

## Recommendation(s) Status: Self-detrainment of passengers onto lines that were still open to traffic and electrically live at Lewisham, south-east London

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

### Key to Recommendation Status

<b>Implemented:</b>	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
<b>Implemented by alternative means:</b>	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
<b>Implementation ongoing:</b>	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
<b>Insufficient response:</b>	The end implementer has failed to provide a response; or has provided a response that does not adequately satisfy ORR that sufficient action is being taken to properly consider and address a recommendation.
<b>Progressing:</b>	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
<b>Non-implementation:</b>	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
<b>Closed - carry forward:</b>	ORR intends to take no further action as it has been superseded by another recommendation.
<b>Awaiting response:</b>	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:

**Red** – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

**Blue** – The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

**White** – The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

# Recommendation Status Report



<b>Report Title</b>	Self-detrainment of passengers onto lines that were still open to traffic and electrically live at Lewisham, south-east London
<b>Report Number</b>	02/2019
<b>Date of Incident</b>	02/03/2018

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
02/2019/01	Implemented	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to identify practical opportunities to improve train service resilience when conductor rail ice risk is forecast.</p> <p>Network Rail (South East route) and Southeastern, should undertake a holistic review of their seasonal preparedness arrangements for winter taking into account the actions already taken or in progress as result of this incident. This should have the objective of maximising operational resilience and minimising the risk of train stranding incidents that could lead to unsafe passenger detrainment. In so doing it should consider the effectiveness of existing and proposed mitigation measures (for instance conductor rail heating and the running of de-icing trains), and the criteria for their use, taking into account the criticality of locations to operational performance. The review should also include consideration of operational strategies, such as the key route strategy, and encompass train routeing strategies designed to enhance operational resilience during winter weather and avoid the unnecessary blocking of key junctions. Strategies and practices used by other metro-type railway operators should be considered. Network Rail and Southeastern should jointly implement changes that are identified as beneficial (paragraphs 175a.i, 175a.iii, 176a, 176b and 177).</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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			<p>This recommendation may also be applicable to other train operating companies and Network Rail routes.</p>	
02/2019/02	Awaiting Response	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that signallers and drivers respond in a timely manner to events that have the potential to result in a train being stranded or held at a signal for an extended period of time.</p> <p>Network Rail (South East route) and Southeastern should work in conjunction with RSSB to provide suitable instructions and guidance to operations staff to help them determine when a train should be considered as stranded (as a result of it being unable to move, or make adequate progress), the timeframe within which this needs to be declared and the actions that then need to be taken. They should develop and publish suitable instructions, and where appropriate update the Rule Book (paragraphs 175a.ii and 176c).</p> <p>This recommendation may also be applicable to other train operating companies and Network Rail routes.</p>	<p>IM content that reasonable actions have been taken. ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
02/2019/03	Implemented	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that information that is critical to the operation of the railway is communicated to the correct role within the KICC in an accurate and timely manner, as highlighted by the reasons for miscommunication identified in paragraph 129.</p> <p>Network Rail (South East route) and Southeastern should continue their joint review of the processes for decision making, communications and the handling of information with and within the KICC. They should make enhancements so that:</p> <p>I the functional responsibilities of the individual roles within the KICC, and the information important to them, are defined and make arrangements</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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			<p>to ensure that staff clearly understand;</p> <p>I the appropriate lines of communication between signalling staff and KICC staff are defined, and incorporated in the method of working, and make arrangements to ensure that staff clearly understand; and</p> <p>I within the KICC, information critical to the operation of the railway is made visible to, or communicated to, the relevant responsible role in a timely manner (paragraph 175a.ii).</p> <p>This recommendation may also be applicable to other railway control centres.</p>	
02/2019/04	Implemented	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to improve the availability of Southeastern staff that are competent to support train crews in the event of a railway incident at locations other than in station platforms. This complements recommendation 2 in RAIB report 16/2018 that was placed on Network Rail (South East route) to enable provision of appropriate support to staff on the ground, such as train crew.</p> <p>Southeastern, in consultation with Network Rail (South East route), should review its arrangements and resources for assisting train crews in managing, informing and reassuring passengers on trains that are stopped at locations remote from station platforms. It should make any changes that are necessary to provide sufficient numbers of suitably trained staff who are competent to access the track and support the managed evacuation of trains. It should also clarify when and how these staff will be deployed (paragraph 175b).</p> <p>This recommendation may also be applicable to other train operators.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
02/2019/05	Implemented	None		<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has</p>

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		<p>The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that the essential needs of train passengers are reasonably met in the event that they need to stay on board for an extended time as result of a foreseeable extreme weather event.</p> <p>Southeastern, in consultation with Network Rail (South East route) as appropriate, should continue its review of the adequacy of the systems and facilities on each type of train it operates as they relate to alleviating the risk that passengers decide to detrain from trains that have been stranded for extended periods of time. This should include consideration of toilet use, heating, ventilation, passenger information, food and drink, and take into account the practice of other metro-type railway operators. It should then review its seasonal preparedness and make arrangements to provide any additional facilities, provisions and information that passengers need in an emergency resulting from an extreme weather event (paragraphs 175a, 177 and 178a).</p> <p>This recommendation may also be applicable to other train operators.</p>	<p>completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
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