

Recommendation(s) Status: Near miss between a train and a track worker at Peterborough

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Recommendation Status Report



Report Title	Near miss between a train and a track worker at Peterborough
Report Number	04/2019
Date of Incident	20/07/2018

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
04/2019/04	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk to track workers on the LNE&EM route by reducing the amount of work undertaken with lookout warning by improving the planning and management of maintenance tasks to better utilise existing resources and track access opportunities.</p> <p>Network Rail should increase engagement of all maintenance sections across the London North Eastern and East Midlands Route, with the route's 'Safe and Effective Working' project, so that as many of its cyclic maintenance tasks as possible are undertaken in planned possessions or using line blockage protection systems (paragraph 120a).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
04/2019/05	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to significantly reduce the number of routine work activities that are undertaken at the lowest level of the hierarchy for safe systems of work in Network Rail company standard NR/L2/OHS/019.</p> <p>Network Rail should:</p> <p>a. reduce the number of cyclic maintenance tasks that are undertaken with lookout warning by establishing improved planning processes to substantially decrease the reliance on lookout warning by enabling more pre-planned activities to take place in planned possessions, or using line</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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			<p>blockages protection systems; and</p> <p>b. implement effective arrangements for the monitoring, audit and review of these revised planning processes (paragraph 120a).</p>	
04/2019/01	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to minimise the exposure of site lookouts to the risk of being struck by moving trains.</p> <p>Network Rail should promote an amendment to the Rule Book (GE/RT8000) to require Controllers of Site Safety and Safe Work Leaders to default to placing their site lookouts in a position of safety, unless this is not practicable to implement the safe system of work, eg the site lookout needs to be positioned elsewhere to achieve unrestricted sighting of intermediate / distant lookouts or trains, give a warning by touch, or be close by to give an audible warning (paragraph 119b).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation.</p> <p>ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p> <p>ORR response letter: https://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/42757/raib-peterborough-station-2020-04-15.pdf</p>
04/2019/02	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of track workers being struck by a train as result of a breakdown in the communications between a Controller of Site Safety / Safe Work Leader and site lookout at the site of work, and the intermediate and distant lookouts.</p> <p>Network Rail should:</p> <p>a. investigate the common practices used by Controllers of Site Safety / Safe Work Leaders and site lookouts to communicate with intermediate / distant lookouts using flag signals to indicate 'all clear' at the start of work and after a train has passed, and 'work complete';</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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			<p>b. seek to understand the reasons for the unofficial systems of communication currently used and the risks that they introduce;</p> <p>c. investigate ways of improving communication between those at the site of work and intermediate / distant lookouts, including the use of technology;</p> <p>d. implement, across its network, an improved system of communication, based on the findings from (a), (b) and (c) above, including training of relevant staff and promoting amendments to the rule book as necessary; and</p> <p>e. implement effective arrangements for the monitoring, audit and review of the improved system of communication that it puts in place (paragraphs 119d.i and 120b).</p>	
04/2019/03	Closed - IA	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk to track workers working under lookout warning, by removing the potential for confusion arising from having multiple work groups and distant lookouts in close proximity.</p> <p>Network Rail should provide guidance and training for its staff holding the Controller of Site Safety / Safe Work Leader competency, on the actions to be taken if more than one group wants to use a safe system of work with distant / intermediate lookouts that overlap at a location (paragraph 119d.ii).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed the actions taken (by alternative means) in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>