Recommendation(s) Status: Near miss with a track worker near Gatwick Airport station

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

| Open | Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing. |
|----------------------------|--|
| (replaces Progressing and | |
| Implementation On-going) | |
| impionionitation on going/ | |

| Closed | ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and |
|---|---|
| (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non- implementation) | evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken. |

| Insufficient response: | The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into |
|------------------------|--|
| | consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is |
| | insufficient evidence to support no action being taken. |

| Superseded: | The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have | | |
|-------------|---|--|--|
| | subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation. | | |

| Awaiting response: | Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation. |
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RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report



| Report Title | Near miss with a track worker near Gatwick Airport station | |
|------------------|--|--|
| Report Number | 12/2019 | |
| Date of Incident | 02/12/2018 | |

| Rec No. | Status | RAIB Concern | Recommendation | RAIB Summary of current status |
|------------|------------|--------------|---|---|
| 12/2019/01 | Closed - I | None | The intent of this recommendation is to ensure the effective transfer of information needed to prepare safe systems of work for isolation activities. It is anticipated that both switching and earth strapping will be covered, possibly by simple diagrams showing the exact locations at which staff must work. The detail of implementation is expected to take account of the programme for installing and bringing into use remote switching and isolation facilities in some areas, the need for adequate precautions until these are operational and the possibility that these facilities may not become operational at the times currently programmed. Network Rail should improve its processes for planning conductor rail isolations so that safe systems of work planners are provided with simple, clear and precise information about the locations at which isolation work will take place. | ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate. |
| 12/2019/02 | Closed - I | None | The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that safe system of work planners issue plans to site workers with accurate and appropriate protection for the location and nature of the work being undertaken. This should apply to all site activities, not only work relating to isolation of conductor rails. It is anticipated that work already undertaken by BAM Nuttall since the incident will contribute to implementation of this recommendation. BAM Nuttall should improve its safe system of work planning and checking | ORR has reported that BAM Nuttall has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate |

Recommendation Status Report



| processes so that: | |
|--|--|
| I all safe systems of work plans include protection for the actual positions at which people are required to work; | |
| I safe system of work planners seek additional information if they lack the information needed to identify and document safe methods of working; and | |
| l persons in charge of work participate in the planning process as required by Network Rail standards. | |