Case: 1810155/2018

EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS

Claimant: **Gemma Boylan**
Respondent: **DL Insurance Services Limited**

AT A HEARING

Heard at: **Leeds** **On: 10th, 11, 12th, 13th and 14th June 2019**
Before: **Employment Judge Lancaster**
Members: **Mrs LJ Anderson-Coe**
Mr M Brewer

Representation
Claimant: In person
Respondent: Miss N Joffe, counsel

WRITTEN REASONS

Brief Chronology

1. The Claimant was employed by the Respondent from 18th March 2014 until her resignation, which took effect on 3rd August 2018.

2. In January 2016 she was seconded and then on 5th April 2016 the Claimant was transferred permanently to the Technical Referral Unit (TRU).

3. On 18th January 2018 the Claimant reported to her line manager, Sally Deighton, that she had been subjected to sexual harassment and an assault by "colleague X". (For the avoidance of doubt the Anonymisation Order of 4th February 2019, which was erroneously made in respect of Sally Deighton, is revoked.)

4. She did not, however, ever wish that this matter be formally investigated so that neither the Respondent nor the tribunal is in any position to make a finding as to what did in fact happen.

5. The Claimant went of sick on 12th February 2018 and never returned to work.

6. The Claimant requested home-working and made a formal flexible working request on 10th May 2018, which further requested that she not work evenings or weekends ("compressed hours").

7. On 25th May 2018 the request for home working and for week-day day-time only working was refused but the Respondent was prepared to offer fixed shifts.

8. On 3rd May 2018 the Claimant had raised an initial complaint about Ms Deighton allegedly "pressurising her to return to work. This was consolidated with a grievance dated 8th May 2018 which was itself later expanded (on 1st June 2018) to include what was effectively an appeal against the refusal of the flexible working request

9. The grievance outcome was first provided on 22nd June 2018, updated on 28th June 2018, and on 2nd July 2018 the Claimant appealed.

10. Whilst the appeal was still pending the Claimant resigned on 6th July 2018.

The issues

11. The issues were identified at a preliminary hearing on 29th October 2018 and have since been reduced to an agreed list, referred to in bold below.

Direct Sex Discrimination

12. **Was the Claimant treated less favourably that the Respondent treats others by: Not receiving "second product training" on joining the TRU until January 2018 (comparator Richard Koslowsky)?**
If so was any less favourable treatment because of the Claimant's sex?

13. Mr Koslowsky joined TRU at the same time as the Claimant. His background was in homes insurance claims whereas the bulk of the TRU work was in motor insurance. There was an imperative to train him so that he could work productively and be allocated shifts where he would be the only person available to deal with the high volume motor insurance calls. He was therefore shortly after starting assigned to receive "second product training" in motor insurance whereas the Claimant, who was already competent in motor insurance did not receive home insurance training at the same time.

14. The Claimant did not receive her second product training until January 2018. Throughout 2016 the Claimant was not eligible for this training because on the Respondent's measure of performance, even if that model was potentially flawed, there were issues as to her capability. Ms Deighton was consistent in opposing training for anyone, male or female, who had failed their performance indicators. In 2017 there was effectively a moratorium on training.

15. Mr Koslowsky is not therefore a relevant comparator as defined by section 23 of the Equality Act 2010 because there is a material difference between his circumstances and those of the Claimant.

16. There is therefore no less favourable treatment.

17. In any event there is nothing beyond the mere fact that the Claimant is a woman and Mr Koslowsky is a man to suggest that the reason for her being treated differently was her sex.

18. The only fact which the Claimant seeks to prove as something from which, under section 136 of the Equality Act, decide in the absence of any other explanation that there had been discriminatory treatment because of sex is her general assertion that there was a "laddish culture" in the office. That is not however a culture which wholly

excluded the Claimant from conversations because, for instance, she herself has an interest in sport, and is not, therefore, something from which we could properly infer discrimination so as to pass the burden of proving otherwise to the Respondent. The decision maker, Ms Deighton, was of course a woman and therefore not herself part of any alleged "laddish culture" As we have said there is in any case a full and non-discriminatory reason for Mr Koslowsky being trained earlier.

Time Points/Jurisdiction

19. **Has this claim been presented outside the statutory time limits for bringing such a claim?**
If the complaint was not submitted in time, would it be just and equitable to extend time?

20. The latest date from which time begins to run in this case is not January 2018 when the training was eventually given but May 2016.

21. On that date home insurance training was given but the Claimant was not included. The trainees on that occasion were in fact the cohort who had started in TRU the previous year, 2015.

22. It was apparent therefore at this point that a decision had been taken not to train the Claimant within a similar timeframe to Mr Koslowsky.

23. The claim was not issued until 11th Septembers 2018, that is 2 years and 4 months later. The Claimant, though in possession of all the material facts that found he complaint did not act at all promptly and it would not, in any event, be just and equitable to extend time.

Direct Sex Discrimination

24. **Was the Claimant treated less favourably that the Respondent treats others by:**
Not being allowed the fixed shifts/ compressed hours she requested on 10th May 2018?
If so was any less favourable treatment because of the Claimant's sex?

25. The Claimant requested that she work only 8am until 6pm on Monday to Wednesday and 8am to 6pm on Thursday.

26. None of the named comparators had requested to work nor in fact worked this pattern. They all worked some evenings until 8 or 9 pm and they were all on the weekend rota as well.

27. None of them is therefore a relevant comparator as defined by section 23 of the Equality Act 2010 because there is a material difference between his circumstances and those of the Claimant.

28. There is therefore no less favourable treatment.

29. Again, there are in any event no facts established by the Claimant from which we could properly infer discrimination.

Direct Race Discrimination

30. **Was the Claimant treated less favourably that the Respondent treats others by: Not being allowed the fixed shifts/ compressed hours she requested on 10th May 2018?**
If so was any less favourable treatment because of the Claimant's race?

Direct Age Discrimination

31. **Was the Claimant treated less favourably that the Respondent treats others by: Not being allowed the fixed shifts/ compressed hours she requested on 10th May 2018?**
If so was any less favourable treatment because of the Claimant's age?

Direct Disability Discrimination (but see also paragraphs 34 to 43 below)

32. **Was the Claimant treated less favourably that the Respondent treats others by: Not being allowed the fixed shifts/ compressed hours she requested on 10th May 2018?**
If so was any less favourable treatment because of the Claimant's disability?

33. The same arguments apply as in paragraphs 25 to 29, dealing with the allegation that, on exactly the same facts, this treatment amounts to sex discrimination.

Disability Discrimination

34. **Was the Claimant disabled in relation to impairments of anxiety and depression at relevant times?**
Did the Respondent know or ought it reasonably to have known that the Claimant was disabled at relevant times?

35. The Claimant had suffered an episode of anxiety and depression in 2013/2014

36. The medical evidence does not identify this as the start of any underlying condition.

37. In 2017 the Claimant, who is evidently more anxious than most people, experienced a number of adverse reactions to life events, including a panic attack which led to one day's absence from work. None of these are however sufficient indication of the recurrence, continuation or onset of a mental impairment with substantial adverse effects upon he normal day-to-day activities. She did not see a doctor between April 2014 and January 2018.

38. From 12th February the Claimant was off work, principally as a consequence of having experienced the alleged harassment.

39. Initially , however, the sick notes were all short term and envisaged - as indeed did the Claimant at this stage - that she would return to work, certainly with adjusted duties, within a reasonable time frame

40. At this juncture it could not therefore have been said that it was likely that the substantial adverse effects of any mental impairment would be likely to last for at least twelve months, that is until and beyond 12th February 2019.

41. The "step change" came with the fit note of 19th June 2018. This says the Claimant is wholly unfit to work for two months from 1st June 2018. There is no longer any suggested ion that she might be fit for amended duties or with workplace adaptations.

42. That is why we have found that the Claimant was disabled from 1st June 2018. That is the date when it became likely (in the sense that by now "it could well happen") that the substantial adverse effects of mental impairment which had resulted in her absence from 12th February 2018 would, in fact, go on to last for at least 12 months.

43. Because, however, the Respondent had been on notice since the Occupational Health report of 6th April that the Claimant may be disabled it is conceded that it must be held to have had knowledge of her disability from the first, that is from 1st June 2018.

Direct Disability Discrimination (but see also paragraphs 34 to 43 above)

44. **Was the Claimant treated less favourably that the Respondent treats others by:**
The Respondent stating that any change in shift pattern would be subject to review every three to six months. ?
If so was any less favourable treatment because of the Claimant's disability?

45. The proposal to review periodically the suggested new fixed-shift pattern for the Claimant was in fact communicated on 29th May 2018, just before the onset of disability for the purposes of this claim.

46. In any event this suggestion of fixed shifts was not simply a counter-proposal to the flexible working request, it was also expressly made in the context of supporting the Claimant's return to work.

47. None of the named comparators had requested to work flexibly at a point where they were off work and looking to negotiate a return. Their requests for a variation to their existing terms and conditions at work had been granted. That is why there was no reservation of a right to review, although we note and accept that Mr Smith did in fact monitor all cases of flexible working, believing that he would have been entitled to do this. Had the Claimant's request for flexible working been granted without more then it too would, in law, have effected a permanent change in her contract with no review, and conversely no right to reapply for a further variation within twelve months.

48. None of them is therefore a relevant comparator as defined by section 23 of the Equality Act 2010 because there is a material difference between his circumstances and those of the Claimant.

49. There is therefore no less favourable treatment.

Failure to make reasonable adjustments

50. **Did the Respondent apply the following provision, criterion or practice (PCP) to the Claimant:**
A requirement to undertake work in the office?
If so, did that PCP put the Claimant at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who are not disabled?

Indirect Disability Discrimination

51. **Did the Respondent apply a PCP to the Claimant of requiring her work to be done in the office?**
If so, would the PCP put others who shared the Claimant's disability at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons who are not disabled?

52. The TRU did not have the established infrastructure to support home-working in the way that other teams did.

53. It would, however, have been possible to install the equipment necessary to allow the Claimant to work taking referral telephone calls at home. This would have been at a not insignificant cost, but the Respondent does not rely upon that as a reason for not having implemented it.

54. Some purely administrative work could have been done from home but this would not have amounted to a full-time position

55. We accept Mr Smith's evidence that, as the manager responsible for this team, he genuinely did not consider home working feasible in TRU, because of the nature of the interactions between the team and the need to ensure a spread and diversity of work; in particular if all the admin work were hived off to the Claimant not only would others become "de-skilled" in that area but it would also create a "single point of failure".

56. Nobody in TRU worked from home. For a short period an employee with a physical disability had been allowed to work from home doing purely administartive tasks. This had not proved to be a satisfactory arrangement and came to an end in any event because of supervening long-term sickness absence. The nature of administartive tasks required to be done within the TRU had also changed somewhat since that time.

57. In so far as, in these circumstances, the Claimant's request for home-working was declined that does, in practice, constitute a PCP that she undertake work in the office.

58. The Claimant, of course, never actually attended at work after she was identified as suffering from a disability and had requested home -working before the point she met the statutory definition of a disabled person.

59. The Claimant has not, however, satisfied us even after 1st June 2018 that that PCP placed her as a disabled person at a substantial disadvantage. That is because she was not, by reason of her disability prevented from working in an office. She had requested to work from home thinking it was likely to be declined and her final position (as expressed on 17th July 2018) was that she would have been "just happy with compressed hours". In her grievance she had earlier referred to her proposing to work "2 days in the office, 2 days homeworking" and to her being willing to consider working from home only on particular days of anxiety.

60. The Claimant would, on the evidence, still have been prepared and able to work out of the office. She is not, therefore, substantially disadvantaged by a practise that she was required to do so

61. There is certainly no medical opinion that she required permanent home-working. At most it was suggested as temporary measure, if feasible, to facilitate a phased return to work.

62. Of course, the Claimant expressed an understandable preference not to work in the same place as Colleague X, but that arises out of the allegations made against him and not by reason of her disability. A non-disabled person who had expressed similar reluctance to return to a particular workplace but also in circumstances where the

substance of the dispute between her and the alleged harasser could not ever be resolved by the employer would have been equally uncomfortable with the situation.

63. In the circumstances we have not needed to address the further questions as to whether in declining home-working **the Respondent took such steps as were reasonable to avoid that disadvantage** or **was the PCP a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim?** Both these questions would be purely hypothetical; they would only become relevant if the Claimant had in fact been unable by reason of her disability to attend at the office.

Failure to make reasonable adjustments

64. **Did the Respondent apply the following provision, criterion or practice (PCP) to the Claimant:**
Not allowing hearings to be audio recorded?
If so, did that PCP put the Claimant at a substantial disadvantage in comparison with persons who are not disabled?

65. It is admitted that it is not the Respondent's practice to allow recordings of grievance hearings.

66. At the start of the meeting on 1st June 2018, and before the process had been explained to her, the Claimant requested to be allowed to record proceedings and this was declined.

67. There was, however, a note taker present and at the end of the hearing – throughout which the Claimant was clearly able to participate fully – minutes were provided to her which she amended.

68. As the Claimant had expressly agreed to a record of the meeting being made in this way, as an alternative to her making an audio recording, the Respondent could not reasonably have known that she was likely to be subject to any disadvantage such as she now alleges by not having a recording to assist her memory when checking the minutes.

69. No duty to make adjustments therefore arises under schedule 8 part 3 to the Equality Act.

Associative Direct Disability Discrimination

70. **Was the Claimant's mother-in-law disabled in relation to impairments of petit mal epilepsy and osteoporosis?**
Was the Claimant treated less favourably that the Respondent treats others by:
Not being allowed the fixed shifts/ compressed hours she requested on 10th May 2018?
If so was any less favourable treatment because of the Claimant's association with her disabled husband and mother-in-law?

71. We accept that both the Claimant's husband and her mother-in-law were disabled, though there is no actual medical evidence to support this in the case of the mother-in law.

72. In her grievance, which was then incorporated in to her flexible working request, the Claimant states that spending time with her husband, who does not work weekends,

"is an important element of my wellbeing." She further says "I would also consider myself a care for him during depressive episodes which tend to occur at weekends. I will also soon be a key carer for his mum and having weekends off will allow me to help her around the house, with errands etc."

73. This request for weekends off was a very recent development. The Claimant had changed her position since the home visit on 3rd May 2018 because "I thought through a little bit more what would be most sustainable given my circumstances and so updated my request regarding weekends".

74. The Claimant did not ever, of course, work every weekend: she was on a variable shift pattern including being on the rota to cover these shifts from time-to-time. The proposed fixed pattern envisaged working alternate Saturdays and no Sundays.

75. Leaving aside the fact that again these are not appropriate comparators, the reason for rejecting this newly expressed preference to avoid any weekend working, primarily for her own perceived wellbeing, was not because of any association with disabled people, who may or may not, then or in the future, have needed some assistance from the Claimant on an occasional basis at weekends. It was because it was not acceptable within the whole context of TRU, when the Claimant was in fact capable, as she always had done, of working weekend rotas alongside all-bar-one of her full-time colleagues. That one female colleague worked a fixed pattern of 5 days a week Monday to Friday, whereas the Claimant also wanted some form of compressed hours during the week. All other full time employees in TRU (including the three comparators) who were on fixed patters still remained on the weekend rota.

Harassment related to Disability

76. **Did the Respondent's conduct set out below amount to:**
Unwanted conduct;
Related to the Claimant's disability;
Which had the purpose or effect of violating her dignity and/or creating an environment that was intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating of offensive to the Claimant?
Ms Deighton calling the Claimant on 4th May 2018 and stating that she expected her to return to work on 9th May based on the time scale in the Occupational Health report dated 4th April 2018.

77. The Claimant was not in fact disabled at this time.

78. In any event we would not find this to be harassment.

79. Ms Deighton made this telephone call on the instructions of HR. That HR advice was, in the circumstances, inappropriate, given that there was a more recent sick-note but the fact of raising of the anticipated return date does not meet the threshold of harassment. We are satisfied that there was nothing untoward in Ms Deighton's tone: we accept her evidence that she did not in fact herself agree with the HR advice she had been given. The Claimant's own perception, contemporaneously recorded in her diary, was that she had been perfectly able to stand up for herself and challenge the suggestion that she should return immediately to work.

Harassment related to Disability

80. **Did the Respondent's conduct set out below amount to:**
Unwanted conduct;
Related to the Claimant's disability;
Which had the purpose or effect of violating her dignity and/or creating an environment that was intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating of offensive to the Claimant?
The Respondent stating on 25th May that it would review the Claimant's flexible working pattern after three to six months.

81. The Claimant was, again, not in fact disabled at this time.

82. In any event we would not find this to be harassment.

83. Because it was related to the phased return to work following sick leave it might be said to be related to disability, if that were a disability related absence, but it cannot objectively be harassment where the purpose is to facilitate that return.

Harassment related to Disability

84. **Did the Respondent's conduct set out below amount to:**
Unwanted conduct;
Related to the Claimant's disability;
Which had the purpose or effect of violating her dignity and/or creating an environment that was intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating of offensive to the Claimant?
Ms Deighton contacting Clare Mclure, the Occupational health Adviser, around June 2018, allegedly requesting the details of the Claimant's sexual harassment be disclosed to her.

85. The email from Ms Deighton is in fact dated 19th June.

86. It is based on a misunderstanding. Ms Deighton had clearly thought that Ms Mclure was saying that the Claimant had now disclosed the details of the incident with Colleague X to somebody at work. In actual fact Ms Mclure was referring to a disclosure of details to herself, but her report is potentially ambiguous. In response Ms Deighton asked "Do you know who this has been disclosed to".

87. On no sensible reading that can that in fact be construed as a request that Ms Mclure actually disclose the details given to her, even if that is, unfortunately, how the situation was then reported back to the Claimant by OH.

Harassment related to Disability

88. **Did the Respondent's conduct set out below amount to:**
Unwanted conduct;
Related to the Claimant's disability;
Which had the purpose or effect of violating her dignity and/or creating an environment that was intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating of offensive to the Claimant?
Ian Davis' alleged failure to take into account the Claimant's email regarding Amanda Marshall when considering the Claimant's grievance appeal.

89. This is not related to the Claimant's disability.

90. On 5th August, that is after the effective date of termination, but whilst the grievance appeal was still pending, the Claimant emailed Mr Davis.

91. This was in relation to an incident involving Ms Marshall, who may or may not herself be disabled and who cares for a disabled son.

92. This email is headed "Something else I'd like to mention just to give some context".

93. It would have been better had Mr Davis acknowledged receipt but it is not, on the face of it, something which actually impinges upon his investigation nor which requires the instigation of a seaprate enquiry where Ms Marshall had not raised these issues.

94. It does not, viewed objectively, constitute post-employment harassment of the Claimant, and is certainly not unwanted conduct related to her disability.

Victimisation

95. **Did the Claimant do a protected act within the meaning of section 27(2) of the Equality Act 2010 in the form of the following communications**
2 March 2018; 3 May 2018; 10 May 210; 5 August 2018; Her grievance of 4 and 8 May 2018?
Did the Respondent at the relevant time know or suspect that the Claimant had done or intended to do a protected act?

96. Nothing happened on 2nd March 2018 which could amount to a protected act.

97. On 3rd May 2018 at the home meeting the Claimant's diary clearly records that she told Mr Smith and Ms Deighton that she was going to seek advice from ACAS, which she in fact did on 4th May. We accept that she said this and it is sufficient to put the Respondents on notice that she did intend to do a protected act.

98. The complaint of 4th May confirms that she had indeed spoken to ACAS and is a further protected act.

99. The grievance of 8th May and the flexible working request of 10th May which cross references it explicitly mention the Equality Act.

100. The email to Mr Smith on 5th August 2018 in respect to Ms Marshall does not give any indication whatsoever that the Claimant is in fact asserting a breach of or intending to take any action under the Equality Act. It is alleging a beach of confidentiality in respect of a third party and is presented as background information as to why the Claimant had not wished to retract her own resignation letter. It is not therefore a protected act.

Victimisation

101. **Did the Respondent subject the Claimant to a detriment because she did a protected act in the following respects:**
Ms Deighton calling the Claimant on 4th May 2018 and stating that she expected her to return to work on 9th May based on the time scale in the Occupational Health report dated 4th April 2018.

102.We refer to paragraph 79. There are no facts from which we could infer that this was done because the Claimant had done a protected act on 3rd May 2018.

Victimisation

103**Did the Respondent subject the Claimant to a detriment because she did a protected act in the following respects:**
The Respondent stating on 25th May that it would review the Claimant's flexible working pattern after three to six months.

104.We refer to paragraph 83. There are no facts from which we could infer that this was done because the Claimant had done a protected act on 3rd, 4th 8th or 10th May 2018.

Victimisation

105**Did the Respondent subject the Claimant to a detriment because she did a protected act in the following respects:**
Ms Deighton contacting Clare Mclure, the Occupational Health Adviser, around June 2018, allegedly requesting the details of the Claimant's sexual harassment be disclosed to her.

106.We refer to paragraphs 85,86 and 87. There are no facts from which we could infer that this was done because the Claimant had done a protected act on 3rd, 4th 8th or 10th May 2018.

Victimisation

107**Did the Respondent subject the Claimant to a detriment because she did a protected act in the following respects:**
Ian Davis' alleged failure to take into account the Claimant's email regarding Amanda Marshall when considering the Claimant's grievance appeal

108.We refer to paragraphs 90, 91, 92 and 93. There are no facts from which we could infer that this was done because the Claimant had done a protected act on 3rd, 4th 8th or 10th May 2018.

Constructive Dismissal

109**Did the Respondent without reasonable and proper cause, conduct itself, in a manner calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust between itself and the Claimant? The alleged breaches are all of the above allegations of discrimination bar the alleged final act of harassment/victimisation and the following:**
Ms Deighton not contacting the Claimant between 4th and 25th May 2018;
Mr Smith not password protecting an Occupational Health referral form attached to an email to the Claimant dated 25th May 2018;
The Respondent declining the Claimant's request for permanent home working for all of her contractual hours (in light of the fact homeworking was allowed for the Claimant's colleague Carlie Knight) on 25th May 2018.
The Respondent allegedly carrying out a flawed grievance investigation and rejecting the Claimant's grievance.
If so did the Claimant resign as a result of the breach of the contract of employment?
Did the Claimant waive any breach?

110 We repeat our comments on the alleged acts of discrimination, harassment or victimisation.

111 We are quite satisfied that the hiatus in contacting the Claimant during her sickness absence was an oversight. It would have ben open to the Claimant to make contact herself had anything turned upon the lack of communication. In any event the position was rectified more than six weeks before the Claimant in fact resigned.

112 Mr Smith clearly believed that the document he sent on 25th May 2018 was password-protected. That is because he also sent separately the password which he expected the Claimant to need in order to open it.

113 We have already referred to the position regarding Carlie Knight at paragraph 56.

114 We have heard Mr Cross give evidence and have read the investigation report. We are quite satisfied that the grievance was investigated conscientiously and properly The format of the report may not be ideal, but we fully accept that if there is any criticism to be levelled on this ground it is because Mr Cross is dyslexic. It would, we think have been preferable if a manger who was clearly senior to Mr Smith had carried out the investigation, but no objection was taken at the time to Mr Cross, and we are satisfied that he acted with all due integrity and independence. It is simply a case of the Claimant not being satisfied with the outcome of the investigation.

115 Initially Mr Cross did not consider it necessary to make a finding as to whether or not the OH referral sent by email had in fact been password protected. In the light of the clear evidence of intention to protect it that is a perfectly proper resolution to the grievance: it does not indicate that he is giving the benefit of the doubt to the "other side". siding with the When the Claimant insisted on a specific finding being made the position was clarified and it was confirmed that the document had not been password - protected. This delayed the preparation of the final report slightly. All other delays in the process had been duly notified to the Claimant and had been agreed. In any event the time taken in producing the outcome to this grievance was not at all excessive.

116 The Claimant was informed in writing that she could appeal and she did so. There was some confusion as to the process and the Claimant was told by Mr Cross, on advice from HR, that she had no automatic right of appeal. Whilst this was clearly intended to reflect the internal procedures that required grounds of appeal to be submitted, and did not simply allow for a re-hearing anew, HR ought not to have advised that it be worded in that way.

117. On 2nd July 2018 the Claimnt then submitted her appeal, with reasons, to Mr Cross who immediately passed it on to HR. The Claimant had not in fact heard anything back from HR as to the next steps in the process before resigning on 6th July 2018; she did not chase up progress until 9th July 2018. Subsequently the appeal did go ahead, even though the Claimant had confirmed her intention to resign in any event.

118 None of these matters, singly or together, amount to a fundamental breach of contract entitling the Claimant to resign and claim constructive dismissal.

EMPLOYMENT JU DGE LANCASTER

DATE 16th July 2019

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