and the **dark web** as enablers;
- the **overlaps** between the threat areas;
- the impact of **technology**; and
- a **rapidly changing picture** in some areas.

The Government is committed to tackling SOC. The SOC strategy published this year sets out our commitment to:

- 1) relentless disruption and targeted action against the highest harm SOC networks affecting the UK;
- 2) building the highest levels of defence and resilience in vulnerable systems, businesses, people and communities;

- 3) stopping the problem at source; and
- 4) establishing a single, whole-system approach.

An important part of building our capacity to respond is improving our evidence base. Good quality, robust research is fundamental to ensuring a comprehensive understanding of the scope of the threat and the most effective and efficient targeting of resources, using tactics supported by solid evidence.

This cannot be achieved by Government or law enforcement alone. Working with partners from academia, industry, voluntary sectors and elsewhere is essential to developing and enhancing the scientific knowledge needed to tackle SOC. To facilitate this cross-sector ambition, we are publishing this set of **prioritised research requirements** to support implementation of the 2018 SOC strategy.

This document is designed to help external partners considering research in this area to focus their work on the priorities most important to Government and law enforcement, improving the evidence base on which policy choices are made and the targeting of resources on the most important risks and vulnerabilities.

Partners have a vital role to play in supporting us in the fight against SOC. We look forward to working with you.



Mike Warren
Director, Home Office Analysis and Insight

¹ Home Office (2018) Understanding Organised Crime 2015/16; October 2018.

² <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/905-national-strategic-assessment-for-soc-2018/file>

1. Summary

This document summarises research priorities to support the current and future needs of the Government's 2018 serious and organised crime (SOC) strategy³. It aims to set out clearly the most important areas for research and analysis in this area, improving the evidence base on which policy choices are made and the targeting of resources on the most important risks and vulnerabilities.

The research priorities presented here have been identified in discussion with a range of partners and relate specifically to the priorities set out in the current SOC strategy. This is to ensure that research is focused on the questions that are most relevant to current policy priorities and will have the greatest impact.

They are grouped into the following four thematic areas, though there is considerable overlap between them and they should not be viewed in isolation.

- 1) **Understanding the threat:** It is likely that SOC will continue to operate in new ways and places. Improved research and intelligence in this area will help to develop a better evidence base on the changing landscape of SOC and the harms it presents.
- 2) **Criminal markets:** The supply and demand of illicit goods or services is a key characteristic of organised crime. Understanding more about the threat posed by SOC markets and their operating models will help to inform the most effective response.
- 3) **Vulnerabilities:** Organised crime groups (OCGs) exploit the vulnerabilities of individuals, businesses and society at large to further their criminal interests. Improving our understanding of the vulnerabilities of both victims and offenders will help to direct when and where to respond.
- 4) **What works:** The threat from SOC is complex and wide-ranging, requiring an equally diverse response. Improving the evidence base of what works in terms of prevention, disruption and tackling SOC, will achieve better value for money interventions. It can help to ensure that the most appropriate and up-to-date tools are used to respond at the most effective points.

The remainder of this document sets out the key research questions underpinning these cross-cutting thematic topic areas, including a description of broad, high-level questions applying to the range of SOC threats as well as considering individual crime types where relevant. It also includes details of how we intend for this document to be used, outlines sources of funding for research and existing centres of expertise.

Finally, it also includes **contact details for Home Office analysts working in this area**. We are committed to working collaboratively with the wider research community to improve the evidence base on SOC.

³ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/serious-and-organised-crime-strategy-2018>

2. Background

The publication of the Government's 2018 serious and organised crime (SOC) strategy reflects the changes in the threat posed by SOC since 2013. The strategy sets out a requirement to strengthen the scientific evidence base and there is a clear ambition to do more to increase the level of knowledge.

Whilst there are plans in place to improve the understanding of threats and exploit new intelligence data through the National Crime Agency,⁴ it is essential to bring together the widest possible community to achieve these aims. This research agenda represents the first steps in meeting this requirement by providing a clear, current and prioritised set of research needs relating to the 2018 SOC strategy. The intention is that this research agenda will set the direction for both internal government research and that of the external research community to improve the evidence base on which policy choices are made and the targeting of resources on the most important risks and vulnerabilities.

2.1. Focusing evidence needs on the serious and organised crime strategy

Research into SOC is challenging. SOC is, by its nature hidden and underreported, constantly evolving and diversifying and crosses both physical and online boundaries. SOC operates through a number of different models, from lone individuals, traditional hierarchical groups and loose sets of individuals. It is often, but not always, motivated by financial gain. It is an increasingly transnational issue that exploits new technologies and is a recognised national security risk.⁵ There is no legal definition on which to base research questions. This research agenda follows the same definition as the SOC strategy: *'Individuals planning, coordinating and committing serious offences, whether individually, in groups and/or as part of transnational networks'*. The main categories of serious offences covered by the term 'SOC' are illustrated below.




⁴ Through the establishment of an enhanced National Assessments Centre and National Data Exploitation Capability (see Part 3 of the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy, 2018).

⁵ HM Government (2018) *National Security Capability Review*, March 2018.

The complexity and challenges of this research area means that there are many evidence gaps, ranging from broad thematic questions to very specific criminality-focused ones. One of the key features of this document is that it relates evidence needs directly to the priorities set out in the 2018 strategy. That is not to say that other research questions in this area are not important, but instead that these are the questions that are most relevant to the Government's current policy priorities and where research and analysis can have the greatest impact.

The SOC strategy has four overarching objectives, illustrated below. This research agenda presents evidence gaps thematically and cuts across the strategic objectives outlined in the strategy. Whilst some may appear to relate to particular objectives, the research questions should not be viewed in isolation; there is considerable overlap in the strategic response to SOC, requiring evidence from a variety of areas.



2.2. Methodology

The development of this research agenda has been an iterative process, involving a range of stakeholders. The thematic areas emerged from an assessment of the cross-cutting evidence gaps relating to each of the strategic objectives and represent those questions considered the highest priority at this point in time. The relative priority of questions was assessed according to the following criteria:

- 1) those most relevant to the implementation of the 2018 SOC strategy;
- 2) those relating to the greatest threats;
- 3) areas where there is no, or limited, existing research.

2.3. Building a strong research community

In the same way that the threat from SOC cannot be solved by law enforcement alone, the research priorities outlined in this document require a broad community of researchers and analysts to help to identify and address areas where more evidence is needed. The publication of this research agenda is a first step in facilitating a discussion about research in this area, bringing opportunities for a diverse range of partnerships and collaborations, both between specialists and across sectors.

This approach should attract a wide variety of ideas, knowledge and skills, and highlight different issues, problems and solutions. The value of a range of contributions from different stakeholders offers an opportunity for more rigorous and effective research. Discussion is particularly encouraged in relation to the following challenges:

- employing a range of methodologies and professions, considering social, economic, behavioural, computer science and business approaches;

- ensuring joint working with law enforcement and operational partners, who provide an invaluable insight into the threat areas being considered;
- considering the wider context – encouraging local, regional, national and international partnerships to consider the geographical and transnational nature of SOC; and
- considering multidisciplinary work, drawing together a range of backgrounds including specialists in sociology, criminology, economics, and business studies, and data science.

2.3.1. Research at the Home Office

Analysts working as civil servants within government departments and agencies work across a number of analytical professions to carry out a range of activities to ensure ministers and officials have access to the best possible evidence. They also have a role in engaging with the wider research community to enable close working with, and between, partners to enhance knowledge to support operational and strategic priorities.

Whilst this document identifies areas of interest, this is just the starting point. We are committed to encouraging dialogue and encourage contact via the dedicated email address: SOCResearchAgenda@homeoffice.gov.uk.

Home Office statistical and research reports can be found on the Home Office publications website.⁶

⁶ For official statistics see: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics?commit=Refresh+results&departments%5B%5D=home-office&from_date=&keywords=&official_document_status=all&to_date=&topics%5B%5D=all&world_locations%5B%5D=all . For research reports see: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?keywords=&publication_filter_option=research-and-analysis&departments%5B%5D=home-office

3. Thematic research areas

Four key thematic areas underpin the priority areas for research to support implementation of the 2018 serious and organised crime (SOC) strategy.

Understanding the threat

Whilst it is unlikely that new types of SOC will develop in the next 5 years, it is likely that existing crime will operate in new ways and places. Technology change will continue and with it, new opportunities for criminals activity. It is unclear how Brexit will impact on the opportunities presented to organised criminals. Exploiting new data and becoming more aware of the range of existing research and intelligence in this area will help to develop a better evidence base on the changing landscape of SOC and the harms it presents.

Criminal markets

The supply and demand of illicit goods or services is a key characteristic of organised crime. Whilst the traditional criminal markets for drugs and illicit goods remain strong, newer and more complex markets such as organised immigration crime continue to grow in scale and impact. The dark web has enabled the virtual trading of illicit goods to expand and it is likely that this trend will continue. Understanding more about the threat posed by SOC markets and their operating models, will help to inform the most effective response.

Vulnerabilities

Organised crime groups (OCGs) exploit the vulnerabilities of individuals, businesses and society to further their criminal interests. Whilst there are a number of different pathways into SOC, there is no definitive set of 'characteristics' to identify those most at risk of becoming an offender or a victim. Businesses unwittingly offer opportunities for criminality and a range of social and economic factors influence the success of SOC in local areas. Improving the understanding of these vulnerabilities will help to direct when and where to respond.

What works

The threat from SOC is complex and wide ranging and, may require participation from a range of stakeholders and cross local, national and international borders. Interventions may take place with individuals already involved in SOC and with those at risk of offending. They may target specific activities or processes, or network-wide disruption or focus on building resilience in the system. By improving the evidence in this area, better value for money will be achieved as the most appropriate and up-to-date approaches are used to respond to the threat at the most effective points.

3.1. Research questions in more detail


This section sets out an assessment of the key research questions underpinning the cross-cutting thematic topic areas. This includes a description of broad, high-level questions applying to the range of SOC threats as well as considering individual crime types where relevant.⁷ There is considerable overlap across the thematic areas; we encourage you to consider all of the questions when planning research in your own areas of expertise, rather than viewing them in isolation.

3.1.1. Understanding the threat

Understanding the threat is a broad umbrella term for improving knowledge of the harms and impacts of SOC activity. This relates to a variety of aspects of SOC, including group or network features, individuals and the different roles they can play within an OCG, and the role of wider factors, such as technological developments, which may have an impact on SOC offending. Most of the research questions in this area come directly under this thematic heading, although there are some specific questions relating to expanding access to data and exploitation of new data sources to strengthen the evidence base.

Further details are provided in Figure 1 and Table 1 below.

Figure 1: Understanding the threat – A visual representation of key research questions



⁷ The Home Office has also published research priorities to support the UK’s response to tackling and preventing modern slavery (see <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2018-uk-annual-report-on-modern-slavery>).

Table 1: Understanding the threat – Key research questions

Theme	Research question	Detail
Understanding the threat	How do OCGs operate? How does this differ from e.g. street gangs?	<p>Whilst we know there are different types of OCG, we tend to group these by factors such as criminality or nationality, rather than by characteristics that reflect their structures. Further research is required in this area to allow for more targeted interventions, particularly in separating OCG and gang activity (e.g. in relation to violence).</p> <p>SOC impacts the UK both socially and economically. More robust research is required to identify the relative costs and harms of SOC activity as a whole, rather than just in terms of specific types of crime or victim (e.g. how does it impact the UK business sector?). In particular, more robust evidence is required to understand the threat from economic crime.</p> <p>The other key questions in this thematic area relate to how the threat will change, in relation to social, international and technological factors. Understanding what opportunities are presented and how offending is driven by such events is important for predicting future trends. Understanding how the harms from online offending may change is important, particularly in relation to child sexual exploitation (CSE). It is also important to understand the demands and capability challenges that SOC places on law enforcement in response to the changing threat.</p>
	What is the harm from SOC? Where is the threat the greatest?	
	What is the threat from economic crime?	
	What is the scale of SOC?	
	How will the threat evolve over the next 10 years?	
	How is technology used by organised criminals?	
Data exploitation	How can we better keep track of current research on SOC?	<p>SOC is a large area to research and there are numerous individuals, groups and centres of expertise carrying out excellent work in this area. However, keeping abreast of research can be difficult. We welcome initiatives to improve the sharing and dissemination of research to the widest possible audience.</p> <p>A lack of robust data is a continuing problem for SOC research. In line with the strategy, we support the development and improvement of intelligence capabilities. Analytical support to this process is key, as is the identification and exploitation of such data using new and innovative methods.</p>
	What data sources are there that are not currently being exploited for SOC research?	

3.1.2. Criminal markets

Key research questions relating to criminal markets focus on three fundamental areas where evidence is limited.

- **Business models:** Understanding how criminal business models operate and succeed is key to understanding their vulnerabilities and how to disrupt them effectively. In particular, understanding the actions, decisions and processes used to operate a criminal business in a specific marketplace and the specific roles actors play within these. Understanding how OCGs consider risk and profitability in their business models would provide valuable disruption opportunities.
- **Understanding the threat:** Understanding how SOC markets work, interact and impact is important for understanding how best to tackle them. Many OCGs are involved in more than one type of criminal market.
- **Disruption:** The ultimate aim of disruption is to prevent organised criminals. When thinking about SOC markets, there are a number of possible points for disruption, including both upstream supply and downstream demand, as well as focusing on the specific roles of actors within the SOC network.

Further detail is provided in Figure 2 and Table 2 below.

Figure 2
Criminal markets – A visual representation of key research questions



Table 2: Criminal markets – Key research questions

Theme	Research question	Detail
Business models	How do criminal markets operate?	Understanding how market forces apply to different illicit markets is central to developing new ways to undermine OCGs' business models with targeted and evidence-based interventions.
	What are the decision-making processes?	
	How do OCGs identify and exploit new opportunities?	These questions relate to improving the evidence base on how organised crime networks and markets work, illustrating and describing the interlinkages between:
	How do different roles interact within criminal markets?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • illegal markets, with one another; • illegal markets and legal markets; • local, regional, national and international activity.
	What are the similarities and differences between legal and illegal markets?	<p>This includes the use of 'cybercrime-as-a-service' and how technology facilitates SOC markets.</p> <p>Illegal markets trade in both illicit goods and services. Crime types of particular interest include: Materials relating to Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE); drugs; firearms; money laundering; and, cross-border smuggling services.</p>
Understanding the threat	How do criminal markets differ between crime types?	Organised crime is an umbrella term for a number of serious crime types. Whilst there are pockets of evidence on the most effective points for the Government, law enforcement and others to intervene in some serious crime types, other crime types have not been so closely researched. This means that it is difficult to compare market factors between crime types.
	How do criminal markets overlap?	
	How are 'county lines' used?	County lines activity poses a particular threat and forms a part of the Government's strategy for tackling SOC; a better understanding of this activity is essential to the most effective response.

Disruption

What social factors facilitate SOC markets?

What are the best points for intervention?

Which roles are most effective to target to disrupt an OCG?

How do we best intervene at the international, regional and local level?

How do you tackle public tolerance?

Targeting market factors is an important tool for disrupting OCGs, but requires further evidence on the most effective approaches. The key research needs in this thematic area are in relation to:

- social factors that may facilitate the threat;
- where in the market chain disruption can be most effective;
- how and when disruptions to the market are appropriate at different geographical levels; and
- how best to tackle public tolerance and the ongoing demand for illicit goods and services.

3.1.3. Vulnerabilities

OCGs exploit vulnerabilities in order to further their criminal activities. By improving the evidence base in this area we will be better able to build resilience to defend against SOC. Research questions in this area focus on the following.

- **Individuals:** Which individuals are at risk of becoming offenders and/or victims, for what reasons and at what stages of their lives?
- **Macro-level factors:** Which vulnerabilities in the wider system, including businesses, communities and local social and economic dynamics, give rise to the risk of exploitation by SOC nominals?

Further detail is provided in Figure 3 and Table 3 below.

Figure 3: Vulnerabilities – A visual representation of key research questions




Table 3: Vulnerabilities – Key research questions

Theme	Research question	Detail
Individuals	What makes an individual at risk of becoming involved in SOC? What are their motivations for offending?	<p>Those who are vulnerable or at risk of being exploited by SOC need to be protected. However, there is no robust model for identifying or predicting who these individuals are or when to best intervene.</p>
	How do entry points differ among SOC nominals? How does this affect prevention?	<p>This is a key research need for improving the response at source. Understanding how risk factors differ, by type of offending or role played in an OCG, is also important for effective targeting of interventions.</p>
	How do risk factors and motivations differ for different types of offender?	<p>Reducing the risk of victimisation is an equally important part of the response. This includes a better understanding and identification of those at risk, with a particular focus on those at risk of the highest harm forms of SOC, including modern slavery, human trafficking, and CSE.</p>
	How do we reduce the risk of victimisation?	<p>It also includes identifying the combination of technology, regulatory and behaviour change interventions that are required to reduce the risk of victimisation.</p>
	How do we support those who are victims, mitigate harms and prevent re-victimisation?	
Macro-level factors	How are businesses exploited to enable SOC?	<p>A range of wide, system-level factors, are also important for reducing the UK's vulnerability to SOC. Key research questions include the following.</p>
	How do international factors influence SOC?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How and why businesses are exploited by OCGs? What are the vulnerabilities in the system that allow this to happen? What is the role of the professional enabler? • What international changes influence SOC? How do these manifest? • Why is SOC prevalent in some areas and not others? What are the factors that make an area or community vulnerable or resilient to SOC? Does this differ by crime or OCG type? • What types of opportunities or barriers are presented to criminals by exiting the EU?
	What social and economic factors make an area vulnerable to SOC?	
	What opportunities or barriers does exiting the EU present to serious organised criminals?	<p>By answering these questions, we will be better equipped to take steps to protect communities and improve their resilience to the threat posed by SOC.</p>

3.1.4. What works

There are two key areas where more evidence to broaden the understanding of our impacts on the threat:

- **Preventing involvement in SOC:** The SOC strategy renews its focus on stopping the problem at source to help to reduce the threat. Work in this area focuses not only on early intervention but also covers diverting existing offenders away from SOC and improving the management of lifetime offenders. Better understanding of the factors that lead to offending, draw offenders away from criminality and the types of interventions that are most effective in both cases, are key to success in this area.
- **Disrupting SOC:** There are a range of approaches, tactics and powers available to tackle SOC at different points and with different impacts, ranging from traditional law enforcement methods to protective community programmes. Building evidence in this area will help to identify the most effective tools and the contexts they are most suited to, improving targeting of resources and disruptive efforts.

Further detail is provided in Figure 4 and Table 4 below.

Figure 4: What works – A visual representation of key research questions




Table 4: What works – Key research questions

Theme	Research question	Detail
<p>Preventing involvement in SOC</p>	<p>How do we measure the success of interventions?</p>	<p>Interventions with SOC offenders are not new, but the approach continues to require more, robust evidence to achieve effective results.</p>
	<p>How should we tailor our approaches to different levels of offending?</p>	<p>Measuring the success of interventions for preventing involvement in SOC is challenging; it may take some time for effects to be seen and not all impacts are easily measured. We encourage innovative and long-term approaches to these questions, as well as drawing on and applying existing evidence from the wider criminological literature. Whilst impacts will always include future offending, ‘successful interventions’ may include other, broader outcomes, including those on the community.</p>
	<p>When is intervention most effective?</p>	<p>Sub-topics of measuring success apply to interventions with specific types of offenders, e.g. low-level prolific offenders compared with high-level and serious offenders, and with those at risk of offending. Understanding when intervention is most effective, and how professional enablers are drawn into SOC are both areas of particular interest.</p>
	<p>How can we best rehabilitate SOC offenders?</p>	<p>Whilst there is cross-cutting interest in this area, the 2018 strategy prioritises the following criminalities: drug trafficking and distribution; cybercrime; and CSE.</p>
<p>Disrupting organised crime</p>	<p>What works in disrupting OCGs?</p>	<p>Disruptions need to have maximum effect to demonstrate value for money. Interventions take a range of approaches, each with different impacts. Whilst we need to evaluate the new powers and capabilities described in the strategy, evidence is still required on how best to disrupt OCG activity. Assessment should include measurement of:</p>
	<p>How do we measure the impacts of different types of approaches?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • both immediate, short-, medium- and long-term effects; • impacts locally, on people and communities; • impacts upstream and downstream; and, • economic impacts.
	<p>What types of disruption provide value for money?</p>	<p>The concept of building the resilience of communities to SOC is still developing and is a key feature of the strategy. Further evidence around how building resilience in local communities helps to disrupt SOC activity, as well as other protective approaches, are a key research need.</p>
<p>Does building community resilience help?</p>		

4. The research landscape

This section contains useful information and contact details for existing centres of expertise for serious and organised crime (SOC) research as well as potential sources of funding. Otherwise, funding is not within the scope of this document.⁸


4.1. Centres of expertise

There are a number of existing bodies with expertise in SOC research, each playing an important role in building evidence in this area. This section seeks to highlight key centres of expertise, as well as funding sources. It is by no means exhaustive but covers some of the main UK and international organisations in this area.

4.1.1. Networks

Networks	Detail
	<p>Centre for Information and Research on Organised Crime (CIROC)</p> <p>CIROC is an international centre for information and research on organised crime and the fight against it. The centre was founded by universities and the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice.</p> <p>http://www.ciroc.nl/en/home.html</p>
	<p>EU Research Network on Organised Crime</p> <p>The EU Research Network coordinates academia and law enforcement agencies. The network is a partnership between research centres in Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden.</p> <p>https://www.bka.de/EN/OurTasks/SupportOfInvestigationAndPrevention/Research/OrganisedCrimeResearch/organisedcrimeresearch_node.html</p>
	<p>International Interdisciplinary Research Consortium on Cybercrime (IIRCC)</p> <p>The IIRCC aims to link the fields of social and technical science with practitioners and law enforcement to research and understand cybercrime and cybersecurity and promote a safer Internet.</p> <p>https://cj.msu.edu/programs/iircc/</p>


4.1.2. Academic institutions

Academic institutions	Detail
	<p>Academic Centres of Excellence in Cyber Security Research (ACEs-CSR)</p> <p>The ACEs-CSR is an initiative outlined in the UK's national cyber security strategy <i>Protecting and Promoting the UK in a Digital World</i>. Universities can apply to join the scheme and will be assessed against criteria.</p> <p>https://epsr.org.uk/research/centres/acecybersecurity/</p>


⁸ The icons in this chapter were made by Gregnor Cresnar, Freepik and Turkkub. Those Icons and Vectors Market from www.flaticon.com.

<p>Cambridge Cybercrime Centre</p>	<p>The Cambridge Cybercrime Centre is a multidisciplinary initiative combining expertise from the University of Cambridge's <u>Department of Computer Science and Technology</u>, <u>Institute of Criminology</u> and <u>Faculty of Law</u>. It holds substantial datasets relating to cybercrime for the purpose of sharing with academics for further research and analysis.</p> <p>https://www.cambridgecybercrime.uk/</p>
<p>Centre of Excellence in Terrorism, Resilience, Intelligence and Organised Crime Research (CENTRIC)</p>	<p>Located within Sheffield Hallam University, the mission of CENTRIC is to provide a global platform for researchers, practitioners, policy makers and the public to focus on security research.</p> <p>https://research.shu.ac.uk/centric/</p>
<p>N8 Research Partnership</p>	<p>The N8 Research Partnership is a collaboration of eight research-intensive universities in the North of England, developing programmes nationally and internationally and driving economic growth for urban and community transformation.</p> <p>https://www.n8research.org.uk/</p>
<p>Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research (SCCJR)</p>	<p>The SCCJR is a collaboration of four Scottish universities that aims to produce research in Scotland and internationally to advance an understanding of the meaning and practice of justice.</p> <p>http://www.sccjr.ac.uk/</p>
<p>St Mary's University Centre for the Study of Modern Slavery (CSMS)</p>	<p>The CSMS is engaged in independent research to provide evidence that informs policy responses to modern slavery and human trafficking, both in the UK and internationally.</p> <p>https://www.stmarys.ac.uk/research/centres/modern-slavery/overview.aspx</p>
<p>Sussex Centre for the Study of Corruption (SCSC)</p>	<p>The SCSC takes an interdisciplinary approach to researching corruption and related issues.</p> <p>http://www.sussex.ac.uk/scsc/</p>
<p>Universities' Police Science Institute (UPSI)</p>	<p>The UPSI, in partnership with South Wales Police, develops the research evidence base for the art, craft and science of policing.</p> <p>http://upsi.org.uk/</p>
<p>University College London (UCL) Organised Crime Research Network (OCRN)</p>	<p>The OCRN is a multidisciplinary collaboration platform for organised crime research and disruption. It is based in the Jill Dando Institute of Security and Crime Science, the first institute in the world devoted to crime science.</p> <p>http://www.ucl.ac.uk/jill-dando-institute/research/research-groups/org-crime</p>

4.1.3. Global institutions

Global institutions	Detail
	<p>European Consortium for Political Research</p> <p>The Standing Group on Organised Crime (SGOC) of the European Consortium promotes research across disciplinary, regional and professional boundaries.</p> <p>https://ecpr.eu/StandingGroups/StandingGroupHome.aspx?ID=20</p>
	<p>Global Initiative against Transnational Organised Crime</p> <p>Based in Geneva, the Global Initiative comprises a network of nearly 300 independent global experts working on human rights, development and, increasingly, organised crime.</p> <p>http://globalinitiative.net/</p>
	<p>Transparency International (TI)</p> <p>TI is a global movement sharing one vision: a world in which government, politics, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of corruption.</p> <p>http://www.transparency.org.uk/</p>
	<p>U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre</p> <p>U4 works to reduce the impact of corruption on society by sharing research and evidence. U4 is a permanent centre at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Norway and includes a number of global partners, including the UK's Department for International Development (DfID).</p>

4.1.4. Government and law enforcement

Government and law enforcement	Detail
	<p>Action Fraud</p> <p>Action Fraud is the UK's national fraud and cybercrime reporting centre, which also provides a central point of contact for information about fraud and cybercrime.</p> <p>https://actionfraud.police.uk/</p>
	<p>Europol</p> <p>Europol is the EU's law enforcement agency, specialising in strategic and operational intelligence analysis in the fight against organised crime and terrorism.</p> <p>https://www.europol.europa.eu/</p>
	<p>National Crime Agency (NCA)</p> <p>The NCA is an intelligence-led agency driven by a central intelligence hub. The NCA produces the national strategic assessment (NSA), which provides a single picture of the threat to the UK from serious and organised crime.</p> <p>http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/</p>
	<p>National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB)</p> <p>The NFIB, based at City of London Police, analyses fraud and cybercrime reports to help to identify offenders and organised crime groups, and to determine emerging crime threats.</p> <p>https://www.cityoflondon.police.uk/advice-and-support/fraud-and-economic-crime/nfib/Pages/default.aspx</p>

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)

UNICRI is a UN entity established to support countries worldwide in preventing crime and facilitating criminal justice to promote social peace, development and political stability.


<http://www.unicri.it/>

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

UNODC helps Governments to react to the instability and insecurity caused by crimes like the smuggling of illicit drugs and human beings between countries and continents.

<http://www.unodc.org/>

4.1.5. Other centres of expertise

Other centres of expertise	Detail
 <p>Centre for Counter Fraud Studies (CCFS)</p>	<p>The CCFS is one of the specialist research centres of the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies. The centre provides a central knowledge resource, and aims to identify areas for future research.</p> <p>http://www.port.ac.uk/centre-for-counter-fraud-studies/</p>
<p>Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse (CSA)</p>	<p>The CSA Centre aims to bring about significant and system-wide change in how child sexual abuse is responded to locally and nationally through high quality evidence.</p> <p>https://www.csacentre.org.uk/</p>
<p>Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST)</p>	<p>CREST is a national hub for understanding, countering and mitigating security threats. It has a plan for sustained and long-term growth, through stakeholder and international researcher engagement.</p> <p>https://crestresearch.ac.uk/</p>
<p>EPSRC/NCSC Research Institute in Science of Cyber Security (RISCS)</p>	<p>RISCS is the UK's first research institute to focus on understanding the overall security of organisations, including their constituent technology, people and processes.</p> <p>https://www.riscs.org.uk/</p>
<p>RAND Corporation</p>	<p>RAND Europe is a not for profit research institute, in areas including security, health and education. Much of this research is carried out on behalf of public and private grantors and clients.</p> <p>https://www.rand.org/randeurope.html</p>
<p>The Police Foundation</p>	<p>The Police Foundation is a think tank. It is the only independent body in the UK that researches and works to improve policing for the benefit of the public through an impartial perspective.</p> <p>http://www.police-foundation.org.uk/</p>


**What Works Centre (WWC)
for Crime Reduction:
College of Policing**

The focus of the **WWC for Crime Reduction** is on practices and interventions to reduce crime. The WWC is also involved in other related areas, such as local economic growth, early intervention and wellbeing.

<http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Pages/default.aspx>

4.2. Sources of funding for research

Whilst funding is not within the scope of this document, this section outlines potential sources of funding for SOC research. The priorities set out here do not have any formal implications for the funding decisions of individual departments or agencies, which remain in control of their own budgets and research programmes. It does, however, provide a starting point for discussion.

Source	Detail
 Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)	The ESRC is part of UK Research and Innovation, a new organisation that brings together the UK's seven Research Councils, Innovate UK and Research England. The ESRC funds research to deepen and broaden the understanding of transnational organised crime (TNOG). https://esrc.ukri.org/funding/funding-opportunities/transnational-organised-crime-deepening-and-broadening-our-understanding/
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC)	The EPSRC is part of UK Research and Innovation, a new organisation that brings together the UK's seven research councils. It funds research and training in engineering and the physical sciences. https://epsrc.ukri.org/
European Commission	The European Commission is a large source of funding across social sciences. EU research and innovation is funded under the Societal Challenge of the Horizon 2020 programme. https://ec.europa.eu/info/research-and-innovation_en
Research England	Research England is a new council within UK Research and Innovation. Research England is responsible for funding, engaging with and understanding English higher education institutions (HEIs), challenging them to deliver to national agendas and supporting them in achieving that. https://re.ukri.org/
UK government departments and devolved administrations	UK government departments and devolved administrations routinely publish research outputs, calls for bids and information on their respective websites. Adverts for Home Office research calls can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/contracts-finder . Grant funding available for cybercrime research, sponsored by the Home Office, can be found advertised via the RISCS institute: https://www.riscs.org.uk .

Devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have their own dedicated public sector procurement websites:

- [Public Contracts Scotland](#) for opportunities with public sector bodies in Scotland;
 - [Sell2Wales](#) for opportunities with public sector bodies in Wales;
 - [eSourcing NI](#) and [eTendersNI](#) for opportunities with public sector bodies in Northern Ireland.
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5. Conclusions and implications for policy and operations

Serious and organised crime (SOC) is a broad and wide-ranging problem, affecting individuals, victims, communities and society more generally, requiring a joined-up and whole-system response. The range of potential partners is large; this document is relevant to anybody with an interest in research into serious and organised crime. This includes:

- academia and the broader research sector;
- policy makers;
- operational partners and practitioners;
- the public and private sectors;
- business, security and the voluntary sectors.

Whilst the focus is mostly domestic, SOC transcends borders and international partners will also have an interest. We will work with the seven UK Research Councils to maximise dissemination of this agenda and to help prioritise funding for future areas of research.

Whilst the focus of this document has been on identifying specific research questions, the wider aim of publishing this list of priorities is to improve communication and collaboration between partners and enable better dissemination and application of research to support strategic and operational decision making. The scale of the challenge from SOC is stark and robust; relevant evidence is crucial for ensuring our response is as effective as it can be, both now and in the future.

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