O-802-18

 ORDER under the Companies Act 2006

In the matter of consolidated applications

No. 1501 and No. 1502 by Brighton and Hove Bus and Coach Company Limited

For a change of company name of registrations

No. 10551454 and 10555770

BACKGROUND, CLAIMS AND DEFENCES

1) The company names Spirit of Sussex Limited and Spirit of Sussex Coaches Limited (hereafter “the respondents”) have been registered since 6 January 2017 and 10 January 2017 under numbers 10551454 and 10555770 respectively.

2) By applications, both filed on 27 June 2017, Brighton and Hove Bus and Coach Company Limited (hereafter “the applicant”) applied for a change of name of these company registrations under the provisions of section 69(1) of the Companies Act
2006 (“the Act”).

3) The applicant claims that it has provided premium bus and coach services under the name “Spirit of Sussex” since 14 November 2016 when it provided the service by running two buses under a new style and livery. The applicant also points out that
the respondent is based in the same geographical area, i.e. Sussex. The applicant objects to the respondents’ names because the dominant element “Spirit of Sussex” is a trading style of the applicant. It acknowledges that respondents have not yet traded and remain dormant. It claims that the respondents and/or their sole director,
Russell Elliot Stepe, have registered their company names in order to either inconvenience and cause cost to the applicant or, alternatively, with a view to the respondents taking advantage of the applicant’s goodwill generated in the name “Spirit of Sussex”.

4) The respondents filed notices of defence. These were provided by Mr Stepe.  He claims that:

•  The applicant’s claim that the respondent companies were registered for the purpose of inconveniencing and causing cost to the applicant is false, as is the claim that the respondents were registered in order to take advantage of the applicant’s goodwill;
•  It was determined that his business would adopt a new trading name of “Spirit of Sussex” when he met with his management team on 24 August 2016 and in order to complement his business’ diversification into the corporate markets;
•  On 20 October 2016, the first coach was purchased for this venture and a second coach purchased on 3 November 2016. Whilst the second coach was sent away for painting, upon checking the company names were available,
the respondents were registered in preparation for when he “was ready to launch”.

5) The respondents request that the applicant provide proof that it commenced trading under the name “Spirit of Sussex” on 14 November 2016. Mr Stepe claims that the first use he has been able to find is an excursion brochure launched on 30
January 2017, some five months after Mr Stepe’s management meeting.

6) At Section 3 of the Form CNA2, the respondents have indicated that they rely upon the defences under section 69(4)(a), section 69(4)(b)(i) and section 69(4)(d).

7) Mr Stepe was subsequently joined to the proceedings as co-respondent and the two sets of proceedings were consolidated.
8) Both sides filed evidence and we will summarise this to the extent that we believe is necessary. The respondents also filed written submissions in lieu of evidence, and the applicant filed written submissions in lieu of a hearing. We keep these in mind. Neither party requested a hearing and we make our decision after careful consideration of the papers.

9) The applicant is represented in these proceedings by Mayo Wynne Baxter LLP. The respondents are not represented.

Evidence for the applicant

10) This takes the form of three witness statements from the following:

•   Patrick Warner, Business Development Manager for the applicant;

•   Dean Orgill, Partner at Mayo Wynne Baxter LLP;

•	Ray Stenning, design director at Best Impressions, the third party used by the applicant to develop its “Spirit of Sussex” branding.

11) The salient points are as follows:

•  The applicant began considering a “coaching rebrand”1 on 24 March 2016, when contact was made with Best Impressions regarding rebranding themes. Mr Stenning states that he met the applicant on 9 June 2016 at the outset of the project and that his involvement continued throughout2;
•  On 22 July 2016 and following internal discussions, the preferred alternative was identified as “Spirit of Sussex”3. Designs for consideration were provided on 26 July 20164 and these were discussed at a commercial strategy meeting
on 27 July 2016;

1 See email from Mr Warner to Ray Stenning at Exhibit PW1, page 1
2 Mr Stenning’s witness statement, para. 4
3 See email at Exhibit PW1, page 6
4 Mr Stenning’s email, Exhibit PW1, pages 7 - 10
•   After further considerations in August 2016, it was decided to take forward

the rebranding as “Spirit of Sussex”. Colour swatches for the rebranding were

Tweeted on 5 August 2016;

•  In October 2016, a marketing campaign to promote the rebrand started with more Tweets being posted including photographs of coaches in the applicant’s paint shop in November 20165, the last of these (dated 23
November 2016) showed “Spirit of Sussex” appearing, for the first time,

prominently on the side of the newly re-painted coach as shown below:

5 Mr Warner’s witness statement, paras. 15 - 18 and pages 14 - 17 of Exhibit PW1
•  Such Twitter promotion continued, with tweets often being made when the coaches were used6 and Tweets of two photographs of the applicant’s coaches in its “Spirit of Sussex” livery are provided, dated 12 and 28
February 2017, respectively7;

•  A new brochure for “Spirit of Sussex” coaches was launched on 31 January

20178. The front cover of this brochure is shown below. Mr Warner submits that he believed Mr Stepe, “was by this time aware of [the applicant’s]
rebranded coaches” but, nevertheless, he did not respond to the Tweet9:

6 Ditto, para. 20
7 Pages 18 & 19 of Exhibit PW1
8 Exhibit PW1, pages 20/21
9 Witness statement, para.21

•  In March 2017, the applicant purchased a new coach for the rebranded business10. It is submitted that its cost commitment of £270,000 would not have been contemplated if there was any doubt as to the success of the rebranded coach business;
•  At the same time, the applicant launched its “Spirit of Sussex” website11 and a

tweet promoting this was made on 31 March 201712;

10 ditto, para. 24 and pages 22- 27 showing Tweets of the visit to the coach builder
11 ditto, para 25
12 Page 26 of Exhibit PW1
•  On 11 May 2017, the applicant also made a trade mark application to register “Spirit of Sussex”. This was published for opposition purposes but no opposition was received and it progressed to registration13;
•  In July 2017 a further coach was refurbished with “Spirit of Sussex” branding and the new coach was launched on 12 September 201714;
•	The applicant’s promotion of its “Spirit of Sussex” brand has taken place within its travel shops, its brochure and via Twitter15;
•  On 11 May 2017, the applicant’s representative wrote to Mr Stepe requesting that he change the respondents’ names to non-offending names or the applicant will instigate proceedings before the Company Names Tribunal16. It is disputed whether, or not, Mr Stepe replied. Although no letter was
received, Mr Stepe has subsequently produced his letter of 13 May 2017 that he states he sent. In this letter he offered to sell the respondent companies and associated web domains for £10,000. Mr Warner suggests that this illustrates that the respondents had not incurred significant start-up costs17;
•  The domain names registered by Mr Stepe are either not in use or link to his

Heritage website. Further, the respondent companies remain dormant18.

Evidence for the respondents

12) This takes the form of a witness statement by Mr Stepe. The relevant points are as follows:
•	At a board meeting on 24 August 2016 it was agreed that if a pending deal to sell Mr Stepe’s company’s “SussexBus” branded bus services business was completed, it would concentrate on its coach hire services and would use a new name in order to develop a market for corporate and business customers19;
•   Mr Stepe had read about a historical company called “Spirit Buses” a few

years earlier and was attracted to the positive feeling the name created and

13 Witness statement, para. 26 and pages 27 – 30 of Exhibit PW1
14 ditto, para. 27
15 Ditto, para 35
16 Mr Orgill’s witness statement, para.6 and pages 1 and 2 of Exhibit DO1
17 ditto, para 34
18 Mr Warner’s witness statement. Para. 31
19 Mr Stepe’s “defence statement”, para. 1
this name “surfaced during the board meeting”20 and the decision was made

to go with the name “Spirit of Sussex”21;

•   The sale of Mr Stepe’s company’s bus services business was concluded on

30 September 2016 “and novation of the contracts and commercial routes commenced with the new company from the 1st October 2016 and as a result [they] began to look for new vehicles to match with the new corporate identity [they] were pushing as ‘Spirit of Sussex’”22;
•   New vehicles were purchased on 20 October and 3 November 2016.

Following delays beyond the respondents’ control the first vehicle was received “back between Christmas and New Year 2016/2017”23;
•   Having checked the Companies House database to check availability, Mr

Stepe applied for the incorporation of first Spirit of Sussex Limited (on 5

January 2018) and then Spirit of Sussex Coaches Limited because he wanted

“to ensure nobody else could try and pass off as my new brand”24;

•   At the same time he also obtained a number of domain names featuring as

part of the address the term “spirit of sussex”25;

•	Mr Stepe explains how “amazed” he was to receive the letter of 11 May 2017 from the applicant’s legal representative “attempting to threaten [him] into changing [his] company name […] [he] had legally registered 5 months earlier!”26;
•	Mr Stepe’s response of 13 May 2017 offered to licence the name to the applicant or to sell the company and associated websites for £10,00027;
•	Mr Stepe claims that as of 6 August 2017, the applicant was still not “actively promoting” the name “Spirit of Sussex” as claimed by the applicant. In support of this he cited the lack of promotion on social media and at that date its Facebook page was still showing a bus in its “red and cream” livery28;
•   Mr Stepe requests that “previous […] evidence as already submitted is

accompanied within this latest statement to avoid duplication and

20 Ditto, para. 2
21 Ditto, para 3
22 Ditto, para. 8
23 Ditto, paras 9 - 11
24 Ditto, paras 13/14
25 Ditto, para. 15
26 Ditto, para. 20
27 Ditto, para. 22
28 Ditto, paras 28 & 29
unnecessary photocopying29.” Whilst these documents are not specified, we take this request to be a reference to the Exhibits RS1 – RS12 filed under cover of a letter of 6 August 2017. Mr Stepe’s witness statement was accepted by the tribunal. The exhibits not being referred to in the statement, or being attached to it constitutes an irregularity that Mr Stepe should have
been given an opportunity to correct, but this was not done. In light of this, we accept that they form part of Mr Stepe’s evidence and that the applicant has seen these exhibits and has had an opportunity to reply to them (and has done so). Insofar as these exhibits are relevant, they are:
o Exhibit RS1: a copy of Mr Stepe’s letter, of 13 May 2017, to Mayo

Wynne Baxter acting for the applicant

o Exhibit RS2: a copy of an email from a John Wilkes of Capex Finance to a person identified as hurst4@talktalk.net setting out what documentation and information he needs to provide about a coach that Mr Stepe was considering purchasing from him. It is dated 19 October
2016;

o Exhibit RS3: an invoice made out to “Heritage” (Heritage Travel is identified elsewhere as Mr Stepe’s company) for the “Prepare and paint” of a vehicle and also for its “body repairs”. The vehicle is identified by reference to a registration plate number only. The invoice is dated 19 January 2017;

DECISION

13) Section 69 of the Act states:

“(1) A person (“the applicant”) may object to a company’s registered name on

the ground—

(a) that it is the same as a name associated with the applicant in which he has goodwill, or

29 Ditto, para 48
(b) that it is sufficiently similar to such a name that its use in the United Kingdom would be likely to mislead by suggesting a connection between the company and the applicant.

(2) The objection must be made by application to a company names adjudicator (see section 70).

(3) The company concerned shall be the primary respondent to the application.

Any of its members or directors may be joined as respondents.

(4) If the ground specified in subsection (1)(a) or (b) is established, it is for the respondents to show—

(a) that the name was registered before the commencement of the activities on which the applicant relies to show goodwill; or

(b) that the company—

(i) is operating under the name, or

(ii) is proposing to do so and has incurred substantial start-up costs in preparation, or

(iii) was formerly operating under the name and is now dormant;

or

(c) that the name was registered in the ordinary course of a company formation business and the company is available for sale to the applicant on the standard terms of that business; or

(d) that the name was adopted in good faith; or
(e) that the interests of the applicant are not adversely affected to any significant extent.

If none of those is shown, the objection shall be upheld.

(5) If the facts mentioned in subsection (4)(a), (b) or (c) are established, the objection shall nevertheless be upheld if the applicant shows that the main purpose of the respondents (or any of them) in registering the name was to obtain money (or other consideration) from the applicant or prevent him from registering the name.

(6) If the objection is not upheld under subsection (4) or (5), it shall be dismissed.

(7) In this section “goodwill” includes reputation of any description.”

Does the applicant have the requisite goodwill?

14) Under section 69(1) the applicant must establish that it had a goodwill or reputation under the names upon which it relies at the date of incorporation of the respondents, in this case, 6 January 2017 and 10 January 2017.

15) Mr Stepe submits that the first evidence of use that the applicant had commenced using its “Spirit of Sussex” branding was on 30 January 2017 when it announced it on social media and in particular its Twitter account and that this was
24 days after he applied to register the respondent companies.

16) The applicant has provided evidence that from October 2016 it made a series of tweets trailing that it was undertaking a rebrand. The final photograph in this series of tweets, dated 23 November 2016, revealed a photograph of “Spirit of Sussex” appearing prominently on the side of the newly re-painted coach.

17) This is the only promotion to the applicant’s customers that can be dated to
brand in its travel shops and via Twitter, with tweets often being made when the coaches were used, but it does not identify specific dates when, or from which date, this occurred and there is no corroboratory evidence to support this. This evidence demonstrates minimal effort to bring the change of branding to the attention of consumers. We find that a single Tweet of a photograph of a bus in “Spirit of Sussex” livery is insufficient for the respondent to generate any goodwill identified by the name, or reputation in the name.

18) In summary, we conclude that at the relevant dates in January 2017, the applicant did not have the requisite goodwill or reputation as required by section
69(1)(a) of the Act.

19) This finding ends the applicant’s case because it must have the necessary goodwill or reputation in order to have any prospect of success. However, for completeness, we will go on to consider, if we had found that the applicant possessed the requisite goodwill and/or reputation at the relevant date, whether the names are sufficiently similar and, if they are, whether any of the defences would have succeeded.

Are the names “sufficiently similar”?

20) In addition to demonstrating the requisite goodwill, in order for the applicant to succeed, the respective company names must be “sufficiently similar” so that use of the respondent’s name would be likely to mislead by suggesting a connection between the parties.

21) The respondents’ names differ from the applicant’s sign “Spirit of Sussex” only by the addition of “Limited” and “Coaches Limited” respectively. The first is an indication of corporate status and we consider that this is to be ignored for the purpose of the comparison (see, for example, MB Inspection Ltd v Hi-Rope Ltd at paragraph 48). The second has the additional word “Coaches” as well as the word “Limited”, but we consider that this is a descriptive word merely indicating the area of business. Consequently, we find that the words “Coaches Limited” can also be ignored for the purposes of this assessment and we find that the names are the
same. Even if we are wrong and the word “Coaches” cannot be ignored, we find that

the names remain sufficiently similar.

22) In summary, we find that the names are the same or similar under section

69(1)(b) of the Act.

DEFENCES

23) If the applicant had the requisite goodwill in the UK, in light of our conclusion that the respective names are the same or sufficiently similar, the applicant would succeed unless the respondent has a defence under one of the sub-sections of section 69(4) of the Act. The respondent relies upon three defences, each of which are considered below.

Section 64(1)(a): The name was registered before the commencement of the activities on which the applicant relies to show goodwill

24) The respondents’ names were registered on 6 January 2017 and 10 January

2017, respectively. We have found that the applicant’s evidence has shown that it’s “Spirit of Sussex” was first presented to its customers via a photograph of its first coach to be painted in the “Spirit of Sussex” livery Tweeted on 23 November 2016. Even though it was not enough to demonstrate goodwill, this nevertheless illustrates that the applicant’s activities relating to the “Spirit of Sussex” commenced prior to the registration of the respondent companies. Consequently, we find that the respondents’ defence based upon a claim to registrations that pre-date commencement of the applicant’s activities must fail.
Section 69(4)(b)(i): That the company is operating under the name

25) Under section 69(4)(b)(i), the respondent may rely upon the defence that it is operating under the name. The respondents state, in their Form CNA2s, that a first coach was bought on 20 October 2016 for the “Spirit of Sussex” venture, and a second coach purchased on 3 November 2016. These statements are supported by an email that relates to the potential purchase of the first coach and an invoice that Mr Stepe states refers to the painting of the rebranding onto the second coach.

26) This evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the respondents are trading under the name “Spirit of Sussex”. The two exhibits referred to above relate to activities of preparing to trade, but before the date of incorporation of the respondent companies and, therefore, cannot show that the respondent companies were operating under the name. Mr Stepe is the director of the respondents and well placed to provide evidence of trading activities, but he has failed to do so. Further, the respondent companies remain dormant.

27) Consequently, we conclude that no trade by the respondents has taken place in the name “Spirit of Sussex” at any time up to, and including, 27 June 2017, the date on which the applicant’s applications were made to the tribunal.

Was the respondent’s name adopted in good faith?

28) Section 69(4)(d) provides a defence where the names were adopted in good faith.

29) In (1) Adnan Shaaban Abou-Rahmah (2) Khalid Al-Fulaij & Sons General Trading & Contracting Co v (1) Al-Haji Abdul Kadir Abacha (2) Qumar Bello (3) Aboubakar Mohammed Maiga (4) City Express Bank of Lagos (5) Profile Chemical Limited [2006] EWCA Civ 1492, Rix LJ commented upon the concept of good faith:

‘48 The content of this requirement of good faith, or what Lord Goff in Lipkin Gorman had expressed by reference to it being "inequitable" for the defendant to be made to repay, was considered further in Niru Battery. There the defendant bank relied on change of position where its manager had
authorised payment out in questionable circumstances, where he had good reason to believe that the inwards payment had been made under a mistake. The trial judge had (a) acquitted the manager of dishonesty in the Twinsectra or Barlow Clowes sense on a claim of knowing assistance in breach of trust, but (b) concluded that the defence of change of position had failed. On appeal the defendant bank said that, in the absence of dishonesty, its change of position defence should have succeeded. After a consideration of numerous
authorities, this court disagreed and adopted the trial judge's broader test, cited above. Clarke LJ quoted with approval (at paras 164/5) the following passages in Moore-Bick J's judgment:

"I do not think that it is desirable to attempt to define the limits of good faith; it is a broad concept, the definition of which, in so far as it is capable of definition at all, will have to be worked out through the cases. In my view it is capable of embracing a failure to act in a commercially acceptable way and sharp practice of a kind that falls short of outright dishonesty as well as dishonesty itself.”’

30) In (1) Barlow Clowes International Ltd. (in liquidation) (2) Nigel James Hamilton and (3) Michael Anthony Jordon v (1) Eurotrust International Limited (2) Peter Stephen William Henwood and (3) Andrew George Sebastian the Privy Council considered the ambiguity in the Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] 2 AC 164 judgment. The former case clarified that there was a combined test for considering the behaviour of a party: what the party knew at the time of a transaction and how that party’s action would be viewed by applying normally acceptable standards of honest conduct.

31) In Harrisons Trade Mark Application (“Chinawhite”) [2004] FSR 13 Pumfrey J

commented:

‘14 Mr Engelman's argument was a direct challenge to the hearing officer's approach to the question of good faith, but he also objected that it was not open to the hearing officer to infer bad faith from the facts, which he maintained was contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Davy v Garrett (1878) 7 Ch D 473 at 489. This I think is a misapprehension as to the scope of the decision in Davy v Garrett. That case was dealing with fraud in a different context. In this field context is everything. The words "bona fide" or "good faith" are what are sometimes called chameleon words and take their content and their colour from their surroundings. Once the hearing officer had decided that the correct approach was that which I think he may well have been bound to accept, it was open to him to find that objectively the behaviour
of the application did not satisfy the second half of the formulation. The word "inference" itself has a wide meaning, as Robert Walker L.J. demonstrates in REEF Trade Mark [2003] R.P.C. 5. This was not a question of drawing an inference at all. It was a question of coming to a secondary finding of fact on all the material. I do not consider that the hearing officer's decision is open to challenge on this ground and the appeal must accordingly be dismissed.’

32) At Section 3 of the Form CNA2s, the respondents indicate that they rely upon

this defence. The applicant submits that the respondents have shown no evidence of genuine intention to trade as “Spirit of Sussex” but have opportunistically registered their names either to profit from, or at least cause inconvenience to the applicant. Taking the evidence of the parties into account, the timeline of their respective actions prior to the respondents’ dates of incorporation appears to be as follows:

24 March 2016: The applicant considered a coach rebranding when it contacted Best Impressions;
9 June 2016: The applicant first met with Best Impressions;

22 July 2016 – 27 July 2016: The applicant identified “Spirit of Sussex” as its

new brand;

5 August 2016: The applicant Tweeted colour swatches for the new brand, but did not reveal the name;
24 August 2016: Mr Stepe agrees with his board that his company would concentrate on its coach hire service and would use the new name “Spirit of Sussex”;
1 October 2016: Mr Stepe’s company began to look for new vehicles to

match its new corporate identity;

20 October 2016 and 3 November 2016: Mr Stepe’s company purchased

new vehicles for his new corporate identity;

October/November: The applicant made a number of Tweets tracking the refurbishment of its first coach to be rebranded (without revealing the name);
23 November 2016: The applicant Tweets a photograph of its first coach in

the “Spirit of Sussex” livery;
Between Christmas 2016 and New Year 2017: Mr Stepe’s company receives back (it is contested whether it had been sent for repairs or to have it decorated with the new corporate identity) the first of these coaches;
6 & 10 January 2017: The respondents were incorporated.

33) Taking this timeline into account, prior to the incorporation of the respondent companies, the only publicly available information from which Mr Stepe could have become aware that the applicant intended to adopt the name “Spirit of Sussex” was the applicant’s single Tweet of 23 November 2016. Despite Mr Warner’s submission that Mr Stepe had an opportunity to comment on this, there is nothing in the evidence, whether factual or circumstantial, that suggests that Mr Stepe viewed or was aware of this Tweet. In the absence of this, or any evidence that he could have become aware of the applicant’s plans by some other method, there is nothing that suggests to us that Mr Stepe had any knowledge of the applicant’s plans to rebrand as “Spirit of Sussex” at the date he incorporated the respondent companies. Taking both parties’ evidence together, it paints a sequence of events that suggests Mr Stepe acted in good faith when pursuing his own legitimate aims of developing a corporate identity conceived in August 2016 without knowing that the applicant was developing the same name.

34) Further, whilst not specifically relied upon as an act that illustrates that the respondents’ were not acting in good faith, we comment briefly of Mr Stepe’s offer to either licence the name or sell the respondent companies and associated domain names for £10,000. The applicant commented that the amount requested illustrates that Mr Stepe had not invested in the name to the same degree as the applicant. There is an implication, in this submission, that this sum is not exaggerated but rather an amount that reflects a reasonably small amount of costs incurred by the respondents in the setting up of their “Spirit of Sussex” venture. We share this implied view and conclude that the offer to sell the respondent companies and related domain names is not evidence which disproves or impacts negatively on the respondents’ evidence of good faith.

35) In summary, our finding is that the respondents’ names were adopted in good faith.

36) As a result of this finding, even if we had concluded that the applicant had the requisite goodwill or reputation at the relevant dates, its applications would still have failed.

Summary

37) The applicant has failed to demonstrate the requisite goodwill or reputation and, furthermore, the respondents’ good faith defence has been successful. Consequently, the applications for a change of the respondents’ names to non- offending names are refused.

COSTS

38) The respondents, having been successful, are entitled to a contribution towards their costs. The Tribunal’s Practice Direction indicates that as the respondents have not been professionally represented, their costs, other than official fees, should be reduced by a half.

39) Mr Stepe submits that the respondent should be refunded the three official fees it has paid, amounting to £450 plus compensation for the time spent and earning lost through delaying its launch of its “Spirit of Sussex” name. We agree that the respondents are entitled to costs in respect of the official fees paid, however, the costs regime before the tribunal is a contributory one and not one of compensation. There has been nothing unusual about this case that warrants consideration of costs other than based upon the published scale (Section 10 of the Tribunal’s Practice Direction). Having regard for this published scale, we award costs on the following
basis:

Official fees (2 x Form CNA2; 1 x

Form CNA3):

£450

Considering applicant’s statements

and preparing the respondents’

statements:	£175	

Considering applicant’s evidence		
and preparing respondents’

evidence:	£350	

Preparing written submissions	
£125	

Total:	
£1100	

40) Brighton and Hove Bus and Coach Company Limited are ordered to pay Spirit of Sussex Limited and Spirit of Sussex Coaches Limited the sum of £1100. This sum to be paid within fourteen days of the expiry of the appeal period, or within fourteen days of the final determination of this case if any appeal against this decision is unsuccessful.

41) Under section 74(1) of the Act, an appeal can only be made in relation to the decision to uphold the application; there is no right of appeal in relation to costs.

42) Any notice of appeal must be given within one month of the date of this decision. Appeal is to the High Court in England Wales and Northern Ireland and to the Court of Session in Scotland. The Tribunal must be advised if an appeal is lodged.

Dated this 13th day of December 2018

Mark Bryant Company Names Adjudicator

Judi Pike Company Names Adjudicator

Oliver Morris Company Names Adjudicator