



Ministry
of Defence

Joint Doctrine Note 2/19

Defence Strategic Communication: an Approach to Formulating and Executing Strategy



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Defence Strategic Communication: an
Approach to Formulating and
Executing Strategy

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Head Doctrine

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What you acquire and how you use it sends a message



Maintaining a nuclear deterrent at sea 24/7/365 sends a message



How and where you train sends a message



How you think and what you think about sends a message



What you protect sends a message



The causes you support sends a message



Who looks up to you sends a message




Who you inspire
sends a message



Who you work with sends a message



Having a well-trained, motivated, professional workforce sends a message



But the message that is received will vary by audience



Preface

Purpose

1. Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2/19, *Defence Strategic Communication: an Approach to Formulating and Executing Strategy* supersedes JDN 1/12, *Strategic Communication: the Defence Contribution* with a view to evolving UK Defence doctrine at the strategic level. It refines the Ministry of Defence's (MOD) definition of strategic communication (StratCom) and clarifies the formulation and execution of Defence strategy within a Fusion Doctrine context.

Context

2. Within the context of the emerging Fusion Doctrine and the National Security Secretariat Implementation Groups (NSSIG) constructs, the MOD has had to reassess the manner in which Defence strategy is formulated to enable a coherent contribution to the cross-government approach to national security issues.

Scope

3. The norms of StratCom set out in JDN 1/12 have not changed. JDN 2/19 articulates an approach to implementing the Defence component of NSSIG strategy in an audience-centric manner that focuses on achieving the behaviour changes inherent in UK government policy outcomes. It recognises that **all activity within the Defence Operating Model has communicative effect** and that the formulation of strategy must take account of this.

Audience

4. The primary audience for JDN 2/19 is those military officers and civil servants who formulate, direct and execute the Defence component of an NSSIG strategy. It will also inform other government departments who contribute to NSSIG strategy execution and those military officers and civil servants who deliver other Defence strategies.

Linkages

5. Readers of JDN 2/19 should also read the following publications, available on the Gov.uk website:

- *National Security Capability Review*, March 2018;
- *How Defence Works*;
- Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 0-01, *UK Defence Doctrine*;
- JDP 01, *UK Joint Operations Doctrine*;
- JDP 04, *Understanding and Decision-making*;
- JDP 07, *Defence Engagement*,¹
- Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations* (UK joint doctrine);
- JDN 1/19, *Deterrence: The Defence Contribution*;
- Joint Concept Note (JCN) 1/17, *Future Force Concept*; and
- JCN 2/18, *Information Advantage*.

The following publication is available on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Office website:

- MC 0628, *NATO Military Policy on Strategic Communications*.

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1 Due to be published in 2019.

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Chapter 1

This chapter explains how Defence defines the term ‘strategic communication’ and related constructs. It introduces the premise of audience-centric strategy formulation and execution and an understanding that the strategic outcome to be achieved is behaviour change, or maintenance, in target audiences.

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“

Everything we say and do, and everything we fail to say and do, will have an **impact** in other lands.

It will affect the **minds** and the **wills** of men and women there.

”

Presidential candidate Dwight D Eisenhower
Campaign speech, 1952

Chapter 1 – Strategic communication in the Defence context

1.1. We cannot not communicate. Every Defence action, and inaction, has communicative effect. Everything we do, or do not do, communicates a message that will be perceived differently by a multitude of target audiences, be they friendly, supportive, neutral, opposing or hostile; both at home and abroad. Differing perceptions of our activities will influence the attitudes and behaviours of those audiences. The military is one of the four levers of UK national power¹ and its use, or non-use, is one of the most powerful forms of messaging available to government.

1.2. Within the Defence Operating Model,² the communicative effect of every action will not necessarily be the prime motivation of that action. The primary purpose of acquiring equipment is to meet capability requirements; the communicative effects derived from ‘acquire’ may be useful but are unlikely to be the primary driver of procurements. However, activities within ‘operate’ are intended to change or maintain the attitudes and behaviours of key target audiences. Therefore, they must be planned and executed with the communicative effect as the main consideration.

Section 1 – Defining strategic communication

1.3. Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1/12, *Strategic Communication: the Defence Contribution* proposed a definition for strategic communication (StratCom) of: ‘advancing national interests by using all Defence means of communication to influence the attitudes and behaviours of people’. This far-sighted approach

1 National strategy directs the coordinated application of the four instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic, military and information.

2 The Defence Operating Model comprises: direct, enable, acquire, generate, and develop and operate. See *How Defence Works* for further information.

created some confusion as to exactly what it meant. It has frequently been interpreted as how we communicate about Defence activities – Defence communications. It should, however, be understood as an approach to planning and executing strategy using, innovatively, all the assets at Defence's disposal to communicate the government's strategic message.

1.4. The UK Defence definition of StratCom sees all Defence's assets as potential tools of communication. The proposed definition is therefore now:

advancing national interests by using Defence as a means of communication to influence the attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of audiences.

The StratCom approach has two elements.

- a. Planning Defence activities (actions, words and images) with a concentration on what they will communicate and to whom. Planning is focused on those audiences whose behaviour is to be changed or maintained and how they will interpret the activities undertaken. This is **not** the planning and execution of activities with communications about those activities as an afterthought.
- b. Ensuring consistency of actions, images and words, pre-empting exploitation of any gap between what we do, what we show and what we say. Defence's activities must send consistent messages to target audiences, irrespective of the location of the activity, or the audience.

1.5. A StratCom approach to strategic planning envisages formulating and executing strategic military plans that are coherent with each other and which focus activities on delivering the UK government's intent, rather than undertaking activities and then trying to explain them. Success is influencing target audiences sufficiently to cause them to change or maintain their behaviour. However, this is normally achieved as part of a cross-government enterprise and therefore Defence's activity must be consistent with the activities of other government departments. This consistency will be achieved by the National Security Secretariat Implementation Groups (NSSIG).

In his book *The Utility of Force*, General Sir Rupert Smith draws on an observation by Henry Kissinger in respect of the intent of President Sadat of Egypt, in launching the Yom Kippur war in 1973. Sadat understood that he needed to send a message to the Israelis that the political and military stalemate was not acceptable, and his chosen communication was a military attack.

‘What literally no one understood beforehand was the mind of the man: Sadat aimed not for territorial gain but for a crisis that would alter the attitudes in which the parties were frozen – and thereby agree the way for negotiators...Rare is the statesman who at the beginning of a war has so clear a perception of its political objective...The boldness of Sadat's strategy lay in planning for what no one could imagine...’

Henry Kissinger
Years of Upheaval

1

Section 2 – Principles

- 1.6. There are five Defence StratCom principles. They are as follows.
- a. **Strategic military planning must be predicated on appropriate analytical underpinning.** An understanding of target audiences and the information environment within which they exist are essential prerequisites of strategic military planning.
 - b. **Strategic military direction must focus on audiences and desired attitudes and behaviours.** Strategic military direction must set out the target audiences whose behaviour the UK government wishes to change or maintain. Success is changing or maintaining behaviours as intended.
 - c. **All Defence assets are a potential means of communication.** Activities should communicate by design using a planned and synchronised combination of actions, images and words. They should employ such Defence assets as are appropriate, whether in their primary role or not.

d. **Strategic narratives must be fought.** Defence's actions, images and words must consistently align with the relevant strategic narrative to build and maintain credibility. Maintaining the initiative will require a proactive and innovative approach. Hard-earned credibility with audiences must be protected.

e. **A continual 'influence cost/benefit analysis' is required.** There will be an ongoing 'influence cost/benefit analysis' to identify the most advantageous, or least disadvantageous, combination of activities. Defence activities that generate influence to the advantage of the UK government within a given target audience may also generate influence to the government's disadvantage in respect of other target audiences.

Section 3 – Strategic narrative

1.7. A narrative is generally defined as: **a spoken or written account of connected events; a story.**³ Its military usage, however, aligns more with the inequity to be righted or the *status quo* to be maintained, within the historical context. A target audience's 'truth' is what it perceives to be true (irrespective of the facts) and its belief in that truth can be hard to shake, even when presented evidence of the facts.

1.8. A strategic narrative is a story designed to provide an emotive justification for a policy goal, and in many cases how that goal is to be realised and the moral authority for doing so. The policy is the desire to move to a future state or maintain a current state (the ends). The strategy is the plan to get to that state (employing ways and means to achieve the ends). The narrative provides the 'why?' It provides a justification for action, and a justification can be very subjective.

1.9. A strategic narrative should comprise the following.

- The current state: a description of the wrong to be righted or the desirable condition to be retained.

.....
3 Concise Oxford English Dictionary.

- The future state: a description of the ends, be it a maintenance of the current state or a transition.
- The pathway: how to get there.
- The justification: why the proposed change of state, or maintenance of the current state, is better than the alternatives; validating the pathway. The justification is usually woven into the other three elements.

The strategic narrative, written at the strategic level, must speak to a broad swathe of audiences in a manner that allows them to understand it and be positively influenced by it, despite language and cultural differences. Therefore, for Defence activity to be effective, it requires sound strategy and a supporting narrative. The narrative will guide planning and give meaning to actions, when perceived by audiences. The pervasive nature of information means the perception of activity is as important as the activity itself. Narratives must compete to connect with audiences and to endure.

1

The strategic narrative might be the first public articulation of policy ends where actions, images and words are bound. It will, therefore, provide a benchmark against which actions will be judged. While the narrative may have to change, its rhetoric must not be empty. A strong narrative should promote authorities relevant to the target audience, while undermining opposing narratives. This requires a multidimensional approach. Aristotle's three elements of rhetoric remain a foundation for connecting with audiences.



1. **Ethos**, requiring the narrative to establish a credibility against which its enactors actions will be judged, which in turn will affect that credibility. This credibility will be judged against the values of the audience.
2. **Pathos**, requiring the narrative to be empathetic with the emotions and motivations of the audience. The audience will be predisposed to accept certain messages and will most likely be hostile to a complete rejection of their own position.
3. **Logos**, requiring the narrative to logically present its case and to ensure its representative actions factually embody that case. Actions may also need to be messaged, in case the audience or an adversary interpret them for their own ends.

Section 4 – Understand

1

1.10. Misunderstanding our target audience risks activities being perceived negatively and contributing to mission failure. The perceptions of the outputs of our activities will vary from audience to audience and may not create the effect that was expected. An activity intended to break morale could harden resolve. A 'liberating' force might be perceived as intervening on humanitarian grounds, or as invaders to be evicted. Development activity that is welcomed by some might cause anger in others. A target audience analysis (TAA) of the parties to a situation and an information environment analysis (IEA) are essential if the appropriate activities are to be identified, the intended effects created, and the desired outcome achieved. Without this analysis there is potential for activities to be not only ineffective, but counterproductive and potentially dangerous.

1.11. Accurate TAA and IEA require persistent understanding of potential audiences and of their information environment. This will allow military commanders and senior officials to understand: the stimuli (cultural, religious, national, institutional, economic, and so on) to which various audiences will respond; the means by which those audiences gather, exchange and disseminate information; and the sources that they consider to be credible (or not) and authoritative (or not).

1.12. An IEA improves the chances of being able to reach a target audience in a manner that it might take heed of. It will need to address the breadth of issues listed below.

- How will you reach your target audiences within the information environment? What are their methods for receiving, understanding and transferring information?
- Which sources and influencers are credible and deemed authoritative by your target audience? Which are ignored, or considered propaganda?

- How do adversaries communicate with your target audiences and how are they perceived?
- What is the target audience's understanding of our strategic narrative? What counter narratives are they exposed to? Which influence how they act?

1.13. Combining the IEA with the TAA should provide sufficient insight to engage with target audiences in ways they will understand. Those ways may range from face-to-face meetings to applying destructive combat power. Military commanders and senior officials will need to undertake an 'influence cost/benefit analysis' of their planned actions.

We are working out what we are going to do –
they are working out what they are going to make
us do and how to communicate that to us!



Maria de Goeij of the Institute for Statecraft

Reflexive control theory provides an alternative perspective on understanding target audiences and the behaviours you wish to see from those audiences. It requires a deep understanding of an adversary's decision-making process, so you can mimic it and predict the choices the target is going to make. By being able to 'reflex' their decision-making, you are able to think strategically about how an adversary could be influenced to make a decision they think is theirs but is in fact yours.

Reflexive control appears to begin with an analysis of the target audiences, followed by the ideas on what could be achievable with those audiences and how: audience first, specific goals later. These goals are tailored, flexible and short-term steps that fit within long-term goals. Its outcomes are not achieved directly by blatant use of force but by using all levers of national power as a means of communication to set the conditions within which a pre-determined decision is taken willingly and logically by the adversary.

The equations of the founding father of reflexive control theory Vladimir Lefebvre⁴ focus on the probability of a certain person making a certain decision, at a certain moment in time and how that probability can be improved. Important themes in Lefebvre's work are the study of the differences between dominant ethical systems and the importance of the perception of self in the eyes of others.

The perception of the Western diplomatic model and its dominating view on international relations is very much based on the deontological ethical system,⁵ which values honesty and clarity. The end does not justify the means and what the 'end' is should be made clear. If your narrative is clearly understood, actors understand your endstate and can anticipate it. The opposite ethical system is the teleological system,⁶ which is more Machiavellian in nature, in which the end does justify the means and the end is not always clear.

Essentially, reflexive control is a mathematical interpretation (input, output and the relation between them) and elaboration of the work of Sun Tzu: 'If you know others and know yourself, you will not be imperilled in a hundred battles; if you do not know others but know yourself, you win one and lose one; if you do not know others and do not know yourself, you will be imperilled in every single battle.'

4 *Algebra of conscience*, first published 1982.

5 The ethical theory that the morality of an action should be based on whether the action itself is right or wrong and not based on the outcomes.

6 The ethical theory that derives duty or obligation to what is desirable as the end to be achieved, as opposed to whether the actions are morally right.

Section 5 – Military activities to behavioural change

1.14. Any target audience behaves according to the wider influences on it and, as discussed above, these target audiences need to be understood by way of TAA. Figure 1.1 exemplifies how the impact of those wider influences on the attitudes and decisions of the target audience affect their behaviours, which can be observed in the physical and virtual dimensions.




Figure 1.1 – Target audience behaviours prior to intervention

1.15. Where the UK government wishes to change or maintain the behaviour of target audiences, the NSSIG strategy is translated into strategic direction from a variety of government departments. The Ministry of Defence (MOD) issues appropriate strategic direction to relevant Defence entities including, but not confined to, Front Line Commands, Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ),

Defence attachés and British Defence Staffs (BDS). This direction will translate ultimately into activities. This is set out in Figure 1.2.




Figure 1.2 – Strategic direction to generate activities

1.16. The activities that are undertaken will generate outputs (primary, secondary and tertiary). These outputs may not necessarily correlate to the national level of power that generated the activity. An example of this occurs where military means are used to enforce sanctions by preventing movements by air and sea to create ultimately a negative effect on the targeted economy.

1.17. The successful delivery of outputs, as exemplified in Figure 1.2, is not guaranteed to deliver the required outcome of behavioural change. The activities will generate influence once they are communicated to target audiences. This may occur by direct observation or by information activities⁷ undertaken by one or more target audiences, or by our own assets. Information activities range from the informal, such as conversations between neighbours, to the formal, such as radio broadcasts.

.....
 7 NATOTerm defines information activities as: actions designed to affect information or information systems. Information activities can be performed by any actor and include protection measures.

1.18. The TAA should have informed military commanders and senior officials how the outputs would be perceived by different target audiences and therefore whether the intended cognitive effects were likely to have been created. This is important because a target audience will only be deterred, defeated, reassured or coerced if it believes itself to have been deterred, defeated, reassured or coerced. Figure 1.3 demonstrates the cognitive linkages that need to be considered when planning and resourcing activities.




Figure 1.3 – Military activities to behavioural change

1.19. What must be understood is whether or not the influence generated is sufficient to overmatch those wider influences that normally drive the attitudes and decisions of the target audience. Where the effects do not generate sufficient influence, there will be no change in a target audience's attitude to the required behaviour. In such an instance it is necessary to determine the relevant balance of influences to understand why the attitude has not shifted. Once understood, activities will need to be adjusted accordingly.

1.20. Even where a target audience has a compliant attitude to the behaviour change we seek, a decision to change behaviours may not necessarily be forthcoming. Again, no matter how attracted a target audience is to our proposition, an overriding external influence may still prevent the decision to change behaviours from being made. As with impediments to changing attitudes, discussed above, it is important for military commanders and senior officials to understand the factor preventing a decision to change behaviours from being taken.

1.21. Behaviour change may not be binary and a target audience may change its behaviour but not in the manner that was intended. In such circumstances, if this does not constitute mission success, military commanders and senior officials need to direct further work to understand the target audience and use the additional knowledge gained to amend the activities. If the revised activities still do not deliver sufficient behaviour change to be classed as mission success, a reappraisal of the strategy may be required and should be recommended.

Section 6 – Assessment

1.22. **Measures of activity.** Activity is usually straightforward to measure. It provides a metric of what has been undertaken or consumed but provides no measure of what has been achieved. (For example, 10 x sorties flown; 10 x Paveway IV dropped.)

1.23. **Measures of performance** seek to apply metrics to the outputs of activities. They provide an indication as to how well an activity has been undertaken or its success. (For example, 10 x sorties flown; 10 x Paveway IV dropped; 8 x bridges hit; 6 x bridges destroyed; 2 x bridges damaged; 2 x crossing points remain; 4 x crossing points after 48 hours.)

1.24. **Measures of effect** is a binary measure as to whether outputs or wider influences are creating the greater effect and therefore dominating the decision-making of the target audience. A target audience is more inclined to display the behaviour we wish them to adopt than not. This does not

necessarily equate to the target audience liking the behaviour change, instead they favour it as the better option. Investigating measures of effect and identifying impediments to attitudinal and decision-making change can be extremely challenging. However, a failure to do so risks resulting in a continuance of the activities despite no likelihood of behavioural change. (For example, a target audience which believes that our human security agenda is highly desirable may still not participate in it if they are more concerned that they will be punished for doing so by another target audience.)

1.25. **Measures of effectiveness** are the degree and scope of change, or maintenance of, behaviour across a target audience. Measures of effectiveness must be set out at the beginning of the planning process and referenced throughout the execution of strategy as they will indicate when success has been achieved. (For example, 50% of the target audience adopts 75% of the behaviour change.)

1

Section 7 – Implications for Defence

1.26. Target audience perception of Defence activity is now as important as the activity itself. Figure 1.4 illustrates a holistic view of audience-centric strategic planning.

1.27. StratCom is not a new approach to formulating and executing strategy, but by being audience-centric, it does focus on the desired outcomes beyond the conduct of military activity. Some of our adversaries, state and non-state, are well-versed in undertaking activities constructed around the messages they wish to send and the influence they wish to exert to achieve the behaviour changes that they wish to see. However, a StratCom approach to strategic planning is not a panacea. It is not a **replacement** for strategy and it is not a **cure** for bad strategy – it simply intends to make the selected strategy more effective at achieving the policy end, and thus more efficient. Military commanders and senior officials need to understand that they cannot not communicate and that target audience's perception of Defence activity is as important as delivering the activity.




Figure 1.4 – Audience centric strategic planning

1.28. The StratCom approach focuses on target audiences and measures of effectiveness in the context of the strategic narrative. Defence will, under Fusion Doctrine, work with other government departments through the NSSIG to deliver military strategic solutions, including the coercive use of force (Defence's unique contribution) where appropriate. This will contribute to holistic NSSIG strategy execution to meet UK government policy aims. This approach demands properly constructed and researched 'understand' functionality that makes the most efficient use of available resources across government. As Admiral Mike Mullen noted: 'most strategic communication problems are not communication problems... They are policy and execution problems.'⁸

1.29. 'Actions may speak louder than words over time! But they don't speak for themselves and, if we let them, our opponents will interpret them for us.'⁹ In the Information Age, it is not enough simply to act. Actions will be interpreted, contextualised and reported by a wide variety of actors, from friendly to hostile. The messages, visual and verbal, that accompany military actions will be indispensable and will need to be planned, cohered and delivered effectively, as an integral part of military activity.

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 8 Michael G. Mullen, *Foreign Policy*, 'Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics', 28 August 2009.

9 Dr Kate Utting, 'Strategy, Influence, Strategic Communication and British Military Doctrine', in David Welch (Ed), *Propaganda, Power and Persuasion: From World War 1 to Wikileaks*, pages 167-187.



An unambiguous strategic message – Mers-el-Kebir

In June 1940, Britain's position was precarious; militarily inferior to its enemies, the only hope of surviving a protracted conflict would be if other powers joined in the fight against Germany. Unfortunately the predominant world opinion was that Britain would not stand. In particular, during 1939 and 1940 the United States ambassador in London, Joseph P Kennedy, continuously painted a pessimistic picture of the British capacity and desire to prosecute the war with Germany in an effective and vigorous manner.¹⁰ This led to a growing doubt within the United States that Britain had the appetite for all-out war resulting in Churchill becoming acutely conscious of the weakness of his support in some areas of the American administration and the need for his strategic message of total opposition to the Third Reich to be reinforced.

In July 1940 the most powerful squadron¹¹ of the French Navy docked in the naval base at Mers-el-Kebir on the North Western Algerian coast. Fearful that Germany might seize these vessels and thus overturn the balance of naval power in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and also mindful of the need to demonstrate resolve, Churchill blockaded the port and issued an ultimatum to the French commander, which involved the surrender of the ships with an answer required within six hours. Prior to the expiry of the ultimatum the Fleet Air Arm mined the entrance to the port and when no satisfactory answer was received Churchill ordered the Royal Navy to open fire on its former ally. The majority of the French fleet was sunk or disabled and a total of 1,300 French sailors and marines were killed.

The German propaganda ministry depicted the incident as a brutal act against a former ally and it caused much bitterness within the French Navy. In the United States it was seen in a different light – as proof of the determination of the British government to back up Churchill's grandiose statements on fighting the Germans. The strategic messaging was clear and the key target audience, the American administration, took it to heart. The British appetite for the fight was never doubted again.

10 'Democracy is finished here', Ambassador Kennedy quoted in the *Boston Sunday Globe*, 1940.

11 The Squadron Atlantique commanded by Admiral Gensoul, consisted of 34 vessels including two battleships, two battle cruisers, a seaplane carrier and 13 destroyers.

Key points

- StratCom is not a new approach to formulating and executing strategy.
- We cannot not communicate.
- Every Defence action, or inaction, has communicative effect.
- There will be a multitude of target audiences, be they friendly, supportive, neutral, opposing or hostile; both at home and abroad.
- The formulation of Defence strategy must be audience-centric.
- Commanders will need to undertake an 'influence cost/benefit analysis' to determine which course of action will deliver the most advantageous outputs in terms of positive and negative influence on target audiences.
- Commanders must be innovative (manoeuvrist) in the way in which they employ Defence assets.
- Success is achieving the behaviours (changed or maintained) by target audiences that the UK government intended.



Chapter 2

This chapter explains how Defence can adopt a strategic communication approach to strategic planning, placing the achievement of desired behaviours by target audiences as the intended end of both Defence and government strategy within the context of Fusion Doctrine.

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“

However **beautiful** the **strategy**,
you should occasionally **measure**
the **results**.

”

Winston Churchill

Chapter 2 – Formulating and executing Defence strategy

Section 1 – Roles and responsibilities

2.1. As both a department of state and the military strategic headquarters, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) sits at the intersection of government policy and Defence strategy. It is therefore uniquely placed to understand and inform government policy in a manner that optimises what Defence strategy contributes to achieving policy ends. The UK government continues to refine its Fusion Doctrine structures and processes for coordinating whole-of-government national security activity and communicating it coherently. The MOD will, as a result, continue to act in concert with other government departments. This publication is confined to understanding Defence strategic communication (StratCom) and its role in Nation Security Council (NSC) structures and emerging Fusion Doctrine processes.

2.2. While ministers own government policy, it is incumbent on senior military officers and officials to offer their best advice on how Defence, particularly the Armed Forces, can be used to achieve ministers' goals. Policy ends and the strategy that will deliver them must be achievable¹² with the means available and ministers will want indicative costs for proposed courses of action. If achieving the policy end entails a high likelihood of casualties, ministers will want to know the casualty estimate to determine whether the bill in 'blood and treasure' is politically acceptable.

2.3. In formulating what, increasingly, will be the MOD component of a cross-government strategy, Defence needs to have a sound understanding of the actors/audiences with whom it is dealing. Currently, this persistent understanding is undertaken within Security Policy & Operations (Sec Pol

.....
12 Campaigns that are militarily achievable may not be politically sustainable. An example is the Suez invasion of 1956 that, while on course to be a military strategic success, became a political catastrophe, requiring the troops to be withdrawn.

& Ops) in the MOD on a geographical region basis. Within Sec Pol & Ops, International Policy and Strategy (IPS) teams manage Defence's persistent engagement around the world with a continual drumbeat of Defence activity, focused on priority audiences and locations.

2.4. Within the MOD, StratCom has become better understood as an audience-centric approach to strategic planning with a focus on achieving desired behaviours in target audiences. As a result, there is a better recognition of the following requirements.

a. Defence provides elements of cross-government solutions and must liaise closely with the rest of government through National Security Secretariat (NSS) structures and remain coherent at all times with the government's wider national security agenda.

b. Effective strategy execution requires a detailed knowledge of key target audiences. These comprise not only hostile parties ('the enemy') but also opposing, neutral, supportive and friendly audiences. Ideally, target audiences, desired behaviours and required cognitive effects would be identified and prioritised by National Security Secretariat Implementation Groups (NSSIG). Government departments would then determine the outputs likely to create the effects and thus the activities that would be resourced and executed.

c. Success is achieving the behaviours (changed or maintained) by target audiences that the UK government intended. Military actions and tactical victories are only important insofar as they contribute to such behaviour changes.¹³

d. The UK government policy ends that Defence strategy contributes to may aim to achieve, at the same time:

o different outcomes from different target audiences;

o the same outcome from different target audiences; and

.....
13 The Vietnam War is an example of a conflict where multiple tactical defeats of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces did not achieve strategic success for the United States.

- o differing outcomes from the same target audience.¹⁴
- e. Target audience analysis (TAA) and information environment assessment (IEA) are tools to allow understanding of what is most likely to be effective in achieving desired behaviours. Ideally, these would be compiled centrally and consistently under the auspices of NSSIG and shared across government.
- f. The premise around which strategy formulation ought to occur is: ‘what will be effective with respect to these people?’ Not: ‘what can we do militarily?’

Section 2 – Persistent understand and persistent engagement

2.5. Sound strategic campaigning is founded on a platform of persistent understand and persistent engagement; this is the default state of affairs for IPS teams in Sec Pol & Ops and forms the starting point of the strategic planning process, as shown in Figure 2.1. Like all Defence activity, persistent engagement in any given area will vary according to resource availability, policy changes and events.




Figure 2.1 – The basis of Defence activity day-to-day

.....
 14 An example of this would be the UK (while maintaining its diplomatic, economic and military relationships with allies in the Far East) maintaining its trading relationship with China, while simultaneously supporting the decision of the United Nations Law of the Sea arbitral tribunal decision in respect to the South China Sea.

2.6. Persistent understand and persistent engagement cover all Defence activity currently in progress in a region and all learning deriving from those activities, including learning gleaned from other government departments. Activities include the work of the Defence attaché network, high-level international engagement, short-term training team activity, operations and Defence media activity. In some geographic areas, the Defence activity might only be an operation. However, in many areas both operational and non-operational activities are in train and those activities are cohered internally in Defence and with the rest of government by the IPS team. Persistent understand and persistent engagement requires multiple audiences and their activities to be considered in a broad context on an ongoing basis. Figure 2.2 is a visualisation of how audiences might be viewed, in general terms. Such visualisations can be annotated to demonstrate the ends/intent.

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


Figure 2.2 – Persistent understand

Section 3 – Situation: change

2.7. When there is a significant change of situation in a country or region, the IPS team is likely to follow the government (NSSIG) lead in determining whether adjustments to UK Defence activity are required, as depicted in Figure 2.3. Increasing the rate and scope of Defence activity sends a strong message, which can be perceived as escalatory, aggressive and provocative. Some actors will work to portray UK military actions in such terms, reinforcing the need for the government/MOD to communicate clearly on an ongoing basis to key target audiences the rationale and context for any action that it undertakes. Knowledge of the target audiences and the ways in which they communicate, derived from TAA and IEA, will provide essential decision support to this process.




Figure 2.3 – A situation change

2.8. Following a change in the situation, the IPS team will review the extant military strategic objectives, or, if required, formulate them where none are being pursued. At the same time, consideration will be given to the strategic narrative that Defence is telling, or will want to tell, to justify changes to current activities or the potential activities that may be initiated. There will also be a review or a formulation of measurements of effectiveness (MOE). MOE allow an assessment to be made of progress towards achieving the military strategic objectives, and this focus assists in preventing campaign drift or mission creep. The IPS team is the lead for all this activity to ensure that it remains aligned to broader NSSIG strategy and focused on UK government policy ends.

2.9. Articulating the military strategic objectives and the MOE and, if required, writing a strategic narrative are activities that are difficult to divorce from TAA and IEA. This is because the military strategic objectives should describe the maintenance of, or changes to, the behaviour of one or more of the target audiences. Related to this is the fact that MOE that might work well for one target audience may be of no use in gauging behaviour change in another. Some MOE may only be ascertained by intelligence agencies; in such cases the IPS teams should seek feedback on the assessed utility and effectiveness of the Defence contribution.

2.10. Input to TAA can be drawn from a variety of sources, many of them open source. Leveraging the knowledge and expertise of other government departments and academia can also be extremely valuable. The TAA should allow the IPS team to understand:

- the target audience attitude towards the desired behaviour;
- the stimuli to which a target audience responds;
- the way in which the target person or people may react and are most likely to react to certain stimuli; and
- the ways in which those desired behaviours might have to be achieved.

By deduction, the IPS team can then discern the effects most likely to deliver, or contribute to delivering, the behaviour required in target audiences and the

activities required to create those effects. Ideally, within NSSIG, TAA and IEA information can be pooled and the relative merits of diplomatic, information, military and economic ways can be considered holistically.

2.11. The formulation of MOE should focus on two related questions – what are people saying and what are people doing? While the latter is key, the former might indicate the likely permanence of any behavioural change, or identify conditions required for behaviour to change. Therefore, if a policy goal is to be achieved and maintained over time, an understanding of what will change behaviours is essential, and an understanding of what might keep behaviours changed is of no lesser importance.

Section 4 – Defence ways and means

2.12. Creating influence using Defence assets seems very easy, and it can be. However, creating intended perceptions in audiences to generate the required behaviours, while avoiding unintended and unhelpful consequences, is much more difficult. Commanders at all levels will normally be faced with a form of cost/benefit calculation while constructing courses of action (COA). Assessing the totality of the positive and negative perceptions that might be generated from those COA and understanding which COA offers the most advantageous overall effects will be demanding. Figure 2.4 illustrates how an assessment of ways and means should only occur at the stage in the strategic campaigning process where the desired outcomes are known and the target audiences are understood. Much can be considered in advance, but Defence solutions need to be constructed to address the actual issue. It is a mistake to take prepared or available military assets and then try to fit them to the problem, aided by comforting but optimistic and unevidenced assumptions as to their likely effectiveness.¹⁵

.....
 15 This accords with Clausewitz' dictum that: 'The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking'. Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*.




Figure 2.4 – The development and application of ways and means

2.13. Direction from the military strategic headquarters on the composition of forces for operations or non-operational deployed Defence activity forms only part of the Defence messaging toolset. At the strategic level, decisions will be made that will set out not only the force elements to be deployed in any given scenario, but also the posture, presence and profile that they will adopt. Direction on key target audience behaviour changes to be pursued will be wrapped into military strategic objectives but direction on the broad effects to be created on a wider range of target audiences will also be required. Together with the force elements employed, whether on an operational or a non-operational footing, this direction amounts to the communicative boundaries within which subordinate commanders are free to operate and innovate using the manoeuvrist approach. The IPS team formulates this direction for Chief of the Defence Staff authorisation, with assistance from other elements of Sec Pol & Ops and the Directorate of Defence Communications (DDC).

2.14. Full spectrum targeting has a key role to play in identifying the most suitable ways to employ the means available most efficiently and effectively. Targeting is much more than a precursor to employing military assets with intended destructive outputs. Full spectrum targeting should be derived from the full diversity of cognitive effects that need to be created and identify a range of targets¹⁶ to be the focus of tactical commanders' plans and activities. The full spectrum targeting process should guard against defaulting to munitions-based options and instead seek solutions that will deliver those outputs most likely to create the appropriate cognitive effects. Full spectrum targeting should also guard against the use of military means as an end in itself – just because something is possible does not automatically mean that it should be done.

2.15. When deployed Defence activity needs to be adjusted or initiated, the entire situation should be assessed from first principles. When developing COA, a focus on how new or adjusted activities will fit into the current activity drumbeat of persistent engagement is essential to ensure economy of effort and seamlessness of change. What is already known should not remove the requirement to discover what is not yet known but needs to be understood.

2.16. In an era where fighting will occur principally 'among the people', planning should be focused on the fight for the 'human terrain' and be agnostic about the solution until the problem is properly understood. Ultimately, the ends may require Defence's people and platforms to be used for both core and non-core purposes to create the necessary effects.

.....
16 A target is normally not critical in and of itself but rather its importance is derived from its potential contribution to achieving the commander's military objective(s).



The problem/solution dynamic in advertising

Dr Steve Harrison – Creative Director and Copywriter

The same simple process that has built the world's most successful brands can be used to influence the increasingly disparate, often indifferent and occasionally hostile audiences that our Armed Forces are dealing with.

The greatest advertising creative director of them all; Bill Bernbach states: "It took millions of years for man's instincts to develop. It will take millions more for them to even vary." His suggestion is that we must play to our customers' basic instincts – and our fundamental instinct is to survive. Indeed, it drives our habits and behaviour whether we are hunting in the Amazon Rainforest or on Amazon.com. We are essentially intelligent apes who simply want to know how a product or service can further our self-interest.

Therefore, we **must** communicate how our product, service or brand can solve the problems that target audiences are facing. This realisation is critical to a copywriter, or creative director, and before any work is started two simple questions should be asked.

- What is the problem faced now by the target audience – the potential customer the communication is aimed at?
- What is the solution provided by the product/service we are selling?

If these two questions cannot be answered the messaging will not be effective. You could still run a communication campaign but with little chance of real success. If, however, you can answer these two questions, you are on your way to doing effective creative work.

This problem/solution dynamic lies at the heart of all successful advertising and marketing and is, in effect, the engine of consumption and growth in our free market economy. It can also be transferred, with equal success, to most other communications tasks. The audience and the objectives might change, but the fundamentals remain the same: we are intelligent apes. Self-interest rules. Find the problem faced by the people you wish to influence. Offer them the solution to that problem. Use an attention-grabbing dramatisation/demonstration of that solution.

Section 5 – Strategy execution

2.17. The first principle of war is ‘selection and maintenance of the aim’. Strategy execution is rarely a single act. It is generally made up of a raft of synchronised and complementary tactical-level activities, usually within operational-level constructs. The term ‘operational-level constructs’ should be interpreted broadly and include, but not be limited to, the staff of a British embassy or a deployed operational headquarters. To prevent strategic drift and mission creep, the military strategic headquarters is required to carry out the following.

- a. Promulgate clear direction to the relevant operational-level construct, focused on target audiences and desired behaviours. This direction should enable understanding of the strategic intent by all those who deploy. Sailors, soldiers, air personnel, MOD civil servants and engaged contractors should know both what they are to do and how their activity contributes to achieving the policy end. There should be no unnecessary constraints placed on either mission command or the manoeuvrist approach.
- b. Continually assess progress towards achieving the military strategic objectives. This requires a firm focus over time on measures of effectiveness and ascertaining how activities are impacting target audience attitudes to the desired behaviours.

Section 6 – Victory or success

2.18. The strategic campaigning process cycle is completed as illustrated in Figure 2.5. Like many process cycle diagrams, Figure 2.5 does not articulate the internal review, testing and feedback cycles inherent in any complexity of activities. But the Fusion Doctrine basis of the process indicates the manner in which the achievement of outcomes is likely to come about, as a result of the MOD acting in concert with other government departments. As General Rupert

Smith observed: 'The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide a political outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided.'¹⁷ General Smith's comment reflects the reality that it will be rare to see a campaign in the future that will be settled by force of arms alone. Fusion Doctrine, as a mechanism for greater cross-government working, demands a mindset that understands there will continue to be occasions where the Armed Forces will be required to deliver decisive combat victories, but that different deliverables are also likely to be necessary to ensure an enduring outcome. An example of this is the capacity building of another nation's armed forces to improve security in that state, supported by mentoring, which does not require participation in combat operations.

2




Figure 2.5 – Evaluating outcomes

17 General Sir Rupert Smith, *Utility of Force*.

2.19. The UK Armed Forces has great utility in building and maintaining the UK's friendships and alliances. Activities such as ship visits, operations and exercises (in the UK and overseas), firepower demonstrations and static displays can have a disproportionately positive effect on those invited to see or participate in them. Thus, such activities need to be understood in terms of being core business rather than as a distraction from it. Further to this is the issue of reference status – the UK wants its Armed Forces to be a benchmark against which others measure themselves. Our Armed Forces ought to be a preferred partner of choice that other nations wish to see, to train with, be educated by and, if necessary, go to war with. A significant element of persistent engagement entails making, growing and maintaining Defence friendships that may be useful not only when conflict looms, but in realising all elements of the National Security Strategy.

2.20. Such relationship-building activities should, however, be subject to the same planning, execution and assessment criteria as any other operation, with a similar sharp focus on strategic ends. Therefore, an understanding of target audiences is equally critical in this type of activity. A strong ally is more likely to offer honest criticism of the UK's Armed Forces, whereas others might, for cultural reasons, be inclined to put a positive spin on their experience, even if deeply unimpressed. Commanders at all levels should seek candid evaluation from friendly sources, in private if necessary, so that we understand our own weaknesses and are not surprised by them at inopportune moments. Even the act of seeking an opinion can have a positive effect on a target audience.

2.21. Two terms well-known in industry that impact on assessments of how behavioural change was achieved are **causation** and **correlation**. Defence activity might correlate with a behaviour change in a target audience, but it does not necessarily follow that it caused it. There will be a wide range of influencing factors, from the weather, to the price of oil, to UK Defence activity. Determining the relative impact of any particular factor is difficult, but gaining an understanding of why a target audience acts as it does is essential if a valid mission exploitation is to occur. The evidence may be little more than word of mouth from the TAA itself, aid workers, diplomats, journalists, local civilians or local forces. Such knowledge should form part of a commander's critical information requirements.

2.22. The reason for pursuing causality is that it will inform the commander as to which activities are most effective, which activities are counterproductive, whether the activities are popular or not and what might be done to mitigate undesirable outcomes. As correlation cannot be equated with causation, a changed or maintained behaviour should not be assumed to be the result of Defence activities. Importantly, if the target audience's behaviour will not change in spite of Defence activities, an understanding of the target audience's calculus and the key influences is vital. Where behaviour has changed, an understanding of the underlying cause will be necessary to determine the degree of permanence of the change and whether UK force elements can be withdrawn or redeployed. It may be that the task of understanding the reasons for behaviour change does not fall to Defence, but Defence should still seek to understand the contribution that its activities made.

Section 7 – Strategic campaign execution

2.23. As already discussed, an IPS team will not go through the strategic campaigning model outlined in the previous sections solely when circumstances change. It will be doing so constantly, on a micro basis, in concert with other government departments. However, by adopting a StratCom approach (an audience-centric approach), the IPS team will have a focus on behaviours rather than activity, and aim to determine what activities are most likely to result in achieving the intended behaviour. As a result, the IPS team will have a better understanding of what will be effective if there is a political imperative to increase activity in an area quickly and resources are made available for the purpose.

2.24. In undertaking the continual assessments within persistent understand, likely future requirements should be borne in mind. Professor Sir Michael Howard captured this neatly in *Future Character of Conflict*¹⁸ when stating 'No matter how clearly one thinks, it is impossible to anticipate precisely the character of future conflict. The key is to not be so far off the mark that it

.....
¹⁸ This publication has been superseded by *Future Operating Environment 2035*.

becomes impossible to adjust once those requirements are revealed.' The IPS team should adopt a similar approach, seeking evidence of what is most likely to happen and designing activity accordingly, while maintaining sufficient awareness of what could happen along with outline contingency plans.

2.25. The utility of the StratCom approach lies in setting out a way of thinking about strategy formulation and execution which maximises effectiveness. Going through the strategic planning process to understand what will cause target audience behaviour change allows judgements to be made on whether previous activities still form part of an effective solution or whether other solutions need to be identified.

Section 8 – Coherence

2.26. The creation of cross-government teams and now NSSIG have greatly improved broader understanding of each department's input to various areas of national security interest, from Russia to United Nations peacekeeping. However, there is a risk that the focus remains within boundaries, particularly when they are geographical, as geographical boundaries help to neatly bound strategic problems. Clearly, however, some target audiences have a global purview and can reach beyond the immediacy of their 'near abroad' to pursue their policy ends, as the UK does. Therefore, there is a requirement to ensure that related target audiences are getting the same messages and that say-do gaps do not open. Coherence between IPS teams, and therefore strategic campaigns, is a function of Military Strategic Effects (MSE), where a number of cross-cutting themes are integrated. Figure 2.6 illustrates this within the context of the Fusion Doctrine.




Figure 2.6 – Military Strategic Effects coherence across campaigns

Section 9 – Publicity and media

2.27. An IPS team will understand and plan the messages that it wants to send, including those visual and verbal messages disseminated via the news media. There is also a need to put forward the (Defence) strategic narrative and then to reinforce it constantly over time so it can be referred to when required as justification for the activities undertaken. This element is particularly important where there is a risk of casualties; the justification for military activity should not be reverse-engineered after the event, otherwise it risks sounding hollow and insincere.

2.28. Defence communications staffs at all levels are essential to the process of getting messages and images promulgated in a world of 24-hour news cycles, citizen journalists and social media. Senior military officers and officials need to get their messages across to the news media in an unambiguous and attractive way that engenders uptake. This work is supported by Defence communications staff. However, Defence communications personnel do not 'do the publicity' for IPS teams. IPS teams will need to generate the resources that will deliver the media content required, both in terms of quantity and time. Messaging activities will be required across the totality of the strategic campaign, not solely operations. Where Defence activity is observable, there needs to be a commentary that explains actions as, or even before, they occur. Other parties will willingly fill the messaging space if it is left empty and contest the UK's narrative. Maintaining this commentary requires resource and content that IPS teams need to generate on an ongoing basis. Promulgation occurs with the advice and assistance of Defence communications staffs.

2.29. Media de-confliction, both in content and timing, within government is the responsibility of the Government Communication Service (GCS). The DDC is responsible for ensuring that the MOD complies with the wider government news agenda. Defence message de-confliction in a particular Sec Pol & Ops area is the responsibility of the relevant IPS team. Where media exposure is essential to raising the profile of the messages that Defence wishes to send, events may be planned to fit the media timetable. Just as the narrative needs to be fought, our media messages must compete with other news stories

prevalent at the time. To help generate publicity, IPS teams need to consider how their activity can be made newsworthy and direct subordinate commands accordingly. This is an area where Defence communications staffs can advise.

Section 10 – Other models

2

2.30. Annex 2A sets out the OASIS¹⁹ model and contextualises it to the Defence arena. The OASIS model is used across communications industries for the same purpose – as a methodology for detecting and implementing activities that will cause behaviour change in target audiences. This annex is designed to demonstrate that the same methodology is used in industry and is essentially the same, irrespective of whether the behaviour change sought is a change in the brand of toothpaste purchased or stopping aggressive quasi-military action by another government.

2.31. Annex 2B sets out the portfolio, programme and project management (P3M) methodology, again contextualised to the Defence environment. This annex is designed to demonstrate that strategy execution in terms of ends, ways and means can be translated across business areas and essentially involves the same concepts, only with different labels for process steps and products.



The Salisbury poisoning and the competitive system of meaning

Dr Neville Bolt, Director, King's Centre for Strategic Communications

The second decade of the 21st Century has opened up a new way of looking at how states communicate strategically with each other. New approaches are emerging to strategic communication that suggest a turning point. The familiar contest between claim and rebuttal, competing for whose evidence is more credible, now appears two dimensional.

.....
19 OASIS – objective, audience insight, strategy formulation, implementation and scoring

The Skripal Affair in the spring of 2018 saw the attempted murder of a former Russian double agent in Salisbury by poisoning with the military-grade nerve agent Novichok. Skripal was a retired Colonel with Russian military intelligence, had served a prison sentence in Moscow for being a British spy and had been exchanged in a spy swap. He was ostensibly serving a quiet retirement in Salisbury.

The UK's National Security Communications Team and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office developed a response. The result of the UK's coordinated engagement with allies and partners would lead to 29 Western states expelling over 150 Russian diplomats and Russia responding in a tit-for-tat show of strength. The United States, UK and France also subsequently launched missile attacks on a suspected chemical factory in Syria after ensuring no Russian personnel were within range. This led to accusations of performance politics; in effect the bombings would strategically communicate a message to domestic audiences without serious implication to Russia.

The identities of the two perpetrators of the poisoning were revealed, their countries of origin and connections to the Russian GRU confirmed. A Russian strategy of clouding the waters, as opposed to an old-style denial then ensued. Some 40 accounts, from the mildly plausible to the outlandish emanating from Moscow and Saint Petersburg, speculated on how the Skripals might have been poisoned. This included appearances on state television of the perpetrators claiming to be on holiday. Their interviewer, the head of Russia Today, reminding viewers that there was no single truth but many.

This approach may prove to be a watershed. Many analysts inside and outside Russia now recognise a refinement of earlier generations of disinformation that once infiltrated an alternative viewpoint into the body politic. Today's methodology plays with a perspective informed by a third dimension of engaging digital audiences, confusing by sewing doubt while disseminating multiple truths. However, confusion compounds confusion, without a true insight into the Kremlin's motivations. This is no arcane discussion. A difficult challenge lies ahead for the West: to break out of traditional ways of understanding strategic communication and to reposition within a 21st Century mindset.

Key points

- Defence provides elements of cross-government solutions and must liaise closely with the rest of government through NSS structures.
- Effective strategy execution requires a detailed knowledge of key target audiences, how they communicate and how they can be reached in a manner most likely to have impact.
- It is essential that the government/MOD communicate clearly on an ongoing basis to key target audiences the rationale and context for any action that it undertakes as some actors will work to portray UK military actions in negative terms.
- The Defence ways and means to be employed should only be identified after the most likely effective way of influencing target audiences is understood.
- Causation may not be related to correlation and commanders should attempt to understand the reason why they are/are not seeing target audiences display the desired behaviours, adjusting activities as appropriate.
- Activities that are newsworthy have a better chance of gaining publicity; publicity is the responsibility of the commander, who should seek assistance from media staffs early in the planning process.

Annex 2A – The ‘OASIS’ model: An industry standard adjusted for Defence strategy formulation and execution

| OASIS heading | Defence equivalent | Plain English equivalent |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|
| Objective | Define military strategic objectives. | Construct Military Strategic Effects around the behaviours to be sought from target audiences. |
| Audience insights | Target audience analysis. | Gain sufficient understanding of the target audiences and how they communicate to be able to influence them effectively. |
| | Information environment analysis. | |
| Strategy formulation | Define strategic intent; construct Defence strategic narrative. | Formulate Defence strategy around the activities most likely to be effective in delivering the required behaviours. Deduce effects and activities. Issue direction. |
| | Identify effects; extrapolate activities; construct Chief of the Defence Staff's Directive. | |
| Implementation (execution) | Execute strategy to deliver activities and generate effects. | Execute strategy and monitor whether activities are generating the intended outputs. |
| | Manage activities as the situation evolves. | |
| Scoring (evaluation) | Measure effectiveness of activities. | Monitor target audiences for evidence of desired behaviours. Adjust activities in concert with other government departments. |
| | Adjust activities. | |

Formulating and executing Defence strategy



2A

Annex 2B – Ends, ways and means: strategy execution in a different context

2B.1. In the acquisition arena, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) uses a methodology known as portfolio, programme and project management (P3M). It was created by the Office of Government Commerce and is a useful representation of an alternative approach to understanding how ways and means can be managed to contribute to attaining strategic ends.

2B.2. The toolset that P3M provides is designed for managing change and its incorporation into 'business as usual', simply represented in Figure 2B.1. A project can be described as a temporary enterprise undertaken to deliver a unique product, service or result (ways and means). A programme can be described as a collection of related projects, undertaken in concert, where the business benefit sought lies in the overall deliverable (strategic end-state).

2B





Figure 2B.1 – The management of change

2B.3. Portfolio management is described as a coordinated collection of strategic processes and decisions that together enable the most effective balance of organisational change and business as usual. The portfolio is not simply all change programmes and projects being run by an organisation; it includes the process of determining what changes to invest in, and which to cease investing in, from the strategic viewpoint of how and where the organisation seeks to do its business in the future.

2B.4. There are similarities between P3M and the way deployed Defence activity should be determined, planned, resourced and evaluated. P3M assumes that resources are constrained, and, as a result, there is a requirement to identify and resource higher priority initiatives ahead of lower priority ones, as not all desired change can be invested in. This is equally true with deployed Defence activity. There is a limit (in terms of people, equipment and money) to the number of Defence attaché posts that can be created, the number of short-term training teams that can be deployed, the number of multinational exercises that can be undertaken and the number of operations that can be embarked upon. There is also a clear need to understand at the outset the business benefit that is sought and to focus all effort, energies and resources on achieving that benefit. Achieving perfection in elements of the solution may be of no use, if the solution is not achieved.

2B.5. Similarly, to ensure that benefits are delivered, those in charge need to be held to account for achieving them. This implies a form of assessment that allows the strategic headquarters to determine whether the investment (in people, equipment and money) is, or is likely to, deliver the returns expected. If not, the investment should be terminated. However, if it emerges that a small additional investment could greatly increase the return, then a decision on whether to take that opportunity, and what is to be stopped as a compensating reduction, needs to be made. Figure 2B.2 illustrates a simple version of this relationship.



2B

Figure 2B.2 – The creation of benefits

2B.6. In a large organisation, like Defence, such decisions are not a frequent occurrence. Any large organisation has a broad portfolio of committed and contracted activity taking place, some of which cannot be changed quickly. In Defence, there are some activities that cannot be changed at all. But while the drivers of activity and changes in business and industry are different to those in a department of state, or strategic military headquarters, there is a degree of commonality in how means are applied to achieve ends. Thus, the tools, competencies and methods that Defence uses in acquisition should have discernible similarities with those of 'operate', governed by a similar long-term outlook. Figure 2B.3 considers this relationship and a comparison of taxonomy.

| Military | P3M | Plain English |
|--|---|--|
| Understand the battlespace | Portfolio definition cycle | Understand what is happening |
| Receive orders | Receive mandates | Told what to achieve |
| Estimate | Programme identification | Understand what you must achieve within the context of what is happening |
| Estimate step 3: Formulate potential courses of action | Programme definition | Work out how you are going to achieve it |
| Issue orders | Issue mandates | Tell subordinates what they are going to do |
| Conduct operation | Manage programmes | Begin execution and manage progress |
| Hold to account | Hold to account | Hold to account |
| Assessment and lessons process | Identify lessons and modify ways of working | Learn lessons and change practises accordingly |

Figure 2B.3 – The P3M/military relationship

2B.7. One of the main constructs used to support business change methodology is that of portfolio, programme and project offices. This is effectively a backbone structure that seeks to provide a common set of principles, processes and techniques to help deliver projects or programmes within an organisation. The portfolio office is permanent, providing the common toolset that is to be applied throughout the change enterprise. Programme and project offices are temporary, set up and run for as long as they are needed, using the common toolset of roles, processes, functions, services and techniques provided by the portfolio office, to ensure that the information derived from programmes and projects is standardised and can support senior decision-making. A similar structure to determine the benefits deriving from various investments of people, equipment and money, the relative benefits accruing from those investments and actionable business intelligence on what to change, is not currently in place in relation to deployed Defence activity but could conceivably be initiated.

Lexicon

Part 1 – Acronyms and abbreviations

| | |
|---------------|---|
| AJP | Allied joint doctrine |
| BDS | British Defence Staff |
| COA | course(s) of action |
| DDC | Directorate of Defence Communications |
| GCS | Government Communication Services |
| IEA | information environment analysis |
| IPS | International Policy and Strategy |
| JCN | joint concept note |
| JDN | joint doctrine note |
| JDP | joint doctrine publication |
| MOD | Ministry of Defence |
| MOE | measurement(s) of effectiveness |
| MSE | Military Strategic Effects |
| NSC | National Security Council |
| NSS | National Security Secretariat |
| NSSIG | National Security Secretariat Implementation Groups |
| OASIS | objective, audience insight, strategy formulation, implementation and scoring |
| P3M | portfolio, programme and project management |
| PJHQ | Permanent Joint Headquarters |
| Sec Pol & Ops | Security Policy & Operations |
| StratCom | strategic communication |
| TAA | target audience analysis |

Part 2 – Terms and definitions

This section is divided into three parts. First, we list proposed new definitions that will be added to UK terminology. Secondly, we list terms and their descriptions that are used as reference for this publication only. Finally, we list endorsed terms and definitions.

Proposed new definitions

Defence strategic communication

Advancing national interests by using Defence as a means of communication to influence the attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of audiences. (JDN 2/19)

Terms used for reference in this publication only

Defence operating model

The Defence Operating Model comprises Direct, Enable, Acquire, Generate & Develop and Operate. (*How Defence works*)

deployed Defence activity

For the purposes Defence strategic communication, the totality of activities undertaken by force elements at home or abroad, committed to contingent tasks, Defence Engagement and operations. (JDN 2/19)

Fusion Doctrine

To deploy security, economic and influence capabilities to protect, promote and project our national security, economic and influence goals. (NSCR 2015)

information environment

An environment comprised of the information itself; the individuals, organizations and systems that receive, process and convey the information; and the cognitive, virtual and physical space in which this occurs. (AJP-3.10)

narrative

A spoken or written account of connected events; a story. (COED)

NATO military public affairs

The function responsible to promote NATO's military aims and objectives to audiences in order to enhance awareness and understanding of military aspects of the Alliance. (MC 0457/2)

NATO public diplomacy

The totality of measures and means to inform, communicate and cooperate with a broad range of target audiences world-wide, with the aim to raise the level of awareness and understanding about NATO, promoting its policies and activities, thereby fostering support for the Alliance and developing trust and confidence in it. (MC 0457/2)

propaganda

Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view. (COED)

Endorsed definitions

full spectrum targeting

A holistic approach to targeting, reviewing all targets together and apportioning action (lethal and non-lethal) in accordance with the campaign information strategy and desired behavioural objectives. (JDP 0-01.1)

information activities

Actions designed to affect information or information systems. Information activities can be performed by any actor and include protection measures. (NATOTerm)

joint action

The deliberate use and orchestration of military capabilities and activities to realise effects on an actor's will, understanding and capability, and the cohesion between them to achieve influence. (JDP 0-01.1)

manoeuvrist approach

An approach to operations in which shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. (JDP 0-01.1)

measure of performance

A criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (NATOTerm)

measurement of effectiveness

The assessment or realisation of intended effects. (NATOTerm)

media operations

The military information activity that offers accurate and timely information to nominated audiences through the media, in order to achieve the desired communications effect and build consent for UK national objectives, while maintaining operations security and personal security. (JDP 0-01.1)

psychological operation

Planned activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. (NATOTerm)

strategy

The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theatre, national and/or multinational objectives. (NATOTerm)

strategic communications


In the NATO military context, the integration of communication capabilities and information staff function with other military activities, in order to understand and shape the information environment, in support of NATO strategic aims and objectives. (NATOTerm)

target

An area, structure, object, person or group of people against which lethal or non-lethal capability can be employed to create specific psychological or physical effects. The term 'person' also covers their mindset, thought processes, attitudes and behaviours. (NATOTerm)

target audience analysis

The systematic study of people to enhance understanding and identify accessibility, vulnerability, and susceptibility to behavioural and attitudinal influence. (JDP 0-01.1)



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