



**IDS WORKING PAPER**

Volume **2019** No **523**

**Sound of One Hand Clapping:  
Information Disclosure for Social and  
Political Action for Accountability in  
Extractive Governance in  
Mozambique**

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January 2019

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IDS Working Paper 523

© Institute of Development Studies 2019

ISSN: 2040-0209 ISBN: 978-1-78118-511-7

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.



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Charitable Company Number 877338

# **Sound of One Hand Clapping: Information Disclosure for Social and Political Action for Accountability in Extractive Governance in Mozambique**

Nicholas Awortwi and Adriano Nuvunga

## **Summary**

Corruption through opaque public contracts costs Africa billions of dollars in revenue loss annually. Globally, initiatives to address this have centred on information disclosure (ID) but under what conditions does it work to promote accountability in the extractive sector that for a long time has seen its revenue management as being a major cause of conflict in Africa? Our study on this issue in Mozambique reveals intriguing findings, which suggest that protagonists of ID would need to recalibrate their strategies for promoting accountability. The study on ID in extractive governance in Mozambique has found 17 factors that connect to result in citizen and institutional inaction in demanding government accountability. The lesson from the study for policy and practice are that unless there is a link between ID and a government's reputation, which scales up to the risk of a ruling government losing power, accountability is unlikely to occur when new information is disclosed.

**Keywords:** Mozambique, extractive industry, information disclosure, accountability, transparency, social and political action, inaction.

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# Acronyms and abbreviations

A4EA	Action for Empowerment and Accountability
CBO	community-based organisation
CG	central government
CIP	Centre for Public Integrity
CMG	Mozambique Pipeline Company
CMH	Mozambican Hydrocarbon Company
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CSO	civil society organisation
CTV	Centro Terra Verde
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ENG	Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos
FDI	foreign direct investment
FGD	focus group discussion
FoI	freedom of information
Frelimo	Mozambique Liberation Front
ID	information disclosure
IGEPE	Mozambique Institute of Management of State Holdings
LNG	liquefied natural gas
MEITI	Mozambique Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
MIREME	Ministério dos Recursos Minerais e Energia (Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy)
MP	Member of Parliament
MSG	multi-stakeholder group
ODA	official development assistance
PWYP	Publish What You Pay
Renamo	Mozambican National Resistance
SoE	state-owned enterprise
SPA	social and political action
SPI	social and political inaction

# 1 Introduction

The literature is replete with presumptions that an institutional environment that is characterised by openness and transparency contributes to better development outcomes (Geginat 2012; Hameed 2005; Kaufmann *et al.* 2009; World Bank 2016). Nevertheless, for a very long time, governments and corporations in resource rich but economically poor countries have developed opaque business environments in the extractive industry. They do so deliberately in order to take advantage of the sector's wealth and undermine incentives for promoting accountability in its use (Africa Progress Panel 2013). The Resource Governance Index (NRI)<sup>1</sup> shows that among the 81 countries of the world's top producers of petroleum, gas and copper, only 19 (23 per cent) show good or satisfactory governance (NRGI 2017); that is, having laws and practices that are reasonably likely to result in extractive resource wealth benefiting citizens. The 2017 NRGI shows that the only African countries classified as good or satisfactory are Ghana (for oil and gas) and Botswana (for mining). The remaining African countries have either weak, poor or failing governance standards. Transparency and control of corruption are components of the index that the overwhelming majority of African countries either failed or scored poorly. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, shady contracts in the mining sector were estimated to be worth US\$1.36 billion in the two years from 2010 to 2012 (Africa Progress Panel 2013: 56). In 2010, Global Witness reported that the Government of Uganda received US\$500,000 from the extractive sector but the transfer could not be traced to any government accounts (Global Witness 2010: 12).

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a global initiative that emanated from the need to promote transparency in the sector. Established in 2002, the EITI brings together a coalition of governments, companies, and civil society organisations (CSOs) in cooperation to ensure that member countries govern and manage their extractive industries to open and transparent standards. Currently 51 countries constitute its membership. The key objective of the EITI is to ensure that extractive companies commit to disclosing information with regards to their payments to governments so citizens and pro-accountability institutions can use that information to hold governments and private corporations to account (EITI 2017). In the last decade, the EITI has received international recognition as setting the standard for transparency in a sector whose revenue management, for a long time, has been opaque, inaccessible, and unpublished, and a major cause of conflict and political instability in many countries (Haufler 2010).

A number of assumptions are made with regards to information disclosure (ID) and the pathways towards accountability and development in extractive governance:

1. Participation of multi-stakeholder groups (MSG), including CSOs, in extractive governance will get new information out to the public in ways that the government and the private corporations would have no incentives to disclose.
2. Citizens and pro-accountability institutions (parliament, revenue authorities, law enforcement agencies, the media, CSOs, etc.) armed with new information will be empowered to take social and political action (SPA) to demand accountability from government (EITI 2011; 2017). The SPA may include civil and uncivil protest, demonstrations, further investigation, public debate, court action, and campaigns by interest groups. Public protest and further investigations will stimulate policy debate that leads to enforcement and/or legislative review that results in the return of any

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
<sup>1</sup> The NRGI measures the level of transparency and accountability in the oil, gas and mining sectors in 81 countries that together produce, among other commodities, 82 per cent of the world's oil, 78 per cent of its gas and 72 per cent of all copper.

stolen extractive revenue and imprisonment of corrupt public officials and their associates.

3. As pro-accountability institutions openly access EITI reports and use them to enrich public awareness and debate, ID would open the government's decision making to further public scrutiny. Knowing that they are being monitored and the potential consequences arising from such scrutiny; both governments and corporations would avoid clandestine behaviour.
4. Through MSG participation at the national level, a platform for dialogue, cooperation, social responsibility, and peer pressure is created that promotes accountability in extractive governance (Aaronsen and Brinkerhoff 2011). The NRGi argues that by having access to signed contracts, information asymmetry that normally favours the government and corporations is eliminated; hence strengthening the negotiation of CSOs and affected mining communities (RWI 2009). When citizens from poor mining communities are informed about the revenue coming from the exploitation of natural resources, and how such revenue could improve their living conditions, they are empowered to demand their fair share; hence social accountability mechanisms begin to be set in motion (Vijge 2018).
5. Another path to accountability and development is that MSG dialogue will result in mutual understanding, appreciation and consensus among government, private companies and CSOs leading to improved governance without the need for SPA. For instance with greater ID, governments are able to negotiate better and fairer deals with extractive companies. The government's participation also gives it some credibility, as greater transparency reduces political and investment risks for investors (EITI 2014).

These micro-level governance fixes in the long run are expected to bubble up to improve overall governance and developmental outcomes in participating countries (McDevitt 2017). These are the basis of EITI's theory of change (see Figure 1). But this study questions these presumptions in the context of Mozambique.

**Figure 1.1 EITI theory of change**



Source: Authors' construct based on available literature.

In 2009, the Government of Mozambique (GoM) voluntarily joined the EITI, opening the door for MSGs' participation in extractive governance. Since then, the EITI has issued six major extractive governance reports; previously information on the extractive industry had been a closely guarded secret. In 2013, Mozambique received a 'failing' composite score of 37 per cent in the Resource Governance Index but by 2017 it had improved to 50 per cent (NRGI 2017). In 2016, four organisations represented civil society within the MSG.<sup>2</sup> With the exception of the Centre for Public Integrity (CIP)<sup>3</sup> that focuses solely on anti-corruption, the rest are multi-tasked – environmental, participatory governance, land rights advocates, etc. In general, the CIP has been at the forefront in the campaign against corruption in Mozambique (CIP 2014: 9).

Since becoming a member of the MSG in 2013, the CIP has led a campaign to make ID a public discourse, with the aim of empowering citizens to claim their rights and for pro-accountability institutions to enforce rules of accountability. International development agencies (Sida, DANIDA, World Bank, DFID, NORAD, and Dutch Development Cooperation) are supporting transparency initiatives that CIP, Mozambique EITI (MEITI) and other CSOs are pursuing in the country with an understanding that ID would promote empowerment and accountability. CIP believes that through investigations of public interest issues on extractives, and dissemination of information arising from such analysis, an informed public debate will arise in Maputo and in the provinces, leading to SPA for policy changes, strengthening of mining laws and subsequently, an inclusive economic growth for all Mozambicans (CIP 2014: 19). The CIP's theory of change is premised on the understanding that public officials are afraid of being exposed.

Our first priority in the extractive sector has always been to expose corrupt contracts because we are aware that ruling elites are interested in extracting economic rents using their positions and access to confidential information. It is our objective to expose conflict of interest by 'naming and shaming' these public officials. (Interview with a founding member of CIP in Maputo, August 2017).

After 'naming and shaming', the expectation of CIP is that state public accountability institutions would act on the available information to further investigate and punish corrupt public officials. Through its participation in the MSG meetings and private investigations on government contracts, the CIP has held a series of press conferences, seminars and meetings to provide information to the general public and specific state institutions on issues that it regards as public interest. CIP has analysed government contracts with private corporations, drawn implications to public revenue and exposed some of the corrupt deals. In the area of empowerment, CIP has provided training to Members of Parliament (MPs) to improve their capacity to debate, approve laws and hold the government accountable in the extractive sector. It has also provided training to parliamentary committees and provincial assemblies where natural resources are extracted. CIP has also teamed up with international CSOs to organise workshops at home and abroad, with the aim of making transparency in the extractive industry part of the Mozambican public discourse.

While participating in the EITI seems to have empowered CIP, its pro-accountability crusade sounds like 'one hand clapping' – not loud enough to trigger citizens and pro-accountability institutions to take SPA to demand government accountability. In general, there is little evidence to suggest that ID by EITI, CIP or any of the members of the MSG is empowering citizens and pro-accountability institutions to demand accountability. If ID has not been enough to trigger SPA, what could be the reason? To what extent is Mozambique's political economy, social and cultural context an important explanation of this outcome? If information

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<sup>2</sup> CIP, Kuwuka JDA, Centro Terra Viva and Ruth Rede Uthende.

<sup>3</sup> CIP also represents the global campaign 'Publish What You Pay'.

is not enough to trigger SPA, what else do citizens and pro-accountability institutions require to enable them take action? How does the role of external agencies affect the forms and degree of SPA and accountability? These were the questions that informed the Mozambican study of the Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) project.<sup>4</sup>

## 2 Political economy context of ID in the extractive sector

### 2.1 Political economy of natural resource extraction in Mozambique

Mozambique is rich in natural resources. Recent projections indicate that in a few years, the country could become the third largest global exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) with the potential to turn around the country's economy (IMF 2014). Some even project Mozambique becoming the Qatar of Africa (Calcuttawala 2017). Analysts expect that Mozambique will receive US\$115 billion in revenue from LNG exports between 2020 and 2040 if the proposed investment in Cabo Delgado is completed (IEA 2014). In 2014, production at the Pande Temane gas field was worth US\$100 million while the total value of coal was roughly US\$330 million (EITI 2017: 13). The coal deposit at Moatize Basin in Tete Province is estimated at about 23 billion metric tonnes (Gerety 2013), and with current levels of production the country could export about 100 million tonnes a year to become one of the world's top ten coal exporters (World Bank 2014). The Montepuez ruby deposit in Cabo Delgado province is said to be the largest deposit of the gemstone recently discovered in the world and covers an area of about 336km<sup>2</sup>.

The extractive industry has spurred on foreign direct investment (FDI), reaching a peak of US\$6.7 billion in 2013. From 2004 to 2016, FDI reached an average of about US\$4 billion annually (World Bank 2018). The extractive industry currently comprises 30 per cent of the country's exports, 3.5 per cent of GDP and 20.6 per cent of government revenue (EITI 2017). Investments in the extractive sector have spurred the country's two decades of economic growth of over 7 per cent annually; although 2016 and 2017 have seen growth falling below 5 per cent (World Bank n.d.). Nevertheless, the benefits of this growth are not widely shared across the population as national poverty has stagnated at around 50 per cent for over a decade (see Table 2.1).

**Table 2.1 Economic and welfare indicators**

Economic indicators	1996	2002	2008	2014	2016
GDP Growth	26.8	8.7	6.8	7.4	3.8
GNI per capita (current US\$)	200	250	440	620	480
Poverty head count ratio at national poverty lines	69.4	54.1	54.7	46.1	NA
Poverty Head Count ratio at US\$1.90 a day	85.4	80.4	68.7	NA	NA

Note: NA = not available.

Source: World Bank Open Data 2017.

Income, geographical, and gender inequalities have widened in Mozambique. The vast majority of the rural population still live on less than US\$1.90 a day and lack basic services, such as access to potable water, health facilities and schools. While the country's 20-year development plan is anchored in the exploitation of extractive resources, development

<sup>4</sup> A4EA is an international research programme which explores how social and political action can contribute to empowerment and accountability in fragile, conflict, and violent settings, with a particular focus on Egypt, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria and Pakistan.

partners and CSOs continue to express concerns about the governance conditions in the sector. This includes displacement of mining communities, lack of re-integration of revenue into local development, and lack of transparency around mining contracts that corporations have signed with the government (Gentili 2017). It is alleged that President Nyusi supported the revision of the Petroleum Law in 2014/15 to secure stable and favourable tax regimes for Anadarko and ENI. The contract guarantees a low 4 per cent production tax rate for 30 years, and allows a significant amount of the revenue paid to be accounted offshore (Symons 2016: 154–7).

Apart from FDIs, the GoM is also involved in the operation of the oil, gas and mining sector in three varied forms: (a) as a public enterprise (*empresa publica*) that is fully owned by the state and managed by the Ministry of Finance and regulated under the Public Enterprise Law 6/2012; (b) as state companies (*Empresas da propriedade do Estado*) where the state is the main shareholder and it is managed by the sector ministry but regulated under private companies law; and (c) privately created companies in which the state directly or indirectly holds a share (EITI 2017: 44). In 2001, the Mozambique Institute of Management of State Holdings (IGEPE) was created to oversee government participation and shareholding in private corporations. With the expansion of the government's interest in the gas and oil sector through the National Hydrocarbons Enterprise (*Empresa Nacional de Hidrocarbonetos* – ENH) and its subsidiaries: ENH Logistics, Mozambican Hydrocarbon Company (CMH) and Mozambique Pipeline Company (CMG); the CIP, IMF and EITI have all expressed concern about increasing conflicts of interest and potential sources of corruption in the sector (EITI 2017: 44–45). They do so from hindsight of the privatisation experiences of the 1990s.

Harrison (1999) cites a number of government ministers, a former prime minister, and family members of many high-ranking government officials that became owners and shareholders in many businesses including banking and industrial sectors because of privatisation. The literature on the political economy of Mozambique provides a litany of cases of public sector corruption (Hanlon and Smart 2013; CIP 2016; Hanlon 2017). A study by CIP shows that between 2002 and 2014, the Mozambican economy lost over US\$4.8 billion to corruption or about US\$400 million annually. This amount, according to CIP, was equivalent to 30 per cent of the country's GDP in 2014, 60 per cent of the 2015 budget, 195 per cent of 2015 total investment, and 362 per cent of the education budget (CIP 2016). In 2016, Western donors and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) suspended financial support to the government after an amount of US\$2.2 billion in hidden public debt was disclosed (Kroll 2017; Hanlon 2017). Other high-level corruption cases in recent years include overinflating the cost of the purchase of two Embraer aircraft from Brazil where two government officials received a bribe amounting to US\$800,000 (O Pais 2016). Privatisation of state assets, rapid increases in FDIs, and the emergence of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in the extractive industries have created rent-seeking opportunities for public office holders as they collude in appropriating mining concessions (CIP 2016).

The context based on which public corruption thrives in Mozambique is the presence of a dominant political party – Frelimo – with structures that permeate all aspects of state and non-state institutions (Nuvunga 2014). Since 1992, Frelimo has won all democratic elections. MPs are appointed on an electoral system based on blocked party list.<sup>5</sup> The dominant party structure makes separation of powers between the executive, judiciary and legislation blurred, providing the space for power and resources to be centralised in the hands of the same party members and sympathisers.

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<sup>5</sup> In this system, political parties make lists of candidates to be elected, and seats get distributed to each party in proportion to the number of votes the party receives. Voters do not directly elect the MP but a candidate is elected based on the order in which he/she appears on a party's list of candidates.

Another contributing factor to increasing levels of corruption is that the current leadership does not appear to have the disposition to speak openly about it, let alone the appetite to fight it. In contrast, the past leadership of Samora Machel frowned on corruption and indiscipline within the party structures and made that a central focus in a series of public speeches (Munslow 1985). Such speeches provided a powerful discourse from which corruption was discouraged, and morality and hard work became a yardstick for the party elite. The discourse against corruption was so strong that according to Hanlon, in 1980 Francisco Langa, a prominent Frelimo member, committed suicide rather than face the shame of being seen as corrupt (Hanlon 1991: 234).

## **2.2 Mozambique Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (MEITI)**

Mozambique was accepted as an EITI member in February 2009 and constituted a MSG to monitor and manage the implementation of EITI processes. The MSG comprises of three government representatives, four from CSOs, four from private companies, and two observers. The Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy chairs the MSG. With the support of the Mozambique EITI (MEITI) secretariat and donors, about 40 CSOs have established a platform (the Civil Society Platform for Natural Resources and Extractive Industries – CSPEINR) enabling members to engage with both state and private corporations in transparency and accountability issues using ID from the EITI and their own private investigations. The CSPEINR secretariat is held on a two-year rotational basis; from 2015 to 2017, the CIP hosted it.

The MEITI, which is located in the World Bank project office in Maputo has been funded mostly by the World Bank with the GoM funding only about 25 per cent; around US\$50,000 (EITI 2017). Other development partners such as Canada, GIZ and UNDP have also provided financial support to the secretariat. The UNDP and other development partners have also trained CSOs, including journalists, to report news on the extractive sector. In March 2017, World Bank funding had finished, however, and the GoM was in the process of initiating a new funding mechanism.

Objectives and work plans developed by the MSG guide the MEITI implementation. In the 2016–18 work plan, MEITI established the following objectives: (a) to ensure access to extractive information so as to promote informed public debate on extractive resources governance; (b) to improve accountability mechanisms for public and private companies in the extractive sector; (c) to clarify and disseminate the allocation of receipts mechanism for the development of affected communities; (d) to strengthen the monitoring and intervention roles of the MSG; (e) to improve transparency in the license granting process; and (f) to improve the business environment in the country (EITI 2017: 12). The MEITI performs administrative, logistical and coordination support in the implementation of MSG work plans, completion of reporting templates, development of terms of reference (ToR) for the independent evaluator, and preparation of MSG meetings. However, much of the work of MEITI is focused on the development of EITI annual and validation reports. The first EITI report was published in 2009 and by March 2012, the EITI board had declared Mozambique EITI compliant; meaning it had fulfilled the EITI rules (EITI 2012). Mozambique EITI has produced six major EITI reports. The 2017 report declared the country to have made ‘meaningful progress’ with respect to the EITI standard.

With a high level of public debt arising from corruption and the expectation that extractive revenues could be used to clandestinely defray the debt, the EITI’s objective of ensuring transparency through ID is imperative in Mozambique. However if the primary outcome of ID is to reduce conflict of interest and corruption, then the EITI seems to have been unsuccessful as there are many known government and Frelimo party officials who own mining concessions in the country. The African Investigative Publishing Collective in partnership with Africa Uncensored and ZAM has mentioned names of powerful public

officials that have grabbed mining concessions in Montepuez district to produce and export rubies. This includes the former Public Works Minister, Defence Minister, Mayor of Maputo, Agriculture Minister, Frelimo-connected lawyer and head of Mozambique's security service, and a military general (AIPC 2017: 11).

### 3 Literature review on the nexus between ID and accountability

ID and transparency are two core principles of good governance. While ID makes facts, figures, data, and details about an entity public; transparency involves both the processes that lead to an effective release of such information, the trust people have in the information that is disclosed, and its accessibility to the general public (Kaufmann and Bellver 2005; Joshi, 2010; World Bank 2016: 171). Both ID and transparency are connected to raising civic awareness and holding duty bearers accountable (Gaventa and Barrett 2012). Theoretically both can be described as a 'public good' hence the market may fail in their provision (Kreitmair 2015). Market failure means that some form of public policy may be needed to optimise the provision of such goods. But given that ID can have negative consequences for politicians; there is less incentive for a corrupt government to use public policy to intervene, hence state failure. The double jeopardy of state and market failure means that it is in the interest of citizens and their organisations to seek information themselves to hold a government and private interest accountable. Consequently in many countries, CSOs have pushed for the passage of laws on Freedom of Information (FoI). By 2017, 22 African countries had enacted FoI legislation; a remarkable improvement from 2014, when only 13 countries had done so (Mohan 2014; AFEX 2017).

Pro-accountability campaigners believe that FoI laws could empower citizens to demand access to information in a context where rational interest does not compel those with information to voluntarily disclose their private interest. With access to public interest information, it is assumed that citizens and pro-accountability organisations will be empowered to act. The logic of this presumption lies on the basis that information is power and citizens with access to information will use it to demand accountability from government and private corporations. But how does ID work to influence citizens' action for accountability? The information-transparency action cycle by Fung *et al.* (2004) provides some clues.

According to Fung *et al.* (ID has effects on public accountability when information enters the calculus of the user and subsequently triggers a chain reaction: comprehension, action, and response (2004: 9). Fung *et al.* argue that information is a necessary condition, but not sufficient to trigger action due to conflicting preferences, cognitive challenges, and other hindering factors such as: 'perceived value' of the information in advancing a user's goal; compatibility of the information to a users' routine decision-making; the way the information is presented (quick and easy reading); the time it is released; and the credibility of the actor that releases the information.

Accountability on the other hand means an actor or duty-bearer being held responsible for its (in)actions and behaving according to a set of standards. It involves 'setting standards, getting information about actions, making judgments about appropriateness and sanctioning unsatisfactory performance' (Joshi 2010: 5). Accountability mechanisms compel public leaders to reduce their private interest and rent seeking. However, empirical evidence on the impact of ID on indicators of accountability is a mixed bag. Kolstad and Wiig (2009) found that increased budget transparency is associated with a reduction of perceptions of corruption. This relationship is however conditioned by: (i) having a competitive media that is

eager to search for quality information; (ii) a society where a greater percentage of the population is educated and can process available information, and; (iii) the capacity of CSOs to empower and mobilise people to act on the basis of information disclosed.

In Uganda, the Reinikka and Svensson (2005) widely cited study on the power of ID on accountability shows that the government's monthly publication of educational grants in local newspapers reduced capture and corruption of public funds from 80 per cent in 1995 to less than 20 per cent in 2001. The study concluded that public access to information was a powerful deterrent to corruption, as local government officers could no longer hide the government grants from parents. However, in a review of five public governance initiatives<sup>6</sup> that encourage disclosure of information and public participation, Brockmyer and Fox (2015) concluded that generally evidence of ID impact on public accountability or social and economic improvement is weak or non-existent. Earlier analysis by Rocha Menocal and Sharma (2008) on the impact of voice and accountability initiatives on MDGs could not clearly find a demonstrable impact. However they could find improvement in intermediary outcomes such as policy changes and responsiveness by public officers.

If the relationship between citizens and government is seen in the form of principal-agent, then information and accountability relate in a situation where citizens as voters (principal) can punish the government (agents) if the citizens have information on the actions and inactions of the government. Where information is not disclosed, the vertical accountability mechanism is broken (Keefer and Khemani 2005; Stromberg 2001). Lack of information discourages participation hence people are unable to form interest groups that use the political process to agitate for their interests. Educational campaigns that enable citizens to understand the implications of the government budget, expenditure and revenue and how those relate to citizens' standards of living provide incentives for citizens' action (Michener 2015). Withholding information from citizens is therefore an important strategy by governments to create rent or reduce the harmful effect of public knowledge and opinion. It also makes it difficult for the citizens to punish an inefficient or bad government.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that users of information are diverse, they may be citizens, voters, employers, employees, youth, urbanites, poor, rich, activists, students, etc. or a combination of diverse groups hence their interests may differ. Given the diverse interest of these groups, they may be casually or intensely interested in new information that is disclosed. In a fragile and conflict affected setting (FCAS), new information may impose direct and indirect costs that far outweigh the expected immediate benefits to diverse information users. This may include individual safety in taking rational actions following new information. The literature provides a number of contextual and structural factors that either facilitate or constrain the information–accountability nexus. Below we summarise some of these mediating factors from the literature.

### **3.1 Factors that mediate information disclosure–accountability nexus**

#### **3.1.1 Quality of information**

The quality of information is likely to mediate between transparency and citizen action for accountability. Apathy is an action; meaning citizens have made deliberate decisions not to act for several reasons including the quality of the information provided. For ID to have the potential to generate citizen action, it has to be targeted, translated into a language that the people can understand and relate to, and must suggest an actionable position (Fung *et al.* 2004; Brockmyer and Fox 2015: 28). Untargeted ID and unspecified civic action are likely to have no effect (World Bank 2016). The information has to be disseminated at the opportune

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<sup>6</sup> Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI), Construction Sector Transparency Initiatives (CSTI), Open Government Partnership (OGP), Global Initiative on Fiscal Transparency (GIFT) and Open Contracting Partnership (OCP).

time. For example, a study in Brazil shows that the timing of the release of audit reports correlates with voters' choices in voting for a change of leaders. Mayors that are shown to have adverse findings in an audit report are sanctioned at the polls, while those with better findings are voted for. The study shows that such impacts are stronger in municipalities where there are local radio stations to spread the information (Ferraz and Finan 2008).

Other studies show that ID is likely to be effective in triggering citizen action if it provides private benefits more than public (Kolstad and Wiig 2009). The reason being that public goods tend to have free rider issues. According to Kolstad and Wiig 'information is likely to be effective for government activities that provide private goods, such as subsidized food, whereas it is relatively ineffective in the provision of public goods such as infrastructure' (Kolstad and Wiig 2009: 252). The public is likely to react to information being disclosed if individuals can relate to its impact or expected outcome. Kolstad and Wiig argue that 'providing highly aggregate macroeconomic figures on oil revenues or expenditures, is likely to result in collective action problems, because individual incentives to act on the information are weak' (2009: 252).

### **3.1.2 Degree of citizens' empowerment and political engagement**

Leveraging citizens' SPA essentially entails providing them the means to assert their rights and entitlements. The 'means' is referred to as 'empowerment'. Rather than relying on the proxy actions of others, empowerment establishes agency in the citizens themselves, to act on their own behalf. CSOs and NGOs are disclosing information to get communities to know what their rights, entitlements and obligations are according to law and policies. In Madagascar, a study that assessed the nexus between ID and accountability in the extractive sector showed that an inadequate presence of CSOs meant that mining corporations cared less about efforts to achieve 'good governance', transparency, and proper engagement with communities (Sovacool *et al.* 2016). A highly educated society is presumed to complement the ID-accountability nexus. As argued by Fung *et al.* information needs to be processed and an educated society can process information better than a less educated one. The educational level of citizens mediates the effectiveness of press freedom as an anti-corruption mechanism (Lindstedt and Naurin 2005). In 2008, a study conducted by Aaronsen and Brinkerhoff (2011) in 23 countries concluded that the EITI MSG is good as long as the public is able to make sense of its reports and for government to implement its recommendations. But key constraining factors about the usefulness of the EITI reports are many, including illiteracy, livelihood demands, lack of interest, and/or cultural and political factors. The EITI reports also require some highly technical knowledge to understand them.

### **3.1.3 Nature of political regimes and competitive party politics**

The nature of the political regime is an important factor in explaining the outcome between transparency and accountability. In competitive democratic states where leaders are elected on the basis of public knowledge, ID is likely to have much more impact than uncompetitive democratic states (World Bank 2016). Even in less competitive party states such as Vietnam, a study shows that ID induced significant changes in the central political party's decisions (Malesky, Schuler and Tran 2012). In competitive democratic politics, where the media reports on corruption scandals, opposition parties may capitalise on this to promise greater transparency and accountability. A single dominant party regime is less concerned about domestic reputation or the possibility that an opposition party may take advantage of a corruption scandal, unless they seek to obtain international legitimacy (Michener 2015; Wehner and De Renzio 2013). Wehner and De Renzio (2013) show in their analysis of 85 countries that domestic politics is a key factor in determining the level of fiscal transparency in a country. That citizens/voters and legislators are the key drivers in achieving fiscal transparency. Where demand from these two groups is weak, there is strong doubt that external initiatives like EITI can achieve progress in fiscal transparency. Legislators in a competitive multi-party system have greater incentive to use ID to hold governments

accountable for the simple reason that their own electoral hopes may be enhanced. However, in a country dominated by a single party, legislators may be unwilling to advocate for greater accountability using ID because that can negatively affect the legislator's own political career as party insiders use the whip to discipline party members according to party interest. Acosta's (2009) analysis on a programme in Ghana and Tanzania to strengthen MPs' role in promoting accountability in the extractive industry, illustrates how the nature of party politics influences a legislator's incentive structure.

Citizen political engagement in the governance of a country, both as voters who select and sanction political leaders, and as organised groups putting pressure on elected and appointed public officials, is an important factor in mediating the information and accountability nexus (World Bank 2016: 55). The literature suggests that in the history of nations where institutions have been effective in changing the way a government works, transparency mechanisms have worked in combination with progressive political engagement (Camp, Dixit and Stokes 2014). Available evidence seems to suggest that transparency initiatives focused on citizen engagement outside the political process are less effective in promoting government accountability. As argued by the World Bank, in the absence of political engagement, ID will have a momentary effect. For instance, a media campaign may reduce public corruption but corruption may re-emerge when the 'noise' is over (World Bank 2016).

Furthermore, through patronage politics, the government can distort the potential effect of ID on voters' behaviour. So instead of collective demand for accountability, the citizens acquiesce. Corrupt politicians invest in campaigns to counter any effect of ID on citizens' voting pattern. This includes increasing vote buying, using coercion, or attacking the credibility and sources of the information. Humphreys and Weinstein's (2012) analysis in Uganda showed that although citizens were sensitive to ID via a service delivery scorecard, it did not substantially change their voting pattern. They concluded that politicians are able to discredit the information that is disclosed if it works against them. In Mexico, Chong *et al.* (2015) found that there was no effect between ID provided by NGOs through a door-to-door campaign and voters' choices in the election because citizens mistrusted the information provided by NGOs.

### **3.2 Evidence of progress in accountability outcomes**

Various studies have examined evidence of the impact of EITI on general governance and development outcomes and reached several conclusions (Hilson and Maconachie 2008; Sovacool *et al.* 2016; Corrigan 2014). Rainbow Insight reported that the EITI multi-stakeholder initiative has made a major impact on the capacity of the public to analyse and debate fiscal policies in many countries where in the past natural resource revenues had been opaque (Rainbow Insight 2009). The impact stories of a number of multi-stakeholder initiatives indicate that CSOs have succeeded in passing or modifying laws on the extractive industry. Ghana, Liberia, and Nigeria have all enshrined rules for revenue disclosure into national law, although many of these laws are not followed through. In Nigeria, EITI 'has identified US\$9.8b of oil revenue owed to the Federal Government, of which US\$2.4b has been recovered' through campaign activities (Andreasen 2016: 1; Brockmyer and Fox 2015: 27).

In Nigeria, militias in the Niger Delta have used unruly SPAs to hold extractives to account, while another coalition of CSOs and labour unions under the loose umbrella, 'Occupy Nigeria' have staged protests based on information regarding the effect of institutional corruption on oil subsidy payments and mismanagement of oil revenues. The group effectively used multi-media and protests to hasten the federal government's announcement of a reduction in petroleum prices (Ako and Ekhaton 2016). In Burkina Faso, ID in EITI reports in 2014 resulted in civil society protests and public pressure, drawing MPs' attention

to poor mining communities and leading to their subsequent approval of an increase in royalties from 0.5 to 1 per cent (EITI 2014; One 2016). In Sierra Leone, international organisations and the Kimberly Process ended the trading of blood diamonds (Howard 2015). The lessons from these countries show that compelling, fact-based campaigns can lead to legal reforms, even in the face of industry and government resistance. The use of both traditional and social media is important for mobilising public pressure to overcome the reluctance of vested interests to policy change.

Taking official development assistance (ODA) receipts as a proxy for economic impact, David-Barrett and Okamura (2016) show that countries implementing EITI received proportionately more aid than non-EITI countries when resource endowment is a key factor. Such countries attribute their increase in ODA to increasing credibility generated on the international stage by their participation in the EITI. Schmaljohann (2013) found that EITI implementation on average increased a country's ratio of FDI inflows to GDP by two percentage points. Using a panel data over a period of 17 years (1997/98 to 2014), Caitlin assessed the impact of the EITI on changes in economic and corruption indicators of member and non-member countries and found that the 'EITI has had a significant and positive effect on economic development in member states but these effects have not yet been translated to observable and significant improvements in control of corruption' (2014: 1). While statistical analysis from these studies may have shown either a positive or negative effect of the EITI on FDI, ODA and GDP growth, the micro economic effect of extractives on mining communities' livelihoods, income growth and standard of living is generally poor in Africa.

In Chad, the government has allowed public debate about transparency and mismanagement of oil revenues, but it routinely ignores public criticism (Bryan and Hofmann 2007: 50). In their analysis of studies on MSGs, Rustad *et al.* 2017 show that only 2 out of 14 promote public debate about the management of extractive resource revenue in their countries. Reduction in corruption as an indicator of EITI outcome is not confirmed in several studies (Corrigan 2014; Ölcer 2009; Aaronsen and Brinkerhoff 2011; Scanteam 2011; Smith *et al.* 2012; Sovacool and Andrews 2015; Sovacool *et al.* 2016). An impact analysis conducted by Sovacool and Andrews (2015) in Azerbaijan and Liberia was unable to attribute significant governance improvements to the implementation of EITI. Studies conducted in Ghana (Andrews 2016), Madagascar (Smith *et al.* 2012), and Kyrgyzstan (Furstenberg 2015) did not find positive a governance outcome as a result of MSGs. Using more recent data of year-to-year changes in the corruption perception index, Kasekende *et al.* (2016) found that EITI is actually associated with worsening perceived levels of corruption in participating countries. Corrigan (2014) found that countries implementing EITI did not significantly improve on levels of democracy and political stability, but the study concluded that in general, the initiative helped participating countries to ease some of the negative consequences of resource abundance. For instance the negative effect on GDP per capita, the capacity of the government to formulate and implement sound policies, and the level of rule of law are mitigated.

## 4 Research method: hypothesis, data collection and analytical framework

Based on the evidence arising from the literature and our understanding of the Mozambican context, we analyse why ID by CIP, MEITI and others has not triggered SPA in Mozambique. We hypothesise that social and political inaction (SPI) for government accountability in the extractive sector is due to four major factors:

- A: The quality of information disclosed by EITI, CIP and the MSG
- B: The capacity of citizens, CSOs and state accountability institutions to act on the basis of ID
- C: Mozambique’s institutional and structural context that provides incentives and sanctions for SPA
- D: The financial and technical support that external agencies provide to the government


We represent the above hypothesis in a simple exploratory model:

$$Y = f(a, b, c, d)$$

Where Y= SPI (dependent variable); and A, B, C, and D are ‘independent’ variables.

We represent our ‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ variables based on the literature review and our knowledge of the Mozambique context in an analytical framework in Figure 4.1.

**Figure 4.1 Study analytical framework**



Source: Authors' own.

We argue that the four ‘independent variables’ interact or connect with one another and together contribute to SPA/SPI by citizens and pro-accountability institutions. We applied three empirical data collection techniques that include: (i) scoping survey; (ii) focus group discussions (FGDs) and participatory workshops; and (iii) triangulation of information through semi-structured interviews with key informants and institutions. During the scoping and mapping survey, we talked to the four CSOs that are represented on the MSG, the EITI Secretariat, extractive corporations, international organisations, development partners, and government sector ministries to identify specific SPAs that have occurred as a result of ID by EITI, CIP or any of the members of the civil society platform on extractives; and whether those actions contributed in any way to government accountability. Having ascertained that very little SPA has taken place, we proceeded to ask the institutions what factors might have contributed to SPI. The explanations provided were identified in the four major factors in our hypothesis.

The second phase of the study involved organising 9 FGDs that comprised politicians, researchers, leaders and representatives of CSOs and CBOs, women’s groups, and sub-national government bureaucrats. During each of the 9 FGDs, we explained our hypothesis and asked participants to identify specific sub-factors of the four major factors and narrate how they connect with one another to ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ SPI. In phase three, we conducted 15 semi-structured interviews with senior central government officers, donors and development partners, EITI and CSOs on specific factors that the FGDs raised as contributing to SPI. The field research was conducted in Maputo and Cabo Delgado over a period of 12 months. Because of security reasons we could not visit the mining communities. The study protects the rights, anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants.

## 5 Analysis and findings

### 5.1 Quality of ID for SPA

In the extractive sector, information on contracts and concessions, taxes and revenues that companies pay to the government, revenues earmarked as royalties to sub-national governments and/or mining communities, and public investments arising from extractive revenue are of interest to the public in view of their potential effects on citizens’ social and economic welfare. Participants spoken to in the study mentioned four factors that relate to the quality of ID. These factors are allocated specific numbers (from A1 to A4) to correspond with our independent variable ‘A’.

- A1: Little appreciation by citizens and pro-accountability institutions of EITI and CIP information disclosure on extractive governance
- A2: Mode of dissemination of extractive information
- A3: Groups targeted with ID (Maputo elites, academics, public officers, public intellectuals, etc.)
- A4: CIP, EITI and CSOs advocate for civic action through parliament, state agencies and the international community but less on citizens’ action

We elaborate on how these four sub-factors connect to contribute to SPI below.

#### ***A1: Little appreciation of ID on extractives provided by EITI and CIP***

Since 2009 the MEITI has produced six annual reports that provide information on extractives that otherwise would not be available to the public. The MEITI reports disclose information on bidding rounds that have been organised in the oil and gas sectors, an overview of the applicants, the licence awardee, and maps outlining the areas for each round, production levels of extractives, the monetary value, the contribution to total government revenue, the nature of governance of the sector, an assessment of the government’s commitment to transparency, monitoring of legal provisions related to disclosure of contracts, and government transfers of royalties to sub-national governments and communities. The EITI validation reports aim to provide all stakeholders with an impartial assessment of whether EITI implementation in Mozambique is consistent with the provisions of the EITI standard.

The 2017 EITI report discloses that there is a lack of information on the financial relationship between the government and state-owned enterprises (SoEs) in the form of dividends, financing, loans and reinvestments. The report gives the example of gas tariffs and transportation revenue associated with ROMPCO, where dividends from the SoE and payment to government, and off-budget operations are opaque (EITI 2017: 44–45). The report further shows that none of the 48 extractive companies disclosed information on

beneficial ownership. This is a new EITI requirement that CIP has argued Mozambique needs to implement. Disclosure of beneficiary ownership provides information on the identity of the real owners of an extractive company beyond what is usually put on registration documents. Furthermore, the EITI validation report provides information to show that the government's budgetary allocation to mining communities does not correspond with the 2.75 per cent stated in the law.<sup>7</sup> In addition, the 2017 EITI report shows that 17 out of 71 private companies that reported having paid revenue to the government failed to reconcile their payment with the independent administrator because, among other reasons, they were unaware of EITI requirements. Despite this information, none of the members of the MSG or the CSO platform have used the findings of the report to organise public debate or follow-up actions with state institutions.

CIP, on the other hand, has undertaken private investigation outside of the MEITI work plan into contracts related to gas and coal mining in Mozambique and published its findings (Nuvunga and Mapiisse 2017; CIP 2015). CIP described the Petroleum Production Agreement between the GoM and Sasol<sup>8</sup> as a 'rip-off'. The report shows that Sasol's underpricing of gas over the last ten years has resulted in the government receiving a paltry US\$141 million in tax and royalties instead of US\$500 million. CIP shows that Sasol manipulated its operational cost to make it possible to under-declare revenue to the state, and that its US\$1 billion gas extraction and pipeline project had not delivered many of the benefits it promised to the Mozambican people. The report further raised concerns about potential corrupt deals that might have influenced the nature of the contract. Sasol vehemently disputes the claims, saying the findings contain inaccuracies and create unfounded perceptions regarding both the inflation of costs and transfer prices.

For the first ten years of the project, about US\$1 billion (2004-2014) has flown to the Government of Mozambique instead of the US\$500 million quoted by CIP. Furthermore, based on our current projections, our contribution over the lifetime of the Petroleum Production Agreement (PPA) project would be closer to over US\$3 billion. (Sasol's response to CIP report, Sasol 2017)

While both the Mozambican Tax Authority and the Ministry of Economy and Finance showed interest in CIP's report, by being present at its launch; in general state institutions have been hesitant to follow up on any accountability action. Towards the end of 2017, Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM) showed interest in the report by requesting CIP to make a detailed presentation to them, but no substantial action followed this. The World Bank and the IMF also disagreed with the findings but failed to provide clear answers to the issues that CIP raised. In 2018, the Governor of Inhambane Province boldly said that the GoM had lost confidence in Sasol. According to the Governor, Sasol has not been fulfilling its social responsibility to the people in the province (Chapo 2018).

CIP has also investigated a number of unfair contract deals and the management of the 2.75 per cent in mining revenues that should be transferred to mining communities as royalties. This includes Kenmare heavy sands (contract and fulfilment of legal obligations to Moma communities), and Vale, Jindal, and ICVL on coal. On average, CIP claims to investigate about 15 suspected cases of conflict of interest and public fraud a year. While private companies mentioned in CIP's ID and 'naming and shaming' are quick to react forcefully, and in many cases disagree with CIP's findings; the public reaction has been indifferent. With the exception of the resettlement advocacy work pursued by CTV, neither CIP nor the EITI reports have been used as sources for further state investigation, public protest, or led

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<sup>7</sup> Law 20/2014 requires that 2.75 per cent of the revenues generated in the petroleum and mining sectors should be allocated towards developing the communities where the extractive resources are located.

<sup>8</sup> Sasol is an integrated chemical and energy company based in South Africa.

to state prosecution. CIP believes that in many communities, ID on extractives has not reached the people, and those that are aware appear to have resigned themselves to ‘minding their own business’, while responses from pro-accountability state institutions have been muted as if to echo the slogan of the former President Joaquim Chissano – ‘let it go’. The following reasons why ID is not leading to citizen action were put forward by CIP staff during a FGD on 8 August 2017:

*Until people believe that their daily lives will change they'll not act. They simply don't get it with ID.*

*People are concerned about their private interest. They see ID and the work CIP does as anti-government so they don't want to be associated with it. People's appreciation to ID is little to compel them to act.*

### **A2–A3: Mode of dissemination of extractive information and target groups**

The MEITI reports are disseminated to sector ministries, the MSG, parliament, development partners and published on EITI's website. The MEITI occasionally organises workshops in the provincial capitals to disseminate its reports. CIP, on the other hand, uses both traditional media (newspaper and TV) and social media to disseminate its reports on extractive governance. However, dissemination through traditional media is limited to a few elites. The largest circulation newspaper prints no more than 20,000 copies in a country of about 28 million people. Cable TV reaches less than 1 million people. Almost all newspapers and print media are published in Portuguese, and given that about 45 per cent of the population cannot read and write, their reach is minuscule (Salgado 2014). CIP targets the youth with information on corruption via social media because it believes that if there will be any SPA in the country it is more likely to come from the youth. Table 5.1 shows some of the informatics on CIP publications on extractives.

**Table 5.1 Informatics on CIP ID on extractives**

<b>Name of publication</b>	<b>Date of publication</b>	<b>Website downloads</b>	<b>Facebook views and likes</b>	<b>Mailchimp (mailing list)</b>
Receipts from LNG will flow first to the enterprises and only afterwards to the Mozambican government	5 June 2017	1,484	50,025	5,277
Domestic natural gas from the Rovuma Basin: Non transparent process selects doubtful enterprises	20 March 2017	5,147	89,510	5,213
There is too much optimism about the amount of the capital gains taxes	13 March 2017	9,720	95,501	1,349
What can Mozambique do to save its coal industry?	6 November 2016	3,085	47,509	5,274
Who is behind the enterprises that exploit the mining resources?	31 October 2016	3,642	420,581	3,585
Doing the groundwork to avoid the resource curse in Mozambique	18 May 2016	10,766	28,521	5,185
LNG from the Rovuma Basin: When will Anadarko invest in Area 1?	13 March 2016	5,211	76,256	1,588
Oil majors fight over Angoche Blocks in 5 <sup>th</sup> licensing round: Will Frelimo-linked Petroinveste be forced on the winners?	11 August 2015	1,265	112,588	4,050

By making investigative reports public, CIP aims to pressure state accountability institutions into investigating and prosecuting cases of alleged corruption.

Analysis and findings of the responses from the FGDs show that CIP and EITI work on ID in the extractive industry is fairly well known in Maputo, but outside the capital recognition is more limited. Seven out of the 11 CSO FGD participants working in the province where minerals are extracted had not heard of the work that CIP or EITI does on transparency. Only four out of the ten urban youth in the FGD (see Table 5.2) said they had heard about the CIP Sasol report, but none expressed interest in the story because it was complicated to understand.

*I posted it on my Facebook but people didn't pay attention to it. It was as if they didn't understand. People didn't know what to do with it because CIP did not tell them what to do.*

(Male youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018).

**Table 5.2 Awareness about transparency work in the extractive sector**

Are you aware about the information and transparency work that CIP and EITI undertake in extractive governance?	No. of participants	Responses	
		Yes %	No %
<i>Focus groups</i>			
Academics and researchers based in Maputo	11	100	0
Leaders of the mining community	4	75	25
CSOs in Cabo Delgado	11	36	64
Women's associations in Cabo Delgado	9	22	78
CSOs in Maputo	11	100	0
MPs	3	100	0
Provincial government officers	3	67	33
Urban youth	10	40	60
<i>Total</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>66</i>	<i>34</i>

From the FGDs there is a perception among academics, MPs, government officials, and CSOs based in Maputo that ID could promote SPA for government accountability (see Table 5.3). They gave a number of anecdotes from outside the extractive sector where information has led to SPA and a positive government response. However, CSOs based in the Cabo Delgado province and urban youth rejected the idea that ID is critical to promoting SPA. They argued that information is important but is insufficient.

**Table 5.3 Stakeholders' perception of ID and SPA**

Do you think ID can trigger SPA for government accountability in the extractive sector?	No. of participants	Yes (%)	No (%)
Academics and researchers	11	100	0
Community leaders	4	75	25
CSOs from the provincial capital (Pemba)	11	0	100
CSOs from Maputo	11	72	28
Members of Parliament	3	100	0
Women's groups	9	100	0
Provincial government	3	100	0
Urban youth	10	40	60

*Yes, information is prerequisite for transparency, and transparency is necessary for accountability. But the leadership of government restricts information flow to opposition legislature that is supposed to provide checks. The executive is only interested in working with the majority in parliament. The MPs that can make a difference do not receive information and when they receive information, they do not have sufficient power and funds to initiate action.*

(Opposition MP, FGD, Maputo, 15 March 2018)

CIP admits though that reaching out to local communities with ID is one of the challenges that the organisation faces. The sheer size of the country and the fact that CIP does not have affiliated grassroots organisations makes it difficult to have face-to-face interactions with people outside Maputo.

*We recognise that mobilising citizens for collective action especially in the remote areas requires face-to-face interactions but we do not have the capacity to do so. While our news conferences and newspaper articles easily reach urban residents, we need to consider different approaches to reaching out to rural communities. Rural people have less information and proper understanding of the extractive contracts and the consequences. You need to connect corruption with poor services that they receive in a face-to-face meeting before they can take action.*

(Interview with a CIP founding member, August 2017)

MPs, on the other hand, argue that information on extractive contracts come to them too late to be useful for decision-making.

*Contracts are signed before they are presented to parliament. What else can you do? EITI reports come to us late. You only comment and 'cry' but there is little to change. Given the context of Mozambique, it would have been appropriate that the MSG includes a representative of parliament and especially opposition political parties. The executive is part of the MSG but not the MPs?*

(MP, FGD, Maputo, 15 March 2018)

In 2018 and before this study was completed, the EITI co-ordinating unit agreed to include a representative of parliament as an observer in the MSG.

#### **A4: Unclear proposal on citizens action to follow ID**

Neither MEITI nor CIP reports suggest clear SPA by citizens to promote government accountability. MEITI annual reports make general recommendations, but do not suggest specific pro-accountability groups taking action; at best they put the responsibility on the government to take action.

*CIP information seems to inform academics, urban elites and public intellectuals but to change people's current attitude of passiveness, ID must reach the larger population outside Maputo and explain what we need to do. CIP and EITI must not only inform the people but also must mobilise and support the masses to act in ways to improve accountability.*

(Male youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018)

While CIP's report on the Sasol gas project attracted media attention in Mozambique and South Africa, it failed to suggest specific actions for citizens to take. Rather it warned that it would deliver its protest to the ANC-led government in South Africa and the African Union on behalf of the Mozambican people because it does not believe that either the GoM or Sasol will take action to ensure Mozambique benefits from the gas exploitation (CIP 2017). CIP hopes to take the case to the new South African government of President Ramaphosa.

The CIP believes that some of its ID could trigger unruly citizen action,

*We expect citizens to demand accountability from the government in a civic manner. However if by providing information and educating the public, an unruly civic action arises so be it!*

(Speech by the Executive Director of CIP, workshop, 5 December 2017)

The responsibility for action is delegated to state institutions. But in a context where state accountability institutions are totally controlled by party interest, very little SPA can come from these institutions without citizen action.

## **5.2 Capacity of citizens, CSOs and state institutions to take action**

From the narratives provided by interviewees and our analysis, there are four capacity related factors labelled 'B1–B5' that combine to effect SPI among citizens and pro-accountability institutions despite the availability of information on corrupt extractive governance.

- B1: Citizen high illiteracy rate, inadequate consciousness, civic values and voice
- B2: High levels of economic vulnerability and poverty
- B3: Citizens' disbelief of their capacity to take action on the basis of new information
- B4: CSOs' inability to mobilise citizens

### ***B1: Citizen high illiteracy rate, inadequate consciousness, civic values and voice***

Education and conscientisation<sup>9</sup> are tools for empowering people to pursue SPA to demand their rights and to hold a government accountable. Mozambique has an adult illiteracy rate of 45 per cent, one of the highest in the world (UNESCO 2016: 10). But in Cabo Delgado, a province in the north where numerous precious minerals are extracted and where a LNG project is underway, the illiteracy rate is as high as 60.7 per cent. Adult illiteracy in rural Mozambique on average 66 per cent. While EITI and CIP reports may be publicly available, a high illiteracy rate makes understanding and using the information for SPA impossible. Only 11 per cent of the population can speak Portuguese, but the reports are rarely translated into local languages. As a result, ID on extractives rarely improves citizens' awareness and consciousness about how corruption in contracts relates to their living conditions. Provincial government officials and MEITI coordinators argue that the people fail to make extensive use of ID because their levels of education are very low.

Community members at Pemba also argue that while they may accept that ID is important for transparency in the extractive sector, they have not seen any tangible results coming out from civil society representation on the EITI. They argue that access to information on EITI findings is limited to participating CSOs, and people who live in Maputo. Nevertheless, they praised the legal action that CTV took against Anadarko in the Afungi Peninsula case by mobilising communities to demand their land rights.

FGD participants argued that many people in rural areas do not understand that their poverty conditions are a consequence of their inaction against the government.

*People don't understand that donors have pulled out because of government corruption but when you explain to them, they will still not take action because the values embedded in civic responsibilities to protect public interest are not part of our culture. People lost their civic responsibility to the state after independence and during*

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<sup>9</sup> The process of making people aware of the contradictions of their socio-economic, political and cultural circumstances that diminish their wellbeing. Conscientisation happens when a critical awareness is formed among the people who have been oppressed, leading to collective action.

*the reign of President Chisano when 'Deixa-andar' (let it go) mentality crept into people's sub-consciousness.*

(Interview with CSO in Maputo, 14 March 2018)

The former President is alleged to have used the phrase 'Don't worry, people want to eat a little, let it go' to disregard accountability. Speaking at the Police Practical School in Marracuene District, the current President, Filipe Nyusi, stressed that civic and patriotic education among citizens is needed to fight corruption in the country. Such education is needed to awaken the moral values and awareness of the people (AllAfrica 2017).

*Education is not only about reading and writing but it is also about conscientisation. If you don't have a certain level of reason to protest, then you don't protest.*

*Conscientisation includes a certain degree of citizenship, values and awareness.*

(Interview with a MP, Maputo, 15 March 2018)

## **B2: High levels of economic vulnerability**

Poverty and economic vulnerability are constraints to accessing and making use of ID to pursue collective action. The cost of a newspaper is almost US\$1 so that restricts many of the few people who can read from accessing information via print media. As argued by many of the CSOs, poverty is a major issue that works against citizen mobilisation for SPA for accountability. Unlike rural communities where the majority may be illiterate, in urban areas like Maputo, CIP sees the challenge to citizen action differently; people are afraid to act because doing so means losing their economic livelihoods.

*In Maputo, it is not because people don't understand the implications of the information we disclose. They are afraid to be associated with CIP because doing so means losing their livelihoods. There are many people who work in the government and in the private sector including the informal sector who depend on the state in one way or the other for their livelihoods. These people will never sacrifice their economic privileges to pursuing public protest.*

(Interview with the CIP Executive Director, December 2017)

Access to sustainable income and resources is controlled by the ruling regime, so to be seen as not affiliated to the Frelimo Party is economically suicidal. Without alternative sources of livelihood outside the party-state economic network, one is disempowered to act. Economic empowerment is key to citizens' confidence to pursue SPA for accountability but the Mozambican middle class is not independent of the state to be able to mobilise to demand accountability from their government. As argued by many informants and FGDs, the Maputo middle class is related to the state through the rent it provides, so they play it safe.

*To get a job in the local administration for only US\$200 a month, one needs the party state as a reference. Frelimo was smart to capture the economy during privatisation of state enterprises. Without economic emancipation, one cannot demand government accountability because you are afraid to bite the hands that feed you.*

(Interview with senior citizen linked to the Frelimo Party, Maputo, 13 March 2018)

Maputo's economy is dependent on government income; even the private sector depends very much on government contracts. Without economic independence from the ruling government, it is unrealistic to expect people to pursue SPA to hold the government accountable.

*You have a party that controls the economy so how do you expect social movement to arise? Frelimo is so powerful that people are afraid to take action against the government. If you're public officer and complain your career is finished.*

(Provincial public officer, FGD, Pemba, 19 March 2018)

As people are poor, CSOs believe the incentive to undertake SPA against the government is low.

*People are poor; you give them information but it does not put food on the table or money in their pocket. They will not take action because there is a belief among the citizens that any benefit from such action will not come directly them. There is so much poverty in the country to expect activism.*

(CSOs, FGD, Maputo, 14 March 2018)

The few who do criticise openly are mainly intellectuals who make a living outside of the state. So when low levels of education, poor citizen awareness, concern for 'bread and butter', and fear come together they constrain people's ability to pursue SPA even if the quality of ID is high. Economic vulnerability also works against public officers using ID to trigger traditional accountability mechanisms such as investigations, inspections and audits. The Attorney General will not act. The police will not act because they need to protect their jobs and income.

*As a public sector worker you can lose your job so having the information is good but the reality is that information is constrained by other practical and contextual factors.*

(Interview with a senior government officer, Maputo, 31 May 2018)

*Joining any public protest or action may result in me losing my job and income. So although I have information, I value other aspects that affect myself and family, more than any collective gain that may not benefit me.*

(Interview with a public servant, Pemba, 20 March 2018)

### **B3: Citizens disbelieve of their capacity to act on the basis of information**

Participants from the various FGDs agreed that information that CIP and EITI provide is good for building citizen awareness, but that alone does not empower them to take SPA. Table 5.4 shows the responses of different FGDs on the question of ID and empowerment.

**Table 5.4 Does ID on extractive resources empower you to take SPA?**

Focus group	No. of participants	Yes (%)	No (%)
Academics and researchers	11	0	100
Community members in Pemba	4	25	75
CSO in Maputo	11	82	18
Women's groups	11	100	0
Youth groups	10	40	60

*No doubt, information can empower citizens but you can't do much with it. In the extractive industry, there are many powerful senior Frelimo Party members that operate mining concessions so people are afraid to ask accountability questions let alone organise SPA against the interest of such powerful party officials. While ID can raise people's awareness, it is not enough to move people into action.*

(Interview with academic/researcher, Maputo, 13 March 2018)

Six out of ten of the urban youth FGD thought that ID does not empower them to act. They consider the Mozambican context and people's practical approach to secured livelihoods as their concerns and priority.

*Information is for our own consumption. It empowers us for our academic purposes but not to go on the street to protest because taking part in public protest will not change anything in this country.*

(Male youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018)

*I don't think giving me information about corruption on Sasol's contract is enough to push me to protest on the street. Accountability is not part of our culture so having information doesn't change me.*

(Female youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018)

*My action alone cannot bring change. My action is filtered through a society that has little activism in its culture. As a young person growing up in Maputo, information will not empower me to confront a state authority because the police can easily kill you. In the northern provinces, the police may not be active to clamp down on public dissent that is why they are able to demonstrate and vote against Frelimo but in Maputo that is risky to do.*

(Male youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018)

*Having information doesn't trigger action in me because we do not have the leadership to lead the youth into action. There are youth associations but the active ones are linked to the government. That is why there is no critical debate on issues concerning the youth. There is a law on freedom of speech but when people speak freely, they suffer consequences.*

(Female youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018)

#### **B4: CSOs' inability to mobilise citizens for SPA**

There has been a steady growth in the number of CSOs in Mozambique, although the data on numbers is unreliable. Most of these organisations prefer to work on providing economic and social services that directly benefit the poor, to working on advocacy or political activism to promote government accountability.

*In terms of activism, there aren't many CSOs in the country. CIP is more of a think-tank; taking up street protest is not in their work. This tells you something about the nature of CSOs in the country. They are good on demonstrating on Facebook but will not take to the street. That is related to economic factors because if you demonstrate on the street you've no job. But generally our history and culture are not related to activism.*

(MP, FGD, Maputo, 15 March 2018)

*Many CSOs are not based in the communities but in the provincial capital and Maputo and claim to represent the communities. The MPs do not relay information back to their constituents because there isn't any constituency that they can truly claim to represent since they are elected based on party list.*

(Interview with a researcher/academic, Maputo, 13 March 2018)

*Our society is not active in the face of poverty, illiteracy and fear but there is also lack of civic leadership in the country to mobilise people. The few middle class and urban elites that can mobilise people only pursue their self-interest.*

(MP, FGD, Maputo, 15 March 2018)

CIP's interaction with citizens outside Maputo is weak. While the organisation analyses public sector corruption that has a direct effect on people's standard of living, its advocacy and engagement is focused on national and macro-level issues and by doing so it fails to connect with ordinary people at the sub-national level. It has not been able to mobilise

people for SPA. It has not established an office outside Maputo although staff occasionally visit the mining communities. Both CIP and EITI engagement with communities is the weakest link in their efforts to use information to empower citizen action for accountability. With a staff of 16 (11 technical and 5 administrative) CIP has capacity challenges, but its commitment to the 'risky job' of fighting corruption in Mozambique is unflinching. However, it has no plans to establish a strong relationship with communities in the fight against corruption.

*There is a risk that once we establish offices in the provinces, we may be infested by the virus – referring to corruption or co-option by the state as some CSOs have been compromised. Besides, we don't have the resources to build affiliated CBOs. NGOs that we can work with have moved away from advocacy to poverty alleviation and service delivery. They do not want to confront the government.*

(CIP staff and founding members, FGD, August 2017)

In our FGDs and interviews, it was argued by academics, CSOs and some of the international organisations, including a bilateral donor that SPA resembling a real social movement for change will most likely come from Mozambican youth born after 1992. These people constitute about 60 per cent of the population and seem to have less attachment to any particular indoctrination associated with either Frelimo or RENAMO. Anecdotal evidence suggests youth tend to vote for a third party instead of any of the two known political parties. While there is a high expectation among Mozambicans that the urban youth could become potential change agents in Mozambique if ID targets them, the FGD with ten selected urban youths shows that they may be aware of CIP and the work it does, but cannot be relied on yet to embark on SPA. In the FGD 40 per cent suggested that ID provided by CIP and other CSOs can influence them to support SPA for accountability, provided other complementary factors such as security, employment and income are in place.

### **5.3 Structural and institutional factors**

Participants of the FGD and informants listed about seven structural and institutional factors that contribute to SPI for accountability. We have labelled these factors C1–C7.

- C1: Culture of submissiveness (devoid of confrontation and activism)
- C2: Fear arising from the nature of the political regime
- C3: Dominance of a single party and the nature of political representation (party list)
- C4: Weak horizontal accountability between the executives, judiciary and legislature
- C5: Wide geographical spread of the country
- C6: Limited independent media (state-centred and private self-censorship)
- C7: Pro-accountability institutions considerations in the context of conflict and fragility

#### ***C1: Culture of submissiveness (devoid of confrontation and action)***

A society's disposition to embark on collective action to demand accountability from duty bearers is influenced by its history and culture. Colonisation and a culture of patriarchy have suppressed collective action in the past, as both require the citizen to be submissive to state authority. This historical context can develop into an institutional culture of submissiveness that perpetuates for a long time. Pieces of historical narrative put together by FGDs and corroborated by informants suggest that such a society was built in Mozambique during the Portuguese colonisation and this has been carried over to the post-independence era. The Marxist-Leninist ideology that characterised post-independence Mozambique perpetuated a culture of fear and obedience that further restricted citizen active engagement. The ideology has left almost no space for independent social organisations to emerge with a divergence of opinions. Formal political party structures and informal traditional authorities at the community level are designed to ensure citizen submissiveness. Dissenting views are

discouraged at all cost. The default position of the government is that CSOs are agents of foreign interests.

*In rural areas where there is less information and more control by the state who are you to say that government doesn't work for you? Any information on governance has to be mediated through a government administration to be considered credible.*

(Interview with Senior Frelimo Party Officer, 13 March 2018)

*For any information provided by a CSO, there is counter information to say that 'beware of these people'. They have an agenda to manipulate the citizens. As a result, many people don't trust other sources of information except the state.*

(Interview with Senior Frelimo Party Officer, 13 March 2018)

A UK DFID evaluation report argues that 'Voice and Accountability' are unknown concepts, which are not easily translated – into Portuguese or into the Mozambican socio-political context (Rocha Menocal and Sharma 2008: vii). Researchers and academics during the FGD expressed similar sentiments:

*We never had the opportunity to express our views. Our culture had been to speak in one voice. Speaking against the government is interpreted as unpatriotic, traitor and against the ideals of the state. Since independence, we've been taught to believe in the government as a benign actor that seeks first and foremost the interest of all citizens. The media has been the same, to speak only in favour of government. The newspapers write the same things – what the government wants to hear. Now with democracy we are being challenged to think differently. But it's not in our DNA, our culture to hold a government accountable through SPA.*

(Academics and researchers, FGD, Maputo, 13 March 2018)

*Historically we're a passive people. We heard about the hidden public debt and Sasol contract but didn't act because it's not in our nature to do so especially when it is not directly related to you. Knowledge is important but fear is a justification for why people don't act.*

(Provincial CSOs, FGD, Pemba, 19 March 2018)

## **C2: Fear arising from the nature of the political regime**

The Mozambique Constitution guarantees freedom of speech, association and peaceful protest but Frelimo tolerance on these two tenets is not always to be expected. CTV and CIP leadership have received threat and harassment for their role in the promotion of transparency and accountability in extractive governance. In the wake of the September 2010 demonstration, the GoM demanded the registration of all SIM cards. It was alleged that phone users had used text messages to mobilise people to demonstrate.

*Freedom of speech is not respected in the country so people are afraid to speak. In the worse scenario, you can lose your life. People hide behind social media to communicate but they won't show their face. They don't even use their real names in case the state authorities trace their identity. They delegate opportunity for change to social media but social media does not act. People do.*

(MP, FGD, Maputo, 15 March 2018)

*Last year the youth wanted to demonstrate but saw helicopters hovering over our heads that intimidated us. Professor Macuane was shot at. A civil right advocate (Joao Massango) wanted to demonstrate against the US\$2.2 billion hidden public debt but was abducted and beaten.*

(Mozambican urban youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018)

*In 2013, health professionals including medical doctors mobilised and protested on the street. The leader of that movement working for an NGO at that time lost his working contract with the NGO. He has children and families... In 2014, we saw this same person in Tete province campaigning for the ruling party. He has been compelled to support the ruling government.*

(Mozambican urban youth, FGD, Maputo, 16 March 2018)

In May 2016, Professor Jose Macuane, a university lecturer and political analyst was shot in the leg after he had commented on issues on television that some considered critical of the government. The threat on his life was seen as a warning to people that there could be serious consequences if you dare embark on street protest. Another example was the threat to the Catholic Council for Justice and Peace. The council annually issues a statement that tends to criticise the quality of governance in the country. In 2016, the council was asked by government communicators to emphasise the spiritual being of citizens and not the nature of governance in the country.

### ***C3: Dominance of a single party and the nature of political representation***

The possibility that an alternative government might emerge encourages political groups to mobilise and exert pressure on a ruling government to be accountable. ID feeds into that pressure to make a government responsive. However, the principal-agent relationship that enables democracy to provide incentives and sanctions for accountability does not work in Mozambique. The presence of a single dominant political party and the modality based on which MPs are elected (party list) are major constraints on SPA. The Mozambican state, to a large extent, is represented by the interest of the Frelimo Party and its members. There is no separation of powers and interest between the party and the government. The functioning of the government is mediated through the party system, where every level of government is accountable to the party. MPs feel accountable to those that put their names on the party list and not the people in their constituency. Mozambicans, irrespective of their educational level, have no idea about the MPs that represent their constituency because they never selected them in their voting.

Prospective candidates who want the party leadership to put their names on the party list will not join any collective action to demand accountability. The dominance of a single party in government since independence has given the impression that a change of government is impossible; hence voter participation is poor.

*Look at the low voter turnout rate in both presidential and parliamentary elections in the country? People are not interested in national election because they know the outcome will not make a difference.*

(Academics and researchers, FGD, Maputo, 13 March 2018)

**Table 5.5 Voter turnout in national elections**

	1999	2004	2009	2014
Presidential	69.5	36.42	55.86	48.64
Parliamentary	66.5	36.34	44.44	48.49

Source: Election Guide 2018

Within the Frelimo Party there are internal mechanisms that ensure individuals toe the party line. The thought that Frelimo could lose an election may help to promote SPA, but that appears a long shot in view of Frelimo's embeddedness in every aspect of Mozambique's economic, social and cultural fabric. Without the fear that citizens could vote out a ruling

government through the ballot box, Frelimo will pay no attention to ID. Frelimo's dominance of the political space and over state and society leave the citizens with little space to embark on SPA.

#### **C4: Weak horizontal accountability between the executives, judiciary and legislature**

As a pro-accountability institution, a parliament has an important role to play in demanding accountability from the executive using ID, but the nature of the Mozambican Parliament does not allow it to serve that catalytic role. The ruling political party heads the Committee of Parliament that has responsibility to hold the executive accountable. As argued by a MP during the FGD, 'the Parliament of Mozambique is designed to defend government more than providing checks and balances'.

*Since information on the ENI and ExxonMobil contract came to the public domain, I've asked for a debate on the contract and to understand how the supposed government revenue of US\$350 million was arrived at. But for more than a year, the leadership of parliament has not scheduled this debate. The Frelimo party uses its majority to dominate parliament and manipulate discussions. The leadership of parliament is hesitant to bring issues that will make the government unpopular.*

(MP, FGD, Maputo, 15 March 2018)

*Theoretically access to information can give us more power to monitor government but what we have in Mozambique is a weak parliament that is unable to hold the executive accountable.*

(MP, FGD, 15 March 2018)

The Mozambican system of government where the President appoints about 80 per cent of the state officials works against promoting horizontal accountability.

#### **C5: Geographical spread of the country**

Mozambique is around the size of France and Germany combined. About 70 per cent of the population live in rural areas. Maputo, the nation's capital and the seat of government, is located in the farthest south of the country, and away from the second and third largest populous provinces of Zambézia and Nampula located in the north. Maputo is delinked from the rest of urban and rural Mozambique and in general has more economic, social and political privileges. These differences have an effect on the way residents and institutions operate and react to ID and accountability. While the bulk of the extractive work occurs in the villages, sub-national governments have little power over mining companies that operate in the local jurisdictions. The central government (CG) ministries in Maputo make most of the mining decisions (Besharati 2012; MacKinnon 2013). The district administration though is closer to the communities; key information on mining contracts and distribution of revenue come from the CG in Maputo.

In the FGD, researchers and academics estimated that only about 15 per cent of the 1.3 million Maputo residents have formal sector jobs and enjoy urban livelihoods. The remaining 85 per cent have livelihood conditions not dissimilar from the rural poor. Those who do go to the street to protest come from this poor 85 per cent, but their actions are not linked to or supported by the other educated and middle class 15 per cent. Moreover, the disconnect between the state administrative capital and the peripheries where the extractives occur means that SPA occurring in these rural areas is unable to bubble up to the centre because urban dwellers do not connect with the challenges of rural dwellers. In a context where the government is able to provide better services and livelihoods for those in the cities, urban dwellers are unlikely to back SPA in support of the predicaments of the rural population.

### ***C6: Limited independent media***

The presence of an independent mass media to address coordination problems is key in persuading citizens to act (World Bank 2016; Overy 2010). Although improved in the last decade, the media landscape in Mozambique is still dominated by state-controlled outlets. The state run Rádio Moçambique is the most influential news outlet with the largest audience, offering programmes in 18 languages. The state-run television also has nationwide coverage with its programmes tilted in favour of the government, offering little opportunity for dissenting social and political views. Newspapers rarely print stories critical of the ruling party. State domination of traditional mass media makes it difficult to use that to advocate for SPA.

The potential use of new media for mass mobilisation is limited; internet penetration in Maputo is 40 per cent, but for the remainder of the country it is only 6 per cent (Freedom House 2015). There is also a pervasive self-censorship among journalists and news outlets due to fear of the regime. For instance, in 2016, CIP developed a video on the implications of the hidden public debt to ordinary Mozambicans to be shown on 'prime time TV news'. The TV station informed Frelimo party officials. CIP staff received threats from senior government officials after which the TV station refused to broadcast the message. Freedom House (2015) reports that political interference into media content occurs occasionally. Government censorship of community radio stations has been reported. For instance the Catholic radio in Nampula and many community radio broadcasters have been harassed, threatened and had their transmission suspended many times.

### ***C7: Pro-accountability institutions' considerations in the context of conflict and fragility***

Mozambique is considered a post-conflict success country with substantial donor support. However, the extractive boom and prospects for mega projects have given concerns to donors, CSOs and analysts about the potential for a renewal of armed conflict between ruling Frelimo, and the former rebel movement and opposition party, Renamo (Frey 2016; Macuane *et al.* 2017). In July 2013, Renamo threatened to sabotage the mining operation by targeting its rail and road infrastructure. Renamo's Party headquarters were also moved to the north where it enjoys greater support. In such a fragile context, CSOs and pro-accountability organisations temper agitation for SPA with the need to avoid conflict and insecurity. As many of the CSOs from FGDs and interviews indicated, activism and agitation for SPA are carefully designed so that they do not become a security issue.

*... in such a fragile context where there is always a simmering conflict between Frelimo and Renamo, unguarded information disclosure can trigger serious conflict and potential escalation of the war. Fragile context matters because it shapes people's unwillingness to take SPA.*

(Interview with a development partner, November 2017)

## **5.4 Influence of external agencies to SPA for accountability**

In the context of weak endogenous capacity to pursue SPA, external agencies like development partners (donors) and international NGOs leverage government accountability using funding conditions and a threat of international sanctions. We identified two factors (D1 and D2) that external agencies practice that lead to unintentional citizen and institutional inaction for accountability.

### ***D1: Substantial ODA contribution to the government budget is disincentive for upward accountability***

Donors have considerable influence on accountability in Mozambique because of the financial support they provide to the government budget (LeBillon 2013). Since

independence in 1975, ODA has contributed on average about 45 per cent of the state budget (Arndt *et al.* 2015). In 2004, aid accounted for 58 per cent of the government's expenditure, though it reduced to 33.5 per cent in 2014 (Kirshner and Power 2015). It is now estimated to be about 36 per cent (World Bank 2018). Substantial ODA provides negative incentives for government to mobilise local tax, and citizens who do not pay tax have no incentive to demand upward accountability from the government. Tax revenue has fallen from 25.4 per cent in 2014 to 20 per cent in 2016. As tax revenue falls and extractive revenues rise, there is less incentive for people to mobilise for collective action and for the government to be sensitive to ID.

## ***D2: Inadequate external support to mobilising citizen consciousness, voice and action***

External agencies influence citizen voice and action through their funding of CSOs. The funding that is available influences what CSOs choose to do or not to do. In Mozambique, many CSOs are donor-created or would not exist without donor support (NORAD 2016: 27). With about half the population living below the national poverty line, it's not surprising that more donor money goes into supporting service delivery and poverty alleviation than advocacy work. External support to Mozambican CSOs to develop citizen consciousness about the structural conditions that impoverish them and the need to collectively confront these structures through SPA is weak. Our analyses further show that where development partners have reacted strongly to reports of corruption, it has helped to amplify the voices of CSOs. For instance, all the FGD participants had heard about the US\$2.2 million hidden public debt because it became a major public debate in the media and public gatherings when development partners withdrew financial support to the government. The involvement of donors made the information on the public debt too important to be ignored by the state media. According to many of the CSOs we interviewed, donors do not openly react to CIP and EITI reports for a number of reasons: commercial diplomacy due to some of the companies involved coming from their own countries; reservation about the veracity of the reports; or simply because they do not want to escalate an already fragile and conflict sensitive environment.

*If external support to CSOs is directed towards raising citizen awareness, voice and consciousness, we can begin to attack the structural causes of poverty in the country, which in my view are ignorance and corruption.*  
(Interview with CSOs, Maputo, 11 March 2018)

## **6 Summary of the analysis of the causal factors of SPI**

The analyses have shown that there are 17 factors that connect to effect citizen and institutional inaction for accountability. We found that when the technical nature and credibility of EITI and CIP reports on extractives 'A1' are connected with the mode of dissemination of the reports 'A2', the elite groups in Maputo that the reports target 'A3' and the fact that those reports rarely suggest specific citizen or institutional action for accountability 'A4'; then the quality of ID provides insufficient persuasiveness to trigger a chain reaction - comprehension, action, and the response of citizens and pro-accountability institutions as Fung *et al.* (2004: 9) suggest. EITI and CIP information disclosure does not reach the provinces, mining communities, pro-accountability institutions and the wider public to trigger SPA.

When the quality of the reports (written in English and Portuguese and disseminated on organisational websites and during news conferences) is connected with citizens' high levels of illiteracy 'B1', economic vulnerability and poverty 'B2', disbelief of their capacity to take action 'B3', and the poor mobilisation efforts of CSOs 'B4' in a context of structural and institutional constraint – a 'culture of submissiveness' 'C1', fear of the political regime 'C2', the dominance of a single political party that controls access to economic opportunities 'C3', a weak constraint on government 'C4', wide geographical spread of the country such that the poor socio-economic conditions of mining communities do not arouse sympathy and reaction from elites in Maputo 'C5'; then it is extremely hard to expect endogenous initiatives of SPA to arise. The only remedy left is SPA that is facilitated by exogenous actors. Here also the analysis shows that the substantial ODA that is provided through government budget support 'D1' and inadequate external support to mobilising citizen consciousness, voice and action 'D2' seem to constrain SPA. With the support of informants and participants at the FGDs and workshops, we have connected each of the 17 contributing factors into a network chart as shown in Figure 6.1.

There was absolute consensus among the 61 FGD participants that no single factor causes SPI but together they combine to cause citizen and pro-accountability institution inaction. Table 6.1 below shows how focus groups ranked the contributing factors into a top three. A score of 1 means the most significant obstacle to SPA for accountability and 3 the least.


**Table 6.1 Focus groups' ranking of contributing factors of SPI**

Focus group	Ranking of the causes of citizens and institutions' inaction for government accountability						
	C3	B1	C1	B2	B4	C6	C5
Researchers and academics	1	3	-	2		-	-
Community leaders	3	1	-	-	2	-	-
Provincial CSOs	-	1	2	3	-	-	-
CSOs in Maputo	1	-	2	-	3	-	-
Members of Parliament	2	-	1	-	-	3	-
Provincial Government Officers	-	1	3	2	-	-	-
Women's groups	1	-	2	-	-	-	3
Urban youth	-	1	-	2	-	3	-

Notes:

- B1: Citizen high levels of illiteracy and inadequate civic values
- B2: High levels of economic vulnerability and poverty
- B4: CSOs' inability to mobilise citizens
- C1: Culture of 'submissiveness' (devoid of confrontation and activism)
- C3: Dominance of a single party and the nature of political representation (party list)
- C5: Wide geographical spread of the country
- C6: Limited independent media (state centred and private self-censorship)

**Figure 6.1 Summary of the 17 connecting factors that lead to SPI for accountability in extractive governance in Mozambique**



Source: Authors' own.

From the perspective of researchers/academics, CSOs in Maputo and women's groups in the provincial capital, the main obstacle to SPA is the nature of politics and the dominance of a single party in Mozambique. There was consensus among the women's groups that without reforming the way politics works; none of the transparency initiatives by EITI and CIP can lead to SPA for accountability and good governance in the country.

*People fear the government. Even if we know that we're right, we cannot act because we're afraid of the political regime. We need real democracy that people can talk and demonstrate without being worried about the consequences. The majority of the MPs are representing the Frelimo Party in parliament and not the people.*

(Consensus of women's groups, FGD, Pemba, 21 March 2018)

On the other hand; community members, provincial government officers, and the urban youth think it is 'B1': 'low level of citizen literacy, consciousness and civic values' that is the main cause of SPI.

Generally SPA arising from ID is rare or at best episodic in Mozambique. CIP and other CSOs shared a few instances where micro-level actions have resulted in positive accountability from private corporations but this had nothing to do with ID by EITI, CIP or the MSG. For instance, in June 2015, CTV took court action against US oil and gas company Anadarko and the GoM over the installation of an on-shore gas processing plant without adequate consultation, compensation and resettlement of over 5,000 people from the Afungi Peninsula. CTV contested the project on the basis that the communities had not been consulted and that the legal process and people's land rights had not been respected. Anadarko and the Mozambican state initially deployed authoritarian tactics to intimidate CTV staff and associates. The government accused CTV of sabotaging the project, leading to police arrest and detention of the organisation's leaders (Symons 2016: 156). The legal challenge compelled Anadarko to commit more resources into community development. It earmarked US\$180 million as compensation for the community and an additional US\$90,000 for social infrastructure such as homes, schools, hospitals and access roads (Macauhub/MZ 2015). Anadarko claimed that the compensation amounted to about US\$36,000 per person in the Afungi community. If this commitment was delivered, this would have been a major impact but CSOs claim that so far the promises have not been fulfilled. To date only the first eight households have been resettled.

Varied stakeholders have testified that as a result of EITI there have been improvements in dialogue between the government and CSOs in the sector, though CIP is critical that the dialogue is superficial, as the ability of CSOs to influence government intentions or reduce conflict of interest is limited. CIP criticises the government's commitment to the MSG, citing several instances where low-level public officers represented the government in the group's meetings. Some of CIP's criticisms are also alluded to in the MEITI 2017 validation report. In the wake of donor withdrawal of budget support, the government's commitment to the EITI process has declined. By the end of 2017, the World Bank funding of the national secretariat of EITI had ended and the GoM indicated it was not in a position to fund the secretariat in the same way. For instance the GoM cannot pay the same salaries that the World Bank give staff. Since August 2017, CIP has ceased to be a member of the MSG after its two-year term elapsed. Two new organisations based in the provinces, Associacao de Apoio e Assistencia Juridica as Comunidades (AAAJC) from Tete Province and AENA from Nampula have joined the MSG.

## **6.1 Can ID promote accountability and inclusive development without SPA?**

Reflecting on the EITI theory of change and multiple paths to accountability as shown in Figure 1.1, there appears to be evidence that seems to suggest that MSG dialogue can promote accountability without necessarily taking the long route of SPA by citizens and pro-

accountability institutions. The MEITI, CIP and other CSOs claim that their ID work to MPs has contributed to the development and revision of the Petroleum and Mining Laws (Law 20/2014; Law 21/2014) and subsequent amendments. The Law 20/2014 includes Article 8.4 that requires publication of all contracts within 30 days of signing. The Mineral Resources and Energy Ministry (MIREME) has followed up on this standard and published some of the active extractive contracts on its website.<sup>10</sup> But in general, there is weak enforcement of the laws and regulations governing the extractive sector (EITI 2017: 7). While the EITI standard may have informed the law on subnational transfers, up until now, the GoM has not developed any strategy for ensuring that the 2.75 per cent royalties due to communities are actually implemented in accordance with the law. Yet there has been little SPA from CSOs, MEITI or CIP to compel the government to account for the money.

Since Mozambique joined the EITI in 2009, public perception of corruption in the country has not seen an appreciable reduction. With a global average score of 4.3,<sup>11</sup> Mozambique's corruption perception index (CPI) ranks among the highest in the world, as is its Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) ranking (see Table 6.2).

**Table 6.2 Mozambique governance index**

Mozambique	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
CPI	2.6	2.5	2.7	2.7	3.1	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.7	2.5
IIAG overall	53.8	55.0	54.2	53.9	53.5	52.1	52.1	52.3	52.2	NA

Note: NA = not available.

Source: Compiled from Transparency International and IIAG Reports.

The presumption that ID on government corruption would have a negative effect on private sector investment did not seem obvious from discussions with the mining companies. Anadarko did not indicate that the revelation of the US\$2.2 billion in hidden public debt or CIP's revelation of Sasol's shady contract would in any way affect their projected LPG investment in Mozambique, although its representative hinted that premium consumers in Japan and Singapore do take corruption and other governance issues into consideration in their business transactions.

In the early stages of commercial exploitation of natural resources, the GoM and mining communities had high expectations that international investment would create wealth and turn the economy and people's livelihoods around. But as large-scale exploitation has taken place, reality is beginning to dawn on people that they may not receive the benefits of extractive revenue after all. Discussions in the FGDs show that infrastructure development around mining communities has not shown appreciable improvement above those communities without the benefit of natural resources. The physical, social, and economic lives of the people in the mining communities are disconnected from the international capital invested in extractive resources. The poverty conditions of the small towns around the gas project are described as a tragedy, particularly when multi-billion mining investments such as that of Sasol provide very little in return to these poor communities (Whittles 2017; Hlatshaneni 2017). So the presumption that ID and MSG dialogue can lead to improved governance and inclusive development without SPA may be difficult to sustain in the Mozambique context. The fact that private companies hardly attend MSG meetings in Mozambique and prefer instead to have bilateral engagement with the GoM because they cast doubt on the appropriateness of the MSG platform to address their concerns (EITI 2017: 22) supports our conclusion that without SPA, accountability is weak in the EITI process.

<sup>10</sup> [www.mireme.gov.mz/index.php?option=com\\_phocadownload&view=category&id=8&Itemid=160](http://www.mireme.gov.mz/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=8&Itemid=160).

<sup>11</sup> A score closer to zero shows a high level of corruption while closer to 10 means the country is very clean.

# 7 Conclusions and policy implications

## 7.1 Conclusions

The EITI has provided opportunities for multiple stakeholders (CSOs, the government, and private corporations) to be involved in ID and transparency initiatives in extractive governance in Mozambique. The presumed chain of actions that ID, when it exposes corruption in extractive governance, will trigger, such as civic interrogation of political leaders, public protest and further investigation stimulating policy debate, court action, and enforcement and/or legislative review, return of stolen extractive revenue and imprisonment of corrupt public officials and their associates, has rarely happened in Mozambique. This study has identified 17 factors that inter-connect to produce citizen and institutional inaction on accountability. The study shows that when information on 'corrupt' extractive governance is connected with citizens' high levels of economic vulnerability and illiteracy; the presence of a dominant political party with structures that permeate all aspects of state and non-state institutions; an institutional culture of 'submissiveness' that has been created out of fear of the political regime and media self-censorship; and weak CSO capacity to mobilise citizens, then Mozambicans, their parliament, revenue agencies and public prosecutors are unlikely to take action to demand accountability from the government.

Without efforts to improve the economic empowerment of citizens, ID will not trigger SPA. In Mozambique, those who earn a regular and reliable income often work in the public sector or in private firms linked to the government. Without economic independence from the ruling government, it is unrealistic to expect people to pursue SPA against the government that provides them access to economic opportunities. Economic vulnerability also works against the ability of public officers to use ID from CSOs to trigger traditional accountability mechanisms such as investigations, inspections, audits, arrest and prosecution. The Attorney General will not act; the police will not act; public prosecutors will not act because people need to protect their jobs, incomes and security.

Hence the theory of change presented earlier does not work in Mozambique because of the 17 factors. Despite signing up to EITI, the GoM continues to act with impunity in the face of ID, which elsewhere might bring many governments down. The consequences of such accountability failures are enormous. This includes worsening levels of corruption, failure to enforce routine mining legislation, and non-inclusivity of economic growth. These outcomes are not unusual in many natural resource-rich but poor countries, for example Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria, where the physical, social, and economic lives of the people that live in extractive communities are disconnected from the international capital invested in the sector.

In Mozambique the nature of politics and the political regime have been key contributing factors to accountability failures. Since 1994, the ruling political party (Frelimo) has won all democratic elections. The fusion of the political party and state structures coupled with the centralisation of powers in the hands of party elites provide a framework in which citizens and pro-accountability institutions are unable to pursue actions to demand accountability. This context coupled with state control of the economy and social services, means citizens depend on the magnanimity of the party-state for survival. The patron-client relationship that the Frelimo party has with its members provides them with economic benefits and access to state resources in exchange for political support (Macuane *et al.* 2017). Without the understanding that citizens can vote them out through the ballot box, governments will pay no attention to ID.

## 7.2 Implications of the study findings on policies and practices on transparency initiatives

With a high level of public debt arising from corruption, and the expectation that extractive resources could be used clandestinely to defray the debt, transparency and accountability initiatives in the extractive sector would require a recalibration of strategies to make them successful. Based on the findings of this study, we offer the following policy and practice suggestions to EITI, PWYP, CSOs, international NGOs and development agencies that support ID as a mechanism for promoting accountability:

- Poor mining communities have the greatest interest in using information on corrupt mining contracts to pursue SPA, but they are the least targeted with ID. In Mozambique and other resource-rich but poor countries, information on corrupt mining contracts reach only the urban elites who benefit disproportionately from extractive revenue through better infrastructure service provision, hence their interest in collective action following ID is weak.
- Protagonists of ID and accountability initiatives such as EITI, PWYP, CIP, etc. need to go beyond ID and consider how they can support interest groups and institutions to take action. It is not enough to disclose information in a context where 'naming and shaming' does not deter shameless people from abusing power and state resources. It is not enough for EITI to disclose information that the government has not been transparent on extractive revenue or a government's royalty transfers to communities do not match specific legal requirements, or, that a proportion of extractive revenue cannot be traced to any government account. Supporters of ID could also inform (and train) key stakeholders on what action they need to take to ensure that a government fulfils its legal obligations. External agencies need to facilitate weak endogenous actors in focusing attention on citizen mobilisation instead of assuming that information itself will mobilise collective action. Information does not mobilise action, interest groups do.
- Conscientisation, civic awareness campaigns and economic empowerment are the first steps for promoting government accountability. Though literacy levels may be low in many resource-rich but poor countries, other forms of education such as citizen civic awareness and consciousness will be critical first steps to move ID to real empowerment. Without inculcating in citizens public interest values, ID as a means to holding government accountable is less effective or meaningless. External support to CSOs on developing citizen consciousness about the structural conditions that impoverish them and the need to collectively confront these structures is needed. Additionally, in fragile contexts, ID initiatives must go hand in hand with strategies to improve citizens' economic livelihoods. Economic advocacy may be needed to complement policy advocacy.

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