## Recommendation Status Report: Fatal accident involving a train passenger at Twerton

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

## **Key to Recommendation Status**

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non- implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

## **Recommendation Status Report**



Report Title	Fatal accident involving a train passenger at Twerton		
Report Number	14/2019		
Date of Incident	01/12/2018		

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
14/2019/01	Closed - I		The intent of this recommendation is to prevent passengers leaning out of	ORR has reported that Operators
			opening windows on trains operating on the mainline railway.	of mainline passenger trains,
				including charter operators, using
				stock with opening windows have
			Operators of mainline passenger trains, including charter operators, using	reported that they have
			stock with opening windows that passengers could lean out of, should	completed actions taken in
			review their risk assessments for operating those trains and	response to this
			implement any additional mitigation measures necessary to minimise the	recommendation. ORR proposes
			likelihood of passengers leaning out of the windows away from stations	to take no further action unless
			(paragraph 95b).	they become aware that the
				information provided becomes
				inaccurate.
14/2019/02	Closed - I	White		ORR has reported that Network
				Rail has reported that it has
			The intent of this recommendation is to improve heritage railways'	completed actions taken in
			management of the risk associated with passengers leaning out of	response to this
			vehicles.	recommendation. ORR proposes
				to take no further action unless
			Operators of heritage railways, using stock that passengers could lean out	they become aware that the
			of, should review their risk assessments for people leaning out and	information provided becomes
			implement any additional mitigation measures necessary to achieve an	inaccurate.
			acceptable level of safety (paragraph 95b).	
14/2019/03	Closed - I	None		ORR has reported that Great
				Western Railway has reported
			The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the potential for Great	that it has completed actions
			Western Railway to overlook hazards associated with its operations.	taken in response to this

## **Recommendation Status Report**



			Great Western Railway should review its hazard identification process to understand why, prior to 2017, it did not result in identification of the hazard of passengers leaning out of a droplight window, or an assessment of the associated risk. It should take any necessary action to ensure that the possibility of other hazards being overlooked is minimised (paragraph 96).	recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
14/2019/04	Closed - I	None	The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that the advice contained in the relevant Railway Group Standards or Railway Industry Standards in relation to warning signs on rolling stock, accurately reflects the level of risk associated with the hazard to be mitigated.	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the
			RSSB should review its existing guidance to train operators on the design of emergency and safety signs. It should then, as necessary, revise it and prepare new guidance (possibly associated with the Technical Specifications for Interoperability for Persons with Reduced Mobility). Guidance should be prepared in consultation with train operators and should suggest designs of emergency and safety signs that are appropriate and commensurate with the risk to passengers being managed. Specific consideration should be given to the types of warning signs to be displayed on and around external doors with opening windows (paragraphs 46 to 48).	information provided becomes inaccurate.