



Business Environment Reform Facility

*Adaptive Programming and Business Environment Reform –
Lessons for DFID Zimbabwe*

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About Business Environment Reform Facility (BERF)

BERF is funded by the UK Department For International Development (DFID) under the Business Environment for Economic Development (BEED) Programme. BERF is a central facility responding to demand from the DFID's priority Country Offices and stakeholders to initiate, improve and scale up business environment reform programmes. BERF is managed by a consortium led by KPMG LLP. The programme started in January 2016 and will finish in January 2019.

We provide expert advice, analysis of lessons learned, policy research about what works and what doesn't and develop innovative new approaches to involving businesses and consumers in investment climate reform.

BERF has a strong emphasis on strengthening the Business Environment for women and girls, as well as for young adults more generally. It is also aiming to improve the relationship between business and the physical environment including where relevant through linkage to climate change analysis. BERF recognizes the need for appropriate political economy analysis in order to underpin business environment reform processes and interventions.

About this Report

Research for this study was conducted by Elbereth Donovan and Clare Manuel of The Law & Development Partnership (LDP) between March and April 2017.

The views contained in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of KPMG LLP, any other BERF consortium member or DFID.

This is a working paper shared for discussion purposes only. No reliance should be placed upon this report.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ASI	Adam Smith International
BC	Business Case
BEAM Exchange	Building Effective & Accessible Markets programme
BEED	Business Environment for Economic Development
BEEP	Business Enabling Environment Programme
BER	Business Environment Reform
BERF	Business Environment Reform Facility
BMO	Business Member Organisations
CIG	Centre for Inclusive Growth, Nepal
CLJ	Commercial Law and Justice
Danida	Danish Development Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Denmark
DDD	Doing Development Differently
DFID	Department for International Development
DFID- Z	Department for International Development in Zimbabwe
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ENABLE	Enhancing Nigerian Advocacy of a Better Business Environment
EPI	Economic Policy Incubator - Pillar 2 of the Accelerating Private and Public Investment in Infrastructure programme, Nepal
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict Affected States
FOSTER II	Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform II, Nigeria
GoN	Government of Nepal
GoZ	Government of Zimbabwe
LASER	Legal Assistance for Economic Reform
LDP	The Law & Development Partnership
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
M4P	Making Markets Work for the Poor
MDA	Ministries, Departments & Agencies
MEL	Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning
PBR	Payments by Results
PCR	Programme Completion Report
PDIA	Problem driven iterative adaptation
PPD	Public-Private-Dialogue
PPP	Public-Private-Partnership
PSD	Private Sector Development
SAVI	State Voice and Accountability Initiative, Nigeria
SME	Small-medium-enterprise
STAAC	Strengthening Action Against Corruption, Ghana
SUGAR	Strengthening Uganda's Anti-Corruption and Accountability Regime
ToC / ToCs	Theory of Change / Theories of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
VFM	Value for Money
ZIM ASSET	Zimbabwe's Agenda for Sustainable Social Economic Transformation
Zimbisa	PPD component of the BEEP programme



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Executive Summary

Report purpose

This report provides lessons and recommendations for DFID Zimbabwe on how to support business environment reform (BER) using an adaptive programming approach. Lessons are drawn from a desk based review of five previous or on-going DFID business enabling environment programmes (Centre for Inclusive Growth in Nepal, FOSTER II,¹ LASER,² Private Sector Development Programme in the DRC and SAVI³ in Nigeria). A light touch review of four other programmes were also undertaken (Pillar 2 of AiiN⁴ in Nepal, Beam Exchange,⁵ SUGAR⁶ in Uganda, and STAAC⁷ in Ghana).

These lessons are intended to inform the design and implementation of DFID Zimbabwe's new BER programming, after the closure of the Zimbisa component of the Business Enabling Environment Programme (BEEP) at the end of 2017. Zimbabwe's complex and highly uncertain economic and political environment is likely to present opportunities for DFID to support economic reform - but it will require working in a politically aware and adaptive manner; tracking changes, rapidly reacting to opportunities for engagement and leveraging the political momentum for change.

Adaptive programming will enable this kind of approach. The aim is to design, deliver, manage and oversee the programme so that there is a conscious and systematic effort throughout the programme cycle to learn and adapt in response. Adaptation needs to take place in real time and embrace both strategic aspects (including theories of change, results frameworks, and approaches) and operational details (e.g. systems, tools, resources, budgets).

Lessons

The review focuses on three issues: (i) results frameworks; (ii) governance and decision-making; and (iii) gender. Three key overall lessons emerged:

- There is no 'one size fits all' solution to how adaptive programmes are designed. Some programmes tried to find ways to use conventional tools in a non-traditional way, while other programmes experimented with novel approaches. Each of these approaches presented its own benefits and drawbacks.

¹ Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform II

² Legal Assistance for Economic Reform

³ State Voice & Accountability Initiative

⁴ Economic Policy Incubator of Accelerating Private and Public Investment in Infrastructure

⁵ Building Effective and Accessible Markets

⁶ Strengthening Uganda's Anti-Corruption and Accountability Regime

⁷ Strengthening Action Against Corruption



- An adaptive programme design does not automatically deliver an adaptive programme. To achieve this learning and adaptability need to be built into every stage of the programme cycle.
- Adaptive programming entails cost: on-going adaptation, re-programming and re-budgeting takes time and requires high levels of supplier and DFID engagement.

Specific lessons included the following:

(i) Results frameworks

- There is scope to move away from the theory of change as a static and linear extension to the logframe, and instead use it as an active adaptive programme management tool, which develops over time in the light of learning and reflection about how change happens.
- The logframe is still the dominant result framework tool. Typical characteristics of logframes in adaptive programmes which seek to combine high levels of ambition and accountability whilst still enabling flexibility include: use of a high level ‘framework’ logframes supplemented by more detailed ‘nested’ logframes; ‘harvesting’ results retrospectively; a portfolio or ‘basket’ approach to outputs; and the use of process related outputs focussed on learning and adaptive management. It is key to view logframes as active management tools which are frequently changed and updated.
- ‘Pressure release valves’ can be built into the theory of change by treating this as an indicative hypothesis, which is refined as the programme evolves, and by incorporating both process and learning related outputs in the logframe.

(ii) Governance and decision-making

- Decision-making structures need to enable agile decision making. There should also be scope for them to evolve over time.
- Monitoring, evaluation and learning should not be viewed as external functions, but as an integral part of the programme management and technical delivery.
- Decisions to change the programme should be documented through tools such as problem diaries or strategic reviews – to ensure strategic direction is maintained.
- An adaptive programme requires an extensive exploratory phase, both to generate an understanding of needs and problems and the political context, and to develop and test solutions with partners.
- Putting the prospect of substantial funding on the table during the initial stage of a programme has the ability to distort the relationship between development practitioner and developing country counterparts. Flexibility on total budget is possible even at the business case (BC) stage.

(iii) Gender

- Addressing gender equality while working in a demand led and problem driven manner has proved to be challenging.

Recommendations summary

The report contains 30 recommendations for DFID Zimbabwe to put adaptive programming into practice in its new programming, which has been mapped against the five cases detailed in the DFID Business Case as per Annex A. Key recommendations are summarised below.

- **Before programme design:** reflect on the need and appetite for this way of working. Consider developing a business proposition⁸ as a precursor to the business case to ensure adequate engagement and understanding of the approach (recommendations 1-2).
- **Theory of change:** develop a theory of change which is not a conventional, linear model, but instead shows multiple change pathways and is designed to be a living tool, initially indicative and high-level and developed over time in a participatory way, and which is subject to on-going development and refinement (recommendations 3-7).
- **Logframe:** ensure flexibility is enabled at outcome and output level through mechanisms such as stories of change, and menus of results. Expect and cater for multiple logframe amendments during the course of the programme (recommendations 8-13).
- **Governance structure:** distinguish between internal (overseeing supplier performance) and external (stakeholder engagement and accountability) governance structures. Expect the make-up and role of the external structure to evolve over time (recommendations 14-15).
- **Decision-making:** ensure changes are properly documented. Agree clear triggers and processes for DFID sign off on decisions (recommendations 16 -22).
- **Funding, commercial arrangements and risk:** consider supplier incentives, in particular whether a payments by results (PBR) modality adequately incentivises risk, compared with the challenge in forecasting inputs when using a non-PBR model (recommendations 23-27).
- **Gender:** consider creating a nested gender strategy, and using rolling gender output and outcome targets (recommendations 28-29).

⁸ DFID Business Case guidance

1. Project scope

1.1 Our understanding of the project

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) is committed to reducing poverty in Zimbabwe, through support for broad based economic development and empowerment which promotes social inclusion and increases opportunities for women and girls.⁹ Over the past 4 years, the Business Enabling Environment Programme (BEEP) programme¹⁰ has been one of the ways in which DFID has endeavoured to achieve this aim. DFID Zimbabwe is now poised to embark on a new phase of support for BER¹¹ in Zimbabwe - which will coincide with an election cycle in what is already a dynamic and complex political environment. To ensure sustainable change and impact in this highly politicised and constantly evolving setting, it will be necessary to work in a politically aware and adaptive manner, rapidly reacting to changes and opportunities.

This study, undertaken by The Law & Development Partnership (LDP) through the Business Environment Reform Facility (BERF), feeds into DFID Zimbabwe's development of the business case for a new multi-year BER technical assistance programme. It reviews DFID funded programmes where an adaptive approach has been used, to identify lessons about:¹²

- How **results frameworks** (e.g. Theories of Change (ToC), logframes) suited to an adaptive approach have been designed, how flexible working have been incorporated without sacrificing ambition or impact, and which solutions would be suitable in the Zimbabwe context;
- Which **governance and decision making structures** were used in adaptive programmes, which proved most suited to BER, and which would be suitable in the Zimbabwe context; and
- How **gender requirements** were built into the framework for an adaptive programme, and how DFID Zimbabwe can promote social inclusion and improved job prospects for women and girls while working adaptively.

1.2 Approach and methodology

In partnership with DFID Zimbabwe, LDP developed an approach¹³ which combined lessons from established / completed adaptive DFID programmes¹⁴ with latest thinking and experimentation from ongoing 'second generation' adaptive programmes. This paper also

⁹ Operational Plan 2011-2016 DFID Zimbabwe (updated Dec 2014)

¹⁰ BEEP Business Case

¹¹ TOR for this assignment (Annex 2)

¹² See mini-concept note (Annex 3)

¹³ LDP mini-concept note (Annex 3)

¹⁴ Although other donors – most notable USAID and DFAT – are utilising adaptive programming approaches in programme delivery, the focus of this assignment was on reviewing DFID programmes.

draws on our reflections on the design and delivery of BEEP itself, which was envisioned as a non-traditional programme.

A desk based review of key documents – the business case (BC), ToC, logframe, gender strategy, annual reviews, programme completion reports and relevant lessons learning publications¹⁵ – was undertaken of five completed or well-established programmes¹⁶ delivered in accordance with adaptive principles. These are the:

- Centre for Inclusive Growth (CIG) in Nepal,
- Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform II (FOSTER II) programme in Nigeria,
- Legal Assistance for Economic Reform (LASER) programme operating in 8 DFID priority countries,
- Private Sector Development (PSD) programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and
- State Voice & Accountability Initiative (SAVI) in Nigeria.

LDP also explored - through interviews and exchanges with programme managers - current thinking on the ToC, logframes, governance structure and gender strategy being utilised in the delivery of a new wave of DFID adaptive programmes, specifically:¹⁷

- Building Effective & Accessible Markets programme (Beam Exchange),
- Pillar 2 Economic Policy Incubator (EPI) component of the Accelerating Private and Public Investment in Infrastructure (AiiN) programme in Nepal,
- Strengthening Action Against Corruption (STAAC) programme in Ghana, and
- Strengthening Uganda's Anti-Corruption and Accountability Regime (SUGAR) programme.

Findings from this review were augmented with lessons on programme design and implementation from BEEP and the extension of the Zimbisa component (focussed on public-private-dialogue), gained from both a review of relevant documentation, and an interview with the Team Leader.

A review of DFID guidance on the design of a business case, development of a logframe and ToC, value for money (VFM) and programme monitoring as well as the latest Smart Rules were also undertaken, to ensure recommendations are aligned with current DFID requirements.

¹⁵ Depending on availability; documents were accessed through DevTracker or where still in draft and not in the public domain where shared by the programmes directly

¹⁶ These programmes were proposed by DFID Zimbabwe for review; it is not an exhaustive list of programmes that operate in accordance with adaptive principles. In the drafting of the report LDP excluded the *Support to Rural Water Supply, Sanitation & Hygiene in Tanzania* from the analysis as requested by DFID Zimbabwe, as the nature of the programme differs significantly from BEEP, and replaced this with SAVI.

¹⁷ Although the intention was to include the Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn (PERL) in Nigeria in the review, the AR available was undertaken only 3 months after programme inception, and a logframe was not yet publicly available for review.

The key limitation of this study is that it focussed predominantly on reviewing programme documents. It is likely that more extensive interviews would have generated greater insight into how traditional programme tools and approaches were modified during delivery to enable adaptive working, and what the subsequent challenges and shortcomings of the selected approaches to the logframe, ToC and governance structure were during implementation.

1.3 Report structure

Section 2 of the report provides an overview of the political context in Zimbabwe, gives background on DFID's current and anticipated future support and explains why an adaptive approach to BER in Zimbabwe is needed. Section 3 defines adaptive programming, and sets out considerations for DFID-Z to consider prior to the design of an adaptive programme. Section 4 aims to answer the questions posed by DFID Zimbabwe, while section 5 flags lessons from the design and implementation of BEEP. Recommendations are mapped against the requirements of the DFID business case in Annex A.

2. BER in Zimbabwe

2.1 The Zimbabwean context¹⁸

Zimbabwe is fragile economically and politically. Economic growth declined between 2013 and 2015 and forecasts remain gloomy for 2016 and 2017. Following the initial stabilisation and restoration of policy credibility during 2009 - 2013, the country has slipped back into policy reversals and factionalism in the ruling ZANU-PF distracting from economic and regulatory reforms. Where reforms have been undertaken, they have had limited impact, in part due to the ongoing concerns from the market on land ownership and the requirements posed on investors by the Indigenisation and Economic Act. With elections in 2018 looming, and the debate on a successor to President Robert Mugabe, (who recently turned 93) unresolved, the short to medium-term political and economic outlook for Zimbabwe remains highly uncertain.

There is however an expectation that the upcoming period of inevitable change in the local political landscape could result in both an increased desire by the government and opportunities for donors to engage and support initiatives aimed at alleviating poverty and increasing prosperity. What is unclear is when or how quickly this change will happen.

For DFID Zimbabwe to be in a position to react appropriately in such a dynamic environment, it must continue to: (1) have an up to date awareness of national developments; (2) engage in priority areas of reform, retaining a position as a trusted advisor; and (3) be able to, at short notice, provide support that meet local needs and leverage the political momentum for change.

2.2 DFID's support for BER in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe continues to be a priority country for DFID, in part as a result of its regional importance, its potential to drive economic growth beyond its borders, and the affect any instability has on the wider region.¹⁹ In line with DFID's Economic Development Strategy²⁰ the UK Government will continue to support the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) to improve its investment climate, to address aspects that provide foundations for inclusive growth and has the potential to create jobs, and which contribute to building a productive and dynamic economy underpinned by open governance.

Between 2013 and 2016 DFID provided targeted support for BER through the BEEP programme, in alignment with the GoZ's Agenda for Sustainable Social Economic Transformation (Zim ASSET). This £5.8M joint DFID and Danida funded programme had two components: (1) a policy level investment climate reform component, delivered by the World Bank; and (2) technical assistance to Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) and Business Member Organisations (BMOs) to effectively engage in dialogue and utilise research to develop and implement pro-growth policies, delivered by Adam Smith International (ASI).

¹⁸ Zimbisa Impact Assessment Note: Macro-economic constraints to improved business Environment in Zimbabwe (2016)

¹⁹ Operational Plan 2011-2016 DFID Zimbabwe (updated Dec 2014)

²⁰ DFID Economic Development Strategy: prosperity, poverty and meeting global challenges Jan 2017

The technical assistance component (known as Zimbisa) has recently been extended until the end of 2017,²¹ to enable more demand led support to BMOs, and to support the GoZ to implement policy reforms adopted between 2014 and 2016.

DFID Zimbabwe is now in the process of designing a follow on BER support programme. This programme will leverage Zimbisa's trusted advisor relationships with the GoZ²² and employ established relationships to address reform in areas which are binding constraints to economic growth - including the highly-politicised area of property rights²³ – without which investment in Zimbabwe is unlikely to flourish.²⁴

Although the BC for the BEEP/Zimbisa programme envisioned a non-traditional way of working informed by an M4P approach,²⁵ the procurement and management of the programme was not conducive to adaptive working, as outlined in Section 5 below. Despite this, over the past 18 months, Zimbisa has incorporated systems and processes which enable more flexible working.²⁶

It is DFID Zimbabwe's intention that any follow-on programme to Zimbisa will be delivered in accordance with adaptive principles, to enable DFID Zimbabwe to:

- React quickly to ongoing changes in the local political environment over what is projected to be a dynamic period,
- Leverage opportunities for reform, responding to engagement and exploiting support from MDA's as and when these arise,
- Address evolving GoZ and BMO needs, and
- React to learning, scaling up areas of work where results are promising, and pausing or closing down activities where traction is not being achieved and impact is unlikely.

²¹ BEEP 2017 Programme

²² Interview with BEEP Team Leader

²³ Interviews with DFID Zimbabwe Economic Advisor and BEEP Team Leader

²⁴ Zimbisa Impact Assessment Note: Macro-economic constraints to improved business Environment in Zimbabwe (2016)

²⁵ BEEP Business Case

²⁶ Interview with BEEP Team Leader

3. Adaptive programming

3.1 What is adaptive programming?

Over the past few years there has been an acknowledgement that traditional approaches to public sector transformation and institutional reform have often had limited impact, and that in many countries, donor interventions – including those of DFID²⁷ - have not always managed to improve the effectiveness and accountability of institutions,²⁸ or achieved the desired impact. One of the reasons for this lack of improvement is the focus on form over function²⁹ - or the process of pushing institutional reforms that are modelled on ‘best practice’ but which fail to deliver in reality. Other related factors include a lack of ownership and support from influential actors,³⁰ and inadequate consideration of culture and context. This is of specific importance for programmes operating in fragile and conflict affected (FCAS) environments,³¹ where the context is by definition complex, unpredictable and rapidly changing.³² Much has been written about why donors and development programmes should operate in more flexible, adaptive and context specific ways,³³ and a movement geared to acknowledging the complex nature of development and stressing the need to ‘do development differently’³⁴ (DDD) has emerged.

The broad area of DDD encompasses a wide range of ideas, all with the ultimate aim of increasing the impact of development initiatives through provision of more appropriate support. Three key approaches in particular have gained traction within the development community –the need for programmes to (1) work in a politically smart manner, (2) be problem driven, iterative and adaptive, and (3) to be demand led.³⁵ There is also an emerging awareness that development programmes are not only about improving services or reforming organisations, but are at their core about bringing about changes in behaviour.³⁶ The impact of an approach such as system thinking,³⁷ which stipulates that the complex linkages and interconnections in play in systems should be taken into account, is also visible in the design of recent development programmes.

This thinking has resulted in a shift in emphasis from what is done, to how it is done,³⁸ with greater focus on the design and delivery of development programmes which:

²⁷ ICAI-report-DFIDs-approach-to-Delivering-Impact

²⁸ M Andrews 2013

²⁹ What Lance Pritchett has termed ‘isomorphic mimicry’: L Pritchett et al 2012.

³⁰ G Kareyija 2012

³¹ Manuel, C and Kirwen, E. 2016

³² Ramalingam, B., 2013; Valters, C., et al, 2016; Frej, W., & Ramalingam, B., 2011; Maclay, C., 2015.

³³ Isser, D., et al, 2014; Ramalingam, B., 2013; Valters, C., et al, 2016; Frej, W., & Ramalingam, B., 2011; Maclay, C., 2015.

³⁴ <http://doingdevelopmentdifferently.com/>

³⁵ Andrews, M., et al, 2012; Andrews, M., 2013; Andrews, M., et al, 2017

³⁶ WDR 2015 Mind, Society and Behaviour

³⁷ Pritchett, L., 2012.

³⁸ Andrews, M., et al, 2012; Andrews, M., 2013; Andrews, M., et al, 2017



1. Not only acknowledge the context within which support is provided, but which also makes efforts to **identify changes in the political environment on an ongoing basis** – and to respond to, and leverage these changes.
2. **Work in an exploratory way, addressing problems local actors care about**, rather than setting out to introduce international best practice, or to address pre-determined issues identified through technical analysis (often by external experts).
3. **Support local actors to identify and implement local solutions** in consultation with key decision makers, instead of simply ‘engaging’ with stakeholders with the aim of securing ‘buy-in’ to predetermined solutions.
4. **Emphasis learning by doing**,³⁹ testing solutions and utilising tight feedback loops which enables ongoing reflection and adaptation, and **sharing of knowledge**.
5. **Involve a range of actors** to ensure relevancy, legitimacy and support for reforms, and **address both supply and demand** aspects, increasing capacity of government to bring about change while simultaneously supporting local stakeholders to become more effective and active players in reform.

In the absence of a formal, industry wide, accepted definition, we argue that adaptive programming is *an approach which enables the design, delivery, management and oversight of a project where there is a conscious and systemic effort to, at all levels and on an ongoing basis for the life of the project, learn about what works (and what doesn’t), about changes in the political environment, and about the needs of local actors – and to adapt, in real time, strategic aspects (including theories of change, results frameworks, approaches) and operational details (e.g. systems, tools, resources, budgets) with the aim of achieving systemic and sustainable change and increased impact.*

In practice, however, adaptive programming plays out along a continuum, with programmes being more or less geared to exploration, ongoing learning and adaptation. In addition, although the principles of adaptive programming – learning by doing, being demand led and problem driven, operating in a politically smart manner – are mutually inclusive, the presence of all requirements is not guaranteed. (For example, an adaptive programme might change as a result of learning, yet might not desire to operate in a demand led manner). Additionally, not all aspects of a programme necessarily require an adaptive approach. A review of adaptive programmes as detailed in this study shows that working in an adaptive manner is resource intensive, takes time and can be highly risk. It requires being comfortable with uncertainty and flexibility at all levels of the programme, demands critical thinking and ongoing reflection, and necessitates innovation and relationships of trust, as well as the development of innovative tools and systems. As is evident from a review of annual reviews and programme completion reports (PCR) of past and current adaptive programmes, adaptive programming is not a ‘magic bullet’. Therefore, before designing an adaptive programme, DFID Zimbabwe should reflect

³⁹ Faustino, J., & Booth, D., 2014

on the need for, and requirements of, this way of working. It is worth exploring the following considerations.

- 1. Why an adaptive approach is required, and what benefit this will offer.** What is driving the need to work in a flexible way, and what is the advantage of working adaptively? Is there an alternative to working adaptably, which could achieve equal or greater impact, and be more cost effective or lower risk? Which problems would an adaptive approach help solve – and which not?
- 2. What the effect of working adaptively is.** What will the impact of scaling up and closing down initiatives be (including on reputation and relationships?) Is adequate time and resources available for ongoing learning and adaptation? What is the cost of working adaptively?
- 3. If there are any political or organisational requirements which will hinder adaptive working.** Is there pressure to achieve quick results? Is budget flexibility viable? Is there a pressure to spend funds, or strict expenditure targets programmes need to meet? Will it be possible to balance the need for accountability and flexibility, or are there set reporting cycles and requirements which programmes should adhere to? How is VFM perceived?
- 4. What the risk appetite is.** Are programme partners comfortable with a high level of uncertainty? Is there scope for innovation, and an appetite to learn through trial and error? How will partners deal with failure, and how will failure be perceived by others?
- 5. If correct partnerships are in place.** Is there a high level of trust between programme partners? Do programme partners have the relevant skills and expertise to work in an adaptive way, and do internal systems support ongoing learning and adaptation?

Recommendation 1: DFID Zimbabwe should consider issues 1-5 above prior to rolling out an adaptive programme

Once a decision has been made on the appropriateness of an adaptive approach, the BC does not need to detail other non-adaptive approaches that are not viable or have already been discarded. In development of the business case, DFID Zimbabwe therefore has the opportunity to compare two adaptive programmes with different focuses with a ‘do nothing further’ option.

Programme examples: (i) The BC for FOSTER II sets forward three options; do nothing further, or two different options of working in an adaptive way. (ii) The BC for STAAC set forward four options - do nothing, as well as three options with different focusses (supply side focus only vs. demand side focus only vs. mixed demand and supply side focus). All three options assumed an adaptive approach.

Recommendation 2: To ensure adequate buy-in within DFID for the design and delivery of a programme which will require a non-conventional approach to procurement, contracting, delivery and oversight it might be useful to develop a business proposition⁴⁰ as a precursor to the business case.

⁴⁰ DFID Business Case guidance



4. Lessons from DFID adaptive programmes

This section details key findings from a review of the programmes listed in section 1 in the areas of interest to DFID Zimbabwe. Approaches to the ToC, logframe, governance structure and gender strategy across the nine programmes are explored, programme specific examples are provided and recommendations to inform the design of a BC for a new adaptive BER programme is made. Reference to the Smart Rules and other DFID guidance is made when applicable.

4.1 Results framework

4.1.1 Theory of Change

Limitations in the use of ToCs in practice

ToCs have the potential to be used as active learning tools in adaptive programming. A review commissioned by DFID in 2012⁴¹ describes ‘Theory of change’ as an outcomes-based approach which applies critical thinking to the design, implementation and evaluation of initiatives and programmes intended to support change in their contexts”. The report acknowledged that some users view it as a tool to map out a logical sequence from input to outcome, while others view it as a process to reflect on assumptions and why change might happen as a result of the initiative underway. The report argues that a ToC is “both a process and a product, and should be seen as an on-going process of discussion-based analysis and learning that produces powerful insights to support programme design, strategy, implementation, evaluation and impact assessment, communicated through diagrams and narratives which are updated at regular intervals”. The report, however, acknowledges that while a ToC can be used as an active learning tool, there is a risk that it can create “top-down accounts of change”⁴² and that practitioners fear that it can become a one-off, “proposal stage process”. The DFID ToC Smart Guide⁴³ describes ToCs as “more flexible and able to capture the more complicated and real world nature of initiatives” than a logframe, encourages the “mapping of multiple causal pathways” and emphasises the need to acknowledge assumptions and the varying degrees of evidence underpinning these.

Thus in adaptive programmes, ToCs are best used as an active tool to enable learning and adaptation, and to explore multiple paths to achieve change.⁴⁴ Used in this way they enable assumptions regarding change to be uncovered and critically appraised throughout the life of the programme.⁴⁵ Instead of serving as the rationale for a programme, a ToC in an adaptive programme could be viewed as a stake in the ground, or a working hypothesis against which observable change is frequently compared as the programme unfolds, and which in turn is

⁴¹ Vogel, I., 2012.

⁴² Valters, C., 2014

⁴³ DFID Theory of Change Approach for Design, Monitoring and Evaluation 2016

⁴⁴ Valters, C., 2014

⁴⁵ Valters. C 2015

refined to reflect the reality of the change process. This approach – whereby the ToC becomes a learning tool and amendments are systematically documented – serves as an opportunity critically to reflect on programme assumptions and the validity of the results chain, and enables a greater understanding of how change happens in practice. It also serves as an early warning system,⁴⁶ ensuring that programmes focus on activities, outputs and outcomes which will ultimately achieve the desired impact, rather than pursuing avenues of change which are unlikely to succeed.

However, as described below, the adaptive programmes reviewed tended to use TOCs in the traditional ways.

Finding: ToCs in practice tended to be used as a tool for planning and communication, rather than learning and reflection. With the exception of SAVI, the ToCs seem to have been an extension of the logframe, detailing how change will be brought about in a linear fashion, with only minor variations from a traditional results chain. ToCs appear to have tended, in conjunction with the logframe, to make explicit how activities (what is done), outputs (what is delivered) and outcomes (what is achieved) hang together, how this is linked to the impact (what is changed) and the assumptions that underpin change. ToCs thus appear to have predominantly been used as ways in which to communicate⁴⁷ the rationale for the initiative – rather than acknowledging the complexity underpinning changes in systems and behaviour, and then using TOCs as a tool to encourage ongoing critical reflection

Some of the ToCs reviewed displayed a multipronged approach to a problem - for example addressing both supply and demand side aspects. But with the exception of SAVI, none looked at various paths to achieve change, nor the linkages between them.

As well as maintaining a traditional, linear format, ToCs do not appear to have been reviewed during the life of programmes. Rather, ToC development seems to have been a one-off exercise undertaken during the design and inception phases of a programme. The DFID requirement to set out the ToC in the BC seems to have constrained programmes from using ToCs as a tool developed by programme partners and beneficiaries, which evolves over time as evidence is analysed, assumptions are explored, and an understanding of how change happens is generated.

Programme examples: The SUGAR ToC conveys, in an easy to communicate manner, a complex results chain: if the programme helps government institutions involved in the prosecution chain to improve what they do, this can lead to an improvement in the investigation, detection and prosecution of corruption, which can in turn lead to greater sanctions, ultimately increasing the risk for those engaged in anti-corruption activities, thereby serving as a deterrent to corruption.

⁴⁶ DFID Logframe Guidance Note

⁴⁷ Valters, C., 2014

The FOSTER II ToC similarly conveys the complex argument that a widespread understanding of issues facing the extractives industry in Nigeria, combined with support to those committed to reform and empowerment of those demanding reform, will lead to enhanced management of the extractives industry, and ultimately contribute to more effective use of Nigeria's extractive industries to support its national development. At the heart of the ToC is the argument that by strategically pursuing the three output areas, and coordinating the space where they overlap, it is possible to deliver policy change and strengthened institutions even in politically challenging areas.

A more multifaceted approach was used by the PSD in DRC programme through the application of a “complexity-based theory of change”, developed during a pilot programme. This diagrammatic ToC aimed to avoid presenting change as linear, and indicated that interventions in four areas would need to progress to achieve the impact desired. This ToC also aimed to reflect that there is an event horizon, after which point results cannot be predicted with a reasonable degree of accuracy. However, the ToC was criticised in an annual review, and a more detailed and comprehensive TOC with clearer assumptions as a way to support logframe revisions was recommended.

SAVI, a longer running programme developed before the introduction of the standardised DFID BC template, developed a ToC over the first few years of the programme, which is conveyed in a simple, easy-to-understand-and-remember six-stage pictorial framework.⁴⁸ This ToC sets out attitude, behaviour and skill change required amongst demand-side players to drive reform towards more responsive, inclusive and accountable governance, informed by practical experience. “The ToC is a practical tool which allows SAVI partners to reflect on and enhance their own effectiveness, while it provides SAVI staff with a framework for planning and measuring incremental change in partners’ capacity and the extent of institutional change in the relationship between state governments and their citizens”.

Finding: Some ToCs were informed by research into how change happens, while others appeared to be based on hypotheses. Some programmes, such as LASER and STAAC, explicitly indicated that their ToCs were informed by evidence, and the PSD in DRC programmes stated the ToC was developed during a pilot programme. In other cases, it is less clear if the ToCs were based on evidence, or merely on a hypothesis to be tested. In general, assumptions underpinning the ToC were not detailed to the same extent across the programmes.

Pragmatic and innovative approaches to ToCs

Some of the programmes reviewed found ways to meet the dual requirements of stipulating in the BC a clear rationale for engagement on the one hand, with the need to enable exploration of multiple causal pathways during delivery on the other.

⁴⁸ SAVI Nigeria, 2016

Finding: In some cases, high level ToCs were put in place, which did not tie programmes down to set pathways for reform. These ToCs addressed DFID’s need to have a clear, central framework for change in place for communication and accountability purposes, without tying the programme down to an overly detailed pre-determined path which restricted the ability to work in a problem driven manner.

Programme examples: The Nepal CIG ToC stipulated that the design and implementation of projects which support the Government of Nepal (GoN) to adopt measures to address key binding constraints, (e.g. regulatory, legislative, expenditure, taxation, social protection, economic and trade policy and institutional aspects) will lead to an acceleration of inclusive growth. Although *binding constraints* were defined, these were not pre-determined, and the type of projects aimed at addressing binding constraints were not specified up front.

The LASER ToC took as its starting point the need to address the provision of commercial law and justice (CLJ) support to developing countries as a market system: The ToC argued that demand from donor countries for support and advice should be matched to the supply of CLJ support, and underpinned by market information about needs, solutions, what works and how. While the LASER ToC was more detailed than that of Nepal CIG, the scope of the outputs and the three very different elements reflected in the outcomes which jointly formed the pathway to change ensured the programme maintained the ability to operate in a flexible manner.

Finding: Attempts at innovation in ToC development took place. The prominence of the ToC as a planning and communication tool in the programmes reviewed does not mean that there was no attempt at innovation. Although the documents reviewed did not convey the use of the ToC as an active learning tool, several programmes amended the ToC during the life of the programme and some innovation was evident.

Programme examples: During the first year of operations, SUGAR moved from having one ToC to having an overarching ToC, supported by four sub-ToCs.

EPI issued an interim ToC during the programme planning phase, with the intention that a final ToC would be issued after the one year inception period; issue based ToC are also being used.

LASER experimented with country level ToCs (e.g. Rwanda), and investigated the viability of developing a participatory ToC (e.g. Somaliland); however, lack of resources and limited timeframes meant these ideas were not pursued.

Recommendation 3: A narrow interpretation of the ToC plots a clear or stable pathway to achieving change at an early stage of the programme, by demonstrating how the programme inputs, outputs and outcomes contribute to the overall impact statement. There is however a risk that this sets the programme on a path which does not hold true in practice. DFID Zimbabwe should consider stipulating an indicative ToC in the BC, and building into the programme the expectation that the ToC will both drive and reflect critical thinking and learning, as pathways to change crystallise during the roll out of the programme.

Recommendation 4: DFID Zimbabwe should make explicit whether the ToC is a hypothesis or developed based on evidence of how change in this technical area happens in a similar context; gaps in evidence should also be acknowledged. This includes recognising how evidence gaps influence the ability to use the ToC as an accountability tool, and identifying opportunities to build the evidence base underpinning the ToC. By building into the programme opportunities consciously to reflect on the validity of the ToC, learning on how change comes about when addressing complex problems in dynamic environments such as Zimbabwe will be generated, and the programme approach can be refined ultimately to ensure activities focus on areas where impact can be achieved.

Recommendation 5: Rather than treating the creation of the ToC as a ‘behind the scenes’ management activity, DFID Zimbabwe could investigate the possibility of local actors co-designing the ToC, to support demand led and problem driven programming. Through engaging local actors in identifying how changes could happen and the assumptions underpinning this, it might be possible for both DFID and local actors to (1) openly acknowledge constraints to BER in Zimbabwe both at a system and capacity level, (2) agree a shared vision of how to address this and (3) focus programme activities on areas where change will ultimately be possible in a highly politicised and complex environment.

Recommendation 6: Although a robust ToC is required at programme approval stage, DFID Zimbabwe should guard against developing an overly detailed ToC in the BC which could restrict the ability of the programme to address the multiple underlying causes which prohibit BER in Zimbabwe.

Recommendation 7: DFID Zimbabwe could consider opportunities for innovation and experimentation – for example through developing a nested approach to ToCs, where the broad overarching ToC (stipulated in the BC) is underpinned by more detailed ToC for individual programme components (developed over time with input from programmes partners) thereby ensuring clarity on how each programme component contributes to achieving the overall impact envisioned by DFID.

4.1.2 Logframe

Whereas the ToC should prompt critical reflection and re-thinking of approach, logframes are the essential underpinning source for results reporting in DFID.⁴⁹ Logframes detail the results chain and the results expected at impact, outcome and output level, provide a way to compare planned and actual results, and detail assumptions linked to the realisation of a project’s success.⁵⁰

The challenge adaptive programmes face is the ability to stipulate results against which performance of the programme (and the supplier) can be measured periodically, while working

⁴⁹ DFID Smart Guide Logical Framework

⁵⁰ DFID Smart Guide Logical Framework



in a manner which stresses the need not to determine in detail what is done and when, up front. While a demand led and problem driven approach requires agility, donors require up front assurance as to the desired results, and a plan to measure progress and performance against.

Applying the Smart Rules

Finding: **Conventional logframes were modified for adaptive programmes.** Although the Smart Rules allow for the use of alternative result frameworks, all programmes reviewed used a conventional logframe. Some innovation, however, was evident in how these frameworks were structured and the types of outcomes and outputs detailed.

Programme examples: The PCR of the Nepal CIG programme highlighted the “clunky use of the logframe”, and flagged the “limitations of DFID systems and tools, which were too linear and cumbersome for an adaptive programme”. It was recommended that “future programmes of this type should consider taking on the spirit of the End to End Review by utilising local judgements in teams, as implied by Smart Rules, to trial innovative tools that allow easy and intuitive overview of programme evolution and strategy”.

LASER used a high-level overarching logframe, underpinned by linked nested logframes for each developing country where the programme operated. Nested logframes allowed LASER to set country level outputs which relate to the specific needs of each country. Key indicators in the overarching logframe include stories of change (at outcome level) and ‘major’ and ‘moderate’ results from a pre-defined menu of results at output level. By agreeing up front the achievement of a set number of stories of change and major and moderate results, according to predetermined definitions, LASER was able to assure DFID of a certain level of achievement, without restricting the programme’s ability to deliver results that reflected evolving needs and priorities.

SAVI utilised a ‘light touch’ or ‘under-developed’ logframe, which was first and foremost a planning tool. During the life of the programme pressure from DFID increased to set quantitative milestones and targets and to detail results which would demonstrate the consequence of the attitude, behaviour and skill change measured at outcome and outcome level. As a result SAVI developed an ‘outcome harvesting mode’⁵¹ whereby retrospective identification of results attributed to SAVI could be claimed by the programme. By giving DFID confidence in the impact SAVI would achieve through quantitative targets and milestones, but retaining flexibility in exactly what or where this will be, SAVI was able to work in an adaptive manner.

⁵¹ SAVI Nigeria, 2016

Recommendation 8: Use of the logframe in a conventional manner is unlikely to be well suited to adaptive programme, where there will be a high degree of flexibility and experimentation, and lack of clarity on outputs. DFID Zimbabwe is not obliged to use a logframe as the central component of the result framework, and amendments or alternatives could be considered - for example the use of a logframe which details primary, secondary and incidental outputs and outcomes,⁵² use of a rolling logframe which evolves as the programme unfolds, the use of nested logframes for different programme components, or the use of alternative experimental results frameworks such as Search Frames.⁵³

Finding: Logframes are viewed as living tools. The most recent version of the DFID Smart Rules views the use of a result framework as a pre-requisite for assessing value for money - but acknowledges that clearly defined and observable results, and a set timeframe for M&E, might not be realistic for some complex programmes or in some contexts. The Smart Rules further acknowledge that logframes are living documents which should be viewed as an active management tool, while DFID guidance on logframes stipulates that amendments to the logframe should be made regularly, as and when new data or information is available. There is an expectation that result frameworks will be used proactively by both DFID and programme partners to monitor progress and measure performance against both quantitative and qualitative indicators.

Programme examples: SAVI had 14 formal iterations of the logframe over the life of the programme. In the first year since contract signature STAAC has utilised five iterations of the logframe. LASER amended its overarching logframe twice in its first two years, and the five nested logframes 11 times in the same period as developing country needs became clearer, as the programme's understanding of the context evolved, and as clarity was gained about the avenues of support which were gaining traction and were likely to achieve impact. SUGAR found the initial logframe to be overly simplistic, and utilised 17 different iterations for planning purposes during the one year inception phase; the programme is in the process of redesigning the logframe a year after the programme commenced.

Amendments to the logframe can however be labour intensive and a source of contention, especially on an output based contract. On the one hand, there is a risk that adaptation could be a way to stop doing that which is difficult and to focus on achieving the 'low hanging fruit'; on the other hand, working narrowly towards pre-determined results can reduce a programme's ability to achieve impact, by focussing resources on achieving programme results, rather than real change, and restricting programmes from changing course to exploit opportunities to make real difference as and when they arise.

⁵² The design of an alternative logframe fell outside the scope of the project; further work in this regard can be undertaken through an in-country workshop or further desk based work if required. Although often discussed in engagement with DFID staff, the authors are not aware of any examples of an alternative to the logframe in use.

⁵³ Andrews, M., et al, 2016

The annual review or PCR of several programmes reviewed flagged concerns related to the amendment of logframes, which centred on:

- A variance between the intended level of ambition as stipulated in the business case and the level of ambition in the revised logframe,
- The difficulty in agreeing amendments on an output based or payment by results (PBR) contract,
- Delays in signing off amendments to the logframe; in one programme this resulted in certain programme components reporting against outdated indicators at annual review stage, as agreement on changes could not be reached in a different area,
- Concerns about weighting of results and/or ‘dropping’ outputs; on the one hand, it can be argued that the programme focussed resources in an area where impact could be achieved – on the other hand, this single-minded focus is a high-risk strategy, and might have resulted in missed opportunities for impact in other areas, and
- The difficulty in evaluating and reviewing programmes where changes to the logframe have been made, in terms of the indicators which should be considered in the final review, the complexity posed by reviewing a wide range of projects which relate to one outcome indicator, and the administrative difficulty in tracking changes over time.

Recommendation 9: DFID Zimbabwe should take into account the time and effort associated with frequently reviewing logframes, and should ensure adequate time and resources are available. The commercial impact of making amendments to the logframe should also be considered.

Recommendation 10: DFID Zimbabwe should require suppliers to detail why and how logframes are amended, to enable DFID to measure performance and VFM effectively.

Recommendation 11: DFID Zimbabwe should acknowledge in the BC that programme outcomes might be indirect, and difficult to measure. Adequate consideration should be given to the harvesting of results and identification of primary and secondary benefits, and the impact of initiatives influenced, but not undertaken. Programmes should be rewarded for impact, not deterred from pursuing opportunities for change as a result of a narrow results framework.

Balancing flexibility and accountability

In the programmes reviewed, the most striking characteristic of the logframes utilised was the attempt to balance the need for accountability with flexibility,⁵⁴ and to generate space for ‘accountable adaptation’.

Finding: While the logframes frequently set clear quantitative targets against which success could be measured, the indicators themselves often allowed great flexibility.

⁵⁴ Derbyshire, H., & Donovan, E., 2016

Logframes conveyed a high level of ambition at impact and outcome level, but great attempt was made to retain significant flexibility at output level. A portfolio or 'basket' approach to outputs was common, as was the use of process related output indicators, or even outputs focussed on learning and adaptive management.

Programme examples: The FOSTER II logframe holds the supplier accountable to achieve improvements in any of the 12 key areas of natural resource management (as reflected in the natural resource charter) without limiting flexibility by specifying which area engagement should be in.

The Nepal CIG logframe sets the level of ambition for the programme by specifying at output level the number of projects identified and agreed, without stipulating the nature of these projects. At outcome level, the programme aimed to support government to adopt measure to address key binding constraint to inclusive growth - without stipulating milestones and targets against the indicator of success. This 'portfolio' or 'basket' approach is also evident in STAAC and SUGAR.

The EPI programme is one of three pillars of the AiiN programme, which shared an overarching logframe. This approach, also used by PERL in Nigeria, ensures that supply and demand side programmes, delivered by separate suppliers, work towards a common impact. As detailed in the logframe, DFID holds the EPI supplier accountable to significantly ease one of the top 10 cross sectoral constraints to inclusive and transformational growth without restricting the ability of the programme to work in an adaptive manner by specifying which constraint. Although the 10 constraints are pre-determined and serves to guarantee the level of ambition, the programme has flexibility in deciding which outcomes it will pursue.

Several logframes reviewed, including those of Nepal CIG, EPI and STAAC, detailed process related output indicators while the LASER logframe contained outputs related to learning, and SUGAR outputs related to adaptive programme management. EPI for example measured the number of significant steps taken towards more effective policy by EPI counterparts and partners, while STAAC's performance is measured on the extent to which problem driven adaptive processes are embedded in technical delivery and lessons on what works are gathered and shared.

In addition to retaining flexibility through the way the logframe is designed, adaptive programmes also experimented with non-traditional approaches to setting milestones and agreeing budgets. Care should however be taken to ensure adequate detail is agreed as the programme unfolds.

Programme examples: Programmes such as SUGAR, STAAC and EPI set annual workplans and milestones, while LASER agreed these on a rolling basis every six months. In addition to harvesting results, SUGAR developed a basket of indicators, which allows the monitoring of a much larger number of efficiency indicators, which relates back to logframe targets.

The PCR of the Nepal CIG programme detailed a difficulty in measuring performance – specifically the over or under achievement at outcome level – as a result of targets and milestones, which were to be set on a rolling basis, not being adequately specified.

Recommendation 12: DFID Zimbabwe should ensure the logframe sets the level of ambition and provides a framework against which to hold the programme accountable – but should take care not to stifle the ability of the programme to adapt by tying down too many specific outputs. The use of innovative approaches and the development of appropriate accompanying tools should be considered to enable accountable adaptation.

Recommendation 13: DFID Zimbabwe should experiment with the type of outputs and outcomes detailed and should consider incorporating outputs and outcomes related to learning and adaptive working, to ensure the programme operate in an adaptive manner, and to monitor the application of this approach throughout the programme lifecycle.

4.2 Governance structure

In the BC for its proposed new programme, DFID Zimbabwe is required to address governance arrangements necessary for the successful delivery of the intervention.⁵⁵ The management case section of the BC also requires DFID Zimbabwe to address (1) procedures for monitoring and evaluation, (2) any joint funding arrangements, (3) the relationship and division of roles between DFID, any partner government, other donors, programme partners or implementing agents, (4) how ‘beneficiaries’ are represented in the governance of the intervention, and (5) key risks to achieving outcomes, and mitigation actions or residual risk. This section details recommendations on the above.

Internal governance arrangements & external beneficiary involvement

Finding: Programmes reviewed used both internal and external governance structures, but the make-up of these structured differed from programme to programme. Internal governance structures were aimed at ensuring appropriate day to day management of programmes and accountability to DFID, with a focus on overseeing programme progress, supplier performance, fiscal oversight, and monitoring and managing of risk. The composition of internal governance structures appears conventional in nature, involving DFID and supplier staff, although the specific staff and combination of representatives differed by programme.

External structures were predominantly used to involve local actors in decision making, and to enable problem driven and demand led engagement. Although the external governance structures aimed to involve a wide range of local actors, programmes reported that self-selection tended to take place, with some actors engaging more than others. Where the membership of the external committee was pre-determined, this was reported as challenging; although the make-up of the membership was not necessarily inappropriate. Allowing membership to evolve as part of the inception phase of the programme might have been more

⁵⁵ DFID Business Case Guide 2017

conducive to an adaptive approach and the creation of good working relationships and establishment of mutual trust.

Programme examples: The CIG BC stipulated the use of a facility approach. The service provider was expected to create a Programme Management Unit which would be responsible for managing operations, while drawing on the input of its stakeholders, to select, prioritise, and design projects which contributed to the facility's intended outcomes. Oversight would be provided by DFID HQ and DFID Nepal. FOSTER II stipulated a similar approach, with day to day internal management provided by a Team Leader, reporting to the DFID SRO and DFID Nigeria programme co-ordinator responsible for oversight.

The BC of the PSD in DRC programme recommended the creation of a Programme Management Board chaired by the DFID DRC Head of Office and consisting of DFID DRC programme staff and Decision Support Unit representatives, with representation of DFID HQ Experts. The Project Director would be accountable to DFID for ensuring the programme is on track, and regular meetings between the Project Director and DFID DRC would ensure adequate oversight. The General Manager, reporting to the Project Director would be responsible for day to day delivery of the programme.

Day to day internal management and oversight of SUGAR is provided by a Programme Director, Programme Manager and Technical Team Leader, reporting to the DFID senior responsible officer. In addition to signing an MOU with the Prime Minister, SUGAR envisioned the creation of a conventional external steering committee where representatives of anti-corruption institutions would provide strategic guidance to the programme, and track performance. Instead, this format and structure of this forum evolved to focus on problem identification, allowing external stakeholders an opportunity to identify and agree on the challenges SUGAR should focus on and to propose the steps the programme should undertake to address these.

STAAC developed a demand and supply side governance structure. On the demand side of the programme, DFID pre-selected local partners for involvement in the STAAC programme, prior to appointment of the service provider. These partners are represented on a programme working group, and decide on the direction of the programme; they meet monthly and are responsible for strategic and investment decisions. The programme reacts to problems identified by this group, and the vote of each member carries equal weight. Conversely, the management structure on the supply side involving government partners have evolved organically. To ensure STAAC operates in a demand led manner, the programme engages with potential partners, how decides to engage or not depending on how useful a forum they perceive the committee to be.

Recommendation 14: DFID Zimbabwe should consider how governance structures will ensure operational oversight and accountability, while enabling demand led and problem driven engagement. The creation of both an internal and external governance structure is recommended, with the internal oversight body responsible for monitoring project progress and performance, and overseeing supplier performance (including financial performance and VFM). External governance entities could function as high level advisory entities, could provide input into needs identification and resource allocation, critically reflect on progress and performance with the aim of identifying solutions to delays or underperformance, and/or and engage with technical approaches and findings. Careful consideration should, however, be given to the make-up of the external governance structure, which could evolve over time as the shape and focus of the programme changes. Engagement with a wide range of local actors should also be encouraged to ensure legitimacy of decisions.

Finding: Adaptive programmes require agile decision making processes and structures to enable programmes to react quickly to changes in needs and the political context, and to leverage opportunities for engagement and reform as they arise. An aim of an adaptive approach is to exploit opportunities to achieve impact as and when they arise, and to enable programmes to change direction and respond appropriately in dynamic environments. It is however challenging to balance the need for real time adaptation with the requirement for robust analyses and oversight, and different programmes used different approaches to balance these contrasting requirements.

The programmes reviewed also appeared to differ in their ability to make decisions quickly, as a result of the governance structures and processes put in place. Some programmes, like Nepal EPI, followed a more conventional quarterly meeting schedule, while others like LASER aimed to scale the frequency of meetings up and down depending on the needs of the programme and the stage of engagement.

Programme examples: Nepal EPI is overseen by a Board, which meets quarterly; the Board consists of the DFID senior responsible officer, a Programme Director and Team Leader respectively, the Head of the Partner entity (a think tank) and the World Bank country representative. The Board is responsible for approving issues for investigation which has been identified in a problem driven and demand led manner, and is responsible for allocating expenditure of above £100k to areas of exploration, while the Team Leader can allocate up to £50k on investigating and addressing areas of engagement as they arise.

In contrast, LASER put in place several management structures to ensure both appropriate oversight and the ability to adapt on an ongoing basis.

- A Strategic Advisory Board comprised of senior donor representatives and thought leaders met annually, and served as critical reviewer and a sound board.
- The Programme Oversight Committee consisted of senior supplier staff who met quarterly, and focussed on management of risk and programme performance and progress.

- Quarterly meetings between the suppliers and DFID, to report on progress, identify risk and review impact also took place. This committee was responsible for certain important decisions, for example significant reallocations of funds and closing down country or other major interventions, and for reviewing formal evaluations and agreeing next steps. The membership of the committee and frequency of meetings changed as the scale and risk of the programme changed.
- To allow fast adaptation, the DFID senior responsible officer was however responsible for signing off changes to the results framework (including menu of results and programme milestones) after a review of the rationale, informed by programme data, on an ongoing basis and for approving monthly reports and quarterly deliverables.
- The Technical Leadership Team was made up of senior technical staff, and met frequently (every few weeks) to agree the programme approach, including allocation of funds across the eight countries based on need and likelihood of impact, and to share knowledge across the programme. Finance specific review meetings also took place every few months, or more frequently as needed.
- Smaller groups of senior technical and country staff responsible for delivery met regularly (weekly at its peak) to review data and lessons, and refine interventions and approaches; these meetings also included peer reviews and challenges to findings and recommendations.
- The programme director and programme manager remained in regular contact with the DFID senior responsible officer, corresponding several times a week and speaking weekly during the busiest phase of the programme, but less as the programme scaled down.

Recommendation 15: DFID Zimbabwe should consider the balance required between robust oversight and quick decision making; this balance might not remain static, but would most likely change as the programme evolved, as risk changed and as programme activities and spend increased and decreased in accordance with an adaptive approach.

Recommendation 16: DFID Zimbabwe should consider the requirements posed by working in a politically dynamic environment; it might not be possible or desirable to sign off every change to the programme. Instead, DFID Zimbabwe could consider (1) agreeing criteria for the type of changes and decisions DFID would want to be aware of and engaged in in real time, (2) agreeing clear processes for suppliers to sign off decisions which could be periodically reviewed and audited, and (3) ensuring adequate transparency in why decisions were made by putting in place appropriate systems to document the rationale for and the change itself.

Finding: The management and oversight of adaptive programmes are labour intensive, and require adequate investment, appropriate skills and suitable processes and systems. Adequate time from DFID staff to engage with adaptive programmes on an ongoing basis is required, as is the need for intensive programme management inputs from suppliers.

In programmes reviewed it was at times difficult to distinguish between technical and programme management expenses, and adequate budget for programme management was required.

In addition, adaptive programmes needed access to skills and expertise that differ from conventional programmes.⁵⁶ Instead of designing and delivering solutions, programme staff often serve as facilitators who guide discovery, and provide support to test solutions rather than offering answers. DFID staff responsible for programme oversight should understand adaptive programming, and be supporting of working in an adaptive way.

Programme examples: The PCR for FOSTER I acknowledged the need for strong collaboration between DFID and the service provider, specifically as it relates to decisions around scaling initiatives up or down. Both LASER and STAAC indicated engagement with the SRO took place at least twice a week, while SAVI viewed the DFID SRO as an integral part of the programme management team.

Several programmes commented on the need for a relationship of trust between the SRO and the supplier, while others viewed specific soft skills such as facilitation skills as important, or a mode in depth technical understanding to comprehend the rationale behind changes in technical methodology as desirable.

Although programmes reviewed emphasised the need for ongoing engagement, easy access to DFID decision makers, and quick turn around on decisions, some programmes also endeavoured to put in place processes which enabled ongoing adaptation. For example, in the LASER programme it was agreed that the programme budget could be continuously reallocated as programme priorities changed, without sign off from the DFID SRO, to enable resources to be focussed on areas likely to achieve the greatest impact. The submission of periodic financial reforecasts however allowed for adequate oversight and enabled financial reporting against up to date information. In contrast, the agreement of rolling milestones required a contract amendment every six months – a lengthy and slow process which resulted in the supplier consistently working without an up to date contract in place.

Recommendation 17: In designing the business case, DFID Zimbabwe should indicate the requirement for ongoing and intensive involvement from the SRO. In considering delivery options in the BC, a ‘making and buying’⁵⁷ option (or a combination of using DFID resources and procuring external support) could ensure more extensive involvement of DFID staff.

⁵⁶ Manuel, C 2016; Derbyshire H & Donovan, E., 2016 & Mercy Corps / IRC, 2016

⁵⁷ DFID Business Case Guide, 2017

Recommendation 18: DFID Zimbabwe should give adequate consideration to the cost of adaptive management, and the commercial and financial case should provide for a high level of programme management, partner engagement and donor oversight.

Recommendation 19: DFID Zimbabwe should consider the type of skills required to work in an adaptive manner, and should ensure the way the programme will be taken to market and the procurement modality detailed in the BC takes this into account.

Recommendation 20: DFID Zimbabwe should ensure the senior responsible officer and other DFID staff involved in the programme have adequate capacity to engage appropriately on an ongoing basis. DFID Zimbabwe should also consider the skills set of staff involved, with the requirements for lateral and critical thinking, tolerance of uncertainty and confidence and authority to make ongoing decisions as to the programme direction. Strategies to limit the turnover of DFID staff involved in the programme should also be considered, as significant time and resources can be required to bring new staff up to speed on an adaptive programme.

Monitoring, learning and adaptation

Finding: Monitoring, evaluation and learning were not viewed as external functions in the BC, but as intrinsic to the delivery of an adaptive programme. Adaptive programming stresses the importance of designing and implementing development support through processes of learning by doing, continually testing and adapting programme approaches and delivery. Learning and reflection is not viewed as an add-on activity⁵⁸ which stands separate from delivery, but is integral to the programme. It informs, on an ongoing basis, decisions regarding technical focus areas and approaches, potential results, programme partners, financial spend, resource requirements etc.

This approach requires that monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) forms an integral part of technical delivery, that processes for testing and learning should be clearly articulated,⁵⁹ and that the programme framework and systems enable structured reflection, learning and adaptation.⁶⁰ MEL data should not be viewed only as a way of measuring impact or ensuring accountability, but should be used in operational decision making to enable evidence based programming.

In addition, it is paramount that programmes have the ability to continually adjust as a result of MEL data, changes in needs and the political environment. This requires time and effort, and an approach which sees project management as less about overseeing the implementation of workplans, and more about enabling the delivery of altering technical support.

⁵⁸ Craig Valters et al 2016

⁵⁹ Wild, L., et al 2017

⁶⁰ Derbyshire H, and Donovan E, 2016



Programme examples: M&E within the LASER programme was undertaken by programme staff, and data gathered through tools such as problem diaries was used on an ongoing basis to inform technical decisions. Strategy reviews took place at three to six month intervals and involved critical review of what has been learned, challenges to decisions and adaptations, and testing of inbuilt biases. Country and output teams also met regularly (every one to two weeks) to consider the political economy and risks and assumptions underlying the intervention. They discussed progress, identified lessons, re-evaluated VFM and considered whether the either overall approach, or logframe, require amendment. Feedback from partners and data from the regular monitoring processes informed the team's discussion. Thirty five percent (35%) of LASER's budget was also allocated to learning and influencing, and LASER had logframe targets on the write up and publication of lessons, and collaborations to influence practice.

Strategic planning, M&E, and results analysis frameworks in SAVI enabled staff to record their actions, learning and ideas as they progress – and to update or adjust their strategies, workplans and budgets. PEA was used as an active tool to inform decision making, and quarterly and annual review processes were used not simply to package SAVI results for DFID requirements but as an opportunity for structured reflection. Programme partners (e.g. civil society organisation) were also not required to undertake formal M&E for donor accountability purposes; instead this was done by SAVI, leaving partners free to focus on gathering and analysing data which was of use to them in their own decision making process.

Recommendation 21: In designing the business case, DFID Zimbabwe should address MEL requirements appropriately, and factor in the cost of and time required to enable ongoing MEL. Although DFID guidance on monitoring⁶¹ emphasises M&E for accountability and performance purposes, DFID Zimbabwe should ensure that the programme's monitoring plan detailed in the BC reflects the need for MEL to be an integral part of the programme management and technical delivery.

Finding: An adaptive programme requires an extensive exploratory phase, both to generate an understanding of needs and problems and the political context, and to develop and test solutions with partners. Adaptive programmes emphasise engagement with a wide range of local actors, and the joint identification of problems and refinement of solutions - which requires relationships of trust established over time, as well as building in time for reflection, innovation, experimentation and adaptation. Instead of identifying problems through extensive analysis and presenting pre-determined solutions which stakeholders 'buy in' to as is the case in conventional programmes, adaptive programmes require ongoing engagement with a wide range of local partners to identify problems they care about and to support development, testing and uptake of locally developed solutions to these problems.

A lengthy exploratory phase - in contrast with a short inception phase in a conventional programme - provides opportunities to establish relationships, build trust and gain an in-depth

⁶¹ Improving Project Monitoring, DFID guidance Feb 2016

understanding of the local political context and stakeholders. It also offers opportunities to facilitate the identification and deconstruction of problems; help design local solutions; and to take ‘small bets’, testing what will work and what not, before committing to a specific avenue of support.

Programme examples: LASER undertook a nine-month inception phase, before agreeing the first detailed budget breakdown or finalised VFM indicators. STAAC’s initial six-month inception was extended by an additional six months, while SUGAR was designed to incorporate a one year combined inception / design phase. In FOSTER, although not intended at the outset, the first year served as an exploratory phase, after which the nature of the programme changed from think tank to technical advisor, the direction of the programme shifted and the logframe was extensively amended.

Recommendation 22: In designing the business case, DFID Zimbabwe should clearly set out what the implementation of an adaptive programme entails, and timeframes and level of investment required should take into account the need to extensive on the ground exploration and relationships development, ongoing political economy analysis and MEL throughout the life of the programme, and in depth programme management inputs to enable adaptation as a result of learning.

Funding & commercial arrangements

Finding: Careful consideration should be given to funding and commercial arrangements which have the potential to skew programme incentives and serve as a barrier to adaptive working. In an attempt to avoid *isomorphic mimicry* - where country actors emulate donor-preferred models and end up making only superficial changes that do not deal with the real issues - adaptive programming emphasises the development of locally led solutions, where change is led and driven from within. Putting the prospect of substantial funding on the table during the initial stage of a programme has the ability to distort the relationship between development practitioner and developing country counterparts.⁶²

Some adaptive programmes have avoided offering large sums of financial support, to enable a focus on providing technical support, or to help identify problems before unlocking further funding.

Programme examples: SAVI eschewed a traditional grant making approach to supporting civil society, instead, it took money off the table and provided technical assistance, with good result.

Cost benefit analyses of LASER interventions have found that a relatively small pot of investment could achieve good results; by removing the offer of significant investment from the discussion, the programme was able to work with local actors to identify and address embedded constraints, rather than funding a ‘wish list’ of support.

⁶² Manuel C 2015,

Recommendation 23: DFID Zimbabwe should guard against the design of a programme where financial support can skew perceived needs. In developing the commercial case, experimentation with alternative funding models, ways to ‘take the money of the table’⁶³ - to ensure distance between funds provided and the actors in the driving seat of reform or change processes⁶⁴ - should be considered.

Adaptive programming should enable a high level of innovation, exploration, risk taking and creative thinking. Care should be taken that reporting and commercial arrangements do not inhibit these: rigid reporting requirements, spending and VFM targets or commercial incentives should not drive delivery. Instead, constant reallocation of funds and reforecasting in line with technical priorities, and innovative funding models⁶⁵ should enable the delivery of the most appropriate technical support in response to learning, changes in the political environment and local needs.

Programme examples: Commercial arrangements in adaptive programmes are complex. It is difficult to distinguish between programme management and technical costs, as found by FOSTER and LASER, or between technical and M&E costs as experienced by SAVI and LASER. This makes input based contracts challenging. But output based contracts might not incentivise adequate cost saving, as found in CIG. Hybrid contracting models using both input and output based payment attractive were used by Nepal CIG, EPI and LASER. These worked well in some respects, but financial management can become complex.

Recommendation 24: DFID Zimbabwe should give careful consideration to commercial arrangements, to ensure financial incentives are compatible with flexible and adaptive working. The benefits and drawbacks of input, output and hybrid based contracts, and the level of effort involved and ability to effectively generate financial reports for each model should be carefully considered.

Finding: Flexibility on total budget is possible at the BC stage. Although convention dictates that the total programme budget should be specified up front, the Smart Rules allows for some flexibility. DFID Zimbabwe could investigate the viability of requesting approval for a lower and upper budget ceiling, to ensure the ability to respond immediately to needs depending on the results of the upcoming elections.

⁶³ Booth and Chambers 2014

⁶⁴ Wild, L; et al, 2016

⁶⁵ Wild, L., et al, 2017

Programme examples: The FOSTER II BC stipulated two options – the counterfactual ‘do nothing further’, and a case for ongoing engagement using an adaptive approach, with two scenarios. Although scenario A was recommended, which advocated less extensive technical assistance directly to government due to the high risk of this approach, the commercial case for scenario B (more direct engagement with government) was also made in the BC. The BC explicitly stipulated that an extra £6M would be requested to move to scenario B if the political environment became conducive and certain predetermined requirements were met while scenario A was being implemented.

The LASER BC detailed two options for differentiating between countries of engagement, with Option 2 focussing on FCAS environments. Although the TCV did not differ significantly, the BC reflected the difference in types of spend, with significantly increased spend on programme management for engaging in FCAS countries. The final country selection was only made during the inception phase.

Recommendation 25: To enable DFID to respond quickly in a highly dynamic political environment, the possibility of gaining agreement on different upper limits of funding, depending on local developments and the programme meeting pre-determined requirements, should be investigated at the BC stage.

Risk management

Finding: A wide range of risk factors should be considered in the design of an adaptive programme. An adaptive programme embraces innovation and risk taking. It demands candid recognition that some activities may fail to deliver results. Programmes should be able to scale up approaches that work, and to close down activities that have not generated traction. This involves operational financial, reputational, and relationship risks. The operational culture and financial incentives should therefore encourage, not punish, risk taking and failure.

Programme example: The LASER programme incorporated the delivery of two rigorous impact evaluations (RIEs) in addition to demand led support. Halfway through the programme it became clear that the successful completion of a RIE in Bangladesh was unlikely, as a result of significant delays from the GoB in agreeing to make data available. In partnership with DFID, LASER agreed to stop this activity, and to reallocate nearly £200k of funds to activities where greater impact could be achieved. This did however have some impact on the relationship between DFID and the IFC in Bangladesh.

Recommendation 26: The BC should explicitly address the risk of failure, both in the appraisal and management case, and DFID Zimbabwe make adequate recommendations for dealing with failure. Risk management in the BC should also take into account the potential impact of scaling up or closing down activities on diverse aspects such as relationships, reputation and accuracy of financial forecasts.

Recommendation 27: Commercial arrangements should be carefully considered and the danger that a PBR modality does not adequately incentivise risk taking should be explored, and should be compared with the challenge in forecasting inputs when using a non-PBR model.

4.3 Gender

Under the 2002 International Development Act, DFID must give meaningful yet proportionate regard to the contribution its assistance is likely to make to reducing gender inequality (development) or to gender-related differences in needs (humanitarian) before assistance is provided.⁶⁶ DFID has also pledged to ensure that all economic development work tackles gender discrimination and contributes to delivering safer, more secure and higher-return work for women.⁶⁷ As a result, DFID Zimbabwe is required to ensure that women's economic empowerment is adequately addressed in any future BER work in Zimbabwe.

As set out in Section 3 above, adaptive programming emphasises operating in a manner which is problem driven and demand led – and gender issues may not necessarily be a priority of local stakeholders.

Finding: Addressing gender equality while working in a demand led and problem driven manner is challenging. In exploring how the programmes under review addressed gender aspects, it became apparent that nearly all programmes struggled to resolve this challenge. The approach that appears to have most appropriately addressed DFID's requirement is the development of individual gender specific output measures for different programme components on a rolling basis.

The approach to incorporating gender, and the extent of gender initiatives appeared to differ vastly in the programmes reviewed, ranging from basic attempts to include more women in training (FOSTER II), to setting targets and measuring the cumulative number of women who saw a net increase in income at impact level (PSD in DRC). Several programmes indicated that their experience of a demand led and problem driven approach was that it posed challenges to addressing gender equality, as programmes found it difficult to identify entry points. It was however deemed important that there is an awareness of the need to address gender at all levels of the programme, and that programmes should on an ongoing basis both try to identify entry points, and investigate how gender can be incorporated and addressed in new programme initiatives as these arise throughout the life of the programme.

Programme examples: At the early stages of the LASER programme, attempts to find entry points to address gender aspects in some countries threatened to scupper relationships with local partners. LASER engaged with DFID, and it was agreed that LASER would initially step back from implementing an overt gender strategy, instead focussing on generating trust and developing strong relationships before re-engaging. As the programme unfolded, LASER was

⁶⁶ DFID Smart Rules 2017

⁶⁷ DFID Economic Development Strategy: prosperity, poverty and meeting global challenges 2017

able to more actively explore opportunities to identify and address gender specific aspects of commercial law and justice reform. This decision to delay engagement on gender, resulted in support to a local partner in Rwanda to share findings on 'legal obstacles facing start-up entrepreneurs' with the Minister of Trade and Industry and with various government agencies specifically drawing attention to the challenges faced by women in business, as well as the provision of support directly to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and East African Community Affairs to identify gender base business problems women traders faced, which is now being factored into the drafting of new legislation. 'Pushing' gender initiatives early on would likely have hindered overall progress.

Both SUGAR and STAAC, two anti-corruption programmes, have found it challenging to find entry points to deal with gender equality, with a lack of research on grand (not petty) corruption and gender equality to draw on confounding matters. In Uganda, STAAC is considering commissioning research, in an attempt to learn more about both grand corruption and gender, and to explore the validity and impact of the observation that the more transformational institutions involved in the prosecution chain are headed by women.

Nepal EPI undertook a scoping study to explore how the programme could integrate gender at all stages of its work, and an action plan was developed. The programme is now arranging access to a local gender expert who can engage on an ad hoc basis with the programme team to explore opportunities to address gender as programme activities evolve, and a rolling gender strategy is evolving. At a logframe level, EPI also set a target to address three policy reforms over the next year that reduce barriers to women's employment and entrepreneurship, and is actively seeking entry points

Recommendation 28: DFID Zimbabwe should consider the creation of a nested gender strategy and the development of rolling gender output and outcome targets; this approach will enable the programme to identify how gender equality can be addressed in each specific area of engagement, as the programme unfolds, while working in a problem driven and demand led manner.

Recommendation 29: DFID Zimbabwe should continue to remain up to date on developments regarding gender and adaptive programming, reviewing two upcoming publications by the Australian Department for Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and UK Gender and Development Network commissioned by DFID once these are available., and engaging with programmes such as EPI, SUGAR and STAAC as they complete research and the implementation of gender strategies unfold.

5. Lessons from BEEP

In addition to drawing on the experience of past and current adaptive programmes, there are lessons from BEEP itself to consider during the design of a new BER programme.

Upon reviewing the evolution of the BEEP programme, it is evident that BEEP was designed with the intention of being – what we would now call - a flexible and problem driven programme. The business case, in turn informed by the [Enhancing Nigerian Advocacy of a Better Business Environment](#) (ENABLE) programme, not only sets out a three-phased approach, implemented over a five or even seven-year period, but detailed three scenarios for engagement, and restricts itself to detailing activities for the first two year period only. This approach to the programme’s design was seen as key to managing the currently uncertain political and economic environment in Zimbabwe.⁶⁸

In addition, Option 2 in the BC, which formed the basis for BEEP, incorporated a Business Advocacy Capacity Development component which would be demand - not issue – driven. The aim was to address “the underlying way in which business advocacy is practiced in Zimbabwe, and focus on practice (behavioural) change in areas consultatively agreed on as having (1) the greatest chances of success and (2) the most significant impact on the business environment and overall economy... in doing so flexibility is built into the programme from inception”.

Interestingly, the intention was that Phase 1 of BEEP – Inception, would ‘expand resource and effort on growing its partnership portfolio and deploying pilot programmes’ which were unlikely to yield high level impact, but was viewed as “essential to the process of identifying where theoretical constructs of impact meet practical success”. The programme’s advocacy approach would also allow “for consolidation of relationships and momentum in areas showing early success and reassigning resources and effort where little progress is made”. In addition, the intention was that “a second dimension of flexibility” could be incorporated into BEEP by splitting the inception into two sub-phases (targeting the PS/media and MDA’s separately) “through which the programme tempo [could] be fine-tuned in response to the unfolding political context”.

Phase 2 of BEEP would allow an opportunity to “*adjust the partnership portfolio toward areas of success*”, while Phase 3 would focus on replication of successes and acceleration, and Phase 4 would be reached where there is evidence of impact on the business environment becoming self-sustained.

The business case acknowledged that the speed of transition would be slow, and that “the programme’s impact on the business environment [was] likely to develop in a non-linear fashion, regressing backward to earlier phases and then progressing quickly past stages”.

⁶⁸ BEEP business case

This process of gaining trust, making ‘small bets’, testing what works and what doesn’t, and then scaling initiatives up or down is at the heart of the design of an adaptive programme. However, although BEEP was envisioned as what we would now call a flexible and adaptive programme, the result framework and programme management approach used was conventional in nature. Although the strategic case emphasised adaptation, the BEEP management, commercial and financial case:

- Stipulated a requirement for clear implementation plans at bidding stage, rather than allowing time and space for exploration;
- Incorporated a political economy analysis and economic scoping as a base from which to frame and design interventions, rather than as ongoing processes to inform programme focus areas and priorities;
- Specified that a detailed scope of work, time bound deliverables and results, pre-agreed targets and clear milestones should be in place after inception, rather than using a ‘rolling’ approach whereby workplans and milestones are agreed as programme prioritise crystalize;
- Required the use of a logframe which set clear quantitative targets, and did not allow for adding / harvesting of results as the programme unfolded and demands changes / opportunities arose (although it did provide flexibility as to the area in which capacity was developed or policies and legislation was reformed); and
- Envisioned M&E as separate from delivery, and with a key focus of measuring impact and enabling accountability, as opposed to driving learning and adaptation.

The flexibility initially envisioned for BEEP was not followed throughout the programming approach. In practice this was conventional, in terms of (1) programme procurement (which aims to pin details of interventions, outcomes, resources and budgets down up front), (2) developing a traditional results framework which assumes the linear delivery of pre-determined results, (3) treating M&E as predominantly a way to ensure accountability and separate to the programme, and (4) viewing political economy analysis and scoping of interventions as a once off, initial activity to inform programme design.

Finding: Adaptive programming is about more than designing an adaptive programme; it is about ensuring flexible working at every stage in the programme lifecycle. A key lesson from BEEP was therefore that – although the programme was technically designed in accordance with what is now viewed as key principles of adaptive programming – the overarching approach to the management of the programmes as detailed in the commercial, financial and management case was not conducive to adaptive and demand led working.

In addition to lessons from the design of BEEP, the implementation of the Zimbisa extension also offers lessons⁶⁹ worth considering in the development of a follow up programme. For Zimbisa adaptation was:

- Predominantly incidental and opportunistic, and as a result of the type of people involved in delivery - rather than incorporated into the design and enabled by programme systems. While the importance of having the right people in place in an adaptive programme cannot be underestimated,⁷⁰ any systems proposed in the BC should accommodate and drive adaptation.
- Informed by staff's understanding of the local political environment, and of client needs and opportunities - it was not necessarily underpinned by evidence gathered through programme activities. An increased approach to evidence based should be emphasised in the design of a follow up programme.
- Hindered by siloed working and treating programme components as separate. It became easier to adapt once cross component working was introduced. The design of a follow up programme should guard against introducing artificial division of technical support which should be interlinked.
- Initially constraint by a lack of budget flexibility. Once more frequent, programme wide reforecasting was introduced, flexibility increased. Consideration to maintaining a larger flexible pot of funds should be considered in any follow up programme.
- Hindered by a lack of responsiveness from programme partners and slow decision making.
- Decreased as a result of inadequate support to BMOs in piloting, monitoring and evaluating success of initiatives.

As evident from the review of BEEP, a programme can be envisioned as an adaptive programme, but if conscious efforts are not made at design, procurement and contracting stage to build in flexibility, adaptation will remain elusive.

Recommendation 30: To deliver a programme which is able to identify and exploit unexpected opportunities and to respond quickly, often and on an ongoing basis for the duration of the programme to changes in the political environment and partner needs, and to learn about what works and doesn't, it is necessary for DFID Zimbabwe to build adaptability in to every stage of the programme lifecycle. The BC is merely the starting point in the programme lifecycle which should set the scene for incorporating flexibility in all programme aspects.

⁶⁹ Interview with BEEP Team Leader.

⁷⁰ Manuel, C 2016; Derbyshire H & Donovan, E., 2016 & Mercy Corps / IRC, 2016

6. Conclusions

The movement to ‘do development differently’ has gained a foothold in the UK development sector, and DFID and its suppliers are experimenting with ways to increase impact by working in a more iterative and adaptive manner. Programmes are testing methods which enable technical support to be provided in response to local demand and problems, and are trialling tools which allows MEL data to be used for technical and operational decisions, in addition to conveying progress and performance. Most importantly, awareness of critical reflection on what we are doing and how we are doing it throughout the life of a programme is increasing.

This review has shown that there is no ‘one size fits all’ solution to the design and delivery of adaptive programmes, and no easy answer to the conundrum of presenting both operational and financial predictability and certainty of results, while enabling technical flexibility.

While traditional approaches to ToCs and logframes might have limitations, alterations to conventional tools are not without challenges. Some programmes, like Nepal CIG and FOSTER, have aimed to maintain an ability to change while using traditional tools, while other programmes like PSD in DRC, LASER and SAVI have experimented with amendments to conventional methods. As programme reviews show, although there are encouraging results, this has not been easy, and has raised as many questions as it has solved.

‘Second generation’ adaptive programmes (large and technically complex programmes like EPI, STAAC and SUGAR) have not shied away from the challenge of finding ways to help partners develop local solutions to difficult problems, while reassuring DFID of their ability to achieve impact. Through lengthy exploratory phases and ongoing iteration, these programmes are working with DFID to find ways to balance stringent accountability requirements with a need for technical and operational flexibility. This includes testing new ways of conveying the process of change and of mapping out possible results, as well as designing new ways to provide guidance and oversee programmes.

Many challenges remain, including finding ways to encourage partners to address entrenched problems, such as gender equality, and developing ways of balancing risk and financial reward. It does, however, appear as if closer working between DFID and suppliers at programme level, and a joint appetite for experimentation, could bear fruit.

Thirty (30) lessons for the creation of a BC for an adaptive programme have been detailed in this document, ranging from how ToCs can be used as learning tools, to the use of logframes which set the level of ambition but do not tie programmes down to predetermined results. Internal and external governance, which enables both robust oversight and ongoing adaptation, as well as beneficiary involvement, were explored, and the design of financial, commercial and MEL requirements suited to an adaptive programme in the BC was investigated. The use of rolling gender strategies was also considered. A key take away from this review is, however, the need to not only design adaptive programmes, but to ensure that a programmes’ systems and processes enable, encourage and reward learning and adaptation.



Appendix 1 Recommendations mapped against the DFID Business Case

DFID Zimbabwe should consider the following recommendations in the design of a business case for a new BER programme:

Recommendations		
Stage of development	DFID Zimbabwe should consider:	Details
A. Prior to development of BC	<p>A1. The requirements for and barriers to working adaptively</p> <p>A2. The impact of an adaptive approach</p> <p>A3. How to ensure adequate engagement with and support for a non-traditional / adaptive approach within DFID, through development of a business proposition prior to development of a business case</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As set out in this report, the rationale for working in an adaptive way in a highly complex and dynamic environment like Zimbabwe is clear. DFID Zimbabwe should however carefully consider the requirements for and barriers to working adaptively; this includes exploring: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> DFID Zimbabwe's risk appetite, and how comfortable DFID is with a high level of uncertainty the viability of investing time in building relationships and identifying areas of engagement vs. the need to achieve 'quick wins' the likelihood of budget flexibility vs. the need for significant up-front or predictable expenditure perceptions regarding VFM (and specifically sensitivities towards increased project management and MEL expenditure) the interest from DFID Zimbabwe in designing and testing new approaches and tools, and engaging with learning over a period of time - and the subsequent availability of resources to do this the ability of appropriate DFID staff to oversee and engage with an adaptive programme, and the availability of implementing partners able to operate in a flexible and adaptive way the ability and availability of local partners and counterparts to engage and their willingness to learn and adapt approaches accordingly.
B. Strategic case	<p>B1. Risks intrinsic to working adaptively</p> <p>B2. How a wide range of stakeholders will be involved and consulted</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An adaptive approach is high risk, and the nature of a learning by doing approach involves trial and error. DFID Zimbabwe should consider risks specific to an adaptive approach, such as the impact of scaling up and closing down initiatives and the impact of failure (including on reputation and relationships) <p>To ensure the legitimacy of a demand led and problem driven approach, adequate involvement of a wide range of stakeholders in problem identification and ongoing decision making is required; a</p>

Recommendations		
Stage of development	DFID Zimbabwe should consider:	Details
	B3. The viability of developing a rolling or nested gender strategy	<p>lengthy inception phase is required to enable the programme to develop relationships of trust with a large number of stakeholders.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> To date, a demand led approach has not proven conducive to engaging effortlessly on gender aspects; DFID should consider the use of a rolling or nested gender strategy. This will however require consideration of the approval required for and impact of operating in a manner whereby activities within the programme aimed at improving economic opportunities for women and girls are initially highly uncertain, evolving on an ad hoc basis and over time as the programme evolves.
C. Appraisal case	<p>C1. Gaps in the evidence base informing the development of a ToC</p> <p>C2. Developing an indicative and participatory ToC, with realistic levels of ambition</p> <p>C3. A broad interpretation of VFM</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DFID Zimbabwe should consider the evidence available to inform the development of a ToC, and should consider how the use of a ToC as a learning tool can be enabled – while generating support and sign off for the particular approach in the BC; to achieve this use of an indicative or nested ToC is recommended, and DFID Zimbabwe should guard against the use of a ToC which limits exploration of multiple pathways for reform at an early stage To ensure the legitimacy of a demand led and problem driven approach, adequate involvement of a wide range of stakeholders in problem identification and ongoing decision making is required; DFID Zimbabwe should consider the development of a participatory ToC as part of the current Zimbisa programme DFID Zimbabwe should consider the use of an alternative result framework, or ensure the logframe sets an appropriate level of ambition without tying the programme down to predetermined outputs which restricts the ability to explore multiple pathways to change The delivery of adaptive programmes is labour intensive, and requires extensive MEL and management inputs; DFID Zimbabwe should guard against a narrow interpretation of VFM and should ensure adequate investment is available for monitoring, evaluation, learning, adaptation and oversight.

Recommendations		
Stage of development	DFID Zimbabwe should consider:	Details
D. Commercial case	<p>D1. Non-traditional approaches to procurement</p> <p>D2. A 'making and buying' option</p> <p>D3. The impact of different funding and commercial models on the ability to work adaptively</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The design, implementation and oversight of an adaptive programme requires staff with skills which is conducive to establishing relationships, building trust, and facilitating the design of solution. It also requires suppliers with systems and processes which enables ongoing adaptation, and effective real time decision-making. DFID Zimbabwe should ensure the procurement modality and TOR developed enables the evaluation of these skills and systems. Adaptive programming requires significant engagement with DFID; DFID Zimbabwe should consider delivery of the programme using a combination of procurement of external support and use of DFID staff. The viability of making financial provision for DFID staff to bill time to the programme should also be explored. Financial arrangements – both support to partners and incentives to suppliers – can negatively impact on the ability to operate in a demand led, problem driven and adaptive manner. DFID Zimbabwe should consider 'taking money off the table' in discussions with partners, and careful consideration to the benefits and drawbacks of input, output and hybrid contracts with suppliers should be given.
E. Financial case	<p>E1. The level of investment required to work in an adaptive manner</p> <p>E2. How financial and commercial arrangements could help or hinder adaptive working</p> <p>E.3 The level of effort required and ability to effectively generate financial reports</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An adaptive approach requires adequate investment and financial flexibility; DFID should consider requesting approval for a maximum and minimum level of expenditure and/or predetermining criteria against which additional funds can be released, to maintain the ability to react quickly to opportunities DFID Zimbabwe should aim to retain as much flexibility as possible in when and how funds are used, and should guard against expenditure targets driving technical delivery Care should be taken to ensure financial reporting requirements and commercial arrangements do not inhibit innovation, exploration, risk taking and creative thinking; these elements are imperative in the delivery of an adaptive programme

Recommendations		
Stage of development	DFID Zimbabwe should consider:	Details
F. Management case	<p>F1. Treating the creation of the MEL approach as an integral part of the programme delivery, not as a design function</p> <p>F2. The different MEL requirements for technical delivery, measuring progress and measuring performance</p> <p>F3. Developing both an internal and external governance structure</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> DFID Zimbabwe should acknowledge that data is needed for learning, oversight and accountability purposes – and that this might require different datasets, gathered at different times. The design of the approach to MEL should not be treated as a stand-alone initiative, but should form part of the programme, and might require experimentation and innovation. Adaptive programming requires ongoing, real time decision making to enable programmes to act on data, and to respond to changes in partner needs and the local political context. DFID Zimbabwe should consider where DFID sign off of changes are required, and where the documentation of decisions and periodic auditing might better serve the dual need for quick turnaround on decisions and transparency in why decisions were made. The ability to appropriately balance the need for technical flexibility with accountability requirements, and learning by doing with a clear sense of the results programmes will achieve is central to the complexity of working in an adaptive way. DFID Zimbabwe should consider the creation of an internal and external governance structure, which enables both oversight and demand-led engagement, and should acknowledge that the make-up and role of these entities might change over time as the shape of the programme changes.
G. After development of BC	G1. Ensure flexibility at every stage of the programme lifecycle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The success of an adaptive programme depends not only on appropriate design, but on ensuring that adaptive programming is enabled and encouraged at every stage of the programme. DFID Zimbabwe needs to take care that the design of the TOR, the procurement of suppliers, the oversight, financial and accountability requirements and the DFID engagement allows adaptation, in real time, as a result of learning.

Appendix 2 LDP mini-concept note & methodology

Adaptive Programming and Business Environment Reform – Lessons for DFID Zimbabwe (BERF Assignment no: 0063)

Background

DFID's priority in Zimbabwe is to reduce poverty, and to support broad based economic development and empowerment which promotes social inclusion and has the potential to increase opportunities for women & girls. Business environment reform (BER), delivered through support to multilaterals, NGOs and the private sector, is central to achieving these aims.

DFID Zimbabwe (DFID Zimbabwe) requires support to develop a framework for adaptive programming (AP), which will underpin a new phase of BER work in Zimbabwe; this programme will build on the success of the Business Enabling Environment Programme (BEEP) and the results achieved through Zimbisa, which prioritised business advocacy and public-private dialogue (PPD).

An adaptive approach to BER will allow DFID Zimbabwe to be responsive to new demands that may arise in Zimbabwe's politically dynamic environment, and to rapidly react to opportunities in this fragile context where the political situation is a binding constraint.

Our understanding of the project

DFID Zimbabwe has tasked The Law & Development Partnership (LDP), through the DFID Business Environment Reform Facility (BERF), to review donor funded programmes – specifically BER programmes - where an adaptive approach has been used, and to identify lessons to inform the development of the business case for the new DFID Zimbabwe BER programme. LDP will submit a report which capture lessons and detail recommendations, and which will specifically address:

- **Theories of Change (ToC) & results frameworks** – how did ToCs and logframes incorporate an AP approach, and enabled flexibility without sacrificing ambition? Which solutions are suitable in the Zimbabwe context?
- **Governance & decision making** - which governance and decision making structures were used, which proved most suited to BER programmes, and which would be suitable in the Zimbabwe context? How did the selection and prioritisation of themes and partners take place, and which of these methods are applicable to the Zimbabwe context?
- **Gender** – how was gender requirements built into an AP framework? And how can this be done to help DFID Zimbabwe achieve its goal of promoting social inclusion and improving job prospects for women and girls?
- **Pressure release valves** – which are suitable and how could this be built into the ToC and results framework?

Methodology

LDP will undertake desk based research, consisting of document reviews and a small number of phone interviews. To best utilise the limited time available while drawing on latest thinking from a range of DFID BER programmes, we will undertake a review of the DFID programmes listed below, most likely focussing on reviewing the business case/TOR, ToC & logframe, gender strategy and programme completion or latest annual review depending on availability; we will also review relevant lessons learnt publications where available.

The programmes selected for review are the DFID funded:

- Legal Assistance for Economic Reform (LASER)
- Private Sector Development programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo
- Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform II (FOSTER II)
- Centre for Inclusive Growth in Nepal
- Support to Rural Water Supply, Sanitation & Hygiene in Tanzania

LDP will also undertake light touch reviews, speaking to the relevant programme managers to explore current thinking on the ToC, logframes, governance structure and gender strategy used in the new wave of DFID adaptive programmes, potentially:

- Pillar 2 Economic Policy Incubator of the Accelerating Private and Public Investment in Infrastructure (AiiN), Nepal programme
- Building Effective & Accessible Markets (Beam Exchange)
- Strengthening Uganda's Anti-Corruption and Accountability Regime (SUGAR)
- Strengthening Action Against Corruption (STAAC) in Ghana

LDP will not undertake a review of programmes funded by donors other than DFID, due to the limited scope of this programme

LDP will submit a draft report (of no more than 25 pages excluding annexes) entitled 'Evidence & Learning Note on Adaptive Programming and BER' to Itad by 13 April, and a final report by 30 April; Itad will share the report with DFID Zimbabwe for dissemination.

Timelines

The revised timelines proposed are as follows:

Date	Activity
24 March	Mini-concept note submitted to DFID
29 March	Agreement on mini-concept note between LDP & DFID Zimbabwe



Date	Activity
13 April	Draft report to KPMG & Itad for quality assurance
18 April	Comments back from KPMG & Itad
21 April	Draft report submitted to DFID for comments
25 April	Comments back from DFID
30 April	Final report submitted to DFID

Appendix 3 DFID Zimbabwe Terms of Reference

Evidence and Learning Note on Adaptive Programming and BER: Lessons for DFID Zimbabwe

Overview

DFID Zimbabwe has approached BERF for support to develop a framework for adaptive programming that can systematically be built into its Business Environment Reform (BER) work. The need for a flexible programming approach is considered vital as DFID enters into the second phase of its BER and investment climate programme in Zimbabwe. The timing is also seen as opportune as the political and operating environment in Zimbabwe seems set to enter another dynamic phase in the next two years, based on the country's election cycle. Against this background, donors such as DFID are reviewing their programming approach to ensure that they have the ability to be as responsive as possible to potential new demands that may arise from changes in the political and economic landscape.

Adaptive programming refers to an approach to development that is flexible and adaptive, where the design and implementation of development support is done through a process of learning by doing and allowances are made to test programme methodologies and delivery.⁷¹ The adaptive programming approach has traditionally been outside the scope of conventional development programmes which rely heavily on pre-established work-plans, budgets and inputs as well as supporting management and operational systems.

Latest analysis from the World Bank⁷² suggests that Zimbabwe's economy will only achieve zero percent growth in 2016, from 1.5 % in 2015 and 3.2 % in 2014. But despite protracted political uncertainty, a non-transparent application of the rule of law and a deteriorating macro-economic environment, the country is considered to be one of Sub-Saharan Africa's most promising economies. According to the World Bank,⁷³ the country's strengths lie in its 'relatively well-educated work-force, abundant natural resources and developed, though ageing, infrastructure'.

Zimbabwe remains one of DFID's high priority countries. DFID's Operational Plan⁷⁴ underscores a commitment to support the people of Zimbabwe to 'build a free, peaceful and prosperous future', which will improve the economic well-being of Zimbabweans, 22% of whom live in extreme poverty and the majority of whom survive on less than \$1.10 per day. An emphasis on broad-based economic development and empowerment which promotes social inclusion and has the potential to increase opportunities especially for girls and women will continue to be prioritised in DFID's economic aid to the country.

⁷¹ LASER, SAVI: *Adaptive Programming in practice: shared lessons from the DFID-funded LASER and SAVI programmes*

⁷² <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zimbabwe/overview>

⁷³ <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/zimbabwe/overview>

⁷⁴ DFID Operational Plan 2011-2016 : DFID Zimbabwe



The political fragility which has been a feature of Zimbabwe’s policymaking for the last ten years, is a binding constraint to sustained efforts to improve the business environment and attract foreign investments. This constraint has also limited donors’ ability to extend economic development support directly to the Government of Zimbabwe. It is for this reason that DFID works through multilateral institutions, international non-government organisations (NGOs) and the private sector to deliver the United Kingdom’s technical assistance.

One such example is DFID’s support to Zimbabwe through the Business Enabling Environment Programme (BEEP). It has assisted the landlocked country to improve business advocacy through the Public Private Dialogue (PPD) known as Zimbisa. This programme is viewed as a success and has recorded good results. The advocacy system groups being supported - BMOs, ministries and government agencies, research institutions and the media - are on schedule to meet all outcomes and outputs, including the target of delivering six new or amended regulations or laws by January 2017 and ensuring that inclusive growth policies are implemented.

As planning for the design and roll-out of DFID’s next phase of support to Zimbabwe to reform the business environment gets underway, DFID Zimbabwe has started work on its business case and has asked BERF to share evidence on how adaptive programming in BER and investment climate in fragile contexts could be adopted for the new DFID Zimbabwe Theory of Change, log frame and programme governance structure.

Although adaptive programming is a relatively new concept in DFID, the agency has benefitted from the methodology which has been deployed by consultancy service providers in DFID programmes in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and more recently in Nepal, which has just started a new investment climate programme.

Objectives

To provide evidence on how to practically apply lessons from adaptive programming approaches to the second phase of DFID Zimbabwe’s BER and investment climate programme, specifically evidence to support the design of a Theory of Change and logframe that provides adequate signposting on how to:

- Manage course corrections and respond quickly to opportunities in Zimbabwe’s business environment and investment climate, without sacrificing impact on results,
- Select the best choice of governance structures (e.g. the Board of Investment or other BE related institution) that could lend themselves to DFID’s active involvement in BE reform in a post-fragile political context.

Link with BER/investment/jobs/poverty (ToC)⁷⁵

Evidence from this Evidence and Learning Note will support DFID Zimbabwe’s efforts to respond rapidly and flexibly to the politically fragile environment in Zimbabwe which acts as a

⁷⁵ This assignment provides expert external assistance and does not replace the work of DFID civil servants.

binding constraint to donors' ability to assist Zimbabwe to effect long term reforms in the business environment. Guidance from this assignment will boost efforts to create jobs and attract the investments needed that can directly help poor people, especially young girls and women to earn a decent living and lift themselves out of poverty. Development partners, including those with whom DFID work in country will benefit from the lessons shared from BERF's Evidence Note.

Client and Beneficiaries

The immediate client for this output is DFID Zimbabwe. The ultimate beneficiaries will be poor people, including women, the working poor and the rural poor. DFID Zimbabwe's development partners (World Bank, IFC, UNDP and others, will also benefit from BERFs guidance which they will be able to use to design and develop flexible BER programmes which take account of the changing nature and the fragility of Zimbabwe's political and operating environment.

Scope

The scope of this assignment will include:

- A review of DFID's (and other donors' experience) with adaptive programming to date, based on lessons from past and current BER and investment climate related programmes, including those in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Nepal.
- A review of available reports on adaptive programming in BER and investment climate, including the following DFID-funded **LASER** synthesis papers to distil practical lessons of what has worked and hasn't worked in adaptive programming:
- Delivering institutional reform at scale: Problem-driven approaches supported by adaptive learning
- Adaptive Programming in Practice: shared lessons from the DFID funded LASER and SAVI programmes
- Changing the Rules of the Game: Investment Climate Reform in Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations
- An assessment of the business case for the new phase of DFID's BER and investment climate work in Zimbabwe to advise DFID Zimbabwe on the following:
 - Designing a results framework to reflect changing results areas and potentially varying levels of ambition over time and potentially an evolving theory of change
 - Programme governance, decision making structure and selection and prioritisation of themes and partners that are applicable for Zimbabwe
 - What governance structures work best in a 'not too clear' business environment
 - How to put together BER and investment climate theory of change and logframe in politically fragile environments like Zimbabwe

- How to build in the requirements of gender in the adaptive methodology framework in a manner that reflects DFID's goal to promote social inclusion and improve the jobs prospects for women and girls
- What are potentially suitable 'pressure release valves' that could be built into the Theory of Change and the logframe

Method

The consultant will undertake the following tasks:

- Initial telephone/skype consultation with the DFID Commissioning Officer (Economic Adviser, DFID Zimbabwe).
- Desk research to review relevant documents and reports.
- Consultations by skype or phone with DFID's current BER development partners in Zimbabwe (as approved by/agreed with DFID Zimbabwe).
- Collate and analyse research findings.
- Draft a formal report for use as an *Evidence and Learning Note on Adaptive Learning in BER: Lessons for DFID Zimbabwe* summarising evidence to illustrate the practical application of the adaptive programming methodology to DFID's BER and investment climate Programme in Zimbabwe.

Timeframe

Desk research for this project is expected to start on 02 March, 2017. A final draft of the Evidence and Learning Note is scheduled for delivery to the Commissioning Officer at DFID Zimbabwe on 30 April 2017.

The consultancy will be undertaken by a researcher/expert with support as needed from a research assistant. The expected level of effort is a total of 12 days (including two days of inputs from a Research Assistant).

Deliverables

The consultancy will produce an *Evidence and Learning Note on Adaptive Programming and BER: Lessons for DFID Zimbabwe*. The report will be a maximum of 25 pages excluding annexes.

Dissemination

The Evidence and Learning Note will be published and disseminated to DFID Zimbabwe and DFID's local development partners and stakeholder groups (as agreed with and approved by the Country Office). The report will also be accessible to BER development partners including the DCED Business Environment Working Group (BEWG) through BERF's website <http://www.businessenvironmentreform.co.uk/>



Workplan (schedule)⁷⁶

Workplan (E&L Note on Adaptive Programming and BER: Lessons for DFID Zimbabwe)		
Action	Timing	Week No
ToR submitted to BERF for comments/approval	13-Feb	1
Approved draft sent to DFID Zimbabwe for approval	15-Feb	1
ToR revised as needed based on comments received	20-Feb	2
Final ToR submitted to DFID Zimbabwe for review/information	22-Feb	2
Final ToR, budget and CV submitted to DFID ICT for approval	22-Feb	2
Feedback/approval received from DFID ICT	27-Feb	3
Consultant contracted	01-Mar	3
Desk research and data gathering	02-Mar	3
Consultations/initial briefing with DFID Zimbabwe	03-Mar	3
Draft E&L Report submitted to Itad, QA'd and forwarded to KMPG for QA	15-Mar	6
Revised draft submitted to DFID Zimbabwe and DFID ICT	20-Mar	7
Comments received	25-Mar	7
Report finalised, QA'd and submitted to DFID Zimbabwe	30-Mar	8

Competencies Required

This assignment requires the following expertise:

6.1 A Research Consultant with Post Graduate qualifications in Economics, Public Policy, Law or other relevant discipline.£

- Working experience in investment climate or business environment reform in developing countries
- Good understanding of the concept and practice of adaptive programming and business environment reform in fragile countries
- Knowledge of the political economy and business operating frameworks in fragile and conflict affected states such as Zimbabwe
- Understanding of DFID's programme management approach including how it measures results and applies the Theory of Change
- Experience in political economy analysis
- Excellent research, analytical and report-writing skills
- Sound knowledge of relevant research methodologies
- Excellent communication skills

⁷⁶ Please see concept note in appendix 2 for a revised timeline and workplan.

6.2 A Research Assistant with Graduate qualifications in Economics, Development Studies or related discipline

- Good knowledge of research methodologies
- Experience in investment climate or business environment
- Excellent analytical and report writing skills

CVs (attached)

Budget (attached)

Attachments (technical)

Appendix 4 Project & DFID documents reviewed

Business Enabling Environment Reform (BEEP)

- Business Case
- Zimbisa Impact Assessment Note: *Macro-economic constraints to improved business Environment in Zimbabwe 2016*
- BERF Report to DFID: Future Options for Zimbisa
- Zimbisa 2017 programme

Centre for Inclusive Growth (CIG) in Nepal

<https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-114234/documents>

- Business Case (strategic case only)
- Logframe
- Project Completion Report
- Annual Review 2012, 2013, 2014 & 2016

Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform I (FOSTER I) programme in Nigeria

<https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-200341/documents>

- Business Case
- Project Completion Report

Facility for Oil Sector Transparency and Reform II (FOSTER II) programme in Nigeria

<https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-205126/documents>

- Business Case
- Logframe

Legal Assistance for Economic Reform (LASER)

<https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202647/documents>

- Business Case
- Logframe
- Annual Review 2016
- Mid Term Review 2016
- Derbyshire, H., & Donovan, E. 2016 *Synthesis paper 3: Adaptive programming in practice: shared lessons from the DFID-funded LASER and SAVI programmes*



http://www.laserdev.org/media/1171/11-laser_savi_report-online-version-final-120816pdf.pdf

- Manuel, C., 2015 *Synthesis paper 1: Investment Climate Reform: Doing it Differently What, Why and How* <http://www.laserdev.org/media/1117/laser-first-synthesis-paper-investment-climate-reform-doing-it-differently.pdf>
- Manuel, C., 2016 *Synthesis paper 2: Delivering institutional reform at scale: Problem-driven approaches supported by adaptive programming* <http://www.laserdev.org/media/1163/laser-second-synthesis-paper-delivering-institutional-reform-at-scale-final-feb-2016.pdf>
- Manuel, C., & Kirwen, E., 2016. LASER Occasional Research Paper Changing the rules of the game: investment climate reform in fragile and conflict affected situations
- Powrie, E., & Callaghan, S., (forthcoming) *Rwanda Case Study: Gender considerations and perspectives in commercial law and justice reform – LASER's experience in Rwanda*

Partnership to Engage, Reform and Learn (PERL)

<https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204822/documents>

- Business Case
- Annual Review 2016

Private Sector Development (PSD) programme in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

<https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203161/documents>

- Business Case
- Logframe
- Annual Review 2016

State Voice & Accountability Initiative (SAVI) in Nigeria.

<https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-114230/documents>

- Business Case
- Logframe
- Programme Completion Review 2016
- SAVI 2014 *Approach Paper 5: Defining and Measuring Results* http://savi-nigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/SAVI_ApproachPaper5_8Pager_Web4.pdf
- SAVI 2014 *Think piece: Rising to the challenge: supporting 'problem driven iterative adaptation' and 'politically smart, locally led' approaches through a donor-funded programme. The experience of the State Accountability and Voice Initiative in Nigeria*



- http://savi-nigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/DFID_SAVI_brief_Challenge_Online.pdf
- SAVI 2016, *Think Piece: Moving Targets, Widening Nets: Monitoring incremental and adaptive change in an Empowerment and Accountability programme* <http://savi-nigeria.org/resource/moving-targets-widening-nets-monitoring-incremental-adaptive-change-empowerment-accountability-programme/>

Building Effective & Accessible Markets programme (BeamExchange)

<https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-203732/documents>

- Business Case
- Addendum to Business Case
- Logframe

Pillar 2 Economic Policy Incubator (EPI) component of the Accelerating Private and Public Investment in Infrastructure (AiiN) programme in Nepal

- Logframe
- Annual Review (unpublished)

Strengthening Action Against Corruption (STAAC) programme in Ghana

<https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204375/documents>

- Logframe

Strengthening Uganda's Anti-Corruption and Accountability Regime (SUGAR) programme

<https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204375/documents>

- Logframe

Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme, Tanzania Phase 2

- Business Case
- Logframe

DFID Papers & Guidance

- DFID, 2014. *Operational Plan 2011-2016 DFID Zimbabwe (updated Dec 2014)*



- DFID, 2017. *Economic Development Strategy: prosperity, poverty and meeting global challenges*
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/587374/DFID-Economic-Development-Strategy-2017.pdf
- DFID, April 2017. Smart Rules Better Programme Delivery.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/605536/Smart_Rules-Apr2017.pdf
- DFID, April 2017. Business Case Guide
- Craig, R. March 2016. DFID. DFID's Approach to Value for Money
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- Poskett, E., & Bianco, J. Feb 2016. DFID. Improving Project Monitoring

Appendix 5 Programme staff consulted

Organisation	Representative	Position	Contact details
DFID Zimbabwe	Dave Mollatt	Economic Adviser	Email: d-mollatt@dfid.gov.uk;
DFID Zimbabwe Business Environment Enabling Programme (BEEP)	Mungai N. Lenneiye	Team Leader	Email: e. nlenneiye@udugu.org;
Strengthening Action Against Corruption (STAAC) programme in Ghana	Isabel Castle	Project Manager	Email: Isabel.Castle@adamsmithinternational.com
Building Effective & Accessible Markets programme (BeamExchange)	Ashley Aarons	Project Manager	Email: ashley.aarons@beamexchange.org
Pillar 2 Economic Policy Incubator (EPI) component of the Accelerating Private and Public Investment in Infrastructure (AiiN) in Nepal	Harry Jones	Project Manager	Email: Harry.Jones@thepalladiumgroup.com
Strengthening Uganda's Anti-Corruption and Accountability Regime (SUGAR) programme	Mark Gilkes	Project Manager	Email: Mark.Gilkes@adamsmithinternational.com

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