REVIEWING THE EVIDENCE BASE FOR REINTEGRATING POPULATIONS DISPLACED BY CONFLICT

FINAL REPORT

ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY STUDIES

November 2019
EXPERT ADVISORY CALL DOWN SERVICE – LOT B

STRENGTHENING RESILIENCE AND RESPONSE TO CRISSES

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DISCLAIMER

This document has been produced by the Royal United Service Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI) with the assistance of the UK Department for International Development contracted through the EACDS Lot B service ‘Strengthening resilience and response to crises’, managed by DAI Europe Ltd. under contract to the UK Department for International Development.

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# CONTENTS

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................... 3
   1.1 KEY TAKEAWAYS ................................................................. 3
       Problems with existing models ....................................... 3
       Comprehensive approaches .......................................... 4
       Factors underpinning success ....................................... 5
       Role of different stakeholders ................................... 5
       Lessons ........................................................................ 6
       Recommendations: .................................................... 6
       Managing expectations and improving evaluations .......... 7

2. INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 8
   2.1 HAZARAS ........................................................................... 9
   2.2 ROHINGYAS ...................................................................... 9
   2.3 KASHMIRI PANDITS .......................................................... 10
   2.4 TAMILS........................................................................... 10

3. RESEARCH METHODS .......................................................... 11
   3.1 LITERATURE LANDSCAPE ............................................... 11
   3.2 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES ..................................... 12

4. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES WITH DURABLE SOLUTIONS ............ 12
   4.1 POLICY-MAKER PERSPECTIVES AND THEIR PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTIONS ....... 12
   4.2 COMPREHENSIVE, MULTI-SECTORAL APPROACHES .................. 19
   4.3 DESIRES OF DISPLACED POPULATIONS AND PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES ...... 21
   4.4 UNPACKING RECIPIENT CATEGORIES ................................... 24
       Youth 25
       Gender 26
       Socioeconomic Differences .......................................... 26
   4.5 LESSONS AND QUALIFIED EXAMPLES .................................. 28
   4.6 FACTORS UNDERPINNING SUCCESS ................................... 32
       Security, Livelihoods and Information ............................. 32
       Land 34
       Urbanisation .................................................................. 36
       Investing in Local Integration and Empowering Displaced Populations ............ 37
   4.7 ROLE OF DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SUCCESS .... 40

5. AFGHANISTAN AND THE HAZARAS .................................. 44
   5.1 LOCALLY LED REINTEGRATION EFFORTS ................................ 45
   5.2 STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS ............................................. 49
   5.3 NATIONAL PROGRAMMING ............................................... 50
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study examines the displacement and reintegration of minority communities into majority populations through the lens of four case studies from South Asia – the Hazaras in Afghanistan, the Rohingyas in Myanmar, the Kashmiri Pandits in India and the Tamils in Sri Lanka. It documents lessons from previous reintegration experiences and approaches, including those conducted in regions outside South Asia, and seeks to identify factors that are required for successful reintegration as well as conditions that are believed to undermine the prospects of success. The range of case studies selected enables a more complete understanding of the factors that enable or deter reintegration, in particular factors associated with the conflict itself as well as socioeconomic conditions and policies in both the place of origin and the place of displacement. They also enable an examination of different types of integration or reintegration including different national government, local government, international donors, and civil society approaches.

The study first reviews the broader conceptual literature and literature associated with cases beyond South Asia, drawing lessons from those, before focusing on the South Asian cases and attempting to apply some of the findings to their specific contexts. RUSI adopted a comprehensive set of eligibility parameters for the literature, including for example, grey literature alongside peer-reviewed academic content. There are, inevitably, limitations: first, the search was only conducted in English, and second, pre-2010 material was excluded from the conceptual literature collection on the assumption that any significant findings outside this time period would be referenced in more contemporary studies.

1.1 KEY TAKEAWAYS

Problems with existing models

Global policy on refugees, displaced communities and reintegration has been broadly framed by the three ‘durable solutions’ championed by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement. While prioritisation among these has fluctuated over time depending on prevailing geopolitical imperatives, the current preference appears to be for the ‘home-coming model’, which typically aims to rebuild former livelihoods for returnees on the presumption this best satisfies their futures. The literature criticises this approach, accusing it of conflating return with the re-establishment of normality. This is also highlighted in the case studies, specifically with reference to the Rohingyas, where a repatriation arrangement was signed by the governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh in spite of the failures of past cycles of displacement and repatriation, and the fact that there was no real scope for genuine reintegration. The literature instead suggests return and reintegration are iterative processes with non-linear, staggered, sporadic or cyclical variants, and repatriation is likewise a longitudinal, multi-staged development rather than a one-time move from a ‘place of asylum’ to ‘home’.

The ‘durable solutions’ framework tends to marginalise the agency of IDPs and refugees, especially when they pursue organic, locally designed approaches that do not align with the normative preferences of international stakeholders. Displaced populations are generally neither static nor immobile but operate as purposive, rational actors. Comparisons between the conditions of exile and those in the country of origin, the availability of transnational support networks, remittance infrastructure, the political status of returnees and their eligibility for humanitarian assistance are all factored into their calculus. The decisions that emerge from these calculations could result in innovative survival strategies or resistance to repatriation even in the face of pressures exerted by host governments and international donors. In Afghanistan, for example, refugee movement has consolidated transnational communities that do not conform to the conventional typologies applied
by donors. This allows displaced households to ‘spread the risk’, creating organic coping strategies for satisfying basic needs, sourcing remittances and accumulating capital. Without recognising such agency among refugees and IDPs, there is a risk that institutional capacities may be outflanked by the speed and enthusiasm of refugee-led processes, meaning they cannot be managed in a comprehensive and sustainable way. Rather than a linear, one-time process, return can be staggered or cyclical, requiring donors to embed greater financial flexibility into their activities so they can exploit transient ‘windows of opportunity’.

**Comprehensive approaches**

More recent literature emphasises the need for conflict-sensitive analysis, granular understandings of local, trans-local and regional contexts, and a suite of complementary and concurrent activities, from strengthening social infrastructure to enhancing economic resilience and delivering relief for host communities. These holistic approaches not only involve physical or economic re-adjustment across the developmental and humanitarian spheres but also integrate wider issues of reconciliation and transitional justice. These interventions create a platform for strengthening civic trust, with the underlying argument being that inclusive participation and comprehensive buy-in can lead to superior outcomes conducive to long-term reintegration and social stability. Importantly, the literature suggests that participatory approaches should be integrated from the project planning and design stage, as well as during implementation, in order to avoid becoming tokenistic and top-down.

In spite of the challenges with the current reintegration frameworks and a dearth of credible ‘success stories’, promising indicators can be identified as potential building blocks, alongside various failures that need to be understood and learnt from. The literature emphasises the importance of distributing assistance holistically, including to host societies, on the basis these efforts help facilitate the inclusion of displaced populations, remediate economic resilience, accelerate poverty reduction efforts, and gradually shorten the life cycle and resource-consumption of humanitarian aid operations. Moreover, projects, like the World Bank’s concessional multi-year financing model, could support host communities alongside refugee populations, helping reduce social friction while also lending greater weight to external advocacy efforts. This is particularly salient in the case of the Rohingyas, given the combination of prevailing sentiment in Bangladesh to prevent local integration and the low possibility of a sustainable return to Myanmar in the near future. The literature does, however, outline issues deriving from the political incentives of recipient states, including the danger that they may be reluctant to distribute resources to refugees, and so the benefits may become concentrated on host societies. This therefore requires robust monitoring mechanisms to track how investments help specific target groups.

There have been participatory projects that have sought to adopt best practice from the development space by facilitating the domestic procurement of goods and services to spur local innovation and preserving the productive potential of displaced persons. The Kalobeyi camp housing Somali refugees in Kenya, for example, is now more affluent than satellite villages and has become an attractive economic hub. While there are contextual specificities that need to be considered, it indicates the potential of treating refugee camps as promising commercial ecosystems in their own right, rather than as humanitarian silos and financial burdens. The key distinction is that these interventions do not anticipate or advocate any final ‘return’, and so exercise greater latitude when cultivating economically viable communities that can gradually enmesh themselves in the societal fabric of host states. Nevertheless, it should be noted that assimilation into host societies is not necessarily an end point. Instead, this approach can often help equip refugees with the education, skills and resources for eventually returning to their countries of origin. Even where large-scale integration appears to have occurred, as in the case of Afghans in Iran and Kashmiri Pandits in Jammu, the communities have still expressed a desire to return home.
Factors underpinning success

While the factors framing displacement experiences are diverse, several feature prominently across the conceptual literature as well as case studies, indicating broad patterns that may be conducive to promising reintegration processes. These include the provision of security and livelihoods as well as access to information. For the latter, refugees may either send members of their family to scope out local conditions and assess the feasibility of eventual return, or this can be facilitated through fact-finding missions, preparatory excursions and ‘look-and-see’ visits. Even in cases of ‘voluntary’ return, international organisations and national authorities should brief prospective returnees on the situation in their communities of origin, explaining the available options and their likely consequences of each option, unlike the case with Rohingya repatriation in 1992. At the time, UNHCR signed MoUs with the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar and conducted a mass repatriation registration exercise, with the onus being on refugees to decline to register if they did not wish to return.

It is also important to consider urbanisation trends when designing programming geared towards reintegration. Rural refugees tend to gravitate towards cities and urban hubs on the assumption they can more readily access public infrastructure, protection and livelihood opportunities. Many are reduced to living in crowded slums and informal settlements, competing with destitute residents for jobs and creating strains on overstretched welfare services. This is compounded by a lack of documentation and relevant skills, insecure tenancies, limited contact networks, and government-imposed restrictions on rights to work. In Afghanistan, the absence of coordinated urban planning has led to the creation of ‘informal’ districts amounting to 80 percent of the city’s composition. This has increased the strain on community services and social infrastructure and Hazara IDPs have faced greater competition and disadvantages in urban commercial markets. External stakeholders can support national and municipal planning and investment to stabilise, regulate and gradually integrate illicit settlements such as peri-urban slums, in line with the sensitivities of host communities and the relevant labour demands.

Land access is another key factor, and as in all the selected case studies in this paper, has been a barrier to reintegration. It is often difficult for refugees and IDPs to furnish documentation confirming ownership of land that has been appropriated. In addition, the confiscation of property by state entities at both the national and municipal level can accelerate spatial segregation along ethnic and sectarian lines, as has been the case in Kashmir with the Pandit community and as is ongoing with the repurposing of Rohingya land in Rakhine State. The literature points to Burundi’s ‘villagization’ process as a success story, and the ‘Village Ruraiz Integres’ (VRI) programme implemented there in 2008 may provide lessons for the Tamil case, where IDPs have struggled to regain their land. While there were several flaws with how VRIs were implemented in Burundi, if a genuine participatory approach is adopted, and the intervention is nested within a holistic strategy of national development, peacebuilding and land planning, they could help formalise the reintegration of IDP settlements and expedite the evolution of camps into prosperous commercial hubs. However, this would require participation from the government of Sri Lanka as a key coordinator and implementer within a multi-stakeholder strategy.

Role of different stakeholders

Crucially, states are the only actors that can legitimately, and realistically, restore authority and the rule of law in their own territory over the longer term. The centrality of the state is highlighted in the case of the Rohingyas and the Tamils. Without the buy-in and political will of both host countries and countries of origin, interventions to facilitate integration from external stakeholders will likely flounder. Partnerships can also be enhanced with a range of actors from the initial stages of intervention, including civil society, the private sector and international financial institutions. Private
companies, for example, are deemed more efficient in mobilising capital, delivering quick impact projects and investing in economic revival than traditional donors and can complement the comparative strengths of development actors. Similarly, empowering municipal authorities and community-based organisations in sectoral responses helps effectively target programmes, encourage local ownership and internalise context specificities across every strand of the intervention. Further, categories of displaced people need to be disaggregated according to gender, socioeconomic background, preferences and interests so programmes can more accurately gauge their different interests, preferences, challenges and coping mechanisms.

Lessons

There is no panacea or silver bullet solution to the issue of protracted displacement. Data shortages, insufficient feedback loops, and methodological deficiencies, particularly in terms of tracking programme participants and quantifying the nature of ‘integration’, are widespread, leaving many studies reliant on anecdotal evidence and speculation. There is a lack of systematic monitoring and evaluation, making the verification of both assumptions and results difficult.

In addition, none of the potential ‘success stories’ are sufficient in isolation. Technocratic reforms such as vocational training and capacity building programmes, while a favourite deliverable for donors owing to their quantifiable outputs, have been questioned in the literature in terms of how far they can underpin sustainable reintegration. Other economically-focused interventions involving distributing money directly to displaced populations have encountered problems with transparency, oversight and accountability, especially in ‘fragile’ environments where extortion, corruption and criminality are rife or in cases of long-term aid dependency.

Wider questions of citizenship and renegotiating concepts of identity and the social contract appear necessary before any long-term solution can be entertained. It is also imperative that return programmes consider the nuances of conflict and political economy in targeted contexts and acquire a granular understanding of the local history, society and cultural circumstances that condition exile and return.

Recommendations:

**Diagnosing the problem**

- Responses need to evolve from a rigorous assessment of need and contextual analysis. This includes tracking and responding to the fluctuating needs, interests and dynamics of displacement situations;
- Disaggregate categories of displaced people according to gender, socioeconomic background, preferences and interests so programmes can more accurately gauge their interests, preferences, challenges and coping mechanisms;

**Adopt an inclusive approach from the outset at both the recipient and donor end**

- Ensure a participatory and consultative approach, particularly in the preliminary stages, and synchronise interventions with locally-led autonomous strategies where possible;
- Holistic, multi-agency interventions are critical and incorporate a spectrum of humanitarian, development, peacebuilding and transitional justice strategies;
- Undertake holistic capacity building, which includes the urban poor and pre-existing city residents, and provide economic initiatives to rural areas to diversify vocational opportunities to manage internal migration flows;

**Frame activities in line with contextual realities and utilise local resources**
Local and transnational dynamics need to be understood and leveraged where possible, whilst the use of regional organisations, development banks, municipal governments and unconventional agents (such as churches and traditional brokers) as sources of investment, political support and legitimacy should be encouraged;

Empower local agents with autonomy, discretion and dignity and factor spontaneous returns into formal reintegration programmes by installing reactive mechanisms to not only deliver support to sudden influxes but also manage the costs of locally led processes, particularly in terms of compensating host communities to negate any immediate tensions;

Supplement national and municipal urban planning and investment with international support to strengthen livelihood assistance packages and improve access to basic services, infrastructure and commercial markets;

Learn from experimental models already in operation, such as the use of vouchers and virtual currencies in Kenya, which help empower refugees and diminish aid dependency;

Any commercial schemes must be nested in broader social and political programming that responds to the issues and sensitivities relating to identity and citizenship;

**Managing expectations and improving evaluations**

Avoid projecting idealised visions of ‘home’ and raising untenable aspirations. Replace the envisaged ‘end point’ of the return cycle with a sophisticated understanding of what reintegration means;

Monitoring and evaluation need to be improved, particularly in terms of collating robust indicators, disaggregating data and sharing findings between stakeholders, and metrics should prioritise process rather than outcome
2. INTRODUCTION

The UN Human Rights Council’s (UNHRC) ‘Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons’ highlights that the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) do not disappear when a conflict ends or when they initially find safety. Rather, when they ‘return to their homes, settle elsewhere in the country or try to integrate locally’, they ‘face continuing problems, requiring support until they achieve a durable solution to their displacement’.¹

While this statement can also apply to cross-border displacement, research specifically focusing on people displaced across borders has found that successful or sustainable return processes require the reintegration of refugees, which ‘can be complicated by their protracted refugee experience and conditions in the country of origin’.²

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) equates reintegration with ‘the achievement of a sustainable return’ for refugees and defines it as ‘a process that should result in the disappearance of differences in legal rights and duties between returnees and their compatriots and the equal access of returnees to services, productive assets and opportunities’.³ In spite of the challenges, voluntary repatriation/return is seen as one of the durable solutions to protracted refugee situations and is the ‘preferred’ solution of the international community, as opposed to resettlement and local integration.⁴

Much of the research undertaken in this field has focused on Africa, with some work done on the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Balkans and Central America. This study therefore examines displacement and reintegration of minority communities into majority populations through the lens of four case studies from South Asia and its periphery, a region that has not received the same level of attention in the existing literature on these issues.

The study provides a landscape of evidence from available literature that examines the link between displaced communities and the key factors leading to their reintegration or the barriers that prevent or disrupt these processes. This includes a mapping of salient themes, lessons and gaps from across a broad range of contexts. The focus is on minority integration into majority populations but also includes programmes that have facilitated successful reintegration in other displacement scenarios. The ensuing analysis examines the experiences of different categories of displaced populations, including IDPs and refugees. Further, the analysis identifies the differences between cases that feature minority-majority dynamics and those that do not, including cases where displaced communities are reintegrated into areas in which they may not have been minorities (in spite of being minorities at a national level), such as Tamils in Sri Lanka’s Northern Province. The paper also explores examples of agency that displaced communities can exhibit and the impact this has on reintegration. The goal of this study is to identify conditions that may either enable or disrupt these processes and to identify important factors required for successful reintegration.

The four case studies – the Hazaras in Afghanistan, the Rohingyas in Myanmar, the Kashmiri Pandits in India and the Tamils in Sri Lanka – have been explored in order to test these factors.

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2.1 HAZARAS

The Hazara population in Afghanistan have historically suffered discrimination and marginalisation including during Afghanistan’s Communist government from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. It experienced some of the worst atrocities under the Taliban regime owing to their ethnicity and Shia faith. In particular, in many parts of Bamiyan Province, in Central Afghanistan, Hazara populations experienced murder, disappearance, imprisonment, torture and the burning and looting of houses. This prompted several instances of mass migration, and a proportion of inhabitants moved to other parts of the country or migrated abroad. Following the defeat of the Taliban and the implementation of the new constitution in 2004, the Hazaras were given equal rights as well as representation in government. Nevertheless, some discrimination continues. The legacy of the community as being confined to the lower rungs of society has been difficult to shed, and there are concerns that Hazaras are often appointed to symbolic positions with little authority and subjected to discrimination in hiring and work assignments. There are also concerns that the Shia population is increasingly at risk from armed groups, such as ISIS. This case study will enable the study of a community that has been able to re integrate to a certain extent, not only at a provincial level but also at a national level. Moreover, political actors and indeed Hazara mujahideen groups are examples of the community’s agency, facilitating an analysis of their role in the reintegration process as well as in affecting the socioeconomic and political contexts surrounding their displacement and return.

2.2 ROHINGYAS

The Rohingyas from Myanmar’s Rakhine State have experienced severe discrimination owing to state policies for nearly half a century, including statelessness, extreme poverty, segregation and restrictions on freedom of movement. This has resulted in steady displacement over the years and the creation of small Rohingya communities across Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and parts of the Middle East. Since mid-2017, there has been a spike in violence because of clashes between a group known as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and the Myanmar Army. This was followed by a military campaign that targeted the Rohingya community and has led to their wholesale displacement from Myanmar to neighbouring countries, in particular to Cox’s Bazaar in Bangladesh. As of May 2018, the UN’s Central Emergency Response Fund had allocated $19 million to support urgent relief efforts, while the humanitarian response in Cox’s Bazaar is being coordinated by the Inter-Sector Coordination Group (ISCG) which is led by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The Myanmar and Bangladesh governments signed a repatriation agreement in November 2017; however, there has been no credible assessment to determine that the environment into which the displaced might return is any more secure than when they were forced to flee. This case study will provide insight into a recent crisis, and although it may be hard to document lessons for reintegration from the current cycle, it will highlight an array of factors that have caused displacement in recent years as well as in past instances of mass displacement. Moreover, it will enable an assessment, albeit partial, of policies implemented in response to the crisis in Bangladesh.

as well as the efforts undertaken to facilitate either repatriation and reintegration into Myanmar or partial integration in Bangladesh.

### 2.3 Kashmiri Pandits

The Kashmiri Pandits experienced a mass exodus from the Kashmir Valley in India’s Jammu and Kashmir state in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of being targeted by insurgent groups seeking independence from India. A large portion of the community remains in a protracted displacement situation, with estimates indicating that of the several hundred thousand Pandits previously residing in the Valley, only about 3,000 remained as of 2016. Plans to facilitate return have occasionally been discussed by various governments; however, none have succeeded owing to difficulties with employment prospects for returning Pandits, land rights, as well as entrenched alienation between large segments of Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits. Moreover, while the insurgency is no longer as violent as it was in the past, it continues to simmer, creating uncertainty about the prospects of reintegration following return. The idea in this paper is to highlight potential steps that can be taken given the political and security environment in the region and apply lessons from the broader literature and examine it in the context of the Kashmiri Pandit case.

### 2.4 Tamils

The Tamil community in Sri Lanka, largely concentrated in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, experienced severe excesses during the Sri Lankan Civil War between 1983 and 2009. Sri Lankan military operations against the militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) group contributed to large-scale casualties and displacement among the Tamil population. Operations often involved indiscriminate violence, exacerbated by the use of civilians as human shields by the LTTE, and forced IDPs to be displaced repeatedly. There has been nearly no accountability for the numerous violations that occurred during this period, in spite of short-lived optimism following the election of the new government in 2015 and calls by the UN to establish an independent international investigation. Nevertheless, while several thousand IDPs continue to live in camps, some Tamils have returned to their homes. However, the continued militarization of northern and eastern Sri Lanka has prevented a return to normalcy. This case study will facilitate the study of minority-majority dynamics in reintegration not only at the national level, where the Tamil population constitutes about 15% of the population, but also at the provincial level, where Tamils are the overwhelming majority in Northern Province and a plurality of the population in Eastern Province (as per the 2012 census). Moreover, the presence of Tamil political parties in the national parliament as well as in provincial councils demonstrates Tamil agency, allowing for an examination of its impact on the prospects of IDP return and reintegration.

The range of case studies enable a more complete understanding of the factors that enable or deter reintegration, in particular factors associated with the conflict itself as well as socioeconomic conditions and policies in both the place of origin and the place of displacement. They also enable an examination of different types of integration or reintegration including different national government, local government, international donors, and civil society approaches.

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3. RESEARCH METHODS

RUSI’s approach involved i) the identification of search terms and criteria for inclusion and exclusion; ii) the identification of sources; iii) the discovery of material relating to conceptual and empirical issues related to reintegration; iv) the analysis of conceptual and empirical issues related to reintegration, with specific reference to four case studies v) and the analysis of case studies in order to produce this report and accompanying slide deck.

RUSI’s experts on conflict, peacebuilding, migration, displacement and reintegration were consulted to help identify useful sources, as was the Institute’s CILIP-trained head of library services. These included JSTOR; Google Scholar; Taylor and Francis; Sage; MIT Press; Cambridge Press; Oxford Press; Wiley; Science Direct; Nexis Global News and Business Service; Factiva; Scopus; BBC Monitoring; the British Library catalogues (including the ETHOS catalogue of doctoral theses), as well as the library catalogues of Senate House and SOAS; documents and reports from international organisations such as the UN and affiliated organs (IOM, UNHCR and UNDP); NGO reports by ICRC, Oxfam, Saferworld and International Crisis Group; journalistic articles from Reuters Investigates; and reports from UK and foreign government departments and assorted agencies.

Case study and wider conceptual and empirical content were gathered simultaneously. RUSI adopted a comprehensive set of eligibility parameters, including for example, grey literature alongside peer-reviewed academic content. Incorporating low quality evidence has not only helped identify important findings across the literature but provide an auxiliary benefit in mapping the research landscape in terms of, for example, themes, geographies and methods. While the chosen string searches specifically reference South Asia and the ethnic/demographic qualities of the chosen case studies, RUSI did not proscribe other geographic experiences that were captured, enabling the inclusion of lessons drawn from a range of different contexts.

There are, inevitably, limitations as the search was only conducted in English. It is therefore possible that the search reflects an implicit western-centric bias. A cluster of string search terms were used across the specified catalogues, websites and databases, reflecting the empirical and conceptual scope of reintegration efforts.

A second phase of snowballing was then conducted based on citations in articles identified during the initial systematic search protocol. These approaches produced a preliminary body of 257 documents. Given the breadth and nature of the available material, this bibliography was filtered to include the most relevant articles by reading abstracts and gauging the applicability of each to the project’s focus areas. In cases where abstracts were deemed insufficient to indicate applicability or if a document’s relevance was contested within the team, the entire document was read.

3.1 LITERATURE LANDSCAPE

Aggregated and quantified conclusions should be treated with caution, as the bibliography was not a comprehensive compilation of available material, both academic and grey, but a tranche of resources specifically focusing on this project’s central research questions. They are therefore subject to revision and re-interpretation. Nevertheless, broad trends can at least start to be identified. In terms of geographic dispersal, the evidence base tended to concentrate on East and Central Africa, with Burundi being a particularly well-analysed case study. Likewise, a clear majority was of medium quality, a relatively surprising finding given the volume of grey literature from NGOs, international organisations and news outlets included in the search parameters. However, a shortage in primary data has also emerged, with 40 percent of reviewed documents (literature reviews and conceptual articles) recycling a small set of empirics across different studies. This not only risks regurgitating
problematic findings, assumptions and interpretations as institutionalised knowledge but may leave policy-makers reliant on ahistorical or out-dated lenses for understanding how dynamic processes function in diverse places over different time periods. The nuances and contextual granularities of specific incidents may therefore be overlooked, creating unresponsive or antiquated programmes with sub-optimal outcomes.

3.2 STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

The inclusion criteria were relatively broad to help develop a comprehensive data-collection process, contributing to an up-to-date mapping of both academic and practitioner debates. Despite various methodological challenges, incorporating grey literature allowed a dynamic assessment of displacement issues: shortening feedback loops between policy-makers and the piloting of new ideas, and grounding the application of theory in relevant contexts and case studies. This feeds into a holistic appraisal of the reintegration space and facilitated more in-depth analyses of research questions germane to the client.

However, there were limitations that should be flagged. A smaller sub-set of the total literature initially catalogued was prioritised in accordance with the research questions agreed with DfID, and this therefore involved a subjective selection process that may have omitted relevant content. While previous literature reviews were integrated to ensure no themes or major ideas outside this set of documents were overlooked, the boundaries of discussion and analysis were framed, in part, by secondary – and possibly imperfect – source material.

4. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES WITH DURABLE SOLUTIONS

Before extracting effective practice and workable solutions, it is important to consider common conceptual problems threaded across the literature. These issues consistently resurface as impediments to both reintegration programming and policy-making, raising uncomfortable questions over current international approaches designed to ‘resolve’ displacement situations. Fundamentally, there appear to be contradictions in what practitioners are trying to achieve, what effectiveness looks like and who defines it, raising tensions between the preferences of intervention recipients, national governments (both host states and countries of origin) and external donors. Likewise, what interventions are deemed a ‘success’ clearly depends on how success is interpreted, the levels on which the case is analysed, and whether the evaluation or analysis adopts a long-term perspective.9

4.1 POLICY-MAKER PERSPECTIVES AND THEIR PROBLEMATIC ASSUMPTIONS

Global policy on refugees, displaced communities and reintegration has assumed various guises but is broadly framed by the three ‘durable solutions’ championed by UNHCR: voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement.10 While UN and humanitarian agencies argue there is “no

hierarchy” amongst these prescriptions, their prioritisation appears to be largely ephemeral, fluctuating over time depending on prevailing geopolitical imperatives. Resettlement, for instance, was the favoured strategy of nation states until the mid-1980s but is now critiqued by stakeholders as having limited strategic value, with third country relocation schemes benefiting only around one percent of recognised refugees globally. Today, international and national donors display a clear preference for the “home-coming model”, describing return as a vehicle for repairing the socioeconomic and political connections “binding communities.” In this context reintegration is often described as “the re-inclusion or re-incorporation of a person into a group or process, for example, of a migrant into the society of his or her country of origin or habitual residence”. By pre-facing interventions as restorative, donors, practitioners, and both host and return governments, typically try to rebuild former livelihoods for returnees on the presumption this best satisfies their futures.

However, the literature critiques such approaches on both a conceptual and programmatic basis. This needs to be understood given the central role “voluntary return” of both refugee and IDP populations occupies in the broader policy aspirations of “reintegration”.

Primarily, these preferences conflate return with the re-establishment of normality and assume a refugee’s original “home” is where she belongs, irrespective of her interests or aspirations. This logic relies on a “sedentary bias” that casts “one’s homeland as one’s normal and ideal habitat”, and infers beneficiaries of durable solutions “will no longer want or need to migrate, if all goes well” as they “belong to a particular location as if by nature”. The teleological supposition colouring these claims is problematic as it interprets return as a “finite event” with a fixed end-point; providing a reductive understanding of individual agency and overlooking the contribution of mobility to

sustainable livelihoods and reconstruction. Fresia concludes any focus on repatriation as the default solution limits the extent to which rights can be redressed because it remains “embedded in a sedentary view of just order which does not reflect the complex patterns of movement characteristic of ordinary people”. In reality, academic studies suggest return and reintegration are iterative processes with non-linear, staggered, sporadic or cyclical variants, and repatriation is likewise a longitudinal, multi-staged development rather than a “one-time move from place of asylum to home”. Mobility should therefore be viewed as an essential component of individual livelihoods and coping strategies, not a symptom of failed reintegration.

In this context, the prioritisation of “voluntary return” (AVVR) not only restricts the options available for IDPs and refugees, but has also been pilloried in the literature for often forfeiting the “voluntary” dimension of repatriation. Studies describe a proclivity among national and international stakeholders to sometimes coerce displaced people into participating in AVVR schemes, depending on the political context and urgency imposed on return. Examples arguably include UNHCR’s revocation of refugee status for Liberian populations in Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea, and the designation of Burundians expelled by Zaire as “voluntary returnees” in the 1990s. AVRR also suffers from various practical deficiencies, largely because few interventions tackle the structural problems underpinning displacement, and many are characterised by financial shortfalls and logistical inadequacies. The Belgian model, for instance, advocates a “repatriation trajectory” for asylum seekers across its various activities but has been critiqued in a report for undercutting the agency of returnees by sometimes offering parsimonious or insufficient reintegration packages. Repatriation efforts by UNHCR and other international donors have faced similar difficulties in previous crises, dispensing aid parcels too meagre to kick-start the economic self-sufficiency of refugees and therefore contributing to a cycle of dependency and humanitarian emergency.

Perhaps most problematically given the clear donor preference for return, research suggests those

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33 Ine Lietaert,(2017) Transnational knowledge in social work programs: Challenges and strategies within assisted voluntary return and reintegration support, Transnational Social Review, Volume 7, Issue 2.
eligible for and participating in voluntary repatriation are a tiny fraction of the total displaced population globally, and the process remains highly episodic, resource-intensive and inefficient.\(^{37}\)

Moreover, external stakeholders and recipient governments have a tendency to deliver “durable solutions” as “mutually exclusive and permanent” initiatives, siloing voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement as discrete options.\(^{38}\) This inflexibility not only fails to reflect the operative reality of programming but also provides a narrow point of reference for analysis and introspection.\(^{39}\) Harild et al, for example, argue local integration “does not necessarily work against the decision of refugees to repatriate in the longer term, as education, employment and training in the country of asylum may help equip refugees for eventually undertaking sustainable return”.\(^{40}\)

This “all or nothing” approach of policy-makers means they tend to interpret activities as outcomes rather than processes, overlooking the complex interplay between different interventions and abruptly terminating attention given to refugees at the point of return.\(^{41}\) Instead, the literature implies governments and international donors favoured long-term “care and maintenance” models that do little or nothing to promote self-reliance amongst refugees or foster positive relations between host and displaced populations.\(^{42}\) Crisp goes as far as accusing UNHCR, NGOs and governmental agencies as previously having a “vested interest” in perpetuating this relief framework, which “entailed the establishment of large, highly visible and internationally funded camps, administered separately from the surrounding area and population”.\(^{43}\) Other reports allude to broader risks such models face in terms of opportunity costs if they neglect to invest in the socioeconomic potential of displaced people or develop a culture of dependency on external aid flows.\(^{44}\) Examples include refugees in Sudan, operating as rational agents, rejecting free UNHCR repatriation assistance and remaining suspended in refugee settlements to ensure ongoing access to education for their children and allow for healthcare and other basic needs to be met.\(^{45}\) Subsequent shifts in UNHCR’s approach to ‘self-reliance’ have been applauded, especially as they delineate between responses to ‘emergencies’ and ‘chronic displacement’.\(^{46}\) However, Milner and Loescher caution that international stakeholders should remain cognisant of the negative perceptions some host states in the global South have towards notions of self-reliance, particularly its propensity to become a “back door to local integration”.\(^{47}\)


\(^{40}\) Ibid.


\(^{43}\) Ibid.


Problems associated with state-centrism are likewise becoming clear. While policy-based analyses usually emphasise the importance of government obligations in resolving forced displacement, the wider literature has gradually recognised the limitations of country-based responses when such problems accrue transnational dimensions. Cross-border affiliations are usually overlooked on the assumption that refugees’ strongest ties are to their country of origin rather than the networks and bonds they can develop in host communities or the wider diaspora.\textsuperscript{48} Focusing too heavily at the national level also invariably tends to situate agency with, and attention on, national authorities, leaving local government - including municipalities and other frontline institutions - excluded from capacity building schemes, donor sponsorship and mapping exercises.\textsuperscript{49} Sub-national disparities in economic opportunity, conflict, identity-based violence, discrimination, land disputes, de-population and spatial segregation may similarly be obscured if the state is levied as the basic unit of analysis. Crucially, various case studies highlight the propensity of states to instrumentalise displacement as a political issue and distort both the scope and underlying premise of interventions. In Central America, for instance, the durable solutions framework was arguably leveraged by various stakeholders, including “States of Origin keen to attract aid money; regional governments concerned with stability and development in the Americas, and international agencies and NGOs thirsty for a success story to offset criticism of deeply flawed operations in the Balkans, East Africa and the Great Lakes region”.\textsuperscript{50} This involved a narrowing of the eligibility criteria so that only an estimated 10 percent of displaced victims were included in either national or international interventions.\textsuperscript{51} Whereas UNHCR advocated all Guatemalans fleeing conflict should be recognised as refugees \textit{prima facie}, 1.8 percent of asylum applications filed in the US between 1983 and 1990 were approved, and only 45,000 of a total 200,000 were accepted in Mexico.\textsuperscript{52} As Bradley summaries: “UNHCR itself acknowledges that although the CIREFCA process was mandated to support both refugees and IDPs, CIREFCA\textsuperscript{53} projects principally targeted refugees and thus touched only the ‘tip of the iceberg’”.\textsuperscript{54} Recent case studies draw analogous conclusions, arguing interventions prioritising state interests “simply have not worked”, at least in part because they ignore the preferences and opinions of displaced individuals themselves.\textsuperscript{55}

The dimension of time is also neglected under these conventions, casting the concept of ‘home’ in ahistorical terms that often create a disjuncture between notions of return and contextual fluidity.\textsuperscript{56} Violence tends to precipitate and accelerate change, contributing to a permanently altered socio-political landscape removed from the memories and experiences of those displaced. Destroyed or appropriated property, de-population, societal re-configurations and ethnic homogenisation, militarised identities and enfeebled governmental capacities are all well-attested symptoms of conflict, generating new ecosystems that are generally unsuitable for prospective returnees.\textsuperscript{57}


\textsuperscript{49} UN (2011) Durable Solutions: Follow-up to the Secretary General’s 2009 Report on Peacebuilding.

\textsuperscript{50} Megan Bradley (2011) ‘Unlocking Protracted Displacement: Central America’s Success Story Reconsidered’.

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{53} The International Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) process.


Modelling repatriation as the recovery of some idealised version of home\textsuperscript{58} may therefore stoke unrealistic expectations from participants, frustrating perceptions that are “at least as important, if not more, than objective quantifiable provision figures”\textsuperscript{59}. Displacement is, in itself, transformative.\textsuperscript{60} While the interests, logics and dimensions of dislocated populations evolve over time there is little effort to control for the evolution of protracted situations. A recent Oxfam report describes how IDPs in Chad have become increasingly aware of their civic, economic and human rights after interacting with host populations and humanitarian aid workers, precipitating new expectations that need to be negotiated.\textsuperscript{61} As a result, inflexible interventions may be left focusing on out-dated objectives or issues that no longer align with the aspirations of recipients, despite the widespread recognition that refugees spend an average of 17 years in exile.\textsuperscript{62} Likewise, the social, economic and demographic fabric of host communities is liable to change over time, with profound implications at a local, national and regional level. Unfortunately, studies suggest these shifts are rarely factored into the orthodox templates of ‘durable solutions’ because stakeholders continue to conceptualise in static terms.\textsuperscript{63}

Importantly, an inadequate appreciation of time affects the assessment and evaluation of interventions, leaving practitioners to recast metrics used in emergency relief packages without any modification to factor in the wider structural reforms necessary for sustainable reintegration. This creates superficial benchmarks that cast, for example, the reconstruction of houses as analogous to building a “home”,\textsuperscript{64} a deleterious conflation that assumes the act of return will automatically “restore the destroyed relations of trust” IDPs and refugees had with their communities of origin.\textsuperscript{65} Programmes therefore risk focusing on material outputs – the quantity of shelters built or infrastructure restored– at the expense of longer-term, resource-intensive efforts to foster social reconciliation, rolling out temporary stop-gaps rather than any genuine resolution to the underlying causes of displacement. Ensor describes this logic as the “tyranny of the urgent”: negative incentive structures surface in emergency contexts where “immediate survival needs are prioritised over targeted solutions more conducive to long term sustainability”.\textsuperscript{66}

The cessation of conflict is likewise adopted as an indicator for successful interventions even though peace agreements do not necessarily end violence or resolve its legacies, particularly at the local level. Disarmament initiatives, for example, are often superficial and may even entrench instability, grievances, and perceptions of victor’s justice - especially where countries lack viable institutions and


\textsuperscript{64} Nassim Majidi (2010) Home sweet home! Repatriation, reintegration and land allocation in Afghanistan, Remmm.


a professional security apparatus - leaving returnees exposed to the same adverse factors that precipitated their original flight. There are rarely any quick-fix options: sustainable post-conflict repatriation is inevitably contingent on broader state-building processes that require inter-generational buy-in. Rapid impact and expedited stabilisation packages – such as replacing lost documentation, allocating emergency accommodation and delivering capacity building schemes – are of course important for addressing the immediate needs of displaced populations, but these should be nested within more strategic, longer-term and holistic responses. Humanitarian assistance, in isolation, is neither a panacea nor a substitute for sustained engagement: the evidence indicates any efforts to induce social reconciliation and encourage economic growth depend on political investment and decades-long funding commitments. This creates a problem as Lischer describes ‘conflict-induced displacement’ as falling “in the cracks between various scholarly and practical disciplines”. On an academic level, international relations focus on conflict and violence but “rarely connects with this theoretically with forced migration”, and latter usually prioritises the outcome of conflict rather than its underlying causes. Similar binaries are reflected in the realms of policy and programming: humanitarians often consider security issues “beyond their purview” and there is little dialogue between refugee experts and those stakeholders responsible for conflict prevention and management. Until the interaction and symbiosis connecting various typologies of violence and displacement crises are properly interrogated, interventions will likely remain reductive and fail to achieve their full potential.

Humanitarian and development agencies have also previously exhibited short attention spans and departed before longer-term strategies are completed. Many simply delegate responsibility to cash-strapped host states burdened with other priorities, leaving programmes to eventually expire. Omata argues the involvement of UNHCR often ceases without “really investigating the durability of the most ideal durable solution”. Donor fatigue became particularly stark in the 1990s across countries like Somalia, creating “dramatic and recurring shortfalls in refugee funding, and UNHCR still struggles to maintain minimum human rights standards decades after it declares emergencies as over”. The rigidity of such approaches sits uneasily with the need for flexible, experimental and politically risky interventions, making them not so much “undurable solutions as unstartable” unless there is a permissive local context to work in. Even where interventions have not displayed an unwavering focus on “return” they have been hampered by these constraints. Often touted as a resounding success, Tanzania’s supposed willingness to naturalise 220,000 Burundian refugees in 2010 is a clear example. By 2014 the process had stalled due to declining public confidence in the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) party and a weakening of President Jakaya Kikwete, leaving the

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71 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
prospect of integration politically unpalatable. Rather than expressing programmatic commitment and flexibility, UNHCR and the donor community adopted a “wait and see” approach, demonstrating the dependence of global interventions on conducive policy windows at the international and national level. Quick impact projects (QIPs) relating to health and education experienced similar difficulties in South Sudan, with Harild et al finding severe structural weaknesses stemming from an absence of recurrent funding, limited governmental capacities, and the unwillingness of national partners to absorb project costs. Simply put, without viable partners and amenable environmental conditions – rare qualities in contexts suffering from displacement crises – interventions consistently struggle to gain traction.

### 4.2 COMPREHENSIVE, MULTI-SECTORAL APPROACHES

“Comprehensive, multi-sectoral approaches” are defined by Ozerdem and Sofizada as integrated frameworks for “institutional collaboration” in post conflict situations, bringing together “humanitarian, transition and development approaches throughout the different stages of a reintegration process in a structured manner.” More recent studies emphasise a need for conflict-sensitive analysis, granular understandings of local, trans-local and regional contexts, and a suite of concurrent activities, from strengthening social infrastructure to enhancing economic resilience and delivering relief for host communities. Two mutually reinforcing strands are emphasised in this approach: the macro level, with a focus on security, transport, power, communication and building national capacities; and the micro level, addressing the specific constraints effecting specific refugee groups and individuals. Both need to operate in parallel from the start, accompanying simple locally oriented interventions with wider development efforts that consider “how the sequencing and prioritization of these programmes underpin national stability”.

These holistic approaches not only involve physical or economic re-adjustment across the developmental and humanitarian spheres, but also integrate broader issues of reconciliation and transitional justice. IDPs and refugees often suffer from multiple vulnerabilities and exist in a precarious limbo, indicating they have much to gain from the mechanics of peacebuilding and restorative justice. Notions of ‘just return’ are therefore salient features of transitional protocols; creating opportunities for restoring marginalised populations, like refugees, as “citizens with...”

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78 Ibid.
84 Ibid, p.33.
fundamental moral and legal prerogatives”, including the right to obtain, through formal or informal judicial mechanisms, restitution, compensation and accountability. By validating and empowering displaced persons as recognised claimants, returnees would be placed “back on an equal footing with non-displaced co-nationals”, at least nominally, by reinstalling “the normal relationship of rights and duties between the state and its returning citizens”. These interventions also create a platform for strengthening civic trust, enfrianchising returnees as stakeholders in ongoing state-building processes, and repairing frayed government-society bonds through criminal prosecutions, institution reform, truth-telling commissions and reconciliation initiatives.

The underlying argument of these studies is the instrumental value of inclusive participation, with Purkey arguing that comprehensive buy-in can lead to more effective interventions and “superior outcomes” conducive to long-term reintegration and social stability. While commensurate material reparations are often impossible to deliver, and expectations around compensation need to be realistic, transitional justice may at least start distributing benefits to victims. The act of engagement also has value in itself, allowing people to “manifest their inherent worth”, reconstruct their identities and exert ownership over post-conflict programming. Conversely, the absence of returnee and IDP input may render these mechanisms “entirely ineffective” and “undermine any efforts to promote reintegration, sustainable peace and reconciliation for all concerned”.

This debate remains largely theoretical and the literature offers little empirical evidence to test or support its claims, highlighting a research gap that needs to be explored. The few studies that are available include Kenya, where Iyodu concludes that the psychological impact of feeling heard cannot be overstated in the case of refugees; Liberia, which incorporated refugee and diaspora testimonies as a discrete witness category in its domestic truth and reconciliation process; and smaller experiments in Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone and Guatemala. The legal empowerment of ‘some’ displaced groups in Central America through human rights and vocational training similarly allowed otherwise fringe social actors, such as IDPs, opportunities to leverage peace processes for their own

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interests, specifically in relation to developmental strategies and institutional reforms. While the tangible dividends of these campaigns were usually meagre, the experience nevertheless enhanced their agency and provided outlets for pursuing largely overlooked preferences. However, Bradley cautions that reparation issues should not detract attention from wider obstacles to return and “inadvertently generate new tensions that further complicate return and reintegration processes”. When used effectively, financial restitution can entice minority groups among others to repatriate, but lessons learned from previous experiences suggest reparations will only have a positive contribution if it responds specifically to “local needs, concerns, conditions and constraints”.

Other risks with combining transitional justice and reintegration include the inflation of (potentially frustrated) expectations and the propensity of states to co-opt local participation as a “veneer of legitimacy”. Prevailing approaches tend to be top-down and externally imposed by authorities that prioritise operational impediments such as distance rather than addressing the “fundamental questions of capacity, representation, legitimacy and empowerment”. Attempts to incorporate displaced voices may also become tokenistic if practitioners only seek engagement in implementing not planning and designing programmes.

When introducing the mechanics of transitional justice into fragile contexts, it is therefore incumbent on donors and governmental stakeholders to empower individuals and local communities as autonomous agents capable of navigating these processes independently. As McCallin argues, “knowledge is the beginning of participation, which is the beginning of ownership”, indicating the need to build the legal literacy, education and awareness levels of displaced populations through, for example, public legal information campaigns, community legal education projects and community training. By doing so, these strategies can carve space for disadvantaged groups to advance their interests, mobilise efficiently and develop the capabilities to claim their rights in countries of origin.

### 4.3 DESIRES OF DISPLACED POPULATIONS AND PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES

Irrespective of the view on UNHCR’s durable solutions, many commentators share the presumption that ‘return’ is, and should be, the aspiration and envisaged end-point for displaced populations. This seemingly ignores the perspectives, preferences and lived realities of those ‘beneficiaries’ such programmes are trying to empower. In contrast, new critical scholarship in refugee studies highlights the limitations of conventional intervention typologies, asserting that the focus on repatriation has

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“failed to solve the problem of extended exile for the majority of the displaced people in the world”.  
While ‘return to past’ approaches are now starting to be questioned, the experiences and future prospects of returnees remain under-examined, especially given the funding constraints and short time horizons generally defining donor programming. Bradley argues that in place of ‘turning back the clock’, land restitution and compensation schemes – popular features of reintegration efforts – must be “premised on consultation with the displaced regarding their own preferences and priorities and must take into account the claims and concerns of secondary occupants, who are often displaced persons themselves.” The evidence suggests a penchant for local integration from both IDPs and refugees, albeit driven by mixed motivations that need to be recognised and embedded into any future approaches.

'Durable solutions' tend to marginalise the agency of both IDPs and refugees, especially when they pursue organic, locally designed approaches that do not necessarily align with the normative preferences of international stakeholders. Under the rubric of ‘repatriation’, governments and humanitarian agencies may try to return and anchor the beneficiaries of their programmes in place, essentially casting displaced persons as passive recipients on the assumption they will either be satisfied with the dispensation granted by interventions, or are content to wait in limbo until a ‘durable solution’ can be delivered. This precludes any consideration of further internal or cross-border movement regardless of the many functions mobility serves including economic engagement, remittance generation, transnational networking, protection and experimental return.

Displaced populations are generally neither static nor immobile but operate as purposive, rational actors. Given the limited space granted for autonomous decision-making, many refugees and IDPs develop improvised coping mechanisms that help maximise family well-being, increase access to livelihoods and services, and expedite alternative strategies outside the formal, heavily bureaucratised and often laborious state-led remedies to displacement. These strategies typically draw on networks that predate displacement, indicating a complex circuit of transnational relations and social realities existing outside the interventions of humanitarian agencies. Refugee households, for example, may not depart together but send out the more vulnerable or politically exposed individuals first, or leave members behind to look after property and land. Many IDPs in Burundi continued to till their farmlands upcountry during the day and returned to displacement camps in the evening.

Refugee decision-making is therefore far more complex than traditional 'durable solution' models suggest. Comparisons between the conditions of exile and those in the country of origin, the availability of transnational support networks, remittance infrastructure, the political status of

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returnees and their eligibility for humanitarian assistance are all factored into their calculus.\textsuperscript{116} This could result in innovative survival strategies or resistance to repatriation in despite of the pressures exerted by host governments and international donors.\textsuperscript{117} Drawing on the Burundian experience, an International Refugee Rights Initiatives (IRRI) report states that “pushing large-scale repatriation initiatives in the face of consistent opposition from the refugee population, and in the absence of viable and flexible alternatives, is not just misjudged but ineffective”.\textsuperscript{118} Studies do highlight exceptions where this pressure has seemingly induced return, for example the locally-led repatriation of 14,000 Somali returnees from Kenya between 2002 and 2003, who were prompted more by their concern about insecurity in refugee camps than by optimism about the conditions inside Somalia.\textsuperscript{119} But there are few indications that such processes led to sustainable reintegration.

Moreover, Afghanistan, Angola, Liberia and South Sudan all provide examples of ‘spontaneous return’ that preceded voluntary return schemes and were largely driven by the agency of displaced populations themselves.\textsuperscript{120} While approximately 600,000 refugees fled to neighbouring countries as a result of the Angolan civil war, for instance, around 80 percent had opted to return by 2007.\textsuperscript{121} As an organic process working outside of, and dwarfing, the formal, internationally funded repatriation scheme, returnees received no identification, health or humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{122} Rather than a linear, one-time process, return can therefore be staggered or cyclical, requiring donors to embed greater financial flexibility into their activities so they can exploit transient “windows of opportunity”.\textsuperscript{123} Without modifications to reflect the dynamism of return, there is a risk that institutional capacities may be outflanked by the “speed and enthusiasm” of refugee-led processes, meaning they cannot be managed in a comprehensive and sustainable way.\textsuperscript{124}

That said, refugee-led returns have not always been successful and the results varied depending on local conditions, forcing many participants into secondary displacement.\textsuperscript{125} Nevertheless, even the more critical literature concludes that the creativity displayed by local actors needs to be accommodated across policy responses, as many refugee or IDP-led strategies, such as the “twin tracking of integration and migration”, geographically dispersing family members, and remote or temporary return, can potentially reinforce the objectives of ‘durable solution’ programming.\textsuperscript{126}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) (2013) ‘From Refugee to Returnee to Asylum Seeker: Burundian Refugees Struggle to Find Protection in the Great Lakes Region. IRRI, p.10.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Niels Harild, Asger Christensen and Roger Zetter. (2015) Sustainable Refugee Return: Triggers, Constraints, and Lessons on Addressing the Development Challenges of Forced Displacement’.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ib\textsuperscript{id}.
\end{itemize}
Analysts suggest integrating participatory approaches more readily across project design and delivery.\textsuperscript{127} Research suggests bottom-up, inclusive methods can help cultivate trust and encourage dialogue in conflict-afflicted areas. The ‘Welcome Capacity Approach’ in South Sudan, for example, leverages participatory mapping and discussion exercises to build confidence and foster amicable relationships between stakeholders, generating dividends not only from the project’s quantifiable outputs but the wider communication process itself.\textsuperscript{128} This created opportunities for practitioners to navigate contentious issues like land rights, which were previously considered “too sensitive to address” and led to ad hoc, superficial and largely unsustainable responses.\textsuperscript{129} Weima, among others, also argues that greater attention should be paid to the “daily lives and practices of people in exile”\textsuperscript{130}.

However, these locally led strategies encounter tensions when they start to challenge the defined legal norms of humanitarian programming. Unregulated mobility “pushes at the boundaries and constraints placed on displaced people by host countries and humanitarian agencies, who perceive it as a denial of a ‘bona fide’ refugee identity”.\textsuperscript{131} As Zetter outlines, this independent agency fits uneasily with “notions of quasi-sedentary populations waiting for durable (i.e. permanent solutions)” and resists the obsolete, western-centric parameters of status and of expected behaviour still framing international interventions.\textsuperscript{132} Importantly, the literature has also avoided grappling with existential questions as to how or whether informal and illegal solutions, including undocumented movement, could be accommodated into mainstream intervention approaches.\textsuperscript{133} The reluctance of states to recognise and protect the rights of migrants arriving through clandestine means raises a wider query over how organic, locally-led initiatives to manage displacement can be integrated into existing refugee policies when they contradict the boundaries of what international stakeholders consider ‘acceptable conduct’.\textsuperscript{134} Granting refugees the right to settle wherever is simply not politically palatable or feasible for most countries of asylum, and many refugees would be at risk of early refoulement if UNHCR were to start advocating for such an approach.\textsuperscript{135} This tension remains unresolved in the literature and requires urgent consideration.

The distance between ‘durable solutions’ and the demands and desires of their apparent beneficiaries makes it important to therefore identify who decides ‘status’, who determines the strategy, and, crucially, whose interests are served by the anticipated objectives and outcomes.\textsuperscript{136}

### 4.4 Unpacking Recipient Categories

Stakeholders often have a tendency to lump displacement crises, causalities and victims together as an “indiscriminate multitude” when in reality “people displaced by conflict often have quite different

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid, p. 81.
\item \textsuperscript{131} Roger Zetter (2011) ‘Unlocking the protracted Displacement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: An Overview’, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Ibid, p.11.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Megan Bradley (2011) ’Unlocking Protracted Displacement: Central America’s Success Story Reconsidered’.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Roger Zetter (2011) ‘Unlocking the protracted Displacement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: An Overview’.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Anne Lindley and Anita Haslie (2011) ‘Unlocking Protracted Displacement’, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford.
\end{itemize}
motivations for flight”. The literature highlights the importance of disaggregating categories of displaced people to more accurately delineate their eclectic needs, preferences and expectations, alongside their different understandings of ‘success’ and ‘sustainability’. Displaced people cannot be treated en masse as a single monolithic cohort. Returnees, IDPs and refugees clearly constitute highly heterogeneous groups whose motivations and capacities diverge according to numerous factors, from lineage and education through to socioeconomic status and exposure to cash economies. Research similarly highlights several endogenous variants including age, gender and urban-rural livelihoods that must be controlled for. Given these discrepancies, Zetter and Omata both argue it is “unreasonable to anticipate the same adjustment and outcomes from the repatriation of a diversified population”. In reports disseminated by both UNHCR and the World Bank, analysts similarly conclude:

**different groups of returnees will face different constraints to reintegration depending on factors such as their length of stay in exile, challenges to reclaim property, access or lack thereof to social networks in the country of return, and differences between the educational systems accessed in exile and that in the country of return.**

**Youth**

Inter-generational issues typically stem from displaced youths’ aspirations for ‘modern’ – synonymous with ‘urban’ – lifestyles that are often considered incompatible with the traditional occupations, social relations and conservative cultural moorings of their countries of origin. This disjunction frequently interrupts reintegration efforts but is rarely incorporated into the programmatic logic of interventions despite the disproportionately high number of young refugees. In South Sudan, for example, an estimated 75 percent of returnees were under 18 years old and did not have the same emotional attachment to their nominal homeland as their parents. New arrivals also had to contend with unfamiliar, low-wage rural vocations, and faced substantial language barriers that disrupted recreational and educational opportunities, leaving many socially isolated and disenfranchised. Similarly, the 1993 cohort of Burundian refugees living in Tanzania faced additional challenges regarding social and economic reintegration when compared to older waves of people displaced in 1972: many were born in camps as second generation refugees, could not speak Kirundi and those that had access to education faced the prospect of a new curriculum in a different language when they returned to Burundi. Understanding how age influences the challenges and experience of ‘return’ is therefore essential for gauging what activities have ‘worked’ and what success looks like for different stakeholders.

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143 Ibid.
144 Ibid.
**Gender**

The literature included in this review similarly appears to be mostly gender blind.\(^{146}\) Findings from case studies suggest women generally have fewer socioeconomic opportunities and resources, lower status and influence in generally patriarchal milieus,\(^{147}\) and negotiate greater difficulties securing livelihoods, accessing housing and advocating for property restoration, land access and welfare.\(^{148}\) Transitioning across societal and normative boundaries seems to be particularly detrimental to female agency, with reintegration frequently becoming a vehicle for re-imposing conservative value systems.\(^{149}\) In Iran, Afghan refugees "now consider it a positive and important development that their daughters and wives were able to breathe more freely in the Iranian cultural environment", benefiting from girls’ schooling and freedom of movement.\(^{150}\) Many are therefore reticent to return and risk losing their mobility and opportunities for public participation.\(^{151}\)

Ruiz also highlights the malign impact forced migration often has on existing societal structures, which is liable to both sap women's “social capital at the community level, and decision-making power at the household level”.\(^{152}\) These dynamics are usually neglected in policy discourse, as are gender-sensitive nuances between different categories of displacement. Female IDPs, for instance, are particularly ill-prepared, disadvantaged and overlooked in the reintegration process, largely because there are few international mandates or modalities specifically addressing the needs of internally displaced populations. In contrast to refugees and returnees, these women rarely receive adequate health care, shelter, emergency assistance or inclusion in longer-term development schemes, exacerbating their existing vulnerabilities.\(^{153}\) These challenges need to be appreciated and integrated into interventions where possible, alongside distinct gender-oriented survival strategies such as the leveraging of horizontal networks by widows and divorcees to improve their social and economic prospects.\(^{154}\)

**Socioeconomic Differences**

There are also huge disparities in opportunities for capital accumulation and the wider socioeconomic position of displaced peoples, which are usually rooted in the circumstances of flight and camp


\(^{150}\) Ibid.


This poses a clear problem to propositions promoted by some humanitarian agencies that frame “repatriation as an unproblematic home-coming for all types of returnee.”

While poverty “both restrains and encourages return,” Liberian refugees with affluent demographic profiles on average re-assimilated far more easily in contrast to poorer households, which remained in Ghana for longer and were exposed to greater liabilities. In South Sudan, certain social groups more successfully reintegrated in comparison to others: semi-skilled returnees, for example, experienced acute difficulties adapting to their new living conditions. These variations are usually accentuated over time: protracted displacement may have a substantial impact on the depreciation of skills, the consolidation of new economic circuitries and support networks, and the dilution of emotional, familial and societal bonds between returnees and their countries of origin. However, the exact implications of protracted displacement on these variables remain disputed and often context-specific. Ruiz describes how a longer period in exile could increase the propensity of refugees to eventually return by providing time to consolidate their assets and build the necessary capital for funding social assimilation. In contrast, other studies imply those individuals or households staying longer in well-established host communities are less likely to voluntarily repatriate, particularly if it means potentially jeopardising their financial security or losing ‘location-specific assets’ that are not readily transferable. Any solution must therefore be sensitive to these nuances and avoid bundling displaced people together as a single homogenous bloc.

Incidents of protracted displacement are therefore often idiosyncratic, defined by context-specific dynamics, variables and stakeholders. However, many programmes implemented by international agencies are derivatives of generic solutions that fail to account for either the intricacies of their operational environments or the diverse interests of their recipients. According to Omata, elements of UNHCR’s repatriation programme of Liberians from Ghana were conducted as large-scale operations with “uniform assistance packages”, when in reality refugees required tailored interventions to mitigate the various vulnerabilities different segments of the target population were exposed to. Ensor’s investigation into South Sudanese repatriation exposes similar problems, claiming standardised approaches to reintegration were inadequate given the heterogeneity of the returnee population. Any return programme must instead not only consider the granularities of conflict and its political economy in targeted contexts but acquire a detailed understanding of the local history, society and cultural circumstances that condition exile and return.

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156 Ibid, p.279.
160 Ibid.
4.5 LESSONS AND QUALIFIED EXAMPLES

The practical and conceptual limitations of ‘durable solutions’ are myriad, and the importance of multi-sectoral, comprehensive solutions and participatory approaches raise serious challenges in the literature. As a result, there is a dearth of credible ‘success stories’. While promising indicators can be identified as potential building blocks, alongside failures that should be understood and learnt from, any lessons need to be understood with the appropriate degree of scepticism as a lack of systematic monitoring and evaluation makes the verification of both assumptions and results difficult. Data shortages, insufficient feedback loops, and methodological deficiencies, particularly in terms of tracking programme participants and quantifying the nature of ‘integration’, are widespread, leaving many studies reliant on anecdotal evidence and speculation. Progress has been made in certain respects, such as a Durable Solutions Indicator Library, but further improvement is necessary.

Researchers emphasise the importance of distributing assistance holistically, including to host societies, on the basis these efforts help facilitate the inclusion of displaced populations; remediate economic resilience; accelerate poverty reduction efforts; and gradually shorten both the life cycle and resource-consumption of humanitarian aid operations. Surging refugee populations typically strain already tight budgets, at least initially, fuelling resentment among locals. However, rather than trying to compensate these recipient communities directly, Lindley and Haslie argue, “a better approach would be to adopt wider development approaches targeting refugee-hosting areas”. Jacobsen identifies various examples such as Kibanda district in Uganda, where UNHCR distributed roughly 40% of its assistance to “the area surrounding the refugee settlement at Kiryandongo, in order to mitigate possible resentment by the local population”.

Similarly, in 2016, for example, the World Bank introduced a concessional multi-year financing model that has been described as a “game-changer”, allowing states to readily improve a “broad range of services, from public infrastructure to health and education”. These grants and loans support vulnerable host communities alongside IDP and refugee populations, helping reduce social friction and stimulate more holistic economic development. They also lend greater weight to external advocacy efforts. In exchange for securing a financial package worth roughly one billion dollars, the World Bank convinced the Jordanian government to allocate work permits to refugees, relax vocational restrictions and enabled them to launch home-based businesses.

However, the literature specifies issues deriving from the political incentives of recipient states. Many are reluctant to distribute grant resources to ‘foreigners’ such as refugees, even indirectly, and so the civil and

170 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
commercial benefits are usually concentrated on host societies. This is problematic as there has been a "near universal absence" of attention at the project-level to the outcomes that World Bank-supported activities may have had for IDPs and returnees in places like Bosnia Herzegovina. Without robust monitoring to track how investments help specific target groups, donors risk creating lax accountability regimes that conflate reintegration with broad-based poverty relief - exercises potentially overlooking the displaced populations they were intended for.

Wider developmental approaches also involve converting migrants into productive economic agents so they can positively engage with the local economy and be perceived as an asset instead of a liability. The task, at least in theory, is fairly straightforward: refugee participation in host labour markets needs to increase to both reduce their dependency on long-term aid provision and accelerate their transition from financial burden to net contributor. Nevertheless, programmatic methods for achieving these outcomes remain contested.

Analogies have been drawn with the economics of voluntary migration, where individuals move to environments where their skills can be leveraged more productively, yielding benefits for migrants, host communities and, through remittance flows, countries of origin. In contrast, there is a tendency for forcibly displaced people to “seek safety first and foremost”, usually leaving them stranded in commercially lagging borderlands with few job opportunities. Participatory approaches that entice and expedite further movement to areas with higher labour demands and more readily available livelihood opportunities may therefore be profitable to all stakeholders, assuming it is managed sensitively. There are various case study examples of positive impact emanating from the injection of human capital, such as the introduction of new skills and progressive attitudes by young returnees in South Sudan, galvanising economic and social development previously ‘halted for decades’. Burundian refugees clustered in Katumba, Mashano and Ulyankulu along Tanzania’s north-eastern periphery are not only self-reliant but contribute to the national economy by paying taxes to district authorities from the sale of various cash crops including tobacco. Flourishing new markets have similarly proliferated across deprived regions of Chad, driven primarily by an influx of refugee populations, and the ‘informal remittance industry’ anchored by refugee camps in Kenya have created “all kinds of spin-offs in the form of telephone companies, banks and courier services”. Importantly, reports cite the need to buttress these dividends by enhancing both the demand and supply sides of economic reintegration, supplementing job creation, livelihood diversification and quick impact projects with incentives to encourage private

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180 Ibid, p.95.


183 Ibid.


185 Ibid.


sector growth.\textsuperscript{399} While proponents like the World Bank concede there is rarely a ‘one size fits all’ instrument for promoting labour cohesion, best practice seems to involve a range of financial initiatives from accessible credit lines, risk-pooling mechanisms and matching grants through to lending start-up capital and funding insurance.\textsuperscript{391}

However, these prescriptions so far remain largely speculative and lack corroborating empirical data. Anecdotal evidence from various displacement episodes imply that economic synergies between host communities and refugees can provide an entry point for wider reintegration, but it is clear these activities are insufficient in isolation. Civic contributions from Burundian businesses helped foster good will and public receptivity in Tanzania to the idea of naturalisation, but the process ultimately ran afoul of shifting political currents in Dar es Salaam.\textsuperscript{392} Wider questions of citizenship and renegotiating social contracts and concepts of identity appear necessary before any long-term solution can be entertained.\textsuperscript{393} While the skills imported by younger, educated returnees undoubtedly enriched Juba’s local industries, any benefits were at least partially constrained by the structural dilapidation of South Sudan.\textsuperscript{394} There are also problems from an economic perspective: commercial environments are often fluid, high-paced and volatile, creating sudden shocks that reconfigure host labour markets and lead to sub-optimal outcomes as refugees struggle with a mismatch between their capabilities and available vocational opportunities.\textsuperscript{395} It is therefore important to avoid distorting recipient economies by managing demographic influxes and encouraging financial cohesion, with the caveat that these measures cannot unilaterally facilitate reintegration.

Other technocratic reforms have also been questioned by the literature in terms of how far they can actually underpin sustainable reintegration solutions. Vocational training and capacity building programmes, for instance, are a favourite deliverable for donors as they not only produce quantifiable outputs but also embody a linear, market-oriented logic that assumes increasing the skill-sets of returnees will lead to a greater demand for their labour. The World Bank, for example, cites the importance of pushing beyond social welfare provision to proactively invest in public services, technical assistance and job creation schemes.\textsuperscript{396} These assertions need to be qualified as many derive from policy reports without any methodological grounding or empirical evidence. The few evaluation studies that are available suggest overall employment conditions and socioeconomic status do generally increase for participants but this is not a silver-bullet and any outcomes are vulnerable to the litany of exogenous shocks characteristic of post-conflict contexts.\textsuperscript{397} Crucially, Omata’s longitudinal analysis of vocational training in Liberia concludes such programmes are more effective when coupled with the sequential provision of start-up capital and access to credit – components usually lacking in resource-strapped interventions.\textsuperscript{398}

Caveats have similarly been raised for using cash to build local capacities, rather than in-kind developmental assistance. Distributing money directly to displaced populations emerged as a possibly more efficient and flexible method for sustainable integration as it empowers recipients in

\textsuperscript{390} UN (2011) Durable Solutions: Follow-up to the Secretary General’s 2009 Report on Peacebuilding.
\textsuperscript{394} Marisa Ensor (2013) ‘Displaced Youth’s Role in Sustainable Return: Lessons from South Sudan’.
\textsuperscript{398} Ibid.
deciding how and where to settle. For example, UNHCR programmes in Cambodia, Afghanistan and Timor Leste were all lauded for allocating bursaries, encouraging local agency and allowing refugees to satisfy their own material needs as they “see fit”. However, many of these interventions encountered problems with transparency, oversight and accountability, especially in ‘fragile’ environments where extortion, corruption and criminality are rife or there is the spectre of long-term aid dependency. These perverse incentive structures also disrupt wider integration processes, as displaced households can exclusively rely on the largesse of external donors and therefore have little motivation to enmesh themselves in the national economy.

New models are now being piloted in areas like Kalobeyei in North Western Kenya, which are not only circulating an experimental voucher currency – “bamba chakula” – but also developing a novel “cash for shelter” initiative. While available accounts are mainly journalistic and not anchored by large sample sizes, anecdotally results appear promising. Within the confines of a single displacement camp, residents receive and spend these grants via text message in selected shops stocking both staple and luxury commodities. Aside from mitigating the dependency of refugee economies on donor funding, this model helps preserve some degree of individual autonomy. Instead of being “shuffled into preapproved housing”, new arrivals also acquire a choice in the design and commission of their accommodation using domestic building services paid for by UNHCR. Rather than creating an unsustainable reliance on in-kind assistance, these initiatives therefore inject cash into local markets, streamline construction, expand access to credit and help incubate refugee-owned businesses.

There are of course limitations: it is unclear whether this framework can be scaled up and the camp’s commercial industries remain hermetic and uncompetitive when compared to indigenous companies. Employment still largely revolves around low-paid work with international NGOs, and additional barriers including transport costs constrain any integration into Kenyan society more widely. Kalobeyei has also been a fixture in the county since 1992 and is more affluent than satellite villages, making the settlement an attractive economic hub. Such contextual specificities would be hard to replicate elsewhere. Nevertheless, it seems to address some of the fallout from Nairobi’s previous “abdication and containment policy” by treating refugee camps as promising commercial ecosystems in their own right, rather than a humanitarian silo and financial burden to be unloaded. UNHCR is developing a manual based on the Kalobeyei experience, emphasising the importance of dignity, autonomy and efficiency when trying to integrate displaced populations.

201 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
In many respects these participatory projects echo the recommendations from the World Bank and aid agencies by adopting best practice from the development space: facilitating the domestic procurement of goods and services to spur local innovation and preserving the productive potential of displaced persons.\footnote{MYarnell and A Thomas (2014) ‘Between A Rock and A Hard Place: Somali Refugees in Kenya’, Refugees International; UNHCR (2012) ‘The State of the World’s Refugees: In Search for Solidarity’; The Forced Displacement Crisis: A Joint Paper by Multilateral Development Banks’, a report written by a group of multilateral development banks, 2017.} The key distinction is they are not anticipating, or advocating, any final ‘return’, and so exercise greater latitude when cultivating economically viable communities that can gradually enmesh themselves in the societal fabric of host states.

However, the lessons and examples outlined in the literature still prioritise the practical delivery of ‘durable solutions’ by assessing interventions through a reductive economic lens, offering a bundle of technocratic reforms while overlooking cultural issues, social currents, identity politics, ideas of citizenship, belonging and other dynamics that influence integration processes in different ways.\footnote{Jeff Crisp (2010) Forced Displacement In Africa: Dimensions, Difficulties, And Policy Directions, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Volume 29, Issue 3.} While they may now be in a stronger position from a materialistic perspective, Somali refugees in Kenya, for instance, are embedded in a “complex mesh of socio-political relations with the Kenyan public, each other and Somali-Kenyans”, resulting in many not really seeing themselves as members of Kenyan society.\footnote{Anna Lindley (2011) ‘Between a Protracted and a Crisis Situation: Policy Responses to Somali Refugees in Kenya’, Refugee Survey Quarterly, p. 36.} As Lindley and Haslie conclude, “it is impossible to answer how much of this is due to local discrimination or Somali preference”, but the disconnect does highlight the limitations of commercially-focused interventions that simplify the agency of displaced people and assume they are only driven by economic considerations.\footnote{Anne Lindley and Anita Haslie (2011) ‘Unlocking Protracted Displacement’, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, p. 36.}

### 4.6 FACTORS UNDERPINNING SUCCESS

While the factors and variables framing displacement experiences are diverse, broad patterns can be discerned that are, at the very least, conducive to ‘successful’ or promising reintegration processes. These are explored in greater detail across the various case studies included in this report, but a selection can be harvested from the wider conceptual literature on reintegration.

#### Security, Livelihoods and Information

In their comprehensive analysis of ‘durable solutions’, Harild et al not only list security and the usual roster of economic incentives – “adequate services, housing and livelihood opportunities” - as ingredients encouraging sustainable return, but also highlight the importance of accessible information.\footnote{Niels Harild, Asger Christensen and Roger Zetter. (2015) Sustainable Refugee Return: Triggers, Constraints, and Lessons on Addressing the Development Challenges of Forced Displacement’, p. xi.} Fact-finding missions,\footnote{Ibid.} preparatory excursions and ‘look and see’ visits all inform refugee decision-making by helping them directly access the situation on the ground.\footnote{Oxfam (2018) Returning to Fragility: Exploring the Link between Conflict and Returnees in Afghanistan, Oxfam Research Report.} As previously mentioned, displaced households often disperse members as a coping mechanism to safeguard family welfare, which usually involves sending individuals back to their countries of origin.
to scope out local conditions, gauge their expectations and assess the feasibility of eventual return. 

This can help develop organic reintegration strategies, designed and owned by refugees themselves, although many continue to face significant barriers in a space dominated by state-centric interests. Collating the perspectives of irregular Salvadoran migrants living in the US, Bradley’s ethnographic work indicates a desire among many to repatriate to El Salvador, either temporarily or permanently. However, the risk of illicitly crossing borders without the necessary documentation “make short-term returns impossible”, especially as family members in country usually depend on remittance streams. Qualitative evidence from IOM research suggests migrants – both forced and economic – have an interest in returning to their countries of origin as long as they are able to maintain linkages and access to host states. Unfortunately, blocks on transnational migratory flows all too often impede these options. In Iran, for example, Afghan refugees are obliged to surrender their ‘amayesh’ (identity) cards in exchange for an exit visa, essentially making their journey a one-way trip.

While government preferences for border controls and strict migratory management are unlikely to change, especially in regions experiencing conflict, studies identify various opportunities for integrating regulated transnational transit in the preliminary stages of reintegration schemes. Where mobility cannot be facilitated, Oxfam argues that international organisations and national authorities should brief prospective returnees – both refugees and IDPs - on the situation in their communities of origin, explaining the available options and their likely consequences, and granting displaced people a free and informed choice. Cross-border networks can also be used as a conduit for information and intelligence. Similarly, interacting with the diaspora has value in its own right as Lindley argues, “one of the most constructive forms of transnational engagement by Somali refugees in Kenya might quite easily be facilitated – or at least not hindered by policymakers”. By readily distributing internal travel permits, “enthusiastic young camp residents” could “observe and participate” in Somali political meetings in Nairobi, strengthening bonds between refugees and their former (or theoretical) homeland, and encouraging a sense of national affiliation.

Remittances are central to these arrangements, particularly in the context of informal integration, as it can allow displaced populations to “access documents, pay bribes”, save capital and invest in independent commercial ventures. Contact networks can likewise facilitate social reintegration and access to local labour markets. Omata describes the utility of kinship and familial linkages – the most reliable source of assistance - in the initial phase of the transition process. These connections are essential for patrimonial environments like Afghanistan and Somalia, where economic

226 Ibid, p. 17.
227 Ibid, p.34.
arrangements still depend on patterns of patronage, corruption and nepotism that often define who is eligible for particular jobs or entry into professional industries.229

Land

Land access seems to be a particularly pernicious barrier to reintegration, with the appropriation of farmland becoming a problem for returnees in countries including Somalia230 and Afghanistan.233 Victims often lack documentation confirming ownership and face difficulties accessing both formal and informal judicial mechanisms for resolving claims.232 Importantly, the appropriation of property can also accelerate spatial segregation along ethnic and sectarian lines, as evident in Iraq233 and Bosnia Herzegovina,234 transforming the socio-political landscape of societies and blocking opportunities for secure, successful reintegration.235 As previously noted, these conditions often mean the ‘home’ of displaced populations no longer exists physically and figuratively. Land issues are ubiquitous across the South Asian case studies explored in this report, but the literature also packages Burundi’s ‘villagisation’ process as a ‘success story’ for peacebuilding, stabilisation and resolving the problem of displaced, landless populations.236 Such claims require a more detailed examination given the alleged promise of these methods.

Burundi

Between 2002 and 2010 Burundi reintegrated over 500,000 returnees, an ‘extraordinary achievement’ considering this total included 473,000 refugees pressured to leave camps in Tanzania such as the ‘1972 Cohort’ - an eclectic group of exiles bearing children that do not speak Kirundi or French.237 Given the scale and pace of repatriation, and pre-existing strains of population density, land scarcity and post-conflict social fragility, this could in some respects be considered a unique experience.238 However, there were shared complications with other countries like Sudan and Rwanda, specifically in relation to property disputes: farmland tilled by returnees was often untenable; and a lack of documentation and poorly maintained registries complicated ownership claims.239 To accommodate this influx, the national government in Gitega launched a series of

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233 Patricia Weiss Fagen (2011) ‘Refugees and IDPs after Conflict: Why They Do Not Go Home’.
238 Patricia Fagen Weiss (2011) ‘Refugees and IDPs After Conflict: Why They Do Not Go Home’.
‘villagisation’ schemes, including the ‘Village Rurauz Integres’ (VRI) programme in 2008, to help facilitate return, offering substitute settlements as hubs for distributing services and establishing viable livelihoods for participants.\textsuperscript{240} The scope of its objectives required an inter-agency framework involving UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP and FAO, alongside municipal stakeholders and local authorities, to exploit comparative advantages and align with Burundi’s long-term development goals.\textsuperscript{241} In keeping with international best practice, these projects also used a bottom up, inclusive approach to empower representatives of refugees and local communities.\textsuperscript{242}

However, many of these initial attempts were undermined by poor infrastructure and geographic isolation, with new villages built inaccessibly far from market towns. Later iterations such as the VRIs also struggled with resource shortages as a result of delayed donor funding, accentuating problems with land tenure, agricultural production and general “community disharmony”.\textsuperscript{243} While improvements to inter-agency partnerships were made compared to previous interventions in the region, which were characterised by a failure to navigate “different cultures, working methods, funding arrangements” and inadequate institutional linkages between humanitarian and development organisations, multilateral cooperation remains a challenge.\textsuperscript{244}

While there was a demand for seed money and start-up capital to accelerate economic diversification in rural areas, the modalities of VRI were similarly flawed as the cash grants distributed under UNDP’s flagship 3x6 Programme were used to satiate recipients’ basic needs rather than investing in sustainable livelihoods.\textsuperscript{245} The consultative aspects of these activities likewise broke down: host communities largely dismissed VRIs as transplanted refugee camps, creating barriers to long-term reintegration, and preferences of refugees themselves were often overlooked as many no longer had pastoral skills after protracted displacement in urban areas.\textsuperscript{246} A 2011 evaluation by UNHCR concluded, “the effective reintegration of the population remained precarious” in second-generation villages, and an estimated 95 percent suffered from food security.\textsuperscript{247} While dominant, donor-led narratives continue to blame inefficient aid coordination, research shows returnees deplored their marginalisation in a process of “top-down social engineering”, contributing to a greater sense of frustration and resentment.\textsuperscript{248}

Crucially, donors ignored lessons from the first tranche of ‘village models’ and analogous experiments such as Rwanda’s ‘Imidigudu strategy’,\textsuperscript{249} leading to a replication of mistakes and the launch of activities imbued with a sedimentary bias.\textsuperscript{250} Villagisation was therefore problematic in both

\textsuperscript{242} Greta Zeender and Barbara McCallin (2013) ‘Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons in Burundi Within Reach’.
\textsuperscript{244} Ibid, p.65.
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid.
conceptual and practical terms. While a 2009 review of the UNHCR mission in Burundi identified broad satisfaction with repatriation processes in rural areas, the durability of its outputs were considered extremely low. Studies cite the absence of available templates as a possible reason for these limitations, and suggest it may be emblematic of a wider gap in the literature.

There are more reassuring trends in relation to the reintegration of internally displaced populations. Grappling with over 800,000 IDPs, Burundi has managed to return an estimated 90 percent to their homes “under improved security conditions” between 1999 and 2005, although the definition and metrics for ‘improvement’ are generally unspecified. Judicial vehicles such as the National Commission for Lands and Other Properties (CNTB) were created to resolve the lack of vacant or productive land plots and seem to be making tentative progress. Zeender and McCallin suggest the clear preference expressed by Burundian IDPs for local integration rather than re-settlement or return to communities of origin could also make these populations perfect candidates for the VRI scheme, and so advocate extending the programme to “those who already see the benefits of living in villages”. Instead of creating new sites for voluntarily (or forcefully) repatriated refugees, it may be easier to impose the VRI model on existing IDP camps as many already have burgeoning local economies and connections with neighbouring communities. If a genuine participatory approach is adopted, and the intervention is nested within a holistic strategy of national development, peacebuilding and land planning, studies cautiously argue VRIIs could help formalise the de facto reintegration of IDP settlements and expedite the evolution of these camps into prosperous commercial hubs.

While these claims remain speculative, they nevertheless highlight the importance of addressing issues of land insecurity and suggest a modified process of villagisation may help accelerate reintegration in spaces where there are already promising indicators.

**Urbanisation**

Successful programmes also acknowledge and respond to urbanisation trends, a largely neglected dimension in the literature focusing on displacement. As described in this report, returnee and IDP situations tend to be fluid, with the interests and expectations of stakeholders fluctuating over time. These changes are particularly evident in the preferences of rural refugees, who usually gravitate towards cities and urban hubs in host countries on the assumption they can more readily access public infrastructure, protection and livelihood opportunities. In reality, many are reduced to living in crowded slums and informal settlements, competing with destitute local residents for jobs and creating strains on already overstretched welfare services. The lack of documentation and relevant skills, insecure tenancies, limited contact networks, and government-imposed restricts on rights to work raise additional entry barriers to the labour market. Nevertheless, various studies argue this is not a temporary phenomenon that will readily subside but may represent a permanent

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253 Ibid.
254 Ibid, p.96.
255 Ibid.
demographic shift.\textsuperscript{259} Even those households based in densely populated refugee camps experience de facto urbanisation, leading to a depreciation of agricultural skills or diminishing interest in returning to an ‘agro-pastoral’, largely subsistence-based lifestyle.\textsuperscript{260}

This therefore poses a significant problem for conflict-afflicted cities like Juba in South Sudan, which are not capable of absorbing a large influx of returnees.\textsuperscript{261} National and local authorities in similar contexts are usually reticent to lend assistance on the pretext it may entice further IDP and refugee flows or encourage permanent illegal settlement; leading to a lack of municipal investment and disrupting any disaster risk management or formal urban planning.\textsuperscript{262} International interventions are similarly restricted from engaging in this arena, either as a result of government proscriptions or the limited experience they can apply to unfamiliar settings.\textsuperscript{263} Humanitarian programming traditionally focuses on restoring rural livelihoods rather than helping integrate new city dwellers, requiring a shift to adequately reflect the changing disposition of contemporary displacement situations. Customary ‘seeds and tools’ packages, for instance, need to be replaced with, or supplemented by, alternative measures such as vocational training to build capacities in urban or peri-urban contexts.\textsuperscript{264}

More broadly, Weiss argues effective initiatives should levy ‘innovative strategies’ that respond to the needs of disparate groups with different life experiences and expectations coalescing under conditions often involving secondary displacement.\textsuperscript{265} This could include consolidating partnerships between CSOs and private sector interests; developing creative approach such as “ICT-enabled access to education... digital financial services... and crowdsourcing tools to mobilize resources”;\textsuperscript{266} investing in diverse, non-agricultural livelihoods in rural areas; and strengthening institutional arrangements in cities so they can become “poles of development” linking rural and urban spaces in post-conflict countries.\textsuperscript{267} However, there are scarce examples of ongoing projects in the literature. Many studies instead identify the problem but preface it in terms of recommendations rather than providing data on initiatives being delivered.

**Investing in Local Integration and Empowering Displaced Populations**

Those programmes bearing some promising results usually leverage the benefits of local integration, even as a platform for subsequent repatriation in the longer term. As already noted, assimilation into host societies is not necessary an exclusive process, and can often help equip refugees with the education, skills and resources for eventually returning to their countries of origin.\textsuperscript{268} Cambodian refugees in Thailand were often able to gradually accumulate enough capital, contacts and assets to expedite their reintegration into Cambodian society, purchasing new homes and developing


\textsuperscript{260} Marisa Ensor (2013) ‘Displaced Youth’s Role in Sustainable Return: Lessons from South Sudan’.

\textsuperscript{261} Marisa Ensor (2013) ‘Displaced Youth’s Role in Sustainable Return: Lessons from South Sudan’.


\textsuperscript{264} Marisa Ensor (2013) ‘Displaced Youth’s Role in Sustainable Return: Lessons from South Sudan’.

\textsuperscript{265} Patricia Fagen Weiss (2011) ‘Refugees and IDPs After Conflict: Why They Do Not Go Home’.


sustainable livelihoods on the back of commercially lucrative transnational networks. Ruiz et al’s mixed method analysis of Burundian refugee datasets similarly shows those displaced people who felt “part” of host societies were more positive about the idea of migration, including return, suggesting that policies encouraging integration into host countries may be beneficial even in the event of repatriation. As Harild et al summarise, this is because “where large scale integration appears to have occurred, the vast majority of refugees may still return home if the conditions are right even after decades in exile”. Despite the fluidity of individual preferences and the relatively small sample sizes the study relies on, it nevertheless alludes to the receptivity of many displaced populations to ‘return’ in some form. According to polling data, South Sudanese refugees in Sudan and Uganda, Afghans in Iran and various other groups all expressed some interest in the prospect of return, indicating those projects working to build the capabilities and socioeconomic strengths of refugee populations may contribute to an organic, locally led process of incremental return over time.

On this basis, research suggests piecemeal strategies such as investing in eligible subgroups, including very long-term refugees and qualified professionals, or gradual approaches to integration through identifying progressive, conditional pathways to fuller legal status, merit exploration. Modest examples are cited such as the easing of work permit requirements, which facilitate integration opportunities that are manageable in the short-term and cater to more durable solutions in the long term. Involving refugees in the administrative services and management of displacement camps is as another method of encouraging ownership, particularly with the establishment of municipal-style governance structures to streamline decision-making and devolve authority back to local beneficiaries.

A corollary is the importance of empowering displaced populations themselves reflecting the multiple strategies often employed by IDPs and returnees, as previously highlighted in this report. Various interventions have tried to accommodate a degree of agency, with at least some anecdotal success stories. In Uganda, for example, a Self-Reliance Strategy (SRS) for South Sudanese refugees has attempted to facilitate interim self-sufficiency without leading to permanent integration or citizenship. By enabling access to education, health and other governmental services, granting right-to-work permits, and encouraging displaced populations to trade and engage with host communities, SRS was assessed as a benefit for social cohesion, albeit using fairly broad metrics. Crucially, it did not consider local integration as the ‘end solution’ and so provided a useful platform

\[\text{Footnotes:}\]

269 Ibid.
for strengthening the position of refugees before they eventually repatriated back to South Sudan under their own volition.278

Long similarly argues that return-focused programmes are most impactful when they are combined with other strategies such as "continued transnational relocation" or "dual citizenship". 279 This aligns with broader operational lessons documented by Rohwerder’s literature review of protracted displacement situations, which suggests effective return involves demand driven community-based projects that "engage both returnees and stayees in participatory planning", and transformative programmes delivered at scale to have impact and durability. 280 Typically, these solutions benefit "whole communities". 281 NGO-backed interventions in Afghanistan during the 1990s incentivised a staggered repatriation process, encouraging refugee labourers to help repair irrigation systems, plant crops and rehabilitate public infrastructure in recipient villages, before the rest of their household returned. 282 Salaries from the reconstruction work not only provided start-up capital for participants to invest in longer-term livelihoods but also eased tensions with local residents and created a more stable footing for social reintegration. 283

Of course, research suggests there are numerous limitations with locally led initiatives, and practitioners should be cautious about over-romanticising the role of displaced voices in policy-making, irrespective of the authenticity they may lend to the process. Grassroot social support mechanisms used by Somali refugees in camps and urban neighbourhoods across Kenya, for example, may generate ethno-centric ‘bubbles’ that further segregate them from their host communities. Sharing homes and meals, paying alms and participating in rotating savings and credit associations or “ayuuto”, underpin an informal welfare system that helps secure refugee households but provides few incentives for integrating into wider Kenyan society. 284 This can encourage a cycle of endogenous dependency, where displaced people become reliant on the assistance of their peers and therefore forgo potentially more sustainable processes of social assimilation. Similarly, participatory action in Central America was successful in terms of “increasing security for refugees” and keeping their interests as relevant issues in national peace processes, but this was less practical as a method of achieving development in communities once they had returned. 285 Bradley argues that grassroot mobilisation failed in Guatemala, for instance, to prevent discrimination and impoverishment by the state, undercutting returnee’s abilities to advocate for greater justice and equality. 286 She also suggests that while undocumented migration and other informal coping strategies functioned as useful stopgaps, they left many unrecognised refugees “feeling trapped”, particularly when families became increasingly reliant on remittances. 287 In this sense, large scale, unregulated migration may be a condition for both “unlocking and inadvertently perpetuating protracted displacement”. 288

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282 Ibid.
283 Ibid.
286 Ibid.
4.7 ROLE OF DIFFERENT STAKEHOLDERS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SUCCESS

Given the complex factors determining ‘successful’ reintegration interventions, the role of various stakeholders need to be understood. As previously referenced in this report, the literature clearly emphasises the importance of comprehensive, multi-sectoral approaches. A spectrum of actors with different expertise and specialisms is therefore necessary for helping maximise comparative advantages and creating a more impactful intervention model, particularly given the spatial and time scales of these processes.

Drawing on numerous interviews with returnees and local practitioners, Oxfam’s account of post-conflict fragility in Chad concludes that states are the only actors that can realistically restore authority and the rule of law in their own territory over the longer term. Despite the dangers of state-centrism already flagged in this report, the duty of resolving protracted IDP situations similarly appears to lie with governments, which can establish security, accountability and the provision of public services by extending its presence in volatile areas and exercising its writ at a national and local level. This includes, for example, empowering judicial mechanisms to effectively adjudicate and enforce decisions over land disputes. Without the buy-in and political will of both host countries and countries of origin, any additional interventions to facilitate integration from external or subnational stakeholders will likely flounder. The lack of confidence in states’ capacities and inclination to protect their citizens is a perennial obstacle for donors and NGOs trying to encourage reintegration as they cannot substitute or reproduce the trust necessary for communities to commit themselves to these processes. In this context, the provision of physical and legal security by national agencies is not only a sovereign responsibility but also a precondition for any solutions having a long lasting effect.

However, states often do not always have the capacity to provide adequate support for repatriates and IDPs, and outside command economies or the public sector governments are rarely able to directly manufacture jobs and livelihoods. Research suggests these material gaps should instead be filled, where possible, by institutional assistance from the UN, humanitarian entities and a mix of other stakeholders. There has been a recent shift away from UN-centric orthodoxies in favour of more diverse multilateral interventions to help supplement the technical expertise of UNHCR and strengthen its often under-resourced programming. Coordination between development, rapid response and stabilisation agencies is essential given the scope of displacement and its underlying factors, but this synergy is frequently disrupted by inflexible funding mechanisms that segregate emergency relief from longer-term structural projects. NGOs are consequentially starved of cash and left little room to envisage or implement activities orientated around integrative processes. Many studies emphasise the difficulties of synchronising and combining projects sponsored by

290 Ibid.
293 Ibid.
297 Ibid.

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different donors, as they usually have distinct mechanics, priorities and objectives.\textsuperscript{298} UN analysis similarly suggests many transitional activities trying to facilitate the return of displaced populations are bereft of flexible funding streams; restricting the delivery of targeted services for the preliminary stages of reintegration schemes, weakening the intermediate support between rapid stabilisation projects and longer-term developmental programming.\textsuperscript{299}

To mitigate these concerns, the Office of the UN Secretary General (UNSG) suggests enhancing early partnerships with a range of actors from the initial stages of an intervention, from civil society through to private sector and international financial institutions.\textsuperscript{300} Private companies, for example, are deemed more efficient in mobilising capital, delivering quick impact projects and investing in economic revival than traditional donors, and can complement the comparative strengths of development actors like UNDP, the World Bank and the UN Peace-Building Fund.\textsuperscript{301} Empowering municipal authorities and community-based organisations to assume the lead for sectoral responses also helps effectively target programmes, encourage local ownership and internalise context specificities across every strand of the intervention. Likewise, supranational bodies like the African Development Bank, Asia Development Bank and the Council of Europe Development Bank have the assets necessary for funding long-term structural reforms such as "infrastructure reconstruction, economic recovery and the development of social safety nets".\textsuperscript{302} However, while Milner and Loescher echo the importance of including a “broader range of political, security and development actors both inside and outside the UN system”, they also flag a number of constraints such as UNHCR’s reassertion of its own “non-political mandate”.\textsuperscript{303} Its insistence that states should “play the catalytic role in leveraging solutions and engaging other actors” may precipitate opportunity costs or potentially expose these coalitions to greater levels of politicisation and co-optation if they are primarily led by national governments that are conditions by independent, often contradictory interests.\textsuperscript{304}

Regional entities such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) are also considered important, if underused, stakeholders, with studies suggesting they have a more nuanced understanding of the contextual sensitivities framing displacement crises in their ‘backyard’ that allow for amenable partnerships with the affected member-states.\textsuperscript{305} Nevertheless, these assertions need to be qualified as commentators rarely provide case study examples for their conclusions and tend to ignore the ethical implications of involving nominally impartial actors that may be impacted by regionalised problems.

Despite the rubric of cross-sectoral inclusivity, these ‘comprehensive’ models also continue to prioritise economic transformation rather than identity, citizenship and reconciliation. In this


\textsuperscript{299} UN (2011) Durable Solutions: Follow-up to the Secretary General’s 2009 Report on Peacebuilding.

\textsuperscript{300} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{302} UN (2011) Durable Solutions: Follow-up to the Secretary General’s 2009 Report on Peacebuilding.


context, research suggests that informal authority structures such as churches, schools and traditional local mediators also needs to be acknowledged, as they are usually more receptive to the survival strategies of displaced populations themselves.\textsuperscript{306} Kaun’s 2008 study, for example, suggests Angola’s spontaneous return flows in the 1990s were facilitated by grassroots intermediaries or ‘sobas’, who help re-distribute land to repatriates and resolved community level disputes.\textsuperscript{307} Churches and religious institutions provided similarly space for returnees and ‘stayees’ to socialise, share experiences and reconcile.\textsuperscript{308} These unofficial nodes lend a degree of soft power to strengthen local activities, and offer creative entry points for supporting reintegration through existing civic structures. Instead of saturating community mechanisms with cash, external agencies should learn about their roles, sensitivities and needs to “uncover small innovative ways to support them” and help reaffirm the value, dignity and autonomy of people themselves.\textsuperscript{309}

Unfortunately, there were few instances of genuinely multi-agency, comprehensive approaches referenced in the literature that have already been delivered, in part due to a lack of political investment. Sporadic episodes of multilateral coordination surfaced in countries like Afghanistan, but these were generally improvised and did not translate into any wider paradigmatic shifts in how reintegration is achieved.

**Central America**

Historical interventions in Central America may be a prominent exception to this lacklustre track record, exhibiting at least a nominal attempt to deliver a comprehensive, multi-tiered and inclusive intervention that appreciated the utility of both local and international agencies.\textsuperscript{310} Characterised by an “unprecedented degree” of engagement, funding and diplomatic commitment from the global North, initiatives such as the CIREFCA process (1984-1994) are therefore frequently referenced as archetypal success stories in the literature.\textsuperscript{311}

By exercising flexibility in how durable solutions were delivered, this multilateralism is widely applauded for helping ‘unlock’ a regional crisis that saw over three million Guatemalans, Salvadorans and Nicaraguans displaced.\textsuperscript{312} While return was undeniably still the preferred option, there was an increasing receptivity to local integration in host states, providing a choice for participants.\textsuperscript{313} At the international and regional level, the “pursuit of solutions was...characterised by cooperation, innovative...assistance programmes” and quick impact projects, and functioned malleably enough to engage with concurrent episodes of grassroots activism such as the formation of locally led solidarity networks.\textsuperscript{314} As a result, the CIREFCA helped return or locally integrate some 62,000 Nicaraguans, 27,000 Salvadorans and 45,000 Guatemalans, levying US$422.3 million to “backstop” its initiatives across the region.\textsuperscript{315}


\textsuperscript{308} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{309} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{310} Alongside other examples including The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees and the Dayton Accords.


\textsuperscript{312} Roger Zetter (2011) ‘Unlocking the protracted Displacement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: An Overview’.


\textsuperscript{314} Ibid, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{315} Ibid, p. 91.
Despite its fanfare in the literature and CIREFCA’s acceleration of regional peace agreements however, it is clear the resolution of the underlying causes and consequences framing protracted displacement was not particularly successful in the longer term.\textsuperscript{316} When measured against the relatively narrow technical standard of the Inter Agency Standing Committee’s Framework on Durable Solutions for IDPs, Bradley concludes, “it is clear that the efforts to unlock Central America’s protracted displacement crisis were far from an unblemished success”.\textsuperscript{317} Many programmes accentuated the social and economic disparities between returnees and local communities, or pushed participants into “rigid assistance packages” that almost exclusively focused on land acquisition rather than the idiosyncratic preferences of refugees.\textsuperscript{318} Restitution and re-allocation schemes similarly stalled, precipitating secondary displacement and turning repatriated refugees into IDPs.\textsuperscript{319}

The comprehensive multi-sectoral framework was also heavily politicised and bureaucratic, leading to many Central Americans to avoid the system altogether and rely on self-help strategies including “concealment, solidarity” and undocumented migration.\textsuperscript{320} Over two million were estimated to have illegally settled in Mexico, the US and Canada alone between 1974 and 1996.\textsuperscript{321} As Bradley qualifies that if only a small fraction of these irregular migratory streams had been recognised as refugees, the scale and complexity of regional programming would have ‘increased dramatically’ and likely distorted CIREFCA’s outcomes.\textsuperscript{322} Many IDPs in cities and urban centres were eventually re-categorised as ‘poor’ rather than ‘displaced’ revealing the vulnerabilities of status designations and the political expediency conditioning humanitarian discourses.\textsuperscript{323} As a result, many of those uprooted by war continued to consider themselves displaced long after the situation was officially declared ‘resolved’.\textsuperscript{324}

The malign legacies of these approaches continue to hamper the region’s recovery efforts and general development. Sixteen percent of El Salvador’s gross domestic product (GDP) was drawn from remittances in 2009 as local economies were drained of human capital by disproportionately high outflows of educated labour.\textsuperscript{325} As Averbuch and Kinosian document, many immigration experts “believe no amount of aid dollars alone would reduce the incentive for Central Americans to try to get to the United States” as “there are so many other factors that go into people’s decisions to leave”.\textsuperscript{326} While these findings are drawn from a small sample size, they allude to the deleterious realities of a CIREFCA model that failed to ameliorate the original drivers of conflict, from abusive state power to societal inequalities.\textsuperscript{327}

Despite its successes, reintegration efforts in Central America therefore remained relatively flawed. Multi-sector cooperation at international, regional and local levels produced some dividends but the neglect of displaced populations and host communities ultimately led to disappointing results.\textsuperscript{328} Critics argue that the targeted beneficiaries of interventions need to be placed at the centre of economic, social and governmental reforms, a repositioning not always achieved in post-conflict

\textsuperscript{318} Ibid, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{319} Megan Bradley (2011) ‘Unlocking Protracted Displacement: Central America’s Success Story Reconsidered’.
\textsuperscript{320} Ibid, p. 109.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{323} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{324} Megan Bradley (2011) ‘Unlocking Protracted Displacement: Central America’s Success Story Reconsidered’.
\textsuperscript{325} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{326} Maya Averbuch and Sarah Kinosian ‘Pay to Stay? Why US Aid to Central America has Not Eased the Flow of Migrants’, \textit{Foreign Policy}, December 2018.
\textsuperscript{327} Megan Bradley (2011) ‘Unlocking Protracted Displacement: Central America’s Success Story Reconsidered’.
Central America.\textsuperscript{329} The direct engagement of NGOs and human rights advocates throughout these activities is another important precondition for ensuring that regional cooperation mechanisms ostensibly intended to advance the wellbeing of refugee and IDPs are not co-opted by “anti-immigrant interests”.\textsuperscript{330}

This represents a problem for other interventions, as initiatives like CIREFCA were able to draw on ample reserves of financial and political support rarely attainable for practitioners today. Efforts to entice similar interest in displacement issues outside the Americas have repeatedly faltered, as the under-funded International Conferences on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I and II) indicate.\textsuperscript{331} But, even with this unprecedented level of investment from stakeholders in the global North, the comprehensive, multi-sectoral approaches leveraged in Central America failed to make a sustainable impact to regional reintegration.

It would therefore appear the importance of participatory methods that centralise the preferences and interests of displaced populations, and their host communities, cannot be overstated. As the literature shows, there has already been significant progress strengthening the macro-level development strategies. Importantly however, the other half of the equation - bottom-up, locally oriented micro-level approaches – remain a gap that needs to be addressed.

5. AFGHANISTAN AND THE HAZARAS

This case study explores return and reintegration processes in Afghanistan, with particular reference to local Hazara communities. The invasion by US-led coalition forces in 2001 is widely considered a “water-shed moment”,\textsuperscript{332} precipitating the return of approximately 5.2 million registered refugees over the next decade, the largest assisted repatriation process in history.\textsuperscript{333} This influx has strained an already over-burdened government and an exhausted population, with 76 percent of Afghan households surveyed by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) claiming they have been displaced twice, “once into exile and again back to Afghanistan”.\textsuperscript{334} The country is suffering from overlapping tensions that intersect and accentuate various land disputes, familial feuds and socio-economic grievances.\textsuperscript{335} Decades of conflict, from the Soviet invasion through to the fall and resurgence of the Taliban, have also securitised identities, strengthening parochial forms of affiliation along tribal, ethnic and kinship lines.\textsuperscript{336} As a result, the country has been at the front-end of programmes designed to support displaced populations, providing a unique context for assessing the effectiveness of interventions given their scale, multi-lateral disposition and extensive time frames. As a persecuted minority, the Hazara offer a useful lens for understanding these dynamics in more detail, and can help identify where progress is being made.

\textsuperscript{329} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{333} Afghanistan, Fact Sheet, UNHCR, July 2018.
Given the lack of research documenting the specific experience of the Hazara community, this case study threads an analysis of their reintegration through a wider appraisal of post-2001 programming in Afghanistan.

As a “physically distinctive” ethnic minority practicing a Shi’ite interpretation of Islam in a predominately Sunni populated country, the Hazara have experienced particular difficulties in an already fraught environment.\textsuperscript{337} Displacement, economic appropriation, political repression, and concurrent spontaneous and state-led pogroms beleaguered the community since the 16\textsuperscript{th} century,\textsuperscript{338} gradually concentrating survivors into relatively small territorial enclaves across Baghlan, Balkh, Daikundi, Ghazni, Herat, Maidan Wardak, Uruzgan, Hazarajat city and the western districts of Kabul.\textsuperscript{339} Between 1929 and 1970, Hazaras could not openly reveal their ethnic lineage when applying for citizenship,\textsuperscript{340} and these strictures only increased under a Pashtun-centric Taliban government in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{341} Human rights violations, forced conversions and extrajudicial killings were all relatively normalised,\textsuperscript{342} and the community was frequently subjected to food blockades,\textsuperscript{343} well-documented atrocities including the 1989 massacre in Maar-e Sharif\textsuperscript{344} and various episodes of ethnic cleansing in 1998\textsuperscript{345}, 2000 and 2002.\textsuperscript{346} In this unstable context thousands of Hazara fled to neighbouring districts or across Afghanistan’s borders into Iran and Pakistan, swelling a latent Afghan diaspora composed almost entirely of refugees.\textsuperscript{347}

### 5.1 Locally Led Reintegration Efforts

The collapse of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate in 2001 and the implementation of a new constitution in 2004 appeared to “bring a new era of hope” that the Hazara “could escape their historic persecution and rise to a level of equality with other ethnic groups”.\textsuperscript{348} It also created an opportunity for reintegrating displaced households, particularly as the community was granted equal rights and received delegates for Shia constituencies in both the Cabinet and national parliament.

Social and commercial arrangements at the municipal and national level in Afghanistan are still often defined by patterns of patronage, where kinship bonds, familial networks and clientelism mediate

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\textsuperscript{338} Frank Clements and Ludwig Adamec (2003) \textit{Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia}, ABC-CLIO.


\textsuperscript{341} Ibid.


economic access, job opportunities and entry into professional circuitries. The historical stigmatisation of Hazaras largely precluded their societal integration, at least in part because they did not have the largesse of a benevolent strongman or a viable political elite they could depend on. After their recognition in 2004 as a legitimate ethnic constituency, Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami Afghanistan, the predominant vehicle for Hazara political demands and aspirations, assumed “modest” influence in the Interim Administration (2001-2002) and provided a platform for high-fliers including Karim Khalili, future Vice President in Karzai’s administration, and Muhammad Mohaqiq, future second vice chief executive of the country under President Ghani.350

With new access and stronger networks, the community’s position has undoubtedly improved; facilitating the rise of corporative empires and media conglomerates such as Tolo, 351 and enabling the group to manage the discriminatory tendencies still prevalent in large parts of Afghanistan. Local innovation, commercial profits and appropriated state funding can be better leveraged to compensate for derelict infrastructure in neglected areas like Hazarajat, and private institutions including so-called “Hazara universities” help substitute for under-resourced public services.352

However, these dividends are limited, and local solutions struggle to attract adequate capital and generate isolative trends that further distort locally-led processes of social assimilation.353 In reality, minority rights under President Karzai arguably remained cosmetic, masking the financial dispensation enjoyed by more powerful ethnic constituencies354 and alluding to a wider problem with the notion of ‘Hazara revivalism’ in the context of reintegration.355 The Hazara are not a homogenous social bloc and suffer the same intra-communal problems of inequality and corruption as other social groups, only with a much narrower bandwidth given their history of marginalisation and economic exclusion. Political parties, for instance, were often seemingly co-opted as platforms for profligacy and personal rivalries.356 Stakeholders often competed over career opportunities rather empowering, or investing in, Hazara districts, and patronage remained mostly insulated within in a very exclusivist, family-based circuitry orbiting Kabul.357 Crucially this also entrenched the position of an oligopolistic elite, making it difficult for newcomers to enter the Hazara political scene.358

The community was therefore left bereft of clear leadership and political capital, meaning disadvantaged or fringe members, specifically IDPs or refugees, had very little purchasing power or mobility in the Afghan socioeconomic marketplace.359 Since their ‘emancipation’ in 2001, many of Hazara still lack the necessary social connections to reintegrate successfully or improve their social standing, and consequently become trapped in cycles of poverty or under-employment.

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355 Ibid.
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid.
359 Ibid.
As highlighted, migration often assumes trajectories that neither definitive nor linear but function as a "series of (recurring) multidirectional displacements". This is no different in the socio-cultural milieu of Afghanistan where refugee movement has consolidated "genuinely transnational communities" that do not necessarily conform to the conventional typologies applied by donors. This allows displaced households to spread the risk, creating organic coping strategies for satisfying basic needs, source remittances and accumulate capital for land, housing or commercial investment. The concept of a ‘finite’ transition or fixed destination – underpinning the preferred ‘durable solution’ - remains anathematic to the Afghan experience. The Hazara continue to exploit "circulatory territories" defined by socio-economic opportunities, security and supranational kinship networks, reflecting an innovative logic that preceded Afghanistan's many conflicts and features 'spontaneous return' as an integral component. Both registered and undocumented Hazara refugees and IDPs were able to tap these contacts and facilitate some form of reintegration, alluding to an independent, locally led societal system existing outside the prescriptive confines of donor funded interventions. These processes often gravitate towards urban hubs on the assumption economic infrastructure, public services and livelihood opportunities are disproportionately concentrated, and therefore more accessible, in cities and provincial towns. District 13 on the western outskirts of Kabul, for example, is a Hazara-dominated enclave accommodating residents from Ghazni, Bamiyan, Ghor, Uruzgan, Wardak and Daikundi displaced from conflict, drought and poverty. Many new arrivals are returnees from Iran, crossing the border and sharing accommodation with local relatives. The demographic composition of often illegally built neighbourhoods is extremely complex, with high turnover rates and an accumulated blend of different generations - bearing distinct preferences, interests and priorities. Given the fluidity and inherent dislocation underpinning such relationships, informal social protection mechanisms are therefore “on the whole” much weaker in urban settings while concurrent demand for welfare remains high. Kabul’s population expanded from 2 million in 2001 to 4.5 million in 2010 and is likely to reach 6 million by 2020. This is problematic as the absence of any coordinated urban planning or civic management has lead to a proliferation of illicit building-work, creating ‘informal’ districts that now

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361 Ibid p. 71.


367 Metcalfe, V et al (2012); Sanctuary in the City? Urban Displacement and Vulnerability in Kabul’.


amount to 80 percent of the city’s composition. These slums are characterised by a lack of service infrastructure, low quality housing and are over-saturated by an eclectic mix of urban poor, returnees and displaced persons.

As a result, the absorption capacity and strain on community services and social infrastructure in District 13, and Kabul more generally, have reached unsustainable levels. Hazara IDPs are particularly vulnerable as newly arriving Hazara from rural provinces face greater competition and acute disadvantages in urban commercial markets. Without suitable skills or access to capital, many risk becoming trapped in the grey economy relying on bonded or low-paid menial labour in construction or waste collection to survive. Similarly, despite, cities and larger service-economies generally facilitating greater social mobility, those in female-headed households continue to be sidelined into largely domesticated activities including sewing and begging. This disparity between vocational opportunities and the expectations of new arrivals feeds into increasingly volatile social stresses. Therefore, whilst displaced populations, including the Hazara, develop independent coping strategies that function as resilient stop-gaps, they do not necessarily translate into sustainable forms of reintegration and may disrupt longer-term integration efforts by precipitating unstable second order effects.

In Afghanistan, displacement is generally considered a “temporary phenomenon”; claims tinted by the deleterious presumption “that in time people will return to their rural areas of origin”. This has led to significant shortfalls in government investment and inflated social tensions as local claimants compete for scarce resources. Exceptions surface when actors can explo\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\. In Kabul’s District 7, for example, displaced Hazara arrivals allegedly leveraged contacts in the Ministry of Interior to secure new properties. Unfortunately, this influx aggravated relations with surrounding residents who cast the IDPs as illegal squatters occupying land designated for cemeteries and pasture, disrupting any attempt at sustainable social assimilation and increasing the likelihood of secondary displacement.

Any successful, locally led integration efforts by displaced Hazara communities are often derived more from time and momentum than local agency. For instance, displaced Hazaras in District 7 initially experienced abuse from state security forces as they lacked any land titles and building permits. This mistreatment was partially mitigated by paying bribes but the city police became increasingly reluctant to intervene as the area grew more densely populated and its inhabitants

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373 Ibid.


375 Ibid.


380 Ibid.

developed better connections.\textsuperscript{382} This implies an organic process of re-balancing as a neighbourhood absorbs new tenants, creating a new social equilibrium that stabilises over time and assumes its own independent momentum. While such arrangements may not necessarily ameliorate broader structural problems relating to inadequate investment, regulation and welfare, it does suggest a degree of integration is possible however reluctant local stakeholders may be.

\section*{5.2 STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS}

Wider legislative and policy developments have not yet translated into the robust safeguarding of individual rights, and national authorities lack the resources, and arguably the inclination, to defend their most vulnerable citizens.\textsuperscript{383} Afghanistan’s formal justice system is in a “catastrophic state of disrepair”,\textsuperscript{384} and its security apparatus, political elite and civic institutions are fragmented and often susceptible to corruption, leaving displaced populations susceptible to various abuses.\textsuperscript{385} These dynamics feed into a climate of unpredictability, condemned in the conceptual literature as detrimental to any reintegration process.

Insecurities persist from a mix of spoilers including a resurgent Taliban, Lashkar-e Jhangvi, Hizb-e Islami, and Islamic State in the Khoran (ISKP). UNAMA catalogued 25 incidents involving the abduction of 224 Hazara civilians in 2015, and further 82 a year later,\textsuperscript{386} consolidating a collective sense of grievance and encouraging the mobilisation of ‘self-defence’ ethnic militias.\textsuperscript{387} Hazaras are also victimised by other Afghan ethnic populations, with latent social tensions re-ignited by perceptions of the group as the main beneficiaries of political arrangements manufactured after the invasion in 2001.\textsuperscript{388} While this is not entirely a fallacy given the improvements experienced by some Hazara,\textsuperscript{389} it is misleading given the group’s low pre-2001 baseline, the non-exclusivity of post-Taliban commercial and political dividends and dearth of state funding in areas like Hazarajat.\textsuperscript{390} Imagined inequalities nevertheless continue to stoke resentment and contribute to the militarisation of ethnicity and the isolation of Hazara neighbourhoods. These challenges raise substantial barriers for

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{382} Ibid.
\bibitem{389} EASO Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan: Key Socioeconomic Indicators, State Protection and Mobility in Kabul City, Mazar-e Sharif and Herat City’.
\end{thebibliography}
Hazara integrative efforts, diminishing the agency and power of displaced actors as they try to implement independent local strategies for assimilating back into Afghan society.

5.3 NATIONAL PROGRAMMING

Given the scale of challenges facing refugees and IDPs, a significant proportion of Hazara returnees turn to national and international schemes for potentially more durable reintegration opportunities. While interventions occasionally show promise, their outcomes have been generally meagre so far.

Stakeholders including the Ministry of Return and Reintegration (MoRR) have engaged with these issues; launching a National IDP Policy process in 2012 that was interpreted by donors as an opportunity for developing Afghan-led strategies in conformity with international best practice.\(^{391}\) In reality, this appears to be largely cosmetic legislative change, functioning, at least in part, as signalling exercise to entice external funds. As argued by Metcalfe et al “one day they (MoRR) will categorise 100% of residents in one area as IDPs, the next they’ll say [the residents] are lying about their status and are criminals.”.\(^{392}\) Status is often politicised and arbitrarily applied by some Afghan authorities on the basis of ethnic, familial or social linkages, creating complex, highly subjective and inconsistent spaces to navigate.\(^{393}\) This is further complicated by the wish to install time limits on those identified as IDPs, in part due to MoRR's nascent funding streams.\(^{394}\) Lacking any unified political representation, Hazaras usually have few options or available contacts to safeguard their interests in a heavily contested policy arena.\(^{395}\)

The idea of holistic, multi-faceted activities prescribed as a necessity in the wider literature have been attempted under the auspices of the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), referenced as “one of the most successful” Afghan-led initiatives in this space, providing “community-based assistance to rural communities”.\(^{396}\) By allocating block grants to villages for local development packages designed and delivered by elected Community Development Councils (CDCs), interventions not only encouraged buy-in from, but ownership by, recipient populations, and specific provisions were made to include marginalised voices in the planning stages.\(^{397}\) Between 2003 and mid 2014 the NSP established 34,000 CDCs across 387 Afghan districts, including Hazara dominated areas, and sponsored nearly 86,000 projects from a funding pot of $1.53 billion.\(^{398}\)

Feedback from beneficiaries has been largely positive; the programme’s comprehensive approach helped mitigate tensions between host communities and returnees, contributing to general improvements across most developmental indicators. Likewise, an “overwhelming majority” of returning refugees and IDPs considered the expansion of local infrastructure, and the associated uptick in short term employment opportunities, as having a valuable impact on their reintegration experience.\(^{399}\)

Unfortunately, it appears any improvement in economic welfare was almost exclusively derived from the initial injection of block grant resources rather than the completion of projects, suggesting any


\(^{393}\) Ibid.

\(^{394}\) Ibid.

\(^{395}\) Ibid.


\(^{398}\) Ibid.

positive outcomes were largely unsustainable. While these funding tranches were able to induce socio-economic activity, its results showed no clear connection to improving social reintegration.

As identified in the literature review, land restitution and property disputes are also pervasive problems for reintegrating displaced populations. Hazaras often lacked documentation to confirm their tenancy and faced difficulties accessing both formal and informal judicial mechanisms for resolving claims. The Land Allocation Scheme (LAS), introduced by MoRR, was designed to help alleviate these pressures by distributing alternative land parcels amongst returnees, and helping foster viable socioeconomic opportunities and replacement livelihoods. Between 2005 and 2013, 13,745 plots were allocated to refugees, and a further 290,000 prepared for applicants, indicating the scale of what were effectively artificial townships.

Unfortunately, these aspirations were disrupted by a programmatic logic casting return as a “mechanic rather than organic” process. As with other examples highlighted in this literature review, this led to the assumption that the allocation of land was synonymous with creating a ‘community’, overlooking the complex normative dynamics and local agency integral to ideas of social cohesion. In many respects LAS arguably disrupted integrative opportunities, imposing settlements on host communities without any space for local consultation and creating a state-imposed social ‘dichotomy’ that accentuated tensions, fragmentation and exclusion.

They have been also been disappointing from a practical perspective. While many participants demanded land, a majority were “too poor” to build houses on it in the absence of concurrent vocational opportunities. This precipitated a high departure rate of nearly 80 percent in some townships; frustrating the expectations of returnees, donors and policy-makers, and reducing abandoned land plots to areas of long-term speculation and illicit re-sales. Many of these disillusioned participants were Hazara, encouraged to leave Iran by authorities in Kabul and the UNHCR with messages promising a ‘better future in Afghanistan’. Crucially, the government-sponsored LAS approach also excluded IDPs, who were deemed ineligible for the scheme if they refused to return to their often-insecure province of origin.

Regardless of the challenges tentative lessons can still be drawn, and there is evidence displaced populations prefer living in townships established by returnees themselves. As a 2017 Oxfam report describes, integration, livelihood development and ownership are more visible in locally manufactured settlements, with “people investing more in their future...despite the lack of government or NGO assistance”. This suggests the underlying premise of returnee-hubs may be conducive to reintegration if the process is organic and locally directed, lending a framework for state investment to potentially supplement and reinforce. These arrangements are still frustrated by poor

400 Ibid.
402 Ibid.
405 Ibid.
incentive structures and the negative externalities of developmental programming. For example, refugees are aware they can access lucrative aid flows from registered IDP camps in the suburbs of Kabul, producing convenient, highly visible focal points for welfare support from international actors unable to reach vulnerable populations elsewhere in the country.\textsuperscript{411} In this context there is little motivation for families, particularly those from disadvantaged social groups like the Hazara, to break a cycle of aid dependency in favour of precarious opportunities in the Afghan economy.\textsuperscript{412} Instead many may opt to enmesh themselves further in the hermetic circuities of humanitarian relief as a preferred coping mechanism.

5.4 INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMMING

Similar issues problems disrupted internationally led interventions, providing few viable outlets for Hazara refugees to engage with, and even less for local IDP populations.\textsuperscript{413} Those interventions that did find traction tended to be concentrated in stable and secure spaces, and were expedited when assistance was either directly requested by recipients or members of refugee households were able to “scout ahead” on scouting missions.\textsuperscript{414}

Progress was made through holistic programming conducted by, for example, the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR), which adopted a participatory approach with both host communities and returnees in the 1980s. This helped ensure an equitable distribution of targeted, carefully sequenced assistance in “defined and relatively small areas”, achieving a tangible impact in terms of local recovery.\textsuperscript{415} Harild et al flag early successes in 1991 amongst Pashtun refugees from Khost, where “totally devastated villages were almost fully rebuilt, the bulk of refugees had returned, and life had returned to something resembling pre-war normalcy” in two years.\textsuperscript{416} This may not necessarily be relevant to the Hazara experience given the disjuncture in social standing, at least historically, between the two groups, but similar humanitarian and emergency coverage has been extended to Hazara-dominated provinces such as Ghazni, Balkh and Baghlan.\textsuperscript{417} These modalities are embedded in the Citizen’s Charter Afghanistan Project (CCPA), a flagship programme of national authorities in Kabul designed to help low income communities access a basic package of welfare services, leasing it a degree of sustainability. CCPA builds on the CDC infrastructure first installed under the National Solidarity Programme and has received significant investment from the World Bank including $127.7 million to strengthen service delivery and “emergency short term employment opportunities through labour-intensive public works”.\textsuperscript{418}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{411} Metcalfe, V et al (2012): Sanctuary in the City? Urban Displacement and Vulnerability in Kabul.’
\item \textsuperscript{413} Pete Spink (2004) ‘A Closing Window? Are Afghanistan’s IDPs being Forgotten?’, FMR 21.
\item \textsuperscript{414} Norwegian Refugee Council (2012) Challenges of IDP Protection: Research study on the protection of internally displaced persons in Afghanistan.
\item \textsuperscript{416} Ibid, p. 58.
\end{itemize}
5.5 ‘Voluntary’ Return

Multilateral interventions like the Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees (SSAR), a “quadripartite consultative process” between Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and UNHCR launched in 2011, are described in the literature promising regional solutions, at least on paper.\(^{419}\) Designed as a multi-year initiative, the SSAR offers a comprehensive, bespoke framework for joint programmes: supporting host communities, building the capacities of displaced populations, and coordinating donor resources to maximise comparative advantages.\(^{420}\) Beneficiaries receive a suite of activities ranging from “micro-financing and vocational training in marketable skills” to cash-for-work schemes and the rehabilitation of community infrastructure.\(^{421}\) This requires significant transnational cooperation to ensure programmes are sequenced throughout the repatriation process, from host countries such as Iran and Pakistan to communities of origin in Afghanistan. As such, the SSAR’s Quadripartite Steering Committee therefore seems to be a useful mechanism for ensuring a comprehensive approach and synchronising efforts at various levels.\(^{422}\)

Nevertheless, this still arguably fails to adequately factor in the preferences of so-called beneficiaries, and Hazaras have been particularly reluctant to participate in ‘voluntary’ return processes.\(^{423}\) Comprising 43 percent of documented Afghans in Iran, Hazaras account for only 25.6 percent of total UNHCR-assisted returnees – an imbalance stemming from greater economic opportunities abroad, residual identity-based prejudices in Afghanistan and local insecurities.\(^{424}\) Conflict is a perennial concern, with 86 percent of polled “Afghan-Iranians” citing war and physical violence as the most important barriers to repatriation.\(^{425}\) While more recent opinion surveys are scarce, deteriorating stability and the resurgence of militant groups such as the Taliban and ISKP will likely exacerbate these concerns.\(^{426}\) Many express a desire to permanently integrate into host communities; particularly those in Iran.\(^{427}\) Historically, the Hazara also enjoy strong cross-border kinship bonds and religious affiliation with Iran, allowing refugees to leverage these social networks in a bid to acquire work, housing and financial support.\(^{428}\)

The preference for local integration is not unanimous across the diaspora, but studies suggest Hazara women, the poorly educated and rural dwellers are all less willing to return for various reasons, from modest livelihood prospects at ‘home’ through to the social emancipation and greater female equality experienced abroad.\(^{429}\) This reticence may be due to a lack of information regarding politico-legal changes in Kabul and the improved standing of Hazaras, at least nominally.\(^{430}\) Accommodating

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\(^{420}\) Ibid.
\(^{421}\) Ibid, p. 12.
\(^{422}\) Ibid.
\(^{425}\) Ibid.
\(^{430}\) Ibid.
cross-border excursions of refugees to assess conditions in their country of origin may therefore help appease such anxieties. However, this does not address the broader problems of perceived and actual shortages in housing, welfare and staple commodities that continue to deter or delay those contemplating return.435 Crucially, many Hazara also believe successful repatriation requires capital and social assets.432 These resources are often accumulated in exile and analogous case studies referenced in the conceptual literature review suggest affluent refugees are generally less likely to jeopardise their position by moving ‘home’.433

UNHCR has become progressively aware of the need to develop a new paradigm that reflects these social realities. Nevertheless, research clearly demonstrates voluntary repatriation still remains “the preferred durable solution” of both international agencies and national governments, creating plausible cover for states to pursue self-interested agendas under the rubric of humanitarian interventions.436 As such there is a risk such interventions may co-opted to pressure Afghan refugees into returning.435 Since the 1990s, authorities in Tehran have passed legislative measures targeting unregistered Afghans, and new restrictive regulations constrain how far documented refugees, including Hazaras, can embed themselves in the economic fabric of their host communities.436 Much like Pakistan, Iranian security services have also launched a series of deportation campaigns, raising questions over the degree of coercion behind those returns labelled spontaneous or voluntary.437 Schmeidl summaries these dynamics by claiming: “the Afghan case painfully demonstrates the problems with resolving protracted displacement where considerations other than refugee protection are at the heart of the activities of international actors”.438

Similar issues are evident for Hazara asylum-seekers repatriated back from Europe and Australia, where they are sometimes perceived as “contaminated”,439 and subjected to robbery, kidnapping and extortion on the assumption they are receiving some stipend or reintegration assistance.440 While evidence suggests recipient populations do not inherently discriminate against returnees, their socioeconomic prospects are contingent on the same patronage base, contact networks and patrimonial configurations conditioning Afghan society more widely. In this context, the history and societal stigmatisation of the Hazara tend to accentuate these challenges, as summarised by Schuster: “A Hazara who is returned to Kabul without social connections is likely to end up destitute, or to be exposed to gross exploitation or criminal predation”.443 These policies therefore raise difficult ethical and practical questions, and the risk of secondary displacement, high levels of debt, low levels

of credit and overstretched support networks all imply Afghan refugee repatriation processes face severe difficulties.\footnote{442}

Finally, it is difficult to measure how far repatriation efforts result in successful reintegration, alluding to a wider limitation in effectively verifying and evaluating intervention outputs.\footnote{443} IOM can only monitor Afghan returnees for twelve months and seemingly has “no strategy in place to use the data they collect for practical purposes such as vulnerability analysis, increasing assistance or protection”.\footnote{444} Conventional metrics also fail to account for “recyclers” amongst registered refugee populations, who either exploit aid packages and seasonal vocations with no intention of staying long term, or face such significant difficulties they precipitate “backflows” to Iran and Pakistan.\footnote{445} The porosity of boundaries between voluntary and forced movement is similarly high, with households relocating multiple times for different.\footnote{446} Determining when displacement ends in this context is therefore challenging, making it difficult to identify relatively fluid IDP and refugee populations.\footnote{447} As a result, these monitoring regimes are often compromised practically and methodologically, leaving practitioners with redundant feedback loops and an opaque understanding of what their interventions have actually achieved.

\section*{5.6 Takeaways}

Across certain areas and communities, local integration and efforts to repatriate refugees have achieved traction in various forms, but how far these experiences can be generalised or scaled up remains limited. The Hazaras face particular difficulties in sustaining their locally led coping strategies due to ubiquitous structural barriers and socio-economic discrimination. Unfortunately, national and international programmes have largely failed to compensate for these shortfalls. The nuanced dispositions, interests and anxieties of different individuals and groups often lost in the search for ‘durable solutions’, and policy prescriptions risk becoming the superficial confections of external donors rather than the nominal beneficiaries. As a result their objectives typically fail to reflect local realities and create, at best, short-term relief. Afghanistan is an excellent example of this trend: its economic absorption capacity is finite,\footnote{448} and full repatriation is therefore “neither feasible nor desirable”.\footnote{449} By pursuing these goals ‘at all costs’, donors and practitioners risk destabilising the country’s ‘fragile equilibrium’ and inducing negative externalities across the region more broadly.\footnote{450}
6. MYANMAR/BANGLADESH AND THE ROHINGYAS

6.1 CONTEXT

The current crisis began after Rohingya militants attacked border posts in Rakhine State on 9 October 2016, killing nine police officers. Crackdowns began almost immediately, with reports suggesting the military was attacking Muslim civilians and torching villages, as well as blocking food aid deliveries from the UN World Food Programme. Over the following weeks and months, violence escalated as army raids on Rohingya villages led to mass killings and displacements. Further clashes broke out in August 2017, after the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) claimed responsibility for attacks on police and army posts. The government declared ARSA a terrorist organization and the military mounted a brutal campaign that destroyed hundreds of Rohingya villages and forced seven hundred thousand Rohingya to leave Myanmar. Though the government insisted it was targeting terrorists, it became increasingly clear that there was a concerted effort to shift the Rohingya community out of Myanmar. The scale of the displacement is highlighted by the fact that as of January 2019, there were 911,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh – mostly around Cox’s Bazar in the country’s southeast – set against provisional data from Myanmar’s official 2014 census, which estimated 1,090,000 people in northern Rakhine that were not counted, most of these likely being Rohingya who refused to be counted as ‘Bengali’, the term many in the country use for them in reference to their links to the Chittagong district in Bangladesh.

While the current flight of Rohingyas is the largest, it is only the most recent of numerous waves of displacement from Myanmar to Bangladesh and a product of systemic marginalisation and erosion of civil rights. The Muslim community, especially the Rohingyas, have suffered persecution at the hands of successive governments since General Ne Win seized power following a coup d’etat in 1962, and their social and political position has deteriorated on a number of fronts. In contrast to the parliamentary government period (1948–1962), they hold no important political offices. Few, if any Muslims, are found in the higher ranks of the military. Like all Burmese, they are required to carry identification cards stating their religion, which leaves them vulnerable to official discrimination. In recent years, they have often not been allowed to build new mosques, or even repair old ones, and many mosques have been torn down by the authorities, especially in Rakhine State. Unlike other ethnic minorities, including some Muslim groups, the Rohingyas are not recognized as citizens by the Burmese government, but are considered illegal aliens.

The regimes of Ne Win (1962-1988) and the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)/State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) (1988-2011) enlisted Rakhine Buddhists in attacks on Rohingya communities, and, after evicting the Muslims, allowed the Rakhine Buddhists to occupy their lands. In a 1978 operation called Naga Min (‘Dragon King’), the military swept through Rohingya areas in search of illegal aliens, forcing between 200,000 and 300,000 Rohingyas to flee to Bangladesh, where they were housed in refugee camps until largely repatriated under UN auspices.

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451 BBC, ‘Myanmar policemen killed in Rakhine border attack’, 9 October 2016
452 Al Jazeera, ‘UN: Food aid for 80,000 Rohingya blocked by Myanmar’, 19 October 2016
453 Lone, Wa and Shoon Naing (2017), ‘At least 71 killed in Myanmar as Rohingya insurgents stage major attack’, Reuters, 25 August 2017
457 Seekins, Donald M (2006), Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar) Historical Dictionaries of Asia, Oceania and the Middle East, No. 59.
In 1991–1992, a similar operation, Pyi Thaya (‘Clean and Beautiful Nation’), resulted in the flight of 200,000-300,000 Rohingyas.

Over the years, the authorities in Myanmar have announced different identification regimes for the Rohingya, steadily eroding their rights. In 1989, as part of a citizenship verification programme under the 1982 Citizenship Law, the Rohingya handed over the National Registration Cards they had held since 1951 in exchange for Citizenship Scrutiny Cards. However, these were never issued, and in 1995, they received Temporary Registration Certificates (TRCs) which afforded certain rights, including the right to vote, but did not confer citizenship. In 2015, with a national election approaching, the TRCs were revoked, disenfranchising the 797,504 mostly Rohingya people who held them. The election that year, which brought Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD) to power, was the first since 1948 in which the Rohingya could neither vote nor run.

### 6.2 STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS

Even prior to the current cycle of violence, Rakhine State was the least developed of Myanmar’s 14 states and regions. It has been characterised by widespread poverty, weak infrastructure and a lack of opportunities for employment and income generation. This is exacerbated by the state’s vulnerability to natural disasters, and prolonged internal displacement as a result of communal violence. A survey of living conditions in 2017 estimated that poverty incidence in Rakhine the second-highest in Myanmar at 41.6 percent, compared with the national average of 24.8 percent. In 2016, it was estimated that approximately 416,000 people were in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, and access to adequate food security, education, healthcare, clean drinking water, and other basic services was poor. For example, Rakhine had the lowest percentage of households with access to improved sanitation in the country (48 percent compared to a national average of 84 percent), as well as the lowest primary school enrolment rate (71.4 percent compared to a national average of 87.7 percent).

This widespread poverty, poor infrastructure, and a lack of employment opportunities in Rakhine State have aggravated the cleavage between Buddhists and Rohingyas, and everyday frictions between Muslims and non-Muslims are made worse by government-encouraged rumour-mongering. This has been exacerbated in recent years by a sudden explosion of internet access. In fact, Facebook acknowledged that until 2018, they ‘weren’t doing enough to help prevent our platform from being used to foment division and incite offline violence.’ The UN fact-finding mission noted that ‘Facebook has been a useful instrument for those seeking to spread hate, in a context where, for most users, Facebook is the Internet’.

Even if the government wished to take action against the military for violations in Rakhine State, it is hamstrung by provisions in the military-drafted 2008 constitution, which ensures that the home, border affairs and defence ministries are headed by a serving military officer. Moreover, it enshrines

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461 In Myanmar, sim cards went from costing over $1000 under the military junta to as cheap as $1.60 in 2014, see Strangio, Sebastian (2014), ‘Talk is suddenly cheap in Myanmar – and that could be costly’, Christian Science Monitor, 15 August 2014; Also see BBC, ‘The country where Facebook posts whipped up hate’, 12 September 2018


the military’s political role by reserving 25 percent of the seats in Parliament and specifying that several articles of the constitution can only be amended with the approval of more than 75 percent of all representatives, thus handing the military de facto veto power over any amendments.

This complicates any attempts to amend the 1982 Citizenship Law, which stripped the Rohingyas of their citizenship and is seen as the key obstacle to a durable solution. The law restricts citizenship to 135 constitutionally recognised national races and ethnic groups that were settled in the territory comprising Myanmar prior to 1823. The Burmese government claims the Rohingyas are descended from Bengali residents of Chittagong district who migrated into Rakhine after the British annexed it following the first Anglo-Burmese War in 1824–1826, and thus cannot be recognized as a legitimate Burmese ethnic nationality. A portion of northern Rakhine was a part of British Bengal until 1937. However, Rohingya spokesmen claim their community is descended from Arabs and other migrants who settled on the Rakhine coast in the ninth century CE. While there is a provision for naturalised citizenship, it requires ‘conclusive evidence’ that the person’s family lived in Myanmar before 1948 as well as fluency in one of the national languages. Only a handful of Rohingya are able to satisfy these criteria.

There is no indication from the military that its view on the Rohingyas has changed. Following the release of the international fact-finding mission, which accused the military of ‘genocidal intent’, Myanmar’s army chief Min Aung Hlaing emphasised Myanmar’s sovereignty as well as the 1982 Citizenship Law, suggesting that the Rohingyas must undergo scrutiny as per the law. The government is now offering a new form of identification to the Rohingyas, the national verification card (NVC), which it suggests is ‘a first step for the process of citizenship scrutiny’. However, the card does not allow the selection of ‘Rohingya’ as an ethnic identity, only ‘Bengali’, and requires applicants to indicate the date on which they entered Myanmar. This has been criticised as an attempt to formalise the status of the Rohingya community as outsiders and to reinforce barriers towards reintegration.

As noted earlier, Oxfam’s account of post-conflict fragility in Chad found that states are the only actors that can restore authority and the rule of law in their own territory over the longer term. In Myanmar, owing to the large role played by the military in both governance and security provision, this is a key factor. The challenge here, however, is less about state capacity and more about political will. Even though Rakhine State as a whole is one of the poorest in the country, the Rohingya crisis itself stems from issues around ethnicity and a perceived security threat from Rohingya militant groups like ARSA, though there are contesting accounts of the group’s size and capabilities. Therefore, without a change in behaviour from the government, external interventions aimed at facilitating return and reintegration are unlikely to succeed, as international organisations and NGOs cannot substitute or reproduce the trust necessary for communities to commit themselves to reintegration.

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468 Reuters (2018), ‘Myanmar army chief says ‘no right to interfere’ as U.N. weighs Rohingya crisis’, 24 September 2018

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reintegration.\textsuperscript{673} This is compounded by the fact that the operational space for international NGOs in Rakhine State is often restricted.\textsuperscript{674}

6.3 Repatriation

In November 2017, Myanmar and Bangladesh signed the Arrangement on Return of Displaced Persons from Rakhine State, intended to facilitate the return of those Rohingya refugees who had been displaced as part of the latest conflict. The arrangement recognised ‘the need for sustainable and durable solutions’ and of ‘voluntary return in safety, security and dignity’.\textsuperscript{475} However, in his July 2018 oral update on the situation of human rights of the Rohingya people, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that of the 8,032 names given by the government of Bangladesh to the government of Myanmar for verification and return, none were consulted on the process, nor did they apply for voluntary return to Myanmar. Moreover, Myanmar had only verified 1,387 names.\textsuperscript{476}

Though preparations were being made in November 2018 for the repatriation of an initial batch of 2,260 Rohingya to Myanmar under the above arrangement, the plan stalled after it was opposed by the Rohingya in the camps in Bangladesh, UNHCR and aid groups, who remained unconvinced as there were no guarantees of safety, citizenship, land rights and freedom of movement considered essential for repatriation to begin.\textsuperscript{477} The situation had not changed in August 2019,\textsuperscript{478} with Myanmar and Bangladesh blaming each other for the inaction.\textsuperscript{479} UNHCR has stated that the conditions in Myanmar were not conducive for returns to be ‘safe, dignified, and sustainable’, and stressed that the responsibility for creating such conditions remains with the Myanmar authorities and that it entails more than preparation of physical infrastructure to facilitate logistical arrangements.\textsuperscript{480}

In fact, Burmese government officials have said that many of those proposed for repatriation were ‘involved in terrorism’ and that ‘if they are sent back to Myanmar, we have to take action against them according to the law’.\textsuperscript{481} Given the sweeping nature of such allegations against members of the Rohingya community, these statements are only likely to diminish the prospects of repatriation.

The problematic nature of the agreement, drafted without input from the affected community, the UN or UNHCR, and containing no enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance from the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{477} Alsaafin, Linah (2018), ‘Rohingya crisis: One year on, do they want to return to Myanmar?’, Al Jazeera, 25 August 2018; McPherson, Poppy (2018), ‘U.N. will not help Myanmar with long-term camps for Rohingya – document’, Reuters, 13 November 2018
\item \textsuperscript{478} Ellis-Petersen, Hannah and Shaikh Azizur Rahman (2019), ‘Rohingya refugees refuse to return to Myanmar without rights guarantee’, The Guardian, 21 August 2019
\item \textsuperscript{479} Ministry of Information, Republic of the Union of Myanmar, ‘Repatriation of Displaced Persons from Bangladesh did not occur as scheduled’, 23 August 2019, https://www.moi.gov.mm/moi-eng/?q=announcement/23/08/2019/id-18845; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Bangladesh, ‘In view of Myanmar’s repeated claim that they are prepared to receive the displaced persons and the recent interactions of a high-level delegation from Myanmar with the representatives of displaced people at camps in Cox’s Bazar on 27-28 July 2019 to convince the displaced people to return, Bangladesh agreed to facilitate the commencement of repatriation on 22 August 2019’, 25 August 2019, https://mofa.gov.bd/site/press_release/9a082f55-d146-4af9-a03-9a6a3063d73a
\item \textsuperscript{480} UNHCR, Bangladesh, UNHCR agree on voluntary returns framework when Rohingya refugees decide conditions are right’, 13 April 2018, https://www.unhcr.ca/news/bangladesh-unhcr-voluntary-returns-rohingya-refugees/
\item \textsuperscript{481} Radio Free Asia (2018), Dozens of ‘Terrorists’ Among Rohingya Slated For Repatriation, Myanmar Official Says’, 8 November 2018
\end{itemize}
government of Myanmar following the return of refugees, was reflected in the Bangladesh Refugee Commissioner’s acknowledgement that no one was willing to return and that officials could not force people to do so.\textsuperscript{482}

There was also concern that the reception centres for returning refugees in Taung Pyo Letwe and Nga Khu Yar, intended to be temporary, may become permanent, and that they will be unable to process the number of people displaced. Reportedly, the two centres are able to process 300 returnees a day, five days a week, vastly insufficient given that there are now over 900,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{483} These fears are exacerbated by conditions in existing IDP camps in central Rakhine State, which host over 128,000 people displaced following communal violence in 2012.\textsuperscript{484} While Rakhine Buddhists displaced by that episode of violence have been permitted to return to their places of origin or have been relocated to resettlement sites, and although some camps housing Muslims have been closed since 2012, the remaining Muslim IDPs have been confined to camps for six years. In April 2018, the Assistant Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs described the conditions of these camps as being ‘beyond the dignity of any people’, without any freedom of movement, access to sufficient food, adequate health care, education and livelihoods.\textsuperscript{485}

Prospects of the Rohingya ever returning to their places of origin are also dropping, as the areas where they lived in Rakhine State before displacement are being transformed. The villages in which the Rohingya resided were burned, flattened and scraped by bulldozers, and hundreds of new houses are being built, occupied mainly by Buddhists, some from other parts of Rakhine. The security forces are also building new facilities in these areas.\textsuperscript{486} Myanmar’s Social Welfare Minister Win Myat Aye confirmed fears that the villages left behind by Rohingyas who fled to Bangladesh would not be returned to them, stating that ‘burnt land becomes government-managed land’.\textsuperscript{487} Further, an official at the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation indicated that since Rohingyas aren’t citizens in Myanmar, they would have to negotiate with local authorities to recover their land or receive compensation.\textsuperscript{488}

Repatriation was undertaken following the previous two mass displacements as well, in 1978 and 1992. Unlike in the current case, steps were taken at the time to force refugees to return to Myanmar. Even in 1978, the refugees were reluctant to return as they felt they had not received any solid guarantees from the Burmese government that they would not face the same kind of persecution once they returned. However, serious shortages and delays in food delivery as well as restrictions that confined the refugees to the camps exerted pressure on the refugees to make them go back.\textsuperscript{489} Similarly, in 1992, while UNHCR persuaded the Bangladeshi authorities to limit restrictions on the provision of assistance, it agreed in May 1993 to ‘assist in the smooth repatriation of refugees who opt to return on the basis of their own judgement’ as well as ‘undertake promotional activities to motivate refugees to return home’. By August 1994, following MoUs with the governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar, UNHCR embarked on a mass repatriation registration exercise, with the

\textsuperscript{482} Alam, Julhas and Emily Schmall (2018), ‘Bangladesh scraps Rohingya return, says no one wants to go’, AP News, 16 November 2018
\textsuperscript{484} BBC, ‘Burma violence: 20,000 displaced in Rakhine state’, 28 October 2012
\textsuperscript{487} Lewis, Simon (2017), ‘Government will take over burned Myanmar land – minister’, Reuters, 27 September 2017
\textsuperscript{488} McPherson, Poppy, Simon Lewis, Thu Thu Aung, Shoon Naing and Zeba Siddiqui (2018), ‘Erasing The Rohingya: Point of No Return’, Reuters Investigates, 18 December 2018
onus being on refugees to decline to register if they did not wish to return in spite of civil society apprehension that refugees were not being provided information that they needed to make an informed choice.\textsuperscript{490}

While a repeat of the above events appears unlikely, the previous cases serve to highlight the pitfalls of focusing on repatriation as an end goal, as discussed in the conceptual section, without the willingness to ensure sustainable reintegration, which would require significantly more investment in resources as well as time. Further, Human Rights Watch has noted that there will be no durable solution to the Rohingya refugee problem until Myanmar complies with its obligations under international law and respects the basic rights of its Rohingya minority. To this end, it recommends that the international community, including the UN and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), must press the Burmese government to undertake fundamental reforms in its treatment of the Rohingya, and also supply the funds necessary to ensure conditions for full reintegration.\textsuperscript{491}

\section*{6.4 LOCAL INTEGRATION IN BANGLADESH}

Bangladesh has repeatedly promoted repatriation and resettlement as a long-term solution, as opposed to local integration, which implies a sense of permanence. While Bangladesh has been an able host and has been cooperative in the provision of humanitarian assistance, the rapid influx of refugees has stretched resources and capacity in the country. To prevent integration, the government has prohibited registrars from officiating marriages with Bangladeshi nationals and between Rohingya couples, arguing that they were being abused to obtain Bangladeshi citizenship.\textsuperscript{492}

The government of Bangladesh bars formal education in the Rohingya camps,\textsuperscript{493} and ensures that children are not taught Bangla, limiting their ability to interact with locals.\textsuperscript{494} UNICEF learning centres provide education in basic literacy, numeracy and life skills, in addition to the English and Burmese languages.\textsuperscript{495} Overcrowding – in what is now the world’s largest refugee camp – as well as increased competition for resources has also resulted in a gradual increase in anti-refugee sentiment in host communities.\textsuperscript{496} This has led to plans to relocate the Rohingyas to an island off the coast of Bangladesh that civil society groups note is prone to flooding and cyclones.\textsuperscript{497}

As highlighted earlier, local integration does not necessarily prevent return as it can equip refugees with the education, skills and resources for eventual repatriation.\textsuperscript{498} While in the case of the Rohingyas, this depends to a large extent on steps taken by the government to create environment

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item BBC (2018), ‘Bangladesh court upholds Myanmar Rohingya marriage ban’, 8 January 2018
\item Mahmud, Tarek (2018), ‘Repatriation delay jeopardizes future of 100,000 Rohingya schoolchildren’, Dhaka Tribune, 18 February 2018
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
that facilitates return, many refugees have indicated a willingness to return if they are able to gain citizenship, have their land returned, and obtain safeguards against persecution.

International programming has largely been focused on improving conditions for the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, with the key coordinating body indicating that while international humanitarian actors are ready to contribute to the reintegration effort when required, the ‘obligation to create conditions conducive to such return rests with the Government of Myanmar’. Further, with access being restricted for international humanitarian actors in Rakhine State, they have been unable to undertake adequate needs assessments and aid activities within Rakhine State.

As the literature highlights, to facilitate inclusion in the host community, it is important to distribute assistance beyond displaced populations, including host societies, as these are suggested to establish economic resilience; accelerate poverty reduction; and shorten the life cycle and resource consumption of humanitarian aid operations. As the example of the World Bank’s 2016 concessional multi-year financing model indicates, such projects could support host communities alongside refugee populations, helping reduce social friction and stimulate more holistic economic development while also lending greater weight to external advocacy efforts.

6.5 TAKEAWAYS

The repeated cycles of Rohingya displacement reflect a failure to identify a sustainable solution. In the past, efforts have been geared towards repatriating refugees from Bangladesh to Myanmar. As shown by the broader literature, however, when this exercise is undertaken without addressing structural issues – in the case of the Rohingya, disenfranchisement and systemic marginalisation, as well as widespread poverty and unemployment across Rakhine State which exacerbate the schism between Rohingyas and the Buddhist majority – the violence and associated displacement are likely to repeat. Unlike in previous instances, arrangements for the return of Rohingyas are being actively resisted by the refugees and the international community, and the destruction and repurposing of traditional Rohingya land in Myanmar have diminished the prospects and desirability of return in the near future. As a result, in this case, it may be useful to create pathways for sustainable integration both within Bangladesh and elsewhere. In order to mitigate anti-refugee sentiments, it will be important to align strategies with the host country’s economic and development objectives and bring in members of local and refugee communities from the early stages of decision making.

7. INDIA AND THE KASHMIRI PANDITS

7.1 CONTEXT

Following allegations of electoral malpractice in 1987, the militant Kashmiri group Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) launched its armed campaign for independence from India in July 1988.

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501 The Forced Displacement Crisis: A Joint Paper by Multilateral Development Banks, a report written by a group of multilateral development banks, 2017
Fuelled by material support from and training camps in Pakistan, the security situation in the Kashmir Valley rapidly deteriorated. As the violence intensified, Muslim–Hindu relations in Kashmir came under strain, particularly given the militants’ targeting of Hindu officials. During the course of 1989, civil disobedience and political violence by Kashmiri Muslims gathered pace, and the Indian government imposed central governor’s rule in January 1990. Due to the breakdown of law and order, a series of assassinations and violent attacks against Kashmiri Pandits, and threats to the community’s security and livelihoods, most Kashmiri Pandits fled their homes, relocating to the city of Jammu in the southern part of the state and different parts of north India. The movement of Kashmiri Pandits out of the Valley continued as attacks on the community persisted throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.

Though there are varying estimates on the number of Kashmiri Pandits displaced as a result of violence and intimidation in Kashmir, official Indian figures state that 57,000 families (primarily Kashmiri Pandits, but also including Sikhs and Muslims) fled from the region. As of 2018, more than 40,000 registered Kashmiri migrant families were residing in Jammu; about 19,000 registered Kashmiri migrant families were living in Delhi and about 2000 families were settled elsewhere in India. Of the over 300,000 Kashmiri Pandits in the Kashmir Valley before the exodus, only 3000-5000 remain.

In Jammu, 6,036 families had been accommodated in transit camps since the beginning of their displacement. These camp colonies were important centres of the migrant community until residents were relocated to a new township in the outskirts of the city in 2011. Datta refers to the Pandits as constituting ‘a significant presence in the city, becoming a part of the urbanscape and citizenry’.

7.2 NATIONAL INITIATIVES AND OBSTACLES

Transitioning from the ‘temporary’ policies that keep the displaced communities intact in ‘safe zones’ to policies that aim to secure long-term solutions presents moral and political dilemmas for policymakers, given the context of the broader Jammu and Kashmir dispute. The government of India has in the past stated that its policies with regard to the Kashmiri Pandits are geared towards their repatriation ‘as soon as conditions reasonably conducive for their return are created’, and that ‘the permanent rehabilitation of the migrants outside the State is not envisaged’. Often the policies formulated to address the crisis is an outcome of labelling the Kashmiri Pandits as ‘migrants’. However, the displacement of the community has now extended to nearly three decades, and there is an entire generation of youth born and educated outside Kashmir. Raina points out that ‘migration’ as a term signifies movement for ‘the better’, wherein people migrate in search of jobs and better lifestyles. She suggests that it would be more appropriate to refer to the Kashmiri Pandits as IDPs, indicating they left their homes because of persecution, conflict, or human rights violations.

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509 Government of Jammu & Kashmir, Relief and Rehabilitation (Migrants) Department, http://kmigrantrelief.nic.in/
raises concerns about the utility, as well as the false promise, of the ‘temporary’ policies implicit in the initial positions of the policymakers – designed to serve the ‘transitional needs’ of those displaced.511

The official response to what was called the ‘temporary disturbance’ was to provide the Kashmiri Pandits with township-like settlements outside the Kashmir Valley as a safe haven and a ‘close to home-like experience’. Consistent with the official position that saw this displacement as a temporary crisis, the government retains ownership of the townships, allowing the residents to stay till a hypothetical normality returns to the Kashmir Valley. The transitional nature of this accommodation does nothing to address the community’s deeper concerns of restoring a sense of normality and providing long-term security for the Kashmiri Pandits.

Unemployment, under-employment and deterioration of income have been a chronic problem among the displaced Kashmiri Pandit community, long after their physical relocation. In addition, people became alienated as they lost their cultural space as well as their homes.512 To alleviate economic pressures, the policy package for the families included the temporary use of shops made available for their use in the host communities. In the short term, this allowed families to partially regain their sense of dignity and economic well-being; however, the government retains the ownership of the shops and prohibits expansion.513 The dilemma faced by policymakers in this situation is that a shift from temporary to more durable housing or income generation arrangements may be perceived as tacit recognition that the displacement is more than temporary. While this is of course the case – the Kashmiri Pandits have been displaced for nearly three decades – it is difficult to acknowledge given the hyper-politicised nature and religious dynamics of the broader Kashmir issue. The Indian government currently provides cash relief up to a monthly ceiling of Rs. 13,000 (about $185) per eligible family in Jammu and Delhi, with those in Jammu also receiving dry ration including rice, flour and sugar.514

While the townships arranged by the government had a crucial role to play in the initial years of displacement, over the years of protracted displacement these townships created a cultural and societal divide between the local communities in Kashmir and those that were displaced. Further, despite being surrounded by members of their own community, with temples, schools and shops, displaced Kashmiri Pandit families have limited economic opportunities or political space.515 In 2011, the government shut the camps across Jammu and moved the Kashmiri Pandits to what it called two-room tenements (TRT) on the outskirts of the city. Each family was allocated a TRT consisting of two rooms with an attached bathroom and kitchen. The township was a large complex of two-storied apartment buildings.516

While this was seemingly done to offer better living conditions to the Kashmiri Pandits, Datta argues that it is ‘the challenge of imagining a possible future in Jammu on mundane but crucial matters that affect the Pandits, such as finding fulfilling and gainful employment and socio-economic security’. As a result, whatever the intentions of moving the community to the TRTs, there is persistent fear among Pandits of being forced to move again that shapes their attachment to a place.517

516 Outlook (2010), ‘J&K Govt to Allot 4,200 Flats to Kashmiri Pandit Migrants’, 15 October 2010
India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has repeatedly stated its objective of creating separate townships for the rehabilitation of displaced Kashmiri Pandits in the Kashmir Valley. When forming a coalition government in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 2015 with a Kashmiri political party, the People’s Democratic Party, its ‘agenda for alliance’ mentioned ‘protecting and fostering ethnic and religious diversity by ensuring the return of Kashmiri Pandits with dignity based on their rights as state subjects and reintegrating as well as absorbing them in the Kashmiri milieu’. In 2014, the government expanded a rehabilitation and relocation package announced by the previous government to provide up to Rs. 2 million ($33,315) per family for reconstructing homes. However, it was reported in 2017 that only two families had availed of this scheme since its inception in 2008, and only one had returned to live in Kashmir. This in spite of the fact that security threats in Kashmir reduced between 2008 and 2015. Further, across the different rehabilitation packages, 6000 state government jobs have been created and reserved for Kashmiri Pandit youths and 6000 transit accommodations as well as 200 flats have been constructed in the Kashmir Valley for those who take up these jobs.

These initiatives continue to demonstrate the focus on returning the displaced community to its place of origin without much consideration of what comes after. As has been demonstrated in other cases as well, this has been a stumbling block; one that is exacerbated in the current context, as the security situation in the Valley has been deteriorating since the death of the popular militant Burhan Wani in 2016. There is uncertainty over the community’s safety upon any future return. This is not improved by numerous Indian governments’ blunt handling of the issue and the inability to bring about a genuine political solution.

In August 2019, the Indian government revoked Jammu and Kashmir’s special privileges and divided the autonomous state into two centrally governed union territories. While the government cited security, socioeconomic and development concerns as reasons for implementing this move, observers have noted that the unilateral nature of the decision and the communications shutdown and political detentions that accompanied it may exacerbate tensions in the Kashmir Valley. While a large number of Kashmiri Pandits welcomed the government’s move, some have highlighted that it does not improve their chances for rehabilitation and that the way in which it was undertaken could deepen the rift between Kashmiri Muslims and Pandits.

There is increasingly a desire among some Kashmiri Pandits to leave the city of Jammu and the state in search of employment and education. One of the ways by which young people hope to leave is

519 *DNA*, ‘Agenda for Alliance: Full text of the agreement between PDP and BJP’, 1 March 2015
520 For details of the Prime Minister’s 2008 Package for the rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits, see MHA (2009), Annual Report 2008-09, p. 167. For details of the 2015 update, see MHA (2018), Annual Report 2017-18, p. 18
528 *India Today* (2019), Striking down Article 370 tipping point, say Kashmiri Pandits’, 14 August 2019
through quotas for Kashmiri Pandits in institutes of professional education. These quotas were first established in Maharashtra before being extended to other Indian states, and have been utilised by Kashmiri Pandit families to enhance their opportunities for education and employment. However, the utility of reservations has been questioned by poor Kashmiri Pandits, who point out that the quotas are usually taken advantage of well-to-do families who are better equipped financially and better exposed to the range of opportunities outside Jammu and Kashmir.\footnote{Datta, Ankur (2016), ‘Dealing with dislocation: Migration, place and home among displaced Kashmiri Pandits in Jammu and Kashmir’, \textit{Contributions to Indian Sociology}, Vol. 50, No. 1, pp. 52-79}

Observers have noted that even though Pandits appear to have adjusted to life away from Kashmir and have ostensibly remade life in Jammu, the connection or sense of attachment to place seems fleeting.\footnote{Ibid.} On one hand, many Kashmiri Pandits have placed themselves in Jammu and observe everyday life to varying degrees of success and failure. Yet, even when there is apparent settlement, there is a sense of unease or an inability to connect to a place and to imagine a future home in that or any other place.\footnote{Ibid.}

Thus, even though examples from the broader literature prioritise the practical delivery of ‘durable solutions’ by assessing interventions through an economic lens, this case highlights the need to remain conscious of cultural issues, identity politics, as well as notions of belonging and other dynamics that influence integration processes.\footnote{Jeff Crisp (2010) \textit{Forced Displacement In Africa: Dimensions, Difficulties, And Policy Directions}, Refugee Survey Quarterly, Volume 29, Issue 3.}

### 7.3 TAKEAWAYS

While there is general agreement among political decision makers in India that Kashmiri Pandits should be repatriated, successive governments’ insistence on temporary measures for relief and support, largely for political reasons, has prevented the emergence of a sustainable solution. Transitional policies obscure the fact that the displacement is protracted and that entire generations from the community have never lived in Kashmir. A disaggregated survey would enable an understanding of different interests within the community, facilitating targeted interventions aimed at either return or integration outside Kashmir. Currently, the limited assistance provided to Kashmiri Pandits for opportunities in other parts of India are accessible only to a small percentage of the community, generally those that are better placed socioeconomically. Beyond questions of economic prospects, however, cultural identity and the notion of ‘home’ is key, as in spite of security issues and prolonged periods away from Kashmir, many Pandits continue to harbour a desire to return. In order for this to be possible in a sustainable manner, the concept of Kashmiri identity both within Kashmir and across India needs to be considered. Given the polarising effect of the ongoing conflict, interventions are unlikely to succeed unless they emphasise an inclusive Kashmiri identity and recreate the cultural space for the Kashmiri Pandit community within it.

### 8. SRI LANKA AND THE TAMILS

#### 8.1 CONTEXT

The decades-long civil war between the government of Sri Lanka and armed Tamil groups, most prominently the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, also known as the Tamil Tigers), resulted in
widespread displacement among the civilian population, mostly from the ethnic Tamil and Muslim minority populations but also including some Sinhalese. Many were displaced more than once. Causes include the deliberate targeting of members of a particular ethnic or religious group with the aim of driving them from their homes, as was the case with the anti-Tamil riots in 1983 and the LTTE’s expulsion of the Muslim community from Northern province in 1990. Hundreds of thousands also fled fighting in or near their home areas between the LTTE, other Tamil armed opposition groups, and government and paramilitary forces.

One of the first waves of conflict-related displacement followed the anti-Tamil riots of 1983, known as Black July, after which over 100,000 Tamils fled to India while others sought asylum in other countries overseas. Throughout the mid-1980s the fighting between Tamil armed groups and the Sri Lankan security forces continued to displace significant numbers of people from their homes. Levels of displacement escalated following the departure of the Indian Peacekeeping Force and the resumption of hostilities in 1990, when thousands of people fled to escape the violence. While the majority of those displaced were Tamils, in October 1990 over 70,000 Muslims were driven out of the north by the LTTE.

Levels of displacement peaked at over one million in 1995 following the breakdown of peace negotiations between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government and the resumption of hostilities. Hundreds of thousands of people fled Jaffna in advance of its capture by the Sri Lankan military in 1995, and high levels of displacement continued throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s.

8.2 ROLE OF THE STATE

During the civil war, government forces occupied territory and established military bases for operations, demarcating certain areas as High Security Zones (HSZs). The LTTE, too, had de-facto administrative control over large areas across several districts and were involved in forcibly displacing people, including a mass eviction of the Muslim community. By the end of the war, territory controlled by the military had expanded to include the areas previously held by the LTTE. While the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration initiated the release of land back to original owners, the military retained control over large areas, which they used for both military and non-military purposes. The military consolidated its position and control, including shifting from de facto occupation to legal acquisition. It not only established barracks, but also used the land for agriculture, tourism, and other commercial ventures. In 2014, it was estimated that at least 160,000 largely Sinhalese soldiers were stationed in the north, creating a ratio of one army member for every six civilians, despite the official end of hostilities in 2009.

In October 2015, at the UNHRC, Sri Lanka cosponsored a resolution that encouraged the government to ‘accelerate the return of land to its rightful civilian owners’ as well as to end military involvement in civilian activities. The government has since stated that it has returned nearly 80 to 85 percent of the land held since the war ended and will give up control in all areas without compromising on national security. Civil society groups, however, argue that there has been no transparency in the process, and many affected communities dispute the government’s claims. While the government

536 Human Rights Watch (2018), “‘Why Can’t We Go Home?’: Military Occupation of Land in Sri Lanka”, 9 October 2018
539 Shanika Sriyananda (2018), ‘Army to release over 263 acres of north east land to owners before 31 Dec’, Daily Financial Times, 19 December 2018
has released land in a number of sites across the north and east, the process has been delayed with other sites.\textsuperscript{540} In October 2018, Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena directed officials to release all civilian land held by the state in the northern and eastern provinces before the end of the year.\textsuperscript{541} This was further pushed back to 25 January;\textsuperscript{542} however, this deadline also does not seem to have been met,\textsuperscript{543} and observers have noted that land being used for military bases may never be returned.\textsuperscript{544}

\section*{8.3 RETURN VS REINTEGRATION}

Thiranagama writes that home among communities affected by violence and conflict is not just about relationships to the past but also about the possibilities of finding a future in which ‘one can flourish personally and collectively’.\textsuperscript{545} In July 2015, IDMC found that of the more than 794,000 IDPs registered as having returned to their places of origin in Northern and Eastern provinces, the situation of tens of thousands remains a cause for concern. While official IDP numbers have fallen since the end of conflict as the government has deregistered IDPs, no comprehensive assessment has been carried out to determine whether returnees had achieved a durable solution.\textsuperscript{546}

In April 2017, the Sri Lankan navy announced that it would release 100 acres of land occupied by the security forces since 2007 to the general public in the Mullikulam area and return the houses in the area to the original owners.\textsuperscript{547} However, in August 2018, the houses had not been returned, forcing the locals to live in semi-permanent shelters with limited livelihood options.\textsuperscript{548}

Even in other cases where land is said to have been released, there are issues. For instance, a portion of the land in Palaly HSZ in Northern Province that was offered to IDPs for resettlement in February 2015 was previously considered unacceptable, as people wanted to return to their original lands and because traditional farming families were being resettled at the site of former stone quarries or on land that was infertile. In contrast, the military continued to hold fertile land and operated luxury resorts, golf courses and other non-military enterprises on land taken from IDPs. In the case of Sampur HSZ in Eastern Province, 60 acres of land were released in 2015, but people were unable to resettle due to continued encroachment by the naval camp that had been relocated from the HSZ to adjacent territory. In an exercise of agency on the part of the IDPs and the Tamil community, protests and demonstrations as well as political pressure from Tamil MPs led to the remaining land from the HSZ being released in March 2016. However, the navy camp was relocated to an area close to the old site, which also includes land owned by the community. Moreover, having a navy camp in close proximity to the village is a security concern for the locals, who faced harassment and abuse at the hands of the Sri Lankan Army during the civil war.\textsuperscript{549}

\textsuperscript{540} Human Rights Watch (2018), “’Why Can’t We Go Home?’: Military Occupation of Land in Sri Lanka’, 9 October 2018
\textsuperscript{541} Sunday Times (2018), ‘President instruct officials to ensure return of civilian lands in N&E by Dec 1’, 4 October 2018
\textsuperscript{542} Chandran, Rina (2019), ‘A decade after war ends, Sri Lankan Tamils to “occupy” land held by army’, Reuters, 25 January 2019
\textsuperscript{543} Colombo Gazette (2019), ‘Tight security as Keppapilavu residents protest near army camp’, 26 January 2019
\textsuperscript{544} Chandran, Rina (2019), ‘Ten years after war ended, Sri Lankan Tamils may never get back land’, Reuters, 17 May 2019
\textsuperscript{549} The Oakland Institute (2016), ‘Waiting to Return Home: Continued Plight of the IDPs in Post-War Sri Lanka’
Land access is thus a key barrier to reintegration in Sri Lanka. As noted earlier, this has been the case in other regions as well, where the appropriation of property by the state has exacerbated segregation along ethnic and sectarian lines. In this context, the previously highlighted case of Burundi’s VRI programme may serve as an example. While in that case, issues such as poor infrastructure and distance from market towns as well as resource shortages undermined the objectives of the programme, lessons could be drawn to refine a similar programme in northern Sri Lanka. Critical to these efforts would be an understanding of the local context and culture as well as coordination between development agencies and humanitarian organisations. As Zeender and McCallin recommend, such a programme must adopt a participatory, bottom-up approach, with external activities aligning with national strategies for development, peacebuilding and land planning. Nevertheless, any adaptation of this or similar programmes must consider the central role of the state, which was a key implementer in Burundi. While the government of Sri Lanka has stated that it will return IDP land, it has been slow in doing so, citing national security concerns, something that external actors may have limited influence over.

8.4 TAKEAWAYS

The case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka presents a current example of resettlement being insufficient as a long-term solution for displacement. While this is the stage at which national government and international attention tends to dwindle, resettlement policies that ignore economic realities create the possibility of further displacement. Resettlement of members of the Tamil community on infertile land and in the shadow of the military, who may have caused their displacement in the first place, means that although statistics reflect a decreasing number of IDPs, a comprehensive examination is required to assess the impact of this policy. While the agency of the community has been exercised through demonstrations backed by local political leaders, this case also points to the requirement of having bottom-up, inclusive processes for planning and designing reintegration interventions from their initial stages. Models such as Burundi’s ‘villagization’ scheme can be seen as lessons in this regard, as in spite of having shortcomings, it provided the foundations of an inclusive approach towards generating livelihoods and facilitating return for displaced communities.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS

As the evidence base attests, there is no panacea or silver bullet solution to the issue of protracted displacement, and both practitioners and policy makers need to confront the uncomfortable reality that they may only be able to manage rather than resolve these issues.

The literature prescribes a litany of technocratic recommendations to improve how stakeholders design and deliver reintegration programming, usually prioritising an economically oriented analytical lens. There is little indication these lessons have been learned and applied by local, national or international institutions. Across various case studies the same mistakes are repeated and many

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of the assumptions framing paradigmatic approaches to reintegration remain flawed. Conflating reintegration with ‘return’ and offering restorative models as a preferred response to displacement ignores the aspirations of refugees and IDPs themselves, and the practical realities of what ‘return’ implies on the ground.

Actionable recommendations have therefore been designed to help strengthen on-going policy and programming. The authors caveat their suggestions with the acknowledgement that these measures will only have a cosmetic or moderate impact within a narrow set of parameters, as the problems disrupting reintegration are ultimately political, rather than technical.

Responses need to evolve from a rigorous assessment of need and contextual analysis:

- This should include a political economy review of conflict, displacement and host community dynamics (such as informal authority structures, grey economies and grass-root networks) alongside operational, stakeholder and historical migratory mappings. Policy-makers need to appreciate they are not operating in passive or static spaces, and time can have a visceral impact on the logic of displacement. Similarly, there are no ‘benign activities’, even piloted and experimental interventions create unintended consequences and negative externalities. Fluctuating needs, interests and dynamics of displacement situation must be tracked and responded to as they develop and persist.

- Categories of displaced people need to be disaggregated in relation to gender, socioeconomic background, and interests so programmes can more accurately gauge their interests, preferences, challenges and coping mechanisms.

Ensure a participatory and/or consultative approach, particularly in the preliminary stages:

- This encourages local buy-in and delivers granular feedback regarding conditions on the ground, which are often fluid and require constant monitoring. They are also essential for programme design and delivery. Interventions need to be synchronised with locally led autonomous strategies where possible, as this can mitigate the problem of secondary displacement and channel resources into community-created mechanisms that have authenticity and legitimacy but lack the faculties to sustain themselves independently.

Holistic, multi-agency interventions are critical:

- This is important when controlling for both macro and micro level variables, allowing a spectrum of actors to exploit comparative advantages and available synergies. This includes not only creating space for grass-root voices and host communities but also building the capacity of local agencies so they can substantively contribute to, and negotiate, complex processes and therefore any tokenism or latent paternalism. Hybrid programming should not be siloed between different disciplines but incorporate a spectrum of humanitarian, development, peacebuilding and transitional justice strategies, with the necessary coordination, coherence and sequencing to the exploit any mutual reinforcement between activities.

Local and transnational dynamics need to be understood and leveraged where possible:

- This involves using regional organisations, development banks, municipal governments and unconventional agents (such as churches and traditional grass-root brokers) as sources of investment, political support and legitimacy. This creates greater leverage for negotiating the hurdles associated with state-centrism, mobilising resources, and encouraging flexibility. International donors and humanitarian organisations also need to safeguard against states co-opting multilateral platforms for their own interests.

- This also involves considering how societal and economic configurations of operational environments are often orientated around patronage and kinship affiliations. International organisations, as impartial mediators, should monitor any external funding flows and enforce a rigorous accountability regime that enforces an inclusive dispensation empowering recipients,
irrespective of social identity. Corruption in this context is difficult to navigate. At a local level it can expedite integration, lower barriers to commercial/professional networks and 'grease the wheel' of municipal administration. The legal and ethnical integrity of interventions are critical but corruption is a nuanced dynamic that programmers need to be sensitive to, particularly when it is embedded in organically created coping mechanisms. While deleterious in the long term and antithetical to the ethical parameters of any intervention, its benefits need to be understood and if possible substituted or compensated for.

**Spontaneous returns must be anticipated and factored into formal reintegration programmes:**

- These need to be considered alongside a myriad of alternative solutions including continual trans-border migration streams that allow households to gather information and assess conditions at home. This requires donor and governmental flexibility to not only install reactive mechanisms capable of delivering welfare, vocational and security support to sudden influxes but leasing a degree of autonomy for displaced people to settle where they choose. Formal programming can help consolidate the benefits and manage the costs of locally led processes, particularly in terms of compensating host communities to negate any immediate tensions and allow social relations to mature over time.
  - Empowering local agents with autonomy, discretion and dignity is essential, although the authors concede this often conflicts with state-centric interests, exposing a fault-line the literature has yet to fully grapple with.

**The realities of urbanisation should to be recognised and reflected in programming for both refugees and IDPs:**

- This includes the need for urban planning and investment from municipal and national authorities to stabilise, regulate and gradually integrate illicit settlements such as peri-urban slums, in line with the sensitivities of host communities and relevant labour exigencies. Government engagement can be supplemented with international support to strengthen livelihood assistance packages and improve access to basic services, infrastructure and commercial markets.

**Transforming new arrivals into positive net contributors cultivates societal goodwill and forestalls the vulnerabilities associated with the grey economy:**

- Any exercise in emancipation or capacity building will need to be holistic, requiring the inclusion of the urban poor and pre-existing city residents, and should be supplemented by economic initiatives in rural areas to diversify vocational opportunities and manage internal migration flows. This necessitates systemic interventions that nest capacity building efforts in the longer-term regeneration of critical infrastructure, services and government institutions to ensure recipient populations have access to markets, a viable consumer base and are plugged into the wider economy.

**Learn from experimental models already in operation (e.g. Kenya):**

- Across a number of countries cited in this study, the emancipatory logic of cash funding has been enhanced by the use of voucher and virtual currencies to help mitigate negative externalities and limit opportunities for corruption. These innovative strategies help empower refugees and diminish aid dependency, providing a dynamic medium for supporting displaced populations as they develop self-sufficient economies. Such arrangements can foster platform for enmeshing IDPs and refugees into wider host societies.
  - Any commercial schemes cannot be conducted in isolation and must respond to the sensitivities relating to wider esoteric issues of identity and belonging. Consulting and/or partnering with local authorities and informal agents may help navigate these difficulties. The evidence base shows creative solutions are feasible when synchronised with the surrounding environment.
It is important to furnish realistic expectations not only for displaced populations but also among host communities, governments and donors.

- Grievances can be partially managed through restitution, compensation and the mechanics of transitional justice, but only when working in tandem with broader security, peacebuilding and developmental measures that deliver attractive alternatives for victims rather than leaving them in limbo. These realities may not necessarily live up to the idealised visions of home often promoted by donors and practitioners, and the raising of unattainable aspirations must be avoided as they are likely to be frustrated.

- Crucially, the envisaged “end point” of the return cycle need to be replaced with a sophisticated understanding of what reintegration means. Donors, host governments and countries of origin should therefore lower their own expectations and work pragmatically to help displaced people navigate the difficult choices available, factoring in input from refugees and IDPs themselves to understand what they interpret as ‘success’

**Monitoring and evaluation need to be improved, particularly in terms of collating robust indicators, disaggregating data and sharing findings between stakeholders.**

- Metrics should prioritise process rather than outcome and acknowledge the continual mobility of participants is not necessarily a sign of failure.
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