

Recommendation Status Report: Near miss with a group of track workers at Egmonton level crossing, Nottinghamshire

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of the recommendation(s), as reported to us, are described by the following categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

Open (replaces Progressing and Implementation On-going)	Actions to address the recommendation are ongoing.
Closed (replaces Implemented, Implemented by alternative means, and Non-implementation)	ORR consider the recommendation to have been taken into consideration by an end implementer and evidence provided to show action taken or justification for no action taken.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has not provided sufficient evidence that the recommendation has been taken into consideration, or if it has, the action proposed does not address the recommendation, or there is insufficient evidence to support no action being taken.
Superseded:	The recommendation has been superseded either by a newer recommendation or actions have subsequently been taken by the end implementer that have superseded the recommendation.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concern over the way that an organisation has responded to a recommendation are indicated by one of the following:

Red – RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.

Blue – RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

White – RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

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Report Title	Near miss with a group of track workers at Egmonton level crossing, Nottinghamshire
Report Number	11/2018
Date of Incident	05/10/2017

Rec No.	Status	RAIB Concern	Recommendation	RAIB Summary of current status
11/2018/01	Closed - I	Blue	<p>The intention of this recommendation is to both strengthen safety leadership behaviour on site and reduce the occurrences of potentially dangerous rule breaking by those responsible for setting up and maintaining safe systems of work (ie COSS, SWL, PIC) (paragraph 117a).</p> <p>Network Rail should review its processes for monitoring and managing the safety leadership of its staff in COSS, SWL or PIC roles, in order to identify improvements such that only those who exhibit satisfactory safety attitude, leadership and compliance with safety rules and procedures, undertake these roles. The review should include consideration of the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> risk based analysis of the non-technical skills required for different work scenarios (ie under protection and warning systems of work); evaluation of the effectiveness of non-technical skills training since its initial introduction; assessment tools (eg COSS pre-course workbook, 360 degree feedback) to assist managers with monitoring the ongoing suitability of staff for safety leadership roles; and using re-certification training and assessments, independent of line managers, to reinforce good safety leadership and the importance of compliance with the rules. 	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>

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			Network Rail should then implement the identified improvements to relevant working practices and procedures.	
11/2018/02	Closed - I	Blue	<p>The intention of this recommendation is to mitigate the potentially adverse effect that client-contractor relationships can have on the integrity of the Worksafe procedure when contract workers are not willing to challenge unsafe systems of work set up by Network Rail staff in safety leadership roles, due to the fear of losing future employment (paragraph 117a).</p> <p>Network Rail should assess the effectiveness of its existing processes when its staff act as COSS, SWL or PIC to a team of contractors on site, and consider what additional measures can be taken to enable effective challenge in the event that an unsafe system of work is set up. Options for consideration should include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> using only those who are experienced in managing contractors; including an experienced COSS from the contractor team to review the system of work prior to commencing work; using an additional Network Rail staff member as part of the work team to perform a challenge function; and reinforcing the importance of inviting questions as part of the safety brief. <p>Network Rail should then implement the identified improvements to relevant working practices and procedures.</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
11/2018/03	Closed - I	None	<p>The intent of this recommendation is to clarify the working instructions for track workers on the correct use the Train Operated Warning System (TOWS) when working with noisy tools and/or when at the end of a TOWS</p>	<p>ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in</p>

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		<p>area, so that there is safe and consistent practice across the network (paragraph 118).</p> <p>Network Rail should:</p> <p>supplement its working instructions for TOWS to include clear instructions for the protection arrangements that must be in place when working with noisy tools and/or when working at the ends of a track section fitted with TOWS;</p> <p>brief out the enhanced instructions to its staff and contractors and include them in training material for all relevant track competencies; and</p> <p>include checks in the certification and re-certification assessments of staff in safety leadership roles that they are familiar with how to use TOWS in all situations they are likely to encounter.</p>	<p>response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.</p>
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