DSA 03.OME Part 4 (JSP 498)- Defence Code of Practice (DCOP) and Guidance Notes – Defence Major Accident Control Regulations (MACR)

Defence OME Safety Regulator

DOSR

DSA VISION

Protecting Defence personnel and operational capability through effective and independent HS&EP regulation, assurance, enforcement and investigation.

PREFACE

AUTHORITY

1.   This document is crown copyright and the intellectual property rights of this publication belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). However, material or information contained in this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form provided it is used for the purposes of furthering safety and environmental management.

STATUS

2.   This document:

        a.   Is uncontrolled when printed.

        b.   Will be updated as part of a continuous improvement programme but at least 12-monthly from the period of document issue date.

REQUESTS FOR CHANGE

3.   Proposed changes, recommendations or amendments to DOSR Regulations and Guidance publications can be submitted by anyone using the DOME Request for Change Function (RFC) available for every Dome publication in the DOME library located **here** or by completing the Word version of the Change Proposal Form available from the DOME Library, see figure 1 below for the location.


Figure 1. Change Proposal Form (Word version) Location

4.   Any post and grammar change proposals can be approved or rejected by the DOSR PRG Authors without involvement of the associated Working Group.

5.   Technical change proposals will need to be submitted to the associated Working Group for review and approval or rejection.

6.   When incorporating changes care is to be taken to maintain coherence across regulations.

7.   Changes effecting Risk to Life will be published immediately.

8.   Other changes will be incorporated as part of routine reviews.

REVIEW PROCESS

9.   The DOSR PRG team will ensure these OME Regulations remain fit for purpose by conducting reviews through the DOSR Governance Committees, involving all Stakeholders.

FURTHER ADVICE AND FEEDBACK

10.   The document owner is the DOSR. For further information about any aspect of this document, or questions not answered within the subsequent sections, or to provide feedback on the content, contact:

Job Title	DOSR-Policy, Regulations and Guidance
E-mail	DSA-DOSR-PRG@mod.gov.uk
Address	Juniper #5004, Level 0, Wing 1, Abbey Wood North, Bristol, BS34 8QW

AMENDMENT RECORD

Version 1.0					
No	Section	Para	Amendment Summary	Agreed	Date

AMENDMENT RECORD

CHAPTER 4
ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN

INTRODUCTION

1   The On-Site Emergency Plan specifies the response to an emergency by those people working on or visiting the establishment. In the case of Upper Tier Establishments (UTE) it is complemented by an Off-Site Emergency Plan prepared by the Local Authority (LA). In order to ensure correct working of the complete emergency response it is important that the On-Site Emergency Plan and the Off-Site Emergency Plan have a seamless interface and all aspects are properly dovetailed together.

2   The On-Site Emergency Plan does not have to be a stand-alone document and can draw information or procedures from existing establishment documentation. It is also acceptable to utilise existing documentation and enhance it in order to meet the requirements of the Major Accident Control Regulations (MACR). Establishments will already have many documents and procedures in place covering a wide range of potential accident scenarios. Where appropriate such documentation may be fully utilised in demonstrating how the establishment meets the requirements of MACR. The On-Site Emergency Plan should be complementary to the emergency plans required to meet the provisions of Integrated Contingency Planning (ICP).

3   The On-Site Emergency Plan should be the subject of consultation with the establishment employees. This may be done through the normal Trade Union (TU) consultation procedures or the military Chain of Command as appropriate.

OBJECTIVES

4   The On-Site Emergency Plan has the following four objectives:

   4.1   Containing and controlling incidents to minimise the effects and limit damage to human health and or the environment.

   4.2   Implementing the measures necessary to protect human health and or the environment from the effects of Major Accidents (MAs).

   4.3   Communicating the necessary information to the public, LA and the emergency services.

   4.4   Providing for the remediation of the environment should an MA occur.

RESPONSIBILITIES

5   There is a minimum requirement to provide information on the responsibilities for the following:

   5.1   The Establishment Main Controller.

   5.2   The Establishment Incident Controller.

   5.3   The Person responsible for liaising with the LA.

6   Details should be provided of the responsibilities of any other individual who has a significant role to undertake within the On-Site Emergency Plan.

7   The Establishment Main Controller has overall responsibility for directing operations from the Emergency Control Centre (ECC). During working hours this responsibility is normally discharged by the Head of Establishment (HOE) or nominated deputy. The Establishment Incident Controller operates at the forward

control point and provides the interface between the ECC and the incident. Initially he may be required to carry out the duties of the Establishment Main Controller until the latter arrives at the ECC. Terms of Reference detailing the responsibilities and actions the individual is expected to undertake should be provided for all significant positions. Examples of typical responsibilities for the Establishment Main Controller and the Establishment Incident Controller are at Annexes 4A and 4B respectively. It is essential that Suitably Qualified Experienced Persons (SQEP) are available to undertake the duties of the Establishment Main Controller and Establishment Incident Controller. Arrangements must be made to ensure cover for these roles are available 24 hours a day. Guidance on meeting SQEP requirements is shown in Annex 4G.

RESOURCES

8   Arrangements should show how the timescales for staffing key positions are to be met, including details of on call or standby arrangements. The back-up arrangements to be used in the event of first choice personnel not being available should be included.

9   The type and location of safety equipment that is to be used in the event of an incident should be identified. This will include fire fighting equipment and systems, damage control equipment and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

10   It is not possible to be prescriptive in respect to the range of equipment required. An appropriate assessment should be made as part of the evaluation of risk process. The broad manpower requirements available to contain an incident should be detailed, including the arrangements for augmentation from off-site where necessary and feasible.

11   Details of availability of MOD resources external to the establishment will be contained in the establishments Integrated Contingency Plan and should cover the possibility of the loss of utilities. Appropriate cross-reference should be included in the On-Site Emergency Plan.

12   Details of additional resources that could be made available via enabling contracts or from the LA should be shown. These should have been identified as a result of the Risk Assessment process and it is important to link the resource with the identified need.

EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE

13   Adequate control of any major incident requires the use of dedicated facilities where command and control can be exercised. This is normally referred to as the ECC, which may form part of an existing facility (such as a guardroom). It will contain information, communication systems and other facilities, which allow an incident to be managed and any consequences minimised. For larger incidents it may be necessary to utilise more than one ECC. If this is done then the division of responsibility and tasking must be made clear to all participants.

14   The minimum information and plans to be held in the ECC are given in Annex 4C. As this is the minimum requirement it should be expanded as dictated by the Risk Assessment process.

15   At least one alternate ECC should be identified in the event the incident puts the prime ECC at risk. In the event of an incident it is essential that an adequate record be kept of all events, decisions and actions taken. The record may be written

or electronically recorded and should be a part of the establishment's permanent records.

ACTIVATION

16   Activation of the emergency plans is a two stage process, as follows:

16.1   Stage One - Activation of the On-Site Emergency Plan. This is initiated by internal warning systems whether automatic or manual and can be activated by anybody on the establishment in accordance with standard procedures. Calling of the emergency services should be an integral part of the internal warning system. At any time during an incident where it is thought that those in the PIZ may be immediately affected the PIZ alert must be initiated.

16.2   Stage Two - Activation of the Off-Site Emergency Plan (UTE only).   The decision to move from Stage One to Stage Two is made between the Establishment Main Controller and the Senior Emergency Services Officer (SESO). This alerts the LA and other interested parties that an MA has occurred or is about to occur. At this stage the Off-Site Emergency Plan will be implemented along with the additional resources it deploys.

17   The information to be provided to the emergency services for the initial warning stage should, as a minimum, cover the items given in Annex 4D. Arrangements should be made for additional information to be passed to the emergency services and the LA as the incident progresses. This may be through the 999 system or by direct contact with the Police Emergency Control Room (normally initiated by the Police to the ECC). Once the emergency services are present at the ECC, the SESO will become the main point of contact.

18   The Establishment Main Controller will need to ensure that the initial warnings are issued as soon as it appears that the incident could escalate beyond the control of the establishment. The warnings may be issued by a variety of methods depending upon the type of hazard and those likely to be affected. For example, a pollution incident is likely to concentrate upon immediate notification to down-stream water abstractors and the Environment Agency (or SEPA). An imminent explosion on the other hand may require a wider spread alert to be initiated, eg via a warning siren. The Establishment Main Controller will monitor the incident and advise on any further actions deemed necessary for the Public Information Zone (PIZ) (UTE only) and beyond. If the incident escalates to the extent that evacuation of the surrounding area is necessary, or likely to be necessary, this information is to be passed to the SESO. Arrangements for the passage of this information to the local population should be laid down in the Off-Site Emergency Plan (UTE only).

EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

19   Good communications are integral to any effective control system. British Telecom (BT) is able to respond quickly to the needs of an emergency situation provided the requirements are known in advance. BT has a local 24 hour control centre which can be accessed via an emergency link line number - 01345-555999. This control centre will mobilise the resources required including an Incident Manager if needed.

20   The national Emergency Communications Network (ECN) is a robust network that links directly a number of government departments, Emergency Services and

LAs. Arrangements can be made to link other authorities through the public telephone network. The ECN facility will ensure that urgent telephone contact can continue.

21   Mobile phones are increasingly being integrated into the emergency response systems; however, the mobile phone system is vulnerable to disruption and overload in the event of a serious incident. Cellular Radio Network Providers (CRNP) have a control programme that they have agreed to implement in the event of a serious incident – Mobile Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS). The scheme allows priority use to specific cellular phones (MTPAS requires a special SIM card to be installed in the mobile phone). The system is activated under the authority of the Civil Police and members of the scheme require specific mobile phones to be registered. MTPAS is only available to Category 2 and 2 Responders (as defined in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004) and partner organisations which directly support them at the scene of an incident. The scheme is managed by the Telecommunications Sub Group in the Local Resilience Area. Contact details can be obtained via the Emergency Planning Officer in the Local Council. Registration of a limited number of cellular phones for use in an emergency is recommended.

RESPONSE TO AN ACCIDENT SITUATION

22   The intended strategy for dealing with the MA scenarios should be identified in the Risk Assessments. Actions to be taken should be grouped where feasible to simplify the range of response required.

23   The degree of detail required in the emergency plan should be sufficient to cover any feasible event. This may, in some instances, be an explanation of broad principles to be applied or a step by step guide.

24   The mitigation measures will be dictated by the Risk Assessment and more detailed actions are to be expected for the more predictable events. It is however important to ensure that any guidance produced is flexible and can be adapted as an incident progresses. The actions to be taken to control each credible event are as follows:

   24.1   Immediate response (give warning).

   24.2   Initial actions (first aid fire fighting).

   24.3   Evaluation of incident.

   24.4   Mustering and Search and Rescue.

   24.5   Evacuation.

   24.6   Use of mitigation measures.

   24.7   Recovery actions.

   24.8   Remediation.

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE

25   The immediate response to an incident should be to raise the alarm.

INITIAL ACTIONS

26   Initial actions should be easily understood and displayed. Examples would be to attack a fire with first aid fire fighting equipment (where it is safe to do so) or to stop pumping in the event of a fuel spillage etc.

EVALUATION OF INCIDENT

27   The incidents should be evaluated to determine which of the pre-planned mitigation measures would be best suited. This may include activation of the appropriate alerting system.

MUSTERING AND SEARCH AND RESCUE

28   Details should be shown of the mustering arrangements. Whilst adjustment can be made for the complexity or size of the establishment, mustering should normally be completed within 30 minutes. It is not necessary to muster the complete establishment if arrangements are in place to restrict access to the area that is affected by an incident. The system should include the principles for the search and rescue of people who are not accounted for on completion of mustering eg, forwarding details to the emergency services along with an assessment of the risk involved in entering particular areas that are affected by the incident.

EVACUATION

29   Evacuation will normally be a three stage process:

   29.1   Stage One.   The evacuation of non-essential personnel from within the establishment boundary to a safe location. The decision to evacuate non-essential staff rests with the Establishment Main Controller. It is feasible that only partial evacuation will be required as some staff may already be at a safe location and movement could expose them to additional risk.

   29.2   Stage Two.   Off-site - the evacuation, as a precautionary measure, of members of the public from an area which has the potential to be affected by the consequences of an MA. The procedures should detail what actions are expected of the local population and how they are to be achieved. This is likely to include evacuation arrangements with the aid of the Police, etc. Any interfaces with outside agencies should be cross-referred to the Off-Site Emergency Plan (UTE only). The decision to evacuate members of the public rests with the SESO.

   29.3   Stage Three. The evacuation of essential staff still within the boundary in the event that the mitigation measures are not effective and a full scale emergency is inevitable. The decision to evacuate rests with the SESO advised by the Establishment Main Controller.

USE OF MITIGATION MEASURES

30   Pre-planned mitigation measures should be implemented as early as possible in order to minimise the consequences of any incident. The Establishment Main Controller should review the effectiveness of the mitigation measures and be prepared to adapt them or respond innovatively should they prove ineffective.

RECOVERY ACTIONS

31   Initially the recovery actions should be aimed at ensuring that any consequences of an incident are kept to a minimum. There may be a delay before the long term recovery actions can be implemented. The short term actions should be sufficient to ensure that the situation is stabilised and any delay does not result in further harm.

REMEDIATION

32   Remediation should be part of the medium and long term recovery plans based on the Risk Assessment process, which will have highlighted the possible consequences of an MA. Appropriate plans should be drawn up to allow the recovery of the local environment. The tasks required will be dependent upon the hazards identified and the nature of the local environment and should address, for example, the following:

    32.1   Direct blast or debris damage.

    32.2   Plume dispersion and deposition.

    32.3   Firewater run off.

    32.4   Oil or chemical spillage arrangements, removal or treatment of contaminated soil or water.

    32.5   Restricting foodstuffs (including those grown at home).

    32.6   Restricting access to the area.

    32.7   Restocking watercourses, lakes, woods etc.

    32.8   Remediation of surface and groundwater supplies.

    32.9   Removal of dead animals, fish etc.

    32.10   Neutralisation and disposal of chemical contaminants.

    32.11   Re-introduction of species.

33   Specific actions may be required should any environmentally sensitive sites such as Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) be within the potentially affected area. Such actions should be agreed with local and national conservation groups and the Environment Agency (EA) or Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA).

LIAISON WITH EMERGENCY SERVICES

34   The emergency services should arrive at an agreed Rendezvous Point (RVP) that will normally be close to the ECC. This may vary depending on prevailing wind direction for nominated safe approach route. They will then be briefed on the following:

    34.1   Current situation and action in progress, covering fire fighting and casualty state.

    34.2   Operational constraints, evacuation routes and safe areas.

    34.3   Explosive and toxic hazards.

    34.4   Any other hazards.

35   The responsibilities of the agencies involved in an MA are contained in various items of legislation and in summary are:

35.1   Police.   The Police co-ordinate all activities of those responding to and around the scene, which must, unless a disaster has been caused by severe weather or other natural phenomena, be preserved to provide evidence for subsequent enquiries and possible criminal proceedings. Where practicable the Police establish cordons to facilitate the work of the other emergency services in the saving of life, the protection of the public and the care of survivors. They oversee any criminal investigation. They also facilitate Inquiries carried out by the responsible accident investigation body, such as the Health & Safety Executive (HSE), Military Aircraft Accident Investigation Branch, Air Accident Investigation Branch or a Service Board of Inquiry convened under Armed Forces (Service Inquires) Regulations 2008. The Police process casualty information and have responsibility for identifying and arranging for the removal of the dead. In this task they act on behalf of HM Coroner or Procurator Fiscal who has the legal responsibility for investigating the cause and circumstances of deaths arising from a disaster.

35.2   Fire and Rescue Service. The Fire and Rescue Service is responsible for the Health and Safety of the personnel of all agencies working within the inner cordon and will liaise with the police about who should be allowed access, to ensure they are properly equipped, adequately trained and briefed. Their first concern is to rescue people trapped in a fire, wreckage or debris. They assist the Ambulance Service with casualty handling and the Police with the recovery of bodies. In the event of an incident that is, or is suspected to be, as a result of terrorist activity then control of activities within the cordon will remain with the Police.

35.3   Ambulance Service. The Ambulance Service is responsible for co-ordinating the on-site National Health Service (NHS) response and for determining the hospital(s) to which injured persons should be taken. The Ambulance Service seeks to save life and limb through effective emergency treatment at the scene. They will determine the priority for release of trapped casualties in conjunction with the Fire and Rescue Service, and arrange transport of the injured, in order of priority, to the receiving hospitals.

INTEGRATION OF COMMAND AND CONTROL

36   The SESO would normally operate through a focal control point and it is envisaged that this would be co-located within the ECC and provisions for this should be made in the layout of the ECC.

37   The Police have primacy in the event of an MA. The HOE will retain command of all establishment resources throughout the operation. Co-ordination and control of fire fighting and rescue in the initial phase is the responsibility of the establishment. The Senior Officer from the LA Fire and Rescue Service will assume control of the fire and rescue operation once briefed. An Ambulance Service Officer will control the deployment of Ambulance Service resources, liaising with the Senior Police Officer and the Senior Fire Officer on the casualty state and recovery process.

38   The principles by which command and control are exercised have been agreed and adopted by all emergency services. Full details of arrangements can be found on the UK Resilience Website run by the Cabinet Office. The management of the response can be divided into the following three levels:

38.1   Operational (Bronze).

38.2   Tactical (Silver).

38.3   Strategic (Gold).

39   The need to implement one or more of these levels will depend on the nature of the incident, but normally incidents will be handled at the operational (bronze) level, only moving on to the tactical (silver) or strategic (gold) levels should that prove necessary. The On-Site Emergency Plan is an example of operational (bronze) arrangements. The tactical (silver) level should be covered by the Off-Site Emergency Plan whilst the strategic (gold) level is the sole responsibility of the LA.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

40   Effective management of the information coming into the ECC is vital to understanding the issues and implications of an incident. Information should be recorded as it is received. Ideally this should be via dedicated logbooks (whilst electronic logs are acceptable a manual log is preferable). The logbook will be a prime source of evidence and will be required for any subsequent inquiry. To aid situational awareness significant information from the logbook should be displayed within the ECC. An example Information Board is shown at Annex 4E.

41   The Incident Commander in the ECC (this will be the MOD Establishment Main Controller in the early stages of an incident prior to a Senior Emergency Services Officer (SESO) arriving at the site) should instigate regular update sessions to ensure all information coming into the ECC has been captured. This should then lead on to a Strategy Meeting where the implications of the event to date can be considered and a Strategy Plan developed for managing the incident. This decision making process is vital to the effective management of an incident and the decisions should be recorded. An example Agenda for a Strategy Meeting is shown at Annex 4 E.

HEALTH HAZARDS

42   In developing the public health aspects of the On-Site Emergency Plan, establishments need to consult with their local Health Authority. The essential response actions placed on Health Authorities are as follows:

42.1   Evaluating the risk to the health of the public in the light of the available toxicological data on any chemicals released the results of biological and environmental sampling and the receipt of specialist advice and support.

42.2   Advising on the measures needed to limit or prevent further exposure to any substances released in any MA.

43   The majority of the measures will be agreed as a part of the Off-Site Emergency Plan (UTE only). However, the following aspects are appropriate to the On-Site Emergency Plan:

43.1   Requirement for a Medical Incident Officer.

43.2   Use of establishment facilities and medical staff.

43.3   Notification of specialist requirements such as chemical protective suits.

43.4   Information database on dangerous substances on the establishment.

43.5   Pre-positioning of medical stores.

43.6   Agreement of casualty reception areas.

43.7   Mortuary arrangements.

43.8   Decontamination procedures.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

44   Arrangements should be made to provide general awareness training of the emergency procedures for all people present on the establishment. This training should include contractors working on the establishment as their actions may have the potential to cause an incident and they will therefore be at the centre of an incident.

45   Training should be carried out with the emergency services on a regular basis. The training should concentrate on verifying effectiveness of interface arrangements, command and control arrangements and familiarity with the establishment and its equipment.

46   The minimum level of training must include the requirements given in Table 4.1. It is expected that each establishment will have identified additional key posts that will require training. A list of posts identified as having a role to undertake within the emergency response organisation and the relevant training must be maintained. A record of the training undertaken for all occupiers of the identified posts is to be made and kept for a minimum of 3 years. The record of training should include confirmation of competence of the individual or used to identify additional training requirements in order that individuals can operate effectively in their designated role.

Table 4.1 TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Serial (a)	Role (b)	Training (c)	Frequency (d)
1	Establishment Main Controller	a. Minimum of table top exercise b. Live exercise	Yearly Yearly
2	Establishment Incident Controller	a. Minimum of table top exercise b. Live exercise	Yearly Yearly
3	ECC staff	a. Communications exercise b. ECC exercise	Yearly Yearly
4	Ministry of Defence Police (MDP)/MOD Guard Service (MGS)/Military Provost Guard Service (MPGS)	Communications exercise	Yearly

5	Emergency Services Note: co-operation can be requested but emergency services are not obliged to attend training.	a. Familiarisation visit	Yearly
		b. Live exercise (on-site)	Three Yearly
6	All Establishment personnel	Familiarisation	On joining

EXERCISE ARRANGEMENTS

47   Exercising of the On-Site Emergency Plan should be undertaken on a regular basis. A forward exercise plan is to be prepared covering a 3 year period. A copy of the plan should be forwarded to the MACR CA SG to assist in developing the exercise inspection programme. For any exercises which involve the Local Authorities suggested exercise dates are likely to be required via the Local Resilience Forum at least 12 months in advance to enable them to fit MOD's requirements into their overall exercise programme. The HOE has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring the arrangements to minimise the effects of an MA are adequate. Details of the type and frequency of exercises are given in Table 4.2. Use of a table top exercise is recommended for those situations when there has been a large turnover of key staff and therefore a number of people need to gain an understanding of the emergency response principles and procedures. They are also useful to consider the emergency response requirements across a wide range of scenarios or for an extended period of time which is impracticable to test in a live exercise. Combined exercises may also be of use where a relatively small live play exercise tests immediate response arrangements which is then followed by a tabletop to consider the follow on actions across a number of hours or even days.

Table 4.2 EXERCISE TYPE AND FREQUENCY – LTE & UTE

Serial (a)	Type (b)	Frequency (c)
1	Table Top	Recommended Yearly (see para 46)
2	Communications	Recommended Six Monthly
3	Live (internal only)	Mandatory Yearly (can be combined with exercise requirement at serial 4)
4	Live (multi-agency exercise in conjunction with emergency services and Local Authorities)	Mandatory Three Yearly

48   Serial 4 is a requirement for both UTE and LTE. For UTE, there is an additional requirement to co-operate with the Local Authorities in order to enable them to test their off-site plan. A joint exercise of the On-Site and Off-Site Emergency Plans enables all interfaces to be tested. The Local Authority may wish to test the Council Emergency Plans, setting up rest centres, arranging catering facilities for the emergency services for an extended incident, setting up their technical information cells and local media arrangements. The extent to which the off-site plan is tested is solely the responsibility of the Local Authority.

49   The overall exercising regime for LTE and UTE should aim to ensure that the following aspects are covered:

   49.1   Activating the On-Site Emergency Plan. Initial response of establishment including the sounding of alarms, local evacuation and alerting emergency services.

   49.2   Mobilising Establishment Personnel. Mobilising establishment personnel identified in the emergency plan as having a role to play in the event of an emergency.

   49.3   Activating the ECC. The ECC is where the response to the emergency can be directed and co-ordinated as required by the emergency plan, within a suitable timeframe. Consideration should also be given to the possible need for an alternative ECC should the designated ECC become untenable.

   49.4   Testing the Flow of Information into and out of the ECC. The flow of information into and out of the ECC will require demonstration that communication systems used by participating organisations can be received promptly and accurately. This will ensure that those in the ECC have access to an up to date picture of the emergency and the current response upon which to base their decision making.

   49.5   Testing the Flow of Information within the ECC. The flow of information within the ECC will require demonstration that information received is exchanged and disseminated to all parties with a role to play and in a format that can be understood and assimilated. Additionally, all decisions made within the ECC must be forwarded to relevant participants.

   49.6   Decision Making Process. Decision making involves demonstrating that advice is provided by all participating organisations to allow rational decisions to be made, which can then be implemented.

   49.7   Command and Control Arrangements. Command and control arrangements will require demonstration that there are clear and effective lines of responsibility and that the participating organisations work together in a coherent and effective manner.

   49.8   Emergency Equipment. Emergency equipment involves demonstrating that the equipment identified as having a role to play in the response to an emergency, is fully operational with maintenance and testing procedures in place, and that identified personnel are competent to operate it.

   49.9   Public Relations Arrangements. Public relations arrangements involves the need to demonstrate how information on the emergency and current response can be passed to all participating organisations and appropriate media. This may require preparing briefs for the media or providing a media briefing centre.

   49.10   Activating the Off-Site Emergency Plan (UTE only). Activating the Off-Site Emergency Plan will require demonstration that there are effective interface arrangements in place to enable integration of command and control in a multi-agency setting.

50   The HOE is to inform the MACR Competent Authority (CA) of the dates of the mandatory 3 yearly exercises as a representative will attend it.

51   Each exercise should be recorded, and records kept for a minimum of three years. In order to obtain maximum benefit from each exercise an exercise plan should be produced which covers the following:

   51.1   Specific objectives for the exercise. This may be as simple as testing particular elements of the emergency plan such as the evacuation arrangements or testing how the emergency plans cope with a particular type of incident and should identify the exercise objectives in discussion with all the agencies involved.

   51.2   Performance criteria for each objective. These should be agreed in advance and where possible should be quantitative eg, full muster of staff completed within 30 minutes of the alarm.

   51.3   Realistic scenario for the exercise. This should be based on one of the MA scenarios identified. The off-site agencies may have particular requirements that they would like to exercise that will not be readily apparent to establishment staff. In order to generate maximum benefit, the exercise scenario should be agreed with the establishment and off-site agencies.

   51.4   Key events timeline for the exercise. Artificial compression of the timeline may be necessary in order to exercise all elements of the plan. However, any compression will introduce exercise artificiality and should be kept to a minimum. All staff should be made aware of any intentions to compress the timeline.

   51.5   Directing Staff for the exercise. These should be identified and separate from those people undertaking their emergency response function. It is advantageous to have observers at various locations on the establishment to provide feedback on the responses that occur to the exercise action.

52   There should be an immediate post exercise debrief ("hot debrief") followed by a written report. Any lessons learnt as a result of these exercises should be utilised to update the On-Site Emergency Plan. The exercise record should be kept for a minimum of 3 years. A copy of the mandatory three yearly exercise report should be sent to the MACR CA.

EQUIPMENT READINESS

53   Regular inspection and testing is essential if equipment is to be kept in a state of readiness. Each establishment should already have in place an appropriate maintenance methodology as part of their Safety Management System (SMS). The SMS should cover scheduled maintenance, records of statutory tests, safe systems of work including permits to work and arrangements for repair in the event of breakdown. The maintenance system should ensure that any equipment provided for use in an emergency situation can perform correctly.

54   Emergency equipment must be adequately protected from the effects of weather. Protection arrangements should ensure that the effectiveness of the equipment is not diminished as a result of bad weather conditions eg, frost protection for equipment stored out of doors.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

55   Any major incident in an MOD establishment will result in significant media interest. Reporters, photographers and TV camera crews are to be expected. The arrangements for advising the media and the local inhabitants of an MA and for advising the local public on actions to be taken are the responsibility of the Police.

56   The On Site emergency plan should explain the internal Public Relations (PR) procedures that go towards supporting the Civil Police arrangements. These include laying out the responsibilities of the establishment and the MOD PR Office (PRO) systems. It is important that information is provided in a coherent manner and in such a way that the PR effort does not distract from the effective control of the incident.

57   The primary PR objective will be to reassure the public (through the media) that they are safe, that the incident is being dealt with in a professional manner and to advise what action they should or should not take. The key to this is in supplying early, accurate information. The local MOD PRO should therefore be consulted and agreed procedures detailed in the On-Site Emergency Plan.

58   For a major incident it is likely that the media arrangements will be dictated by a County Emergency Plan under the Civil Contingencies Act. MoD will therefore need to ensure its internal arrangements are capable of interfacing effectively with those arrangements. Once a major incident has been declared the emergency services will be under pressure to provide an immediate statement. At the earliest opportunity a media cell lead by the Civil Police attached to Strategic command will issue a holding statement.

59   Civil Police press staff will contact their counterparts in the other responding organisations so that all agencies can participate in the media cell.

MEDIA BRIEFINGS

60   The focus for briefings by responding organisations should be as follows:

  • The nature of the incident
  • Overview of the emergency response
  • The number of casualties
  • How the emergency services coped/are coping
  • Any criminal investigations (except incidents on the railway)
  • Casualty bureau telephone number (if issued)
  • Local disruption (past and continuing)
  • Praise for local people who may have assisted in rescue operations
  • The rescue operation
  • How many people were trapped and in what circumstances
  • The level of response in terms of appliances and staff
  • What equipment was needed to free people?
  • Where relevant, specific information relating to flooding, fires or chemical incidents
  • Details about potential public inquiries
  • How other responding agencies are coping
  • Aid to the community
  • Number of staff involved in the clear up
  • Preparations for the recovery of the community

MEDIA CENTRE

61   If the incident is likely to attract a significant media presence for days, weeks, or even longer, press officers should consider whether it would be beneficial to establish a media centre near the scene. Such a centre gives journalists a base to operate from, shelter from the elements and (ideally) toilet and refreshment facilities. The advantages to the emergency services include improved communications and speedy organisation of briefings and interviews.

62   If a suitable facility cannot be established at the establishment then Local authorities keep lists of available buildings in their areas and will assist in identifying a suitable venue such as a school, church hall or community centre, preferably with a large outdoor area where heavy equipment such as outside broadcasting units can be parked.

MEDIA – INITIAL MACR REQUIREMENTS

63   For a major accident the Civil Police exercise primacy including press liaison. The Civil Police will normally deploy a Press Officer to the establishment or press facility. The MACR qualified establishments need to identify individuals to act as the MOD point of contact for the Civil Police Press Officer. Ideally this is a MOD Press Officer. Alternatively this is someone with an understanding of the MOD Press system and who can help exchange information on a two way basis between the Police and MOD Press Officers. Any press releases can therefore be agreed jointly within a short but realistic timescale. It is important to note that MOD can't stop information being given out by the Police and as they take control as the Silver Commander they will be aware of all the information established during these early stages

64   Depending on how long an incident goes on for it may be necessary to support the Press Liaison post for an extended period. It is important to ensure that an agreed message is given out and that the same message is then provided to the wider MoD press system so anyone from the press coming in to say Main Building will get the correct response.

65   An initial holding brief should have been pre-prepared. This is very simple and states little more than an incident has occurred, the matter is being addressed in conjunction with the emergency services and more information will be provided in due course.

66   Each establishment should also have a prepared information pack ready to hand out to the press which explains the role of the establishment, possibly some history and which can be used as filler material by the press. Such information packs (probably only a couple of sides of A4) would have been cleared for use as required by the relevant MOD Press Officer.

INCIDENT REPORTING ARRANGEMENTS

67   Each establishment will have a reporting system based on their parent organisation requirements which should include the following appropriate authority:

    67.1   HSE under the requirements of the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 2013 (RIDDOR).

    67.2   EA or SEPA under the requirements of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 (as amended).

68   Additionally, establishments should notify the MACR CA of an incident (as defined in Chapter 1) by email within 24 hours using the MA incident report form given in Annex 4F. This initial report on the incident is required in order to formally notify the National CA. Notification to the National CA will be undertaken by the MACR CA. Any further reports would be subject to specific requirements which would be advised on a case by case basis by the MACR CA.

REVIEW

69   Formal review of the On-Site Emergency Plan must be carried out at least on a three yearly basis and in the event of a significant change to establishment operations.

ANNEX 4A

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT MAIN CONTROLLER

1   Take responsibility for overall control from the Establishment Incident Controller.

2   Be the principal point of contact for the Senior Emergency Services Officer (SESO).

3   Provide technical advice and support to the emergency services.

4   Review and assess developments as appropriate, to help predict the most likely outcome of an incident.

5   Ensure cordon and access control measures are implemented.

6   Activate elements of the On-Site Emergency Plans as appropriate.

7   Formally activate the Off-Site Emergency Plan (Upper Tier Establishments).

8   Ensure key personnel have been mobilised.

9   Ensure that all staff are accounted for.

10   Ensure that casualties are receiving adequate attention and, if appropriate, arrange for additional medical assistance.

11   Liaise with external agencies to provide advice on possible effects on areas outside the establishment – Police, Fire, Ambulance, Coastguard, Environment Agency or Scottish Environment Protection Agency, Health and Safety Executive, Water Board, Meteorological Office and the Health Authority.

12   Direct the shutting down of plant and evacuation of buildings and the establishment in conjunction with SESO.

13   Update MOD Senior Staff on the situation as appropriate.

14   Provide Public Relations (PR) input to the MOD PR Office (PRO) and the media (via SESO).

15   Provide for welfare needs of establishment personnel, e.g. provision of breaks, food and drink and relief in the event of a prolonged incident.

16   Ensure that full consideration is given to the preservation of evidence.

17   Ensure adequate recording of events and actions.

18   Authorize stand down and all clear at end of incident.

ANNEX 4B

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE
ESTABLISHMENT INCIDENT CONTROLLER

1   Must be easily identifiable as the focal point for control of an incident.

2   Ensure emergency services have been notified of an incident.

3   Take charge of incident until arrival of specialist response personnel, (eg firefighting pending arrival of Defence Fire & Rescue (DFR) or Local Authority (LA) Fire and Rescue Service) after which he will advise the Senior Fire Service Officer of any particular risks or hazards, communications restrictions and safe distance or area in case evacuation becomes necessary.

4   Determine the locations of the Forward Control Point as follows:

> In the event of a major incident the Emergency Control Centre (ECC) will be activated. Utilising the information available from state boards, hazard maps etc. the most appropriate location of the Forward Control Point will be determined. Reliefs or stand-ins for officers absent are to be nominated.

> The Establishment Main Controller (normally Head of Establishment) will inform the Ministry of Defence Police, MOD Guard Service or Military Provost Guard Service of the location of the Forward Control Point.

> Dependent upon the exact location of the incident, the Establishment Incident Controller will confirm the position of the Forward Control Point to the ECC or advise that it is moving to a new position with an indication of the new location. On arrival at the new location, report the precise position of the revised Forward Control Point to the ECC.

5   Establish a Forward Control Point. Establish radio transmitter communication and, where practicable, a telephone link with the ECC.

6   Maintain continuous link by radio transmitter and telephone (if available) with the ECC throughout the emergency. Provide details of incident, risks and hazards. Advise control or mitigation measures underway and provide details of any casualties and assistance required.

7   Arrange evacuation to safe muster area of all establishment personnel not involved in control measures. Shut down plant as deemed necessary.

8   Advise the ECC of any risk of an explosion if incident involves explosives. If there is a danger of explosion, a **Take Cover** warning must be communicated to everyone who could be affected.

9   Provide specialist advice as required to the emergency services from knowledge of the environment of the establishment and the potential reactions of the dangerous substances involved in the incident.

10   As soon as conditions allow, pass the **All Clear** signal.

11   Summon additional key personnel and resources as required.

12   Ensure the safe use of radio communications considering the following:

Use of radios in some hazardous areas may generate an additional hazard due to the potential to initiate a dangerous event. Safe distances are to be evaluated and notified to the emergency services.

Any operating restrictions should be kept to a minimum in order not to interfere with the effective communications of the agencies responding to the incident.

13   Authorize confined spaces clearance if emergency shutdown of valves is required.

ANNEX 4C

MINIMUM INFORMATION AND PLANS TO BE HELD IN EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTRE

1   Plans of the establishment showing buildings, roads, hydrant systems, emergency water tanks, electrical power lines, gas pipes, etc.

2   Plan of the establishment showing the location of any dangerous substances.

3   Map of the surrounding area with establishment boundaries and safeguarding lines shown.

4   Map showing any environmentally sensitive areas such as Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI).

5   Map showing the water and drainage system.

6   General assembly points.

7   List of fire guides.

8   Fire Orders.

9   Security Orders.

10   Integrated Contingency Plan.

11   List of security sensitive and restricted access installations.

12   Access arrangements for establishment keys.

13   Technical information manuals as required.

14   Environmental Risk Assessment for establishment.

15   Location and inventory of emergency equipment.

16   List of first aid trained personnel.

17   List of key personnel and contact details.

18   Internal and external telephone directories.

19   Local Authority Civil Emergency Plan (the Off-Site Emergency Plan) if applicable.

20   Status boards, fax machine, stationery, etc.

21   For establishments holding explosives, the following additional information by Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ), Hazard Classification Code (HCC) and Hazard Division Sign (HDS) should be held:

    21.1   Contents of explosives storehouses.

    21.2   Contents of explosives processing buildings.

    21.3   Contents of marshalling and stabling areas (road and rail).

    21.4   Contents of vessels at berths, jetties and trots.

22 For establishments with Bulk Fuel Installations (BFIs), the following additional information should be held:

    22.1   Contents of tank farm.

    22.2   Contents of stabling areas.

    22.3   Pipeline and valve layout diagram.

    22.4   Spillage Orders.

    22.5   Disposition of foam stocks.

    22.6   Manning and contents of ships berthed alongside.

23 For establishments with buildings containing chemical hazards, the following additional information should be held:

    23.1   Types and quantity of chemicals held.

24 For establishments with airfields, the following additional information should be held:

    24.1   Forward firing weapon arcs.

ANNEX 4D

EARLY STAGES OF AN INCIDENT & M/ETHANE

1   The METHANE model is an established reporting framework which provides a common structure for responders and their control rooms to share major incident information. It is recommended that M/ETHANE be used for all incidents.

2   For incidents falling below the major incident threshold 'METHANE' becomes an 'ETHANE' message. During the decision-making process using the joint decision model, there should be period consideration of the 'M' (representing 'major incident') by responders to establish whether a developing incident goes above the major incident threshold.

3   Each responder agency should send a M/ETHANE message to their control room as soon as possible. The first resources to arrive on scene should send the M/ETHANE message so that situational awareness can be established quickly. The information received through multiple M/ETHANE messages will gradually build to support shared situational awareness in those responding to the incident and between control rooms.

METHANE – Mnemonic

M	**M**AJOR INCIDENT	Has a major incident or standby been declared? (Yes / No - if no, then complete ETHANE message)	*Include the date and time of any declaration.*
E	**E**XACT LOCATION	What is the exact location or geographical area of the incident?	*Be as precise as possible, using a system that will be understood by all responders.*
T	**T**YPE OF INCIDENT	What kind of incident is it?	*For example, flooding, fire, utility failure or disease outbreak.*
H	**H**AZARDS	What hazards or potential hazards can be identified?	*Consider the likelihood of a hazard and the potential severity of any impact.*
A	**A**CCESS	What are the best routes for access and egress?	*Include information on inaccessible routes and rendezvous points (RVPs). Remember that services need to be able to leave the scene as well as access it.*
N	**N**UMBER OF CASUALTIES	How many casualties are there, and what condition are they in?	*Use an agreed classification system such as 'P1', 'P2', 'P3' and 'dead'.*
E	**E**MERGENCY SERVICES	Which, and how many, emergency responder assets and personnel are required or are already on-scene?	*Consider whether the assets of wider emergency responders, such as local authorities or the voluntary sector, may be required.*

ANNEX 4E

ECC INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

1. Situational Awareness
2. Strategy Meeting Agenda

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

1   Effective management of information is critical to ensuring adequate control of a Major Accident. The ECC should have significant items of information on display (either electronically or manually via a white board or paper chart). An example of a situational awareness display is shown at page 3 of this annex. Establishments should adapt this layout to suit their own individual circumstances.

STRATEGY MEETING AGENDA

2   A Strategy Meeting may be called by the MOD Silver Commander (the Establishment Main Controller) at the early stages of a Major Accident prior to the arrival of the external emergency services. The members of the Strategy team at this point will therefore be MOD/Military personnel/contractors. Although the standard agenda is aimed at a multi-agency meeting the majority of the headings will still be relevant. Following a standard protocol will also ensure there is an effective transfer of control to the Police Incident Officer.

3   The Police Incident Officer will call an initial meeting of the ECC Silver co-ordinating group (multi agency) at the earliest reasonable opportunity once they have been briefed on the incident by the MOD Silver Commander (The periodicity of future meetings should be arranged at this first meeting.

4   The agenda should, as far as practicable, be restricted to items that concern three or more of the relevant services, as matters concerning only two services can usually be resolved by direct two-way liaison. Items such as safety, situation reports, priorities and future developments must be on the agenda each time. At incidents concerned with fire, the danger of fire or involving rescue, the DFR/LAFRS will advise the Silver group on matters of safety.

5   Whilst the FRS will give professional advice, overall responsibility for health and safety rests with each emergency service and responding agency. The group should also consider the advice and expertise that is available from each member organisation including the establishment and the MOD Silver Commander. As well as expertise in the establishment affected the MOD Silver Commander can also access MOD's corporate expertise, particularly valuable in the areas of explosives and fuels safety.

6   Each service should briefly describe the situation as it affects its own operations and, if necessary, mention the matters for which it needs assistance or co-operation.

7   To create a cohesive joint strategy, it is essential to set priorities. This will indicate how to deploy the resources available most effectively and efficiently. Each service

will have objectives to meet within their own area of responsibility. It is important to establish which of these should have priority at the particular stage the incident has reached. In that way, inter-service difficulties may be avoided, and each may concentrate on the actions that contribute most to the success of the operation.

8   A note of decisions taken must be kept of all meetings of the Silver co-ordinating group. Individual members of the group are likely to make their own notes of meetings. This will provide an overall perspective for decisions and priorities. All notes will be treated evidence and are likely to be required for any subsequent enquiry.

9   The Silver co-ordinating group should consider in advance what may happen and what must be done in later phases of the operation.

10 Subsequent meetings will be needed with frequency dependant on the circumstances. Once a more stabilised situation is reached this frequency will usually decrease.

11 A sample Agenda is shown on page 4 of this Annex.

Silver Command Team MOD Incident Commander – Police Silver Commander – Fire & Rescue Service Commander – Medical Incident Officer –		Location of Incident(s) – Incident Description: Hazards at scene –	STRATEGIC AIMS **PRESERVE LIFE** **REDUCE / PREVENT PROPERTY DAMAGE** **RESTORE NORMALITY**
Wind speed and direction –			

RAD HAZ Restrictions	YES / NO	Incident start time -
		
		ICP Location(s) –
			Casualties'
			Number Type
			                                        P1 (T1)
			                                        P2 (T2)
			                                        P3 (T3)
			                                        P1 Hold (T4)
			                                              Dead

Cordons required / set up	Distance	Ingress / egress routes – Assets deployed to scene	Note: do not display names
EOD: Called On Site			
Current Issues:`	Target timescale to resolve		Hazards extending Off Site: E.g. – smoke plume External Agencies notified
		Assets held in reserve	
			Personnel Mustered: Yes / No
		Priorities:	Personnel Missing:

		1	Evacuation: is it required ?
			            Timescales to evacuate
			             Safe Route
			             Safe destination
			             Transportation requirements

		2	
		3	

<u>MAJOR ACCIDENT – STRATEGY MEETING</u>

<u>AGENDA</u>

URGENT MATTERS/DECISIONS – are there any pressing matters which need an immediate decision to mitigate the effects of the incident to:
PRESERVE LIFE
REDUCE / PREVENT PROPERTY DAMAGE
RESTORE NORMALITY

ACTIONS/UPDATES – Incident Commander's should provide update on situation as he/she understands it at that time

SITREP FROM AGENCIES – go around the room to gather latest information from all the responding agencies. Some of this may duplicate info this will either confirm it or could raise concerns over accuracy (often the case with casualty names and numbers).

TACTICAL PLAN (OPERATIONAL PLAN IN MOD TERMINLOGY) – develop tactical plan on who is doing what and when. Particularly important to ensure understanding on what is being done at Bronze level and what is being done at Silver level.

<u>ISSUES</u>

INJURED/DECEASED – establish how many people are injured and what action is required to save lives. Which hospitals are they being sent to? Are there any deaths if so bodies should be left in situ for crime scene work – police will appoint a senior investigating officer (SIO).

HAZARDS – what are the hazards now and what could be generated. What implications are there eg evacuation distances, protective equipment, monitoring equipment required? Timescales to respond.

SCENES – how many scenes are there? Has fire & rescue service implemented sector control? Do we need additional incident officers and cordons?

INVESTIGATION – what investigation level and which investigating bodies are involved eg Police (SIO), MAAIB, LAIT, EA, HSE etc

COMMUNITY – What actions are required to aid the local community – shelter (rest centres), vulnerable populations, children, pets, food. Timescales to achieve. Who can assist, normally arranged through Local Authority – Voluntary Sector eg WRVS, Red Cross, St Johns Ambulance etc

FRIENDS & RELATIVES – what arrangement are there for friends and family. Do you need to separate friends and family of survivors from those with deceased? Is there an appropriate facility. How will it be manned – Clergy?

RESOURCES – what additional resources are required – additional fire tenders, police to man cordons maybe military staff for cordons? Lighting for hours of darkness. Will incident

be prolonged may need to consider shift pattern. Weather could affect shift patterns eg cold or rain

MEDIA – are initial holding statements ready. Liaison with police press officer. Link into MOD press system. Where will the press facility be? Who staff's it. Who will provide press briefings? How are they authorised for release? Police have primacy for press.

ESTABLISHMENT OPERATIONS – what is effect on establishment operations? can some continue should some elements be cancelled?
Would it be best to send people home or will you need them now or later.

STAFF WELFARE – what arrangements need to be made to look after the responders – food drink shelter from weather? Staff rotation. Do vehicles need refuelling? Can we refuel civil emergency vehicles?

<u>MAJOR ACCIDENT – STRATEGY MEETING</u>

<u>AGENDA</u>

URGENT MATTERS/DECISIONS
PRESERVE LIFE
REDUCE / PREVENT PROPERTY DAMAGE
RESTORE NORMALITY

ACTIONS/UPDATES

SITREP FROM AGENCIES

TACTICAL PLAN (OPERATIONAL PLAN IN MOD TERMINLOGY)

<u>ISSUES</u>

INJURED/DECEASED

HAZARDS

SCENES

INVESTIGATION

COMMUNITY

FRIENDS & RELATIVES

RESOURCES

MEDIA

ESTABLISHMENT OPERATIONS

STAFF WELFARE

ANNEX 4F
MAJOR ACCIDENT INCIDENT REPORT

To: MACR Competent Authority Defence Safety Authority #5004 Juniper Level 0, Wing 1, MOD Abbey Wood, Bristol, BS34 8QW Email: DSA-DOSR-Assurance-ATL@mod.gov.uk Civil: +44(0)30 679 35425 Email: dsa-dosr-assurance-3-1@mod.gov.uk : dsa-dosr-assurance-3-3@mod.gov.uk 01179132952	From:
Date of Incident:	Time of Incident:
Location of Incident:	Substances involved: Quantities (tonnes):
Description of the circumstances of the incident:	
Description of the immediate effects on persons and the environment:	
Description of the emergency measures taken:	
Further information as necessary:	

Signature:

Name:

Appointment:

Contact Details: Date: --/--/----

PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK