Transparency data
MoD Government Major Project Portfolio data, September 2019 (csv)
Updated 9 July 2020
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| GMPP ID Number | MOD_0001_1112-Q1 | MOD_0119_1920-Q2 | MOD_0104_1617-Q1 | MOD_0091_1415-Q3 | MOD_0092_1415-Q3 | MOD_0085_1314-Q2 | MOD_0076_1213-Q1 | MOD_0064_1112-Q2 | MOD_0118_1718-Q3 | MOD_0077_1213-Q1 | MOD_0094_1415-Q3 | MOD_0078_1213-Q1 | MOD_0017_1112-Q1 | MOD_0114_1718-Q1 | MOD_0080_1213-Q1 | MOD_0116_1718-Q2 | MOD_0100_1516-Q1 | MOD_0117_1718-Q2 | MOD_0111_1718-Q1 | MOD_0105_1617-Q1 | MOD_0079_1213-Q1 | MOD_0106_1617-Q1 | MOD_0036_1112-Q1 | MOD_0033_1112-Q1 | MOD_0115_1718-Q2 | MOD_0110_1718-Q1 | MOD_0101_1516-Q1 | MoD_0109_1617-Q2 | MOD_0038_1112-Q1 | MOD_0107_1617-Q1 | MOD_0042_1112-Q1 | MOD_0047_1112-Q1 | MOD_0055_1112-Q1 | MOD_0112_1718-Q1 | MOD_0061_1112-Q1 | ||||||||||||||
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| Project Name | A400M | Armed Forces Recruitment Project | Armour MBT 2025 | Armoured Cavalry 2025 | Armoured Infantry 2026 | Army Basing Programme | Astute Boats 1-7 | Carrier Enabled Power Projection | Clyde Infrastructure | Complex Weapons | Contracting; Purchasing and Finance | Core Production Capability | Crowsnest Programme | Defence Estate Optimisation | DREADNOUGHT | Fleet Solid Support | Future Beyond Line Of Sight | Future Maritime Support Programme | Joint Crypt Key Programme | Land Environment Tactical Communication and Information Systems | Lightning Programme | Maritime Patrol Aircraft | Maritime Sustainment Programme | MARSHALL | Mechanised Infantry Programme | MODnet Evolve | New Style of Information Technology (Base) | New Style of Information Technology Deployed | Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme | PROTECTOR | Queen Elizabeth Programme | Spearfish Upgrade Programme | Type 26 Global Combat Ship Programme | Type 31e | WATCHKEEPER | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| Department | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | MOD | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| Description / Aims | Delivery of A400M ATLAS Air Transport Aircraft. | The Armed Forces Recruiting Programme (AFRP) is the tri-Service (tS) programme responsible for delivering a single, common tS Recruiting Op Model for the Armed Forces. | An extension of the Army's MBT capability as part of a balanced force, credible and employable against current and emerging threats, across the mosaic of conflict, and the identification of future capability options beyond 2035. | To deliver an integrated multi-role capability that will include the delivery of the AJAX armoured fighting vehicle and its training solution into service. | Deliver an Armoured Infantry that is more capable, with enhanced lethality and upgraded situational awareness, better integration with dismounts and improved combined arms cooperation. | An infrastructure led transformation programme to enable the Army 2020 structure and withdraw of personnel from Germany. | The design, development and manufacture of Astute class submarines. | An integrated and sustainable joint capability, interoperable with NATO and coalition allies. The project will enable the projection of UK Carrier Strike and Littoral Manoeuvre power, the ability to support a Special Forces raid as well as delivering Humanitarian Assistance and Defence Diplomacy. | Managing the design, delivery and transition into operational use, new build and updated infrastructure facilities in HMNB Clyde (Faslane and Coulport). | Delivers Complex Weapons for use by the 3 Front Line Commands. | To provide a single online end to end procurement system for all MOD procurement activity. | Delivers safe nuclear reactor cores to meet the Royal Navy's submarine programme, now and for the long term. | Equip 10 Merlin Mk2 helicopters with an advanced airborne surveillance system to meet the Force Protection requirement of the Maritime Task Group. | Helping create a smaller, better and a more efficient estate to deliver the required Military Capability. | The design, development and manufacture of the Dreadnought ballistic missile submarines. | Auxiliary Shipping to provide stores, ammunition and food sustainment to Naval Forces at Sea. | Replaces the existing UK sovereign SKYNET 5 secure space-based satellite communications capability. | Commercial arrangements for the provision of Ship & Submarine Engineering and Naval Base Services. | To support the department's Information Assurance Capability. | A transformational change programme that will 'information-enable' the Land Environment in the full conduct of operations. | To deliver a multi-role, carrier-capable aircraft, to be operated jointly by the Royal Air Force and Royal Navy. | To deliver a Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) to provide persistent, responsive, effective and adaptive Military Capabilities in the Under Water, Above Water, Littoral and Land environments. | The Military Afloat Reach and Sustainability (MARS) Tankers will replace the current single hulled tankers operated by the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. | Delivering a sustainable Air Traffic Management capability. | Delivers agile Mechanised Infantry able to operate at reach, at speed, in complex terrain and with low logistic need. | Sustain OFFICIAL and SECRET Information Communications and Technology (ICT) services in the Base and Base Overseas environments from the end of the ATLAS New Style of IT (Base) (NSOIT(B)) contract. | To deliver a cost-effective and modern New Style of IT across the Defence estate. | The provision of an IT system which will deliver operational information service to Land, Air, Maritime and Joint users in all physical environments. | To deliver and sustain the capability (skills, technology, science, personnel, production and support) to underwrite the UK nuclear warhead stockpile now and in the future. | Delivery of a Remotely Piloted Air System. | Deliver 2 x Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers, capable of operating Lightning II and Merlin aircraft (Crowsnest/ASW), as key elements of the Carrier Enabled Power Projection Programme (CEPP). | To update the UK's submarine weapon systems. This includes improvements to the safety system to minimise residual risks and deliver improved performance against increasingly capable threats. | Procure 8 x Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW) ships and associated support. | Aims to deliver a pipeline of credible, affordable and exportable warships enabling Defence to increase its global footprint. | An unmanned air system (UAS) platform that will provide Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance capability to the land tactical commander in the context of Joint Operations. | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (A Delivery Confidence Assessment of the project at a fixed point in time, using a five-point scale, Red – Amber/Red – Amber – Amber/Green – Green; definitions in the IPA Annual Report on Major Projects) | Amber | Amber/Red | Amber | Amber | Amber/Red | Amber/Green | Amber/Red | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber | Red | Amber/Red | Amber | Amber | Amber/Red | Red | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | Amber | Amber | Amber | Green | Amber | Amber | Amber/Red | Amber/Red | Amber | Exempt under Section 24 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (National Security) | Amber | Amber | Red | Amber | Amber | Amber/Green | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| Departmental commentary on actions planned or taken on the IPA RAG rating. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - There has been an issue of poor aircraft availability. Formal efforts to address the situation have been effective and proven to be sustainable. The collaborative MOD and industry enterprise-wide approach that was established in early 2019 was proving to be highly effective. - The international Programme (upon which the UK Programme is dependent) was undergoing a re-baselining exercise, triggered by Airbus Defence and Space. This was a 2-year exercise and did not conclude until Jun 19. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Aircraft that have already been delivered to the Front Line are used in support of military operations, including enduring deployments in the Middle East and the South Atlantic. This constrains the SRO's access to the aircraft needed to support the Test and Evaluation activity necessary to deliver future Capability Milestones. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The collaborative 'Joint Venture' Enterprise governing aircraft availability improvements continued to deliver success. This was a result of particular, concerted focus on: the timeliness of the aircraft retrofit programme; transforming the UK's support organisation; introducing reliability modifications; and transitioning to an electronic (rather than paper-based) maintenance system. - The first of 2 interim upgrade programmes (designed to offset the otherwise detrimental re-scheduling agreed within the global re-baselining of the programme) has been implemented. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The IPA Review DCA in March 19 acknowledged that progress had been made in developing deliverable options but the full scope of the programme was unachievable in the original mandated timeframe. - At the time of the IPA review DCA the programme was being re-baselined to reflect an achievable timeframe with the required additional resourcing, this gave enough confidence to reflect an Amber / Red confidence delivery. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Programme Assessment Review held in Oct 19 upgraded the review to Amber with a re-baseline of activity with a deliverable option for an Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of Mar 24. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Initial Gate Business Case has received IAC approval for an Initial Operating Capability revised schedule of Mar 24. Ministerial approval was granted in Mar 20 & Cabinet Office / HM Treasury Approval in May 20. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - During this period the Armour MBT 2025 programme concluded its competitive, obsolescence only, assessment phase prior to entering an Investment Approvals Committee (IAC) / HM Treasury (HMT) approved expanded assessment phase to assess enhancements to lethality and survivability. At this early stage in the project lifecycle whilst the scope, risks and opportunities are being assessed and evaluated, the maintenance of an amber grade remains appropriate. - In the obsolescence only assessment phase Rheinmetall Landsysteme (RLS) conducted significant technical risk reduction work; this has improved confidence in platform delivery. The programme however is complex, with a number of ley dependencies; as such it is more than simply the delivery of the tank. Given programme complexity an amber grade remains appropriate. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - COVID 19 is having an impact. Working from home and COVID 19 control measures could reduce and delay the provision of evidence for the full business case submission. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The programme is currently clarifying and negotiating the Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land (RBSL) tender return. The outcome of which will either have a positive or negative impact on performance, cost and time. It is too early to draw a conclusion. - Rheinmetall BAE Systems Land (RBSL) delivered both their report at the end of the second assessment phase and their tender return on time. This has therefore had a neutral impact on the DCA. - A number of the risks have been mitigated since the last IPA DCA. Although this is positive, risks remain and work continues to either resolve or mitigate them. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The schedule remained stable between Q2 18/19 and Q2 19/20. - General Dynamics maintained their commitment to deliver the project during a recast of the contract in 2018. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - COVID-19 has caused some short-term delays. The manufacture and acceptance of AJAX vehicles has been delayed by COVID-19 control measures. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - An issue has come to light that could affect the safety operating clearance of AJAX's turret. Remedial engineering work to rectify the issue is causing some delay. - General Dynamics have been late to deliver appropriate safety cases for the AJAX vehicles, delaying the delivery of vehicles to the Army. | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - Op FARAN closed on 30 Sep 19 with all associated personnel and their families successfully relocated to the UK, which means the Programme has achieved its primary Strategic Defence & Security Review 2010 target of returning 20,000 troops from Germany by 2020, thus enabling the closure of the German sites they occupied. - The closure of the sites in Germany drives the underlying benefits of the Army Basing Programme, and following a full review of the programme's benefits position the Programme is forecasting to exceed its current annual running costs savings target of £241M. - Following measures taken in the latest budgetary round, the Programme remains affordable, and based on latest projections of individual project costs, expects to complete within its overall budget of £1.819Bn CDEL limit. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Decisions in the Defence Estate Optimisation programme, with which the Army Basing Programme shares dependencies, has led to increased confidence around a number of the remaining Army Basing Programme projects in delivery. - The recent COVID19 outbreak has impacted on the Programme. While this will not have a material bearing on the Army Basing Programme’s strategic goals, it has affected the schedule and costs of the remaining projects, though as at Apr 20, it is too early to quantify the extent of this impact. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Infrastructure and Projects Authority Review, conducted in Feb 20, provided a GREEN Delivery Confidence Assessment and recommended the Senior Responsible Owner explore early graduation from the Government Major Projects Portfolio. - Extensive work has been undertaken to increase confidence in the Programme’s financial benefits reporting, including the impact of the decision in October 2018 to retain a small enduring training capability in Germany. - The Programme has worked hard to developed an effective succession plan for its staff, which should drive greater confidence in its people that their future after the Programme graduates is assured, and therefore address concerns around retention as the Programme enters its final phase. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - A delay to Boat 4 which was caused by emergent technical issues which required unplanned repair and rework before proceeding with the normal commissioning process. - Elements of work on Boat 5 were paused in order to deploy extra resource to resolving the issues on Boat 4, impacting on the delivery. Through additional recruitment and provision of training to upskill the current workforce, we will significantly improve the situation in the medium term. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The MOD has worked with its Tier 1 industrial partners to deliver Boat 4 to the Royal Navy and to recover the Boat 5 schedule, as well as improve production quality. Normal boat commissioning operations are now progressing. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - A very tight equipment modification schedule (CIP and Fleet Time Support Period) for HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH in order to make operational training timelines. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The global Coronavirus pandemic is having an effect across all CEPP programmes. SROs are working hard to mitigate the effects and deliver IOC(CS) on time in Dec 20. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The successful completion of F-35B/HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH integration testing during Operational Testing Period 1 (OT1) has significantly de-risked the programme and paved the way for a successful Lightning Force Carrier Qualification period in Feb 20. - Crowsnest Radar Powered Flight 1 was completed on 3 Feb 20, marking the first major milestone in flight test. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - The phased transition from predominantly new build scope to a greater focus on refurbishment work of existing facilities within the operational areas of the base requiring greater integration and planning across the stakeholder community, particularly across boat maintenance and weapons programmes. - A greater understanding of existing asset condition has highlighted the fragility of some aspects of the key complex technical waterfront infrastructure which together with greater operational demands on facilities has lead to uncertainty on the volume of intervention required and the ability to deliver within programme time and cost parameters. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The impact of COVID19 on the delivery of the programme is currently being assessed, noting that all non critical onsite projects ceased on 24th March 20 to moderate viral transmission and mitigate the risk to CASD. - The successful completion of the Nuclear Technical Support Provider Framework procurement has been achieved, leading to greater access to a wider pool of nuclear qualified supply chain resource to support the large number of concurrent projects across the programme. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The introduction of Joint Project teams which include representatives from all key stakeholder groups associated with complex project delivery is leading to a more inclusive culture, better communication and transparency resulting in greater efficiency and more effective ways of working. - The introduction of a Steering board for Coulport Projects with broad representation has led to more effective prioritisation and planning of work in key operational areas to address capability risks within the operational delivery programme. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The key areas of concern for delivery of Complex Weapons are: technical development; integration and acceptance onto platforms / systems; production (both new products and those weapons going through refurbishment); and financial planning and control (variable funding levels and cost escalations). - Recruitment of DE&S Suitably Qualified and Experienced Personnel (SQEP) resource to assure the output remains an enduring challenge - The SRO holds no delegation and seeks a £20M per annum delegation. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The DCA has not changed since Q2 and remains at AMBER. This is due to the continued impact of the key areas of concern outlined above. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The DCA has not changed since Q2 and remains at AMBER. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The Government E-Marketplace and e-Sourcing solution will be hosted externally and will both require security accreditation to ensure that they meet MOD security and Networking requirements. - A Review Note was approved in August 2019 covering additional support to 2024/25. If this had not been approved then delivery confidence would have been reduced. - The timeline and funding profile has changed and therefore affordability may be an issue as expenditure now falls into later financial years than previously forecast. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Changing the delivery approach for e-Sourcing from an internally hosted solution with a reach in capability to a cloud hosted software as a service (SAAS) solution. - Gaining approval of a Review Note in August 2019 to allow delivery of Release 4 - Government e-Marketplace Catalogue solution and a cloud hosted E-Sourcing solution. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The Core Production Capability (CPC) Project is the phased regeneration of the current nuclear core production facilities on the Rolls-Royce Site at Raynesway in Derby, the sustainment of the current capability and the production, development and manufacture of the nuclear reactor cores to meet Astute and Dreadnought technical specifications. The Amber Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) recognised completion of significant work to re-baseline the CPC project and enhance governance arrangements. - The DCA remains Amber to recognise the remaining schedule and technical risk in delivering a new core to meet the Dreadnought build programme. | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The abolition of PF2 as a funding source as a result of changes to the Private Funding rules by HMT. Subsequent clarification from Treasury indicates that opportunities for the use of private finance within government are limited and will most likely score ‘on balance sheet’ and require the provision of capital budget. - The impact on delivery of the DEO Portfolio with the transition from the DIO Strategic Business Partner (SBP) to Civil Service leadership and Client Side Partner (CSP). The risk from the handover of responsibilities was partly mitigated through extending the contracts of some delivery staff in key roles but required the onboarding of circa 100 civil servant and contractor staff in the last 12 months. This is providing required resource in both Project delivery and supporting Programme Management, Commercial and Technical functions. - DEO portfolio has been reviewed and revised to align delivery plans with financial planning in ABC20 through a rebaselining exercise. This was undertaken collaboratively between DIO, TLB's and FMC to ensure full transparency of content, schedule and financial implications. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Capacity of suppliers remains a concern given high numbers of major Gov Infra Prog's and Defence Proj. Comms strategy for extensive Assessment Study activity has been developed for review and signoff. A Request for Information was issued to Industry. - The arrangement/Invitation to Tender (ITT) for financial support (Private Finance Technical Support - PFTS) has been temporarily paused, required in May 2020. CCS to award a Construction Capital works Framework in Autumn, DIO to fully mobilise by Q1 20/21. Engagement with Treasury on alternate (PF) funding options continues, led by the SRO. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The Dreadnought submarine programme remains within budget and on track for the First of Class, HMS Dreadnought, to enter service in the early 2030s. Staged investments have allowed good progress to continue on the whole boat design and the construction process. - Design and construction activity is progressing at pace through Delivery Phase 2, which will run until March 2021. This year has seen further investment in the current phase of the programme when construction work officially started on Valiant, the second in class of Dreadnought submarines. - These investments support new facilities for BAE Systems and the next generation of facilities at Rolls-Royce's Raynesway site; needed to deliver nuclear propulsion power plants for all four Dreadnought submarines. This award will support over 600 highly skilled Rolls-Royce personnel, enabling the company to make further commitments into the supply-chain. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - As reported previously, there have been technical complications with the manufacturing of the missile tubes to be used in the Common Missile Compartment being developed for our 3 submarines and the United States (US) Columbia Class. - Build quality issues on some missile tubes for the Dreadnought Class submarines were identified in 2018. Assessment and repair work continues with the main supplier and their subcontractors, with our world class UK engineers working alongside their US counterparts to achieve the earliest supply of missile tubes into the Dreadnought programme. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - Delivery forecast at Q2 was Amber, however cancelation of the competition means Design and Manufacture contract will not be awarded in 2020. The programme is currently undergoing a period of review and reset. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - Delivery confidence remains unchanged however the underlying reasons are different from the previous years assessment. FY 19/20 saw several sequential approvals submitted through Defence and Other Government Departments (OGDs) as well as contracting for a new Client Side Support provider which created uncertainty within the programme. All are now complete so an improved rating is anticipated Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The 2019 General Election and HMT single year approvals drove delay into the investment approvals process. The programme continues to search for ways in which this lost time can be regained and has developed deeper professional relationships with OGDs to better manage this in future. - COVID-19 has impacted on the programme, predominately in the SKYNET 6 Service Delivery Wrap competition. Full COVID-19 consequences have not yet materialised, so it is not yet possible to determine the longer term programmatic impact. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - New Client Side Support partner effectively onboarded and providing significant support to programme, that improved many aspects previous reported as needing attention by IPA and DMPP reviews. All projected approvals have been completed. - New SRO, dedicating 50% of their time to FBLOS-SKYNET 6 was onboarded in Nov 19, a 1-year extension of the additional Programme Director to Oct 20 and completion of the recruitment into the Programme Management Office have all improved the management and governance of the programme. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was RED, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The reduced DCA (at Qtr. 2 19/20) reflected the delays to releasing the ITNs and the fact that the Programme could not be delivered to the IAC approved dates. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) RED IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The single biggest uncertainty as we enter the next phase is related to CV-19. Where possible we have sought to protect resources from being prioritised to CV-19 related tasking. We have put in place ways of working that will allow the Evaluation and Negotiation to proceed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) RED IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Progress between Qtr2 19/20 and Qtr. 4 19/20 has seen significant progress with the procurement process, and with the IAC approving an (up to) 18m extension to the Assessment Phase the Qtr. 4 Delivery Confidence Assessment has improved to Red/Amber. - There have been some real highlights in Qtr4: all the Procurements remain viable; the MSDF Extensions were placed in very tight timescales and with a clear transition to FMSP; the Operating Model has progressed to a level of maturity for final approval and mobilisation. - We have started to get some momentum with establishing the necessary change initiatives to deliver the benefits and the IAC have approved the Extension to the Assessment phase. | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | Provision of narrative not possible due to prioritisation of Covid 19 response | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - Significant activity across all of the Defence Lines Of Development took place in order to rectify issues with weapons' clearances, infrastructure completion at RAF Marham and Sovereign Data Manager for Autonomic Logistics Information System integration on to UK networks. This all enabled the declaration of Capability Milestone 1, Initial Operational Capability from Land, on schedule in Dec 18 . - Post Initial Operational Capability declaration, in June 19, the Lightning Force undertook their first overseas deployment in order to test logistics and support at range. Due to early success the Lightning Force were able to conduct their first operational missions from RAF Akrotiri in Cyprus in support of Operation SHADER. - Significant programme and pan-Defence Lines Of Development effort to effectively burn down provisos from Initial Operating Capability in order to deepen and sustain Initial Operational Capability also contributed to the improved picture maintaining significant momentum for this and future milestones. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Programme management alongside Lightning Delivery Team and Defence Lines Of Development Stakeholders conducted regular deep dives into any issues in order to develop path to resolution. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The Programme made significant progress to de-risk Initial Operating Capability position. Primarily, this was related to infrastructure and providing facilities for operating the aircraft in the first six months, both at Naval Air Station Jacksonville (Florida) and Kinloss Barracks, until RAF Lossiemouth infrastructure is ready (expected September 2020). - After three years of engineering and safety data gathering, analysis and assessment, the Programme achieved the required airworthiness certification which allowed the aircraft to receive its initial Release-to-Service and Military Type Certificate. - Work by the project achieved the necessary mission support facilities to enable initial Marine Patrol Aircraft training and operations, from both NAS Jacksonville and Kinloss. Early concerns around connectivity and ability to provide mission data had been successfully alleviated through forward-leaning intervention. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The biggest long-term Programme risk remains the provision of personnel to enable the required growth path to Full Operating Capability. During this period, it became apparent that there were more concerns around the supporting elements necessary to meet workforce assumptions, particularly in engineering/maintenance. - Development of wider infrastructure at RAF Lossiemouth, including resurfacing of runways and other sustainment projects, has begun. Whilst outside the MPA Programme, this is a key dependency and good progress has been made which is reducing risk against remaining at Kinloss, the temporary operating base. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Programme has taken the decision to draw down supporting facilities and equipment at NAS Jacksonville earlier than planned to focus effort at the UK Main Operating Base at RAF Lossiemouth. This will improve spares and logistic provision and increase the Programme's resilience in the first year of operating. - Further to the mission system preparatory work, the Programme allocated specific 'subject matter expert' personnel to help resolve some challenging integration issues. Although not entirely solved yet, good progress was made. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Green, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - Ship 4 RFA TIDEFORCE , the final ship to be delivered as part of this programme, was declared In Service in August 2019. Full Operating Capability was declared in November 2019 with all 4 ships now fully operational. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Remaining trials will be affected by COVID-19 impact to Navy Command programme. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - Installation of new regulatory-compliant airfield Secondary Surveillance equipment (Wide Area Multilateration - WAM) highlighted performance issues with certain military aircraft types operating non-compliant transponder systems. This meant that the new systems could not be accepted into operational use alongside the legacy primary radar systems. - System users raised concerns regarding the ability to detect and track civilian aircraft with non-compliant secondary surveillance transponder systems (or no transponders at all) when Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) was used alongside legacy primary radar equipment. This meant that WAM could not be brought into operational use. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The programme schedule has been revised in order to prioritise the delivery of new primary surveillance systems. Performance of the new radars will address user concerns associated with Wide Area Multilateration detection of aircraft operating non-compliant secondary surveillance transponders (or no transponders at all). - Legacy secondary surveillance systems will remain in place until the new and more capable primary radars are delivered by the programme. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The schedule remained stable and unchanged between Q2 18/19 and Q2 19/20 - MIV remained on course for a Main Gate Business Case submission and approval in line with the schedule between Q2 18/19 and Q2 19/20 Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - There have been no relevant external factors which have impacted the original DCA. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Mech Inf Main Gate Business Case was approved in Q4 Calendar Year 2019 which improved the DCA from AMBER to AMBER/GREEN - The prime contact was signed with ARTEC (Original Equipment Manufacturer) via OCCAR (Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'Armement - the international organisation through which procurement is taking place) at the end of Q4 calendar year 2019. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The MODNet Evolve Programme has been impacted by Departmental spend control measures that resulted in the pause of several of its Projects until Apr 2020. A Review Note to the Defence Investment Approvals Committee will re-set the Programme by Sep 2020. - The MODNet Evolve Programme continues to have a heavy reliance on contracted support though an improved position has been achieved through the implementation of the Defence Digital resource strategy this is not expected to address the current imbalance until late in 2020. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Defence Digital has implemented a MODNet Evolve Resource strategy that is addressing the Programmes heavy reliance on contracted support. - The MODNet Evolve Programme has raised a Review Note to the MOD Investment Approvals Committee to address the change driven by the Departmental spend control measures implemented in Nov 2019. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - A continued lack of project resources, particularly skilled technical resources has continually delayed delivery Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The programme has not resourced for a successful and timely delivery.. Consequently the schedule for delivery of Secret and Overseas has slipped month on month for the last 18 months. - The MOD and contractor teams are in general located in different parts of the country. This prevents good working relationships and a lack of joint planning Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The SRO with MOD CIO have worked with Cabinet Office Crown Commercial representatives to improve performance including securing agreement to add additional resources. The additional resources have now started to come on stream and some improvements are being seen. Some early users have been migrated to the MODNET(S) service and the Alpha phases of the Windows 10 project have started. - Joint planning and delivery of COVID19 mitigations has improved joint working | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | Exempt under Section 24 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (National Security) | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The improved confidence is attributable to the re-baseline of the Programme and approval of the Review Note with adjusted Control Total by Investment Appraisal Committee Outletter on 8 April 19. This made the programme affordable and approved an adjusted timeline for Initial Operating Capability and Full Operational Capability and incorporated a 28 month slip. - Confidence was also injected into the Programme g when the Direct Commercial Sales 2 Test & Evaluation Contract Milestone was achieved in Sep 19. Award of the infrastructure Phase 1 contract to Boeing UK as well as a number of successful smaller contracts and Critical Design Reviews have also boosted confidence. - A steady increase in overall Reaper Force crew numbers has also improved confidence: this has been brought about by improved retention; Royal Australian Air Force exchange officers; and a pathway to using contractors to relieve Royal Air Force personnel at the deployed location. This gave more confidence that the 45 Reaper crews needed for Transition to Protector would be achieved by end 2020. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The RAF Phase 1, 2 and 3 training has been impacted by the restrictions imposed due to COVID-19. The effect on the Reaper Force crew numbers and, by extension, the transition to Protector is not yet clear. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - DE&S will act as the Delivery Team for the Protector Infrastructure project at RAF Waddington. An exemption from using the Defence Infrastructure Organisation was granted in June 2019. The Protector facility project has been combined with that of E-7 Wedgetail, this has allowed for efficiencies of design by creating shared spaces and use of a joint contracting strategy. - The solution for the Synthetic Training System has been changed to ensure compliance and compatibility with Air's collective synthetic training programme. The impact to the programme cost and schedule are now understood and the amended solution will deliver an excellent capability. This item is still on the critical path but is now progressing. - A contract for crews for the Reaper Launch and Recovery Element based at the deployed location (known as UK1) will take effect in June 2020. This will allow up to seven RAF crews (21 people) to be relieved from the forward deployed location and return to home units, boosting the numbers of crews available for mission control towards the 45 that will be needed for transition to Protector. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - Delivery confidence rating for both Q2 1819 and Q2 1920 reflected the ongoing scheduling challenge of generating HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH for Initial Operating Capability (Carrier Strike) in December 2020. - Concerns expressed in Q2 1819 reflecting the HMS PRINCE OF WALES build challenge were mitigated by a sound relationship with the Aircraft Carrier Alliance and a common desire to meet set targets, reflected in the timely departure on successful Contractor Sea Trials. - Queen Elizabeth Class support has been enhanced through the approval of a Support Improvement Project. This programme of work is funded over 3 years starting FY2021, improving delivery of the QEC Upkeep and Maintenance Cycle and enhancing deployed QEC organic sustainability necessary to deliver Continuous Carrier Availability. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The impacts of COVID-19 on shoreside engineering support and the training schedule for both HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH and HMS PRINCE OF WALES is being assessed. The intent of holding to schedule where it is safe and practicable to do so. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - HMS PRINCE OF WALES was declared In Service on time in Mar 2020. It is normal for some agreed build work to be transferred to the MOD for completion in service. Close relations with Industrial Partners achieved work package that was notably smaller than for HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Red, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - Technical issues were encountered with the new weapon design during the submarine launched trial resulting in the trial being abandoned. The data from this trial was urgently required to support the ongoing technical investigation into weapon reliability and performance of the upgraded fibre-optic guidewire dispensing system. - The Weapon Thread project will deliver the submarine combat system upgrades that are necessary to deploy the new weapon. The schedule for delivery of these changes does not currently support a full transition to the upgraded weapon design before the old weapon design needs to be withdrawn from service. - Under the forecasted schedule for the Weapon Thread project the in-service conversion plan that will allow transition from the old weapon design to the new weapon design will place an extreme stress on the operational availability and reserve stockpile levels of the Spearfish Heavy Weight Torpedo. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - At this point the trials programme for the new weapon was dependent on submarine and surface asset availability and, given the operational demand for these assets, it was increasingly difficulty to successfully co-ordinate trials with RN platform availability. Since September 2019 a trials strategy has been developed that mitigates this dependency. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Confidence in the weapon design, especially the fibre-optic dispensing system, has increased significantly following improvements in the manufacturing process, further shore-based testing and a successful repeat of Boat Trial 2. The weapon design has now been frozen and future trials are planned to improve the statistical confidence in weapon reliability. - An agreed safety case for the Weapon Thread Minimum Operating Capability design and completion of the Critical Design Review is required to progress through testing to manufacture. This has been the main effort of the Weapon thread team for several months and although not yet complete has progressed significantly. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - The consumption of float in the schedule has required a review of the performance management baseline. At Q2 this review had not completed. In project management, float is the amount of time that a task in a project schedule can be delayed without causing a delay to subsequent tasks or project completion date. - Consumption of float expected to impact forecast dates but remain within contractual and approved dates. In project management, float is the amount of time that a task in a project schedule can be delayed without causing a delay to subsequent tasks or project completion date. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The rebaselining is complete and an Operational Plan was issued in January 2020 - Processes to release design engineering products have been addressed to reduce risk of further contingency consumption | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - In order to achieve contract award by mid-November, as challenged by the Prime Minister, cross-Government investment approvals were required by no later than 31 Oct 19. A recent Project Assessment Review (PAR) was conducted in September 19 concluded that a Delivery Confidence Assessment of Amber was considered appropriate. The review team assessed that programme success was achievable, but that two necessary actions must be implemented as soon as practicable. The first action was to resolve the programme's affordability challenge, requiring the Department to prioritise the project within the wider Defence portfolio. The second action was to ensure that full cross-Government approvals were achieved before the fixed price contract offer expiry date of 31 Dec 19. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Cross-Government investment approvals were achieved by the end of Oct 19, permitting award of the T31 Design & Build contract in Nov 19. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The Full Operating Capability 2 programme milestone was successfully declared on 30 Nov 18, which effectively delivered the capability to the Army at the correct modification standard (Equipment Standard 2). - The former In-Service Support Contract for Watchkeeper (CLS16) expired on 31 Mar 19. Contract award of a new In-Service Support Contract (FSC19) was achieved on 27 Mar 19, thereby ensuring continuity of comprehensive logistic support for the capability until Apr 24. - A Watchkeeper Equipment Standard 2 Release To Service was authorised by the Release To Service Authority on 1 Apr 19 which enabled the capability to be operated by the Army in the UK and from an Assured Flying Location in Cyprus. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The adverse weather conditions experienced in West Wales between Oct 19 and Mar 20, severely hampered the developmental test and evaluation schedule. This introduced a delay of approximately 8 weeks to the embodiment of a package of modifications (Spiral 1) originally scheduled for Jul 20. - COVID 19 related restrictions forced all developmental flight testing to cease on 25 Mar 20. The full impact of this is not yet understood, but it will compound the delays already caused by adverse weather. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Delay to the delivery of the next scheduled software modification package will not prevent Watchkeeper from being operationally deployable, but it will mean that the planned additional functionality will not be available for operations as expected (Mode 5 IFF, Radar Maritime Tracking). - Until the emergence of COVID 19, flying training was progressing well in both the UK and Cyprus, giving increased confidence in the programme's ability to generate trained pilots and groundcrew. | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| Project - Start Date (Latest Approved Start Date) | 17/05/2000 | 15/03/2018 | 04/12/2014 | 04/12/2014 | 04/12/2014 | 22/05/2013 | Exempt under Section 24 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (National Security) | 31/01/2011 | 07/09/2015 | 31/03/2008 | 01/12/2011 | 01/04/2012 | 31/03/2013 | 01/11/2016 | 14/04/2011 | 01/04/2016 | 01/01/2011 | 26/09/2016 | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | 16/10/2013 | 01/10/2001 | 13/06/2016 | 25/07/2005 | 03/04/2006 | 02/04/2018 | 29/02/2016 | 01/04/2015 | 01/04/2015 | 01/04/2008 | 30/04/2009 | 01/12/1998 | 01/04/2008 | 21/07/2008 | 01/04/2016 | 01/03/1998 | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| Project - End Date (Latest Approved End Date) | 31/03/2024 | 01/02/2023 | 31/07/2028 | 30/04/2025 | 31/12/2026 | 31/03/2021 | Exempt under Section 24 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (National Security) | 31/12/2030 | 30/03/2032 | 01/04/2032 | 13/08/2021 | 30/04/2028 | 30/06/2023 | 31/03/2041 | Exempt under Freedom of Information Act 2000 sections 24 (National Security) 26 (Defence) and 35 (Formulation of government policy). | 30/04/2030 | 31/12/2041 | 31/03/2030 | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | 31/12/2035 | 31/03/2035 | 01/04/2024 | 28/02/2019 | 31/12/2024 | 31/12/2032 | 01/09/2021 | 31/03/2022 | 25/03/2025 | 30/04/2025 | 31/03/2035 | 31/03/2023 | 31/03/2024 | 01/05/2035 | 28/02/2030 | 31/03/2021 | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| Departmental narrative on schedule, including any deviation from planned schedule (if necessary) | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/24, has lengthened by 366 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/23, due primarily to the following factors; - The ongoing Global Re-Baselining of the international Programme had undermined our ability to accurately judge the baseline project end date. - The date of 31 Mar 2024 account for this, and is in-line with the Mandate, which was revised post-Global Rebaselining. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/24, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The graduation criteria for a number of capabilities have been agreed in the last 6-months. This will have a positive impact and an expansion of the A400M's tactical capabilities on the front line. - Recognising the challenges posed by aircraft availability, the trials and evaluation community has been flexible in their approach to gathering the evidence required to support capability enhancements. As a result, the evidence to support the transfer of a natural surface landing strip capability to front line crews is planned for 2020. | The scheduled project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/02/23, due primarily to the following factors; - The schedule of Initial Operating Capability in Feb 23 allowed 13 months for transition to Full Operating Capability of Mar 24. As highlighted in the DCA Review the timeline was unachievable and required re-baselining. - The schedule has been re-baselined contract let still remains as Mar 23 for an Initial Operating Capability of Mar 24, with Full Operating Capability to follow. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/02/23, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The Initial Gate Business Case has received Investment Approvals Committee approval for an Initial Operating Capability revised schedule of Mar 24. Ministerial approval was granted in Mar 20 & Cabinet Office / HM Treasury Approval in May 20. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/07/28, has lengthened by 791 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/06/26, due primarily to the following factors; - In this period the programme's scope was expanded from obsolescence only to include enhancements to its lethality and survivability. The expanded scope has also lengthened the time to complete the work and increased cost over the assessment, demonstration and manufacture phases. These dates are currently subject to negotiation and will be confirmed when the full business case has been approved. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/07/28, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Currently the impact of COVID 19 on the programme end date is unknown. Other non-project activities have not had an impact. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/07/28, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The change in dates are purely as a result of the expanded scope, as explained above. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 30/04/25, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 30/04/25, due primarily to the following factors; - General Dynamics maintained their commitment to deliver the project during a recast of the contract in 2018. - The schedule remained stable between Q2 18/19 and Q2 19/20. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 30/04/25, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Delays to trials due to COVID-19 may affect the project end date although the impact is still being assessed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 30/04/25, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The schedule to the project end date is being reassessed in light of General Dynamics' delay to deliver vehicles in line with the contract. At the moment there is no forecast change to the end date but there is an increased risk that it will be delayed. - An issue has come to light that could affect the safety operating clearance of AJAX's turret. Remedial engineering work to rectify the issue is causing some delay. This delay should not affect the end date of the project although the full impact is still being assessed. | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/21, has shortened by 240 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 26/11/21, due primarily to the following factors; - This reflected the agreement of an updated mandate for the Programme, reflecting the impact on the Programme of the Better Defence Estate strategy, and subsequently Army 2020 Refine. - These factors had a material impact on the Programme, either by affecting the long-term future of sites the Army Basing Programme had planned to invest in, or by changing the Unit laydown on retained sites. - The updated Mandate affirmed the Senior Responsible Owner's intention of graduating the Programme in Mar 21, accepting that a small number of Army Basing Programme projects would continue to deliver improved infrastructure for units in situ beyond this date. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/21, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The recent COVID19 outbreak has impacted on the Programme. While this will not have a material bearing on the Army Basing Programme’s strategic goals, it has affected the schedule and costs of the remaining projects, though as at Apr 20, it is too early to quantify the extent of this impact. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/21, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The Infrastructure and Projects Authority Review, conducted in Feb 20, provided a GREEN Confidence Assessment and recommended the Senior Responsible Owner explore early graduation from the Government Major Projects Portfolio. The Senior Responsible Owner accepted this recommendation subject to the development of a realistic and achievable graduation plan. - As a result, the Programme is planning to graduate from the Defence Major Programmes Portfolio in Autumn 2020, and a plan to achieve this is being developed. - The Senior Responsible Owner is clear the final decision to graduate will be condition based, with a final judgement to invoke an Infrastructure and Projects Authority Exit Review to be made in Summer 2020, based on satisfactory progress against the Graduation Plan. | Exempt under Section 24 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (National Security) | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/12/26, has shortened by 1461 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/12/30, due primarily to the following factors; - CEPP is on track to deliver IOC(CS) by 31 Dec 20, FOC(CS) by 31 Dec 23 and FOC (CEPP) by 1 Apr 26 as per the mandate. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/12/26, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Covid-19 may well have an impact on IOC(CS) on 31 Dec 20, but all SROs are working hard to mitigate any affects. The programme is still on track. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/12/26, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - A regular process of review has been instigated to monitor/mitigate the effects of Covid-19. | The scheduled project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 30/03/32, due primarily to the following factors; - 2032 is the end date agreed when the programme was rebalanced during 2017, based on the forecast completion date of all projects within the programme. This date remains extant at this time. - The primary drivers for the completion date of the projects include the DREADNOUGHT Class in service date and achieving the endorsed ambition of a Single Integrated Operating Base. The volume of concurrent activity that can be commissioned simultaneously across the site is limited by the need to maintain operations and deconflict activity in a geographically constrained highly secure environment. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 30/03/32, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The long term impact of COVID19 on specific projects and the available industrial base is being assessed to understand the impact on the programme completion date. - Analysis of the volume of work required to remediate key facilities across the Programme, may require some re-prioritisation of the work against the original 2017 baseline. A Capability Audit has been commissioned to review the Portfolio Definition which could impact on the programme completion date. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/04/32, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/04/32, due primarily to the following factors; - The original Portfolio agreement covered a ten-year period that takes us up to Apr 2020, however this agreement is enduring, therefore we do not face a cliff-edge on the contract at that time or in 2032. Work is now underway through the Complex Weapons strategy to assess what the next 10-15 years of the CWP should be, including innovative commercial models that are more responsive to evolving threats, whilst continuing to deliver on the outputs of the current Portfolio with a greater focus on In-Service Support arrangements | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 13/08/21, has lengthened by 1231 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/18, due primarily to the following factors; - Changing the delivery approach for Sourcing from an internally hosted solution with a reach in capability to a cloud hosted software as a service (SAAS) solution has lengthened the timeline. - The Government E-Marketplace and e-Sourcing solution will be hosted externally and will both require security accreditation to ensure that they meet MOD security and Networking requirements. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 13/08/21, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Changing the delivery approach for Sourcing from an internally hosted solution with a reach in capability to a cloud hosted software as a service (SAAS) solution has lengthened the timeline. - The Government E-Marketplace and e-Sourcing solution will be hosted externally and will both require security accreditation to ensure that they meet MOD security and Networking requirements. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 30/04/28, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 30/04/28, due primarily to the following factors; - The baseline end date remains unchanged at 30 April 2028 and will be revised once Phase 2 infrastructure designs have matured. | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/41, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/41, due primarily to the following factors; - No Change - The Portfolio will be delivered in sequential waves: PF and Wave 1 then Wave 2 and possibly then some of Wave 3. Wave 2 onwards is funded from the receipts of the preceding wave so rely on timeliness of delivery and overall receipts generated. Wave 2 onwards are therefore a series of candidate projects that will be matured, programmed and delivered as confidence in the preceding waves improves. | Exempt under Section 22 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Information intended for future publication) | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 30/04/30, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 30/04/30, due primarily to the following factors; - On 5 November 2019 the Secretary of State for Defence agreed that the Fleet Solid Support ship competition should be stopped because it had become clear that a value for money solution could not be reached. The Department is now considering the most appropriate way forward for the Fleet Solid Support Programme. It is too early to say what impact stopping the competition might have on the entry into service of the Fleet Solid Support ships. This will be reviewed as part of our work to develop a way forward. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/41, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/41, due primarily to the following factors; - The FBLOS capability planning assumption is a 15-year spacecraft life commencing 2027. This programme is analysing technological options and can only reassess the programme end date once this part of the programme (Enduring Capability project) reaches predicted Full Business Case in late 2021. - The end date is too far in the future and it is too early in the programme to accurately calculate any changes given the speed at which Space Technology is changing. It is not currently forecast that there is any circumstance that would need that date to be changed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/41, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - There are no known non-project operating environment activities that are expected to affect the 31/12/2041 date; it is too far in the future to predict and impact of any activity since Q2 19/20. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/41, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - There are no known primary project actions that would affect the projects end date of 31/12/2041. The SKYNET 6 Enduring Capability project is still in assessment Phase and will not fully conclude until late 2021, when it is expected to down select the choices/options and make recommendations. - The provision of the SKYNET 6 Enduring Capability project Full Business Case in late 2021 is the first point at which any credible impact to the project end date of 31/12/2041 can credibly be assessed. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/30, has lengthened by 3838 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 27/09/19, due primarily to the following factors; - The Qtr. 2 18/19 date reflected the planned completion of the assessment phase. The revised forecast CR9date now reflects the maximum duration of the FMSP Programme. The contract lengths will be optimised through the commercial and procurement approach and will likely be shorter duration than the maximum forecast duration. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/30, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The project end date will be adjusted in the Final Business Case following the ongoing commercial activity to optimise the duration of the individual contracts within the programme. | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | Provision of narrative not possible due to prioritisation of Covid 19 response | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/35, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/35, due primarily to the following factors; - The project remains on schedule with no foreseeable issues likely to affect a successful outcome | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/04/24, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/04/24, due primarily to the following factors; - The Programme end date is primarily based on delivery of the full complement of personnel required to meet the final Programme milestone (FOC). Delivery of key equipment and supporting contracts will be complete well in advance of this date (final aircraft delivery is expected by end-2021). - There remains risk around the delivery of the some branches and trades of personnel and work is on-going to understand the full implications of any shortfalls and potential mitigations. This is the most significant risk to successful completion of this Programme. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/04/24, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The full impact of Covid-19 on delivery of equipment, support and personnel into the Programme is not yet fully understood at the time of writing. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/04/24, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The Programme achieved its Initial Operating Capability milestone on 1 April 2020, on schedule and as endorsed in the Main Gate Business Case approved in June 2016. By cementing this initial milestone, the Programme has established a firm footing to make further progress. - The next significant milestone is the Interim Capability Milestone scheduled for November 2021, but with a target date of September 2021. By this time the majority of significant equipment, support facilities and contracts will be in place and the Programme will have good indications of reaching FOC. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 28/02/19, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 28/02/19, due primarily to the following factors; - Full operating capability achieved Dec 19. Acquisition complete and all 4 ships are in service | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/24, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/24, due primarily to the following factors; - Equipment delivery across the scope of the programme has progressed well. - Service support to both legacy and newly-installed equipment has been good. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/24, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Replanning has been conducted to prioritise the delivery of primary surveillance radar equipment, but associated changes have not taken the projected end date beyond the existing Baseline End Date (aligned with Approvals). - Delivery of new air traffic management systems such as radios, navigation aids, etc., has continued at pace while replanning for the surveillance systems has been underway. | The scheduled project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/32, due primarily to the following factors; - Full Operating Capability will be achieved by 2032, including the delivery of all platforms on contract. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/32, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - There have been no relevant external factors which have impacted the project end date - it remains as provided in the Main Gate Business Case. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/32, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The baseline project end date remains extant. - Design work is continuing as planned. Covid 19 has yet to have a clear impact, but we are monitoring the situation closely. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/09/21, has shortened by 313 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 11/07/22, due primarily to the following factors; - The dates presented in Q2 18/19 related to the end of Transition from the current contract to new services. Dates presented in Q2 19/20 relate to a contract award date and do not represent the Programme end date. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/09/21, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The MODNet Evolve Programme has been impacted by Departmental spend control measures that resulted in the pause of three of its Projects until Apr 2020. This has delayed the procurement activity of three of the Projects within the Programme, Managed Print, Records management and Productivity and collaboration. The pause has required the programme to raise a Review Note to bring the projects back within their approvals. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/22, has lengthened by 1487 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 05/03/18, due primarily to the following factors; - A two year extension period for exit and transition into the New MODNET Evolve contracts was approved by MOD, Treasury and Cabinet Office in Aug 2019. Contract exit is now March 22. - MODNET Evolve Contracting period has taken longer than originally planned due to a lack of resources and unclear requirements. This issues have now been resolved and plans are in place to transition to the new services. There remains a risk that all services may not be delivered by Mar 22 and action may need to be taken to extend the current arrangements. A decision will be taken by Dec 20. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/22, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Covid19 may affect project end date of 31.3.22. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/22, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - An exit team has been set up in the project team to ensure the plans are in place to achieve a controlled exit from the project and contract. - Services are being moved to crown hosted environments to speed the transition to new contracts and ensure exit dates are maintained. - Options for continued and increased services in the Secret domain are being considered to ensure contract exit dates are maintained. | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 30/04/25, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 30/04/25, due primarily to the following factors; - For the MENSA infrastructure project at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, MOD has made improvements to supply chain management, increasing the proportion of contracts to a fixed cost or target cost forecast basis - We have incorporated lessons learned from the management of MENSA into the development of other significant infrastructure projects. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/35, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/35, due primarily to the following factors; - baseline project end date did not change because this reflects the expected length of time that Protector will be in RAF service. - Baseline end date did not change because Protector is planned to be in RAF Service for 14.3 years after Initial Operating Capability is declared. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/35, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The programme was rebaselined following approval of a Review Note by IAC in April 2019 to reflect a slip to the Initial Operating Capability date. This has moved the end date to 31 Mar 2038. - The reporting has now been updated to show the re-baselined Out of Service Date of 31 Mar 2038, this is 14.3 years after the new Initial Operating Capability date of Nov 2023. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/23, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/23, due primarily to the following factors; - The build programme for HMS PRINCE OF WALES and the generation schedule for HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH to declare IOC(CS) were both on track. The baseline end date of the programme is defined as FOC(CS) and the QEP contribution remains on-track. FOC(CS) is dependent on upon several programmes, most notably F35B. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/23, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - FOC(CS) is dependent upon several programmes, underwritten by achievement of IOC(CS) in Dec 2020 and incorporation of lessons from operational deployment in 2021. The immediate impacts of COVID-19 on the generation of CSG21 is underway but the intent is to hold the existing schedule where it is safe and practicable. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/23, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - HMS PRINCE OF WALES was accepted on schedule in December 2019 and declared In Service on time in Mar 2020. HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH generation for declaration of IOC(CS) is on schedule. At this point, the QEC programme baseline end date remains 31 Mar 23. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/24, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/24, due primarily to the following factors; - Delivery of the upgraded weapon was subject to review due to the technical encountered during trials, however, it was still forecast to be significantly earlier than the date required to support operational use following platform conversion under Weapon Thread and therefore the overall forecast end date remained unchanged. - The Submarine Combat System upgrades are the key driver for the baseline end date. Delivery of these upgrades are expected to push the boundary of the existing MOD0 weapon life, which has become the de facto programme end date and this is relatively inflexible as it driven by weapon safety. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/24, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The in-water trials programme has now been decoupled from the availability of RN assets and plans for an overseas trial removed from the Critical Path. This will allow MOD to renegotiate a commercial position with the Prime contractor and to progress through the demonstration phase to full manufacture. - Since Q219/20 fourteen enterprise wide workshops have taken place working towards a whole-boat safety case for submarine intrinsic and dynamic safety when employing the MOD1 weapon design. Although this work is still ongoing significant progress has been made and critically no changes are anticipated to the current design. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/05/35, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/05/35, due primarily to the following factors; - Project closure is forecast for 2035, it is too early to predict any change to the baseline - The project closure date was a broad estimate at time of Main Gate 2. A revised, risk adjusted estimate is expected to be available at the next full approval point once we seek to move to contract for batch 2. Main Gate was the MOD major investment decision point prior to contractual commitment with industry. Under the internal MOD MAID review in 2019, the process has been modified to align to wider government practice and future major investment decisions points will be known as Full Business Case (FBC) decisions. | The scheduled project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 28/02/30, due primarily to the following factors; - Project closure is baseline for 2030, it is too early to predict any change to the forecast. - The baseline date is based upon the delivery date of the final ship, with an additional programme of work post-delivery to account for acceptance, safety, sea trials and training activities. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/03/21, has lengthened by 1367 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 03/07/17, due primarily to the following factors; - The Jul 17 date relates to the Full Operating Capability 1 forecast date. The Jan 18 Accounting Officer's Assessment explained that this milestone was not achieved due to the loss of two aircraft in 2017, and a lack of Suitably Qualified & Experienced Persons within Industry and in DE&S. - Since the September 2018 transparency report, delivery of the final elements of the programme (beyond Full Operating Capability - principally the Service Inquiry rectification work) has been confirmed for Mar 21 2020. This may now be further delayed due to adverse weather impacting Test & Evaluation and COVID 19 related flying restrictions. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/03/21, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Active risk mitigation and continued engagement with suppliers has ensured the maintenance of an Amber / Green Delivery Confidence Assessment. | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| Financial Year Baseline (£m) (including Non-Government Costs) | £197.82 | £5.10 | £12.46 | £694.71 | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | £307.95 | £467.43 | £1.78 | £112.70 | £755.26 | £4.97 | £163.58 | £87.09 | £19.37 | £1,613.36 | £0.66 | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | £14.48 | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | £235.38 | £711.86 | £437.11 | £0.00 | £127.26 | £7.84 | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | £1,088.00 | £127.37 | £141.63 | £37.68 | £502.38 | £13.24 | £0.00 | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| Financial Year Forecast (£m) (including Non-Government Costs) | £186.19 | £5.10 | £11.95 | £643.00 | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | £314.49 | £424.11 | £1.75 | £117.70 | £728.75 | £4.89 | £163.11 | £75.24 | £11.75 | £1,613.36 | £0.66 | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | £20.20 | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | £238.18 | £750.37 | £513.47 | £0.81 | £129.15 | £8.16 | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | £1,028.69 | £140.35 | £145.27 | £35.32 | £502.28 | £12.76 | £0.04 | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| Financial Year Variance (%) | -6% | 0% | -4% | -7% | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | 2% | -9% | -2% | 4% | -4% | -2% | 0% | -14% | -39% | 0% | 0% | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | 39% | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | 1% | 5% | 12% | 100% | 1% | 4% | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | -5% | 10% | 3% | -6% | 0% | -4% | -12% | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| TOTAL Baseline Whole Life Costs (£m) (including Non-Government Costs) | £3,356.23 | £1,730.24 | £1,304.19 | £6,288.95 | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | £2,270.79 | £10,769.42 | £21.57 | £1,774.57 | £28,717.22 | £130.20 | £1,826.71 | £429.43 | £1,754.74 | £30,099.34 | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | £11,127.66 | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | £11,399.76 | £10,393.30 | £2,229.59 | £618.81 | £1,335.62 | £4,663.31 | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | £20,900.75 | £1,155.84 | £6,782.65 | £414.52 | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | £1,117.73 | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| Departmental narrative on budget/forecast variance for 2018/19 (if variance is more than 5%) | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -6%, is due primarily to the following factors; - In service support costs have been governed by aircraft availability and the number of hours being flown. This has had a concomitant impact (reduction) on in year costs. - Prudent planning has allowed the contingency of some costs to be reduced and efficiencies to be made in the supply chain. There has also been some deferral of planned activity to match the refined programme (realism). Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -6%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Close scrutiny of in service support costs, matching financial with increasingly-accurate availability forecasts has allowed for savings to be realised. - The degree of uncertainty and risk associated with in-service support has also been carefully managed; early decisions to retire risk have proven to be sound. | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -7%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Reduction in AJAX support due to decreased vehicles being fielded from prime production contract. This meant a reduction in CLS forecast, inability to complete ‘BATUS’ support milestone and reduction in planned levels of Capital spares due to inability to agree range, scaling and price of spares required. - Reduction in Infrastructure costs supporting AJAX programme as a result of reprofiling on sub projects projects which didn’t progress as quickly as expected. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -7%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Reprofiling of expenditure between years and minimal variances to the overall AJAX Demonstration & Manufacture and Support forecasts will have occurred as a result of changes to programme timescales. | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -9%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Greater clarity of expenditure across the Boat Build Programme. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -9%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Boat 4 has been successfully delivered from Barrow. - Through continued close engagement and collaboration with industry further schedule improvement has been made. | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -39%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Schedule changes resulting from re-programming activity have impacted expected delivery of Portfolio activity; in particular, the commencement of assessment studies, tendering for infrastructure solutions and construction - Contracts to obtain industry technical support for the development and delivery of site disposals, have been tendered and mobilised more slowly than anticipated. Overall disposals have not been impacted. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -39%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - We have re-baselined the schedule to take account of approval timelines to improve cost estimating and profiling. - We have utilised our industry partner to introduce an assessment study model that improves cost estimating accuracy and profiling - We have standardised the approach to business case submissions and stakeholder management leading to smoother and timely approvals | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 39%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The forecast/baseline variance reflects the funding allocated for Programme Operating Budget (predominantly people and specialist contractor support) necessary to support the procurement process. The forecast position reflected the original P90 estimate; the shortfall has not impacted on project progress. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 39%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - No non-project operating environment activities caused adjustments to the original Q2 19/20 forecast. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 39%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The uplift in OpEX also reflected the challenges in recruiting Civil Servants into key posts, with an increased demand on Manpower Substitutes and Public Sector Support. met with Navy Command TLB funding uplift to the P90 forecast. | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | Provision of narrative not possible due to prioritisation of Covid 19 response | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 5%, is due primarily to the following factors; - During this reporting period there was significant ongoing work on the underlying Lightning Cost Model therefore Control Total (Budget) figures were held at an old 2018 position. As a result there was no change to the control total which would have allowed for an updated forecast - Forex and accounting treatments will also have contributed to this data. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 5%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - Foreign Exchange fluctuations drove some variance into the Programme due to contracts being placed through the US Joint Programme Office. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 5%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - During this reporting period there was significant ongoing work on the underlying Lightning Cost Model therefore Control Total (Budget) figures were held at an old 2018 position. As a result there was no change to the control total which would have allowed for an updated forecast. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 12%, is due primarily to the following factors; - In-year variation has resulted mostly from a change to the exchange rate which affects this Programme as the majority of equipment purchases are from the US and are conducted in US Dollars. - Other factors which have affected the variance include a reduction to the infrastructure costs at RAF Lossiemouth due to changes in VAT treatment approved by HMRC and some underlying cost movements. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 12%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - Foreign Exchange rates have weakened the value of the pound which has increased the cost of equipment purchases from the US. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 12%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Work by the project has secured a reduced VAT position on a proportion of the infrastructure at RAF Lossiemouth, which has reduced overall cost. The final amount has not yet been determined. - The Programme has reduced expenditure on Private Sector Support, reprofiled some payments for synthetic training systems (flight simulators) and changed some safety components on the aircraft to align compliance with UK regulations | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 100%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The variance was caused by a misbooking that has now been corrected. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 100%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The variance was caused by a misbooking that has now been corrected, | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -5%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Revision of MENSA supply chain management has reduced in-year costs. - Increases in energy costs have provided a significant upward pressure across FY19/20 | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 10%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Unfavourable foreign exchange accounts for almost all of the In Year variance - A small variance in year was attributable to slightly increased costs in the Direct Commercial Sales Contract 1 that was signed in Aug 2019. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 10%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - foreign exchange movements continue to change the variance. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 10%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - A small underspend in the Detect and Avoid Capability project was caused by a slower-than-forecast route to approvals for this new project that meant the funds could not be spent In Year. | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -6%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The in-year baseline costs for the Spearfish Programme included manufacturing and operational costs for the conduct of a number of in-water demonstration trials, including one very significant cost to conduct an overseas trial. Due to a combination of technical issues and RN Platform availability these trials were delayed. - During FY19/20 Navy Command requested DE&S to investigate potential savings measures to improve the Top Level Budget in-year Control Total position. The Spearfish Upgrade Project Team identified the costs allocated to the delayed in-water trials, offering to reprofile these costs into later years when these trials could be completed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -6%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - No actions were necessary to recover the variance. As it was not be possible to complete the trials associated with these costs within year, Navy Command agreed a position to reprofile the costs into later years, which also alleviated the Top Level Budget Control Total position. | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -100%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The Type Airworthiness Authority's emerging requirement to be compliant with the Military Aviation Authority's TAE5000 regulation demanded mandated revisions to training, documentation, procedures and subsequent accreditation activity. This was tasked in Apr 19 and increased the forecast. - The correction and un-winding of previous FY accruals dropped the in-year forecast and pushed this to later in the year and next FY. This caused the forecast to reduce. | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| Departmental Narrative on Budgeted Whole Life Costs | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £3,356.23 m, has decreased by £38.66 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £3,394.89 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The reduction in Whole Life Cost for the capability programme has been largely due to the slowdown driven by the period of poor availability. Notable driving factors have also been: opportunities to change aircraft delivery schedules; and the retirement of risk. - The reduction in Whole Life Cost reflects a reduction in activity at the Front Line due to poor availability. E.g. the less the aircraft are flown the fewer spares they consume. Some efficiencies have been made during In Service Support contract negotiations. - There has been a small increase in Whole Life Cost for training provision largely due to revisions to the forecast software licensing costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £3,356.23 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Fluctuating foreign exchange rates continue to have an impact on the original forecast. - The ABC cost pressure within the MoD (particularly within the early years) is driving savings and deferments. This is not (in itself) significantly increasing risk against Programme delivery, as poor availability has introduced a degree of deferment realism. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £3,356.23 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Availability rates have not yet fully recovered, meaning that the Q2 position has endured for both the Capability and Support programmes. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,730.24 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The programme has been directed to not exceed the current cost of the three current single Service systems. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,304.19 m, due primarily to the following factors; - This reflects the financial position following the capability uplift endorsed by HMT. This sees a capability uplift and extension to the Main Battle Tank out to 2035. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £6,288.95 m, has decreased by £2.99 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £6,291.94 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The primary reason for movement in AJAX WLC relates to reduced initial activities required to support the In-service AJAX vehicles. A years’ worth of support costs would have been incurred between Q21819 and Q21920 and further certainty on the number/timing of vehicles being fielded into service from the prime production contract would be understood - this is now reduced so would shape revision of support costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £6,288.95 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - COVID-19 has caused some short-term delays. As the Prime Manufacturing and Support contract with GDUK is a firm price contract, there will be minimal affect on WLC if activity is moved into later months/years. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £6,288.95 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - No significant project actions have materially affected WLC. Reprofiling of expenditure between years and minimal variances to the overall AJAX Demonstration & Manufacture and Support forecasts will have occurred as a result of changes to programme timescales. | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £2,270.79 m, has increased by £211.53 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £2,059.26 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Some non-Programme running costs were inadvertently included in the Q2 19/20 financial baseline, which were mis-forecast, and since Q2 these have been reallocated to the appropriate budget area, returning the Programme forecast to its original baseline. - The remaining cost delta relates to forecast cost increases in the projects that are yet to complete within the Programme (some of which relate to projected inflation increases that have not materialised and were later removed from the forecast as a result). - The Programme remains within its overall Control Total. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £2,270.79 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - The recent COVID19 outbreak has impacted on the Programme. While this will not have a material bearing on the Army Basing Programme’s strategic goals, it has affected the schedule and costs of the remaining projects, though as at Apr 20, it is too early to quantify the extent of this impact. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £2,270.79 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Since the Q2 report, the programme funding has been reforecast in line with departmental annual budgetary processes, and now reflects an updated spend profile. - In preparation for Programme graduation in Autumn 2020, a reconciliation of the historic Programme spend is underway to provide an assurance that the historic accounts are accurate. - The Programme is closely monitoring and controlling remaining project costs to ensure they remain within the overall Programme budget. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £10,769.42 m, has increased by £798.65 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £9,970.77 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The department re-baselined the ASTUTE programme for the long term, with its associated whole life costs, as our understanding of the overall schedule and costs matured. Approval changes across the whole programme including boats, schedules, rates, and performance expectation. None of which are not attributable to a discrete boat or cause | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £21.57 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £21.57 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Planning assumptions for support of all three programmes within CEPP are proving to be valid. - The support assumptions are continually validated to ensure the correct budgeting for further years. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £21.57 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Close out of the QEC build programme costs with the Aircraft Carrier Alliance. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £21.57 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - A further WESTLANT deployment (Sep-Dec 19) which allowed further testing of support cost assumptions for QEC. - F-35B deployments to WESTLANT 19 for Operational Testing and to Exercise RED FLAG for operational training have allowed review of support assumptions. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,774.57 m, has increased by £2.95 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,771.62 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Maturing information across the programme in relation to asset condition. - Maturing information across the programme in development of estimated costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,774.57 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Working restrictions due to COVID19, impact under assessment. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,774.57 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Although the baseline costs have not moved materially, the forward profile for the programme will need to be adjusted to reflect the pace at which work can be delivered across the site given the operational exigencies that limit / constrain interventions to time bound windows of opportunity. - A Capability Audit is underway and will likely see some changes to project prioritisation which could have some impact on the long term financial profile. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £28,717.22 m, has increased by £2682.23 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £26,034.99 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Qtr. 2 1920 has captured cost escalation for Meteor Mid Life Refresh, SPEAR Cap 3 and Aster Mid-Life Refresh which had previously been recorded as Risk Outside Costing. - Planning Analytics went live in August 19 on PB&F and has provided greater tools for manipulating and extracting data from the system. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £28,717.22 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Complex Weapons Rebalancing exercise has realigned the forecast to Budget variance profile but has lead to further cost escalation by delaying delivery of production. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £28,717.22 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Complex Weapons Rebalancing has realigned forecast profile to budget but has resulted in further cost escalation. - Complex Weapons is holding a significant amount of Risk outside costing for FC/ASW and Meteor which are dependant on capability choices and could lead to further cost escalation. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £130.20 m, has decreased by £16.53 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £146.73 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Expenditure on the Government e-Marketplace Catalogue and Sourcing solution was an estimate in 18/19. Further research into the cost of delivering an e-Sourcing solution had taken place by Q2 1920 to support the production of a Review Note and the cost estimate was more informed. - Expenditure on the Government e-Marketplace Catalogue and Sourcing solution was an estimate in 18/19. Further research into the cost of the support of an e-Sourcing solution had taken place by Q2 1920 to support the production of a Review Note and the cost estimate was more informed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £130.20 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Expenditure on the Government e-Marketplace Catalogue and Sourcing solution was an estimate in 18/19. Further research into the cost of the support of an e-Sourcing solution had taken place by Q2 1920 to support the production of a Review Note and the cost estimate was more informed. - Expenditure on the Government e-Marketplace Catalogue and Sourcing solution was an estimate in 18/19. Further research into the cost of the support of an e-Sourcing solution had taken place by Q2 1920 to support the production of a Review Note and the cost estimate was more informed. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,826.71 m, has increased by £167.48 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,659.23 m, due primarily to the following factors; - A re-baselining of the CPC project was approved in early 2019 which incorporated a revised scope and updated cost estimates. | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,754.74 m, has increased by £587.87 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,166.87 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Increase to the Budget Line for PF2 within the v8 baseline to reflect additional PF cost requirements that had not been captured within v6 (as reported at Q2 18/19). Please note that the V8 baseline pre-dated PF2 withdrawal. - Increase in the budget provision to enable preliminary/feasibility studies and to procure private sector expertise to develop and deliver disposals and a Private Finance 2 (PF2) pipeline. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,754.74 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - We have undertaken a series of procurements to obtain industry support to develop and deliver DEO. - We have revised the DEO Portfolio budget profile as the baseline requirement has evolved. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £30,099.34 m, has increased by £39.28 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £30,060.07 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The whole life costs figure is for the acquisition of the submarines and associated additional infrastructure, beyond that currently in place for the Vanguard class, and the balance between the current in-service costs and those estimated to support the new boats. - The understanding of the Dreadnought design has matured significantly. Latest cost estimates provide a much more robust view. The programme still forecasts to come within the original estimates. - Over this last period major suppliers have firmed up their costings; this now provides a greater level of certainty in the financial forecast. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £30,099.34 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - A greater understanding of the technical requirements for the Combat Systems have increased material cost. | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 26 of Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Defence) | Provision of narrative not possible due to prioritisation of Covid 19 response | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £10,393.30 m, has decreased by £81.89 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £10,475.19 m, due primarily to the following factors; - During 2019 significant work was done within the Lightning Delivery Team and Air Command Programme team in order to rework and revalidate the Lightning cost model, ensuring that core assumptions remained valid and any ambiguity was removed from the programme. This, along with work with the Joint Programme Office to mature costings data enabled realism factors to be applied leading to a reduction to whole life forecasts. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £10,393.30 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Foreign Exchange fluctuations drive some variance into the Programme due to contracts being placed the US Joint Programme Office. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £10,393.30 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - During 2019 significant work was done within the Lightning Delivery Team and Air Command Programme team in order to rework and revalidate the cost model, ensuring that core assumptions remained valid and any ambiguity was removed from the programme. This, along with work with the Joint Programme Office to mature costings data, enabled realism factors to be applied leading to a reduction to whole life forecasts. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £2,229.59 m, has increased by £180.69 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £2,048.90 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The primary reason for whole-life cost change has been the change to exchange rates resulting in a weaker value of the pound. - Additional changes have occurred due to including aircraft and mission systems capability sustainment costs and the routine aircraft depth maintenance costs in the whole-life cost model. - Initial approval of the Main Gate Business Case provided funding for the development and manufacture phases and the first four years of support; future costs would be approved through subsequent business cases when these costs were mature enough. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £2,229.59 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Changes to foreign exchange rates have resulted in a weaker pound. - The US Navy has matured its concept for aircraft sustainment and depth maintenance requirements, which have informed the UK Programme's planning and sustainment/maintenance concepts. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £2,229.59 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Inclusion of aircraft and mission systems capability sustainment and routine depth maintenance in the whole-life cost model. - Re-profiling of costs for procurement of synthetic training devices (flight and mission crew simulators, and engineering virtual maintenance training devices). - Inclusion of costs for facilities maintenance at RAF Lossiemouth. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £618.81 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £618.81 m, due primarily to the following factors; - No change to the Baseline since FY18/19 because the MSP has delivered HRAS & MARS Tankers Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £618.81 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - No change to the Baseline since FY18/19 because the MSP has delivered HRAS & MARS Tankers | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,335.62 m, has decreased by £471.97 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,807.59 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Programme MARSHALL remains affordable and is on track to deliver FOC well ahead of Approval (December 2024). The Whole Life Costs recorded in the report are not comparable; the 18/19 figures take into account the full life of the programme (to 2037) whilst the 19/20 figure presents a snapshot of only the first 10 years. - This accounts for the perceived discrepancy. The true forecast position is a variance of less than 1.5% growth over the 12 month reporting period. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £4,663.31 m, due primarily to the following factors; - This reflects the forecast cost as at Sep 2019 following industry responses to Request For Quotations (RFQ) and continued negotiations. - The forecast cost is in line with the scope approved in the Initial Gate Business Case (IGBC) Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £4,663.31 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - No operating environment factors have impacted on WLCs. Covid 19 has not yet impacted programme costs and activity continues on time and to budget. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £4,663.31 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The ruling that VAT costs could be returned to the project, received in Q1 CY 2020, has reduced funding by c£456m. - No significant project actions have impacted on WLCs. | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 27 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (International Relations) | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,155.84 m, has increased by £116.59 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,039.25 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Increased Whole Life cost was caused when the Programme was rebaselined in April 2019 and was slipped by 28 months. This necessitated the renegotiation of contracts at a cost. This increase in cost was the subject of an Accounting Officers Assessment published in Nov 2019. - The rebaseline of the programme also allowed for the capability sustainment of the Multi-Spectral Targeting System from version B to version D in order to deliver the minimum Theatre standard and to manage obsolescence. This increased the Whole Life costs of the Programme. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,155.84 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Foreign Exchange Rate (FOREX) US$ /UK£ challenges have increased the forecast through life costs of the Programme. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £6,782.65 m, has decreased by £14.99 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £6,797.64 m, due primarily to the following factors; - An increase in build costs. Review Note IAC 4957 sought an uplift based upon the need to address cost growth in the prime contract with the ACA IPs, provided against additional schedule risk and included a contingency to be held by Navy Command against further emergent schedule/cost pressure. - Reductions were introduced by the transfer of STOVL/JPALS funding to NCHQ/Navy Ships Support, transfer of funding for support/ maintenance to Naval Ships Support, revised costings on the purchase of QEC spares and reduced infrastructure costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £6,782.65 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - PARKVIEW negotiations between the client and Aircraft Carrier Alliance resulted in a new share-line agreement. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £414.52 m, has increased by £0.63 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £413.89 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The extremely marginal increase (0.15%) in whole-life costs was due to an increase in the number of weapons required for in-water trials during the demonstration phase. These additional firings were requested by MOD to provide increased statistical confidence in the reliability and performance of the new weapon design. - It has not been possible to identify more than one factor driving such a marginal (0.15%) increase in whole life costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £414.52 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The overall whole life costs for the Spearfish Upgrade Project have remain stable. This has been due pro-active management by the Project Team who have identified opportunities to reduce costs in some areas, in order to support emergent requirements and a demand for an increased number of in-water firings. | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | Exempt under Section 43 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Commercial Interests) | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,117.73 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,117.73 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Firm and effective contract and risk management of the programme has enabled its baseline Whole Life Costs to be maintained at the previous year's value. - As it enters the final stages of its delivery, the programme is experiencing fewer emergent risks and issues. Consequently, the ability to maintain costs at forecasted levels is significantly more manageable. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,117.73 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The SRO's direction to re-profile remaining funding across FY 1920 and FY 2021 to match DE&S / Industry capacity has enabled the programme to successfully maintain forecasted costs, without impacting on contracted outputs. - Revised prioritisation across the Combat Air portfolio in DE&S allowed recruitment for key positions within the Watchkeeper Delivery Team to take place. The subsequent filling of previously gapped key positions has enabled the programme team to better meet internal deliverables and milestones. | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| Annual Report Category | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | ICT | Military Capability | ICT | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | ICT | ICT | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Military Capability | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |
| The IPA Annual Report publishes the whole life cycle costs on projects, based on figures from their Business Cases, whilst the National Infrastructure and Construction Pipeline (NICP) focuses primarily on the upfront capital investment on a project. Where both documents refer to the same projects, this distinction will be the principal reason for any differences in the data sets published. Other government publications may use different methodologies to derive cost figures | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |