Transparency data
DfT Government Major Project Portfolio data, September 2019 (csv)
Updated 9 July 2020
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| GMPP ID Number | DFT_0034_1920-Q2 | DFT_0020_1314-Q2 | DFT_0024_1516-Q4 | DFT_0031_1819-Q1 | DFT_0001_1112-Q1 | DFT_0033_1819-Q1 | DFT_0025_1617-Q1 | DFT_0026_1617-Q1 | DfT_0023_1516-Q3 | DFT_0004_1112-Q1 | DFT_0005_1112-Q1 | DfT_0022_1415-Q4 | DFT_0027_1617-Q1 | DFT_0028_1617-Q1 | DFT_0021_1314-Q3 | DFT_0029_1617-Q1 | DFT_0016_1112-Q1 |
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| Project Name | A12 Chelmsford to A120 Widening | A14 Cambridge to Huntingdon Improvement Scheme | A303 Amesbury to Berwick Down | A428 Black Cat to Caxton Gibbet | Crossrail Programme | East Coast Mainline Programme | East West Rail Programme (Western Section) | Great Western Route Modernisation (GWRM) including electrification | Heathrow Expansion Programme | High Speed Rail Programme (HS2) | Intercity Express Programme | Lower Thames Crossing | Midland Main Line Programme | North of England Programme | Rail Franchising Programme | South West Route Capacity | Thameslink Programme |
| Department | DfT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT | DFT |
| Description / Aims | A12 Chelmsford to A120 Widening - widening the A12 to three lanes between junction 19 (north of Chelmsford) and junction 25 (A120 interchange). | To improve the A14 which is a major national and inter-urban regional transport artery between Cambridge and Huntingdon to relieve congestion and support both national and regional economic growth. | Freeflowing dual carriageway replacing the current single lane on the A303 between Amesbury and Berwick down including a twin bored tunnel under the majority of the world heritage site and a northern by-pass of Winterbourne Stoke. | The scheme provides a new off-line two lane dual carriageway between Black Cat roundabout on the A1 in Bedfordshire and Caxton Gibbet roundabout on the A428 in Cambridgeshire. | A new high-frequency rail service which will increase rail-based capacity in London by up to 10% and cut journey times across London and the South East. | Improving capacity and frequency of the services on the East Coast Mainline, increasing passenger seat capacity to major stations along the route, reducing journey times and improving the customer experience through the introduction of new trains. | The programme will reconstruct and upgrade a partly disused railway between Bicester and Milton Keynes /Bedford allowing for the introduction of new passenger services improving connectivity and journey times along the corridor. | An extensive programme to modernise existing infrastructure on the Great Western mainline. It will create faster and more reliable services, better stations and increased freight capacity. | The Heathrow Expansion Programme covered the Government’s policy activities to enable delivery of a new Northwest runway at Heathrow Airport (subject to the granting of development consent). The funding and delivery of the programme is led by Heathrow Airport ltd. | HS2 will form the backbone of the UK's transport network, connecting eight out of ten of Britain's largest cities. By making it easier to move between the North, Midlands and South, cutting many journeys by half, HS2 will make it easier for people to live and work where they want. | Renewing the UK's high speed train fleet on the Great Western and East Coast. Through Train Operating Companies IEP is a key means to deliver the passenger benefits including more capacity, improved reliability, reduced journey times, and better environmental performance. | A new free-flowing road crossing of the Lower Thames east of Gravesend and Tilbury. It will improve network resilience and the performance of the existing crossings at Dartford enabling local regional and national economic growth. | Modernisation of the Midland Main Line Route to provide more passenger capacity and reduced journey times into London and between major Midland cities. | The enhancements provided by the North of England Programme will support economic growth, bring improved journey times, offer additional train services and enable modern trains to run across the North. | To secure the provision of passenger rail services as set out under the Railways Act 1993 (as amended) by letting Rail Franchises. | Programme of infrastructure upgrades and new rolling stock to increase passenger capacity including enhancements works at Waterloo station. | A significantly enhanced high-frequency rail service which will increase rail-based capacity in London and across the wider South East and provide new journey opportunities. |
| IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (A Delivery Confidence Assessment of the project at a fixed point in time, using a five-point scale, Red – Amber/Red – Amber – Amber/Green – Green; definitions in the IPA Annual Report on Major Projects) | Amber | Green | Amber | Amber/Green | Red | Amber | Red | Amber | Amber | Red | Amber | Amber | Amber | Amber/Red | Amber/Red | Amber/Green | Amber |
| Departmental commentary on actions planned or taken on the IPA RAG rating. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - In September 2019, the project was preparing to announce a preferred route announcement for Junctions 19 to 23, as well as a non-statutory consultation for Junctions 23 to 25. The delivery confidence assessment was based on three key outstanding issues which were causing increased project uncertainty on how the scheme would progress. Firstly, there was uncertainty on the timing and outcome of the North Essex Authorities Local Plan, which included the Colchester Braintree Borders Garden Community. Whether the Garden Community was found viable or not in the Local Plan would inform the decision on a proposed route between Junction 23 and 25, as the route may have needed to divert southwards around the proposed Garden Community footprint. - Secondly, in order to divert the road southwards to accommodate the Garden Community, the project required additional funding. The additional funding was to come forward via a Housing Infrastructure Bid submitted by Essex County Council to MHCLG. At the time of the DCA, it was not known whether this would be approved. - Finally, there was a risk of delay to making the PRA for Junction 19-23, a critical milestone to maintain the delivery programme. Approval was subject to discussions with DfT around the interaction with potential RIS3 pipeline projects such as the A120 Braintree to A12. Failure to make the PRA for Junction 19 to 23 in October 2019 would have introduced a significant delay and additional costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The sources of uncertainty highlighted in the September 19/20 DCA assessment have been resolved. In May 2020, the Planning Inspector's report on the Local Plan determined that the Colchester Braintree Borders Garden Community was unviable. This is not expected to be challenged by the Local Authorities. While Housing and Infrastructure Funding was announced in March 2020, this was conditional on delivering the Garden Community housing. This funding is now expected to be withdrawn. - With no viable Garden Community, and without funding for the additional costs of realignment of the A12 further south, the project now has clarity on the recommended route alignment. This recommendation will be taken through governance with the intention of announcing a preferred route for the section between junction 23 to 25 in the autumn. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The project team announced the Preferred Route for Junctions 19-23 in October 2019. In the same month, the project launched a non-statutory consultation on four route options between Junctions 23-25 of the A12 to accommodate the Garden Community. In November 2019, the project mobilised a programme of investigative surveys, which were designed to de-risk the preliminary design stage by providing geotechnical and condition data. - HE has now completed its internal procedures and the recommendation is going to IPDC on 15 June. Alongside this request, DfT and HMT will consider the use of Highways England Regional Delivery Partnerships as the project's procurement route and development phase funding, which will allow the project to proceed into the development phase of the scheme and prepare its' development consent order. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Green, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - The completion of a number of substantial subcontract packages (e.g. earthworks, large sections of pavement) have provided additional certainty on programme and cost outturn. - The completion of additional project critical milestones including bulk earthworks and main carriageway activities enabled continuation of works through the winter period, which has de-risked project delivery. - The retention of key project personnel from within Highways England and the supply chain has maximised consistency in delivery and the continuation of established relationships leading to a high performing team. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Winter 2019 brought the project some bad weather, with yellow warnings for flooding and wind. The project was able to mitigate by planning activities effectively and moving non-critical works which could not be undertaken at that time. - Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The project has implemented a comprehensive handover strategy to ensure efficient handover of the main asset into Highways England Operations for operation and maintenance, and a number of local roads to the Local Authority. This includes over 38,000 asset records. The project successfully opened and handed over the operation of the Southern Bypass in December 2020, with the remainder of the scheme opening for traffic ahead of schedule in May 2020. - The use of data analytics on the project has allowed an improvement in the effectiveness of monitoring and decision making by the senior leadership team. This has ensured management interventions are focussed on key project activities, i.e. safety critical works and those driving completion dates and productivity. - The project has continued to effectively collaborate with the supply chain as set out in the procurement strategy. This has incentivised key contract packages to deliver in line with the schedule and the total project budget. It also supported a strong focus on realising opportunities to enable this outcome. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - At Q2 18/19, the scheme's potential value for money (VfM) was assessed as low. There was concern that the removal of Private Finance as an option would increase costs to a point where the VfM would be too low to sustain the project. This issue has since been resolved with Treasury approval of the OBC in Oct 2019. - One of the key risks to the project was Highways England's confidence in successfully passing Development Consent Order (DCO) given the high profile challenges to the scheme from 3rd parties, such as heritage and environmental lobbying groups. This risk was largely mitigated through a successful Examination Phase ending in Oct 19. A DCO decision was due from Secretary of State on 2nd April 2020. This has been delayed to 17 July 2020. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - HM Treasury approval received in October 2019 and funding certainty was provided in the March 2020 Budget statement demonstrating government support for the scheme. - The DCO decision has been delayed until 17 July 2020. This is the decision by the Secretary of State that give planning permission for the scheme. The delay in DCO decision is not confined to this project and decisions on a number of other road infrastructure projects have also been delayed Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Successful completion of DCO Examination Phase in Oct 19, with an expected Secretary of State Decision now planned for 17th July 2020. - The Invitation to Participate in Dialogue for the main works contract was published on 1 May 2020 | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - The Preferred Route Announcement was made on the 18 February 2019. The project milestones remain on track for delivery. - There continues to be strong stakeholder support and interest for this project demonstrated by the positive outcome from the Statutory Consultation - Funding for the delivery of this project has been included within the Roads Period 2 spending envelope announced in March 2020. The associated benefits case has been approved by Treasury. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Changes in the Design Manual for Road and Bridges resulted in some design rework but this is not anticipated to affect overall programme. Changes in the uncertainty log resulting from increased developments and employment areas within the local plans are being analysed and will be included within the project design. - East West Rail Company have announced their corridor route for the central section (Bedford to Cambridge) which is currently expected to be constructed after the A428. Areas of potential overlap are being discussed to maximise the opportunity for close collaboration. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Approval from HM Treasury in Feb 2020 followed by the announcement of funding of the project as part of RIS2 in the March 2020 Budget Statement. IPA recommendations from PAR in July and September 2019 have been actioned - Formal mobilisation of the Regional Delivery Partnership Framework (RDP) contract has begun for the project. This closed the IPA recommendation to engage with the RDP as soon as possible to finalise budget. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Red, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Red, due primarily to the following factors; - On 18 September 2019 TfL announced that projections were now £42m more than the £2.15bn funding announced in December 2018 as part of the financing package to fund the project’s completion. Modelling scenarios include a significantly higher level of risk contingency, up to £394m more than the committed funding. - In July 2019 a further WMS announced additional funding that has been made available to Network Rail (NR) for the On Network Works (ONW) – the forecast costs for the ONW were now around £2.8bn, though there was a risk of this increasing. - In April 2019, CRL announced a revised 6-month opening window for the central section (Paddington to Abbey Wood – excluding Bond Street) between October 2020 – March 2021. CRL continued to report that this was achievable but that a number of risks remained. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - It is too early to tell exactly how the impact of COVID-19 will be felt following the “safe stop” of work at project sites. CRL have initiated scenario planning work, developing assumptions to inform a range of possible safe start options and assess the impact of COVID 19. - Due to falling ridership numbers as a consequence of Covid-19, Tfl revenues have dramatically decreased and conversations are currently ongoing regarding TfL's continued ability to fund the project. Talks are ongoing with TfL to mitigate substantial drops in revenues due to falling ridership numbers. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - CRL's Delivery Control Schedule (DCS) began to be implemented, this showed early and consistent challenges to meeting milestones. Despite the challenges of delivering the DCS, CRL believe that the Stage 3 opening of the central section in Summer 2021 is still achievable - though acknowledge this would be tight and could have implications for delivery dates of full services. In an attempt to add greater focus on coordination and delivery of the project, CRL added an additional member to their executive team which means there is now a chief programme office and chief project officer in an attempt to increase productivity and delivery. - In November 2019, a revised AFCDC that was aligned to the DCS indicated that it would not be possible to deliver the project within the available funding and would require between £400 to £650m in additional funding. Based on analysis DfT, HMT, TfL and GLA have agreed a funding shortfall target. Discussions are ongoing regarding a revised funding agreement between HMT, TfL and DfT and a further waiver has been agreed until 22 July to further funding negotiations. - An Arcadis review highlighted a Network Rail On Network Works (ONW) funding gap of £140.6m. The February 2020 Network Rail portfolio board have approved an increase of £140m for Crossrail On Network Works. Funding is from existing CP6 budgets has been approved by DfT ministers and awaits HMT ministerial clearance. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - Realisation of the Programme's benefits is dependent upon the East Coast franchise's introduction of InterCity Express Programme trains and the delivery of those trains has been delayed. The final train deliveries are now expected in Summer 2020. - The IPA anticipated that the digital signalling project between London and Peterborough would be incorporated into the East Coast Mainline Programme in November 2019, increasing the complexity of the Programme. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - COVID-19 will delay the delivery of engineering works and is likely to mean the planned introduction of the new East Coast Mainline timetable in December 2021 is deferred. The prolongation and replanning of these activities will increase costs and delay the realisation of the Programme's benefits. - The digital signalling project will not be incorporated into the East Coast Main Line Programme but will be delivered as a separate scheme later in the 2020s. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - As a result of COVID-19, engineering works to remodel the track layout King's Cross Station have been delayed. The project needs to replan the works. There is a risk that the introduction of the new East Coast timetable will need to be deferred from December 2021. - The storms experienced in early 2020, combined with the impact of COVID-19, mean that critical works on the Werrington Grade Separation project have been delayed, putting the entry into service date of this enhancement at risk. The project team needs to replan the works. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Red, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - Project cost estimates and target price were significantly higher than the approved funding envelope available. Negotiations and cost challenge work took place to identify savings to bring within budgets in order to support the full business case investment before entry into target price contract award in 2020. - Other than the cost challenge, the other key risks to the project which may impact on meeting planned entry into service dates is the difficulty in establishing a working timetable that delivers the required train service specification. - A complex interface with the High Speed 2 project at Calvert is on the critical path with works potentially impacting on East West Rail project schedule and may incur additional infrastructure costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Covid-19 may have an impact on the project but it is too early to assess this. Enabling works are still ongoing with sites generally open. Main works are due to commence in the Autumn, pending all approvals, and any impact will only be known nearer the time. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - EWR Co have reviewed the way that they deliver the programme in order to maximise cost and schedule efficiencies. - Further EWR Co and Network Rail scrutiny, negotiations and assurance activities have been undertaken to reduce cost estimates. A benchmarking exercise has been undertaken to understand where further work is needed on costs to inform final target price for the full business case. - Work has progressed to identify and take forward opportunities on the HS2 project interface to de risk programme dependencies. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - In 18/19, Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) was causing issues between the new Intercity Express Trains (IETs) and track infrastructure. In 19/20, the IETs were undergoing a programme of modifications to mitigate risks. - Also in 18/19, decisions were required due to the delay of Crossrail. By 19/20 the decision had been made that Crossrail would operate Paddington to Reading services from December 2019. - In December 2018, electrification to Bristol Parkway and Newbury was completed, enabling the extension of electric operations on 2 January 2019 from Swindon to Bristol Parkway, and to Newbury from Reading, building on the electric operation to Swindon via Reading already in place. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The enhanced GWR timetable with electric timings was successfully implemented in December 2019, substantially reducing the difference between the fastest and slowest journey times between London and the South West. - From 5 January 2020, electric services are operating on the Great Western Main Line from Paddington and Cardiff (excluding electric operation in the Severn Tunnel), due to completion of electrification between Newport and Cardiff. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The Heathrow Airport Expansion Consultation (AEC) ended on 13 September 2019. Following consultation feedback Heathrow was expected to progress its final Masterplan through their formal Business Plan approval gateway (M5) - which was scheduled to complete in April 2020. DfT’s HEP continued to work with Heathrow to understand its evolving Masterplan. - Confidence reviews were completed to examine Heathrow’s construction delivery schedule and scheme financing; together with an internal qualitative review of how the draft Masterplan protects the benefits of expansion and mitigates disbenefits. Engagement continued between DfT, Heathrow and the CAA to review the Heathrow delivery date of 2026. - The IPA agreed that opening a third runway by 2026 was a challenging timescale however the IPA DCA was based upon the HALs ability to deliver new Airport Capacity by 2030. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - On 27th February 2020 the Court of Appeal ruled that when designating the Airports National Policy Statement (ANPS), the previous Government did not take account of the Paris Agreement, non-CO2 emissions and emissions post-2050. The ANPS therefore has no legal effect until reviewed by the Government under the Planning Act 2008. - All reporting on the programme was paused and has not changed since the Court of Appeal ruling on 27th February 2020. Expansion at Heathrow is a private sector project and it is for the scheme promoter to take it forward. Further, there has been a global pandemic and air travel has largely ceased. While we can be confident based on previous recessions, and the pent-up demand at Heathrow, that if any airport is to need additional capacity it would be Heathrow, the future is uncertain. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Following the publication of the CAA position on Cat C costs, HAL confirmed in January 2020 that their schedule for the opening of the runway had been delayed for 2 years to 2028-29. This reflected the need to phase the costs over a longer period. HEP were awaiting further clarification of Heathrow's detailed schedule and costs. Further, HAL confirmed after the Court of Appeal hearing that the Court's judgment would have an impact on its timescales. Lastly, HAL's CEO confirmed a new runway would still be needed but not for 10-15 years. - All reporting on the programme was paused and has not changed since the Court of Appeal's ruling of the ANPS on 27th February 2020. - The Airports and Infrastructure Directorate have been temporarily redeployed to work on the COVID-19 response. Due to the expectation there will be an extended period of time for the aviation industry to return to 'normal' operations, it is likely that any expansion will be delayed. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Red, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - Significant Cost and schedule pressures emerged on Phase One in late 2018, as HS2 Ltd updated its baseline, with inclusion of actual market prices, in readiness for Notice-to-Proceed (the formal start of construction). - Despite remedial activity to improve the cost (and schedule) position, it became clear that it would not be possible to deliver the existing Sponsor’s Requirements within the existing funding envelope and schedule targets. - In August 2019, following a change in Prime Minister, Secretary of State, and in response to publication of the HS2 Chairman’s Stocktake, the Government commissioned an independent review of the HS2 programme chaired by Doug Oakervee to consider whether, and how, to proceed with HS2. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - It is too early to assess the full impact Covid-19 will have on the programme’s cost, schedule and benefits. Enabling Works and initial mobilising of the Main Works Civils are ongoing with sites generally open but there are likely to be some site or contractor-specific challenges to work through. - There has been an increase in protestor action across the line of the route. This is a combination of long-standing action against the programme and a more recent uptick as a result of the emergence of environmental groups . This has created challenges to maintaining schedule. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - In February 2020, following the conclusions of the ‘Oakervee Review’ and having sought wider advice, the Government confirmed its commitment to delivering the HS2 programme. - Between February-April 2020, Government approved the Full Business Case for Phase One and agreed a revised funding regime and governance arrangements to take the programme forward. - In April 2020, Government authorised HS2 Ltd to issue Notice-to-Proceed to its Main Works Civils Contractors and to start construction activities along the line of route. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has improved since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The final Great Western fleet train was successfully rolled out into service in December 2018 improving delivery confidence. - The ongoing roll out of the East Coast trains has improved delivery confidence. IEP East Coast trains were successfully launched on the London-Leeds route on 15th May 2019. The first Anglo-Scot service successfully launched on August 2019. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - COVID-19 and related social distancing measures have impacted the planned roll out of the remaining 9 trains. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The roll out of East Coast fleet trains has continued since early 2019, only 9 of the total 122 IEP trains are yet to be accepted into service. - An electromagnetic interference issue has been largely resolved with track and train resolutions identified and in the process of being implemented. - The significant December 19 timetable change was successfully implemented on the Great Western route. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The project schedule is extremely tight with multiple critical paths and constrained timescales to support a 2027 Open for Traffic (OfT) date. Further work is needed to validate elements of the schedule, particularly how schedule risk and opportunity is handled, and to ensure it is robust. - Further market engagement is required to validate some of the assumptions in the Commercial case, including the proposed commercial model. This engagement needs to target non-UK suppliers, verify the construction programme and validate the contracting strategy and procurement process - The concurrency of key dates for the procurement and DCO schedule are sensitive to one another. There is a risk around completing dialogue before close of DCO examination which is being considered as part of a review of the schedule Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - In March 2020 the Chancellor, as part of the Budget settlement, announced that the project would be fully publicly funded. It was previously announced in October 2018 that private funding would not be used to partly fund the project. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - A baseline (cost, schedule & risk) review of the project was undertaken in late 2019, which was approved by DfT in December 2019. - Further ground investigation have been undertaken to feed into the development of the projects schedule and cost assumptions | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - DCA is now Amber/Red due to effect of COVID-19 on operational readiness planning. - Recent IPA review of Key Output 1 readiness for service rated Key Output 1 as Amber/Red and recommended re-planning of benefit release to May 2021. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - COVID-19 has resulted in scarcity of planning personnel and inability to complete some readiness works on time. This has caused projected benefits release to be projected to be delayed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Pre COVID-19, industrial relations issues and impacts of extreme weather caused re-planning of some possessions required to complete infrastructure works. These were re-planned, but this used float within the project, reducing overall confidence in delivery. - Other activities remained projected to complete to tight schedule. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has declined since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - At the time of reporting there was significant uncertainty around elements of programme scope relating to the Trans Pennine Route upgrade, caused by an exercise to re-evaluate costs and scope of the programme to align to the DfT funding envelope. This resulted in a decrease in delivery confidence for the whole programme, of which the Trans Pennine Route Upgrade was the next major element. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Since Q2 19/20 the Trans Pennine Route Upgrade has been separated from the North of England Programme and established as a standalone programme on the GMPP. The North of England Programme was closed from GMPP in December 2019, and therefore doesn't have a current DCA. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Red, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Red, due primarily to the following factors; - The key risks that justified the Amber/Red rating in Q2 1819 remained relevant in Q2 1920, including the risk of financial default on franchises; - Potential delays to the introduction of new rolling stock, with consequent impact on delivery of passenger benefits; - Potential legal challenge by bidder(s) and its impact on delivery of live projects. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Williams Rail Review. - The General Election purdah period impacting on ability to announce project outcomes. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Red IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Project teams have looked at options on potentially defaulting TOCs, considering whether a new shorter contract could be negotiated with operator(s) or whether the implementation of the Operator of Last Resort (OLR) should be enacted. On Northern, OLR was taken over operation of passenger services. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber/Green, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber/Green, due primarily to the following factors; - All delivery milestones for the South West Route Capacity Programme, including then lengthening of platforms to accommodate 10-carriage train and the re-opening of the former Waterloo International Terminal (Platforms 20-24), have been completed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The Department's response to the COVID-19 outbreak necessitated the temporary redeployment of staff. This has impacted the SWRC Programme in postponing its final assurance activity (the IPA Stage Gate 5 review). Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber/Green IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - The completion of all delivery milestones has enabled the DCA rating of Amber/Green. - The continued engagement with Network Rail to support the quarterly reporting of financial data. | The IPA Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) rating at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) was Amber, which has not changed since last year’s Q2 1819 Amber, due primarily to the following factors; - The Network Rail infrastructure required to deliver the 22 trains per hour service has been delivered with the exception of relatively minor snagging works that do not impede an increase in timetabled operations and which are due to be completed by the end of 2020. - The Class 700 Thameslink train fleet has received updated software which will enable the operation of the Automatic Train Operation (ATO) system which will help offset the performance impacts of operating higher frequency services. - The timing of the 22tph Thameslink service increase has been delayed to enable resolution of the ATO software (now resolved) and the subsequent commencement of driver training. The impact of COVID-19 will delay driver training until a safe method can be developed and agreed by the industry. COVID-19 delays will be captured through a wider timetable strategy. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) Amber IPA DCA, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 IPA DCA; - Due to COVID-19, timetable step- ups will have to be reviewed. Industry stakeholders are working collaboratively to plan the new timescales. - Due to COVID-19 and public health guidelines, a way forward needs to be agreed on how drivers can be trained and 2m distance cannot be kept while in the cab. This needs to be agreed with GTR and the unions. |
| Project - Start Date (Latest Approved Start Date) | 01/04/2015 | 01/09/2012 | 01/12/2014 | 01/04/2015 | 22/07/2008 | 01/04/2014 | 30/11/2011 | 01/12/2011 | 01/07/2015 | 14/01/2009 | 01/06/2005 | 30/05/2014 | 01/01/2011 | 23/07/2009 | 15/01/2015 | 16/07/2012 | 01/07/2005 |
| Project - End Date (Latest Approved End Date) | 01/05/2028 | 30/09/2021 | 01/06/2028 | 01/04/2025 | Data Not Provided | 01/12/2023 | 30/06/2024 | 31/12/2024 | 31/12/2050 | 31/12/2033 | 04/06/2020 | 31/07/2028 | 31/12/2024 | 31/12/2022 | 14/09/2019 | 31/12/2019 | 31/12/2026 |
| Departmental narrative on schedule, including any deviation from planned schedule (if necessary) | The scheduled project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/05/28, due primarily to the following factors; - The schedule allows for design development and preparation of the submission to the Planning Inspector. This includes additional surveys, statutory consultation, and further design and assessment works. - After the design, under the planning act (2008), an application will be submitted to the Planning Inspector. The statutory timescales for a Development Consent Order are approximately 18 months - Once orders are received there will be a construction period starting in Summer 2023, scheduled for 4 years until Open for Traffic in Summer 2027. One year post opening assessment period is allowed for until Summer 2028. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/05/28, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The planning inspector letter on the Local plan was expected by March 31st 2020, however was published on May 19th 2020. This meant there was greater uncertainty for the project for this period while scoping surveys and making preparations for the start of preliminary design. - In addition, Covid-19 has impacted on the project schedule. Traffic counts were cancelled in March 2020 due to the reduced traffic as a result of Covid-19 mitigations. The project has put in place revised traffic modelling strategies to minimise the impact of this. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/05/28, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The project has implemented mitigations to respond to the impact of Covid-19, such as revised traffic modelling and a complete review of method statements to ensure activities being undertaken to progress the project are safe. - To ensure the project could progress as quickly as possible, two route proposals for Junctions 23 to 25 were progressed through Highways England governance processes (Normally this would be one route). This allowed the project additional time to wait for the Planning Inspector's letter whilst minimising the impact on schedule. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 30/09/21, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 30/09/21, due primarily to the following factors; - The completion date has not slipped due to the project being able to accurately re-sequence activities to mitigate delays, to drive improvements and to maximise productivity where opportunities have been presented. - Innovative ways of working to drive improvements have been actively promoted on the project including: locating site batching plants on-site; collaborative and production based work scheduling; and project dedicated resources to promote productivity and lean initiatives. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 30/09/21, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - There has been no change to the baseline project end date; despite some weather events in 19/20 the project has been able to maintain its programme. This is due to the continuous reviews of programme and critical path analysis. The project has applied mitigation measures and the use of collaboration and lean methodology adding confidence to the achieve the projects forecasted end date. - The project successfully opened for traffic ahead of schedule in May 2020 with the works to Huntingdon town centre progressing well, adding confidence to the achieve the project's end date. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/06/28, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/06/28, due primarily to the following factors; - The key risk regarding the delivery of the project related to funding certainty which impacted the likelihood of the scheme going ahead rather than its completion date. This certainty was provided in March 2020 in the Budget. - The project schedule was fully assessed and rebaselined during the approval process to HM Treasury, notwithstanding any issues beyond the control of the project, the original project end date was seen to be viable at Q2 1920. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/06/28, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Despite Treasury approval of the project in Oct 19, BREXIT and the subsequent General Election delayed a statement of funding certainty being released until the March 20 Budget Statement. This has required a project rebaseline which has injected a delay of approx. 6 months to the project. - The Secretary of State DCO decision has now been confirmed as delayed until 17 July 2020 and a further re-plan is required to factor in this delay as the DCO decision is on the projects critical path. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/06/28, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Project rebaselining activity to accommodate slippage to the HMT Funding Announcement. - Further project rebaselining to accommodate current delay to Secretary of State DCO decision. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/04/25, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/04/25, due primarily to the following factors; - Formal mobilisation of RDP has commenced meaning that the production of the detailed design will run in parallel with the DCO allowing construction to begin early in 2022. The construction period remains unchanged. - The project schedule has been fully assessed and baselined. The project is currently undergoing budget setting with the contractor and once this work is completed a further review of the schedule can be undertaken. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/04/25, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The impact of Covid19 on the completion of environmental surveys and archaeological trial trenching may result in a delay to the DCO submission. The project team are assessing ways of mitigating this risk Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/04/25, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Additional targeted consultation will be carried out to seek stakeholder views on a number of areas highlighted in the review of "buildability". This is scheduled for summer 2020 and the results will be fed into the DCO submission. This consultation will be "virtual" given the Covid 19 pandemic. - Covid 19 has resulted in one instance when site operations where closed for a week due to a staff member testing positive. Schedule impacts are being mitigated and future impacts being considered as pandemic restrictions develop and/or change. | Data not Provided - At the November 2019 CRL Board CRL announced a slippage to the revised 6-month opening window for the central section (Stage 3: Paddington to Abbey Wood – excluding Bond Street) stating that the range of opening dates were now between February 2021 - November 2021 with a mid-point of Summer 2021. The CRL Chairman told the TfL Board in June 2020 that he still expects the central section to open in Summer 2021. Stage 5 completion, with services running from Shenfield and Abbey Wood out to Reading and Heathrow, is expected to be 12 months later. - Pre Covid-19: CRL stated that they believe that the Stage 3 opening of the central section in Summer 2021 is still achievable - though this is tight and could impact delivery dates of full services. CRL reported that their internal Trial Running target date 23 September 2020 is under pressure. In March 2020, CRL reported that the achievability of their Trial Running target date is at risk of slipping by between 1 to 3 months, Trial Running would, at the earliest, commence on 12 October 2020. Issues affecting the deadline include the quality, requirements and timeline of the assurance submissions. - In an attempt to add greater focus on coordination and delivery of the project, CRL added an additional member to their executive team which means there is now a chief programme office and chief project officer in an attempt to increase productivity and delivery. TfL have established an Elizabeth Line readiness Board to focus on bringing transforming Crossrail into a Operational Tube Line. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 01/12/23, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 01/12/23, due primarily to the following factors; - At Q2 19/20, all of the projects that enable the new East Coast timetable to be introduced were forecast to be completed at least six months before the timetable change date. - A planning group has been established to develop the new East Coast timetable and at Q2 19/20 its work was proceeding to schedule. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/12/23, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Although COVID-19 will delay engineering works and is likely to delay the introduction of the new East Coast timetable, the Programme's end date is defined by the completion of power supply upgrades. These upgrades could still be completed in 2023, meaning the Programme's end date remains achievable. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 01/12/23, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The project needs to be replan the delivery of the engineering works delayed as a result of COVID-19 and confirm when the new East Coast Main Line timetable will be implemented. - The project is liaising with power distribution companies to confirm the timescales for completion of the new connections that are needed to the National Grid. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 30/06/24, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 30/06/24, due primarily to the following factors; - While the end date has not formally changed the need to determine final target cost and impact on project scope, costs and schedule means this date is under pressure and is very likely to change. - There was also a need to establish the outcome of Transport Works Act Order consents and the potential impact this may have had on planned seasonal environmental work which have continued as scheduled. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 30/06/24, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The potential impact of COVID 19 on works and programme schedules is still being assessed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 30/06/24, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The impact of activities and changes to the delivery of the programme following review, cost challenge, negotiations and scrutiny to agree the final target price will require re-baselining of project delivery dates. - Engagement with High Speed 2 Ltd continue in order to work through project dependencies and to de risk the potential impact on project works to remain on planned schedules. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/24, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/24, due primarily to the following factors; - There has been no change to the forecast or baseline end date. - GWRM is a programme of works, and no scope changes have taken place that would affect the forecast or baseline end date. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/24, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - There has been no change to the forecast or baseline end date. - GWRM is a programme of works, and no scope changes have taken place that would affect the forecast or baseline end date. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/50, has lengthened by 7670 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/29, due primarily to the following factors; - The Project End Date baseline was updated to reflect Heathrow’s decision to phase terminal capacity expansion and other development works over a longer time period (up to 2050) to manage costs and build terminal capacity in line with demand growth. - The ANPS stated there was a need for Heathrow to deliver new airport capacity (an operational runway) by 2030. The actual delivery date will be dependent on Heathrow's timescales (the target date as of Jan 2020 for an operational runway was 2028/29, although it was recognised that this was becoming increasingly challenging to deliver the runway to this timescale given the scale and complexity of the project. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/50, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - On 27th February 2020 the Court of Appeal ruled that when designating the Airports National Policy Statement (ANPS), the previous Government did not take account of the Paris Agreement, non-CO2 emissions and emissions post-2050. The ANPS has no legal effect until reviewed by the Government under the Planning Act 2008. - All reporting on the programme was paused and has not changed since the Court of Appeal's ruling of the ANPS on 27th February 2020. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/50, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - There have been no further change to the rebaselined project end date. - Following the publication of the CAA position on Cat C costs, Heathrow confirmed in January 2020 that their schedule for the opening of the runway had been delayed for 2 years to 2028-29. This was to reflect the need to phase the costs over a longer period. HEP were awaiting further clarification of Heathrow's detailed schedule. - All reporting on the programme was paused and has not changed since the Court of Appeal's ruling of the ANPS on 27th February 2020. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/33, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/33, due primarily to the following factors; - Schedule pressures had emerged over the course of the year and the HS2 Chairman had published a stocktake report indicating that the Company no longer believed it could deliver the programme to the current schedule target. - However, a revised baseline had not been adopted while Government carried out the Oakervee Review and considered how to proceed with the programme. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/33, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - It is too early to determine the impact of COVID-19 on the schedule dates. There is some contingency in the current target dates for Phase 1, which may be able to absorb a certain level of delay. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/33, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - A revised funding regime and incentivisation framework has been agreed between Government and HS2 Ltd and this has revised the target date for delivery of Phase 1. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 04/06/20, has lengthened by 119 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 06/02/20, due primarily to the following factors; - The Department entered a new agreement with the Train Service Provider setting a new project end date of June 2020 to provide time to resolve electromagnetic interference issues and to facilitate later entry into service of the East Coast fleet. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 04/06/20, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - COVID-19 and related social distancing measures have impacted the planned roll out of the remaining 9 trains. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 04/06/20, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Lockdown and implementation of social distancing measures have impacted manufacturing productivity, the Department is working closely with stakeholders to mitigate the effects on the programme. Challenges remain around benefits realisation including the need to improve train performance and completing the full roll-out of the fleet on the East Coast expected in Autumn 2020. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/07/28, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/07/28, due primarily to the following factors; - Certainty of RIS 2 funding and confirmation of funding to replace that which was to be privately financed - Following the removal of the constraints imposed by being partly privately funded (including contract packaging) the project has updated, strengthened and externally assured our Commercial Procurement Strategy which de-risks the schedule. - The outcome of market engagement which will confirm if our assumptions regarding timescales and cost are realistic for the tunnelling work Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/07/28, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The corona virus pandemic is impacting on project delivery. We have implemented business continuity plans and our IT platforms allow office staff to effectively work at home. However Covid-19 prevention measures are impacting on ground investigation and other early works. There are also indirect consequences on the schedule as a result of the effect on the construction market which are likely to affect the procurement process. - The project have introduced a baseline schedule range of December 2027 to November 2028. The likely project end date is 7 months after this to accommodate project close down activities. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/07/28, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - A full review of the schedule is underway to validate the likely project timeline given a number of factors including the impact of Covid 19. The outcome of this work is expected in summer 2020. - As part of the review of the schedule we are considering the timing of the main works procurements as compared to the DCO examination and award dates. This is to derisk the procurement activity by providing sufficient certainty to bidders | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/24, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/24, due primarily to the following factors; - Key Output 1a of the MML programme is being replanned and examined, final completion date has not formally been changed but programme remains in replanning. - Due to COVID-19, Key Output 1 benefit release being replanned for May 2021 currently, dependent on COVID-19 impacts. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/24, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - COVID-19 has delayed the benefit release date for Key Output 1, replanning being undertaken to ascertain realistic new date for benefit realisation. This was planned for December 2020, currently working towards May 2021 timetable for benefit realisation. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/24, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Key Output 1a of the MML programme is being replanned and examined, final completion date has not formally been changed but programme remains in replanning. - Due to COVID-19, Key Output 1 benefit release being replanned for May 2021 currently, dependent on COVID-19 impacts. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/22, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/22, due primarily to the following factors; - At the time of reporting the programme had completed a number of significant milestones and was on track to complete delivery in line with its completion date. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/22, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - Since Q2 19/20 the Trans Pennine Route Upgrade has been separated from the North of England Programme and established as a standalone programme on the GMPP. The North of England Programme was closed from GMPP in December 2019. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 14/09/19, has lengthened by 167 days since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/03/19, due primarily to the following factors; - Given the nature of the Rail Franchising Programme, Passenger Services and IPA agreed to use the most advanced project to report on delivery Milestones. In Q2 1819 Q2 this was South Eastern Project with end date of 31/03/2019. The reason for the 167 day increase is that in Q2 1920 the most advanced project was West Coast Partnership with an end date of 14/09/2019. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/19, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/19, due primarily to the following factors; - There has been no change in scope for the Programme and no new milestones . - All delivery milestones have been completed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/19, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The continual engagement between the Department for Transport and Network Rail has enabled the baseline project end date to be met (for Delivery milestones). - The revisiting of benefits management plans which align with the baseline project end date. | The scheduled baseline project end date at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is 31/12/26, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 date of 31/12/26, due primarily to the following factors; - The assumptions about completion of the project did not change during this period. The Network Rail infrastructure required to deliver the end state Thameslink service has all been delivered, with the exception of some snagging works that are due to be completed by the end of 2020. These works will have no impact on operations or the wider programme. - Currently all Class 700 units have the up to date software required to enable automatic train operation which is needed for end state TLP delivery. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) baseline project end date of 31/12/26, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline project end date; - The project is currently reviewing requirements for a system to support high capacity services for the operation of the Thameslink end state timetable across 4 rail networks in the south east. Work is being undertaken to refine the scope and delivery plans to enable further step-ups in Thameslink services. The end date of December 2026 remains valid for delivery of the planned operational benefits. - All other infrastructure and rolling stock required have already been delivered or will be in place by this date. |
| Financial Year Baseline (£m) (including Non-Government Costs) | £12.98 | £401.00 | £39.70 | £11.02 | £1,137.70 | £208.80 | £112.10 | £289.00 | £9.38 | £3,732.50 | £38.46 | £165.00 | £299.30 | £753.00 | £3.17 | £49.42 | £84.10 |
| Financial Year Forecast (£m) (including Non-Government Costs) | £12.98 | £323.20 | £39.70 | £19.30 | £1,131.20 | £166.70 | £100.00 | £324.00 | £9.38 | £2,784.70 | £38.11 | £165.00 | £288.34 | £251.00 | £2.12 | £34.16 | £169.20 |
| Financial Year Variance (%) | 0% | -19% | 0% | 75% | -1% | -20% | -11% | 12% | 0% | -25% | -1% | 0% | -4% | -67% | -33% | -31% | 101% |
| TOTAL Baseline Whole Life Costs (£m) (including Non-Government Costs) | £1,145.37 | £1,435.30 | £1,919.90 | £809.98 | £17,630.90 | £1,040.40 | £1,091.50 | £5,007.00 | £32,607.78 | £55,700.00 | £6,445.73 | £6,052.20 | £1,671.20 | £5,849.00 | £24.47 | £817.70 | £7,269.40 |
| Departmental narrative on budget/forecast variance for 2018/19 (if variance is more than 5%) | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -19%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The project spend was brought forward earlier in the year than originally planned to support for the road opening to traffic ahead of the publicly committed date of December 2020. This in year reduced cost does not affect the overall scheme cost. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -19%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The project did not spend the forecasted £323m in 19/20 financial year due to extreme wet weather which reduced productivity on activities, such as earthworks, pavements and landscaping. This resulted in some activities being postponed to 20/21 where they could be delivered efficiently without an adverse effect on the scheme opening for traffic. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -19%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Earthworks, pavements and landscaping were adversely affected by extreme wet weather. The project decided to focus on delivering assets required to enable open for traffic as soon in Spring 2020 as possible. - These works were assessed and postponed to 20/21 due to the exceptionally adverse weather. Assessments were made to ensure that these postponed works could be efficiently be delivered after open for traffic. | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 75%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The 2019-20 forecast increased from £11.02m to £19.3m as a result of delays to the Preferred Route Announcement in the previous financial year and reprofiling of future funds to allow the project to progress archaeological and ground investigation works and derisk the project. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 75%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The delay to the Preferred Route Announcement further delayed activities which were undertaken in 19/20. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 75%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - To inform the Development Consent Order, early contractor involvement has been built into the forecast as this will reduce risk and provide increased confidence in the proposed solution. | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -20%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Contracts for power supply upgrades were due to be awarded in August 2019 but this was delayed until 2020 because the tender prices received were higher than expected and further contract negotiations were needed. - The 19/20 in-year forecast underspend would have been greater than 20% but the Stevenage turnback project has been accelerated, bringing forward those costs from 20/21. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -20%, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance; - The variance has not been affected by non-project operating environment activities. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -20%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Since Q2, project team revisions to forecast costs have reduced the Programme-level variance for the year to an underspend of 17%. - Funding was approved in December 2019 to enable power supply upgrade enabling works to start ahead of full contract award and reduce the in-year underspend. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -11%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The estimated forecasts were amended to reflect 2019 spending review settlements approved at mid year. - Some activities did not take place due to the slippage in receiving planning consents resulting in some variance against forecasts Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -11%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The Transport Work Act Order was granted later than expected with consents being received in Q4, which pushed some 2019/20 activities into 2020/21 year, meaning there was some underspend in the 19/20 financial year. These activities will be picked up in the 20/21 financial year. - Further variances may occur due to the outcome of final target cost price negotiations and the need to rebaseline project costs. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 12%, is due primarily to the following factors; - £53.6m of the variance is due to GWEp cost escalation on account of prolongation of works in Severn Tunnel and Cardiff electrification. - Bristol East Junction costs have also increased as Network Rail have now completed the Single Option Development stage. - Offsetting these increases have been in-year cost decreases to a number of projects within the programme either been reduced in cost or reprofiled. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 12%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - A further reprofiling of Great Western electrification costs by Network Rail has resulted in in-year costs dropping below the original baseline, as contingency costs are now accounted for in later years due to not being spent in 19/20. - NR are now undertaking closure activities and concluding contractual arrangements with contractors. This is likely to have an impact on forecasted costs, however, it is too early yet to say what this impact will be. | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -25%, is due primarily to the following factors; - The Baseline budget was set against Baseline 7.0 for Phase One. The programme assumptions at that time assumed a ramp up of Phase One programme activity to support Notice to Proceed. As this milestone was revised this resulted in a revised forecast spend in the financial year. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -25%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - With the Notice to Proceed decision for Phase One (originally scheduled for December 2019) under review, contractor mobilisation activities and procurements, such as ordering tunnel boring machines, were deferred, resulting in significant underspend throughout 2019/20. | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | Budget variance less than 5% | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -67%, is due primarily to the following factors; - Delivery of programme scope relating to the Trans Pennine Route Upgrade was delayed as the programme underwent an exercise to re-evaluate costs and scope of the programme to align to the DfT funding envelope. Spend associated with that delivery was therefore also delayed, resulting in reduced spend in this reporting period. - Some smaller schemes within the programme were also delayed or descoped, resulting in a reduced spend. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -67%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Since Q2 1920 the Trans Pennine Route Upgrade has been established as a standalone programme on the GMPP, and now reports separately to the North of England Programme. As a result in year costs for the North of England Programme have decreased. The North of England Programme has been closed. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -33%, is due primarily to the following factors; - This data references a single project, West Coast Partnership competition, for which the baseline cost envisaged a piece of risk adjustment work that proved not to be necessary. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of -31%, is due primarily to the following factors; - A review of costs was undertaken with Network Rail. It identified that the Programme was previously reporting unrelated costs. These were removed and the corrected costs displayed a variance of negative 31%. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of -31%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - The DfT Wessex Programme Client and Network Rail Sponsor held regular finance meetings reviewing reported costs. This enabled the removal of costs unrelated to the SWRC Programme from the GMPP reports supporting the variance of -31%. - Network Rail have implemented changes to their Finance Reporting System which has improved their ability to report accurate costs to the Department for Transport. | The 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) of 101%, is due primarily to the following factors; - There has been an increase in infrastructure costs, which have required further funds to be allocated, this increase is mainly down to cable troughing at London Bridge and slippage to closing down the Network Rail Programme. - There has also been slippage in the close down of the Network Rail due to closing down the Network Rail Programme. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) 19/20 in-year baseline / forecast variance of 101%, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 19/20 in-year variance; - Additional London Bridge cable troughing works were required which required additional funds to be allocated for 2020/21 and 2021/22. The overall cost remained the same as a result of release of contingency. - Development of the planned Thameslink traffic management system has taken longer than anticipated and required a reallocation from 2019/20 to 2020/21 and 2021/22. |
| Departmental Narrative on Budgeted Whole Life Costs | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,145.37 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The WLC at Q2 remained unchanged from Q1. The WLC at Q2 aligned with the approved budget. - The WLC is based on the assured Commercial Estimate at the time, received in March 2019, of £1,145.37m Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,145.37 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - A revised inflation profile has been implemented, reducing the WLC Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,145.37 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Value engineering work has been undertaken, reducing the WLC. Value engineering outputs included a reduction in the volume of earthworks required, rationalisation of environmental mitigation measures and a shorter construction duration. - The project has also assessed the cost benefits of the proposed procurement route - Regional Delivery Partnerships - which is expected to achieve additional cost benefits. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,435.30 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,435.30 m, due primarily to the following factors; - There are no changes to the budgeted project costs. The project is on track to deliver to its agreed baseline and no future increase in cost is forecast due to significant effort being applied by the project to resolve any problems safely, cost efficiently and in the best interest of the project. - The contractual and commercial model introduced in Deed of Variation - 2 which was agreed in April 2018 has supported the collaborative working required to enable all parties to focus on safe and efficient delivery. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,435.30 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - There has not been any significant external factors that have impacted on the project's whole life cost. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,435.30 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - There have been no changes to the baseline Whole Life Cost, and therefore no project action required. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,919.90 m, has increased by £363.50 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,556.40 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Removal of the option of Private Finance in the 2018 Budget has led to an increase in the amount of non-recoverable VAT which needed to be included in the cost estimate - this accounts for the majority of the £363m difference. This is as a result of the difference between the treatment of non-recoverable VAT in privately or publicly financed projects. - The project was approved by Treasury in October 2019 after the Q2 1819 submission (30th September 2019) and thus this difference and the reasons for it have already been accepted by Treasury. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,919.90 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The Project has been rebaselined to accommodate the delay in announcement of Funding Assurance and further rebaselining will now be required following delay to the Secretary of State DCO announcement. - Any additional costs arising from any schedule delay are likely to be largely mitigated by the project being able to exploit new inflation rates to the funding model. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £809.98m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost, due primarily to the following factors; - The project baseline has remained constant at £810m throughout the period. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £809.98 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - There are no non-project operating environment activities that have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £809.98 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The project compiled a new baseline estimate . The paper was approved by Treasury in early 2020 and reflects the most recent commercial estimate whole life cost. - The formal budget setting process has commenced within the Regional Delivery Partnership Framework. It is anticipated that due to the improved ways of working that a reduction in the Whole Life Cost is achievable and this approach will be fully documented. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £17,630.90 m, has increased by £2156.29 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £15,474.61 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The delay to the CRL programme announced in August 2018 resulted in cost increases. In December 2018 a new funding and financing package was announced to fund the project's completion. This included a £1.3bn Loan to the GLA, £750m contingency Loan to TfL and £100m of GLA's own funding. The combined total of the financing arrangements outlined above means that the overall funding envelope for the project was forecast at £17.6. - Since the 18/19 Q2 GMPP CRL have indicated that they would require between £400 to £650m in additional funding. The total funding envelope project forecast for Crossrail is between £18.3bn to £18.8bn. This includes the costs for both the CRL and the NR works. The independent assurance of the revised Network Rail (NR) On Network Works (ONW) costs has concluded and a request for an allocation of a further £140m to fund Crossrail works was made at the NR Portfolio Board on 27 February. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £17,630.90 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - It is too early to tell exactly how the impact of COVID-19 will be felt following the “safe stop” of work at project sites. CRL have initiated scenario planning work, developing assumptions to inform a range of possible safe start options and assess the impact of COVID-19. The Project-Representative will be making their assessment of the Crossrail pre-COVID-19 benchmark position, against which the future potential disruptive long-term impacts can assessed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £17,630.90 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - In November 2019, the Crossrail Board announced that it would not be possible to deliver the project within the available funding and would require between £400 to £650m in additional funding. CRL undertook scenario analysis exercises and identified a shortfall target which has been agreed between DfT, HMT, Transport for London (TfL) and the Greater London Authority (GLA). Sponsors are in the process of negotiating the funding gap. However given COVID-19 demobilisation further analysis will be required to fully know the impact. - The independent assurance of the revised Network Rail (NR) On Network Works (ONW) costs has concluded and a request for an allocation of a further £140m to fund Crossrail works was made at the NR Portfolio Board on 27 February. It is proposed that the additional funding will be met from the reallocation of existing NR budgets using CP6 underspend. This was recently approved by Ministers. - Talks are ongoing with TfL to mitigate substantial drops in revenues due to falling ridership numbers. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,040.40 m, has increased by £0.03 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,040.37 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The baseline Whole Life Cost for the Programme has not changed but the figure reported at Q2 1920 was rounded to the nearest £100k. - The cost of the power supply upgrades between Doncaster and York has not been finalised due to ongoing contract negotiations with suppliers. When these costs have been confirmed, the baseline Whole Life Cost for the Programme will be updated. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,040.40 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - COVID-19 will delay the delivery of projects and introduction of new timetable. The prolongation and replanning of works is expected to increase costs and mean the benefits of the Programme are introduced later than planned. The Programme will need to be re-baselined when the implications of the virus have been fully assessed. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,040.40 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Network Rail needs to quantify the cost implications of the COVID-19 delays on each project. - The total cost of the East Coast Main Line power supply upgrades is being finalised with the supply chain. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,091.50 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost, due primarily to the following factors; - The Whole Life Cost is based on GRIP 3 costs and the project is now at GRIP 4 stage which now includes HS2 integrated civils costs and additional infrastructure . This has exposed some pressure on WLC that is being considered. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,091.50 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The Whole Life Cost is based on GRIP 3 costs and the project is now at GRIP 4 stage which now includes HS2 integrated civils costs and additional infrastructure which will impact on the anticipated full cost of the programme . - There is an ongoing cost and scope challenge to come to an agreed revised cost price for the programme which is undergoing further scrutiny and challenge. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £5,007.00 m, has increased by £6.00 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £5,001.00 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Brickyard sidings, to the west of Cardiff was an agreed scope increase, to mitigate delay to Cardiff electrification. - Brickyard sidings enables stabling of Electric Multiple Units as well as the Intercity Express Trains, providing extra capacity to Cardiff Central station, especially during special events. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £5,007.00 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - No actions have increased the overall programme baseline costs. - Network Rail have reported that it would not be possible to complete the electrification element of the programme within available funding, but this has not increased the overall programme cost. A re-baselining exercise will be undertaken in due course across the programme. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £32,607.78 m, has increased by £9874.88 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £22,732.90 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The scheme cost profile was updated to reflect Heathrow’s decision to phase the expansion of terminal capacity and other development works over a longer time period than originally planned. Costs were provided as part of a review of Heathrow’s scheme financing. The preferred Masterplan forecast was £32.5bn [in 2014 prices] which included costs expected to be incurred from 2017 – 2051. - The Government made clear it expects Heathrow to work closely with airlines and its regulator (CAA) to refine the scheme design to target landing charges as close to today’s (2016) level as possible. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £32,607.78 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Following the publication of the CAA's position on Cat C costs, Heathrow confirmed their schedule for the opening of the runway has been delayed by 2 years to 2028-29. This reflects the need to phase the costs over a longer period. HEP were awaiting clarification of Heathrow's detailed schedule and costs. - Recent financeability checks concluded that expansion appeared, in principle, to be privately financeable without government support. Should agreement on Cat C costs not be reached, there could be further impact on Heathrow’s schedule and costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £32,607.78 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The government has been clear that expansion is a private sector project. Delivery of expansion at Heathrow will be funded by Heathrow. - Any investment by Government in related surface access would be subject to HMT’s business case process. Where surface access schemes benefit airport and non-airport users, Government would share the cost with the private sector in line with regulatory processes with related costs being managed by DfT road and rail teams. - All reporting on the programme was paused and has not changed since the Court of Appeal's ruling of the ANPS on 27th February 2020. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £55,700.00 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £55,700.00 m, due primarily to the following factors; - £55.7bn (in 2015 prices) represented the then capital estimate for the HS2 project. Whereas ongoing pressures to the estimate and schedule were still being assessed by the Department at Q2 2019/20, there was further scrutiny placed on the project with the publication of the HS2 Chairman’s Stocktake report in September. In addition, the independent Oakervee Review was commissioned at the time of producing the Q2 report. It was therefore considered inappropriate for the baseline capital estimate for the project to be amended at that time and the budget remained at £55.7bn. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £55,700.00 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - Schedule challenges were presented on the delivery of works at Old Oak Common, due to legal challenges to the award of the Construction Partner Contract, which has since been satisfactorily resolved. There were also some further delays to the clearance of ancient woodlands, with some sites paused during the Oakervee Review. However, the project continues to pick up pace and drive forward with delivery. The ongoing COVID-19 situation has resulted in revised working methodologies for the project and HS2 Ltd has risen to these challenges. The rapid development and the uncertain outcome of the outbreak means it has not yet been possible to precisely determine its impact on the project. HS2 Ltd is currently working with its suppliers to assess the implications on schedule and cost. The current schedule and cost estimates contain contingency to address the issues which have arisen due to the pandemic. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £55,700.00 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Since Q2 19-20 the project has been subject to increased scrutiny through the independent Oakervee Review. This review reassessed the deliverability of the project and undertook a further assessment on project cost and schedule. The recommendations were welcomed and adopted by government, with increased focus on savings and ministerial oversight on delivery. In accordance with IPA guidance, the project has re-established a capital estimated cost range for the project: £65-88bn (2015 prices) and £72-£98bn (2019 prices). The Whole Life cost for the HS2 project was included in the Full Business Case for Phase One, which was estimated at £108.9bn (2015 prices). | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £6,445.73 m, has decreased by £137.52 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £6,583.25 m, due primarily to the following factors; - A review of the baseline WLC was undertaken on Q1 19/20. The new forecast and baselines figures reflect more accurately the state of the programme. - Previous RDEL Baselines incorrectly included Bi-mode variation costs even after these were reallocated to CDEL Non-Gov costs. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £6,445.73 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - A variation on RDEL forecast has been made due to the extension of existing contracts and the procurement of new contract for technical advisors. - A Variation on CDEL forecast has been made due to the release of contingency for EMC and deferral of expenditure into next year. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £6,052.20 m, has increased on last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost, due primarily to the following factors; - The increase is due to the addition of portfolio risk to the previously approved cost (in line with HE policy) and an increase in non-recoverable VAT following the move from private to public finance for the link roads. Since Q2 1920 DfT has approved a further update to the Whole Life Cost and the latest approved position is £6,391m. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £6,052.20 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - The delays caused by Covid19 will impact inflation Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £6,052.20 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - In line with Highways England Policy, portfolio risk has been added. This along with design changes (Removal of Tilbury Junction including Rest and Service Area including associated viaduct works) were submitted for approval to DfT in December 2019. - Since December 2019, we have made further design changes for safety and following consultation feedback. We have also updated the schedule to incorporate feedback from a number of independent reviews. These changes may increase the inflation included in the whole life cost. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £1,671.20 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £1,671.20 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Key Output 1 remains projected to complete within budget, however prolongation of works may cause increase in budget. - Key Output 1a re-examination under way, so final programme spend will be determined by outcome of re-examination. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £1,671.20 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Close management of costs continues. - Contingency management system remains in place and allows active management of contingency. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £5,849.00 m, has decreased by £203.00 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £6,052.00 m, due primarily to the following factors; - A reduction in scope of the North of England Programme, as a result of some schemes within the programme being descoped. - Further certainty of WLC for the programme as estimates mature through the development, design and delivery phases. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £5,849.00 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - Since Q2 19/20 the Trans Pennine Route Upgrade has been established as a standalone programme on the GMPP, and now reports its whole life cost separately to the North of England Programme. As a result whole life costs for the North of England Programme have decreased. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £24.47 m, has increased by £3.87 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £20.60 m, due primarily to the following factors; - Competition projects were required to add an additional stage in the project to deal with non-compliant bids, which resulted in additional and unforcasted cost. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £24.47 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following non-project operating environment activities have impacted the original baseline Q2 Whole Life Cost; - We do not have live competition projects. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £24.47 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - We do not have live competition projects. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £817.70 m, has decreased by £2.50 m since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £820.20 m, due primarily to the following factors; - A review of Programme Costs took place between the Department for Transport and Network Rail. It identified corrections, through the removal of unrelated costs, which were then reflected in the GMPP reports. Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £817.70 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The Department for Transport and Network Rail have engaged on a periodic basis to review Programme Costs which has supported the data provided in GMPP reports. | The baseline Whole Life Cost at Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) is £7,269.40 m, has not changed since last year's Q2 1819 (£m) baseline Whole Life Cost of £7,269.40 m, due primarily to the following factors; - The costs have not changed as there has not been overall costs increases and the programme has kept to budget. - This is mainly down to the fact that the vast majority of infrastructure has been delivered Since the Q2 1920 (30th September 2019) £7,269.40 m baseline Whole Life Cost, the following primary project actions have impacted the original Q2 baseline Whole Life Cost; - The costs have not changed as there has not been overall costs increases and the programme has kept to budget. - This is mainly down to the fact that the vast majority of Infrastructure has been delivered |
| Annual Report Category | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction | Government Transformation and Service Delivery | Infrastructure and Construction | Infrastructure and Construction |
| The IPA Annual Report publishes the whole life cycle costs on projects, based on figures from their Business Cases, whilst the National Infrastructure and Construction Pipeline (NICP) focuses primarily on the upfront capital investment on a project. Where both documents refer to the same projects, this distinction will be the principal reason for any differences in the data sets published. Other government publications may use different methodologies to derive cost figures | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set | Not set |