HM Government

UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2018-2022: Guidance Note – Implementing Strategic Outcome 6: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

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About this Guidance Note

This is one of a series of guidance notes being produced on each of the Strategic Outcomes of the UK National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security (2018-2022) to support implementation of policy and programme interventions in each area:

1. Decision-making

2. Peacekeeping

3. Gender-based violence

4. Humanitarian response

5. Security and justice

6. Preventing and countering violent extremism

7. UK capabilities

It is intended to support HMG staff and partners in meeting commitments under Strategic Outcome 6 of the NAP: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism.

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Acknowledgements

Executive Summary – Implementing UK NAP Strategic Outcome 6: Preventing & countering violent extremism

Why it matters

Violent Extremism Organisations (VEO) have long recognised the importance of gender in their communications and propaganda activities; in their recruitment methods; in how they manage their organisations and any territory they hold; and in how they plan and undertake operations. They also **strategically target men, women, boys, girls and Sexual and Gender Minorities (SGM) for Gender-Based Violence (GBV)** to aid their causes; and use GBV perpetration by government security forces and other relevant actors to mobilise support. To Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism (P/CVE) effectively, it is therefore crucial that we also **recognise and respond to the ways that gender impacts on individuals' identities and agency**; how this relates to their grievances, opportunities, resilience and vulnerabilities in contexts where Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs) operate; and the **multitude of roles that women and men play in both violent extremism and P/CVE**. Not only will this **make our P/CVE work more effective and equitable**, it will also help us to **avoid harm**; and to build long-term peace and security by **promoting gender equality** and women's human rights.

Strategic Outcome 6 commits HMG to:

- Ensuring the participation and leadership of women in developing strategies to P/CVE;
- Funding overseas work on P/CVE that includes upstream activity targeted specifically at women, and;
- Developing alternative and counter- narratives that address the specific concerns and vulnerabilities of both men and women.
- Mainstreaming gender across P/CVE programming in line with wider UK goals on gender equality. This means that HMG staff should assess the implications for women, men and sexual and gender minorities (SGM) of any planned P/CVE action so that they benefit equally, and gender equality is not perpetuated.

Tool 1: Gender-sensitive conflict analysis of the violent extremist context

- Within a broader gender-sensitive conflict analysis, take steps to analyse:
- Existing gender inequalities and gender-related grievances in the VE context;
- The gendered ideologies of VEOs and how they are using gender in their recruitment strategies;
- Whether, how and why the VEO is perpetrating GBV;
- The roles played by women/girls/men/boys in VEOs;
- The impact the VEO is having on gender relations and gender equality.

Map the actors involved in P/CVE work. This includes capturing the less visible roles that women and women's rights organisations (WRO) are playing and the risks they may face.

Ensure **research and data collection** is gender-sensitive and incorporates different insights of women, girls, men, boys and SGMs most affected by VE.

Tool 2: Ensure women's participation and leadership

- Take time to understand and recognise the contribution of women and WROs to P/CVE work in the programming context.
- **Consult with women and WROs** in a way that is meaningful; and advocate for women's meaningful participation with partner governments and other stakeholders.
- Provide long-term **funding and capacity building support** to build the capabilities of women and WROs to engage with the P/CVE agenda.
- Provide women and WROs with the resources, time and space to develop a **shared position** before they engage in formal consultation processes around P/CVE strategies.
- Be explicit in the programme documentation that any P/CVE strategies and action plans should involve the **participation and leadership of women**; and should be gender sensitive.
- Work on gender issues in a culturally sensitive way, **taking the lead from WRO**s working in that context.

Tools 3-9: Gender-sensitive P/CVE throughout the programme cycle

- Go beyond programming that promotes equal numbers of women and men as project beneficiaries to **respond to the gendered drivers** and impacts of VE.
- Analyse the gender-specific grievances of women and girls that may drive their engagement with VEOs and develop **upstream activities** that respond to these.
- Ensure programmes respond to the specific needs of **women returnees**, or women whose family members are engaged in VEOs.
- Ensure that campaigns respond to **VEO gendered narratives**.
- Be explicit whether the programme will target both men and women and which men and women.
- Assess whether the programme is promoting harmful norms or reinforcing **power differences** between men and women, and mitigate this.
- Avoid s**tereotyping or instrumentalising women** (using women, or the promotion of WHR, only to achieve a specific P/CVE aim). This can alienate women from the P/CVE programmes, put women at risk, and/or fuel harmful gender norms.
- Develop mitigation strategies to protect the partners and beneficiaries from **gender-related backlash** and violence.
- Ensure implementing partners have a gender policy and **safeguarding** procedures and a strategy for working with WROs.

Examples

Promoting the participation of women in developing P/CVE Strategies in Pakistan

Recognising a lack of available evidence on women's role in P/CVE the British High Commission (BHC) commissioned research to explore this issue. The BHC then held a roundtable with grassroots CSOs, including WROs, to further explore the role women play in VE and P/CVE. This resulted in commitments which included raising women's voices in the strategic communications campaigns. To build ongoing dialogue with WROs the BHC committed to reconvening the group every six months.

Working bilaterally to promote gender sensitivity in P/CVE campaigns

HMG supports a partner government to work with civil society to amplify the reach and impact of CSO-led P/CVE campaigns. The implementing partner is facilitating this through developing a simple tool to help CSOs and government staff prioritise conflict and gender sensitivity analysis in campaign design. The tool prompts users to analyse the ways in which VE affects women/girls differently to men/boys in the specific contexts they are working in, and adapt campaign activities to mitigate potential risks and create opportunities for empowerment.

Further Resources

UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2018-2022

HMG Guidance: JICTU Guidance Note on Gender Sensitivity and Counter Terrorism, SU/GSCI Guidance- Gender and Strategic Communications, DFID Gender Equality Guidance.

External Guidance: UN Women Gender & CVE Guidance, ICAN Invisible Women: Gendered Dimensions of Return, Reintegration & Rehabilitation from Violent Extremism

Advisory support: Stabilisation Unit, DFID Social Development Advisors, CSSF Gender Advisers

Acronyms

BHC	British High Commission
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CT	Counter-Terrorism
DV	Domestic Violence
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GSS	Gender Sensitivity Score
HMG	Her Majesty's Government (the UK Government)
IP	Implementing Partner
KII	Key Informant Interview
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NAP	National Action Plan
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
P/CVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
RF	Results Framework
SGM	Sexual and Gender Minorities
SoR	Statement of Requirements
SU	Stabilisation Unit
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
VAWG	Violence against Women and Girls
VE	Violent Extremists
VEO	Violent Extremist Organisations
WHR	Women's Human Rights
WHRD	Women's Human Rights Defenders
WRO	Women's Rights Organisations and Groups
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
XRW	Extreme Right-Wing

Introduction

> ### Strategic Outcome 6:
> Preventing and countering violent extremism – Ensure the participation and leadership of women in developing strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism.

'If we do not understand how violent extremism is influenced, fuelled and countered by men and women, we cannot harness that understanding to defeat it'

Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon[1]

The **UK National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS)** is the five-year strategy for how the UK Government will integrate a gender perspective into its work to build security and stability overseas, protect the human rights of women and girls, and promote their meaningful participation in conflict prevention and resolution. The NAP outlines seven strategic outcomes that set the vision for the UK's WPS implementation on conflict settings. In line with UK commitments under UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1325[2], 2242, 2354 and the **UN Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism**[3] Strategic Outcome 6 relates to the UK's work on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE).

Strategic Outcome 6 commits HMG to:

- Ensuring the participation and leadership of women in developing strategies to P/CVE;
- Funding overseas work on P/CVE that includes upstream activity targeted specifically at women, and;
- Developing alternative and counter- narratives that address the specific concerns and vulnerabilities of both men and women.

It also commits HMG to mainstreaming gender across P/CVE programming in line with wider UK goals on gender equality[4]. This means that HMG staff should assess the implications for women, men and sexual and gender minorities (SGM) of any planned P/CVE action so that they benefit equally, and gender equality is not perpetuated[5].

This includes relevant work under the **UK Strategy for Countering Terrorism (CONTEST)**[6]. See **Annex A** for the full text of NAP Strategic Outcome 6.

As will be explored within this paper, to prevent and counter violent extremism (VE) effectively, it is crucial that we recognise and respond to the ways that gender impacts on individuals' identities and agency[7]; how this relates to their grievances, opportunities, resilience and vulnerabilities in contexts where Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs) operate; and the multitude of roles that women and men play in both violent extremism and P/CVE. Not only will this make our P/CVE work more effective and equitable, it will also help us to avoid harm; and to build long-term peace and security by promoting gender equality and women's human rights[8].

This guidance note offers practical advice to HMG staff in policy and programme teams on how to design, commission, implement and monitor P/CVE work to meet Strategic Outcome 6 commitments. It first presents evidence of how gender relates to VE, looking across a range of VEOs globally including jihadi, ethno-nationalist and extreme right wing (XRW)[9] groups. The guidance is then structured around the programme cycle and includes considerations and tools for staff. Examples of best practice drawn from across the global portfolio of HMG's P/CVE work are provided, with details of this work (such as implementing partner names, or the specific geographical focus on the project) removed where sensitive.

UN Security Council Resolutions

2242 (2015): Urges member states to conduct and gather gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers of radicalisation for women, and the impacts of counter-terrorism (CT) strategies on women's human rights (WHR) and women's rights organisations and groups (WRO); and ensure the participation and leadership of women and WROs in developing strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism (VE), including through countering incitement to commit terrorist acts, creating counter narratives and other appropriate interventions, and building their capacity to do so effectively.

2354 (2017): Stresses that member states should ensure that counter-narratives take into account the gender dimension, and that narratives should be developed that address specific concerns and vulnerabilities of both men and women.

This guidance note should be read in conjunction with other relevant resources. These include:

- The UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2018-2022;
- JICTU Guidance Note on Gender Sensitivity and Counter Terrorism;
- Integrating Gender into Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) Programming;
- SU/GSCI Guidance Note on Gender and Strategic Communications;
- DFID & FCO How To Note on Gender Equality: A Practical Guide to Integrating Gender Equality into DFID and HMG Programming

Gender and Violent Extremism

Please see Annex B for a detailed evidence review of gender and violent extremism.

Contemporary VEOs around the world tend to support traditional, conservative gender norms and ideologies. Whether jihadi, extreme right wing (XRW), or (less so) ethno-nationalist, VEOs often have distinct gender ideologies that promote patriarchal and rigid gender roles for women and men, often stating that this is crucial for stable and moral societies[10]. Women's human rights are often framed as 'Western', colonialist and/or immoral[11]; and are blamed for the alleged moral decline they fight against[12].

VEO discourses typically state that men are the traditional protectors, power holders and decision makers in society; and that women are under the protection (and by extension) ownership of men[13], with women's stereotypically 'feminine' roles as dependent, domestic wives, sisters and mothers portrayed as glorious and honourable above all else[14]. VEOs also tend to denigrate women; and use their prescribed gender roles strategically to govern and control their territory, when they have it (for example, by using forced marriage to control and use women's labour, energies, networks and resources to support the group[15]) .

Across Central and Eastern Europe, XRW VEOs are building upon Soviet ideologies of corrupt European states to increasingly develop and mobilise individuals around an 'anti-gender' discourse, which argues that gender equality is an anti-family, pro-gay and anti-life ideology.

Gendered constructions have been found to be more critical as determinants of militant jihadist Islamism and terrorism than perhaps any other factors – including religion and poverty – that are often held responsible for such behaviours[16].

Use of gender and gender-based violence in VEO recruitment and propaganda

VEOs recognise that women and men experience a lack of power and act on their frustrations differently[17] due to gender norms, expectations and identities. Their recruitment campaigns are subsequently often highly gendered in order to improve their reach and effectiveness.

For men, VEOs often try to exploit feelings of emasculation, exclusion, alienation, shame and humiliation[18] to offer them a chance to prove a certain type of violent masculinity[19].

VEOs also use their group identity to provide men with a sense of belonging and purpose and a way to go overnight 'from being a nothing, a nobody, to being somebody[20]. This can be a potent pull for some men who are feeling disempowered, frustrated, or publicly slighted in their current situation. As such, we need to understand how VEOs use these gender identities and norms within contexts of wider social and economic disenfranchisement[21]. In conflict settings, for example, VEOs play on gender roles to recruit men who have difficult achieving 'manhood' through traditional means (such as finding a job or a wife, or starting a family).

As with men, VEOs tailor their recruitment campaigns for women. This includes notions of 'hyper-femininity'[22] to mobilise them to protect their children and themselves, do a service in protection of their country or community[23]; and within jihadi VEOs, to fulfil their 'duty' to support the wider Muslim community[24]. Women also have gender specific grievances that VEOs exploit, such as a lack of opportunities to practice their religion; or a desire to escape from rigid, patriarchal norms and restrictions on their freedom[25]. Jihadi VEOs have promised women an end to gender injustice through the implementation of Sharia law – which research suggests is a key driver for women to join or support such groups[26].

Image 1 (above) of a Daesh recruitment poster put out by British foreign fighters, Rayal al Tawheed using graphic still photos taken from popular video games[27]

Gender-Based Violence (GBV) against women by state or international security forces can also be a key driver for men and women to join VEOs; and for women, VEOs can sometimes be perceived to offer them protection from GBV. Within XRW VEOs, the notion of the threat of minority races and immigrants to innocent white women (e.g. as rapists and victimizers) has been a potent mobiliser to garner support for their cause (see image 2 right).

Gender-Based Violence by VEOs

Systematic oppression of women's human rights by VEOs are well documented; and they perpetrate GBV against men, boys, women, girls and SGMs. Restrictions on the daily lives of women by jihadi VEOs such as the Taleban, Daesh and al-Shabaab – from dress to movement, employment, entrepreneurship and religious observance – restrict even the most basic freedoms for women and girls.

Whilst there is less research on GBV committed by XRW VEOs, evidence suggests that many racist VE groups are intensely male-dominated and violently misogynist. The XRW perpetuate harmful gender norms that fuel Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG), including the promoting of aggression and domination and negative norms about the value of women and men's sexual entitlement[28].

The 'anti-gender' discourse promoted by XRW VEOs in Central and Eastern Europe has resulted in violent attacks upon sexual and gender minorities (SGM); and attacks on WROs and women human rights defenders (WHRDs). Such discourses have also fuelled the adoption of gender discriminatory legislation; backlashes against gender equality education; and a roll back of women's sexual and reproductive health and rights[29].

As well as being used to terrorise, coerce and control women and men; and to punish or humiliate their opposition; GBV can be used as a recruitment tool by VEOs – literally giving them a 'sex appeal' by offering men access to multiple wives, in addition to other women and girls as sex slaves[30].

Roles played by women and girls in VEOs and in P/CVE

Women play diverse roles within VEOs. One of the most critical roles is as mobilisers, social facilitators, recruiters and propagandists for VEOs. Women, for example, are prominent in spreading hate speech on social media[31], fuelling the XRW through their rhetoric about race wars; immigration and rape; and their anti-feminist stance, including undermining women's activism on sexual violence and women's sexual and reproductive rights.

Despite strict gender segregation and a lack of public mobility in Daesh controlled areas, women were still able to play key roles as online recruiters for Daesh[32]; with Daesh having dedicated media wings to produce content directly targeting women[33].

As well as spreading extremist ideologies, women play key roles supporting VEOs as mothers and influencers of the next generation[34]. As with jihadi groups, within XRW groups there has been growing recognition of the importance of

Image 2: Race hate stickers distributed on bus stops and lamp posts in the UK by the XRW group North West Infidels[35]

women's role in this respect recent years, as leaders have sought to increase their group's longevity[36].

Women also materially support VEOs[37] and can play a variety of combat support roles including as informants, messengers, intelligence gatherers, transporters for money and hiders of weapons[38]. Women can also be employed by VEOs to staff justice institutions, courts and prisons holding women or dealing with 'women's issues'[39].

Women are more likely to be active combatants in groups with an ethno-nationalist cause, than those with a jihadi mission, though there is evidence of jihadi VEOs training and using women as active combatants. Women have also played significant roles as suicide bombers for VEOs.


Image 3[40] (above) – a female jihadi encourages her husband to go and fight jihad to enable them both to enter paradise after his death/martyrdom

Women also play diverse and innovative roles in the P/CVE space, though this often receives scant attention, and women may not define these roles in terms of P/CVE. With the trust they have built up by being rooted in the local community, grassroots WROs are able to reach out and interact with vulnerable individuals to offer them purpose and a strong sense of belonging; and to provide different interpretations of religious references[41]. Women also play key roles in the regional, national and international policy space, making strategic recommendations to donors, governments and other bodies on how to effectively P/CVE[42].

However, security and counter-terrorism (CT) measures have shrunk space for civil society activism and women's voices to be heard in P/CVE[43]. WROs challenging the status quo by promoting gender equality frequently find themselves at odds with, and targeted by their own governments,

including by those that criminalise such legitimate activities as 'terrorism'[44] CT financing legislation, and donor preference for larger implementing partners (IP) has also resulted in reduced funding for women's peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance in areas where VEOs are active and exercise control[45].

Women and WROs may also suffer from gender bias by those conceptualising and designing P/CVE programmes. Women are often understood to play their major (or only) role in P/CVE as potential de-radicalisers and influencers *in families* through their roles as mothers, wives and sisters. In these roles they are expected to reach individuals and groups that are difficult to access and to influence them away from VE (e.g. through Mothers' Schools)[46].

Implementing Strategic Outcome 6

Diagram One: Implementing Strategic Outcome 6 across the programme cycle

Stage 1: Integrating gender into analysis of the VE context

This section outlines key considerations to ensure that analysis of the VE context is gender sensitive. It is assumed that an analysis of the VE context will form one part of a broader gender-sensitive conflict analysis of the specific programming and policy context, such as a Joint Analysis of Conflict and Stability (JACS). Please consult Stabilisation Unit guidance on Integrating Gender into JACS on steps for conducting a gender-sensitive conflict analysis.

Key Considerations:

a. **Gender analysis is not only about women and girls**. Gender inequality, gender roles, gender identities and GBV may be drivers of VE recruitment for men/boys, as well as women/girls and SGMs. VEOs also often promote rigid gender identities and harmful gender norms, which can fuel GBV and undermine gender equality.

b. **Every VE context is differen**t. There is a need to test any gender assumptions about men/boys and women/girls grievances, needs and coping mechanisms related to VE; and their involvement in VE through research and data collection within the communities affected. Gender intersects with a variety of other factors, including age, race, disability, clan, caste, class and wealth. It is therefore important to analyse the vulnerabilities and opportunities for different groups of women/girls, men/boys and SGMs affected by VE.

c. **Women and WROs play a variety of crucial roles within P/CVE**, including less visible roles in households and communities. Their roles are often ill-recognised, co-opted, or undermined by other P/CVE actors.

d. **There is a need to undertake consultations with women and women's organisations in a way that is meaningful and safe**, in order to capture the views of women and girls (see Case Study Three and the Risks section)

e. **Women, girls, men and boys may have different access to information** (online and offline); different media preferences and habits; different opportunities to create and engage with media and communications; and may react differently to media content such as counter-narrative campaigns (see Case Study Seven).

Case Study One: Conducting gender-sensitive analysis to inform strategic communications programming

HMG partners have been undertaking ongoing research in order to better understand how women participate in and are affected by VEOs in areas controlled or coerced by VEOs; and to provide programmatic recommendations. Their research has included an analysis of existing literature on armed groups and gender in their programming context; the VEO's social activities in their target areas; and the VEO's approach to gender issues. At community level, the IP has also used trusted research partners with access to and connections within their target communities, who are able to gain access to groups of men and hard-to-reach women to gather their insights.

At community level, male and female researchers (often husband and wife, or brother and sister teams), who the IP has trained in interviewing and facilitation techniques, carried out in-depth interviews and focus groups discussions with men and women (in sex segregated groups) in their target communities. Local researchers helped to frame interview questions to get the information needed in a way that was both achievable and culturally sensitive (for example, women and men were never asked directly about their relationships with family members, or directly about the VEO). Asking the same questions to both men and women in relevant communities enabled the IP to see how participant responses could be gender biased (e.g. women detailed the active participation of other women in their communities in political or VEO activities, whereas men often said they were not active); as well as assessing any gender differences in attitudes relating to the VEO's treatment of women.

The IP also regularly reviews how women and men are responding online to VE and P/CVE content, why they are responding that way, and what makes them engage or disengage from online content.

This gender-sensitive research has given the IP detailed and nuanced information about the social context where the VEO operates and where men and women within the target audience live; and has allowed them to more effectively reach men and women with counter-narrative based on their beliefs and their lived experiences (see Case Study Seven).

Tool 1: Gender-sensitive conflict analysis of the VE extremist context

- Within a broader gender-sensitive conflict analysis, take steps to **analyse:**
  - Existing gender inequalities and gender-related grievances in the VE context;
  - The gendered ideologies of VEOs and how they are using gender in their recruitment strategies;
  - The roles played by women/girls/men/boys in VEOs;
  - Whether, how and why the VEO is perpetrating GBV;
  - The impact the VEO is having on gender equality, WHRs and gender relations/norms.

- Ensure that any **research or data collection** is done in a way that is gender-sensitive and collects and incorporates insights of women, girls, men, boys and SGMs most affected by VE.

- **Map the actors involved** in P/CVE work and the power dynamics between them, including capturing the less visible roles that women and WROs are playing within households, civil society and communities; and any risks faced by WHRDs working in this field.

- Analyse whether the **actors involved** in P/CVE work (including government and civil society) are:
  - Gender-sensitive and promoting gender equality;
  - If their actions are promoting the leadership and participation of women, and/or;
  - Whether allocated P/CVE resources are reaching women and girls.

- Analyse how and why women and girls safely **access and distribute alternative and counter-narrative media** and communications (online and offline); whether gender norms are limiting their ability to engage; and whether/how their media preferences and habits differ to those of men and boys.

Case Study Two: Gender-sensitive analysis of resilience to VE in MENA

As part of the British Council's '*Strengthening Resilience in MENA*' programme, a detailed study was undertaken to measure male and female participants' personal resilience (including social ecological resources) at the beginning and the end of their project activities[47]. The project was successful in reaching girls and women from conservative communities.

Through gathering and analysing this gender disaggregated data, researchers found that their target girls/young women reported higher levels of purpose than boys/young men; and were more likely to know people who they considered to be role models (improving their resilience).

Results from the programme also found that (whilst not statistically significant), improvements in some aspects of resilience showed a marked trend towards being stronger for one gender or the other, e.g. the positive change in '*I'm not afraid to speak out*' appeared to be more marked for young women, while the positive change in '*Even when things are going badly, I can see a positive future*' appeared more marked for young men.

Whilst not explored within the study, whether these gendered differences in resilience are a result of the gendered norms, roles and expectations operating within the programming context requires further exploration. Such analysis can help broaden our understanding of how gender identities and norms impact on the resilience of young men and women to VE; and to use this knowledge to refine our programmes accordingly.

Stage 2: Designing P/CVE programmes, policy and strategies

'CVE programming is implicitly gendered, but overtly gender blind'[48]

This section outlines key considerations when designing P/CVE programmes, policy and strategies, in order to:

- Ensure the participation and leadership of women in developing P/CVE strategies;
- Design upstream P/CVE activity targeted specifically at women;
- Develop gender-sensitive P/CVE alternative and counter-narratives;
- Effectively mainstream gender across P/CVE strategies.

Please also see other sections for considerations for integrating gender into Theory of Change development, and identifying and mitigating gender related Risks.

i) Ensuring the participation and leadership of women in developing P/CVE strategies

Key Considerations:

a. **A lack of gender sensitivity in P/CVE strategies may inadvertently cause harm** by reinforcing harmful gender norms and inequalities and excluding the voices and priorities of women and girls. In doing so they fail to tackle root causes of VE or support crucial P/CVE work being undertaken by women in their communities.

b. **Women's contribution to P/CVE work has to date been largely unrecognised**. Misconceptions about women's lack of power and influence to conduct P/CVE work endure. Meaningful consultations with these women may result in real innovation and advances in understanding processes that lead communities to reject VE[49].

c. **Women and WROs are not often consulted abou P/CVE strategies**. When they are, they are often not consulted in a meaningful way (see Case Study Three)

d. **Women do not always agree**. Don't assume solidarity between women, just because they are women, or expect them to prioritise the same issues or speak with one voice. Time is needed to build a shared position and understanding on P/CVE amongst women and women's advocacy groups[50].

e. **There is a lack of long-term sustainable funding for P/CVE work undertaken by WRO**s; and a lack of support to enable them to build their capacity to meaningfully participate.

ii) Designing upstream P/CVE activity targeted specifically at women

Key Considerations:

a. **Women and girls are deliberately targeted for recruitment by VEOs for their important roles** in state building, recruitment, propaganda, fundraising, combat (particularly suicide bombing) and combat support activities. As such, we also need to design upstream P/CVE activity targeted specifically at women.

b. **The propaganda, misinformation and actions of VEOs undermine gender equality**; promote GBV; and create specific risks for women, WROs and WHRDs. This undermines wider UK goals on gender equality and peacebuilding.

c. **Women have gender-specific grievances that VEOs exploit**. These include gender inequality and injustice, GBV (by government, or within their own homes and communities); a lack of opportunities to engage in income generation activities (education, employment, entrepreneurship), civil action, social networks and politics; restrictions on their religious practice, and/or few options to access religious education.

d. **Some women and girls are abducted, trafficked or coerced into joining VEO groups**, whilst others join voluntarily and actively recruit other women and men to their cause.

e. **Women returnees, or women whose male family members are engaged in VEOs may face specific vulnerabilities and have specific needs due to**

injuries and trauma, stigma and ostracization and/or poverty due to the loss of the male breadwinner. It is important to provide services to these women and their families as part of broader P/CVE work to break the cycle of violence; and to prevent them from returning to the VEO.

iii. Developing gender-sensitive P/CVE alternative and counter-narratives

Key Considerations:

a. **VEOs tap into women and men's gender identities and roles as part of their propaganda and recruitment strategies**. To be effective, alternative and counter-narratives must also recognise and respond with gendered narratives.

b. **VEOs promote myths and disinformation about GBV, what gender equality means and the negative effects of gender equality programming, with far reaching implications**. There is a need to challenge these myths as part of our alternative and counter-narratives work to help promote universal values and gender equality.

c. **Highlighting disparities and hypocrisies between VEOs narratives and reality may help reduce the credibility of and debunk VEO narratives on gender**. Different men and women within VEOs sometimes share their societal and gender norms, but may also deviate from them. VEOs often fail to fulfil the promises they make to communities around gender issues (such as protecting women from GBV, women making a significant contribution to their communities, or men gaining honour and glory due to their VE activities) leaving male and female recruits feeling disillusioned. Women who produce and disseminate VEO propaganda

about the need for rigid, traditional gender roles and women's confinement to the private sphere also don't always uphold these roles themselves.

d. **It is important to recognise the important role that women play in disseminating VEO propaganda and ideology**. This includes recruiting other women, as well as encouraging men to join VEOs. HMG can respond to this by tapping into peer networks to promote and support the role of men and women who are promoting messages of peace and tolerance. Young men and women in particular may have specialist knowledge of the comms/media/social media environment and be best placed to engage effectively with P/CVE initiatives operating in this space.

e. **Strategic communications campaigns are most effective if they develop a full understanding of the women and men an intervention is trying to reach** – 'not just who they are, but what they think and feel, and more importantly, why they think and feel it'[51].

f. **Women and men may want different information and may access and respond to information in different ways**. This has consequences for how strategic communications work should be designed. Alternative and counter-narrative work should therefore be based on a thorough gender-sensitive analysis of the VE context and media environment, recognising any specific risks or barriers women may face offline or online (see, for example, Case Study 7)

g. **Women should be given a voice in alternative and counter-narrative work**; the opportunity to design the key messages; and to assess their likely effectiveness. HMG can also help amplify credible women's voices that promote peace, tolerance and non-violent community activism within our alternative and counter-narrative work.

Case Study Three: Making women's participation in developing P/CVE strategies *meaningful*

Research commissioned by the UK network 'Gender Action on Peace and Security'[52] (GAPS) and its members[53] highlights the need for *meaningful* dialogue with women's groups in conflict, including P/CVE. The research outlines the limitations of one-off consultations, where women's groups often find themselves unable to set the agenda, scope and content of the consultation; are given limited time and support to prepare their positions; are restricted to talking about SGBV or other perceived 'women's issues'; and/or lack logistical support, funding, training or capacity building to attend and participate effectively. Such consultations can be a tokenistic exercise that feel extractive and limit the true impact that women's organisations can make to P/CVE.

Instead, the paper recommends developing longer-term ongoing dialogues and partnerships with a variety of women's groups, including marginalised women (such as those with low literacy), women from SGM, women with disabilities, widows and those from rural areas. When shorter consultations are needed, a mixed-methods approach should be used that includes workshops, Key Informant Interviews (KII) and Focus Group Discussions (FGD) with a variety of women's groups to ensure a diversity of perspectives. Key papers or policy documents, agendas and meeting participant lists should be sent to women's groups in advance to enable them to prepare tailored recommendations. Flexible and quick release funding, childcare, chaperones, translation services, and support with travel arrangements (particularly visas) and security are important logistical elements to put in place. To ensure that women participate in a way that genuinely affects decision making, event organisers should also consider and mitigate cultural barriers that may stop women from speaking in public and sharing their opinions. The research has led to the development of a self-assessment toolkit[54] which Government officials, multilateral agencies and NGOs can use to meaningfully ensure women and girls' participation.

Tool 2: Ensure women's participation and leadership

- Take time to understand and recognise the **contribution of women and WROs** to P/CVE work in the programming context.

- **Consult with women and WROs**, (and/or facilitate consultations between decision makers and women and WROs) in a way that is meaningful; and advocate for women's meaningful participation with partner governments and other stakeholders.

- Provide long-term **funding and capacity building support** to build the capabilities of women and WROs to engage with the P/CVE agenda.

- Provide women and WROs with the resources, time and space to develop a **shared position** before they engage in formal consultation processes around P/CVE strategies.

- Be explicit in the programme documentation that any P/CVE strategies and action plans should involve the **participation and leadership of women**; and should be gender sensitive.

Case Study Four: Promoting the participation and leadership of women in developing P/CVE Strategies

HMG in Pakistan has taken a number of steps to ensure the participation and leadership of women in developing their P/CVE work. First, due to the lack of available evidence on women's role in P/CVE, the British High Commission (BHC) commissioned research to explore this issue. The research included secondary research and KIIs with women and men from national and international CSOs, government institutions, journalists and specialists/researchers; and drew attention to trends and risk factors associated with women's radicalisation; the roles women play in P/CVE; the challenges they face to participating in this space; and recommendations for supporting their participation and leadership.

The BHC also held a roundtable with grassroots CSOs, including WROs, to further explore the role women play in VE and P/CVE, resulting in plans to engage more with female politicians in Pakistan on this agenda; raising women's voices and supporting positive female role models within their strategic communication campaigns; and a commitment to assess their funding streams to consider whether they can do more to support small scale pilot P/CVE programming with a particular focus on women. To help build ongoing dialogue and partnerships with women's organisations, the BHC committed to reconvening the group every six months, adding voices where appropriate.

h. **Alternative and counter- narrative campaigns should also provide positive and tangible alternatives** for women to make a difference in their communities, such as through contributing to charitable work or development.

iv) *Ensuring effective gender mainstreaming across P/CVE initiatives*

Key Considerations:

a. **Gender sensitive programming is not just about ensuring equal numbers of male and female beneficiaries**. Understanding gendered push and pull factors for joining or not joining VE groups, including understanding how gender identities and gender relations create various kinds of pressures and vulnerabilities, is an essential part of building effective P/CVE programmes.

b. **Gender-blind P/CVE programmes can inadvertently cause harm by promoting or strengthening harmful gender norms and stereotypes**; and by increasing power differentials between men and women.

c. **All P/CVE programmes have the potential to contribute to gender equality, even if it is not their main aim**. To ensure this, any barriers to women's, or SGMs, participation in P/CVE initiatives should be analysed and removed; and gender transformational[55] P/CVE programmes should be considered, where possible.

d. **It is important to consult meaningfully with women and WROs**. This includes building long-term relationships where possible, and to integrate their concerns and ideas into the P/CVE programmes, even if they are not explicitly targeted at women. If you are not aware of WROs working in the context, you can undertake a stakeholder mapping, or seek the support of women's networks, such as the UK-based network, Gender Action for Peace and Security[56], to find out this information.

e. **Ensuring women's participation in security sectors**[57], as well as improving women's access to security and justice, is an essential element of addressing security sector grievances that create conditions conducive to VE, yet this issue is rarely targeted within P/CVE strategies and programming.

Case Study Five: Upstream activity targeted specifically at women in the Caucasus

HMG has been supporting a women's NGO to prevent radicalisation of girls and young women in the Caucasus. Through targeting young women and girls through online webinars, social media and lectures at universities and schools, the IP works to explain the manipulative techniques that VEOs use to find and recruit women, including through social media and dating sites. They also offer psychological assistance to families with adolescent children deemed to be at risk; and direct campaigns at men and boys to encourage and support women's higher and professional education as a way of improving their resilience to VE recruitment.

The organisation provides tailored support for women and their relatives returning from Syria, who have been suffering from trauma and stigma. Through work stations set up in religious centres and hostels, the IP has been providing post-trauma psychological assistance in a safe space to aid women with rehabilitation and community reintegration.

Tool 3: Designing upstream activity targeting women

Analyse the **gender-specific grievances** of women and girls that may drive their engagement with VEOs and develop upstream activities that respond to these.

Within the P/CVE programme, **respond to the specific impact(s)** that VE is having on gender equality (including GBV) in line with wider UK goals on gender equality.

Respond to and counter the specific ways that VEOs are targeting women and girls for recruitment, including through their online activities, peers and families; and through coercion, abduction and trafficking.

Ensure programmes respond to the **specific needs of women returnees**, or women whose family members are engaged in VEOs

Case Study Six: Reducing women and girls' vulnerability to radicalisation and recruitment to VEOs in Kenya

HMG is supporting a number of upstream projects specifically targeting women at risk of radicalisation and recruitment as part of the CSSF East Africa Building Resilience in Civil Society (BRICS) P/CVE programme. Based on their research and pilot programmes, the IP has defined the circumstances putting women 'at risk' in this context as female-headed households who are alone, isolated, discriminated against and stigmatised due to their husbands or sons being killed (or disappeared) whilst fighting for or being suspected of informing on VEOs; and being targeted by security agencies (either through incarceration or extra-judicial killings). Programmes also target women and girls who have themselves either engaged in VEOs, escaped from, and/or suffered violence at the hands of VEOs. The situation of these women is exacerbated due to the lack of an official government reintegration framework; surveillance and harassment by local security agencies; and a lack of a socio-economic safety net.

BRICS programmes include the provision of group counselling and individual psychological support to target women and girls to promote trauma healing; motivational talks (e.g. from fellow women VE survivors, female sheikhats or professional Muslim women) to highlight women's legal and religious rights and alternatives to VE; and story sharing to reduce isolation and improve group cohesion.

Project participants are involved in the design of participatory theatre performances that raise awareness of the plight of these women and girls and aim to reduce stigma, as well as highlighting the specific risks to women of VE recruitment (e.g. being lured by promises of a better life through marriage to a VE combatant) within target communities. Some BRICS projects offer small-scale training, mentoring, skill building and livelihood support to improve the financial situation of the target women and link women to government economic empowerment schemes. Others promote engagement between female project participants and members of County Assembly (devolved legislative body), as well as offer skills-building and support to these members to enable them to draft and enact county-level legislation that better supports and considers the needs of women victims of VE and CT activities.

v. Integrating gender into the Theory of Change

Key Considerations:

a. **It is important to define and set gender-related outcomes at the outset of the P/CVE programme** to ensure these are integrated throughout the Theory of Change (ToC). As well as integrating any specific gender-related outcomes, the ToC should also consider any gender differences between men and women; gendered barriers to participation; as well as how gender relations between women and men may impact on the programme – please see Diagram Two.

b. **ToC help us consider whether the programme is targeting men, women, or both; and why**. Broad definitions of target groups, such as 'youth' or 'communities' should be avoided. Instead, ToC can help draw out the multiple intersectionalities that impact on the identities of those we hope to reach (e.g. how gender intersects with age, disability, marital status, ethnicity etc.) that should also be considered.

c. **ToC are useful to draw out any assumptions about the roles that different individuals and groups will play in the programme**. For example whether men are perceived to be the only group at risk of recruitment to VEOs; or whether we are seeing or portraying women's roles purely as mothers. These assumptions need to be sufficiently explored and evidenced; or, if there is a lack of evidence, ToC processes can help us acknowledge that we need to test these assumptions within the programme (e.g. through formative research and/or in our M&E frameworks).

d. **ToC can also be helpful in thinking through whether there is something that needs to be closely monitored during implementation**[58]. For example, we may wish to track women's meaningful participation in the development of national P/CVE strategies, or the gender sensitivity of these strategies, assuming this is necessary for ensuring their effectiveness.

e. **Accessing women and men at risk of VE, or living in VE contexts, can be extremely challenging**. ToC processes can help us be explicit about what our IPs need to do, or have in place, to ensure the project succeeds. These could be factors such as ensuring our programme provides support to existing WROs well established in our target communities, who may be able to reach out to vulnerable women; or ensuring our IPs take a gender-sensitive approach to ensure men and women both benefit from the project; and/or ensuring that our IPs have mixed male/female research teams to capture and analyse the voices and opinions of women and men.

Case Study Seven: Gender-sensitive counter-narratives

HMG partners have taken a number of steps to ensure that their P/CVE counter-narratives work is gender sensitive; and that it addresses the specific concerns and vulnerabilities of different types of men and women in their target communities and audiences. Following formative research (see Case Study One) the IP found that some of the women in their target audiences were not using their social media platforms due to a lack of electricity and internet coverage; not having access to smartphones; and/or not feeling safe online to discuss pertinent issues without receiving online harassment and abuse (with the potential for this to become offline violence).

Reacting to these findings, the IP refined the way they covered gender issues online that some may consider taboo (e.g. women's empowerment, sexual violence by VEOs). They set up a closed conversation for women on their social media platform, making it a women-only online safe-space that was highly curated. Through using snowball targeting (where participants are encouraged to invite other women from their peer group or family), over 3,500 women now use this online space to regularly and openly discuss the issues they find most relevant, such as women in Islam, GBV, Domestic Violence and the gender agenda of VEOs. The platform also enables women to go through learning modules and facilitated discussions on P/CVE issues.

To ensure the project reached the most vulnerable women and men, the IP has also established women and men's groups, trainings, social 'cafes'; and workshops offline in hard to reach locations. In these settings, expert facilitators hold community conversations around relevant issues such as men's roles/masculinities in their post-war context; psychological trauma; and how vulnerable women can get involved in small scale early recovery projects in their community that increase their feelings of inclusion and belonging; and ultimately resilience to VE.

Tool 4: Developing gender-sensitive alternative and counter-narratives

- Base the alternative and counter-narrative work on a thorough **gender analysis** of gender roles and norms in a context, and a VEO's gender ideologies, tactics and narratives.

- Ensure the alternative and counter-narrative campaign **responds to VEO gendered narratives**, in particular myths about GBV and the negative effects of gender equality and women's human rights.

- Highlight the **unfulfilled promises VEOs make** on gender issues, the double standards of their campaigners and/or build on the disagreements within VEOs on their gender ideologies.

- Build on, and support women's and girls' roles in peer and youth networks to ensure the **campaign messages** reach different groups of men and women.

- Give women a **voice in the campaigns** and the opportunity to define what they want to say and how they want to say it.

- Design the programmes in a way that enables women and girls, as well as men and boys, to **access and participate in the campaign**, recognising that they may not have equal access to the same media and online platforms.

Case Study Eight: Addressing the gendered narratives used by VEOs in South Asia

Through their events[59] and programmes, UN Women has explored innovative counter-messaging strategies to address the gendered narratives utilised by VEOs to recruit. Drawing upon the success of other innovative strategic communications aimed at promoting gender equality, such as "Burka Avenger"[60] in Pakistan; UN Women, in partnership with Mythos labs, has created two YouTube comedy videos. *Brainwash*[61], aimed at a South Asian audience, is a satirical take on a typical beauty product advertisement that challenges the gender stereotypes used by VEOs. *HI-SIS*[62], made in Indonesia, is a short film that also counters VEO's gendered narratives by using satirical testimonials of fictional female VEO members. Due to the large viewership of Brainwash and positive reception of *HI-SIS*[63], it is likely that future videos featuring both social influencers and strong female heroes are likely to be well received by local audiences.

At community level, UN Women also supports women's participation and leadership in counter-narrative work; including training young women in Bangladesh to write, film, edit and upload videos that promote female empowerment and messages of peace and tolerance[64].

Case Study Nine: Mainstreaming gender in DFID's Community Security Programming

DFID's Improving Community Security Programme aims to reduce levels of insecurity and conflict (including VE) in violence-affected counties in Kenya through improving public confidence in relevant institutions and by improving police accountability. The programme mainstreams gender in a number of important ways. The strategic case analyses how men/boys and women/girls face different insecurities based upon socio-cultural gender roles; and how GBV is one of the largest threats to human security within their target areas. The programme then puts in a place a number of specific interventions to address these gendered vulnerabilities, including: bilateral support to implement community policing, with VAWG focused sub-committees; working with government bodies to develop GBV policies, legislation bills and Standard Operating Procedures on VAWG case management; and training government officials for implementation. In addition, the issue of GBV is threaded throughout the other programme activities, including public awareness raising of rights and police responsibilities; strengthening police capacity; integrating gender within operational research, analysis and data collection surveys; and developing multisectoral VAWG referral chains for survivors.

The programme commits to taking a participatory approach that involves both female and male designed interventions, and the Results Framework (RF) captures gender-related outcomes and outputs (such as the % of men and women in targeted counties reporting their concerns regarding insecurity, criminal violence and/or GBV are being satisfactorily addressed by county security institutions). Gendered risks to the programme, such as the persistence of harmful gender norms, are also explicitly recognised and attempts are made (e.g. through researching drivers of GBV and/or finding suitable entry points) to prevent and mitigate these. This gender-sensitive approach will help ensure that the programme addresses the structural grievances of both men/boys and women/girls that are potentially driving VE in the region.

Tool 5: Mainstreaming gender across P/CVE activities

- Go beyond programming that promotes equal numbers of women and men as project beneficiaries to **respond to the gendered drivers and impacts of VE**.
- Ensure the **P/CVE programme contributes to gender equality**, even if it is not the main aim. E.g. If you are providing alternative options to those at risk of P/CVE, ensure that these opportunities are available for men, women and SGMs; and, where possible, use the P/CVE programmes to support women's empowerment.
- Assess whether the programme is **promoting harmful gender norms and stereotypes**, or reinforcing power differentials between men and women, and mitigate the harm that this could cause.
- **Consult meaningfully with women and WROs** and integrate their concerns and ideas, drawing on women's networks where needed, even if the programme does not have gender equality as its main objective.
- As part of the P/CVE programme, consider enhancing **women's access to security and justice;** and their participation in the security sector.

Tool 6: integrate gender into the theory of change

- Agree **specific outcomes** in relation to gender sensitivity and/or whether the P/CVE programme will explicitly aim to promote gender equality at the outset of the P/CVE programme.
- Be explicit about whether the programme will **target** both men and women (including male and female youth); and which men and women.
- Explicitly take into account gendered differences between women and men; how the programme will remove any **gendered barriers to participation** in the project; and/or how gender relations between men and women may impact on the programme's success.
- Identify and evidence any **assumptions** you have made about women and men; and/or put in place research interventions and/or M&E to test these assumptions within the programme.
- Be explicit about gender-related **pre-conditions for change**, such as women's meaningful participation in P/CVE strategy development, that you will monitor throughout the programme.
- Be explicit about **what the IP will need to do, or have in place** to ensure it accesses and supports vulnerable women and men; and doesn't exacerbate gender inequality.


Diagram Two: Questioning gender assumptions in the Theory of Change

vi. Identifying and mitigating gender-related risks

Key Considerations:

It is crucial to identify and mitigate gender-related risks to our IPs and beneficiaries. Whilst risks are, of-course, context specific, the table below outlines some common risks and example mitigation strategies.

Risk	Example Mitigation Strategies
Gender bias amongst key programme stakeholders, such as religious/clan leaders.	• Consult WROs as to which leaders are credible, respected and uphold human rights and equality values[65]; as well as what works to promote gender equality in their context; and what language to use when discussing gender equality issues. • Consider how leaders can positively influence others on gender issues. • Monitor what programme stakeholders are communicating about gender identities and roles. • Engage proactively with stakeholders on gender issues and the benefits of gender equality.
HMG support for P/CVE work does not reach grassroots WROs.	• Be explicit in any Terms of Reference/Statement of Requirements that you are looking for IPs to develop partnerships with WROs. • Go beyond engaging with a few elite female representatives to ensure you support a diverse set of WROs.
Lack of buy in from bilateral government partners of the need for gender sensitivity in P/CVE work.	• Advocate and build contacts with government counterparts at senior levels to promote leadership on this agenda. • Gather evidence on why gender is important in their VE context and share this with government partners. • Build government capacity to work in a gender-sensitive way (see Case Study Ten).
Women, WROs, SGMs and WHRDs put at risk due to P/CVE work.	• Take a participatory approach to analysing the specific risks to and jointly develop risk mitigation strategies, standard operating procedures, and contingency plans to minimise these[66]. This may include setting aside specific funding for WROs to develop strong security protocols (if they don't already have then), or for emergency security measures. • Ensure you consult with partners on whether there are sensitivities on how their work is presented and publicised by HMG; and how best to frame P/CVE interventions. • Put stringent safeguarding practices[67] in place to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse by IPs.

Risk	Example Mitigation Strategies
Stereotyping or instrumentalising women (using women, or the promotion of WHR, only to achieve a specific P/CVE aim), thereby alienating women from the P/CVE programmes, putting women at risk, and/or perpetuating or fuelling harmful gender norms.	• Avoid thinking of women only in relation to men – i.e. as mothers, wives, sisters. Avoid portraying them as victims. Instead, consider and support the multitude of ways that different women contribute to P/CVE efforts. • Use nuanced context-specific analysis to avoid stereotyping different women, men, boys, girls and SGMs. Don't assume men are inherently violent and women are inherently peaceful; or that women play no role in P/CVE, even if their work isn't immediately visible. • Frame work on gender equality as being important in its own right, rather than as a means to P/CVE. • Test any messages and communication activities with different groups of men and women to gauge their reactions and refine accordingly.
Sacrificing gender equality and human rights principles for the purpose of advancing CVE efforts, e.g. in contexts where perceptions that a culture is being threatened is assessed to be a key driver of VE[68].	• Ensure the P/CVE work is in line with wider UK goals and policy on gender equality and human rights. • Undertake a comprehensive risk analysis to assess the impact of such programmes on longer-term conflict dynamics and peacebuilding. • Cultural norms are not an excuse not to programme on gender equality. Consider, instead, how the programme can promote gender equality in a way that is culturally sensitive, taking the lead from local women and WROs (e.g. you may decide not to refer openly to 'gender').
P/CVE work undermined by gendered abuses by state security forces; or inaction by the state on gender injustice and GBV.	• Work with governments to raise awareness of the role of gendered security sector abuse in fuelling VE. • Provide gender sensitivity training and capacity building to security forces. • Initiate programmes that improve access to justice for different women and men; and that tackle GBV.

Tool 7: Identifying and mitigating gender related risks

• Consider how existing gender norms, stereotypes and the bias of key stakeholders may impact on the programme's success; and how you can minimise this.

• Develop mitigation strategies to protect the IPs and beneficiaries from **gender-related backlash** and violence.

• Assess and **check with a variety of WROs** in the target communities whether the P/CVE approach stereotypes or instrumentalises women.

• Work on gender issues in a culturally sensitive way, **taking the lead from WROs** working in that context.

• Assess whether and how GBV by state security forces, or government failure to respond to gender injustice may undermine the P/CVE interventions; and how you can respond to this.

Case Study Ten: Working bilaterally to promote gender sensitivity in P/CVE campaigns

HMG is funding a capacity building programme to support the Government of Tunisia to work with civil society to amplify the reach and impact of CSO-led P/CVE campaigns. The implementing partner is facilitating this through developing a simple tool/template to help CSOs and government staff prioritise both conflict and gender sensitivity analysis in campaign design.

The tool is designed to prompt users to analyse the ways in which VE affects women/girls differently to men/boys in the specific contexts they are working in, and adapt campaign activities to mitigate potential risks and create opportunities for empowerment. It also includes guidance for government stakeholders to assess CSOs' campaign design and identify gaps where additional research or support to the CSO may be required. The tool will be refined in consultation with government & CSO counterparts and accompanied by capacity building activities. In addition to analysis and campaign planning, it can also be used as a reporting and learning mechanism, through ongoing monitoring and review.

Stage 3: Working with Implementing Partners

This section outlines key considerations to ensure gender-sensitivity when selecting, contracting and working with implementing partners on P/CVE interventions.

Key Considerations:

a. **IPs should thread gender issues throughout their project proposal** – including in their analysis, design, theory of change, results framework, M&E methodology and risk analysis.

b. **IPs should outline their organisational policy on gender issues**. This should include a commitment to equal opportunities and non-discrimination; and a stringent safeguarding policy. IPs should also outline who their project team are, whether they have a mix of men and women; and whether they hold gender expertise.

c. **Larger IPs who sub-commission their work to smaller CSOs should make efforts to support and engage WROs**, E.g. by developing a specific strategy to reach out to WROs and/or ensuring that any partner selection criteria will not disadvantage smaller or lower-capacity WROs.

d. **IPs with existing gender expertise are not always available in contexts where HMG works on P/CVE.** In this case, there may be a need for the IP to undergo gender sensitivity training, and source additional gender expertise into their project teams. Even if not working directly with WROs, IPs can still engage with them to source training, technical advance, quality assurance etc.

e. **It is important to hold IPs accountable to their commitments to be gender-sensitive in their work**. HMG should ensure that IP reports are gender sensitive; and monitor whether research, policy or programming outputs are gender-sensitive.

f. **HMG should seek regular feedback from IPs on their experiences of implementing gender sensitive programming**, using this as an opportunity to identify future opportunities and risks.

Case Study Eleven: Ensuring the participation and leadership of women in developing P/CVE strategies

The International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN)[69] spearhead the Women's Alliance for Security Leadership (WASL) – an alliance of existing independent women-led organisations and women's rights and peace practitioners, who are actively engaged in P/CVE with a strategic focus on providing positive viable alternatives that promote peace, rights, equality and pluralism. The alliance enables women who are locally rooted and trusted in their own communities across 38 countries to also be globally connected and unified; and to amplify their expertise and solutions in national and global policy arenas.

Crucially, ICAN has funding mechanisms, such as the multi-donor Innovative Peace Fund (IPF)[70], that was co-designed with WASL partners, to allocate resources to support women-led organisations undertaking innovative, strategic and timely community-based C/PVE work[71]. ICAN has supported partner programmes in 21 countries with 77 grants since 2015 through these grants. The underlying principle is to 'invest in trust', i.e. to recognise and value the wisdom and judgment of local partners to determine the most effective interventions, and facilitate their access to funding in the least cumbersome manner. ICAN supports their partners with the technical support in project design, financial management and M&E. This fund is a best practice example of enabling women's organisations to determine their own priorities and solutions to P/CVE; and to support them to access funding for their work in a timely and safe manner.

Tool 8: Working with implementing partners

- Ensure IPs have integrated gender throughout their project proposal.
- Ensure IPs have a **gender policy and safeguarding procedures** in place.
- Encourage IPs to have a **strategy to reach out to WROs**, and to remove any barriers to working in partnership with WROs.
- Where there is a limited choice of partners, ask them to **put plans in place** to improve their gender sensitivity and expertise.
- **Hold IPs accountable** to their gender sensitivity commitments.

Case Study Twelve: Setting IP standards for gender sensitivity.

The Counter-Deash Communications Cell (CDCC) takes a number of steps to ensure gender sensitivity in the delivery of their communication campaigns. Firstly, CDCC ensures that gender issues, such as Daesh's use of female specific messaging and the role of female recruiters and recruits, are highlighted in the background information within statements of requirements (SoR).

Secondly, CDCC is explicit in their SoRs that research into their target audience should look at both females and males vulnerable to the Daesh narrative; that women should play an important part in the campaign narratives; that the role of female stakeholders in the radicalisation/recruitment process should be recognised and incorporated into the project and products; that communications output should take into account the drivers and factors unique to men/boys and women/girls; and that gender equity will be sought within the creative and project teams (CDCC itself has a diverse, gender-balanced workforce). The SoRs are also explicit about the need for age and gender disaggregated data within M&E frameworks.

When choosing an IP, CDCC then reviews potential IPs on whether they will be sensitive to the gender dimensions of the project's objectives and design the project accordingly. Scoring criteria for their moderation board includes an assessment on whether the role of women in the radicalisation and recruitment process is recognised and incorporated into the project and products; whether the audience for wider messages will cover men, women, girls and boys; whether outputs take into account the drivers and factors unique to both; and how data will be disaggregated (i.e. ideally by age as well as gender). This approach has helped ensure that their IPs take a gender-sensitive approach throughout the project cycle.

Stage 4: Integrating gender into the Monitoring and Evaluation frameworks

This section outlines key considerations when integrating gender into the design and use of M&E Frameworks for P/CVE interventions.

Key Considerations:

a. **HMG's programme and policy work should be assessed for gender sensitivity**. Gender Equality Markers (or GEM scores, see Case Study Thirteen) help HMG assess whether projects are contributing to gender equality outcomes at funding/design stage; and whether interventions meet HMG's minimum standards[72]. Gender Audits also offer an opportunity to take stock of how gender sensitive our P/CVE policy and programming work is. Gender Audits can also explore any barriers to integrating gender within P/CVE workstreams, and provide technical recommendations for improvement within particular HMG departments or programming contexts.

b. **Gender-sensitive indicators and sex disaggregated data enable programme implementers and donors to identify how and whether P/CVE programming outcomes differ for men and women**; to monitor unintended negative impacts (such as increased income disparities between young men and young women); as well as unexpected positive impacts (such as women's greater decision-making power in their communities)[73]. Gendered impacts not easily quantified should be assessed using qualitative methods, and those findings should be integrated into the analysis of quantitative data[74].

c. **As most P/CVE programming is typically intensely focused on men, it is deeply gendered, albeit not it in the usual way**. P/CVE programmes that are targeted at men also have impacts – whether direct or indirect – on women and SGMs; and impact on gender norms and relations; and those impacts should be monitored[75].

d. **There is no agreed metric for measuring what successful P/CVE looks like**. Indicators related to VE drivers, such as 'resilience' or 'radicalisation', are highly contextual and may mean different things to different women and men, in different communities. Development of VE proxy indicators and baseline methodology should therefore be done in a participatory way in communities[76] – including consultations with different women and men – to ensure they are suitable to be used with respondents and within the specific context. Including survey questions that track gender dynamics as proxy indicators (e.g. around gender norms, stigma and marginalisation due to gender issues, or gender-related risk factors) will help build the evidence base on these issues[77].

e. **Beneficiary feedback is an important mechanism for ensuring accountability and identifying risks and opportunities relating to gender**. This should be integrated into M&E methodologies wherever possible.

f. **M&E is only as good as those that carry it out and data will be affected by the make-up of the monitoring or research team**[78]. To gather gender-sensitive data we need to ensure that those involved understand the importance of gender sensitivity; and have M&E teams that can gather the views of women and men in a safe and culturally sensitive way.

Tool 9: Developing a gender-sensitive M&E framework

- Use **Gender Markers (or GEM scores) and/or Gender Audits** to assess the extent to which the programme and projects are gender sensitive and whether the work meets HMG's minimum standards.

- Ensure all of the **indicators gender sensitive and sex disaggregated**, e.g. use qualitative and quantitative methods to measure whether the intervention has different outcomes for men, women and SGMs; and the gender relations between them; including assessing any unintended impacts.

- Measure the **gendered impacts** of the P/CVE projects that are solely focused on men.

- Ensure that **proxy indicators** around factors such as VE, resilience or radicalisation are developed in a participatory way that involves women and men; and that they are based on a sound gender analysis of what VE and P/CVE success means for women/girls, men/boys and SGMs in the programming context.

- Ensure that the **M&E teams** include those with gender expertise and an understanding of the importance of gender sensitivity; as well as the human resources (such as male and female research teams) to collect the views of women and men in a safe and appropriate way.

Case Study Thirteen: Examples of gender-sensitive P/CVE indicators

At portfolio or programme level

- Gender Equality Markers (or GEM scores): can be used to assess whether P/CVE projects make no contribution to gender equality (0), significant contribution to gender equality (1), or whether their principal objective is to advance gender equality (2) at design and funding stages;

- Gender Sensitivity Scores (GSS): CSSF Gender Audits have used gender sensitivity scores to assess the extent to which gender has been integrated into the aims, analysis, design, ToC, RF and risk registers of P/CVE projects. Such analysis can help identify how gender sensitive HMG's portfolio of P/CVE work is under a certain programme, as well help identify any specific areas of weakness (e.g. a lack of gender-sensitive analysis, or weak RFs)

For community-based programming: Indicators should, of course, be informed by ToC and P/CVE programming indicators are best developed in a participatory way with men and women at community level. However, some example of quantitative proxy indicators on P/CVE outcomes include:

- Number of studies produced on the gendered drivers of VE; or women's role in VE and P/CVE

- % participants (disaggregated by sex and age) who reject the use of violence (including violence by VEOs and GBV)

- Number of young people (disaggregated by age and sex) that feel listened to and/or empowered.

- % decrease in reported frustration of young men and women (disaggregated by age and sex)

- Number of WROs actively working on peacebuilding or P/CVE in the area

- % of female returnees who report they are victims of ostracization and bullying in their community.

- % of women and men (disaggregated by sex and age) who have a positive perception of the counter-narrative.

- % of young women and men (disaggregated by sex and age) able to fulfil their desires to marry and have a family.

- % of young women and men who report that they have supportive peer support networks

For policy and strategy work

- The NAP/Strategy for P/CVE adheres to human rights principles and is gender sensitive.

- % of women and men (disaggregated by sex and age) in the target community who are aware of the NAP/Strategy for P/CVE.

- % of women and men (disaggregated by gender age) who agree that the NAP/Strategy addresses their concerns and priorities (related to security, governance, development etc).

Qualitative indicators can be particularly useful for assessing the gender sensitivity of project outcomes and outputs, such as how meaningful women felt their participation in the programme was; or the extent to which women felt the project responded to their particular grievances and needs.

Adapted from: Holdaway and Simpson (2018), **'Improving the impact of preventing violent extremism programming: A toolkit for design, monitoring and evaluation'**, UNDP and International Alert

Building UK capabilities

Key Considerations:

Strategic Outcome 7 in the NAP is dedicated to ensuring that HMG continues to strengthen its capabilities, processes and leadership to deliver against its WPS commitments. This includes a commitment to developing the necessary resources, expertise and skills at all levels of HMG to implement the other strategic outcomes.

There are a variety of HMG resources that staff can access to support them to implement Strategic Outcome 6, including:

- Training: The HMG Gender, Conflict and Stability Course, run by the Stabilisation Unit (SU), offers staff the opportunity to gain an understanding of the key issues surrounding gender, conflict and stability; and how to integrate gender into their work. The SU can also be commissioned to provide bespoke training for staff at post on Gender and P/CVE.

- Research: Staff can commission specific pieces of research on gender and VE issues through HMG bodies, including the National Security Research Group (NSRG);

the Extremism Analysis Unit; the DFID Work and Opportunities for Women (WOW) Helpdesk; and the DFID Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) Helpdesk. HMG staff can also contribute to building evidence on gender and P/CVE through ensuring that key HMG conflict analysis processes, such as JACS, are gender sensitive.

- Gender Advisers: Advisory support is available within HMG via the Joint Funds Unit and the SU. DFID Social Development Advisers, or FCO Gender Focal Points may also be able to offer support with integrating gender into P/CVE programming at post.

- Gender Strategies or Action Plans: Draw on any existing HMG gender strategies and action plans within your country or department to ensure your P/CVE work explicitly considers wider goals on gender equality; and ensure that your efforts to meet NAP Strategic Outcome 6 are included in these plans.

Tool 10: Developing HMG capabilities to deliver

- Source sufficient **training and support** to enable you and your HMG colleagues to integrate gender into your P/CVE work.

- Utilise **HMG research bodies** to collect gender-sensitive data and evidence to inform the approach.

- Bring in a **Gender Adviser** to improve and quality assure the programme and policy work, if needed.

- Ensure the relevant country/departmental **Gender Action Plan or Strategy** integrates your P/CVE work.

- Use **Gender Audits** to assess whether you are meeting NAP Strategic Outcome 6 commitments within your P/CVE work.

Additional Reading

In addition to the key resources outlined in the Introduction, the following papers provide more in-depth discussions of VE and gender. For country and regional specific research on gender and VE, please draw on the references listed within the Endnotes.

Aghdgomelashvili et al (2015), **'Anti-Gender Movements on the Rise? Strategising for Gender Equality in Central and Eastern Europe'**, Henrich Boll Foundation, Germany.

Includes a variety of research papers documenting the gendered impact of the rise of right-wing populists, ultra-nationalist extremists and anti-egalitarian movements in Central and Eastern Europe.

Holdaway and Simpson (2018), **'Improving the impact of preventing violent extremism programming: A toolkit for design, monitoring and evaluation'**, UNDP and International Alert, Norway.

A gender-sensitive guide to assessing the impact that PVE interventions have in different contexts, drawing on best practice for design, monitoring and evaluation.

Ladbury, S (2015), **'Women and Extremism: The association of women and girl with Jihadi groups and implications for programming'**, DFID, UK.

This report explores drivers and entry points into jihadi VEOs for men and women; women's roles and impact within these groups; and women's role in P/CVE.

Miller-Indriss, C and Pilkington, H (Thurs 24 Jan, 2019), **'Women are joining the far right – we need to understand why'**: Guardian Opinion.

A short article by two University professors explaining the need for a more nuanced understanding of gender in far-right movements.

(Pearson (2018), **'Why Men Fight and Women Don't: Masculinity and Extremist Violence'**, Tony Blair Institute for Change.

This short paper argues that gender analysis of VE must go beyond simple engagement with 'women' as an issue, to analyse how masculinity is important to understanding both male and female extremism.

Sanam Naraghi Anderlini (2018), **'Challenging Conventional Wisdom, Transforming Current Practices: A Gendered Lens on PVE'**, in Beatrix Austin and Hans J. Giessmann (eds), 'Transformative Approaches to Violent Extremism', Berghof Handbook Dialogue Series No.13, Berlin: Berghof Foundation.

A gender sensitive discussion of the challenges of existing P/CVE approaches and ways forward.

Speckhard, A (2016), **'The Hypnotic Power of ISIS Imagery in Recruiting Western Youth'**, International Centre for the Study of Violent Extremism.

A gender sensitive review of the propaganda imagery found in Daesh internet posters, videos and media campaigns.

Stevens and Fraser (2018), **'Domestic and/or Sexual and Gender-based Violence (GBV) and Violent Extremism'**, VAWG Helpdesk Report No 218. London, UK: VAWG Helpdesk.

This short evidence review considers the links between GBV and VE.

Tarras-Wahlberg, L (2017), **'Seven Promises of ISIS to its Female Recruits'**, International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism

Outlines how Western women were specifically targeted for recruitment by Daesh, giving hints as to what women who joined Daesh were lacking; and may also be longing and responsive to.

Annex A: NAP Strategic Outcome 6

UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2018–2022
January 2018

Wafaa, 50, holds her grandchild, Haiban, 1, at their temporary accommodation in an unfinished building in Dohuk, northern Iraq having been , displaced by ISIL.

Picture © Andrew McConnell/Panos for DFID.

Strategic Outcome 6: Preventing and countering violent extremism

Ensure the participation and leadership of women in developing strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism

It is widely recognised that women and girls are impacted by violent extremism; they are often targeted by extremist groups and sexual and gender based violence is used as a tactic by those groups.[31] Women also participate in violent extremism as well as in efforts to prevent it in multiple ways.[32] The roles of women and girls in relation to violent extremism have been far less visible than those of men and boys, and are often overlooked.

The evidence base in this area is emerging. Evidence suggests that violent extremism itself is a diverse phenomenon, and the role of gender is increasingly recognised in contributory factors. The drivers of radicalisation for both men and women can include (but are not limited to) political and socio-economic factors such as governance deficit, state failure and individual grievances, and gender issues for women specifically. More evidence is needed on how efforts to prevent or counter violent extremism can effectively integrate gender perspectives.

Commitments to include preventing and countering violent extremism in the WPS agenda are outlined in UNSCR 2242 (2015) and the UN Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, which urges Member States to ensure the participation and leadership of women in developing strategies to counter violent extremism and build their capacity to do so effectively. In 2015, at the High Level Review to mark the 15th anniversary of UNSCR 1325, the UK made a commitment to "ensure that our overseas work to counter violent extremism includes upstream activity targeted specifically at women. Women will be at the centre in the delivery of programming of overseas violent extremism

work, both nationally and locally."[33] UNSCR 2354 (2017) recommends that "counter-narratives should take into account the gender dimension, and narratives should be developed that address specific concerns and vulnerabilities of both men and women."

Mainstreaming gender across programming to prevent and counter violent extremism will be an important element in the delivery of this strategic outcome. Activities to tackle the drivers of radicalisation can span a wide range of social, economic and political fields; all of which can impact on, and contribute to, the rights, priorities, autonomy and leadership of women and girls. Programmes and approaches can take a variety of forms according to need, but should incorporate an increasing sensitivity to the rights and priorities of women and girls and engage with women on the design and delivery of strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism. Risks around the instrumentalisation of women should be considered and avoided when designing and implementing strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism, which should also explicitly consider wider UK goals on gender equality.

Work to deliver this strategic outcome will also support delivery of other strategic outcomes, particularly **strategic outcome 1** on participation and **strategic outcome 5** on security and justice.

This strategic outcome contributes most directly toward the **participation** pillar of WPS.

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Annex B: Detailed Gender Analysis of VE and VEOs

Gender and Violent Extremism

'CVE programming is implicitly gendered, but overtly gender blind'[79]

Gendered ideologies of VEOs

VEOs around the world tend to support traditional, conservative gender norms and ideologies. Whether jihadi, extreme right wing (XRW), or (less so) ethno-nationalist, VEOs often have distinct gender ideologies that promote patriarchal and rigid gender roles for women and men, often stating that this is crucial for stable and moral societies[80]. Women's human rights (WHR) are often framed as 'Western', colonialist and/or immoral[81]; and are blamed for the alleged moral decline they fight against[82].

VEO discourses instead typically state that men are the traditional protectors, power holders and decision makers in society; and that women are under the protection (and by extension) ownership of men[83], with women's stereotypically 'feminine' roles as dependent, domestic wives, sisters and mothers portrayed as glorious and honourable above all else[84]. It is common for VE individuals and groups to use pseudo-academic theories around biology in order to justify their gender ideology and to appear respectable and intellectual[85]. Religious arguments, history and texts are also used by VEOs to delineate what makes a 'good' woman; and to co-opt and redefine women's empowerment by claiming that submission is a source of power[86].

VEOs also denigrate women. Daesh propaganda, for example, often portrays women as inherently unequal, disposed to indulging in gossip, and preoccupied with shopping, when they should be devoting their free time to prayer and reflection[87]. Women are also often portrayed in a negative light by XRW VEOs, whose members are often hostile towards women members and unsure what role women should play in a movement that has historically characterised itself in idioms of fraternalism – as a clan, a brotherhood, a community of like-minded men[88].

Across Central and Eastern Europe, VEOs are building upon Soviet ideologies of corrupt European states to increasingly develop and mobilise individuals around an 'anti-gender' discourse, which argues that gender equality is an anti-family, pro-gay and anti-life ideology. XRW VEOs mobilise against gender equality – promoting tradition over equality and homophobic attitudes; and perpetuating dangerous myths and lies about policies that aim to promote gender equality[89].

VEOs use their proscribed gender roles strategically to govern and control their territory, when they have it. Studies have found that al-Shabaab, for example, is highly reliant on the control and use of women for the success of its goals, strategies and tactics[90]. Daesh[91] is also well documented for its strategic use of gender roles and relations as a core tactic in governing and controlling their territory[92]. Racist VEOs similarly use gender 'unquestionably' as an organising principle with 'stereotypical traits of masculinity, especially physical strength and aggression' projected through its 'militarized uniforms, command structure, aggressive rhetoric and practices'[93]. VEOs also use women

tactically for their combat operations, taking advantage of (false) gender assumptions that frame women as neither violent, nor a threat, to surprise the enemy; evade searches; or to gain media attention[94].

It is worth noting that there can be ideological disagreements within VEOs relating to their approach on women in combat and that reputational damage may occur if group's followers do not support the use of women and children[95]. Boko Haram's division into two main groups in 2016 were chiefly around who is a viable target for violence and what roles women can play[96].

It is perhaps unsurprising then that gendered constructions have been found to be more critical as determinants of militant jihadist Islamism and terrorism than perhaps any other factors – including religion and poverty – that are often held responsible for such behaviours[97]. Globally, societies that are 'masculine' (i.e. societies that emphasise traditionally masculine values including toughness, assertiveness, success and competition) and have very distinct gender roles (where deviation from gender norms results in severe punishment) have higher terrorism rates (including a greater number of terrorist attacks or fatalities) than those that are low on these dimensions[98].

Use of gender in VEO recruitment and propaganda

There is broad academic consensus that no single factor drives VE and no single profile can reliably be used to identify at risk individuals[99]. Whilst in some cases, individuals are not able to make a choice about whether to support a VEO, nevertheless some men, boys, women, girls and SGMs do actively seek involvement in VEOs. In such cases, research suggests that drivers of girls and women's involvement in VEOs are broadly the same as those that drive boys and men to join such groups, i.e. remuneration; peer group encouragement; protection and safety (particularly relevant for women); and honour and prestige (particularly relevant for men)[100].

However, VEOs recognise that women and men experience a lack of power and act on their frustrations differently[101] due to gender norms, expectations and identities and so, their recruitment campaigns are often highly gendered to improve their reach and effectiveness.

Exploiting masculinities

For men, VEOs often try to exploit feelings of emasculation, exclusion, alienation, shame and humiliation[102] to offer them a chance to prove a certain type of violent masculinity[103], to be a 'man among men' and to reap the sexual payoff of women's admiration, either in this or in the next life[104]. They offer men a way to reclaim their manhood and to restore their sense of lost patriarchal entitlement[105] through fighting against oppression and engaging in violence and danger.

A clear example of this is the use of video game imagery used by Daesh to target male recruits around the world. Recognising that young men often identify with male role models and masculine stereotypes promoted in the video

Image 1 (above left) of a Daesh recruitment poster put out by British foreign fighters, Rayal al Tawheed using graphic still photos taken from video games[106], and image 2[107] (above right) of a recruitment poster inspired by the video game, Call of Duty, used by Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), which has links to Daesh and Al-Qaida


Image 3[108] (above left) of the UK banned VEO, National Action; and images 4 and 5 (middle and right), recruitment propaganda used by Knights Templar International, proposing that white 'knights' defend the future of vulnerable white girls[109].

games that they play, Daesh has used such images in their recruitment materials – see images 1 and 2 – and encourage recruits to play similar, but adapted, video games in their training camps[110].

In parallel, XRW VEOs also promote militarised and hyper-masculine images of their members and organisations, portraying male recruits as saviours (or 'knights') of the white race, particularly against immigrant and Muslim communities – see images 3, 4 and 5.

VEOs also use their group identity to provide men with a sense of belonging and purpose and a way to go overnight *'from being a nothing, a nobody, to being somebody'*[111]. This can be a potent pull for some men who are feeling disempowered, frustrated, or publicly slighted in their current situation. There is also some evidence that some individuals join VEOs to seek 'self-cleansing' after childhood sexual assault[112].

It is important not to problematise all masculinities, but to understand *how VEOs use these gender identities* and norms within contexts of wider social and economic disenfranchisement[113]. In conflict settings, for example, VEOs play on gender roles to recruit men who have difficulty achieving 'manhood' through traditional means (such as finding a job or a wife, or starting a family). Research from Syria noted how men may find alternative ways to fulfil such expectations, including through joining armed VE groups[114]. In this context, 'notions of men as 'natural' protectors of the 'weaker' women and children, expectations of men to be 'in control' of their women, coupled with the assumption that men are naturally prepared to use violence, or that it is their

duty to do so on behalf of their community, makes them (and particularly those from lower socio-economic backgrounds) more susceptible to recruitment into armed groups'[115].

In marginalised communities in Kenya, notions of masculinity and expectations of manhood have also been found to play several roles in men's involvement with VEOs, including pressure to provide for themselves and their families; a way to transition out of boyhood into adulthood and establish their identities as 'men'; and a means of gaining personal agency in difficult situations[116]. Other studies have also drawn attention to the challenges some men face in trying to uphold their male gender roles and responsibilities in post-conflict situations. Research on Somalia suggests that joining Al-Shabaab may be one of the few options for meeting such expectations[117]. Unemployed men in Kosovo who joined Daesh as foreign fighters also stressed the importance of Daesh's offer of wives, free housing and the ability to practice a traditional lifestyle[118].

Exploiting femininities

VEOs also tailor their recruitment campaigns for women – using notions of 'hyper-femininity'[119] to mobilise them to protect their children and themselves, do a service in protection of their country or community[120]; and within jihadi VEOs, to fulfil their 'duty' to support the wider Muslim community[121]. For some women, 'freedom' to practice their religion[122] and the opportunity to study the Quran[123] are also important drivers for joining jihadi VEOs. As with men, revenge for the treatment of loved ones by security agents can be a key factor influencing women to get involved in

VE[124], with deaths and disappearances of husbands also leaving women impoverished and increasingly vulnerable to recruitment to VEOs and the financial incentives or support they offer (see below).

Women and girls are more likely than men and boys to become associated with a jihadi movement as a result of their family connections; though they can also self-mobilise, including through the internet and social media[125]. Whilst the role of social media in promoting women's involvement with VEOs is not well understood, there is some evidence that gender differences online are impacting on offline behaviour, with women more likely to be recruited to Daesh through online approaches[126].

VEOs can also promise women an end to gender injustice through the implementation of Sharia law – which research suggests is a key driver for women to join or support jihadi VEOs[127]. Research has also found that domestic abuse can be a significant 'trigger' factor in women's radicalisation[128]. Daesh, in particular, offered women the prospect of a comfortable life. See for example evidence of female Daesh recruiters posting on Facebook of how rent is not paid, and monthly allowances are provided[129]. As with men, VEOs can also appeal to women with the prospect of adventure; and finding romance in the form of a husband (or in the case of men, a wife)[130].

There is some evidence from Kenya and Nigeria that suggests that the control and subordination of women and girls due to patriarchal ideologies are also important motivating factors for women and girls to join VEOs, who see this as a way to escape from rigid, patriarchal norms and restrictions on their freedom[131]. When traditional norms dictate that they should not (and cannot) participate in politics or public decision making, young women may see joining a VEO as one of the few opportunities to be part of active change in their society[132]. Kosovan women also cited restrictions on their decision making and agency by husbands and brothers as a key driver in their decision to leave to join Daesh, in the hope of gaining greater self-esteem and empowerment[133].

As with men, economic factors are also important drivers for women. Research from Nigeria suggests that the financial support offered by VEOs (Boko Haram in this context) to both men and women entrepreneurs has played a key role in their recruitment to the organisation. Targeting both women and young men who lack powerful 'godfathers' to support them, Boko Haram has provided capital for their businesses, or small cash transfers to buy new equipment or goods as a way to coerce or force them to join the group[134]. Women who are mothers or wives of Shaheed, or martyrs, may also become reliant on paid work from jihadi VEOs as a form of livelihood[135].

When families join VEOs as a unit, there can be challenges in determining whether women members had personal agency in that decision, or whether there were other causal factors, such as the desire to keep familial ties intact, financial dependency and fear of abandonment and hardship if left behind, as well as traditional mores of obeying the demands of one's spouse[136]. Whilst there may well be cases of this, there are also many counter examples of women encouraging their husbands to join VEOs and/or being active decision makers along with their husbands[137]. The current challenges of determining the complicity of women

is nowhere more evident than in Iraq, where thousands of Iraqi women and children with perceived ties to Daesh have been stigmatised and punished for factors outside their control – such as being related, however distantly, to men who were somehow involved with Daesh, or for feeling from areas believed to be Daesh strongholds[138].

Use of Gender-Based Violence in VEO recruitment and propaganda

Within XRW VEOs, the notion of the threat of minority races and immigrants to innocent white women (e.g. as rapists and victimizers) has been a potent mobiliser to garner support for their cause, The term 'rapeugee', for example, has been coined by XRW VEOs to paint refugees as preying on (specifically white) girls in people's neighbourhoods; and to further claims that Islam is misogynistic and supports paedophilia[139], justifying violent assaults on minority and immigrant communities. This approach also involves XRW VEOs distributing disinformation about the extent of sexual violence perpetrated by immigrants to recruit men and women to their cause[140].

GBV against women by state or international security forces can also be a key driver for men and women to join VEOs. Research in Jordan, for example, found that virtually every family – and every returned fighter – identified the systematic rape of Sunni women by Assad's soldiers as the predominate rallying narrative to travel to Syria to join VEOs there[141]. Al-Qaeda was also well-known to have taken advantage of acts of sexual violence by foreign (particularly Western) solders to fuel their recruitment narrative, pointing at sexual violence against Muslim women by Western occupying forces[142]. In central Sahel, social constructs of masculinity have encouraged young men to join VE groups as a means of trying to protect women and redeem their honour from the systematic abuses of security forces of which they are victims[143].

For women, VEOs can sometimes be perceived to offer them protection from GBV. Rape, or fear of rape, by government forces was cited by female fighters as a central reason for joining the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), with survivors of sexual violence viewing terrorism as a 'viable option' since the social stigma they experienced prevented them from getting married or bearing children[144]. Daesh's propaganda aimed at women emphasised how the treatment of women in the West was devaluing of women and that they could protect female 'dignity' and 'honour' from problems such as sexual harassment[145]. Evidence also suggests that Daesh tailored their recruitment tactics towards western women who had suffered aggressive behaviour or sexual abuse (often originally atheist or Catholic), offering them a world where women and girls would be kept separate from men and protected by their niqab[146]. Such tactics have also been used by Daesh in Indonesia and Kyrgyzstan, where the defilement of Muslim women was portrayed as a motive to live under sharia law, as well as to encourage men to defend women's honour by engaging in jihad[147].

Gender-Based Violence by VEOs

'Across religions and regions, a common threat shared by extremist groups is that in each and every instance, their advance has been coupled with attacks on the rights of women and girls – rights to education, to public life and to decision-making over their bodies'[148]

Systematic oppression of women's rights by VEOs are well documented; and they perpetrate GBV against men, boys, women, girls and SGMs. Systematic restrictions on the daily lives of women by jihadi VEOs such as the Taleban, Daesh and al-Shabaab – from dress to movement, employment, entrepreneurship and religious observanc–- restrict even the most basic freedoms for women and girls.

Daesh systematically used GBV[149], including rape and trafficking of girls and women, sexual slavery against minority group women such as the Yazidis[150]; forced marriage[151]; polygamy; violence against SGMs[152]; and rape and sexual violence against men and boys in training camps and detention settings[153]. Other VEOs, such as al-Shabab and Boko Haram also commit widespread GBV against women and girls, systematically assigning women and girls 'husband's' who rape repeatedly them in a marriage without ceremony and subject them to physical violence[154]. Such violence has significant health, economic and psychological impacts on survivors, their families and communities[155]. Stigma is also a significant issue for survivors, which can result in ostracism, abandonment, poverty, 'honour crimes', trauma, unsafe pregnancies and untreated medical conditions[156].

Whilst there is less research on GBV committed by XRW VEOs, evidence suggests that many racist VE groups are intensely male-dominated and violently misogynist, with skinhead boys and men feeling it is their privilege to dominate and exploit their girlfriends, wives and female comrades[157]. Certainly, the XRW perpetuate the harmful gender norms that fuel Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG), including the promotion of aggression and domination, negative norms about the value of women and men's sexual entitlement[158].

The 'anti-gender' discourse promoted by XRW VEOs in Central and Eastern Europe has resulted in violent attacks upon sexual and gender minorities (SGM); and attacks on WROs and women human rights defenders (WHRDs). Such discourses have also fuelled the adoption of gender discriminatory legislation; backlashes against gender equality education; and a roll back of women's sexual and reproductive health and rights[159]. XRW VEOs in Russia have been documented to 'hunt' gay people via dating websites[160].

It is important to note that it is not only men from VEOs that perpetrate GBV against women. Al-Shabaab women have abused women from minority clans (through forced labour, insults and violence)[161] and female leaders have perpetrated violence against other women recruits in al-Shabaab's camps[162]. Daesh promoted a *war of women against women* – wives against other wives, and wives against women captured as sex slaves[163]; with women having responsibility within the all-female al-Khansaa Brigade of violently punishing women found to be in violation of Daesh's punitive restrictions[164]. Women fighters in Iraq have also been documented as orchestrating the mass rape of girls to later recruit them as suicide bombers, believing that they would become more willing recruits as a way to eradicate their shame[165].

As well as being used to terrorise, coerce and control women and men; and to punish or humiliate their opposition; GBV can be used as a recruitment tool by VEOs – literally giving them a 'sex appeal' by offering men lawful access to multiple waves, in addition to other women and girls as sex slaves[166]. There is some evidence that individuals with prior histories or records of perpetrating sexual violence are attracted by the sexual brutality carried out by extremist groups[167]. GBV can also provide income for VEOs – whether through ransoms from missing or abducted relatives[168]; from selling women and girls in to sexual slavery; or from women's unpaid labour that they exploit through forced marriage.

Some research suggest that VAWG should be taken as a warning sign for, VE, as groups that carry out terrorist attacks on civilians often also pursue misogynist agendas and carry out, or advocate VAWG[169]. Implementers using everyday peace indicators[170] to measure P/CVE success at community level have also found that VAWG can be a key metric (universally prioritised by men, women and youth) to determine levels of VE (a concept not often used by villagers in their daily lives), with women's mobility being equated with feelings of security. In the same programme, women also identified domestic violence (DV) as an indicator of VE, with disagreements as to which way the causality ran (e.g. whether DV was attributed to VE, or perpetrators of VE were seen as being more likely to join VEOs)[171].

Roles played by women and girls in VEOs

VEOs increasingly use internet-based propaganda to influence populations and win people over to their cause, making the world of communications the 'new frontline in the fight against violent extremism'[172]. Perhaps one of the most critical roles that women and girls play is within this space – as mobilisers, social facilitators, recruiters and propagandists for VEOs.

Women, for example, are some of the top 'haters' on social media[173], fuelling the XRW through their rhetoric about race wars; immigration and rape; and their anti-feminist stance, including undermining women's activism on sexual violence and women's sexual and reproductive rights. The way these women appeal to the mainstream and normalcy appears to be more effective for the XRW than the 1990s aesthetic of skinheads and gangs; with women playing a key role in softening and normalising the image for such VEOs. These women also play a role in mobilising men through playing on concepts of honour, duty and sexual prowess. Within jihadi VEOs, the contrasts for women between their online freedoms and offline restrictions are significant. Despite strict gender segregation and a lack of public mobility in Daesh controlled areas, women were still able to play key roles as online recruiters for Daesh[174] – distributing propaganda aimed at men – see image 6 – and women – see image 7.

In October 2014, Daesh set up a dedicated media wing, the al-Zara Foundation, to produce content directly targeting women[175]; and it has been noted that women were far more

effective at galvanising support from potential female recruits than their male counterparts, including by offering practical and logistical advice to prospective female migrants on how to reach Daesh-controlled territory and what they could expect when they arrived[176]. There is also evidence that Daesh has put in place an Al Khansaa Kateeba all-girl cyber battalion to engage in strategic communications activities[177].

Women also wrote sections of Daesh's online magazine, Dabiq, devoted to the 'sisters of IS'. Women's articles were mostly aimed at promoting women's wifely roles, including their duty to remind their husbands of the virtue of fighting; and shaming women who were jealous of polygamous marriages, or their husband's sexual exploitation of women held in sexual slavery[178]. Ideologically-committed female preachers have also been documented to be the main agent of outreach to women, playing key roles in Islamic proselytization and women-focused education centres for Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria.

As well as spreading extremist ideologies, women play key roles supporting VE groups as mothers and influencers of the next generation[179]; as well as socially, by participating in campaigns, physically or socially rejecting neighbours who are different than themselves, and/or acting as social facilitators[180]. As with jihadi groups, within XRW groups there has been growing recognition of the importance of women's role in recent years, as leaders have sought to increase their group's longevity[181].

Women also materially support VEOs[182], raising crucial funds, or using their bank accounts to transfer money to VEOs, as has been documented in Indonesia[183] and elsewhere. They can also play a variety of combat support roles including as informants, messengers, intelligence gatherers, transporters for money and hiders of weapons[184]. Women can also be employed by VEOs to staff justice institutions, courts and prisons holding women or dealing with 'women's issues'[185]. Girls – both willingly and unwillingly – have been noted to actively participate in VE acts ranging from targeting civilians for torture and killing, to destroying community infrastructure and participating in active combat – particularly in Northern Uganda and Sierra Leone[186].

Women are more likely to be active combatants in groups with an ethno-nationalist cause, than those with a jihadi mission; and women have made up to 30% of the fighting force within the Sadinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Forces (FMLN) in El Salvador, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) in Guatemala; and the Shining Path in Peru[187]. Women made up to 45% of the fighting force for FARC in Columbia,[188]; an estimated 30 – 40% of Maoist fighters in Nepal[189]; with tens of thousands of women also taking active combat roles with the LTTE in Sri Lanka[190].

Women also played active combat roles with men in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, with a few rising to local prominence as combatants[191]; and today, women in Afghanistan continue to play an active role in combat situations in the Islamic Jihadi Union[192]. Al-Qaeda reportedly trained women at bases near Jalalabad and Kandahar airports in Afghanistan and maintained a unit of well-trained and battle-hardened women who moved between Afghan and Pakistan compounds in 2003-5[193]. In 2007, Hamas established a new all-women battalion[194]; and whilst the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) struggled to reconcile conservative beliefs with evolving terrorist tactics, by 2002 it had begun actively recruiting women for suicide bombings[195]. Whilst Daesh did not originally allow women to engage in frontline combat activities, there is evidence that it may be increasingly recruiting women for suicide bombings[196].


Image 6[197] (above, left) – a female jihadi encourages her husband to go and fight jihad to enable them both to enter paradise after his death/martyrdom; Image 7[198] (above, right) – taken from a female Daesh recruiter appealing to girls and young women who feel they don't belong in the 'west' to encourage them to make the journey to Daesh-controlled territory where they can join like-minded peers.

Women have played significant roles as suicide bombers for VEOs and have perpetrated attacks in a multitude of locations, including Moscow[199], Jerusalem[200], Ankara[201] Iraq[202] and Indonesia[203]. Boko Haram, in particular, depends heavily on female operatives disproportionately relative to similar VEOs, actively and deliberately using girls as suicide bombers. Since the first female suicide attack in 2014, women and young girls (between the ages of 7 – 17) have been coerced into targeting civilians at markets, bus depots and mosques[204]. Indeed, between 2014 – 2016, three quarters of all child suicide bombers in Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameron were girls[205].

Roles played by women in P/CVE

Women play diverse and innovative roles in the P/CVE space, though this often receives scant attention. With the trust they have built up by being rooted in the local community, grassroots women and WROs are able to reach out and interact with vulnerable individuals on a one-on-one basis, encouraging them to undertake civic and community-based economic activities, offering them purpose and a strong sense of belonging; and providing different interpretations of religious references[206]. Working at the grassroots, nationally and internationally, WROs have a unique credibility and authenticity to provide insights into the problems of and guidance on the solutions for VE[207]. Women also play key roles in the regional, national and international policy space, making strategic recommendations to donors, governments and other bodies on how to effectively P/CVE[208].

However, harsh security and counter-terrorism (CT) measures have shrunk space for civil society activism and women's voices to be heard in P/CVE[209]; and WROs challenging the status quo by promoting gender equality frequently find themselves at odds with, and targeted by their own governments, including by those that criminalise such legitimate activities as 'terrorism'[210]. Some WROs have had to continue their essential work in promoting gender equality, peace and human rights below the radar, with the security and confidentiality of their beneficiaries of paramount concern. In such situations, women and WROs may be less willing to address issues framed as VE as directly as they would an issue such as peace[211].

Whilst CT legislation was not designed to close the space for civil society, the way in which CT financing rules have been designed and implemented by financial institutions,

who are risk averse, takes little to no account of the features of WROs and the environment in which they operate. CT financing legislation has therefore resulted in reduced funding for women's peacebuilding and humanitarian assistance in areas where VEOs are active and exercise control[212]. Donor preference for their IPs to be larger, well-known international organisations, who can absorb large grants and meet their high standards on bidding and reporting, has also contributed to the reduction in funding to WROs; particularly as the importance of working with local WROs is not always recognised by these large international organisations[213].

Women and WROs may also suffer from gender bias by those conceptualising and designing P/CVE programmes.

Women are often understood to play their major (or only) role in P/CVE as potential de-radicalisers and influencers *in families*; as entry points to the private sphere of the household through their roles as mothers, wives and sisters – where they are expected to reach individuals and groups that are difficult to access and to influence them away from VE (e.g. through Mothers Schools)[214].

Whilst mothers do have a role to play in counter-messaging and influencing the next generation, seeing women in this limited light risks essentialising women and confining them to pervasive and entrenched gender stereotypes; puts them at risk of exclusion or threats within their own communities (particularly if they are framed as being informants); and shifts the state's responsibility to protect and prevent VE to the shoulders of women[215]. Such an approach also overlooks the full gamut of roles that women play in P/CVE as role models, community activists, policewomen, civil servants, government actors, teachers, intelligence agents, psychologists, social workers, health care workers, academics, journalists, peers, religious leaders and clerics, and as youth, human rights and women's rights activists, amongst others.

It is worth noting that WROs do not generally separate out P/CVE work from their work to reduce all forms of violence, including VAWG and violence perpetrated by government and international military; and that they may be reluctant to accept funding labelled as P/CVE or CT due to risks to their independence and security[216].

Endnotes

Introduction

1   Lord Ahmad speaking at the FCO, UN Women, Wilton Park conference: 'Gender dynamics in violent extremism', Monday 26 November, 2018

2   UNSCR 1325 was the first landmark Resolution to be adopted by the Security Council in 2000, calling for increased representation of women at all decision-making levels for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict. There have been eight related UNSCRs resolutions since then. For more details, see http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/peace-and-security/global-norms-and-standards#_WPS_resolutions

3   http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674

4   HMG commitments on gender equality include the Public Sector Equality Duty (2011), the International Development (Gender Equality) Act (2014), the End Violence against Women and Girls Strategy: 2016 – 2020, and DFID Strategic Vision for Gender Equality (2018)

5   DFID Gender Equality Guidance

6   See: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2018. CONTEST is the UK framework to reduce the risk to the UK and its citizens and interests overseas from terrorism; and includes the 'Prevent' pillar which outlines activities to safeguard and support those vulnerable to radicalisation and to stop them from becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism.

7   Agency is defined here as 'the capacity to make decisions about one's own life and act on them to achieve a desired outcome, free of violence, retribution or fear. Taken from Klugman et al (2014), '**Voice and Agency: Empowering Women and Girls for Shared Prosperity**', Washington, DC: World Bank.

8   There is a growing body of evidence that links gender equality to peace and security; improved development outcomes; and more rapid recovery and poverty reduction. See, for example Hudson, V. et al (2012), 'Sex and World Peace', New York, Columbia University Press; World Bank (2011), '**2012 World Development Report: Gender Equality and Development**', World Bank, US; Petesch, P (2011) '**Women's Empowerment Arising from Violent Conflict and Recovery**', USAID; Paffenholz, T et al (2016), '**Making women count – not just counting women: assessing women's inclusion and influence on peace negotiations**', Inclusive Peace and Transition Initiative.

9   Extreme right wing groups tend to have anti-Semitic and racist tendencies, and some are associated with violence. Such groups employ ideals and symbolisms of Nazism, and often have links to historical National Socialism or Facisms. See Extremism Analysis Unit (2016), '**Strategic Assessment: The European Far Right**'

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10   For example, the manifesto of women by the Daesh Al-Khansaa Brigade states that, '*if roles are mixed and positions overlap, humanity is thrown into a state of flux and instability. The base of society is shaken, its foundations crumble and its walls collapse*': see Winter, Charlie (2015) (translator and editor), '**Women of the Islamic State: A manifesto on women by the Al-Khansaa Brigade**'

11   United States Institute for Peace (2015), '**Women Preventing Violent Extremism: Charting a New Course: Thought for Action Kit**', USIP, US.

12   Ladbury, S (2015), '**Women and Extremism: The association of women and girl with Jihadi groups and implications for programming**', DFID, UK

13   Anderlini and Koch (Jan 2015), '**Extremism in the Mainstream: Implications for and Actions by Women**', UN Women

14   Haynie, J (2016), '**Women, Gender and Terrorism: Gendered Aspects of Radicalization and Recruitment**', Women in International Security Policy Brief, WIIS, US. Blee, Kathleen (2003), 'Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement', University of California Press, also notes that the agenda of most (but not all) racist VEOs also support very traditional familial and political roles for white Aryan women

15   Gardner et al (forthcoming), '**Women, Girls and al-Shabab: Primary research from Somalia, Somaliland and Kenya**, UNDP

16   Aslam, M (2012), '**Gender-based explosions: the nexus between Muslim masculinities, jihadist Islamism and terrorism**', University Nations University Press, New York

17   Haynie, J (2016), op.cit

18   Sommers, M. (2018). '**Youth and the Field of Countering Violent Extremism: Executive Summary**'. Washington, DC: Promundo-US

19   What counts as 'masculine' varies across place, culture and time; and tend to be defined against what is understood as 'feminine'. For a more detailed discussion, see Pearson (2018), '**Why Men Fight and Women Don't: Masculinity and Extremist Violence**', Tony Blair Institute for Change

20   Kimmel, M (2018), '**Healing from hate: How young men get into – and out of – violent extremism**', University of Californian Press, US,, p.21, quoting a man explaining why he joined an XRW VEO

21   Pearson (2018), op.cit

22   United States Institute for Peace (2015), op.cit

23   Blee notes that XRW activism is often seen by women solely as a recourse for protecting their children or themselves, but promises little to them personally – see Blee, Kathleen (1996), '**Becoming a Racist: Women in Contemporary Ku Klux Klan and Neo-Nazi Groups**', Gender and Society Vol 10 (6), p.680 – 702

24   Women have been issued with religious decrees (fatwas) urging women to fight for VEOs to face off an existential threat as early as 2001 – see Cunningham (2008), '**The Evolving participation of Muslim women in Palestine, Chechnya, and the global jihadi movement**', in Ness, C (Ed) (2008), 'Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, utility and organization', Routledge, UK, pp. 84-99

25   Butale (2017), cited in Stevens and Fraser (2018), '**Domestic and/or Sexual and Gender-based Violence (GBV) and Violent Extremism**', VAWG Helpdesk Report No 218. London, UK: VAWG Helpdesk

26   Ladbury, S (2015), op.cit, notes that women are often attracted by VEOs promise of implementing Shari'a law, which many women see as giving them rights long denied by traditional male 'cultural' practices.

27   Speckhard, A (2016), '**The Hypnotic Power of ISIS Imagery in Recruiting Western Youth**', International Centre for the Study of Violent Extremism.

28   Fulu et al (2013), '**Why do some men use violence against women and how can we prevent it: Quantitative findings from the United Nations Multi-country Study on Men and Violence in Asia and the Pacific**', UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women

29   Aghdgomelashvili et al (2015), '**Anti-Gender Movements on the Rise? Strategising for Gender Equality in Central and Eastern Europe**', Henrich Boll Foundation, Germany

30   Lahoud (2018), '**Empowerment or Subjugation: A Gendered Analysis of ISIL Messaging**', UN Women, p.16

31   Hope not Hate (2018), op.cit

32   Speckhard, A (2016), op.cit

33   Tarras-Wahlberg, L (2017), '**Seven Promises of ISIS to its Female Recruits**', International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism

34   Ahmadi and Lakhami (2016), '**Afghan Women and Violent Extremism: Colluding, Perpetrating or Preventing?**' USIP Special Report, USIP, US

35   See Mirror (21 September, 2016), '**Rapefugees not welcome**' race-hate stickers plastered on lamp-posts and bus stops in UK town

36   Blee (2003), op.cit

37   Anderlini and Koch (2015)

38   Ladbury (2015), op.cit; DAI and Wasafiri Consulting (2018), '**Preventing Violent Extremism: Understanding at-risk communities in Kenya**', BRICS (Building Resilience in Civil Society)

39   The Stabilisation Network (2018), '**HTS and Women: A gendered approach to social influence in Idlib and Dar'a**', TSN

40   Taken from: Speckhard, A (2016), op.cit

41   Anderlini with Shoemaker, Holmes, Breitsman and Allam (2016), '**Uncomfortable Truths, Unconventional Wisdoms: Women's Perspectives on Violent Extremism and Security Interventions**', WASL, US

42   See, for example: **https://www.icanpeacework.org/our-work/womens-alliance-for-security-leadership/**

43   Giscard d'Estaing (2017), '**Engaging women in countering violent extremism: avoiding instrumentalisation and furthering agency**', Gender and Development 25 (1), p.103 – 118

44   Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic and Peacemakers Program (2017 '**Tightening the Purse Strings: What Counter Terrorism Financing Costs Gender Equality and Security**'

45   Duke Ibid

46   Giscard d'Estaing (2017), op.cit

Implementing Strategic Outcome 6

47   Recognising that personal resilience is a capacity that can be strengthened, rather than a trait, the study used survey questions to measure factors associated with an individuals' confidence (e.g. '*I have confidence in my skills and abilities*'), sense of purpose (e.g. '*I think life has meaning*'), adaptability (e.g. '*I enjoy meeting new people from different backgrounds*'), social support (e.g. '*being understanding and flexible helps me to build strong relationships that last*') and socio-ecological resilience (e.g. '*I am treated fairly in my community*').

48   Satterthwaite, M (2014), '**Missing indicators, disappearing gender: Measuring USAID's programming to counter violent extremism**;, in Satterthwaite and Huckerby (Eds), (2014), op.cit, p.82

49   Satterthwaite, M (2014), op.cit

50   Jackson and Wallace (2015), '**Creating new spaces: Women's experience of political participation in communities**', Womankind, UK

51   Hedaya (2018), '**The world of communications is the new frontline in the battle against violent extremism**', Hedaya

52   www.gaps-uk.org

53   See Aubrey, Aubrey and Brodrick (2018), '**Meaningful Participation: How to consult and involve women in fragile and conflict affected societies: a self assessment tool**', GAPS, Women for Women International, Saferworld, Amnesty International UK and Womankind Worldwide, UK

54   Available from www.gaps-uk.org/resources

55   Gender transformative programming means attempting to re-define women and men's gender roles and relations; and transforming unequal power relations to promote shared power, control of resources, decision-making and support for women's empowerment. Taken from UN Women: https://trainingcentre.unwomen.org/mod/glossary/view.php?id=36&mode=letter&hook=G&sortkey=&sortorder=&fullsearch=0&page=-1

56   See www.gaps-uk.org for their contact details.

57   This means not just prioritising female law enforcement recruitment, but developing pathways for their leadership in decision-making around VE security threats. See, for example, Peters and Saeed (2017), '**Promoting Inclusive Policy Frameworks for Countering Violent Extremism: Bridging Theory and Practice: A Pakistani Policewoman Case Study**', GIWPS, US

58   Holdaway and Simpson (2018), '**Improving the impact of preventing violent extremism programming: A toolkit for design, monitoring and evaluation**', UNDP, Norway

59   Whilst Burka Avenger was not directly funded by UN Women, it was profiled as an example of best practice at the 2017 UN Women and CTED organised event on "Comedy and Comics: Fighting terrorism one laugh at a time", which provided a forum for sharing experiences on using new forms of media to creatively engage audiences with messages of peace and tolerance. See: http://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/news-and-events/stories/2017/09/creative-approaches-break-new-ground-in-the-battle-against-violent-extremism

60 http://www.burkaavenger.com

61 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JlaQdaclIjA

62 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpltlTxDD1A

63 Launched at the 1 March 2018 event "Transforming Gender Social Norms through Comedy: Fighting Terrorism One Laugh at a Time" in Japan, these videos received over 420,000 views in just five days, thousands of positive comments as well as favourable press mentions without compromising the safety of the comedians

64 For more information, see: http://asiapacific.unwomen.org/en/digital-library/publications/2018/03/gender-sensitive-national-action-plans

65 Anderlini et al (2015), '**The Better Peace Tool**', ICAN

66 See, for example, Rothschild (Eds), '**Gendering Documentation: A Manual For and About Women Human Rights Defenders**', Women Human Rights Defenders International Coalition

67 For more details on how to do this, see **DFID's Smart Guide to Enhanced Due Diligence on Safeguarding** (May 2018), which states, amongst other things that if an organisation works with children, or vulnerable adults or young people, they must have a child protection and/or vulnerable adult's policy in place

68 Satterthwaite, M (2014), op.cit

69 http://www.icanpeacework.org/our-work/womens-alliance-for-security-leadership/

70 http://www.icanpeacework.org/our-work/innovative-peace-fund/

71 Based on the recommendations of WASL members, the fund supports local work by women-led organizations in four areas: i) Deradicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration of fighters/militias including women and girls; ii) Promoting peace, security, resilience, equal rights, and pluralism including work on alternative narratives and opportunities for at-risk communities; iii) Increasing women's representation and gender sensitivity in peace & security policy processes including P/CVE national and regional policy making; and iv) Addressing violence against women and girls as related to conflict and violent extremism and trauma healing for victims.

72 CSSF minimum standards, for example, state that projects should be at least GEM 1 (unless there is a clear justification for GEM 0), with all country programmes including at least one GEM 2 project or strand. DFID is also developing its own Gender Minimum Standards

73 Satterthwaite, M (2014), op.cit

74 Ibid

75 Ibid

76 See, for example, Everyday Peace Indicators: https://everydaypeaceindicators.org

77 Holdaway and Simpson (2018), '**Improving the impact of preventing violent extremism programming: A toolkit for design, monitoring and evaluation**', UNDP, Norway

78 Holdaway and Simpson (2018), op.cit

Annex B: Detailed Gender Analysis of VE and VEOs 80-216

79 Satterthwaite, M (2014), op.cit, p.82

80 For example, the manifesto of women by the Daesh Al-Khansaa Brigade states that, '*if roles are mixed and positions overlap, humanity is thrown into a state of flux and instability. The base of society is shaken, its foundations crumble and its walls collapse*': see Winter, Charlie (2015) (translator and editor), '**Women of the Islamic State: A manifesto on women by the Al-Khansaa Brigade**', Quilliam Foundation

81 United States Institute for Peace (2015), op.cit

82 Ladbury, S (2015), op.cit

83 Anderlini and Koch (Jan 2015), '**Extremism in the Mainstream: Implications for and Actions by Women**', UN Women

84 Haynie (2016), op.cit; Blee (2003), op.cit, also notes that the agenda of most (but not all) racist VEOs also support very traditional familial and political roles for white Aryan women

85 E.g. VEOs use such theories to support racist narratives, see RICU (2016), '**Far-right narratives on UK Social Media**': RICUAR16/031, UK; though pseudo-scientific arguments around gender are also common in VEO propaganda

86 Anderlini and Koch (Jan 2015), op.cit

87 Lahoud (2018), op.cit

88 For example, Andrew Anglin, founder and editor of the neo-Nazi Daily Stormer website strenuously objected to the presence of females in the alt-right movement, saying in his 2017 manifesto, '"*Men are sick of having things explained to them by women. It is a turnoff. And it is absolutely useless. What does a woman have to offer you intellectually? Motivationally? Morally? Absolutely nothing. We need to keep women on the sidelines. Not speaking, not leading, and with no official membership in anything.*" See: https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2017/11/07/lauren-southern-alt-right's-canadian-dog-whistler

89 Aghdgomelashvili et al (2015), op.cit

90 Gardner et al (forthcoming), op.cit

91 Lahoud (2018), '**Empowerment or Subjugation: A Gendered Analysis of ISIL Messaging**', UN Women.

92 Lahoud (2018), op.cit

93 Blee, Kathleen (2003), '**Inside Organized Racism: Women in the Hate Movement**', University of California Press, p.113

94   Bloom and Matrfess (2016), '**Women as Symbols and Swords in Boko Haram's Terror**', Prism Vol. 6 (1), p. 104 – 121: Women, Peace and Inclusive Security, Center for Complex Operations, US

95   National Security Research Group (NSRG), (2018), '**Research Analysts paper: How and why do terrorist groups involve women and children**', FCO, HMG

96   Bryson and Bukarti (2018), '**Boko Haram's Split on Women in Combat**', Tony Blair Institute for Global Change: https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/boko-harams-split-women-combat note that one of the main bones of contention that led to the split between Boko Haram and ISWAP was the permissibility of attacking civilians (especially women and children, including making them slaves) and the legality of using women and girls to commit attacks.

97   Aslam, M (2012), op.cit

98   Information taken from the Global Terrorism Database relating to over 80,000 terrorist attacks between 1970 – 2007. These cultural factors predicted terrorism even when accounting for economic and religious factors. For a more detailed discussion of how 'low gender egalitarianism' and 'cultural tightness' predicted terrorism activity, See Gelfand, LaFree, Fahey and Feinberg (2013), '**Culture and Extremism**', Journal of Social Issues 69.3: 495 – 517.

99   Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015, '**Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism**', cited in Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2017), 'Development approaches to countering violent extremism'

100 Ladbury (2015), op.cit

101 Haynie, J (2016), op.cit

102 Sommers, M. (2018), op.cit

103 What counts as 'masculine' varies across place, culture and time; and tend to be defined against what is understood as 'feminine'. For a more detailed discussion, see Pearson (2018), op.cit

104 Kimmel, M (2018), op.cit

105 Kimmel, M (2018), op.cit

106 Spekhard (2015), op.cit

107 Image taken from: https://hitek.fr/actualite/daesh-seduction-jeune-djihad_9123

108 Taken from Hope not Hate (2018), '**The State of Hate 2018**'

109 Taken from https://knightstemplarinternational.com on 17.12.18

110 Ibid. It is notable that ISIS were developing their own computer games based on popular games such as the 'Call of Duty' and 'Grand Theft Auto'. Called 'Salil al-Sawarem' in Arabic (The Clanging of the Swords), the target of such video games is largely male adolescents who may be more likely to see ISIS as a 'cool' organisation as a result of this activity. See Al-Rawi, A (2018), '**Video games, terrorism, and ISIS Jihad 3.0**', Terrorism and Political Violence, 30:4, 740-760

111 Kimmel (2018), op.cit, p.21, quoting a man explaining why he joined an XRW VEO.

112 Harper (2017) cited in Stevens and Fraser (2018), op.cit

113 Pearson (2018), op.cit

114 Khattab and Myrttinen (2017), '"**Most of the men want to leave": Armed groups, displacement and the gendered webs of vulnerability in Syria**', International Alert.

115 Ibid, p.22, drawing on Davis, Taylor and Murphy (2014)

116 See DAI and Wasafiri Consulting (2018), 'Preventing Violent Extremism: Understanding at-risk communities in Kenya', BRICS (Building Resilience in Civil Society)

117 Gardner et al (2015), '**The Impact of War on Somali Men: An Inception Stud**y': Rift Valley Institute Research Project, LOGICA, notes that young men may be particularly vulnerable as power inequalities between men are significant and young men (and their families) are especially vulnerable to exploitation from older men

118 Speckhard, A (2017), '**Drivers of Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kosovo: Women's Roles in Supporting, Preventing and Fighting Violent Extremism**', ISCVE Research Report

119 United States Institute for Peace (2015), op.cit

120 Blee notes that XRW activism is often seen by women solely as a recourse for protecting their children or themselves, but promises little to them personally – see Blee, Kathleen (1996), op.cit

121 Women have been issued with religious decrees (fatwas) urging women to fight for VEOs to face off an existential threat as early as 2001 – see Cunningham (2008), '**The Evolving participation of Muslim women in Palestine, Chechnya, and the global jihadi movement**', in Ness, C (Ed) (2008), 'Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, utility and organization', Routledge, UK, pp. 84-99

122 A number of studies have documented how Daesh drew on the Islamaphobia and restrictions on religious practice experienced by Muslim women in the west (often linked to their dress and appearance) and the subsequent feelings of exclusion and alienation, to advertise themselves as somewhere where they would be accepted and protected. See, Pearson and Winterbotham (2017), '**Women, Gender and Radicalisation: A milieu approach**', RUSI '**Preventing conflict, transforming justice, securing the peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325**', UN Women, p.226

123 An opportunity to study the Quran was one of the reasons women cited for migrating to join the Boko Haram caliphate: Bryson and Bukarti (2018), op.cit

124 This has been noted in Kenya, e.g. Salifu et al, (2017), '**Preventing violent extremism in Kenya: Why women's needs matter**', Institute for Security Studies; and Chechnya, e.g. Speckhard and Akhmedova (2008), '**Black widows and beyond: Understanding the motivations and life trajectories of Chechen female terrorists**', in Ness, C (Ed) (2008), '**Female Terrorism and Militancy: Agency, utility and organization'**, Routledge, UK, pp.69-83

125 Ladbury (2015), op.cit

126 Pearson, E (2017), '**Online as the New Frontline: Affect, Gender and ISIS-Take-Down on Social Media**', Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 41:11, 850-8740

127 Ladbury (2015), op.cit notes that women are often attracted by VEOs promise of implementing Shari'a law, which many women see as giving them rights long denied by traditional male 'cultural' practices.

128 Stevens and Fraser (2018), op.cit

129 https://www.buzzfeed.com/ellievhall/inside-the-online-world-of-the-women-of-isis

130 Saltman and Smith (2015), '**Til Martyrdom Do Us Part: Gender and the ISIS Phenomenon**', Institute for Strategic Dialogue

131 Butale (2017), cited in Stevens and Fraser (2018), op.cit

132 Nagarajan (2018), cited in Stevens and Fraser (2018), op.cit

133 Speckhard (2017), op.cit

134 Mercy Corps (2016), '**"Motivations and Empty Promises": Voices of former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth**'

135 Ladbury (2015), op.cit

136 Speckhard (2017), op.cit

137 Ibid

138 Amnesty International (2018), '**The Condemned; Women and Children Isolated, Trapped and Exploited in Iraq**'

139 RICU (2016), op.cit

140 See, for example, https://hoaxmap.org that monitors fake news reports about sexual violence and other issues related to migration in Germany and surrounding countries

141 Mercy Corps (2015), '**From Jordan to Jihad: The lure of Syria's Violent Extremist Groups**'

142 Pearson and Winterbotham (2017), 'Women, Gender and Daesh Radicalisation', The RUSI Journal, 162:3, 60-72, cited in Stevens and Fraser (2018), op.cit

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