




Ministry  
of Justice

# Process evaluation of the Global Positioning System (GPS) Electronic Monitoring Pilot

## Qualitative findings

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NatCen Social Research

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# 1. Summary

## Key findings

Eight police force areas in England were involved in a Ministry of Justice (MoJ) pilot of GPS location monitoring between October 2016 and March 2018. This process evaluation used qualitative methods to understand views and experiences of the implementation and delivery of the pilot as well as perceived impacts from the perspective of strategic stakeholders, delivery partners and GPS tag wearers. The key findings of the research are as follows.

- Partner agencies were enthusiastic about the prospect of using GPS location monitoring to help monitor and manage compliance with bail, sentence, and licence conditions.
- Clear and timely training and guidance for the staff involved in the setup and delivery of the pilot was highlighted as vital to effective delivery.
- The process of fitting tags was thought to have gone smoothly, although some concerns were raised in relation to the time taken to fit tags.
- GPS location monitoring was felt to support the effective management of offenders in the community and individuals on court bail in four key ways: supporting offender rehabilitation, facilitating risk management, informing decisions about whether a wearer should be recalled to custody or court, and providing evidence to either exonerate a wearer or link them to a crime.
- Key learning points include the importance of clear communication across and within partner agencies to enable a consistent approach to delivery, and the need for sufficient time and resources to develop the infrastructure to support the wider rollout of GPS location monitoring.

## Introduction and background

This report presents the findings of the independent process evaluation of the Global Positioning System (GPS) location monitoring pilot (GPS pilot), which used GPS tags to remotely record information on the whereabouts of offenders and defendants within the criminal justice system (CJS). GPS location monitoring aims to support offender management, assist rehabilitation and introduce additional assurance to give decision makers the confidence to impose a non-custodial outcome or order release on licence, for individuals who would otherwise be in prison.

Eight police force areas in England (across two regional police force clusters) were involved in an MoJ pilot of GPS location monitoring between October 2016 and March 2018. The pilot

covered a range of criminal justice pathways or cohorts, aiming to facilitate diversion (including via a reduction in the use of custodial remand), as well as early release from prison. Various conditions or restrictions could be monitored by the GPS tag, depending on the cohort, and wearers' and victims' needs. These included monitoring a wearer's location, compliance with exclusion zones that aimed to prevent the wearer from entering an area or address, and attendance at specific activities or appointments.

MoJ commissioned a qualitative process evaluation to explore the setup, delivery and perceived outcomes of the pilot. Findings have implications for policy makers and staff involved in electronic monitoring and offender management. They also offer evidence to inform further rollout of monitoring offenders and defendants via GPS location monitoring.

## Methodology

A qualitative case study design was used to obtain a comprehensive picture of the pilot in four police force areas (across two police force clusters). Case study areas were carefully selected to ensure diversity across: geographical size and context, pilot progress to date, and model of delivery.<sup>1</sup> In-depth interviews and small group discussions were undertaken between April 2017 and February 2018, and captured the perspectives of those involved. A total of 122 participants took part in the evaluation, including 108 strategic and operational staff from the police, prison estate, courts system, probation service, parole, the Public Protection Casework Section (PPCS),<sup>2</sup> and the GPS monitoring centre.<sup>3</sup> Fourteen individuals across different wearer cohorts<sup>4</sup> were interviewed to explore their views and experiences of location monitoring.

## Key findings

### Early views and expectations of GPS location monitoring

Participants were enthusiastic about the potential of the GPS tag to help monitor and manage compliance with bail, sentence and licence conditions. It was expected that location

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<sup>1</sup> Data was also collected from participants outside of the four case study areas where it was felt that this would help to address the evaluation's aims and objectives.

<sup>2</sup> The PPCS is responsible for revoking prison licences following a breach of conditions, issuing recalls to custody, and varying licence conditions.

<sup>3</sup> A monitoring centre for the pilot was set up in Hertfordshire. It was operated by police staff who were responsible for reviewing alerts generated by the tags, and for reporting any confirmed breaches to responsible officers.

<sup>4</sup> Five cohorts of wearers were eligible for the GPS tag when the pilot commenced. The cohorts covered a range of offender groups as well as individuals on court-imposed bail who would otherwise have been remanded in custody. Section 2 of this report provides further detail on the pilot cohorts.



monitoring would offer additional assurance to CJS partners who may not have otherwise been released, to manage individuals in the community, to relieve pressures on other rehabilitative services, encourage desistance, and offer potential safeguarding for victims.

### **Pilot setup**

Setting up the GPS pilot involved implementing necessary infrastructure, systems and processes for delivery. This included: staffing a strategic team in HM Prison and Probation Service headquarters and a police project manager in each cluster to oversee delivery, setting up the monitoring centre to review data generated by tags, and liaising with staff in the CJS and field teams to fit and remove tags.

The importance of clear and timely information, training and guidance was highlighted as vital to ensuring the pilot could be delivered effectively. A range of training sessions and guidance materials were produced including the pilot toolkit, awareness sessions and practical training to support specific parts of the process (such as tag fitting). Overall, staff spoke positively of the training and guidance, but some concerns were raised over the accessibility and timeliness of what was provided. In response to this and over time, additional resources were made available.

### **Uptake of the GPS tag**

In total, 586 individuals were tagged, with uptake increasing over the course of the pilot. The GPS tag was considered appropriate for individuals who would benefit from their whereabouts being monitored, to deter them from certain areas and/or individuals, and provide evidence if they did not comply with conditions set. This included a range of different contexts, including where individuals were suspected of or had been involved in violent offences (including domestic violence), harassment, gang crime, football related offences, and theft, in cases where individuals had been convicted multiple times.

A range of agencies were involved in decisions about whether and how to impose GPS tags. They considered factors such as individual risk levels, previous offending, motivation to change, ability to manage the GPS tag and other sentence requirements. Decision making was enabled through support from the monitoring centre and guidance such as the toolkit. In order to recommend a GPS tag, decision makers needed a good understanding of and confidence in the process.

Decision makers imposed a number of monitoring conditions alongside the GPS tag, which in many cases included exclusion zones to manage where individuals went and when. While

this was perceived to be a useful function of the tag, challenges with defining and communicating exclusion zones were identified, which sometimes made it difficult for wearers to understand zone boundaries and comply with licence, order or bail conditions.

### **Fitting the GPS tag**

The process of fitting tags was thought to have gone smoothly and wearers reported being given useful information to help them understand how the tag would work. However, concerns were raised by some within the judiciary and field team about the length of time between the decision being made to fit a tag and the tag actually being fitted, (which could be up to 24 hours) as this was felt to increase the risk of reoffending and of harm to victims.

### **GPS location monitoring and offender management**

GPS location monitoring was felt to support the effective management of offenders in the community and individuals on court bail in four key ways:

- supporting offender rehabilitation
- facilitating risk management
- helping to inform decisions about whether a wearer should be recalled to custody or court
- providing evidence to either exonerate a wearer or link them to a crime

Alongside these benefits, challenges in monitoring and managing wearers were identified. These included perceived gaps in the infrastructure and staffing required to run the pilot. There were also concerns about information sharing processes.

Levels of compliance were generally thought to be good. Ongoing support provided by the field teams, monitoring centre and probation was considered essential in giving wearers the best chance of complying with the requirements or conditions of their GPS tag. The tag itself was also regarded as important, as it acted as a physical reminder of the need to comply with requirements. Instances of unintentional and intentional non-compliance or breach were, however, reported. Some wearers said they found it hard to comply due to a lack of clarity over requirements and their ability to meet them.

The monitoring centre received alerts for all instances of non-compliance and investigated each to validate. Confirmed breaches were passed to the responsible officer. Issues of non-compliance deemed to be more serious elicited a more serious and quicker response.

Responses were informed by a range of intelligence on wearers, and discretion in handling non-compliance was considered vital to effective offender management.

### **GPS location monitoring as an alternative to custody**

GPS location monitoring gave decision makers confidence that some individuals could be more safely managed in the community than in custody. However, it was thought that some individuals might have been effectively managed in the community without a GPS tag, including for less serious offences or where risks were assessed as lower.

### **Wider outcomes of the GPS tag**

The GPS tag was thought to provide wearers with a freedom to live in the community that they may not otherwise have been granted. It also helped them preserve family links and find or maintain employment. Negative impacts of the GPS tag related to it having an adverse effect on health and wellbeing. For example, some wearers reported increased anxiety about breaching conditions or sleeplessness connected with the large size and weight of the tag.

GPS location monitoring had the potential to reduce staff time and resources spent managing individuals in the community. For example, it was reported that curfews previously monitored in person could be remotely monitored by responsible officers. In contrast, the pilot was also perceived to have had a negative impact on some staff roles, including in courts, where participants reported that discussions over conditions took longer than the usual time allocated for bail cases.

### **Learning from the GPS pilot**

Overall, participants were positive about the potential for GPS location monitoring and thought that it provided the CJS with another way to manage and monitor risk within the community. Learning points to be considered at wider rollout included the need for:

- **Clear and timely communication** across and within partner agencies to help increase awareness, knowledge and embed this form of monitoring across the CJS. The need for clear communication with wearers, around the conditions and requirements of a tag in particular, was also thought to underpin successful delivery.
- **A consistent and well-informed approach** across agencies supported by the use of standardised guidance on processes and areas of responsibility. This should be balanced with the need for a degree of discretion to allow decision makers to manage offenders' behaviour and risk in a way they see fit.

- **Equipment that enables offenders to engage more easily and positively in their rehabilitation**, by minimising discomfort and the need for lengthy and regular charging.
- **Sufficient time and resources** to develop appropriate infrastructure to support the rollout of GPS location monitoring. Partners across the CJS should have the means to collaborate on key issues throughout the rollout, and ensure that resources are allocated effectively in order to sustain GPS location monitoring in the long term.

## 2. Context and approach

This report presents the findings of the independent process evaluation of the GPS location monitoring pilot which operated in eight police force areas between October 2016 and March 2018. This section briefly sets out the research and policy context, an overview of the pilot, the aims and objectives of the evaluation, and the evaluation methodology.

### 2.1 Policy and research background

Electronic tags are fitted around an individual's ankle. They use radio frequency (RF) technology to monitor offenders' compliance with a curfew, and have been used within the CJS in England and Wales in various forms since 1988 (Mair and Nellis, 2013).

GPS location monitoring differs to curfew monitoring in that the tag remotely captures and records information on an individual's whereabouts at all times, rather than only confirming whether individuals are at a particular address at a particular time. The tag receives location signals from satellites and then communicates location data via a mobile phone network to a case management system. Location monitoring via GPS tagging in the current pilot was intended to support offender management, assist rehabilitation and introduce additional assurance that may give decision makers confidence to impose a non-custodial outcome for some offenders and defendants who would otherwise be in prison.

GPS location monitoring has been used prior to the current pilot. Between 2004 and 2006, GPS tags were piloted by the Home Office in Greater Manchester, Hampshire and the West Midlands, primarily with prolific and other priority offenders (Shute, 2007). Since then only a small number of subjects have had a GPS tag imposed as part of an order or prison licence, partly due to the limited availability of such tags. GPS tags have also been used in a small number of cases by some police forces, usually with offenders on Integrated Offender Management (IOM) schemes (Hudson and Jones, 2016). These schemes differ from the current pilot in that they are voluntary. The pilot therefore represents the first large-scale use of compulsory GPS location monitoring in England and Wales.

Evidence on the impact of GPS location monitoring, and electronic monitoring in general, is limited. Meta-analyses have found that electronic monitoring has no significant impact on reoffending, although some studies have reported benefits when it has been integrated with other supporting interventions (Belur et al., 2017). Much of this evidence is from the United States and findings may not be applicable to England and Wales. It was beyond the scope of this study to carry out an evidence review. However, two recent systematic reviews provide a

useful overview of the international literature on electronic monitoring (Belur et al., 2017, Graham and McIvor, 2015).

## 2.2 Pilot overview

The pilot ran for 18 months across two regional police force clusters between October 2016 and March 2018.<sup>5</sup> Eight police force areas were covered:

- Leicestershire
- Nottinghamshire
- Staffordshire
- West Midlands

in the Midlands cluster, and:

- Bedfordshire
- Northamptonshire
- Cambridgeshire
- Hertfordshire

in the BeNCH cluster.

The areas were chosen to ensure sufficient volumes of referrals to the pilot and to include both urban and rural areas. A total of 600 tags were made available across the two pilot clusters and a project manager responsible for the operational delivery of the pilot was appointed to both. The intention was to learn from the pilot before rolling out GPS location monitoring nationally (National Offender Management Service (NOMS), 2016).<sup>6</sup>

### Cohorts

Five separate cohorts of wearers were eligible for the GPS tag when the pilot commenced. The cohorts covered a range of offender groups as well as individuals on court-imposed bail who would otherwise have been remanded in custody. Additional detail about the five cohorts is provided in Annex B.<sup>7</sup> For most cohorts, location monitoring was intended to provide an alternative to custody.

1. Individuals on **court-imposed bail**, who would otherwise be remanded in custody.

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<sup>5</sup> Seven areas went live in October 2016 and the final area went live in March 2017.

<sup>6</sup> It was not an aim of the evaluation to investigate the tagging technology itself or how it worked beyond any behavioural change it may have encouraged.

<sup>7</sup> An additional cohort of offenders subject to Integrated Offender Management (IOM) on automatic release from prison was introduced to the pilot in October 2017. However, they were not included in this evaluation.

2. Offenders given **suspended sentence orders** (SSO<sup>8</sup>) or **community orders** (CO<sup>9</sup>), who would otherwise have been given a short custodial sentence.
3. Offenders released on **Home Detention Curfew**.<sup>10</sup> HDC boards were able to impose a GPS tag for prisoners eligible for HDC and where it was felt that risks could be managed more effectively by a GPS tag than a Radio Frequency (RF) tag.
4. Case managers from the National Probation Service (NPS) or Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) could recommend a GPS tag for offenders who were not complying with their licence conditions and where enforcement action was being considered (**licence variation**) and for offenders who were being considered for **re-release from prison after recall**.
5. Offenders in prison on a **life sentence** or **Imprisonment for Public Protection** (IPP<sup>11</sup>), where the **Parole Board** had the option to impose a tag as a release condition. For the pilot, it was envisaged that GPS location monitoring would be an additional option for the Parole Board that may enable the release of offenders who otherwise would not have been considered.

### GPS tags and monitoring

A recommendation for a GPS tag could come from an offender's existing offender manager, a National Probation Service (NPS) offender manager in court, police, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) or Parole Board. Agencies with overall responsibility for the decision whether to use a tag or not varied according to the wearer cohort and included the judiciary, a releasing prison's Home Detention Curfew (HDC) board, Public Protection Casework Section (PPCS),<sup>12</sup> the Parole Board and probation. Additional detail on the agencies involved across the wearer cohorts is provided in Annex B.

A single monitoring centre for the pilot was set-up in Hertfordshire. The monitoring centre was operational for 24 hours a day and was run by police staff responsible for reviewing

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<sup>8</sup> Short custodial sentences may be suspended for up to two years. This means that the offender does not go to prison but is instead given the chance to live in the community and comply with up to 13 requirements set by the court.

<sup>9</sup> COs require offenders to carry out activities in the community as part of their sentence plan. Wearers within this cohort would not have necessarily been given a custodial sentence if GPS monitoring had not been available. CO requirements must be deemed suitable and commensurate with the seriousness of an offence (Section 148 CJA 2003).

<sup>10</sup> HDCs allow offenders to be released from prison earlier than their release date on licence in the community.

<sup>11</sup> IPP sentences are indeterminate sentences designed to protect the public from serious offenders whose crimes did not merit a life sentence. After offenders have completed a 'minimum tariff' or number of years in custody they can apply to the Parole Board for release. If released they will be on a supervised licence for at least 10 years. IPP sentences were discontinued in 2012.

<sup>12</sup> The PPCS is responsible for revoking prison licences following a breach of conditions, issuing recalls to custody, and varying licence conditions.

alerts generated by tags. They would then report any confirmed breaches within 20 minutes to responsible officers (who included police, NPS and CRC staff), who would consider what action to take. Responses to alerts varied according to the cohort of the wearer and the severity of the non-compliance.<sup>13</sup> As well as the ankle tag, supplementary equipment was provided, including a stationary home beacon that was installed in the wearer's approved address, and two chargers (one portable and one stationary) to be used daily to ensure tags remained charged. Annex F provides further information about the equipment.

## Monitoring conditions

Various conditions or restrictions could be monitored by the tag, depending on cohort:<sup>14</sup>

- **exclusion zones** which aimed to keep the wearer from entering an area or address
- **attendance** at a particular activity or appointment, such as a community offending behaviour programme
- **standalone monitoring**<sup>15</sup> which involved the monitoring of the wearer's location. This data was viewed retrospectively by responsible officers
- **curfews**<sup>16</sup> which aimed to confine the wearer to their home during specified hours

## GPS monitoring data

MoJ issued a Code of Practice, setting out guidelines relating to the processing of data gathered via electronic monitoring.<sup>17</sup> Accordingly, the monitoring centre was required to only monitor a subject's compliance with requirements of the order and not to access extraneous data without a lawful reason. The document also explained that wearers would receive a Fair Processing Notice, to explain the purpose and use of data collected, and that data would be shared with Criminal Justice Agencies 'where necessary and proportionate to do so'. Apart from the monitoring centre and MoJ, responsible officers were to be securely given information to help monitor compliance within their own particular area of responsibility. For example, the Code of Practice explained that NPS staff would be given access to

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<sup>13</sup> The Ministry of Justice developed detailed process maps for each cohort that outline the processes to deal with various types of non-compliance. These are available at:  
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/electronic-monitoring-global-positioning-system>

<sup>14</sup> For individuals on prison licence, legislation permits a location monitoring requirement to be imposed either as a condition in its own right or as a condition to monitor compliance with another requirement of the licence, such as an exclusion zone. For community sentences, legislation was commenced in the pilot areas to allow for location monitoring to be imposed as a requirement in its own right. Legislation already permitted electronic monitoring to be used to monitor another requirement imposed on the order. For Court Bail, location monitoring can only be imposed to monitor compliance with another requirement of the Order.

<sup>15</sup> Standalone monitoring was not available for court-imposed bail cases.

<sup>16</sup> Curfews were added in May 2017 and can only be used if at least one of the other four conditions is imposed.

<sup>17</sup> The MoJ Code of Practice for electric monitoring data can be accessed here:  
[https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/563630/Annex\\_J\\_-\\_Code\\_of\\_Practice.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/563630/Annex_J_-_Code_of_Practice.pdf)



electronic monitoring data on orders and licences where they were acting as the responsible officer.

Responsible officers could also request routine retrospective data for orders that they managed. Again, this was limited to information considered necessary for the managing of offenders or defendants. To ensure processing was compliant with data protection principles, if a responsible officer or other stakeholder required access to data that they had a legitimate need for and would not otherwise routinely be given access to, they had to submit an external agency request (EAR).<sup>18</sup> Each case was considered individually.

## 2.3 Evaluation aims and objectives

NatCen Social Research (NatCen) was commissioned by the MoJ to carry out a process evaluation of the GPS location monitoring pilot to inform wider rollout. The evaluation aimed to understand views and experiences of the implementation and delivery of the GPS pilot as well as perceived impacts from the perspective of strategic stakeholders, delivery partners, GPS tag wearers and victims.

The study did not seek to identify the impact of the GPS location monitoring pilot. Instead, the specific objectives of the research were to:

- describe the implementation of GPS location monitoring for offender management
- understand how decisions to use GPS location monitoring were taken
- identify factors affecting successful implementation of GPS location monitoring
- describe the perceived impacts of GPS location monitoring on wearers, offender management and the wider CJS

A further aim of the evaluation was to provide an estimation of the resource implications of running the GPS pilot and the time and costs involved. This work was conducted by Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) and further detail on the aims, approach and findings is included in Annex A.

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<sup>18</sup> More information and brief guidance on EARs can be found here: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/591843/Annex\\_Q\\_EAR\\_Guidance\\_and\\_request\\_from.docx](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/591843/Annex_Q_EAR_Guidance_and_request_from.docx)

## 2.4 Methodology

The NatCen process evaluation involved two phases of data collection: scoping work and qualitative case studies. Further detail on both phases is provided below.

**The scoping phase** was carried out between October 2016 and March 2017 and aimed to provide the research team with a thorough understanding of contextual issues relating to the pilot and different participant groups. It involved a review of key documents about: the setup and implementation of the pilot, desk-based scoping on the pilot areas, three stakeholder workshops, and three in-depth interviews with key members of staff. Findings from the scoping phase were used to inform the research design of the mainstage fieldwork.

**Qualitative case study fieldwork** took place between April 2017 and February 2018 and involved in-depth interviews in four of the eight police force areas.<sup>19</sup> These case study areas were carefully selected on the basis of: geographical size and context, pilot progress to date, model of delivery, and existence of Approved Premises.<sup>20</sup> Some data was collected from participants outside of the four case study areas where it was felt that this would help to address the evaluation's aims and objectives. For example, due to their integral role in the pilot, field staff were interviewed across the eight police force areas and wearers from outside the case study areas were also included.

Interviews and small group discussions involving between two and six participants were carried out with a broad range of stakeholders, staff and decision makers identified in the scoping phase as playing a role in pilot implementation and/or delivery. They focused on participants' views and experiences of pilot setup and delivery, and perceived impacts and outcomes of the pilot. Fourteen GPS tag wearers<sup>21</sup> were also interviewed about their understanding of how the tag worked, and experiences and impacts of wearing the tag. In total, 75 encounters with 122 participants were completed across this strand of the evaluation. A breakdown of interviews by participant group and further details about the methodology, including sampling, recruitment, interviewing and analysis is provided in Annex C.

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<sup>19</sup> These were Nottinghamshire and West Midlands from the Midlands cluster, and Northamptonshire and Cambridgeshire from the BeNCH cluster.

<sup>20</sup> Approved Premises provide supervision and accommodation in the community to offenders, ex-offenders and defendants. They are run by voluntary organisations or the NPS.

<sup>21</sup> We use the term 'wearer' to refer to all individuals who have had experience of wearing a GPS tag on the pilot. The term 'offender' is not used as some individuals given a tag may have not been convicted of an offence (i.e. the court imposed bail cohort).

## 2.5 Methodological considerations

A key aim of this process evaluation was to comprehensively represent the views of a broad range of individuals. Verbatim quotations and examples from the interviews are used throughout to illustrate the findings. The study was robust in terms of the sampling, data collection and analysis, and this report provides an accurate account of the data collected. As is the case with all qualitative research, the evaluation did not aim to quantify the prevalence of particular views and experiences. Instead the robust qualitative methodology used for this study captured information from a range of different perspectives.

As with all research, the methodology had limitations, and it is a marker of high quality research to acknowledge them. In addition to some changes to the GPS tagging policy, the main methodological challenge associated with this study involved the recruitment of participants.<sup>22</sup>

It was our intention to carry out up to 22 interviews with tag wearers. Different attempts were made to contact and encourage wearers to participate, but recruitment was challenging. Interviews were carried out with 14 individuals in different cohorts, providing useful insight on their views and experiences. It is possible that the evaluation did not capture the full range of experiences of all tag wearers.

Recruitment of staff was also challenging. Participants stated that busy schedules and a lack of direct involvement in pilot delivery made it difficult to take part. Flexibility in the timing and mode of interviews and a joint letter of support from MoJ, CPS and HM Courts and Tribunals Service helped facilitate staff recruitment by providing additional information and assurance about the study.

## 2.6 Report outline

The structure of the report is as follows:

- **section 3** explores the setup of the GPS location monitoring pilot
- **section 4** examines the delivery of the GPS location monitoring pilot, including facilitators and barriers
- **section 5** explores the role of GPS location monitoring in the management of wearers across the eligible cohorts

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<sup>22</sup> More detailed information on the methodological challenges encountered is described in Annex C.

- **section 6** explores the perceived outcomes of the GPS location monitoring pilot on wearers, staff across the CJS, and on offender and risk management more widely
- **section 7** sets out the report's conclusions and recommendations

## 3. Setting up the GPS pilot

This section explores how the GPS pilot was set up from the perspective of strategic and operational staff including views on infrastructure, delivery processes and the usefulness of training. It also explores early perceptions of GPS location monitoring.

### 3.1 Pilot overview

Eight police forces were selected to participate in two pilot areas (the BeNCH and Midlands clusters) to generate a sufficient number of referrals and to include both urban and rural areas. Other reasons included previous experience of the use of GPS location monitoring on a voluntary basis with wearers, and the potential for effective partnership working between police forces and CJS partners within each cluster. Previous experience of working together was felt to have facilitated setup.

“Most police forces have good relationships with their criminal justice partners ... but where there were stronger relationships, they generally had better systems in place to kind of join up and have good local working relationships on a regular basis, largely through criminal justice boards, or ... those types of meetings.” Staff participant, police

To ensure GPS location monitoring could be widely tested, a decision was taken to include additional cohorts across the pilot areas, which included prisoner wearer cohorts in the Midlands cluster and extending eligibility to an IOM cohort.<sup>23</sup> It was hoped that this would increase uptake, and expand understanding of how GPS location monitoring might be used and the overall value of the intervention with a range of cohorts and in different settings.

### 3.2 Eligibility criteria

The pilot guidance stated that GPS location monitoring could be used in the following circumstances if subjects:

- lived in one of the two geographical areas (BeNCH or Midlands)
- were over the age of 18
- fell into one of the five cohorts detailed in 2.2 (cohorts include court imposed bail, SSOs and COs, HDC, licence variation and Parole Board cases)

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<sup>23</sup> GPS location monitoring was introduced for an additional cohort of offenders who were subject to IOM on automatic release from prison from October 2017 onwards. However, this group was outside the scope for the pilot and were not included in this evaluation.

In addition, the guidance indicated that GPS tags should not be used with individuals who did not have a fixed abode or who had 'serious identified mental health or learning disabilities'. These factors were regarded as potentially detrimental to a wearer's ability to comply with conditions.

Staff described some confusion over eligibility criteria at the beginning of the pilot. For example, some were unsure of the exact geographical areas within scope and how the tag should be used alongside other conditions of the order. Furthermore, staff from one prison described how they had initially thought that they should release all offenders on HDC with a GPS tag including those who would have been released anyway without one,<sup>24</sup> rather than only using tagging as a direct alternative to keeping an offender in custody.

Staff were keen to consider how eligibility could be further extended<sup>25</sup> and identified other groups that they felt could be usefully monitored using the GPS tag. Suggestions included the following.

- **Cases that would otherwise be managed in the community without a GPS tag,**<sup>26</sup> including lower level anti-social behaviour. In these cases location monitoring would be used to improve offender management but not as an alternative to custody.
- **Young people who would otherwise be held in secure accommodation for public protection.** However, an alternative view among the judiciary was that a GPS tag was less suitable for young people, who may find it difficult to understand how the tag works.
- **Individuals with no fixed or 'appropriate' address.** One view within the CRC was that the requirement of a fixed address was a barrier to using the tag as a proportion of the individuals they managed did not have a fixed address or appropriate accommodation.<sup>27</sup> While it was hoped there might be opportunities in the future to include individuals with no fixed abode, it was noted that a number of practical issues such as access to charging the tag would need to be overcome.

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<sup>24</sup> Standard HDC releases use a Radio Frequency (RF) tag to monitor a curfew.

<sup>25</sup> As described in sections 2 and 3, the eligibility criteria for the pilot had already been extended to include IOM offenders on automatic release.

<sup>26</sup> As described in section 2.2, GPS location monitoring was intended as an alternative to custody for most cohorts, although in a minority of cases this was not the intent (such as IOM cases).

<sup>27</sup> Subjects of 'no fixed abode' were ineligible for GPS tags as per the pilot guidance. However, tagged subjects could reside at Bail Accommodation Support Services (BASS) or Approved Premises and were not prevented from moving accommodation (providing this was supported by their responsible officer).

### 3.3 Timeframes

Pilot areas were given nine months to set up the pilot, which was launched in October 2016 and ran for 18 months to March 2018, when the final tags were removed. Staff said that they found setup timeframes challenging as they were asked to prepare for launching it more quickly than originally anticipated. One police force started delivering the pilot later than intended (in March 2017 rather than October 2016). A range of reasons were given for this, including difficulties engaging key staff and a recent restructure of the police force in this area. As outlined later in this section, timeframes had an impact on how quickly and effectively agencies were able to deliver pilot activities in the early phases of the pilot.

### 3.4 Infrastructure and resources

Setting up the pilot involved a significant amount of work. This included recruiting a commercial contractor to provide the tags and software, setting up an operational monitoring centre and staffing the field teams. A team was also appointed within MoJ and HM Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS) who had responsibility for scoping, designing and managing the pilot and providing support to the pilot areas and agencies.<sup>28</sup> Working alongside this team, the pilot was overseen by a programme director and a police project lead within each cluster. These were dedicated roles for the duration of the pilot, and their responsibilities included: managing the funding provided by MoJ for police forces to deliver the pilot, developing the relevant policy and processes for the pilot, and management of the field teams. The project leads also served as a central point of contact between the police, CJS partners and the MoJ, and were thought to be an important source of information and coordination.

Field teams were recruited for each police force area to fit and remove the tags and, where necessary, deal with any issues arising for wearers, including faulty equipment and strap tampers. In both clusters, field teams were recruited from non-police backgrounds, but in the Midlands, roles were also taken on by police staff. These field team officers therefore had additional powers to breach wearers and could access data from the Police National Computer database. Participants reported that these additional capabilities were useful in managing wearers. However, the speed at which some field staff had been recruited, especially from IOM teams, led to concerns about the readiness of field teams to deliver at the point the pilot went live.

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<sup>28</sup> This included engaging eight police forces in the pilot, developing the underpinning policies and processes and designing and delivering communication and training sessions. Additional detail on their role is provided in Annex E.

## **3.5 Communication, guidance and training**

### **Communication**

The importance of clear and timely information about the nature of the pilot was highlighted as a key part of the setup stage, especially as GPS location monitoring was a new approach to many of the staff involved. However, some participants felt restricted by the extent to which they were able to share information across the CJS. This was described in two ways.

Firstly, concerns were highlighted by some participants about restrictions placed on more public-facing communications, such as with the media. This perception was thought to have prohibited more open forms of communication and was especially felt by partners sitting outside of MoJ such as the police and judiciary, who reported that it had had a negative impact on their awareness of the pilot early on.

Secondly, the onus was placed on strategic leads and staff to cascade information across and within relevant agencies. This meant that some information did not get to the right agencies or individuals in order to facilitate preparation for the pilot. While this method of cascading information was valued (and was perceived to have improved over time), there was a concern among some that the process might have been too piecemeal to deliver timely and consistent messaging.

Communication was also found to be challenging given the disparate nature of some key stakeholders such as magistrates. More open and timely communication targeted at pilot areas would have been welcomed to facilitate early awareness and information sharing across stakeholders. Participants said this may have helped partners feel engaged and consulted from the outset, and would have encouraged greater commitment to the pilot.

### **Guidance and training**

Part of the setup stage involved providing guidance around how the pilot worked and the roles and responsibilities of key delivery partners. A toolkit was produced by the HMPPS pilot team which detailed how the processes were supposed to work (NOMS, 2016). In addition, other formal training, briefings and written guidance were provided by the HMPPS pilot team, the independent tag provider and partner agencies. This included high-level training, such as the HMPPS awareness sessions about the nature of the pilot and GPS location monitoring technology which were delivered across the CJS. Briefing packs were also distributed to delivery partners about GPS processes including decision making, the wording of licence



conditions, and handling issues of non-compliance. The suite of training materials provided by the pilot team is listed in Annex E.

Staff generally welcomed the training and guidance, and thought it was an important part of the setup process, especially given the multi-agency nature of the pilot. However, concerns were raised over its accessibility and timeliness. One view was that staff did not have enough time to read the guidance provided, especially the toolkit. In response to this, additional guidance and resources were made available, which participants found very useful. For example, a shorter, two-page guide was issued after the pilot was launched which set out key information and was tailored to different CJS partners. This highlights an important flexibility in the HMPPS pilot team as they responded to feedback and provided additional material to support understanding of GPS location monitoring over time.

More specific training was also provided to the field teams and monitoring centre staff around systems and processes relevant to their roles. For field teams this included some standard police training modules (for example in data protection and health and safety) and training to fit and remove a tag. Participants highlighted the importance of practical training and being able to put this training into practice within a reasonable timeframe. In response, a video of the fitting process was made available so that this guidance was even clearer for staff.

“It's okay being trained in a 'doing' thing, but then if you don't do it ... the expectation that you're going to suddenly do it on your own at seven o'clock at night in some offender's house ... three months after some training, it's kind of a bit unrealistic.” Staff participant, police

### **Gaps in training and knowledge**

Staff participants acknowledged that, over time, it was likely the guidance and training provided to support GPS location monitoring would improve as the programme became embedded within the CJS. However, suggestions for specific areas where additional guidance and training would have been useful included:

- Additional training for a wider pool of staff on how to fit tags properly and resolve any fitting issues (such as tags being too tight). This would enable practical issues to be dealt with quickly, including in the absence of the field team.
- Guidance on police protocols, specifically about managing personal risk for staff visiting wearers' homes. This would have been welcomed by field team staff from a non-police background who recognised the potential for them to be placed in dangerous situations.

“I feel that we could have a bit more training ... like being prepared for a situation really because the thing is with this kind of role you just don't know what is gonna happen ... We've always been told if an offender's not happy to be tagged and they're violent ... you just leave. So you just hope that an offender would never lock us in or you know, we can't escape or things like that.” Staff participant, police

- Information about the type of GPS data that responsible officers could request from the monitoring centre to support effective offender management. For example, some staff thought that they would be able to monitor and view wearers' locations in real time and access the data via a central IT system, which was not the case.
- Some wider partners working with both victims and wearers (for example in Approved Premises) reported that they were not aware of the pilot until it commenced, and would have welcomed some light-touch training in order to properly understand the purpose of the pilot and how they might support it.

Barriers to attending training on the pilot included: partners having limited resource and time available, not perceiving the pilot as forming a significant part of their job role, and the timing of training sessions. For example, magistrates found it difficult to attend training scheduled over lunchtimes.<sup>29</sup>

### 3.6 Early perceptions of GPS location monitoring

Staff and stakeholders were asked to reflect on their early perceptions of the pilot, and their expectations for managing different wearer cohorts via GPS location monitoring. They were enthusiastic about the approach, which they hoped would expand capabilities to monitor compliance, manage risk and, for offender cohorts, offer rehabilitative support. A number of potential benefits were discussed.

- **Additional monitoring capabilities** via GPS technology which provided assurance that relevant authorities would be alerted to non-compliance quickly.
- GPS location monitoring was generally felt to offer **an alternative to custody** by enabling individuals who might otherwise be in prison, including individuals released on parole, to live more safely and securely in the community. It therefore extends opportunities to a wider pool of potential wearers than may have been considered for other requirements, such as Radio Frequency tagging. The pilot was also viewed as

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<sup>29</sup> In response to feedback from magistrates, the pilot team subsequently arranged additional training sessions which were held at the beginning and end of the day.

an important part of a perceived wider strategy to reduce the prison population and thus potentially save money, while effectively managing risk.

“I think ... the pilot was aiming to find out whether this technology would be favoured by the judiciary to such an extent that it could save the state money to enable it to reduce the prison population.” Staff participant, court

- A further view was that location monitoring could **relieve pressures on other rehabilitative services**. This included housing, widely acknowledged as a protective factor from reconviction (see for example, Brunton-Smith and Hopkins, 2014). For example, more offenders could reside safely at private addresses because of wearing a tag, which in turn could create space in Approved Premises for other offenders released on license.
- **Potential for desistance** as the tag could act as a physical reminder to wearers about the requirements of their order and therefore reduce their risk of reoffending. Furthermore, location information provided by the tag could help wearers counter false allegations and, for some, support rehabilitation in the community (discussed in section 5).
- **Potential safeguarding for victims** through the use of exclusion zones. Participants reported that GPS location monitoring may help victims feel safer and limit the likelihood of further offences being committed.

Alongside the potential benefits described, hypothetical concerns were also raised about impacts the pilot may have on staff workloads and about how conditions would be enforced. In addition, staff questioned whether and how potential risks to victims would be fully considered when making decisions about order, bail or licence conditions. A view within the judiciary was that the risk to victims could be better managed if they were given alarms which would be triggered if a wearer removed their tag or entered their exclusion zone, though this functionality was beyond the scope of the pilot.

# 4. GPS pilot delivery

This section explores delivery of the GPS pilot, including:

- the profile and types of cases considered for GPS
- the role of decision makers in using GPS location monitoring and setting bail, order or licence conditions
- the processes involved in fitting a tag
- supervision and monitoring of wearers
- the role of partnership working in pilot delivery

## 4.1 GPS cases

### Numbers tagged

As outlined in section 3, one of the pilot aims was to test demand for GPS location monitoring. Prior to knowing how widely the GPS approach would be used, accurately predicting the number of tags required for the pilot was difficult. MoJ made a total of 600 tags available, as it was necessary to ensure a tag was fitted to every person allocated one. It was thought that this approach would support the widest possible testing of the GPS tag in different contexts and with different wearer cohorts, and provide important learning on the number of tags required for national rollout. As has been experienced in other pilots and programmes of this nature (especially in the early stages of delivery), uptake was initially low. With the expansion of the pilot and greater awareness however uptake subsequently increased, and at the end of the pilot 586 individuals had been tagged, as shown in Table 4.1.<sup>30</sup>

**Table 4.1 Number of GPS tag wearers<sup>31</sup>**

<b>Wearer cohort</b>	<b>Number of tags</b>
Court imposed bail	220
Community orders	17
Suspended sentence orders	7
Home Detention Curfew	87
Release after recall	113

<sup>30</sup> As described in sections 2 and 3, the IOM cohort became eligible for the GPS pilot partway through the pilot. Although not included in the evaluation and the numbers reported here, the inclusion of the IOM cohort meant that in total 684 individuals were tagged by the end of the pilot. The number of wearers may have been higher if the rate of uptake at the end of the pilot had been maintained throughout. If this had been the case, MoJ predicted that the total number of tags fitted may have been closer to 1,500.

<sup>31</sup> Data collected by the monitoring centre.

<b>Wearer cohort</b>	<b>Number of tags</b>
Licence variation	60
Parole Board	82
<b>Total</b>	<b>586</b>

This table highlights variation in the numbers of wearers in each cohort.<sup>32</sup> Participants thought this variation might be linked to the extent to which different partner agencies responsible for recommending a tag were aware of and had embedded the pilot, as well as the available pool of eligible wearers within the cohorts. Additional explanations are detailed below.

- Numbers across cohorts may have increased due to changes to policies partway through the pilot. These meant for example that GPS location monitoring could be used for a curfew alongside other conditions monitored by GPS,<sup>33</sup> and may have meant the tag could be deployed to support a greater range of scenarios.
- It was felt that the number of Parole Board cases may have increased due to a proactive decision taken by the Parole Board to raise awareness of the pilot and use systems to flag cases that might be eligible for a GPS tag among colleagues.
- The number of COs and SSOs were lower than anticipated. A suggestion for this was that there may have been a limited pool of wearers from this cohort that the tag could be effectively used with. For example, for COs it was felt likely that judges would have decided that individuals did not need a custodial sentence and would therefore need another convincing reason for using a tag.

Findings here are supported by internal work conducted by the HMPPS pilot team to improve understanding of variation in cohort numbers. This identified a preference among sentencers to use a curfew over a GPS tag for community orders, and a reluctance to use both together, which may have meant that GPS location monitoring was not used as much as it could have been for this cohort.

### **Types of cases monitored**

Participants felt that GPS location monitoring was an appropriate option for individuals who would benefit from continuous monitoring of their whereabouts to help deter them from certain areas and/or individuals. Offences deemed appropriate by staff for GPS monitoring included violent offences such as domestic violence (DV), harassment, some sex offences,

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<sup>32</sup> A level of variation was expected between cohorts and pilot areas due to differences in the eligible population.

<sup>33</sup> This functionality was initially only available for HDC and Parole Board cases.

gang crime, football related offences, and theft, in cases where individuals had been convicted multiple times.

In particular, police and CPS participants thought that GPS location monitoring was a suitable approach for domestic violence cases. This was due to the additional safeguarding offered to the victim by ensuring perpetrators were kept away from specific locations, such as home addresses and places of work. The tag's capability to alert responsible officers quickly to a breach of an exclusion zone was considered particularly helpful in managing risk for this group.

“Yes, from a risk point of view it is definitely a benefit for us as an organisation, because it identifies breaches at an early stage. For instance, if someone is visiting an ex-partner [and they have] a history of violence, that they're not supposed to be [visiting], and we find that out before they keep going daily and there's another domestic incident.” Staff participant, probation

However, others questioned whether a GPS tag was appropriate for all higher risk offenders, especially some DV cases where there was potential for serious harm to victims. As GPS tags themselves cannot physically prevent offending, it was thought that in order for this to work effectively, responses to any breach would need to be swift, which is reliant on having necessary resources in place. This is discussed in section 4.2 in relation to decision making.

The potential benefits of using GPS location monitoring with both first time and repeat offenders, including those with a record of poor compliance in the community, was also recognised. One reason given was because the tag offered repeat offenders a new approach to offender management, allowing non-compliance to be identified and appropriate action to be taken.

## **4.2 Factors influencing decision making**

As outlined in section 2, a recommendation for a GPS tag<sup>34</sup> would be passed on to the relevant agency (the HDC board, Parole Board or the court<sup>35</sup>) to make a decision on whether to impose the tag or not. GPS location monitoring provided reassurance to decision makers that individuals who might otherwise be in custody could be effectively managed and

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<sup>34</sup> The recommendation would be made by different staff depending on the cohort. For example, CPS staff could recommend a GPS tag for the court-imposed bail cohort and the NPS for COs.

<sup>35</sup> Courts could also impose a tag of their own will, without a recommendation.

monitored in the community. Decisions taken about whether to impose a GPS tag centred on an individual's level of risk, including whether the use of a tag was proportionate to their level of risk and any offending behaviour (including previous offending and compliance). In one example a GPS tag was given to an offender who had previously breached their restraining order. The tag was felt to be an effective offender management approach as it had provided evidence to draw on when he subsequently breached his order again.

“By having the exclusion area and the tag in place ... he was immediately sent back to custody. It's far more effective than the restraining order, because, obviously, with a restraining order you've got to contact the police, report it, statements have got to be taken, it's got to be proved that they'd breached the restraining order. Whereas the tag cut all that out, so it was really useful.” Staff participant, support organisation

Other considerations included an individual's motivation to change, perceived ability to manage the requirements of a GPS tag and whether they would potentially benefit from the additional support provided by this form of monitoring.

“It's the fact that you can continue to provide support for the people that you care for and...you can still work, you can still be around, you can still be a brother, a friend, you can still be a dad. You can still be all those things whilst on GPS that you can't if you're in custody.” Wearer participant

### Barriers to recommending a GPS tag

In order to recommend a tag, staff needed to have sufficient knowledge about the tag and how it worked. This was facilitated by being able to draw on necessary guidance, and the support of the monitoring centre. However, staff also reported barriers to recommending and using location monitoring. These are detailed below.

- **The pilot's multiple eligibility requirements**, which included that wearers should reside in the pilot area at a fixed address and that the tag should be used as a direct alternative to custody.<sup>36</sup> While there was demand from staff to use the tags widely, the eligibility requirements restricted this to ensure tags were only used when proportionate to the individual's level of risk.

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<sup>36</sup> With the exception of COs.

- **A lack of awareness among some key agencies** about the pilot. As a result, location monitoring had not become sufficiently embedded within the local CJS to be fully utilised. However, participants were confident that uptake would increase over time and if the pilot was rolled out more widely, as people became more familiar with GPS location monitoring.<sup>37</sup>

“The fact that it wasn't proposed to me, it just didn't seem to weave its way into the narrative of the local criminal justice community, and ... therefore, I've got...nothing to back this up, but I suspect ... it was relatively under-utilised.”

Staff participant, court

- **A lack of knowledge about the approach.** Some staff reported confusion over the range of different tags (such as curfew tags) and orders available, and were unsure about the processes involved in setting the tag up. Participants explained that decision makers were likely to continue to use approaches they were more familiar with until they fully understood GPS processes.
- **The perceived impact on staff resource.** For example, within courts it was felt the pilot created additional paperwork, and the process of setting bail conditions was prohibitively time consuming compared to some other approaches.

“The courts are saying, 'We want to deal with this today, I'm not giving you another 15 minutes to sort a map out.' They'll just say, 'It doesn't matter, we'll go for a restraining order instead.’” Staff participant, probation

- **Consideration of risk and suitability.** Monitoring an individual's location was felt to be less important for effective risk management in some cases. For example, participants suggested that electronic curfew monitoring may be preferable for less serious offences where it may not be considered necessary to have oversight of an individual's whereabouts at all times. Concerns were also raised about whether GPS location monitoring was appropriate for higher risk cases such as DV offences, because of the potential harm to victims. It was suggested, for example that a restraining order may be more appropriate in some cases as it was felt to have more serious repercussions in cases of breach.

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<sup>37</sup> The HMPPS pilot team subsequently undertook substantial awareness raising activities across the pilot area, and uptake increased over the life of the pilot.



“If magistrates aren't reassured that it will stop someone from going to the victim's address, and if they do straightaway someone will come and pick them up, it takes the impact out. And actually, makes it very, very worrying for the victim ... if [they are a] high risk offender they shouldn't be part of this scheme.” Staff participant, court

The speed of an appropriate response was therefore thought to be important and relied on data being interpreted accurately and quickly. Linked to this, participants were concerned about whether the police would be able to take the necessary action quickly enough with the resources available to them.

- **Consideration of vulnerable people.** In line with MoJ's guidance (NOMS, 2016), staff thought GPS location monitoring would not be appropriate for some vulnerable people. However, there was concern that certain vulnerabilities may not have always been identified, and therefore that some people with mental health conditions, learning disabilities and chaotic lifestyles may have been referred to the pilot inappropriately. The importance of ensuring wearers understood tag conditions and requirements was therefore highlighted. This included all wearers being able to charge the tags for two hours a day, as not doing so was a potential breach.

“In terms of bail ones, some of the people are just not suitable, they're too chaotic. We've had ... people with mental health issues who never could comply, people with alcohol issues, the usual one with people giving addresses where they're not welcome ... all the challenging ones are the ones where you would question their suitability.” Staff participant, police

- **Reduction in the number of GPS tags issued as the pilot came to an end.** All tags had to be removed by 31 March 2018 when the pilot ended. Participants reported that fewer tags may have been issued towards the end of the pilot as the length of time individuals could be meaningfully placed on a tag reduced.

### 4.3 Monitoring conditions or requirements

Staff across the CJS including parole, probation, prison staff, legal advisors, the CPS, defence solicitors and members of the judiciary fed into decisions around monitoring conditions for wearers. Alongside the wearer's level of risk, offending history and broader circumstances, victims' needs were also taken into account where appropriate. For example,

the offender manager and victim liaison officer might discuss preferences for exclusion zones before a Parole Board hearing.

A range of conditions were used during the pilot, such as exclusion zones, curfews and standalone monitoring, and were thought to be useful tools to manage and monitor compliance. However, there appeared to be a lack of awareness among some participants about the range of options available, meaning the full suite of conditions may not have been fully utilised. For example, a member of the judiciary reported he was not aware that GPS location monitoring could be used to help monitor attendance at rehabilitative interventions such as group work, and could not recall it ever being suggested as an option by probation.

Once monitoring conditions had been agreed, the relevant agencies including the prison, court, NPS, CRC, and police communicated the request to fit a tag and the specific conditions for each wearer to the monitoring centre. Challenges identified with this process included confusion over which partner was responsible for arranging the tag fitting, administrative errors and information transfers being delayed.

### **Communicating monitoring conditions**

Some partners also found it challenging to communicate conditions, especially exclusion zones. A number of difficulties were discussed in relation to the functionality and ability of maps to accurately depict zone boundaries, which caused confusion for the monitoring centre, field staff and wearers. During the pilot there was a shift in some areas towards using clearer digital maps (rather than paper maps). However, this was not available for all partners, and in some areas IT limitations prevented access to mapping software. Another issue related to the limited time that staff had to mark zones (particularly in court), which sometimes led to confusion. Participants felt it was important to give ample time to this process, to ensure zones were clear and that they properly accommodated wearers' needs, such as routes used to travel to work.

Wearers were told about monitoring conditions by a range of staff including solicitors and probation officers. In instances where tags had been issued quickly, some wearers felt upset that they had not been given a choice about whether to accept the tag or not and felt they lacked necessary information about tag requirements and conditions.<sup>38</sup> For example, one

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<sup>38</sup> GPS location monitoring was imposed by decision makers via Court Orders or prison licences and consent was not a requirement. The ability of offenders to exercise choice was in practice limited (they could reject the tags or cut them off), but this would likely result in custody. This is in contrast to previous small-scale GPS schemes that have operated on a voluntary basis (see for example, Hudson and Jones, 2016).

participant described that he was surprised when arrangements were made to have a tag fitted as he did not recall it being part of his licence conditions. Others knew they had agreed to wear a tag, but did not remember receiving much formal or written information before having it fitted, or found information, including maps, hard to understand.

#### 4.4 Fitting a tag

Upon receiving the request from the relevant CJS agency, the monitoring centre was responsible for liaising with the field teams to fit the tags. The difficulty of accurately predicting uptake of location monitoring meant that planning resources for both the monitoring centre and field team was challenging at times.<sup>39</sup> Participants reported that having prior notice of individuals to be tagged could be helpful, so that resource could be put in place for fitting. However, ability to do this depended upon wearer cohort. For prison cohorts, release dates were generally known in advance, whereas court cohorts required a more responsive approach, since notification to fit a tag was given to the monitoring centre and field team on the same day or within 24 hours of when fitting should take place.

While the process of arranging tag fittings was generally felt to go smoothly, concerns were raised by the judiciary and field team staff about the length of time between some decisions to fit a tag and the tag actually being fitted.<sup>40</sup> For example, staff described how on one occasion an individual remained without a tag over the weekend before being given a tag the following week. Participants felt that the longer this took, the greater the risk of reoffending and/or of harm to victims. Field staff described how improved information sharing between themselves and other key partners had helped to address this. Furthermore, police staff began undertaking risk assessments to inform the order of priority in which to fit the tags:

“If we have a number of tags to be fitted ... I'd have a look to see who they were and what risk I felt they posed. So I would go for the higher risk person would get fitted first. Lower risk would get fitted last.” Staff participant, police

Wearers were broadly content with the information provided by field officers. To support this, the pilot team provided a range of literature for field teams to use with wearers including a leaflet that explained what wearing a GPS tag meant and who they should contact if they had

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<sup>39</sup> However it was felt at a strategic level that field teams were resourced to provide sufficient coverage as per the service level agreement (SLA) and the estimated level of demand. Resources for field teams were reduced once demand was better understood.

<sup>40</sup> The SLA was to install and induct GPS monitoring as soon as possible and within 24 hours of notification. The pilot team reported that this was achieved in almost all cases.

any questions.<sup>41</sup> Some field teams described how they had also created their own documentation to further support wearers' understanding of the tag and the requirements being placed on them. However, some wearers found it difficult to engage with written material they received before or during tag fitting. This highlights the importance of other forms of communication with wearers to ensure they properly understand the conditions and requirements of the tag. This is particularly relevant for those with additional learning and literacy needs, which field teams may or may not have been aware of.

### Challenges associated with fitting tags

Staff felt that the process of fitting tags had improved over time as field teams became more experienced and technical issues such as syncing tags to the central monitoring system were resolved. However, field staff also identified four main challenges to fitting tags.

- **Inaccurate information provided to field teams**, such as wearer contact details and information relating to monitoring conditions. This made locating individuals difficult which meant that tags could not be fitted in a timely way. However, it is also possible some wearers were not at home and had missed appointments for tags to be fitted.

“We certainly had one where someone was released ... and the victim had connections really close to the area, and the address that he'd given to the courts was one that had never been checked out, and when we went there he wasn't there.” Staff participant, police

Field staff highlighted the importance of being able to contact wearers in advance, and draw on accurate police and probation intelligence to ensure that they themselves were aware of any key information prior to visiting. This informed risk management and helped early interactions with wearers. Field teams also required accurate information about monitoring conditions so they could convey these to wearers. However participants reported that they sometimes found it challenging to provide information requested by wearers, including how long the tag had to be worn for.

- **Inconsistent safety and risk management procedures** across field teams. Some participants were concerned about the lack of risk management in place for visits to wearers' homes, including outside of standard working hours. This had been

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<sup>41</sup> Annex E lists the full range of documents produced by the pilot team to be used with wearers.

addressed in some areas by field officers pairing up for fittings and following risk assessment procedures prior to visits.

- **Design of the tags including their size.** Staff and wearers felt that the tags were too large, and field teams found fitting the straps correctly could be difficult.
- **Resourcing.** Some participants within the police, including field staff, felt that there had been insufficient staffing of the field teams to conduct their tasks effectively and safely with wearer caseloads. Staff also reported a lack of designated equipment to support the field team role such as vehicles and telephones, although at a strategic level it had been decided that this was not necessary as field teams would be able to draw on existing resources. Strategies had been put in place to help address gaps such as lengthening the period of time available to fit tags post-release, within the agreed service level agreement (SLA). However, there were questions around whether this posed potential risks to effective management of subjects and victim safeguarding.

“Originally, when we had more funding ... then tags were going on the same day. When the funding dropped, then we looked at the SLA which allows us 24 hours to fit a tag. So, if we didn't get the order before three, four o'clock, we wouldn't go until the next day ... I don't know whether that actually ... created any risk.” Staff participant, police

### **Tag removal and collection**

Field teams were responsible for removing tags when sentences or conditions came to an end. Challenges were reported in recovering tags from wearers who had breached their conditions, and one view was that this part of the process required greater clarity. Wearers who had had their tags removed did not report any problems with the process. However, where officers were not available on the due removal day, there were instances of wearers being asked to cut off tags themselves.

## **4.5 Support for wearers**

In order for a wearer to have the best chance of complying with the requirements and conditions of a GPS tag it was important that they understood how the tag worked and how to avoid potential breach. Field team staff and wearers described how the role of the field teams had often gone beyond fitting the tags, and that they were a key point of contact for wearers if they had any questions. In some areas field officers had started to carry out welfare checks on a regular basis, which involved visiting wearers to ensure that the GPS

equipment was working correctly and that the wearer was not experiencing any difficulties. Some field officers also provided ongoing support to wearers by giving their personal mobile number. This was appreciated by wearers as it made the service feel more personalised, although this was not officially recognised practice.

Wearers also described how monitoring centre staff had been helpful, polite and non-judgemental when they contacted them with queries and requests for support. Issues included when a tag 'went off' unexpectedly (for example, when wearers reported that they were not near exclusion zones), charging problems, or requests to accommodate exceptional circumstances such as family illness. However, there were also instances where wearers said that their requests for information had not been dealt with efficiently, such as wanting to know when a tag would be removed or clarification of an exclusion zone. In some cases, for example, when the tag became hot when charging at night, wearers said they did not contact the monitoring centre because they did not anticipate receiving the support they wanted.

Wearer views on the usefulness of ongoing support from probation officers and offender managers were mixed. Some were disappointed that probation staff had not offered much information about the tag or support with wider rehabilitation and resettlement needs. Others however, reported that probation staff had shown interest in their progress and helped them comply with monitoring conditions. One wearer described how his probation officer had helped him deal with narrowly missing curfews by discussing time management with him. This indicates that the perceived usefulness of support received from probation may have been related to the quality of individual relationships between staff and wearers.

## 4.6 Partnership working

Close partnership working was already well embedded across many of the key agencies, and had facilitated both the setup and ongoing delivery of the pilot. This was especially the case within the BeNCH cluster as three of the four forces were part of an existing strategic partnership. In addition, effective working relationships had been developed as a direct result of pilot delivery. However, several challenges related to communication were thought to have undermined the extent to which partners were able to work together to facilitate pilot delivery. Miscommunication was often underpinned by a lack of knowledge about the pilot and different working practices across agencies. Participants identified two key challenges.

- **A lack of information sharing** was primarily attributed to a lack of knowledge about the pilot, but could also be associated with various data processing requirements

which stopped partners from sharing information on wearers. Participants reported that in some cases this inhibited comprehensive monitoring and management of wearers. For example, a member of staff at the monitoring centre described how a wearer's GPS data had located them at a police station but the police were unable to confirm this or share any further data with them, which made it difficult for the monitoring centre to take further action.

- **A lack of shared understanding and buy-in**, which made it difficult for the pilot to be delivered consistently. Staff described occasions where they were surprised that GPS location monitoring had not been recommended, and also occasions where it had been recommended and then challenged by decision makers (such as judges) or staff responsible for managing wearers in the community. Reasons GPS location monitoring was not recommended or had been challenged included because it was not felt to be appropriate (for reasons outlined in 4.2) or because location monitoring was considered disproportionate to the identified risks in some cases. This perceived lack of a consistency could deter staff and stakeholders from suggesting it again, and may have affected uptake.

“It’s quite hard standing up in court and saying, ‘this is what I think’ and then they’re going, ‘well, we’re not going to even consider that’ and then you’re kind of like, ‘oh, I might not say that again’.” Staff participant, probation

These challenges highlight the importance of ensuring that appropriate training and guidance is in place for the rollout of the national GPS location monitoring programme. This will help guarantee the programme is understood and utilised consistently across CJS partners. Furthermore, staff highlighted the importance of effective multi-agency governance and operational boards to support the smooth management of the programme in the long term.<sup>42</sup> One view was that it would be helpful to review membership of any strategic groups moving forward to ensure they included the full range of partners involved.

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<sup>42</sup> Both a working group and governance board were in place during the pilot. The working group comprised key stakeholders who could make decisions and support the rollout of the project, providing advice and support to the pilot team and take actions forward. The Governance Board was a group of senior representative stakeholders who could review delivery, set direction and ensure the pilot was meeting its objectives.

## 5. GPS and offender management

This section explores the role of GPS monitoring in managing wearers across the eligible cohorts. It reports on the perceived benefits and limitations of the approach, and examines wearers' compliance and non-compliance, and how breaches were dealt with.

### 5.1 Role of GPS monitoring in offender management

As described in the toolkit, 'GPS offers additional monitoring capabilities that could make offender management more robust, and support decision makers to both manage risk more effectively, and get the right balance between punishment, crime prevention and rehabilitation' (NOMS, 2017). The monitoring centre was responsible for reviewing alerts generated by the GPS tag and passing any instances of non-compliance and breach to a wearer's responsible officer. The responsible officer was then in charge of ensuring that wearers followed their bail notice, CO, SSO or release licence conditions and that the correct action was taken if not. Monitoring centre staff described how information held about each wearer assisted them in this role. This included an active log where monitoring centre staff recorded any information or interactions relating to a wearer. This was felt to help build an understanding of wearers' behaviour over time and with different members of staff. Staff and wearers reported benefits and challenges of GPS monitoring in this regard.

### 5.2 Perceived benefits for offender management

Building on the expectations some participants held before the pilot was launched, GPS location monitoring was felt to facilitate the effective management of offenders in the community and individuals on court imposed bail in four ways, outlined below.

Firstly, decision makers and offender managers reported that GPS location monitoring **improved responsible officers' ability to manage risk** and deal with breaches more quickly than previously. This was felt to be useful in the wider context of heavy workloads, as it took them less time to monitor individuals effectively and safely.

Secondly, some staff reported that for offender cohorts, wearing a GPS tag **supported their rehabilitation**. For example:

- offender managers and wearers could discuss licence conditions collaboratively and use the tag as an opportunity to discuss expected behaviour on release
- strategic staff described how the standalone monitoring requirement enabled responsible officers to access historical data about a wearer's lifestyle and how they



spent their time, which was not available previously. This could help inform conversations with wearers about their lifestyle and behaviour, and identify potential concerns

- addressing accommodation need is widely considered an important part of rehabilitation (MoJ, 2014), and one view within the CRC was that GPS location monitoring had enabled wearers who were homeless to be released from custody early into hostel accommodation – this was due to additional reassurance around risk management provided by the tag, which was also felt to have facilitated access to privately run hostels (which were reported to regularly refuse accommodation to prison leavers)

Thirdly, the detailed information the monitoring centre was able to provide on non-compliance or breach provided responsible officers with more nuanced intelligence about a wearer's behaviour. This **helped responsible officers make decisions about whether to recall a wearer based on non-compliance or breach**, or whether a warning was sufficient. Examples were given where responsible officers had received alerts that a battery had run low or a wearer had breached their curfew. If there was evidence that wearers had begun to comply with conditions (i.e. they had started to charge their tag or had arrived back home), responsible officers could use discretion before taking action, and enable individuals to remain safely in the community where appropriate.

Finally, the **ability to rule out or link a wearer to a crime** was considered a positive outcome for police forces involved in the pilot who could focus more time on other lines of enquiry. This is described in more detail in section 6.

### 5.3 Perceived barriers to offender management

Alongside the benefits that a GPS tag brought to offender management, a range of challenges in monitoring and managing wearers were also identified. They fell into three categories:

- highlighting gaps in the infrastructure required to run the pilot
- concerns over the processes in place to support effective information sharing about a wearer
- gaps in adequate staffing to support optimum management of tag wearers, as discussed below

Participants highlighted the importance of having **the necessary technology and equipment in place** to deliver the pilot as intended and ensure optimum supervision of wearers. A number of concerns were reported, which related to the below.

- Whether the technology in place could effectively support oversight and monitoring. For example, the lack of an agreed approach and facilities to produce digital maps in all areas could lead to confusion over exclusion zones for staff and wearers.
- Participants also highlighted some early technical challenges which included issues with charging the equipment. For example, one wearer explained that he would get an initial full charge reading when the tag was not actually sufficiently charged. In other cases, charging issues related more to wearers' behaviour, where individuals reported that they found it inconvenient to charge the tag for the required amount of time each day.

“The down point of it all together is the charging. The charging is just, you can't do it, not when you've only got a slot of time where you can do stuff.” Wearer participant

- Lastly, the GPS tag facilitated monitoring of complicated conditions such as only being able to enter areas at certain times. However, agreeing these conditions could be challenging due to the time they took to be set up on the necessary systems.

Potential **gaps in the information available to support effective offender management** and respond to breaches were also identified, for example:

- Some staff felt that they lacked access to important data held at the monitoring centre on wearers' movements throughout the day, which could have improved the enhanced monitoring capacity of the technology.

“It hasn't delivered the amount of information that I was expecting and I don't think if the Parole Board knew that actually we were only getting snippets of information, they wouldn't be as encouraged to release high risk offenders as what they have been.” Staff participant, probation

Where data had been provided by the monitoring centre (in the form of reports), one view among NPS and CRC staff was that it was not detailed enough or in an easily accessible format for it to always be useful or properly understood. This

was important as they had limited time to consult information, and needed to be sure that they had interpreted reports correctly.

- Some staff did not feel they had been informed about non-compliance in a timely way. Staff described how in some instances they had become aware of breaches up to a week after they occurred, which meant that swift action was not always taken. Reasons suggested for this included information about wearers being sent to an incorrect or generic email address, and a lack of follow-up from the monitoring centre to ensure information had been received by responsible officers. In these instances, participants were concerned about the potential risk of harm to victims and ability to follow-up appropriately with wearers.

“I understand how busy people are etcetera but ... if you're told like a week late you kind of think, well, it's kind of been and gone now. So it's hard to kind of go back and think, ‘Oh, last week your tag was flat on Tuesday, was it?’” Staff participant, probation

Finally, staff in some areas reported that there appeared to **be a lack of capacity across the monitoring centre and field team** to deal with monitoring and compliance issues that occurred out of hours. This created additional work for the police where field team staff were not available to respond. There were also concerns about whether the monitoring centre continued to follow the location of a wearer after reporting a serious non-compliance issue and whether victims were informed in all instances.<sup>43</sup> It appeared that a different approach may be taken depending on the wearer cohort and their level of risk, as described in 5.5.

## 5.4 Compliance with the GPS tag

Levels of compliance were generally thought to be good, and participants reported that wearers were motivated to observe the conditions monitored by the tag. When considering compliance across the cohorts, a view within probation was that parole and probation cases had been more compliant, as wearers saw the tag as an opportunity to ‘change their lives’. Some of the bail cases were felt to be less successful. One suggestion for this was that they included younger men who were reported to be ‘less settled’ and less motivated to comply. A key factor thought to help wearers comply with their conditions was the support offered by the field team. This support was valued by wearers as it gave an opportunity to ask questions

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<sup>43</sup> The monitoring body was under no obligation to inform victims and the pilot did not introduce any changes to existing arrangements to do so via supervising agencies.

and raise any issues, around fit and comfort for example. At a strategic police level it was felt that the time field teams spent explaining the tag as an alternative to custody may have had a positive impact on compliance. Field team staff also felt that their visits to wearers acted as a reminder that non-compliance (such as damaging the equipment) could result in a breach of their order or conditions. In addition, and in line with early expectations, it was felt that the tag's vibrate function and lights (which were activated if wearers came close to entering exclusion zones or tags did not have much remaining charge) were useful in reminding wearers not to breach their order or conditions, and were thought to reduce risks of offending.

“With a GPS tag, they can tell whether you've gone into an exclusion zone. If you go too far into it, it vibrates so you know you're going too far, so obviously, it lets you know, but that's the good thing about it.” Wearer participant

## 5.5 Non-compliance and breaching

Instances of non-compliance or breach were sometimes reported as deliberate and at other times as unintentional. Reasons for unintentional non-compliance centred on wearers finding it difficult to comply due to a reported lack of clarity over what their requirements were and how they should be interpreted. Participants also reported deliberate issues of non-compliance. For example, a wearer had temporarily gone back to live with his partner after they felt they had resolved their difficulties, breaching his licence condition.

Common non-compliance and breach types reported by participants included the following.

- **Entering exclusion zones.** Some wearers felt that the exclusion zones they had been given were too large, and said it was difficult for them to get around their local area without occasionally entering them. Breaches of this nature often happened accidentally as participants approached exclusion zones, sometimes on public transport or when getting a lift. The issue seemed particularly salient for court bail cases, where it was thought that zones were sometimes decided upon quickly.

“I think if they're rushed into making the decision in court. Like we've been to court to promote it. They do say, 'Oh yeah, but we've got to create a map [it's time consuming].” Staff participant, police

- **Not charging the tag or the equipment.** Wearers and staff reported problems with charging the tags, either as a result of human error (for example, because

participants had not plugged them in to charge or had not done this properly), emergencies such as having to go to hospital, or faulty equipment. Staff also described how portable chargers were more likely to be lost by wearers and felt that the requirements for daily charging would be challenging for some. Participants reported that problems were resolved quickly where it was clear that faulty equipment had prevented tags from charging properly.

- **Not abiding by the curfew requirements.** Some participants reported being 'caught out' unexpectedly when travel took longer than anticipated, but were usually able to contact their hostel or Approved Premises to inform them of their whereabouts and plans to get home, which was felt to help their case if investigations into non-compliance were taken further.
- **The tag coming off accidentally.** Alerts were sometimes raised due to accidental damage to the tag. Instances like this were perceived to raise anxiety among wearers who were worried they might be taken into custody if further tag tamper alerts occurred.
- **Removing the tag.** Other wearers had returned to prison as a result of removing their tags deliberately. Some reported having done so because they had become frustrated with wearing the tag and complying with what they perceived to be overly prohibitive conditions (such as zones being too restrictive) over a long period of time.

### Dealing with non-compliance and breaches

Monitoring centre processes for dealing with non-compliance varied according to wearer cohort and the severity of the non-compliance.<sup>44</sup> The monitoring centre received alerts of non-compliance for all wearers and investigated each one to decide on the most appropriate way to deal with the issue, informed by a wearer's response plan.<sup>45</sup> They then took a range of actions, including:

- calling the wearer to warn them that they may be at risk of breaching their GPS requirement or conditions
- deploying the field team to investigate further or perform a welfare check if, for example, they received an alert around a strap tamper or a lack of signal
- recording the breach and sending details to responsible officers to enable them to take further action and/or pass on the information to relevant agencies

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<sup>44</sup> MoJ has developed detailed process maps for each cohort that outline the processes to deal with various types of non-compliance. These are available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/electronic-monitoring-global-positioning-system>

<sup>45</sup> Response plans were created for each wearer by the monitoring centre to advise the team on how they should deal with any instances of non-compliance and to involve the police if necessary.

- alerting the police in order for them to decide whether a wearer needed to be arrested

Some staff implied a lack of understanding about what severity of non-compliance constituted a breach, and what level of discretion they were supposed to exercise, which was partly attributed to a lack of standardised guidance. There was also evidence of an inconsistent approach across the forces with some using less discretion than others across cohorts and offence types. Reasons for this included the overall approach to breaches adopted by the force and the level of risk involved in each case. However, some stated that the reasons for differences were unclear. For example, a police participant suggested some disparity in how the monitoring centre handled non-compliance, and it was felt there may be a higher tolerance of breaches for wearers on licence than for those on bail.

Wearers also reported a lack of consistency in decision making around non-compliance which made it hard for them to always understand and follow the conditions of their licence. However, they felt it was important that discretion was applied, especially where issues of non-compliance were deemed to be less serious. For example, one wearer explained that in instances where he had returned home only slightly after his curfew and had been in contact with the monitoring centre to let them know he was expecting to be late, the non-compliance would be handled differently to if he was running very late and had not informed the monitoring centre. In both cases he would have to explain himself to probation, but thought discretion was more likely to be applied in the case of less serious infringements which he had proactively tried to manage.

Issues with the alerts generated around non-compliance were also raised. One view among field team officers was that the monitoring centre had a challenging role in reviewing all alerts which appeared on their case management system to establish which were possible breaches and required urgent action. A field officer described how tags could generate up to 70 alerts a day but that most related to when a tag lost GPS signal, and many of these alerts would be filtered out automatically by monitoring software.

### **Outcomes of non-compliance and breach**

The outcome of a non-compliance or breach was underpinned by the level of risk posed to the victim (if applicable) and wider society. The decision-making process was informed by:

- the nature and severity of the breach
- the wearer's risk level

- the wearer's previous behaviour, including their overall levels of compliance and whether it was repeat behaviour

In general, issues of non-compliance deemed to be more serious, (such as entering an exclusion zone where there was a known victim) were likely to elicit a quicker response involving the responsible officer or the police. On the other hand, if the potential non-compliance was considered to be accidental, was rectified quickly or was the first time it had happened (and not deemed serious), a warning would be given and it would be explained to the wearer that more serious action would be taken if this were to happen again.<sup>46</sup>

Following discussion with the responsible officer, consequences of non-compliance or breaches included:

- an initial **warning** to check in with the wearer about their understanding of their conditions to allow them the opportunity to explain why the non-compliance happened – wearers who had accidentally or momentarily entered an exclusion zone were often given warnings alongside advice on how to avoid it happening again
- **penalties** for breaches that were deemed to be more serious, including entering exclusion zones for longer periods of time. Penalties included extending curfew hours and having special permissions revoked, such as visiting family in exceptional circumstances
- others were **taken into custody** when arrested for a serious breach, such as forcibly removing the GPS tag, repeatedly not charging the tag, or making intentional contact with victims: locating individuals for the purpose of arrest could be assisted by the GPS tag if it was still functioning, but this could be challenging, especially when the tag was no longer being worn.
- in some instances **courts had decided to remove the GPS tag** following a non-compliance or breach, without sending the wearer to custody. This implies that the tags may not always have been used as intended (i.e. as a direct alternative to custody for cases other than community orders) and may have inadvertently been placing unnecessary restrictions on people

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<sup>46</sup> The Service Level Agreement stated that the monitoring centre would investigate any instance of non-compliance and record/generate a relevant report as soon as was practicable, and in any case within 30 minutes of the alert. Following that it was the responsibility of the RO to determine the response.

## 5.6 Alternatives had GPS location monitoring not been in place

Views varied on what the alternatives would have been for wearers if the pilot had not been in place. One view was that custody would have been the only option. Here decision makers explained that the GPS tag had been the key reason for release, due to the reassurance that it could help manage the wearer's risk.

“If GPS wasn't an option then we definitely wouldn't have released as many offenders as we have done. Having GPS gives you that confidence to release more than you would have done previously.” Staff participant, prison

The GPS tag was perceived to have given decision makers confidence in supporting individuals who may not have complied with licence conditions or prison rules in the past.

“If I haven't been able to give a clear yes or a clear no and I have a few concerns, maybe the person's behaviour in custody hasn't been the best, perhaps mirroring the offences that he came in for ... and because I always have the safety of the public in the back of my mind when I'm making the decision ... it may be that I have a concern, you know, about entering an area or something like that. The GPS will make me think, ‘Well, actually, I've got that tool so I'll be okay to say yes on this occasion.’”  
(Staff participant, prison)

Participants also reported that confidence in the ability of the GPS tag to identify an exclusion zone breach quickly had enabled them to feel confident to either release or grant bail to individuals who may live in areas with close proximity to victims.

In contrast, a group of staff held the view that some wearers may have been effectively managed in the community without the GPS tag. Specifically for court imposed bail cases, one view was that that some wearers would have been bailed even if the GPS tag was not an option. It was felt this group were low risk and because it was unnecessary to remand them in custody, they were being needlessly tagged. This is problematic because it may have led to inefficiencies due to unnecessary monitoring of wearers, and also given wearers unnecessary bail conditions to adhere to.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> It also suggests that GPS location monitoring may have been applied inappropriately. In accordance with the provisions of the Bail Act 1974, electronic monitoring can only be imposed if the threshold for custody has been met, but for the electronic monitoring requirement, the subject would be remanded.



“When they were initially set up, the actual principle of these tags was, if a magistrate decided they were going to remand somebody, at that point they would say, 'Okay, I've decided I'm going to remand you. Is the option of one these tags available as an alternative?' Whereas what's actually happening ... is they're actually deciding to bail people and then using the tags as an addition to their bail.” Staff participant, police

Where there had been lower than expected use of GPS, decision makers such as magistrates, judges and prison staff reported that they would like further detail on how non-compliance or breaches are managed before wider rollout begins. Operational staff involved in the evaluation also felt that decision makers would need further information about potential police response times when setting exclusion zones, particularly for cases that are known to involve a victim. Both these factors would help to provide further reassurances that the GPS tag was managing risk effectively in the community.

## 6. Wider impacts of GPS location monitoring

This section explores participants' perceptions of the wider impacts the pilot had on wearers and staff that do not relate to defendant or offender management. These include, for example, impacts on wearers' lives, and on staff practices and workloads.

### 6.1 Perceived impact on wearers

The perceived impact of GPS location monitoring was mixed. One view was that the freedom enabled by the location monitoring outweighed any negative impacts experienced. Wearers with this view reported they were happy to be able to live in the community instead of custody, and understood that accepting the monitoring conditions of the GPS tag reflected favourably on them. In contrast, there were wearers who reported that they would rather have finished their sentence in prison than be released early and wear a GPS tag. This was either because they felt it was an invasion of their privacy or because the size and shape of the tag made it difficult to wear long term.

#### Perceived positive impacts on wearers

GPS location monitoring was perceived to have had a positive impact on wearers in three ways: by encouraging compliance, helping prove innocence, and allowing wearers to preserve family links and either find or maintain employment, as described below.

Some wearers felt strongly that **monitoring via the tag supported compliance**. The fact that they were being constantly monitored and any breach of conditions would be identified immediately acted as a reminder and incentive to comply.

“I've walked in an exclusion zone before, not realising. I was with a friend after a few drinks, and you go into your exclusion zone. That was before I had the tag on, so I wasn't really bothered about getting seen. Now, with the tag, I knew full well that if I go in that exclusion zone, I'm [going to] get seen no matter what because the Big Brother is watching you, do you know what I mean?” Wearer participant

Staff also thought that GPS location monitoring could support compliance, especially where there were opportunities for wearers to engage in criminal activity with others. Staff reported that wearers' associates were less likely to want to spend time with individuals wearing a GPS tag, due to a fear that they would be indirectly monitored. Staff and wearers also explained that the GPS tag gave wearers the opportunity to decline involvement in further

offences, due to wearers being conscious that the tag's monitoring capabilities could place them at a crime scene.

Other wearers explained that they would have been able to comply with their licence or bail conditions without wearing a GPS tag. For this group, the desire to not offend, be sent or returned to custody or associate with people or places from their past were more important drivers in supporting their desistence.

“Nah, not for me, [because] ... if you [want to] stay out of trouble, you're [going to] stay out of trouble regardless of a tag. Like, a tag for me personally ... [is not] determining whether I'm [going to] stay out of trouble or not.” Wearer participant

Secondly, wearers and staff identified that one of the key benefits of GPS location monitoring was its **ability to prove innocence**. Staff felt this was particularly important for prolific offenders who were well known to the police and could be investigated if similar offences to those the wearer had committed (or been accused of) had taken place in the local area. From a staff perspective, this impact was also considered to have a positive effect on police time and resources, as they could discount wearers from investigation using GPS data, giving them more time to pursue other lines of enquiry. In turn this meant that wearers could begin to focus on rehabilitation without the risk that they would be arrested again.

Another perceived benefit of the GPS tag was that it **enabled wearers to maintain or re-establish positive and productive lives in the community**, including with family. It had enabled them to manage roles as parents or carers (where relevant) and helped show family and friends that they wanted to make positive change. Wearers who were offenders could demonstrate that they were actively engaged in their rehabilitation and that they wanted to comply with the conditions related to the tag (such as charging the tag on a regular basis) as well as wider conditions related to their (suspected) offence.

Finally, the GPS tag allowed some wearers (particularly the court imposed bail cohort) to **remain economically active**. This was perceived to be important because if individuals had been remanded in custody for a period of time, it may have caused them to lose their jobs. For other cohorts, staff gave examples of how the tag had facilitated early release and wearers had moved into employment. There were however, instances where wearing the GPS tag created a barrier to employment, and these are discussed in more detail below.

## Perceived negative impacts on wearers

According to wearers there were two negative impacts of wearing the GPS tag. These related to health and wellbeing, and employment.

A group of wearers described how wearing the GPS tag had led to **feelings of increased anxiety**, particularly about breaching their licence conditions. In some cases, this had had an impact on day to day activities, such as visiting the library, swimming or going to the gym. Others reported feelings of paranoia due to being monitored. These wearers were concerned about being 'constantly watched' by the authorities, which they found intrusive. The large size and weight of the GPS tag also caused some wearers to have difficulty sleeping, which was described as exacerbating feelings of stress and anxiety.

Concerns around being judged or stigmatised for wearing the GPS tag further contributed to these feelings. Depending on their circumstances, wearers were concerned about having to explain why they were wearing the tag. In some instances, wearing the tag left them feeling like they had no option but to disclose information about their offence to those around them.

Following on from this, there were examples of the GPS tag **creating barriers to work**. For instance, one wearer described that it deterred them from looking for work in the first place as they felt they would be unfairly judged. Another explained that the physical size of the tag stopped them from wearing boots that were required for working on construction sites.

## 6.2 Perceived impact on staff and their roles

Views varied about whether the pilot had had an impact on the roles and resources of those delivering it. Some participants felt that the pilot had had no implications for their workload. For instance, NPS and prison staff reported that the GPS approach fitted alongside and complemented other offender management processes, such as supervision sessions. However, others felt that the pilot had had positive and negative implications.

### Positive implications for staff roles and resources

Responsible officers reported that the pilot had reduced the amount of time and resources spent managing offenders in the community. A key reported benefit of the pilot was the added ability to monitor curfews,<sup>48</sup> reducing the need for these to be managed in person by the relevant agency. This had implications for:

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<sup>48</sup> This is not a benefit of location monitoring per se: GPS enabled tags switched to Radio Frequency (RF) mode to enable curfew monitoring when subjects were in range of their home beacon.

- field team officers, who were responsible officers for court imposed bail cases, and reported that physical curfew checks were no longer necessary<sup>49</sup>
- NPS staff who explained that staff in Approved Premises no longer had to manage curfews and respond to breaches, as this was monitored via the tag

While this reduction in workload was perceived as a positive outcome, some participants anticipated that there might be negative impacts on police resources and workloads if the volume of cases were to increase.

### Negative implications for staff roles and resources

The pilot was felt to have had a negative impact on staff roles and resources in three ways.

- **Longer decision-making processes at court added to the workload of court staff.** Court staff explained that using GPS location monitoring for court-imposed bail cases lengthened decision making, as discussions over exclusion zones and conditions took much longer than the usual time allocated for a bail case. It was hoped that the decision-making process would be streamlined for wider rollout. This could, for example, be achieved by the defence considering and preparing for GPS location monitoring at an earlier stage.
- **GPS tag decisions took longer to administer.** Management systems did not include a standard licence template for the GPS tag. This meant that administrative staff were required to manually copy licence conditions into the management system used to process releases, which created additional work.
- **Limited operational resources, which led to some roles not being sufficiently covered.** Strategic and operational staff reported that they did not feel there were always sufficient resources available to cover the field team officer role. This had implications for the cover of 'out of hours' shifts, and meant in some cases field team officers worked these shifts alone, rather than in pairs as some thought was originally intended.<sup>50</sup> Field team officers expressed some concerns regarding their safety when visiting particular homes to fit the tag alone.

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<sup>49</sup> Again, this is not necessarily a benefit of location monitoring. Radio frequency monitoring is effectively used to monitor curfew requirements.

<sup>50</sup> The field teams in the pilot operated in line with the processes used for the national electronic monitoring service. This involved a single member of field team staff to fit and remove the tag. It was decided that the pilot posed no additional risk which would necessitate routinely increasing the number of staff for fitting appointments. However each case was risk assessed and additional resource made available if required. Field teams were not expected to manage violent situations.

## **7. Key learning for the wider rollout of GPS location monitoring**

Findings from this evaluation have important implications for policymakers as well as strategic and operational staff across the CJS working to deliver fair justice that supports people to live more safely in the community with the appropriate level of supervision. This section explores the implications and key learning arising from the research to support the ongoing rollout of GPS location monitoring.<sup>51</sup>

### **7.1 Key benefits and challenges of GPS location monitoring**

Overall, participants were positive about the potential for GPS location monitoring and thought that it provided the CJS with another way to manage and monitor risk within the community. It was felt to be an important additional tool for decision makers (such as the judiciary and Parole Board) in supporting effective rehabilitation for certain cohorts. Key benefits for wearers included increased opportunities to spend time with family, find or maintain employment, and the tag acting as a deterrent from committing crime.

A number of challenges associated with delivering the pilot were also highlighted. These related to a range of processes involved with decision making, fitting the tags, ongoing monitoring, and supervision. Over the course of the pilot, participants discussed ways in which they had overcome some of these issues. For example, bespoke guidance documents were created for partners across the CJS to give tailored information on roles and responsibilities and to enable the team to deliver the pilot consistently. It was expected that, over time, knowledge and processes surrounding GPS location monitoring would improve as delivery became embedded within the wider CJS.

### **7.2 Learning points**

The following seven learning points incorporate direct feedback from participants about issues they thought should be considered at wider rollout, based on their experiences. A general view was that scaling up the programme might have implications for resources and workloads across different parts of the CJS including, for example, police forces. Participants were therefore keen to ensure that learning continued to be consistently collected and fed into the development of the programme.

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<sup>51</sup> The applicability of pilot learning and findings may be affected by different operating models when GPS location monitoring is rolled out more widely across England and Wales.

## **1. Timely communication across and within partner agencies**

There was a sense that important information about GPS location monitoring could have been provided more quickly and clearly, especially when the pilot was first launched. There was also some evidence to suggest that dissemination among key partners was not as effective as participants had hoped. For example, one view was that defence lawyers did not know about the pilot and therefore did not suggest it as an option at bail hearings.

Participants believed that this lack of detailed knowledge dissuaded some decision makers from confidently using GPS location monitoring even if they had heard about it.

Going forward it was suggested that an agreed communication and training strategy is developed and rolled out widely across the CJS, which takes into account the needs of all agencies and beneficiaries. It should provide clear information and update partners on any changes to policy and practice in a timely way to help stakeholders know what they should be doing and when, which could improve confidence in using GPS location monitoring. This overarching strategy should be aligned with the delivery of guidance and training as the programme is rolled out. Guidance and training should include a clear overview of who is eligible to wear a tag, example licence conditions to expedite the decision-making process, and process maps which indicate clearly the role of each CJS partner.

## **2. Clear communication with wearers**

Participants also thought that communication channels between key stakeholders and wearers could be improved. One specific issue related to the maps given to wearers which were considered confusing and could lead to wearers inadvertently breaching for entering an exclusion zone. Clearer communication on the conditions and requirements being monitored by the tag could help wearers understand how the tag worked and what is expected of them, potentially increasing the likelihood of compliance and other successful outcomes.

## **3. Commitment to consistency of approach**

There was evidence to suggest that certain aspects of the pilot were not always delivered consistently. For example, it was not always clear which agency had responsibility for checking key details such as wearers' addresses, and there was a lack of clarity about how the information required for a fitting to take place should be recorded by various partners.

This perceived lack of standardised guidance on some processes meant that on occasions, important information was not recorded and participants were concerned about associated risks.

Before the programme is rolled out, stakeholders involved in delivering GPS location monitoring should agree how processes could best be followed, building on the wealth of knowledge that exists, and ensure that appropriate training programmes are in place. Training should build on the flexible approach adopted for the pilot (for example, responding to additional training needs as they arise), and be regularly reviewed to ensure it is up-to-date and fit for purpose.

It was hoped that having consistent guidance and training would help to identify those most appropriate for GPS location monitoring, and divert others to provisions or orders more suited to their needs. It was also considered important to maintain a degree of discretion to allow decision makers (such as probation officers) to manage wearers' behaviour in a way they saw fit, especially around breaches. In line with other research (including Fox, 2012 and Fox et al., 2014), maintaining this element of a measured, personalised response was considered vital in supporting positive outcomes around reoffending.

#### **4. Equipment that enables wearers with a history of offending to engage more easily and positively in their rehabilitation**

The design and quality of the equipment was thought to prohibit some wearers from leading productive lives in the community. It was hoped that consideration would be given to selecting tags that were more comfortable and smaller than those used in the pilot. Over time, participants hoped that improvements would support wearers, especially those with more chaotic lives, to engage more easily and positively in their rehabilitation.

#### **5. Protocols for fitting tags that appropriately assess risk for each individual**

A key pilot SLA was to fit all tags within 24 hours. While it appeared that this condition was almost always met during the pilot, there were staff who questioned the length of time between the decision making and tag fitting stages, especially in higher risk cases. Decisions about minimum time limits to fit tags should be decided on a case-by-case basis and form part of each wearer's response plan. This will help increase safety for victims and sustain wearers' engagement with their rehabilitation, where appropriate.

#### **6. Clarity over access to data**

As this report has highlighted, there was confusion over which partners should have access to monitoring data and for what purpose. Some participant groups, within the police and probation for example, were surprised that they were not able to access data as easily as they would have liked, or felt that this was a 'missed opportunity'. It was thought that timely location data provided by the GPS tag could help build a more comprehensive picture of



wearers' day-to-day lives, giving, for example, an indication of their willingness to engage in positive rehabilitative activities where relevant. Likewise, it could alert officers to any issues they might need to discuss with wearers – for example if data showed wearers were frequenting areas where acquaintances involved in previous criminal behaviour lived.

To ensure access is granted to the right agencies and responsible officers, a review of the data generated by the GPS tag should be undertaken. Participants felt that it was important that any access paid due attention to existing and forthcoming legislation on data processing, and that it should be given with consideration of proportionality and where information would add value. Furthermore, data should be transferred securely and provided in an accessible format to enable quick and effective use.

## **7. Ensuring sufficient resources and time to develop appropriate infrastructure for rollout**

A final consideration highlighted by participants was that adequate time and resources were needed to establish the right infrastructure to facilitate effective and efficient rollout of GPS location monitoring. It was acknowledged that the rollout timetable should take account of all the processes required to set the project up across new areas and partnerships. This included, for example, incorporating the option of GPS location monitoring into existing offender management systems, and looking at how to use technology effectively to generate clear exclusion zone maps. Police participants raised the need to establish new data sharing agreements with the MoJ. All 43 forces would have to go through this process, and it was anticipated that this would take a significant amount of time.

Furthermore, there was concern that rollout could have disproportionate and ongoing burdens on some partners which might either delay setup or mean that the programme is not delivered as intended. For example, some participants were worried about how they would safely manage increased caseloads and handle breaches if higher volumes of offenders and defendants were managed in the community rather than in prison. Participants were concerned that this may lead to increased risk in the supervision of offenders.

It was therefore considered important to ensure that partners across the CJS have the means to consult and collaborate on key issues throughout the rollout of the GPS location monitoring programme. Participants also thought it would be useful to have a way of collating ongoing learning as the programme is established across new areas. This would help to ensure that delivery is well informed by best practice and that resources are allocated in the most effective way to sustain GPS location monitoring in the long term.

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## **Annex A: Cost evaluation findings**

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## 8. Summary

On the basis of semi-structured interviews, triangulated with appropriate accounting data, and economic modelling:

- We estimate the total financial cost of the pilot was £4.2 million.
- This total was made up in large part by headline costs of the pilot, including: tagging contracts, monitoring and field team, staff recruitment, training and additional staff and equipment costs. We estimate the level of these costs was £4 million.
- In addition to this headline figure, there were also costs which arose from the running of the intervention, but which were not directly available.
  - For example, there was a greater risk of breach or non-compliance in being given a period of GPS location monitoring compared to custody, the assumed counterfactual – over the course of the pilot, we estimate the extra cost of non-compliance was £220,000
  - there were also additional activities undertaken which were attributable to the running of the pilot, but which were paid for out of existing budgets – over the course of the pilot, we estimate the level of these costs was £68,000
- The upper bound estimate of cost per GPS wearer on the pilot was £7,161.
- The upper bound estimate of cost per wearer per day during the period of the pilot was £56.
- Assuming GPS tagging is used as an alternative to an equivalent time in custody, the programme has the potential to be less costly than prison.

## 9. Approach

### 9.1 Aims and objectives of the evaluation

#### Aims

The overall aim of the evaluation was to gather information on the cost of the GPS location monitoring pilot **additional** to those costs which would have been accrued had the pilot not been running. **Additionality** is the guiding principle of cost capture, requiring a comparison of the costs of the pilot to the equivalent under the assumed counterfactual.

The intention for the pilot was that GPS location monitoring would function as an alternative to custody. Preliminary interviews provided evidence that supported this, and so the assumed counterfactual was time in custody.

#### Objectives

The objective of the cost evaluation was to provide an assessment of the full cost of the pilot, taking into account direct, indirect and absorbed costs, and by augmenting existing sources of cost data with information based on the experience of those implementing the pilot. This was necessary because a proportion of the costs were absorbed into existing budgets, for example, police budgets, and so accurate costs could not be obtained from a simple analysis of relevant accounts.

A secondary objective was to comment on the value for money of GPS location monitoring more generally. However, as outlined below, this was far from straightforward due to variations in throughput. We return to this consideration in the section on sensitivity analysis below.

### 9.2 Cost capture methods

The cost capture process involved three methods:

- semi-structured interviews (SSIs), with key stakeholders, followed by further liaison as required
- triangulation of interview data with existing data sources such as accounts data
- comparison of quantitative data sources and qualitative interview material to determine adequacy of coverage of cost points

## **Semi-structured interviews**

The objective of the interviews was to determine, not only the costs of the intervention, but also to refine our understanding of the operation of the pilot and identify in particular, costs borne by stakeholders which might not necessarily have been reflected in the formal budget. The schedule for interviews was drawn up in consultation with the MoJ and pilot area leads. Agencies involved in the pilot were identified through process maps. Stakeholders representing these agencies were identified through consultation with the MoJ, area leads, preliminary interviews, and consideration of the data generated by the qualitative interviews. Ultimately, eight key stakeholders were identified who were key personnel in their respective agencies:

- National Probation Service (NPS) and Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRC)
- Courts and Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)
- Parole Boards and Public Protection Casework Section (PPCS)
- The Monitoring Centre and field teams
- police forces

Agency costs were estimated following a 90 minute to two-hour semi-structured interview with each stakeholder. Unless we were aware of information to the contrary, costs captured through interviews were assumed to be reasonable estimates of equivalent costs in the other pilot areas. For example, the pilot-related cost data provided by the BeNCH CRC was assumed to be a reasonable estimate of equivalent expenses incurred in the Midlands region.

Interviews were followed up by further e-mail communication, facilitating verification and triangulation of data against accounts. In some cases, for example the costs of non-compliance, estimates were not directly available and required economic modelling to estimate.

## **Review of accounts data**

A proportion of the cost of the pilot was effectively fixed, being comprised of, for example, contracts for operating and monitoring the tags. Where possible, pilot accounting data on relevant costs was triangulated with the results of stakeholder interviews.

## **Estimation of indirect costs**

A proportion of the costs of the pilot were not directly accessible, either through interviews or accounting data. These fell into two main areas: pilot costs absorbed by existing budgets,

and the costs of non-compliance. On the basis of stakeholder interviews, and informed by relevant data provided by the MoJ (for example, non-compliance rates) these costs were estimated. Preliminary estimates were refined through later stakeholder interviews where appropriate.

This cost estimation considers the cost of the intervention to the criminal justice system but does not attempt to estimate wider potential costs that might occur, including those related to the cost of harm to victims. Wider impacts of GPS location monitoring are qualitatively explored in section six of this report.

### **Costs captured**

The range of costs captured included:

- capital costs (IT equipment, including tracking and monitoring)
- running costs (rent, utilities, maintenance, insurance, subcontracts and so on)
- staff related costs (relocation, recruitment, training, salary and time spent)
- absorbed costs, where the costs of the pilot have been absorbed by cross-subsidy from existing budgets, from existing surplus capacity or from staff goodwill
- other costs of GPS location monitoring, for example, the cost of dealing with non-compliance



## 10. GPS pilot cost estimates

### 10.1 Headline findings

In Table A.1 below, we provide estimates of the setup and running costs of the pilot. We also provide an estimate of cost per wearer on the pilot.

We break the costs down into three types:

- pilot setup costs – costs which we would expect to see incurred once irrespective of the level of throughput
- pilot fixed costs – costs we regard as fixed up to total throughput of 1,500 cases on the pilot, which would increase if throughput rose above this level
- pilot variable costs – costs which vary proportionally with throughput

In some cases, such as the cost of non-compliance, full data was not available. In such cases costs were estimated on the basis of known data and reasonable assumptions. The assumptions and calculations behind these estimations are set out in subsequent sections.

**Table A.1 Headline findings, GPS pilot cost capture**

Additional costs resulting from GPS pilot		Data Source	£(000)	% of total
<b>Set-up costs</b>			<b>56</b>	
Staff costs – recruitment	Interviews, accounts, estimation		8	0.2%
Staff costs – training	Interviews, accounts, estimation		48	1.1%
<b>Fixed costs (up to a throughput of 1500)</b>			<b>2673</b>	
Accommodation	Interviews		N/A	
Staff costs – monitoring	Interviews, accounts.		893	21.3%
Tag provision	Interviews, accounts.		1642	39.1%
Programme support	Interviews, accounts.		137	3.3%
<b>Variable costs</b>			<b>1467</b>	
Equipment costs	Interviews, accounts, estimation.		99	2.4%
Lost and damaged tags (estimated)	Interviews, accounts		31	0.7%
Staff costs – field teams	Interviews, accounts.		1100	26.2%
Additional staff costs – stakeholders	Interviews, estimation		16	0.4%
Non-compliance	Interviews, estimation		220	5.2%
<b>Total estimated costs</b>			<b>4196</b>	<b>100%</b>

Throughput on the pilot was 586, with an average period of location monitoring of 112 days. The estimated cost per wearer on the pilot was approximately £7,000.

## 10.2 Costs by stakeholder

In the following table, we present the costs of the pilot broken down by stakeholder. It should be noted that in some cases there was expenditure, such as the contract to provide tags, which covered the pilot as a whole. In the case of such expenditure, costs cannot be allocated to particular areas.

**Table A.2 Additionality costs broken down by stakeholder**

<b>Estimated additional costs</b>	<b>BeNCH</b>	<b>Midlands</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>% of total</b>
	<b>(£000)</b>	<b>(£000)</b>	<b>(£000)</b>	
<b>Police</b>			<b>4047</b>	
Programme support			137	3.3%
Staff costs – monitoring centre			893	21.3%
Tag provision contract			1642	39.1%
Lost and damaged tags			31	0.7%
Field support	176	1033	1209	28.8%
Estimated non-compliance	27	107	134	3.2%
<b>NPS</b>			<b>25</b>	
Staff costs – training			8	0.2%
Estimated non-compliance			17	0.4%
<b>CRC</b>			<b>29</b>	
Staff costs – training			2	0.1%
Additional staff costs			9	0.2%
Estimated non-compliance	7	11	17	0.4%
<b>Courts</b>			<b>61</b>	
Staff costs – training			36	0.9%
Equipment costs			1	0.0%
Estimated non-compliance		25	25	0.6%
<b>Parole</b>			<b>35</b>	
Staff costs – training			1	0.0%
Additional staff costs			8	0.2%
Estimated non-compliance	7	20	27	0.6%
<b>Total estimated additional costs</b>			<b>4196</b>	<b>100%</b>

## 10.3 Estimations and assumptions

As noted above, in some cases there was a need to estimate costs attributable to the GPS pilot, which could not be captured directly from budget data or semi-structured interviews. To estimate these, we used the process maps published in the GPS toolkit (NOMS, 2016),

supplemented by data from interviews, costs of crime data and appropriate MoJ data sources to construct and populate economic costing models.

**Field support absorbed costs**

In some of the pilot areas, the field team were members of the police force and the costs of recruitment, training and additional equipment were met from pre-existing budgets. In other areas, the field support team was not rostered on 24 hours per day and the police were utilised to fill in for the remainder of the time. Further, none of the stakeholders interviewed reported having increased accommodation cost as a result of the pilot. So, a proportion of the pilot costs were absorbed, and not represented in the budget allocated to the GPS pilot. These costs must therefore be estimated in order to arrive at a realistic overall cost figure.

Absorbed costs fall into four categories: staff recruitment, staff training, equipment costs, and vehicle and travel costs. To estimate the level of these absorbed costs for the pilot as a whole, we utilised accounts data relating to the West Midlands, where such costs were specified separately. We compared these to the costs of the BeNCH cluster which accounted for recruitment and equipment costs separately, but not training or vehicle and travel costs. Combining these accounting costs, where known, with throughput rates allowed an estimation of costs per wearer in the regions where such costs were not separately specified.

**Table A.3 Estimated Absorbed Costs**

	<b>Actual costs (£000)</b>		<b>Estimated costs (£000)</b>	
	W Midlands	BeNCH	Absorbed	Total Pilot
Staff Costs – Recruitment	1.5	3.9	2.6	8.1
Staff Costs – Training	0.5		1.3	1.7
Equipment Costs	6.0	8.1	10.4	24.4
Vehicle and travel costs	20.3		54.1	74.4
Tag wearers	160	148		586
<b>Estimated absorbed costs (£000)</b>			68.3	

The total level of costs absorbed by the police forces in running the field teams was estimated to have been approximately £68,000. This estimate is a lower bound figure as it does not take into account the accommodation costs of the team. This is because stakeholder interviews indicated sufficient office space was already available for field teams. It is possible there would have been additional costs had this function been contracted out. However, it should be noted that total absorbed costs were a small proportion of the total costs of the pilot (less than 2% of total estimated costs).

## Non-compliance

Where a wearer breached the terms of their requirement, there were additional costs which accrued to stakeholders. For example, if a tag wearer was subsequently sent to prison, this resulted in costs for the police, courts, offender managers etc. These costs were not reflected in the pilot budget, and economic modelling, based on process maps, was used to estimate their scale. This required several strong assumptions which are noted in the following sections. Section 10.4 presents sensitivity analysis to examine the robustness of headline figures on the cost of non-compliance. It is worth noting that the cost of non-compliance makes up only a very small proportion of the overall estimated cost.

By the end of the pilot, the number of breaches was 3,111, giving rise to the actions detailed in Table A.4.

**Table A.4 Action for breaches**

Action for Breaches	Cases	% of total
<u>No further action</u>		
No record/missing data	1	0%
No further action	501	16%
Phone call/verbal advice	2004	64%
Warning letter	258	8%
<u>Further action</u>		
Revoked with custody	190	6%
Revoked without custody	20	1%
Monitoring continues with added req.	8	0%
Monitoring continues as before	129	4%
Total	3111	100%

Due to practical and resource constraints, this analysis did not include information regarding the breakdown of breaches into different wearer cohorts. The following analysis was based on the assumption that the rate and type of breach was distributed uniformly across the wearer cohorts. This assumption will not markedly influence the headline cost estimate.

### No further action

Even where a breach of conditions resulted in no further action being taken, costs were accrued. All breaches were referred by the monitoring centre to the responsible officer. On the basis of interviews, we allowed 30 minutes of call handlers' time at an average cost of £12.81 per hour. For court-imposed bail, the referral was to the police. For all other cases it

was to the NPS and CRC. The probability of breach was allocated pro-rata across the different cohorts (see also the sensitivity analysis in section 10.4 of this Annex).

There were an estimated 2,764 'no further action' breaches, an estimated 38% dealt with by the police. It was not known what proportion of the remaining 62% were dealt with by each of the NPS and CRCs, although this factor did not change estimated total costs. For indicative purposes we allocated the appropriate cost evenly between NPS and CRC, assuming that each service dealt with 31% of the total.

If dealt with by NPS or CRC, we assumed a thirty-minute time cost at an average estimated rate of £20 per hour. If dealt with by police we assumed thirty-minute time at an average estimated rate of £33 per hour. These hourly cost and time figures were based on stakeholder interviews. The estimated total cost was thus around £52,000.

### **Further action**

Where further action was taken, stakeholders accrued additional costs. These costs are examined below.

### **Revoked with custody**

When tag wearers were returned to custody as a result of breach, additional costs were borne by police, courts and offender managers. There were also costs arising from additional time spent in custody. In practice, the period of time in custody after a breach may differ from that which the tag wearer would have experienced had the pilot not been running. However, there was insufficient information upon which to base estimates of time spent in custody resulting from revocation. In the following, therefore, we assumed that the cost of custody following a breach was approximately the same as the cost of custody which would have accrued had the pilot not been running.

### **Police**

In a case of revocation with custody, the police were called upon. The unit cost of police time per offence, taken from the National Audit Office,<sup>52</sup> and updated in line with inflation, was £568. There were 190 such incidents, making the overall cost £108,000.

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<sup>52</sup> National Audit Office (2011) The cost of a cohort of young offenders to the criminal justice system. Accessed 2 July 2018. Available at: [https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/1011663\\_technical\\_paper.pdf](https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/1011663_technical_paper.pdf)

## **NPS/CRC**

We estimated that these cases involved an expected sixty minute time cost at a standard hourly rate of £20. There were 190 such cases. The estimated cost was £3,800. The proportion falling to NPS and CRCs was unknown. Although it would not change estimated total costs, we allocated half the cost to each agency for illustrative purposes.

## **Courts**

We assumed a revocation with custody would require court action for wearers under court imposed bail, suspended sentence orders and community orders. We estimated the cost of this to have been £314, based on the typical court cost of a breach offence National Audit Office<sup>52</sup> adjusted for price inflation. The total cost estimate, which includes all court costs (for example CPS) of the estimated 79 cases in this category was £25,000.

## **Parole Board**

On the basis of stakeholder discussion, we assumed a per-case cost of £140 and the total of these 190 cases was estimated to have been £27,000.

## **Further non-custodial action**

In some cases, further action was taken, but the tag wearer was not returned to custody. Such cases might, for example, have involved a warning. We assumed these were dealt with outside the field team by the police, CRC or NPS team member involved with the case. An estimate of the typical time involved was one hour at rates of pay given above (including call handling). Given there were 157 of these cases, we estimated the average cost to have been £5,000. Where appropriate, this was allocated evenly to CRCs and NPS due to lack of information on the proportion of tag wearers for which each agency was responsible. This allocation between CRCs and NPS did not have an impact on the overall cost of non-compliance, as above.

## **10.4 Sensitivity analysis**

This sensitivity analysis determines the robustness of our estimated cost per day to changes in the estimates of our economic modelling.

### **Adjustment for IOM wearers**

While the GPS pilot was on-going, a proportion of the resources were used for 98 IOM (Integrated Offender Management) offenders. This had two effects on our estimated costs. First, the setup and running costs may be considered to cover 684 rather than 586 tag wearers. Secondly, because the IOM cohort were outside of scope for the evaluation, at the

time of writing, data on non-compliance rates was not available for this cohort. In the following analysis, it was assumed that non-compliance costs of the cohorts in the main pilot and the IOM cohort were similar. This raised our estimated baseline non-compliance cost to £257,000.

**Absorbed and non-compliance costs**

The majority of the estimations of the costs of the pilot were informed by accounting information, triangulated with stakeholder interviews. The two areas in which we were least certain were absorbed costs and the costs of non-compliance. Though costly, these make up a minor proportion of total costs. In Table A.5, we allowed for the higher rate of throughput, including IOM wearers, and considered the impact on our headline daily cost of varying one, other or both of the absorbed and non-compliance costs.

**Table A.5 Impact of varying estimated costs and allowing for IOM wearers**

<b>Total Estimated Costs (£000 except cost per wearer.)</b>	<b>% change</b>
of which	
Estimated absorbed costs	68
Estimated non-compliance costs	257
Other costs	3871
Total Estimated Costs (£000)	4196
Cost per wearer (GPS pilot and IOM)	£6,135
Cost per wearer per day (GPS pilot and IOM)	£55
<u>Impact of doubling estimated absorbed costs</u>	
Estimated absorbed costs	137
Estimated non-compliance costs	257
Total Estimated Costs (£000)	4264
Cost per wearer (GPS pilot and IOM)	£6,235
Cost per wearer per day (GPS pilot and IOM)	£56
<u>Impact of doubling police &amp; NPS/CRC time spent on non-compliance</u>	
Estimated absorbed costs	68
Estimated non-compliance costs	306
Total Estimated Costs (£000)	4245
Cost per wearer (GPS pilot and IOM)	£6,207
Cost per wearer per day (GPS pilot and IOM)	£55
<u>Impact of doubling police &amp; NPS/CRC time spent on non-compliance and doubling absorbed costs</u>	
Estimated absorbed costs	137
Estimated non-compliance costs	306
Total Estimated Costs (£000)	4314
Cost per wearer per day (GPS pilot and IOM)	£6,306
Cost per wearer per day (GPS pilot and IOM)	£56

For the combined GPS pilot and IOM cohorts, the estimated cost per wearer per day was £55 to £56. Even if absorbed costs and non-compliance costs were doubled, compared to

our initial estimates, the impact on the overall daily cost rate was less than 3%. In sum, we consider our headline cost estimate is robust to strong departures from our assumptions.

**Increase in throughput**

One theme which was highlighted in the cost evaluation was the capacity of the pilot. There was a total of 586 wearers on the pilot, and a further 98 on IOM. However, the programme was set up to cope with a maximum of 1,500 people. Because the pilot was time-limited, fewer tags were issued as the intervention came to a close, thus the pilot was necessarily below capacity during this time. In an established intervention, such spare capacity is available to be utilised. It is clear, therefore, that the ‘cost per wearer per day’ on the pilot will not be indicative of the ongoing costs should the intervention be rolled out more widely.

We may consider that the peak caseload for the pilot was 276 cases (inclusive of IOM) being monitoring simultaneously at the end of December 2017. As the average time spent tagged was 112 days, this implies the resources available would have been able to cope with 75 new cases every month, a total of 1,125 cases throughout the course of the pilot. It seems reasonable, therefore, to consider what average costs would have been had the pilot maintained such a caseload. This was estimated by maintaining fixed and setup costs as per Table A.1, and increasing variable costs proportionally, and resulted in a cost per wearer per day of £41.

**Table A.6 Estimation of costs had peak throughput been maintained**

<b>Additional costs resulting from GPS pilot</b>	<b>£(000)</b>
Set-up costs	<b>56</b>
Fixed costs (up to a throughput of 1500)	<b>2673</b>
Variable costs	<b>2474</b>
Equipment costs	163
Lost and damaged tags (estimated)	51
Staff costs – field teams	1810
Additional staff costs – stakeholders	27
Non-compliance	423
<b>Total estimated costs (£000)</b>	<b>5203</b>
Estimated throughput	1125
Cost per wearer	£4,625
Average tagging length	112
Running cost per wearer per day	£41



Similarly, if the pilot had attained its target of 1,500 cases, (assuming all other setup costs remain unchanged, and running costs increase in proportion), the estimated average daily cost would have been £36.

## **10.5 Caveats**

The figures presented above must be taken in the context that they are a cost evaluation of the pilot, not of GPS location monitoring in general. Some of these estimates were based on economic modelling using reasonable assumptions, rather than being directly observed. We have considered the sensitivity of our estimates to the varying of these costs and are satisfied that our headline estimates are robust. Even so, however, these estimated costs can give no more than an indication of the cost per wearer of GPS if it is rolled out more widely. In particular, it must be noted that the national programme will use a different delivery model from the pilot.

It must also be borne in mind that, in the early stages of the pilot, there was a lower level of demand than was experienced as the intervention progressed. Further, the pilot was resourced to cope with a greater level of throughput than that which was observed. Taking both these matters into consideration, there was evidence that throughput could have been greater on the pilot without a substantial increase in costs. So, the per case cost of location monitoring on the pilot might not necessarily represent the cost per case if monitoring were rolled out more generally.

## 11. Conclusion and future directions

The cost of the pilot was estimated at approximately £55 per wearer per day. This estimate is reasonably robust to the necessary assumptions made in the evaluation, but varies with throughput. There was evidence of over-capacity on the pilot, implying that this estimate might serve as an upper-bound of cost-per day.

The efficiency of an intervention can only be considered on a cost per unit basis compared with the counterfactual. Based on qualitative interviews, the wearer of a GPS tag on the pilot would otherwise have been subject to a period of imprisonment or held on remand. The estimated pilot costs were between one half and two-thirds of the cost of imprisonment (on a daily basis).

These costs may not be indicative of the costs of a national roll-out of GPS location monitoring. Firstly, the pilot did not utilise all available capacity, and secondly, the national programme will use a different delivery model from the pilot.

Several interviewees stressed that care would need to be taken to avoid 'net-widening', i.e. monitoring individuals who would not otherwise have been monitored or imprisoned. Widening the use of monitoring in this manner may reduce potential savings when costs are compared to the counterfactual.

Ultimately, on the basis of this pilot, GPS tagging has the potential to be a less costly alternative to time in custody when used appropriately.

# Annex B: GPS pilot overview

This annex provides additional background information about the decision-making agencies involved in the pilot and the processes involved once the decision was made to issue a tag.


A recommendation for a GPS tag would be passed on to the relevant agency to make a decision about whether to grant a GPS tag or not. The agency making the decision varied according to wearer cohort. The table below shows the agencies involved for each cohort.

**Table B.1 Decision-making agencies for each cohort**

<b>Cohort</b>	<b>Agencies able to recommend GPS tag</b>	<b>Agencies that make final decision to grant GPS tag</b>
Court-imposed bail	Police or CPS	Court
SSOs or COs	NPS or defence counsel, CPS	Court
HDC	NPS or CRC	HDC board
Licence variation or release after recall	NPS or CRC	NPS, SPO (Senior Probation Officer) or PPCS
Parole Board	NPS or Parole Board	Parole Board

If a decision was made to issue a GPS tag, a series of steps were followed to relay information between decision makers, the monitoring centre and field teams. The flow diagram below collates information from guidance issued by MoJ to illustrate these processes.

**Figure B.1 Information sharing between agencies throughout the monitoring period**



# Annex C: Methodology

This annex gives further information about the qualitative methodology used for this evaluation. In total, 122 people took part.

## Sampling and recruitment of staff and wearers

As discussed in section 2, a range of staff were interviewed in each case study area, and included those responsible for overseeing the running of the pilot, decision makers and other individuals who were key to pilot delivery.

Following the selection of case study sites, the MoJ provided the NatCen research team with the contact details of key staff across the agencies that may be able to assist with the recruitment of staff for the research. Introductory information leaflets about the evaluation and what participation involved were sent to these individuals to support this stage. On agreeing to participate, individuals were contacted by the NatCen research team to arrange a suitable time and place for the interview.

A two-pronged recruitment approach was used with wearers to maximise the range and diversity of the sample of participants taking part. This involved the NatCen research team:

- drawing on the sample of wearers who had given permission to be re-contacted by NatCen as part of a separate MoJ tagging survey
- liaising with gatekeepers to explore whether they knew of any wearers to whom it would be appropriate to give recruitment literature about the evaluation (on behalf of the research team) and /or if they could assist in arranging an interview with a wearer

The achieved sample for staff and wearers is set out in Table C.1.

**Table C.1 Number of participants interviewed per participant group**

Type of participant	Number of participants
Strategic staff <sup>53</sup>	15
Police	21
Prisons	13
Courts (judiciary, clerks, CPS, defence)	15
Probation (NPS, CRC, Approved Premises)	24

<sup>53</sup> This generally included staff with a strategic oversight of the pilot, rather than being involved in an operational role.

Type of participant	Number of participants
PPCS	11
Monitoring centre	7
Wearers	14
Victim liaison officers <sup>54</sup>	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>122</b>

## Fieldwork

All the interviews and small focus groups conducted for the scoping and mainstage fieldwork were qualitative depth encounters. They took place either face-to-face or over the phone depending on the participant's preference. Topic guides were used to ensure a consistent approach across encounters and between members of the research team. Separate topic guides were developed for each participant group and were used flexibly, with open and non-leading phrasing to allow researchers to respond appropriately to participants' accounts. More information on the topic guides and an overview of key themes covered is included at Annex D.

## Qualitative data analysis

With participants' permission, the interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Where permission was not given, notes were taken instead. Interview data was managed and analysed using the Framework approach developed by NatCen (Richie et al., 2013). This matrix-based analytic method facilitates rigorous and transparent qualitative data management, with a thematic framework used to classify and organise data according to key themes, concepts and emergent categories.

## Methodological limitations

As with all research, the evaluation methodology had a number of limitations and it is a marker of high quality research to acknowledge them. Limitations included the following.

- **Changes to policy:** There were a number of policy changes that took place during the period in which the evaluation was carried out. For example, the IOM on automatic release cohort were introduced to the pilot but were not included in the evaluation.<sup>55</sup> The research team explained to participants that the evaluation did not

<sup>54</sup> Given GPS monitoring may also impact the victims of the wearers this was identified as an important perspective to include. Insight was gained through interviews with relevant stakeholders such as a victim liaison officer.

<sup>55</sup> IOM cases within the HDC, re-release or licence variation cohorts were in scope for GPS location monitoring from the beginning of the pilot.

cover the IOM cohort and checked which cohorts were being discussed during staff interviews. Nevertheless, at times it was challenging to differentiate between the cohorts in the data collected and it is possible that some participants might have discussed aspects relevant to the IOM cohort at points.

- **Difficulties engaging some staff in the evaluation:** In some CJS settings, recruiting staff was challenging and took longer than anticipated which is not uncommon with large, multi-agency evaluations of this nature. It is likely that participating in the evaluation was viewed as an extra task on top of other responsibilities which may have made it hard for some to be involved. In addition, there were a large number of staff marginally involved in the pilot and a lack of awareness about GPS location monitoring may have been a barrier to participation. To ensure the study captured as broad and diverse a range of views as possible, it was important for the research team to be flexible about the timing and mode of interviews. In addition, a joint letter of support from MoJ, CPS and HM Courts and Tribunals Service helped facilitate staff recruitment by providing additional information and assurance on the purpose and aims of the research.
- **Recruitment of wearers:** The research team recruited wearers through two channels, as discussed above. In total the research team attempted to make direct contact with over 150 wearers to take part in the study, but most were uncontactable, did not respond or declined to be involved (either at their first contact with the research team or after initially agreeing to take part). By the end of the fieldwork period, interviews had been carried out with 14 tag wearers, providing useful insight on the views and experiences of individuals in different cohorts. It is however possible that the evaluation did not capture the full range of experiences of those who participated in the pilot, due to difficulties experienced during recruitment.
- **Experience with other GPS location monitoring schemes:** It should be noted that voluntary GPS schemes had been running in the BeNCH area prior to the pilot, and GPS tagging of IOM offenders was running in parallel to the pilot in both areas. Experience of these schemes may have affected the views of stakeholders involved in the research, as not all participants would be aware of the differences between these schemes.

## Annex D: Topic guides

Tailored topic guides were used to ensure a consistent approach across all the interviews and between members of the research team. The guides were used flexibly to allow researchers to respond to the nature and content of each discussion, so the topics covered and their order varied between interviews. Researchers used open, non-leading questions, and answers were fully probed to elicit greater depth and detail where necessary.

The main headings and subheadings from the topic guides used for interviews with police staff and wearers are provided below as examples. Slightly different versions of the police staff guide were used for interviews with different participant staff groups to ensure that topic guides reflected the nature of participants' role and/or involvement.

### Police staff topic guide

#### 1. Introduction

- Introduce self and NatCen
- Introduce research, aims of study and interview
- Brief overview of topics to be covered in interview
- Length (about 60 minutes)
- Voluntary participation
- Confidentiality, anonymity and potential caveats
- Audio recording (including encryption, data storage and destruction)
- Questions
- Verbal consent recorded on tape

#### 2. Background

- Current position or professional role
- Involvement in GPS pilot
- Nature and profile of local area

#### 3. Setup and implementation

- Initial understanding and awareness
- Involvement in setup
- Nature and extent of ongoing support
- Resource implications
- Partnership working



#### **4. Delivery**

- Diversion to GPS monitoring
- Decision-making and considerations for GPS monitoring
- Tagging conditions
- Supervision and monitoring of wearers including non-compliance and breach
- Differences between offender cohorts
- Infrastructure and operational issues

#### **5. Outcomes and impact (for)**

- Police processes and operation
- Offender management
- Offenders

### **Recommendations**

### **Next steps and close**

### **Wearer topic guide**

#### **6. Introduction**

- Introduce self and NatCen
- Introduce research, aims of study and interview
- Brief overview of topics to be covered in interview
- Voluntary participation
- Audio recording and data storage
- Confidentiality, anonymity and potential caveats
- Questions
- Record consent

#### **7. Background**

- Participant background including housing situation
- Offending and court history
- When first tagged

## **8. Initial understanding and expectations of tagging**

- Initial information they received about the tag
- Understanding of how the tag works
- Initial views on being tagged
- Any previous experience of tagging

## **9. Experience of wearing the tag**

- Process of fitting the tag
- Experience of complying with tag conditions and responsibilities
- Any experience of breaching conditions
- Practicalities of wearing the tag
- Process of removing the tag (if relevant)

## **10. Impact of wearing the tag**

- Influence of GPS tag on compliance
- Influence of conditions
- Extent to which tag conditions accommodate needs
- Once tag was removed (if relevant)
- What would have happened if GPS was not in place

## **11. Overall experience and recommendations**

- Overall experience of wearing the tag
- Whether wearing the tag met expectations
- Views on how the tag could be improved

## **Next steps and close**

## Annex E: Context and background

This annex includes additional information provided by the pilot team to give background and context to their role, the funding arrangements for the pilot and the guidance, training and support that they provided to staff delivering the pilot. This information was provided during the writing of this report.

### An overview of the MoJ pilot team

The MoJ pilot team were responsible for scoping, designing and managing the pilot. The team ensured the smooth operation of the pilot by providing support to the pilot areas and agencies. For example:

- engaging eight police forces in the pilot, ensuring they were ready to provide field and monitoring services
- operationalising the pilot and developing the underpinning policies, processes and practical arrangements
- designing and delivering pilot communications to both decision makers and support staff to raise awareness
- delivering presentations and guidance sessions, answering questions and offering advice and guidance on cases
- identifying areas of low uptake, exploring these and taking opportunities to increase awareness

### Literature, guidance and training

The pilot team provided a suite of training and guidance to staff involved in delivering the pilot. This included:

- the pilot toolkit which was published on GOV.UK
- face to face guidance sessions with stakeholders, including a presentation about the pilot
- targeted guidance to staff to address specific issues (for example following the introduction of the curfew capability)
- a question and answer document
- guidance for the EAR process
- example case studies
- court etiquette guidance
- dashboards on pilot progress

## Literature to use with wearers

The pilot team also provided a suite of documents for staff to use with wearers. This included:

- a first 24-hour leaflet issued at the time the tag was imposed which included information about the tag and the fitting process
- a handbook issued at the time of fitting which was intended to answer any questions the wearers or those they lived with had about the GPS tag
- an information leaflet for individuals in custody
- an information leaflet for individuals in the community

# Annex F: Description of tags used in the pilot

The pilot used the Attenti One-Piece GPS Offender Tracking Device. The tags weighed 150g and measured 84x56x31mm (height, width and depth). In addition to the physical ankle tag, supplementary equipment was provided to the wearer, including a stationary home beacon that was installed in the wearer’s approved address, a mains charger, and a portable battery-powered charger. Offenders were instructed to charge the tag for a minimum of 1 hour a day, and this could be done with either the mains or battery charger.

All photos are copyright [Attenti Electronic Monitoring Ltd.](#)

**Figure F.1 Attenti One Piece GPS Offender Tracking Device**



**Figure F.3 Mains charger connected to tag**



**Figure F.2 Tag fitted to ankle**



**Figure F.4 Portable battery powered charger**



## Glossary

**Approved Premises** – Approved Premises (AP) are residential accommodation units which house offenders in the community. They act as a ‘halfway house’ helping to resettle offenders released from custody, and help to protect the public by monitoring offenders’ early months in the community.

**Attendance requirement** – GPS tags could be used to monitoring a wearer’s attendance at a specified activity or appointment, such as a community offending behaviour programmes.

**Breach** – Breaches were confirmed violations of any part a wearer’s monitoring requirements, such as curfew, flat battery, entering an exclusion zone.

**Community order (CO)** - A community order is a sentence given by a court that combines punishment with activities carried out in the community. These can include multiple requirements such as unpaid work, curfew, rehabilitative activities, and offender behaviour programmes. Courts were able to impose location monitoring as one of these requirements in the pilot.

**Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC)** – Community Rehabilitation Companies are private sector suppliers of probation services. They supervise low to medium risk offenders in the community.

**Court Imposed Bail** – After an individual has been charged, but prior to a criminal trial, they can either be remanded in custody or granted bail. When granting bail, a court may impose conditions on the individual. These conditions aim to ensure attendance at court, prevent further offences, and reduce the likelihood of interference with victims and witnesses. Court were able to impose location monitoring as a bail condition within the pilot areas. Bail conditions can also be imposed by the police, while an investigation is ongoing and prior to charge, but this cohort was not within scope for the pilot.

**Curfew** – A curfew requires a wearer to be present at their home during specified hours (for example 7pm to 7am). Curfews are used across the criminal justice system and can be monitored electronically using Radio Frequency or GPS tags, or manually by staff. Curfew capability was not initially available at the start of the pilot, although this was added in May 2017. This allowed curfews to be used alongside the requirements introduced in the pilot, such as exclusion zones.

**Exclusion zone** – A requirement for a wearer to avoid entering a specified zone. These zones would be linked to an offender’s previous criminal behaviour or risk. For example, offenders who have committed shoplifting offences may have exclusion zones set around shopping centres, domestic violence offender may have zones set around an (ex)-partner’s address.

**External Agency Request (EAR)** – If a responsible officer or other stakeholder required access to location data that they could not routinely access, an external agency request (EAR) needed to be submitted to the Monitoring Centre. EAR applications were required to explain why access to the requested information was needed. Each request was considered individually by the Monitoring Centre, and the minimum data required was only released when proportionate and necessary

**GPS tag** – An electronic tag fitted around an individual’s ankle. The tag uses signals from Global Positioning System (GPS) satellites to calculate its location, which is then sent over a mobile network to a central monitoring centre. The pilot used the Attenti One-Piece GPS Offender Tracking Device, which weighed 150g and measured 84x56x31mm (height, width and depth).

**Home Detention Curfew (HDC)** – HDC is a form of early release for prisoners serving sentences of up to four years. If a prisoner is eligible for HDC, they may be released prior to the standard release point, and be subject to an overnight curfew at their home address. HDC is available nationally using Radio Frequency tags, although within the pilot areas this was expanded to include GPS tags for cases that would not have otherwise been released.

**Integrated Offender Management (IOM)** – IOM brings a cross-agency response to the crime and reoffending threats faced by local communities. The most persistent and problematic offenders are identified and managed jointly by partner agencies working together. Further information is available from the Home Office. IOM schemes across England and Wales have often used GPS tags on a voluntary basis, and the pilot introduced the capability for compulsory tagging.

**Monitoring Centre** – A single monitoring centre for the pilot was set up in Hertfordshire. The monitoring centre was operated 24 hours a day by police staff who were responsible for reviewing alerts generated by the tags, and for reporting any confirmed breaches to responsible officers.

**National Probation Service (NPS)** – The National Probation Service is a public sector criminal justice service that supervises high-risk offenders in the community. The NPS are also responsible for the provision of pre-sentence reports within courts, which provide guidance on suitable sentencing options.

**Parole Board** – The Parole Board is an independent body that carries out risk assessments on prisoners to determine whether they can be safely released into the community. Within the pilot the Parole Board were able to impose location monitoring as a requirement of release for prisoners serving life sentences or indeterminate sentences for public protection (IPP).

**Public Protection Casework Section (PPCS)** – The PPCS is a body within HMPPS who are responsible for revoking prison licences following a breach of conditions, issuing recalls to custody, and varying licence conditions.

**Recall and license variation** – If an offender who has been released from prison and is being managed in the community breaches the terms of their license, the probation officer may decide to recall the offender to custody. Recall can either be for a fixed period (14 or 28 days) or for the remainder of the sentence. Within the pilot, GPS tags could be imposed when an offender was being released following a recall period, or as a license variation for behaviour that did not meet the threshold for recall.

**Responsible officer** – The individual responsible for managing each offender or bailee while they are in the community. For court imposed bail cases, the responsible officer would be a person within the police force, for HDC it would be the PPCS, and for all other cohorts it would be a person from the NPS or CRC.

**Radio Frequency (RF) tags** – are routinely used in the criminal justice system to monitor compliance with curfews. They are fitted around an individual's ankle, and work in conjunction with a home monitoring unit to confirm if an individual is in their home. Unlike GPS tags, they can only monitor whether the offender is within a short distance of the base station, and they cannot monitor the individual once they have left their home.

**Service Level Agreement** – Several service level agreements were in place within the pilot. These required field team to fit GPS tags within 24 hours of notification, and the monitoring centre to report any confirmed breaches to the responsible officer within 30 minutes.

**Standalone monitoring** – This involves monitoring the wearer's location without any exclusion zones, attendance or curfew requirements. The data is viewed retrospectively by responsible officers and used for offender management purposes.

**Suspended sentence order (SSO)** – When a court imposes a custodial sentence of between 14 days and two years, the court may choose to suspend the sentence for up to two years. The offender will remain in the community and be subject to requirements set by the courts. Courts were able to impose location monitoring as one of these requirements in the pilot. If the offender does not comply with the requirements or is convicted of another offence, the sentence can be activated and the offender will be sent to prison for the duration of the original term along with any new sentence.

**Violation** – Violations were defined as potentially actionable tag alerts received by the Monitoring Centre. The Monitoring Centre processed these alerts, and decided if an alert constituted a breach, or if the alerts were caused by technical issues.

**Wearer** – Any individual who had experience of wearing a GPS tag on the pilot. The term 'offender' is not used as some individuals given a tag may have not been convicted of an offence – specifically within the court imposed bail cohort.