

Recommendation(s) Status: Fatal accident involving a train passenger at Twerton

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has failed to provide a response; or has provided a response that does not adequately satisfy ORR that sufficient action is being taken to properly consider and address a recommendation.
Progressing:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Closed - carry forward:	ORR intends to take no further action as it has been superseded by another recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report



Report Title	Fatal accident involving a train passenger at Twerton
Report Number	14/2019
Date of Incident	01/12/2018

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
14/2019/01	Implementation Ongoing	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to prevent passengers leaning out of opening windows on trains operating on the mainline railway.</p> <p>Operators of mainline passenger trains, including charter operators, using stock with opening windows that passengers could lean out of, should review their risk assessments for operating those trains and implement any additional mitigation measures necessary to minimise the likelihood of passengers leaning out of the windows away from stations (paragraph 95b).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that passenger train operating companies has a proposed action plan and timescale for delivery to be taken in response to the recommendation. ORR will advise RAIB when actions to address this recommendation have been completed.</p>
14/2019/02	Implemented	Blue	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to improve heritage railways' management of the risk associated with passengers leaning out of vehicles.</p> <p>Operators of heritage railways, using stock that passengers could lean out of, should review their risk assessments for people leaning out and implement any additional mitigation measures necessary to achieve an acceptable level of safety (paragraph 95b).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
14/2019/03	Implemented	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the potential for Great Western Railway to overlook hazards associated with its operations.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Great Western Railway has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this</p>

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			<p>Great Western Railway should review its hazard identification process to understand why, prior to 2017, it did not result in identification of the hazard of passengers leaning out of a droplight window, or an assessment of the associated risk. It should take any necessary action to ensure that the possibility of other hazards being overlooked is minimised (paragraph 96).</p>	<p>recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
14/2019/04	Implemented	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that the advice contained in the relevant Railway Group Standards or Railway Industry Standards in relation to warning signs on rolling stock, accurately reflects the level of risk associated with the hazard to be mitigated.</p> <p>RSSB should review its existing guidance to train operators on the design of emergency and safety signs. It should then, as necessary, revise it and prepare new guidance (possibly associated with the Technical Specifications for Interoperability for Persons with Reduced Mobility). Guidance should be prepared in consultation with train operators and should suggest designs of emergency and safety signs that are appropriate and commensurate with the risk to passengers being managed. Specific consideration should be given to the types of warning signs to be displayed on and around external doors with opening windows (paragraphs 46 to 48).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>