

Recommendation Status Report: Overspeed at Sandy South Junction, Bedfordshire

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

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Report Title	Overspeed at Sandy South Junction, Bedfordshire
Report Number	10/2019
Date of Incident	19/10/2018

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
10/2019/05	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to learn lessons from the 2008 change to the rules relating to emergency speed restrictions and to consider the extent to which these have been addressed by the current processes which are applied by standards committees.</p> <p>RSSB should lead a review of how the proposal to remove the requirement in the rule book to notify drivers of emergency speed restrictions was managed. This review should:</p> <p>I highlight any lessons learnt and consider the extent to which these have been addressed by the current processes which are applied by standards committees; and</p> <p>I consider how RSSB and Railway Group members can best work together to monitor the effects of significant changes to the rule book, such that any unexpected consequences can be further managed or mitigated.</p> <p>The outcomes of the review should then be used to inform any necessary improvements to the current processes and the training provided to persons involved in the evaluation of proposed changes to the rule book (paragraph 97a).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that RSSB has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
10/2019/01	Open	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to minimise the risk of drivers being unaware that they are approaching a section of track where an emergency speed restriction is in force.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that (Dutyholder name) is taking suitable actions to address the recommendation although an accurate plan for full implementation has not been</p>

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			Train Operating Companies and Freight Operating Companies should review their practice in relation to drivers' prior awareness of emergency speed restrictions. This review should be based on a suitable and sufficient risk assessment, and consider any necessary measures to minimise the likelihood that a driver encountering an emergency speed restriction may not respond correctly to the trackside signs. Any necessary actions should be implemented (paragraphs 96c, 97a).	formulated. ORR will advise when the status of this recommendation changes.
10/2019/02	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to provide drivers with early warnings of emergency speed restrictions en route.</p> <p>Rail Delivery Group, in consultation with Network Rail, should consider and review options for a safe and suitable means of providing drivers with warning of emergency speed restrictions on the route ahead through the use of available technologies (paragraph 96c, 97a).</p>	ORR has reported that RSSB has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
10/2019/03	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to review the design and use of the emergency speed indicator board in order that the flashing lights are clearly visible for as long as possible even when the board is in shadow or bright sunlight.</p> <p>Network Rail should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) issue clear instructions to its staff about when it is permissible to deploy a miniature emergency speed indicator board; and b) determine whether the lamp fittings in emergency speed indicator boards are adequate for the purpose for which they are designed, bearing in mind the difficulty of ensuring the optimum alignment when deploying these boards (paragraph 96b). 	ORR has reported that RSSB has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
10/2019/04	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure drivers have an understanding of how to deal with tasks which may require addressing within the cab environment.</p>	ORR has reported that (Dutyholder name) has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR will advise RAIB when actions to address this

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		<p>LNER should review its professional driving policy and associated competency arrangements to ensure that drivers are provided with risk based guidance on how and when they can safely carry out tasks in the cab while the train is in motion. This guidance should ensure that drivers can be confident that they can reduce speed, or stop, if required (paragraph 96a).</p> <p>This recommendation may also apply to other train operating companies.</p>	<p>recommendation have been completed.</p>
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