




HM Government

# Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

November 2018



# Serious and Organised Crime Strategy

Presented to Parliament  
by the Secretary of State for the Home Department  
by Command of Her Majesty

November 2018

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## Foreword by the Home Secretary



Serious and organised crime is the most deadly national security threat faced by the UK, and persistently erodes our economy and our communities. Serious and organised criminals operating in the UK sexually exploit children and ruthlessly target the most vulnerable, ruining lives and blighting communities. Their activities cost us at least £37 billion each year. They are able to reap the benefits of their crimes and to fund lavish lifestyles while all of us, and particularly their direct victims, suffer the consequences.

Protecting the public is my highest priority as Home Secretary. This strategy sets out the government's approach to prevent and defend against serious and organised crime in all its forms, and our unyielding endeavour to track down perpetrators, from child sex offenders to corrupt elites, to bring them to justice. We will allow no safe space for these people, their networks or their illicit money in our society.

Following the publication of the previous Serious and Organised Crime Strategy in 2013, we have made significant progress in creating the powers, partnerships and law enforcement structures we need to respond to the threat. The law enforcement community, and the National Crime Agency in particular, has been instrumental to this progress with an impressive, and sustained, track record of disruptions across the full range of serious and organised crime threats.

Despite all of our success, we must continue to adapt to the scale and complexity of current and future threats. The individuals and networks involved in serious and organised crime are amongst the most capable and resilient adversaries that the UK faces. They are quick to exploit the rate of technological change and the globalisation of our society, whether it is live streaming of abuse or grooming children online, using malware to steal personal data, or exploiting free and open global trade to move illegal goods, people and money across our borders.

The threat transcends borders, and serious and organised crime in the UK is one part of a global web of criminality. Child sex offenders share images of abuse on a global basis. There is a direct link between the drugs being sold on our streets, including the violence linked to that trade, the networks trafficking vulnerable children and adults into the UK, the corrupt accountant laundering criminal funds through shell companies overseas, and corrupt politicians and state officials overseas who provide services and safe haven for international criminal networks.

Our revised approach puts greater focus on the most dangerous offenders and the highest harm networks. Denying perpetrators the opportunity to do harm and going after criminal finances and assets will be key to this. We will work with the public, businesses and communities to help stop them from being targeted by criminals and support those who are. We will intervene early with those who are at risk of being drawn into a life of crime. And, for the first time, this strategy sets out how we will align our efforts to tackle serious and organised crime as one cohesive system. This includes working closely with international partners as well as those in the private and voluntary sectors.

Serious and organised criminals may often think they are free to act with impunity against our children, our businesses and our way of life. They are wrong. They believe that they can use violence, intimidation and coercion to stay above the law, and that the authorities lack the necessary tools and will to take them on. Working together, implementing this new strategy, we will show them just how wrong they are.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'S. Javid', with a small comma at the end.

**Rt Hon Sajid Javid MP**  
**Home Secretary**

# Executive Summary

1 Serious and organised crime affects more UK citizens, more often, than any other national security threat and leads to more deaths in the UK each year than all other national security threats combined.<sup>1</sup> It costs the UK at least £37 billion annually.<sup>2</sup> It has a corrosive impact on our public services, communities, reputation and way of life. Crime is now lower than it was in 2010,<sup>3</sup> although we are also aware that since 2014 there have been genuine increases in some low volume, high harm offences. The National Crime Agency (NCA) assesses that the threat from serious and organised crime is increasing and serious and organised criminals are continually looking for ways to sexually or otherwise exploit new victims and novel methods to make money, particularly online.

2 A large amount of serious and organised crime remains hidden or underreported, meaning the true scale is likely to be greater than we currently know. Although the impact may often be difficult to see, the threat is real and occurs every day all around us. Serious and organised criminals prey on the most vulnerable in society, including young children, and their abuse can have a devastating, life-long effect on their victims. They target members of the public to defraud, manipulate and exploit them, sell them deadly substances and steal their personal data in ruthless pursuit of profit. They use intimidation to create fear within our communities and to undermine the legitimacy of the state. Enabled by their lawyers and accountants, corrupt elites and criminals set up fake companies to help them to hide their profits, fund lavish lifestyles and invest in further criminality.

3 Serious and organised crime knows no borders, and many offenders operate as part of large networks spanning multiple countries. Technological change allows criminals to share indecent images of children, sell drugs and hack into national infrastructure more easily from all around the world, while communicating more quickly and securely through encrypted phones. Continuously evolving technology has meant that exploitation of children online is becoming easier and more extreme, from live-streaming of abuse to grooming through social media and other sites. Serious and organised criminals also exploit vulnerabilities in

1 National Crime Agency, 'National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2018'; HM Government, 'National Security Capability Review', March 2018. Online at: <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/905-national-strategic-assessment-for-soc-2018>; and <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015>

2 Home Office, 'Understanding Organised Crime Estimating the scale and the social and economic costs', November 2018.

3 Our best measure of long-term crime trends on a consistent basis, the Crime Survey of England and Wales, shows a 34% fall in comparable crime since 2010. Online at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingjune2018>



the increasing number of global trade and transport routes to smuggle drugs, firearms and people. They have learnt to become more adaptable, resilient and networked. Some think of themselves as untouchable.

4 In some countries overseas, criminals have created safe havens where serious and organised crime, corruption and the state are interlinked and self-serving. This creates instability and undermines the reach of the law, hindering our ability to protect ourselves from other national security threats such as terrorism and hostile state activity. Corruption, in particular, hinders the UK's ability to help the world's poorest people, reduce poverty and promote global prosperity.

## Our response

5 Despite significant progress, the scale of the challenge we face is stark and we have therefore revised our approach. Our aim is to protect our citizens and our prosperity by leaving no safe space for serious and organised criminals to operate against us within the UK and overseas, online and offline. This strategy sets out how we will mobilise the full force of the state, aligning our collective efforts to target and disrupt serious and organised criminals. We will equip the whole of government, the private sector, communities and individual citizens to play their part in a single collective endeavour to rid our society of the harms of serious and organised crime, whether they be child sexual exploitation and abuse, the harm caused by drugs and firearms, or the day to day corrosive effects on communities across the country. We will pursue offenders through prosecution and disruption, bringing all of our collective powers and tools to bear. We will: prevent people from engaging in serious and organised crime; protect victims, organisations and systems from its harms; and prepare for when it occurs, mitigating the impact. We will strengthen our global reach to confront the threat before it comes to our shores.

6 This strategy provides a framework and outlines a set of capabilities which are designed to respond to the full range of serious and organised crime threats. We have four overarching objectives to achieve our aim:

**1. Relentless disruption and targeted action against the highest harm serious and organised criminals and networks**

We will target our capabilities on criminals exploiting vulnerable people, including the most determined and prolific child sex offenders and we will proactively target, pursue and dismantle the highest harm networks affecting the UK. We will use new and improved powers and capabilities to identify, freeze, seize or otherwise deny criminals access to their finances, assets and infrastructure, at home and overseas including Unexplained Wealth Orders and Serious Crime Prevention Orders. At the heart of this approach will be new data, intelligence and assessment capabilities which will allow the government, in particular the NCA, to penetrate and better understand serious and organised criminals and their vulnerabilities more effectively and target our disruptions to greater effect.

**2. Building the highest levels of defence and resilience in vulnerable people, communities, businesses and systems**

We will remove vulnerabilities in our systems and organisations, giving criminals fewer opportunities to target and exploit. We will ensure our citizens better recognise the techniques of criminals and take steps to protect themselves. This includes working to build strong communities that are better prepared for and

more resilient to the threat, and less tolerant of illegal activity. We will also identify those who are harmed faster and support them to a consistently high standard.

**3. Stopping the problem at source, identifying and supporting those at risk of engaging in criminality**

We will develop and use preventative methods and education to divert more young people from a life of serious and organised crime and reduce reoffending. We will use the government's full reach overseas to tackle the drivers of serious and organised crime.

**4. Establishing a single, whole-system approach**

At the local, regional, national and international levels, we will align our collective efforts to respond as a single system. We will improve governance, tasking and coordination to ensure our response brings all our levers and tools to bear effectively against the highest harm criminals and networks. We will expand our global reach and influence, increasing our overseas network of experts to ensure the UK's political, security, law enforcement, diplomatic, development, defence relationships and financial levers are used in a more coordinated and intensive manner. And we will work to integrate with the private sector, pooling our skills, expertise and collective resources, co-designing new joint capabilities, and designing out vulnerabilities together.

7 As a result, we will be able to measure and demonstrate that:

- a) We have significantly raised the risk of operating for the highest harm criminals and networks within the UK and overseas, online and offline, by ensuring:
  - new data and intelligence capabilities have targeted and disrupted serious and organised criminals and networks in new ways;
  - a range of partnerships and working practices are embedded in the UK that enable us to sharpen and accelerate our response;
  - overseas partners are working with us more often, more collaboratively and more effectively to target serious and organised crime affecting the UK; and
  - we are arresting and prosecuting the key serious and organised criminals, stopping their abuse, denying and recovering from them their money and assets, dismantling their networks and breaking their business model.
- b) Communities, individuals and organisations are reporting they are better protected and better able to protect themselves; and victims are better supported to recover from their abuse or exploitation.
- c) Fewer young people are engaging in criminal activity or reoffending.



# Introduction

8 The strategy builds on the 2015 National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR),<sup>4</sup> which identified serious and organised crime as a national security threat. It also reflects the findings and recommendations of the 2018 National Security Capability Review (NSCR).

9 This strategy has links to other government strategies, including the UK's Strategy for Countering Terrorism (CONTEST),<sup>5</sup> the UK Anti-Corruption strategy 2017-2022,<sup>6</sup> the National Cyber Security Strategy (NCSS) 2016-2021<sup>7</sup> and the Modern Slavery Strategy 2014.<sup>8</sup> It also links to the government's work on serious violence, particularly for threats such as county lines and firearms offences. We set out the links between this strategy and the 2018 Serious Violence Strategy<sup>9</sup> throughout both documents.

10 The Home Secretary has responsibility for the Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) Strategy, but this is a cross-government strategy. The Home Office has led work to produce the strategy, with major contributions from other government departments and agencies, and in close partnership with the devolved administrations, local police forces and the private sector. A new Director General within the Home Office was appointed in 2018 to oversee the response to serious and organised crime.

11 The devolved administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are responsible for the functions which have been devolved to them. In Scotland and Northern Ireland, crime and policing matters are the responsibility of the Scottish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive. These devolved administrations have published their own respective strategies (Scotland's Serious Organised Crime Strategy 2015<sup>10</sup> and Northern Ireland's Organised Crime Strategy 2016).<sup>11, 12</sup> In Wales, we will continue to work very closely with the

4 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-security-strategy-and-strategic-defence-and-security-review-2015>

5 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/counter-terrorism-strategy-contest-2018>

6 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-anti-corruption-strategy-2017-to-2022>

7 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-cyber-security-strategy-2016-to-2021>

8 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/modern-slavery-strategy>

9 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/serious-violence-strategy>

10 Online at: <https://www.gov.scot/Publications/2015/06/3426/downloads>

11 Online at: <https://www.octf.gov.uk/Publications/N-I-Organised-Crime-Strategy/The-Northern-Ireland-Organised-Crime-Strategy-2016>

12 The NCA has agreed working arrangements in the devolved nations. In Scotland, the NCA's powers to operate are conditional on authorisation from the Lord Advocate and through co-operation with Police Scotland. The NCA is a member of Scotland's Serious Organised Crime Taskforce. Within Northern Ireland, the NCA works alongside the Police Service of Northern Ireland and other operational partners, with the consent of the Chief Constable and is a member of the Northern Ireland Organised Crime Task Force.

Welsh Government and the four Welsh Police and Crime Commissioners to implement the ambition of this strategy.

12 Part One of this document sets out the current threat. This includes defining what we mean by serious and organised crime, summarising its impact and setting out how it is likely to evolve.

13 Part Two covers our new strategic approach and sets out our overall ambition in responding to serious and organised crime.

14 Part Three focuses on how this translates into action around our four overarching objectives.

15 Part Four describes how we will implement the strategy in the UK and overseas, including details on governance and oversight and how we will measure our effect.

# Part One: The Impact of Serious and Organised Crime on the UK

16 We define serious and organised crime as individuals planning, coordinating and committing serious offences, whether individually, in groups and/or as part of transnational networks. The main categories of serious offences covered by the term are: child sexual exploitation and abuse; illegal drugs; illegal firearms; fraud; money laundering and other economic crime; bribery and corruption; organised immigration crime; modern slavery and human trafficking; and cyber crime.

17 Crime is now lower than it was in 2010. Our best measure of long-term crime trends on a consistent basis, the Crime Survey of England and Wales,<sup>13</sup> shows a 34% fall in comparable crime over this period. But we are also aware that since 2014 there have been genuine increases in low-volume, high harm offences like knife crime, gun crime and homicide.


18 The National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime, published annually by the NCA sets out the threat in detail.<sup>14</sup> In 2018, the NCA is aware of over 4,600 organised crime groups operating in the UK.<sup>15</sup> Yet, much serious and organised crime remains hidden (child sexual exploitation and abuse, modern slavery), or underreported (fraud, cyber crime), meaning the true scale is difficult to measure and likely to be much greater. Figure 1 outlines some of the indicators of the scale and scope of serious and organised crime threats.

13 Online at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulletins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingjune2018>

14 The 2018 version is online at: <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/905-national-strategic-assessment-for-soc-2018>

15 Organised Crime Group Mapping is a law enforcement tool which maps characteristics of individuals and groups involved in serious and organised crime. Whilst the number of organised crime groups can be a useful indicator of the scale of serious and organised crime in the UK, it does not capture individual offending (e.g. on child sexual exploitation and abuse) and therefore the full scale of the threat.

Figure 1 – NCA assessment of serious and organised crime threats to the UK



19 We estimate serious and organised crime costs the UK at least £37 billion annually.<sup>16</sup> This figure has increased by £13 billion since the 2013 estimate, although this is in large part attributable to changes in methodology to produce more robust estimates, and the inclusion of additional crime types (such as organised waste crime and organised cyber-dependent crime against individuals).

20 Demand for common drug types remains high in the UK, with around 1.1 million adults having taken a Class A drug in 2017/18.<sup>17</sup> There were 2,503 drug misuse deaths registered in England and in Wales in 2017; heroin and/or morphine remained the most lethal drugs, responsible for 47% of these deaths.<sup>18</sup> Recent trends include a spike in the availability of highly toxic synthetics, notably Fentanyl, a synthetic opioid up to one hundred times more potent than morphine and linked to multiple heroin-associated deaths nationally in 2017.<sup>19</sup>

21 There has also been an increase in the availability<sup>20</sup> of crack cocaine and an increase in its use<sup>21</sup>. The street-level purity of crack increased from 36% in 2013 to 71% in 2016, indicating a fluid supply-line capable of overcoming short-term shocks. As set out in the Serious Violence Strategy, there is evidence that crack cocaine markets have strong links to

16 Home Office, 'Understanding organised crime: Estimating the scale and the social and economic costs', November 2018. This figure is likely to be an underestimate, given the absence of reliable data on which to include estimates for certain crime types such as online child sexual exploitation and money laundering.

17 Home Office, 'Drug Misuse: Findings from the 2017/18 Crime Survey for England and Wales', Statistical Bulletin 14/18, July 2018.

18 Office for National Statistics (2018), 'Deaths related to drug poisoning, England and Wales – 2017 registrations'. Available online at: <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/bulletins/deathsrelatedtodrugpoisoninginenglandandwales/2017registrations>

19 National Crime Agency, 'Recent Deaths Possibly Linked to Fentanyl', April 2017.

20 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 'New UNODC report: Coca crops in Colombia increase over 50 per cent in one year'. Online at: [https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2017/July/new-unodc-report\\_coca-crops-in-colombia-increase-over-50-per-cent-in-one-year.html](https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/press/releases/2017/July/new-unodc-report_coca-crops-in-colombia-increase-over-50-per-cent-in-one-year.html)

21 HM Government, 'United Kingdom drug situation: Focal Point annual report 2017'.

serious violence and there is a connection between recent increases in homicide and knife and gun crime, and rising levels of the use and purity of crack cocaine. Research suggests heroin and crack cocaine users commit around 45% of all theft offences in England and in Wales. More broadly, the groups involved in so-called county lines drug distribution networks are impacting on all police force areas and causing significant harm, including violence, firearms use and exploitation of young and vulnerable people.

22 Serious and organised crime has a devastating effect. Any child can be a victim of abuse or exploitation and criminals are exploiting the huge growth in numbers of children with easy access to the internet. The stereotypes of the ‘typical’ child exploitation victim are further than ever from the truth. The exploitation of children online is becoming easier and more extreme.<sup>22</sup> All ages are affected, from babies and toddlers through to older teenagers. Child sex offenders are becoming more sophisticated, using social media, image and file sharing sites, gaming sites and dating sites to groom potential victims. In response to law enforcement efforts to apprehend them, they are using encryption, anonymisation and destruction measures on the dark web and the open internet. Live-streamed abuse is a growing threat and children’s own use of self-broadcast live-streaming applications are being exploited by offenders.

23 The number of referrals to the NCA relating to online child sexual exploitation and abuse has increased by 700% in the last four years.<sup>23</sup> The most immediate impact of exploitation and abuse of vulnerable people is physical and emotional harm to the individual, and the many thousands of victims each year are left with long-term needs which can also have an enduring impact on public services. Organised exploitation on a large scale, such as that seen in Rotherham and elsewhere has also caused generational damage to the integrity and cohesion of local communities. Serious and organised criminals prey on the most vulnerable people in our society, and those who are economically disadvantaged or who are displaced from their home or country are particularly vulnerable to exploitation.<sup>24</sup> 5,145 potential victims of modern slavery and human trafficking were referred to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) in 2017, a 35% increase on 2016. The number of children referred to the NRM increased by 66% over this period.<sup>25</sup>

24 Communities also feel the impact of serious and organised crime through the violence and intimidation that often accompanies many types of crime.<sup>26</sup> Organised criminals can drive out legitimate businesses and use firearms to protect or further their criminal enterprises. There was a 25% increase in firearms offences between 2015/16 and 2017/18.<sup>27</sup> There is also a risk that terrorists may attempt to procure firearms through criminal networks.

25 Economic crime is a broad category of illegal activity, including fraud, corruption, money laundering, and tax evasion. There were 3.3 million fraud incidents in the year ending June 2018, amounting to almost a third of all crimes.<sup>28</sup> The overall scale of economic crime is estimated to be £14.4 billion per year, with the cost to businesses and the public sector from organised fraud no less than £5.9 billion per year.<sup>29</sup> For the purposes of this strategy, illicit finance involves the holding, movement, concealment or use of monetary proceeds of crime that has an impact on UK interests. Organised crime groups and corrupt elites launder the

22 National Crime Agency, ‘National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2018’.

23 National Crime Agency, ‘National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2018’.

24 National Crime Agency, ‘National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2018’.

25 National Crime Agency, ‘National Referral Mechanism Statistics – End of Year Summary 2017’, March 2018.

26 Scottish Government, ‘Serious Organised Crime (SOC) in Scotland: A Summary of the Evidence’, December 2017; The Police Foundation, ‘The Impact of Organised Crime in Local Communities’, December 2016.

27 Office for National Statistics, ‘Crime in England and Wales: Bulletin Tables’, June 2018.

28 Office for National Statistics, ‘Crime in England and Wales: year ending June 2018’, October 2018.

29 Home Office, ‘Understanding organised crime: Estimating the scale and the social and economic costs’, November 2018.



proceeds of crime through the UK to fund lavish lifestyles and reinvest in criminality. The vast majority of financial transactions through and within the UK are entirely legitimate, but its role as a global financial centre and the world's largest centre for cross-border banking makes the UK vulnerable to money laundering. There is a realistic possibility that the scale of money laundering impacting the UK annually is in the tens of billions of pounds. This presents significant reputational risk to the integrity of the UK's financial sector, which is essential for global trade and our long-term prosperity. Professionals such as lawyers and accountants are an important part of the response to serious and organised crime. However, whether complicit, negligent or unwitting, professional enablers are also key facilitators in the money laundering process and often crucial in integrating illicit funds into the UK and global banking systems.<sup>30</sup>

**26** Cyber attacks from criminals continue to damage the economy, and cyber security breaches are a costly and disruptive issue for businesses. 43% of all UK businesses identified at least one cyber security breach or attack in 2017, a figure which rose to 64% among medium size firms and 72% for large firms.<sup>31</sup> High profile attacks such as the WannaCry ransomware campaign, which disrupted over a third of NHS trusts in England and led to thousands of operations being postponed, emphasise the real world harms resulting from these attacks. The distinction between nation states and criminal groups in terms of cyber crime is becoming frequently more blurred, making attribution of cyber attacks increasingly difficult.

**27** Corruption threatens our national security and prosperity, at home and overseas. Domestically there is a particular risk to the borders and immigration, law enforcement and prison sectors which can undermine the rule of law, while overseas it is a cause of conflict and instability which, if not tackled, can increase risks to the UK. Organised criminality, corruption and kleptocracy are also increasingly severe impediments to the UK's overseas policy and development objectives. They distort and impede inclusive and sustainable economic growth, corrupt the democratic process, threaten legitimate, sustainable livelihoods, damage social cohesion and exacerbate exclusion. All of these factors challenge the UK's ability to help the world's poorest people, reduce poverty and promote global prosperity.

## How serious and organised crime is likely to evolve

**28** Serious and organised crime is increasing both in volume and complexity.<sup>32</sup> According to the NCA, advances in technology and instability caused by international conflict in particular will offer criminal networks new ways to identify and target victims and find new markets and ways to make money.

### Technology

**29** Advances in technology will continue to transform the future of crime. Rapid development of new information and communication technologies (especially the introduction of 5G mobile communications, artificial intelligence, and the Internet of Things) is likely to present opportunities for criminal exploitation. The use of technologies such as the Dark Web, encryption, virtual private networks and virtual currencies (such as Bitcoin) will support fast, 'secure' and anonymous operating environments that facilitate all levels of criminality. The increasingly pervasive nature of these technologies will allow less skilled and resourced criminals to gain access to markets and tools that were previously out of their reach.

30 National Crime Agency, 'National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2018'.

31 Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 'Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2018', April 2018.

32 National Crime Agency, 'National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2018'.

## International conflict

30 Serious and organised crime will continue to distort and impede inclusive and sustainable economic growth, corrupt democratic processes, damage social cohesion and exacerbate exclusion. This is particularly true in fragile states, and notably post-conflict settings, where illicit economies and drug and weapons trafficking networks can thrive and become entrenched as conflict ceases. By perpetuating impediments to development, serious and organised crime will increase dependency on aid, deter legitimate business investment and drive violence, conflict and terrorism.

## Exiting the European Union (EU)

31 Criminals will look to exploit any vulnerabilities they can find in our border and security arrangements as we exit the EU. With threats evolving faster than ever before, it is in the clear interest of the UK and its allies to sustain the closest possible cooperation in tackling serious and organised crime and other threats to national security. It is in the interests of all citizens for the UK and EU to remain responsive to any changes in the activities and techniques employed by serious and organised criminals resulting from the UK's departure.

32 At present, the UK and its law enforcement agencies and prosecuting authorities work with other EU Member States through a range of EU tools and measures that help facilitate this cooperation. We will continue to play a leading international role in countering serious and organised crime during and following the UK's exit from the EU. We will seek to maintain deep and close cooperation with European partners on law enforcement, criminal and security matters and, in some areas, including at the border, we will identify and take forward new opportunities to strengthen our security.



# Part Two: Strategic Approach

## Aim and objectives

33 Despite significant progress in delivering the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy, the scale of the challenge we face is stark and, for this reason, we have revised our approach. Our aim is to protect our citizens and our prosperity by leaving no safe space for serious and organised criminals to operate against us within the UK and overseas, online and offline.

34 This strategy sets out how we will mobilise the full force of the state, from the capabilities of our security and intelligence agencies and law enforcement, including police forces, to the powers of local authorities to target and disrupt serious and organised criminals. We will equip the whole of government, the private sector, communities and individual citizens to align their efforts in a single collective endeavour to rid our society of the harms of serious and organised crime. We will pursue offenders through prosecution and disruption, bringing all of our collective powers and tools to bear. We will: prevent people from engaging in serious and organised crime; protect victims, organisations and systems from it; and prepare for when it occurs, mitigating the impact. We will strengthen our global reach to confront the threat before it comes to our shores.

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**2. Building the highest levels of defence and resilience in vulnerable people, communities, businesses and systems**

We will remove vulnerabilities in our systems and organisations, giving criminals fewer opportunities to target and exploit. We will ensure our citizens better recognise the techniques of criminals and take steps to protect themselves. This

includes working to build strong communities that are better prepared for and more resilient to the threat, and less tolerant of illegal activity. We will also identify those who are harmed faster and support them to a consistently high standard.

### 3. **Stopping the problem at source, identifying and supporting those at risk of engaging in criminality**

We will develop and use preventative methods and education to divert more young people from a life of serious and organised crime and reduce reoffending. We will use the government's full reach overseas to tackle the drivers of serious and organised crime.

### 4. **Establishing a single, whole-system approach**

At the local, regional, national and international levels, we will align our collective efforts to respond as a single system. We will improve governance, tasking and coordination to ensure our response brings all our levers and tools to bear effectively against the highest harm criminals and networks. We will expand our global reach and influence, increasing our overseas network of experts to ensure the UK's political, security, law enforcement, diplomatic, development, defence relationships and financial levers are used in a more coordinated and intensive manner. And we will work to integrate with the private sector, pooling our skills, expertise and collective resources, co-designing new joint capabilities, and designing out vulnerabilities together.


36 As a result, we will be able to measure and demonstrate that:

- a) We have significantly raised the risk of operating for the highest harm criminals and networks within the UK and overseas, online and offline, by ensuring:
  - new data and intelligence capabilities have targeted and disrupted serious and organised criminals and networks in new ways;
  - a range of partnerships and working practices are embedded in the UK that enable us to sharpen and accelerate our response;
  - overseas partners are working with us more often, more collaboratively and more effectively to target serious and organised crime affecting the UK; and
  - we are arresting and prosecuting the key serious and organised criminals, stopping their abuse, denying and recovering from them their money and assets, dismantling their networks and breaking their business model.
- b) Communities, individuals and organisations are reporting they are better protected and better able to protect themselves; and victims are better supported to recover from their abuse or exploitation.
- c) Fewer young people are engaging in criminal activity or reoffending.

37 We will maintain the *Pursue, Prepare, Protect* and *Prevent* delivery framework, sometimes known as '4Ps', as it provides a coherent approach for all partners involved in countering serious and organised crime, from preventing crime in the first place to convicting perpetrators and helping victims. The four strands, shown alongside our aim and objectives in Figure 2, are:

- To **Pursue** offenders through prosecution and disruption
- To **Prepare** for when serious and organised crime occurs and mitigate impact
- To **Protect** individuals, organisations and systems from the effects of serious and organised crime
- To **Prevent** people from engaging in serious and organised crime

Figure 2 – Serious and Organised Crime (SOC) Strategy framework





# Part Three: Our Response

## ***Objective 1: Relentless disruption and targeted action against the highest harm serious and organised criminals and networks***

38 The priority of the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy was to prosecute and relentlessly disrupt serious and organised criminals. We have made significant progress in establishing the powers, partnerships and law enforcement structures to achieve this, including the creation of the NCA. The government will continue to prioritise ensuring law enforcement agencies have and use all the powers and levers at their disposal. We will invest in new capabilities and take significant new measures that strengthen our ability to stop abusers, target dirty money and reduce economic crime. We will also sharpen and deepen our specialist online capabilities to combat cyber crime and other online offences, and put data and intelligence at the heart of our law enforcement approach. We will maximise our ability to intervene upstream and at our borders.

## **Law enforcement capabilities and powers**

39 The NCA is the lead law enforcement agency for serious and organised crime in England and Wales. It has a wider remit than its predecessors to strengthen the UK's borders, fight economic crime, fraud, corruption and cyber crime, and protect children and young people from sexual abuse and exploitation. The agency leads, supports and coordinates activity across law enforcement, locally, regionally, nationally and internationally. It works in close collaboration with the UK Intelligence Community (UKIC), police forces across the UK, international police forces and other law enforcement partners, including through its two-way tasking and coordination arrangements. The NCA publishes the annual National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime which provides a single picture of the threats the UK faces.

40 Since its inception, NCA operations have led to over 12,000 arrests in the UK and overseas. Over 7,800 children have been safeguarded. Over ten million schoolchildren in the UK have been helped to stay safe online through the agency's ThinkUKnow<sup>33</sup> programme. NCA targeting of criminal assets has resulted in £22 million of cash forfeited, £34 million of civil

33 ThinkUKnow is an education programme from CEOP. Further information is online at: <https://www.thinkuknow.co.uk/>



recovery and tax receipts and £51 million worth of confiscation orders paid. NCA operations have also resulted in the seizure of over 1,700 guns and 1,000 other firearms, as well as 19 tonnes of heroin and 335 tonnes of cocaine.

41 As a result of the Spending Review (SR) announced in autumn 2015, £200 million of capital funding was made available to the NCA over the period 2016–20, an approximately 25% increase on the previous SR settlement. The uplift was provided in order to support continued investment in the NCA's capabilities, designed to enable the NCA's transformation into a world-leading law enforcement agency.

42 The nine Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCU) are the principal link between the NCA and police forces in England and Wales. ROCUs are regional police units with 14 core specialist capabilities, used to investigate and disrupt serious and organised crime, delivered regionally but accessible to all police forces through an established tasking mechanism. ROCU operations led to a total of 2,052 disruptions in 2017/18, while their support to partners contributed to more than 2,675 further disruptions. In addition to the significant investment by Police and Crime Commissioners, the government has invested over £160 million in uplifting the capabilities of the ROCUs since 2013. In 2017 the Home Office announced £40 million to enhance ROCU capabilities over the subsequent three years.<sup>34</sup>

43 Much of the impact of serious and organised crime is felt at the local level and the local response continues to be led by police forces. Police force responsibilities focus on: local policing across the '4Ps' in response to national priorities; identification and management of local threat; and local safeguarding of children and adults. The National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) coordinates the operational response of police forces across the UK, and helps forces to improve and provide value for money. There is a dedicated lead in NPCC for serious and organised crime who chairs a Serious and Organised Crime Programme Board and has an action plan to help improve the response of police forces. NPCC is also working with the Home Office to provide peer support to forces, including sharing best practice and providing access to subject matter experts.

44 UKIC continues to increase its contribution to tackling serious and organised crime. This includes initiatives such as the NCA and GCHQ Joint Operations Team (JOT), and measures by the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) to reduce the harm to the UK from cyber crime. We are providing £3.6 million in 2018/19 and £4.3 million in 2019/20 for GCHQ which will: make it harder for offenders to use communications technology for the sexual abuse of children; and enable the piloting of an online portal to allow government, charities, companies and academia to improve information sharing and collaborate to improve child protection outcomes.

45 A wide range of other investigative and enforcement agencies play a key role in tackling specific serious and organised crime threats. These include but are not limited to: HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC), which received additional investment in the Autumn Budget 2017 to tackle the enablers and facilitators of tax fraud; Immigration Enforcement; and the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) which both investigates and prosecutes serious fraud, bribery and corruption, and associated money laundering. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)

34 Because of the unique threats impacting on the City of London and the metropolitan area, some ROCU functions, as well as other specialist capabilities, are provided by the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), City of London Police and British Transport Police. Examples include MPS units focused on modern slavery, criminal assets and money laundering and complex cyber and fraud investigations. City of London Police are recognised as the national policing lead for fraud, housing the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau and Action Fraud, the UK's national fraud and cyber crime reporting centre.

prosecutes all cases for the NCA, police, HMRC and others and undertakes confiscation and civil recovery. A full list of the different organisations involved in tackling serious and organised crime is at Annex A.


46 As part of the system-wide response, the NCA will receive additional resources in 2018–2020 to lead the development of new national capabilities such as the National Assessment Centre (NAC), the National Data Exploitation Capability (NDEC), and the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC), announced by the then Home Secretary in December 2017. This will ensure they have world leading capabilities to target, pursue and dismantle the highest harm serious and organised criminals and those corrupt elites and criminals who seek to wash their dirty money in and through the UK.

47 The recent NCA and NPCC joint bid to the Police Transformation Fund (PTF) secured £2.2 million for an immediate uplift to work to tackle online child sexual exploitation. This will fund a significant expansion of the NCA and GCHQ JOT to increase their capability to target the most dangerous and determined online child sexual exploitation offenders. This means more officers working to identify those perpetrators who hide behind anonymisation. The uplift will create a pipeline of intelligence that will expose groomers masquerading as children, high risk offenders using technology to anonymise their presence and offenders accessing live streaming overseas.

48 We will commit £500,000 to provide law enforcement agencies with a better picture of child sexual exploitation offending on the dark web. This will use available data to identify, assess and pursue the highest risk suspects of interest who are impacting the UK, so we can prioritise our resources against them, in collaboration with international partners.

49 Through our £40 million support to the Fund to End Violence Against Children to 2019-20, we have also encouraged a stronger focus on the need to develop innovative technological solutions to break new ground in tackling online child sexual exploitation. Through this in 2018 we have funded the development of ‘Solis’ – an innovative tool for law enforcement to speed up identification of material relating to child sexual exploitation and abuse on the Dark Web.

Figure 3 – Legislation and key powers introduced since 2013



50 As set out in Figure 3, since 2013 the government has introduced robust new legislation, including the Serious Crime Act 2015, Modern Slavery Act 2015 and Criminal Finances Act 2017, to ensure enforcement agencies have the powers and tools they need to relentlessly disrupt serious and organised criminals. These include significant new measures such as:

- Improved Serious Crime Prevention Orders to place conditions on an individual that can include blocking financial or business dealings or restricting travel and meetings with criminal contacts;
- Telecommunications Restriction Orders to provide the power to permanently disconnect illicit mobile phones being used in a prison; and
- Unexplained Wealth Orders that require either a politically exposed person, or a person who is thought to be involved in serious crime, to explain any assets they have obtained (particularly property) which are disproportionate to their known income.

51 Relentless disruption continues to be a key tenet of our response to serious and organised crime, and we remain committed to bringing the full force of the state to bear on the threat. We will ensure operational partners target and coordinate disruptive activity so that we have the greatest impact on the most serious criminals and groups impacting on the UK. The NCA has catalogued the extensive criminal and civil powers available to law enforcement

35 See page 29 for further detail on Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs).

agencies. These range from powers to seize the proceeds of crime and deny criminals access to their assets, to immigration powers to remove or deport offenders, curtail or refuse leave to remain, refuse British nationality or prevent travel to the UK in the first place.

52 There are a wide range of other tools at our disposal to help exploit weaknesses in criminal networks and to make the lives of serious and organised criminals as difficult as possible, from vehicle prohibition and civil tax recovery to gang injunctions and local authority licensing powers. These are set out in the Menu of Tactics<sup>36</sup> published by the College of Policing, which includes hundreds of powers, tools and interventions across national authorities and local agencies to prevent and disrupt serious and organised crime. We will take a coordinated and systematic approach to using to their fullest extent the range of powers available to law enforcement and wider partners.

### Powers to access data and their oversight

53 The ability to harness data is vital both to understand and disrupt serious and organised crime effectively. Recent changes in legislation have resulted in new powers and the ability to use previously inaccessible information. The 2018 Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, which was passed by the US Congress, paves the way for bilateral agreements between the US and qualifying foreign nations to enable access to the content of communications from overseas companies in serious crime and terrorism investigations, regardless of where the information is geographically stored. The UK plans to be the first country to enter into a bilateral agreement with the US.

54 The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA) affords relevant agencies, in certain circumstances, the ability to intercept communications and to use equipment interference. It provides an authority framework for the examination of bulk data. It also puts additional responsibilities on service providers to retain communications data. The IPA has transformed the law relating to the use and oversight of investigatory powers, strengthening safeguards and introducing new oversight arrangements. The authorisation of the most intrusive investigatory powers, such as intercepting communications, requires that both a Secretary of State and a Judicial Commissioner must be satisfied that warrants are necessary and proportionate before they can be issued. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner provides essential oversight of the powers provided by the Act and produces a public report annually.

55 The introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and Data Protection Act in 2018 increases the protection afforded by the current Data Protection Act. These arrangements provide full and transparent assurance to the public that their data will be protected and used lawfully by the government and in a way that is proportionate to the threat posed. At the core of the NDEC model will be control mechanisms around the acquisition, collection, storage, retention and use of data in line with legislation and standards set out in the Common Data Standards, the Data Ethics Framework,<sup>37</sup> the IPA, the Computer Misuse Act 1990 and the GDPR.

### Child sexual exploitation and abuse

56 The Home Office will invest £37.7 million over the next two years on tackling child sexual exploitation and abuse: we will prioritise enhancing our ability to detect and disrupt offenders online. The NCA's Child Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) Command leads, supports and coordinates the law enforcement response to child sexual exploitation and abuse and works closely with law enforcement and intelligence agencies in the UK and overseas, to

36 Online at: [http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/Menu\\_of\\_tactics.pdf](http://whatworks.college.police.uk/Research/Documents/Menu_of_tactics.pdf)

37 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/data-ethics-framework/data-ethics-framework>

identify victims and pursue offenders. This is supported by close collaboration with civil society organisations like the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) and the US National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Through coordinated activity, the NCA and police arrest around 400 offenders in relation to online child sexual exploitation and abuse and safeguard over 500 children every month.

57 We have already provided £20 million for undercover capabilities to tackle online child sexual exploitation within ROCUs and a near-doubling of CEOP's investigative capability. In 2015, we launched the JOT as a collaborative venture between the NCA and GCHQ. The team has significantly increased our understanding of the challenges around disrupting the most serious and prolific UK offenders.

58 All UK police forces and the NCA are connected to the Child Abuse Image Database (CAID), launched in 2014. It contains more than ten million indecent images of children and 30 million hashes (the digital fingerprint of an image). Law enforcement experience is that around 70% of indecent images identified in its operations are held on CAID. CAID provides law enforcement agencies with effective tools to search seized devices for indecent images of children, reduce the time taken to identify such images and increase the ability to identify victims. In 2017/18, UK law enforcement identified 664 victims within indecent images of children compared to 177 in 2014/15.

59 To keep pace with the threat, we will increase our ability to target and disrupt the worst offenders. The Home Office will be investing an extra £21 million over the next 18 months to bolster the response of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies to these types of crimes. This money will give law enforcement new tools and techniques to investigate high end offenders at scale. We will expand the joint taskforce run by police, NCA and GCHQ, bringing together world class expertise in intelligence gathering and investigation. This will prevent offenders from operating with impunity in online forums and chatrooms. We will identify, assess and pursue the highest risk suspects, bringing the full capabilities of our security apparatus to bear.

60 We will fund an information sharing capability for tackling child sexual exploitation and abuse that will ultimately form the basis for a sustained partnership between law enforcement agencies, UKIC, government, charities and industry. Under the leadership of the Home Office, stakeholder organisations will share information to support closer collaboration on emerging threats, learning from working practices used against the cyber threat. We expect to be conducting the first experimental trials in January 2019, leading to development of a new sustainable capability during 2019/20. We will also enable law enforcement agencies to probe digital forensic and other intelligence material to help us understand how people are drawn into offending, so that we can target interventions to prevent abuse before it happens.

61 Alongside a tough law enforcement response to bring offenders to justice, it is crucial to prevent offending in the first place. We will provide a further £2.6 million to collaborate with child protection organisations to improve our understanding of offender behaviour and prevent future offending. This includes ongoing support for an innovative programme of work with the Lucy Faithfull Foundation to deter online offending through their StopItNow!<sup>38</sup> Campaign. This work aims to demonstrate to offenders and potential offenders the harm and suffering caused to child victims, to their own families, and the legal consequences they face. We will also continue to address the risk of first-time and unwitting offending by relaunching our Steering Clear campaign in December 2018 with the Marie Collins Foundation and IWF.

38 Further information is online at: <https://www.stopitnow.org.uk/>

62 We also expect industry to play its part in combatting the threat. In recent years there has been some good work in this area. For example, Microsoft has developed PhotoDNA which has helped to identify and take down child sexual abuse imagery from the internet. Google launched a new artificial intelligence tool in September 2018 to identify and prioritise the most likely child sexual abuse imagery for human reviewers. And when Google and Microsoft made changes to their algorithms to make it harder to find child sexual abuse material in search results, Google reported up to thirteen-fold reduction in search attempts. However, in view of the scale and sophistication of the threats we face, more must be done.

63 Companies must be at the forefront of efforts to deny offenders the opportunity to access children and child sexual abuse material via their platforms and services. In particular, we expect progress on the following priority areas:

- child sexual abuse material should be blocked as soon as companies detect it being uploaded;
- companies must stop online grooming taking place on their platforms;
- companies must work with government and law enforcement to stop live-streaming of child abuse;
- companies should be demonstrably more forward leaning in helping law enforcement agencies to deal with child sexual exploitation (including collaboration between offenders);
- we expect to see improved openness and transparency and a willingness to share best practice and technology between companies; and
- child sexual exploitation and abuse sites must no longer be supported by advertising.

### Case Study

The case of Matthew Falder demonstrates the depravity of serious and organised criminals. It also highlights the harm posed online by offenders with a high degree of technological sophistication, who are able to use multiple fake online identities and a variety of encryption and anonymisation techniques, and stay hidden in the darkest recesses of the Dark Web to try to conceal their criminal activities

Falder was a university academic who is now serving a sentence of 25 years' imprisonment after admitting 137 charges. His conviction followed an investigation by the NCA into horrific online offending which included encouraging the rape of a four year old boy. Falder approached more than 300 people worldwide and would trick vulnerable victims – from young teenagers to adults – into sending him naked or partially-clothed images of themselves. He would then blackmail his victims to self-harm or abuse others, threatening to send the compromising images to their friends and family if they did not comply. He traded the abuse material on 'hurt core' forums on the Dark Web dedicated to the discussion, filming and image sharing of rape, murder, sadism, paedophilia and degradation.

This was a very complex NCA investigation involving US Homeland Security Investigations, the Australian Federal Police and Europol to share and develop intelligence against the suspect, supported by GCHQ and other partners. Each of the hundreds of individuals who had been approached by Falder was reviewed by the NCA's child protection advisors for potential safeguarding.

## Strengthening our ability to target dirty money and reduce economic crime

64 We will prioritise tackling illicit finance, given the critical importance of denying the highest harm networks the ability to hide, move or use their profits. We will identify and seize their assets and make it more difficult for them to move and hide their illicit funds in the UK, by targeting the complicit, negligent or unwitting professional enablers who are often key to moving illicit funds through the UK and global financial systems.

65 The power to locate and seize money made by criminals (known as asset recovery) can disrupt criminal networks, prevent the funding of further illegal activity and compensate victims for their ordeals. We have strengthened the legal powers for tackling money laundering and recovering criminal assets through the Serious Crime Act 2015 and Criminal Finances Act 2017. We introduced new Money Laundering Regulations in 2017 to embed the latest international standards in the UK. And we created new Asset Confiscation Enforcement (ACE) teams which, at a cost of just over £5 million in the last three years, have assisted in the recovery of over £83 million.

66 Joint working with the private sector has significantly improved our response. The creation of the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT) in 2014 provided a new mechanism for law enforcement and the financial sector to share information and work more closely together to detect, prevent and disrupt money laundering and wider economic crime. Since April 2015, JMLIT enquiries have identified over 3,000 bank accounts that were previously unknown to law enforcement, and over 100 new suspects in criminal investigations. In total, 99 arrests have been made, facilitated, or supported by JMLIT activity.

67 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reviewed in 2018 the UK's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist finance regime against the international standards it sets. The UK has a strong and effective regime to tackle money laundering and terrorist finance, and to recover illicit funds, and we will consider carefully recommendations made by FATF that will further enhance our response.

68 We will ensure the full and effective use of the powers created by the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (Unexplained Wealth Orders, expansion of availability of civil recovery powers and bank account forfeiture) and the Serious Crime Act 2015 (compliance orders). Financial investigation techniques remain under-used. We want to increase the use of these powers and the asset recovery opportunities brought about by good financial investigations. We will therefore fund an independent review of the Proceeds of Crime Centre, hosted in the NCA, which has a statutory function to train financial investigators. We will review the training syllabus to ensure financial investigators are capable of dealing with the most complex cases. We will publish research on the benefits of financial investigation to guide future investments and financial investigations by operational agencies. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) will include analysis of the use of financial intelligence as part of the PEEL inspections in 2018/19.

The **Serious Crime Act 2015** provided an emphasis and further powers to ensure enforcement of confiscation orders. Among others, the Act introduced the following provisions:

- new compliance orders to ensure that a confiscation order is effective;
- substantially reduced time to pay for confiscation orders;
- increased default sentences for those who fail to pay their orders; and
- a new power for a judge to make a binding finding over third party ownership of property.

The **Criminal Finances Act 2017** enhanced the Suspicious Activity Reports regime and extended and strengthened civil asset recovery powers. The Act:

- introduced Unexplained Wealth Orders requiring the respondent to explain their lawful ownership and the means by which they acquired specified property;
- provides law enforcement agencies with significant new civil powers to seek the forfeiture of illicit funds held in bank and building society accounts, and assets that are personal or moveable;
- enables information sharing on a voluntary basis where there is suspicion of money laundering, generating better intelligence for law enforcement agencies, and helping firms better protect themselves; and
- extended the availability of powers to the SFO and, in respect of civil recovery powers, to HMRC and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).

69 In December 2017, the government announced measures to improve the UK's response to economic crime. We are investing up to £4.6 million in 2018/19 to establish the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC) that will act as the national authority for the UK's law enforcement response to economic crime, drawing on operational capabilities in the public and private sector. It will ensure that our local, regional, national and international work is driven by a single set of priorities. It will task and coordinate multi-agency operations to achieve the greatest sustained impact on the threat. It will maximise the value of improved intelligence and data capabilities such as the NAC and NDEC. We are also investing in improved frontline financial investigative capabilities, including £2.8 million in 2018/19 for local police forces.

70 We will reform the Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) regime through a public-private partnership. SARs are submitted by the regulated sector to alert law enforcement, at all levels, to activity that might indicate money laundering or terrorist financing. The number of SARs has doubled over the last ten years,<sup>39</sup> and the efficiency of the SARs regime could be substantially enhanced. We will renew and replace the IT system with a more sophisticated system that is better able to meet today's challenges. This is due to be completed by 2020.

71 The reform programme will enhance the way that SARs intelligence is used by law enforcement and will produce clearer and better guidance to the regulated sector, allowing their very significant resources to be better targeted to have the most effect. In support of this, the NCA will increase the size of the UK Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU) which receives,

39 National Crime Agency, 'SARs Annual Report 2017', October 2017.



analyses and disseminates intelligence submitted through the SARs regime. We are also supporting the Law Commission's ongoing review of the consent regime<sup>40</sup> and will facilitate reform where possible within the current regulatory and legal environment.

72 Reducing the corruption risk to the UK and strengthening the integrity of the UK as an international financial centre also forms an important part of our enhanced response to illicit finance. Professional enablers, such as lawyers, accountants and estate agents, are a crucial gateway for criminals looking to disguise the origin of their funds.<sup>41</sup> They can facilitate illicit financial flows through and into the UK due to lack of awareness, negligence or complicity. In 2017, HM Treasury legislated to set clear, high standards of supervision for all professional body supervisors, and the government has created a new body at the FCA, the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision (OPBAS). It has the powers to publicly censure professional body supervisors and can recommend that HM Treasury remove them as supervisors.

73 The Home Office will expand the 'Flag It Up'<sup>42</sup> campaign to increase awareness within the accountancy and legal sectors of money laundering. The 2016/17 campaign demonstrated that accountants and lawyers who recognised 'Flag It Up' were twice as likely to submit a SAR, compared to those professionals who did not have knowledge of the campaign. We will also expand the campaign to encourage increased compliance amongst professionals in the property sector.

74 Successive UK governments have made it progressively simpler and cheaper to establish companies, which while benefiting overall ease of doing business, has also been exploited by criminals to set up UK-registered companies for illicit purposes. Companies House maintains the public register of limited companies, and the government has taken steps to improve information sharing between Companies House and law enforcement agencies. We will now go further to improve the integrity of the register, requiring regulated sectors to report where, through their due diligence, they have identified discrepancies with information held on the public register. Following the FATF evaluation of the UK's anti-money laundering regime, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) will review options to improve the accuracy and integrity of the register.

75 The government will publish an action plan on asset recovery, including support to the Law Commission's work to identify reforms to improve the confiscation regime, due to complete by 2020. As part of the plan, we will explore how private firms could assist in asset recovery. We will also increase the funding by 50% to £7.5 million in 2018/19 for key national capabilities such as the network of ACE teams.

76 The UK established a public register of company beneficial ownership information in 2016. In July 2018, we published draft legislation for the creation of a register of beneficial owners of overseas companies owning property in the UK. This follows the commitment made at the Anti-Corruption Summit in 2016 to combat money laundering and increase the transparency of the UK property market. The new register will be the first of its kind in the world and will aim to make it more difficult for kleptocrats and serious and organised criminals to hide their illicit funds in the UK.

40 Under Part 7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, individual persons and businesses in the regulated sector are required not only to report before the event suspicious transactions or activity that they become aware of, but to desist from completing these transactions until a specific consent is received from the relevant law enforcement agency. This is known as the 'consent regime'.

41 HM Treasury and Home Office, 'National risk assessment of money laundering and terrorist financing 2017', October 2017.

42 Further information is online at: <https://flagitup.campaign.gov.uk/>

77 We will also tighten rules on UK Limited Partnerships, including Scottish limited partnerships (SLPs) to prevent abuse by criminals. Limited partnerships continue to fulfil important functions in key sectors of our economy. However, the NCA has identified a disproportionately high volume of suspected criminal activity involving SLPs, and there are ways to strengthen and update the legal framework. The government launched a consultation in April 2018, which included proposals to strengthen and update the legal framework for limited partnerships. The government will set out reforms to the law governing limited partnerships, including SLPs, by the end of the year. Reforms will require primary legislation and it would be our intention to legislate as soon as Parliamentary time allows.

78 In preparation for the UK's exit from the European Union, Parliament passed the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, which received Royal Assent in May 2018. This primary legislation will provide the UK with powers to impose sanctions, including for human rights purposes. The government could use these powers to address corruption, where this meets one of the purposes set out in the Act, for example, furthering a UK foreign policy objective. We are working to operationalise the Sanctions Act for when the UK leaves the EU. The government will make decisions on the use of sanctions in the future where appropriate, as part of the UK's wider foreign policy and national security toolkit. The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act will also require Overseas Territories to introduce public beneficial ownership registers.

### **Sharpening and deepening specialist online capabilities**

79 Our programme to tackle cyber crime is underpinned by wider objectives set out in the NCSS and by funding from the National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) and Home Office. Over the last two years, we have invested over £50 million in strengthening the capabilities of the NCA's National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU) and continuing to develop cyber teams within each of the ROCUs in England and in Wales. In 2018/19, we will invest a further £50 million to enhance NCA and ROCU digital forensics, intelligence and data-sharing capabilities, as well as to ensure every police force in England and in Wales has a dedicated specialist cyber crime unit to increase local investigative capabilities.

80 The Home Office will lead a three year programme with an initial investment of £4.5 million, to enhance our specialist Dark Web skills and capability, through reinforcing the work of the UKIC and the NCA's Dark Web Intelligence Unit, and investing in strong working partnerships with other countries. In 2019, the Home Office will launch a national training programme, ensuring those working in this area are equipped to investigate properly and prosecute those who commit offences on the Dark Web.

## Harnessing Science and Technology

We need to be at the leading edge of developments in data analytics, biometrics, screening technologies, behavioural and social sciences, continuously innovating to stay ahead of the threat and keep pace with the rapid rate of change. We will support initiatives that seek to explore the ethics of using artificial intelligence in the exploitation and interpretation of big data. This will involve use of innovative detection technologies and algorithms to detect the concealment of weapons and analytical tools that alert us to patterns in communications that might indicate sexual exploitation.

The Home Office will develop a cross-government Science, Technology, Analysis and Research (STAR) strategy. This will consider our response to serious and organised crime and terrorism, taking a full spectrum approach to countering sophisticated threats and ensuring the transfer of learning and knowledge regardless of threat type. We will develop new relationships with wider government partners, such as BEIS, DCMS and UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), to leverage industrial strategy research and development investments. We will also strengthen our partnerships with industry and academia to deliver innovative solutions and explore opportunities to strengthen our collaboration with our priority international partners, including the Five Eyes security partnership, ensuring we understand and are in a position to exploit the global nature of technological change.

In the communications environment, technological advancements can have a profound impact on law enforcement's ability to detect and investigate criminal activity. Threat and Risk Assessment, Capability Exploration and Research (TRACER) is an NCA-led community hub which examines technological developments in their wider context and the implications for serious and organised crime. TRACER monitors changes in the communications environment, including those resulting from legislative change, social trends and commercial drivers, and assesses the likely opportunities and threats for operational outcomes. It also coordinates the development of the community's responses to mitigate threats and exploit opportunities.

## Putting data and intelligence at the heart of our approach

**81** To enable the government and law enforcement agencies, in particular the NCA, to more effectively penetrate criminal networks, we will place new data, intelligence and assessment capabilities at the heart of our response, complemented by a new intelligence operating model.

**82** We will establish a multi-agency National Assessment Centre (NAC) within the NCA. The NAC will fuse data, intelligence and open source information to produce a single understanding of serious and organised crime threats. It will draw on the assessments of law enforcement agencies at all levels and work with UKIC to develop our understanding of online threats and vulnerabilities in particular, including cyber crime and child sexual exploitation and abuse. It will identify the National Intelligence Requirements (NIRs) which highlight the gaps in our understanding and direct partners to fill them. Joint working between the NAC and other assessment bodies, such as the NCSC on cyber crime and the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) on specific overlaps between serious and organised crime and terrorism, will also ensure we have a comprehensive understanding of national security risks in the round.

**83** NAC assessments will drive the operational response across the system, informing the investigations and interventions of the NCA, wider law enforcement agencies and the multi-agency NECC. The NAC will be a key customer of the NDEC (outlined further below),

using its data outputs to underpin assessments, helping to target activity against high end criminals and, at an earlier stage, spot patterns and identify new vulnerabilities that criminals have begun to exploit.

84 The work of the NAC and our reformed approach to intelligence includes increasing the number of analysts with the requisite skills, and building consistent standards of professionalism around intelligence across the national security and law enforcement communities. This will be taken forward by the Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis, the College of Policing (through the Intelligence Professionalisation Programme and review of the Authorised Professional Practice for Intelligence Management) and NPCC (through the National Police Intelligence Strategy 2017-2025).

85 The Government Agency Intelligence Network (GAIN) provides an essential gateway for sharing intelligence between its members.<sup>43</sup> It is fundamental to the work carried out by local disruptions teams who, working closely with the public and private sectors, use non-criminal justice techniques and non-traditional policing methods to disrupt local organised crime groups. In 2018 a new National GAIN Intelligence Hub was established to provide a single point of contact for its member agencies to gather or share intelligence. The enhancement of GAIN will support the development of intelligence and data capabilities within the NCA. It will feed into the NAC and NDEC and support better outcomes at the regional level, contributing to a single and enhanced understanding of the threat.

86 We will transform the way we use data to tackle serious and organised crime by building a new National Data Exploitation Capability (NDEC) within the NCA, in collaboration with law enforcement and national security partners. The NDEC will be a national central capability which will significantly reduce the time taken to ingest, process and exploit existing data which support law enforcement agencies' responses to serious and organised crime. The NDEC will proactively acquire new and underused datasets and use the latest data science to identify patterns in the data and links between different entities (such as offences, people, locations, vehicles or communications), adhering to national data standards and strategies.

### Improving the evidence base

87 To enhance the evidence base and harness the expertise of the academic sector, the Home Office has published a prioritised set of research requirements to support this strategy, after working with partners to review the existing evidence to identify where there are gaps, and sources of data and funding. One immediate research requirement will be to improve our understanding of criminal markets. The NAC and Home Office will undertake pilot projects to understand how market forces such as supply and demand apply to different illicit markets, and test new ways of undermining the business models of organised crime groups by targeting law enforcement activity in innovative ways.

43 GAIN member agencies include the National Police Chiefs' Council, National Crime Agency, Department for Work and Pensions, HM Revenue & Customs, Intellectual Property Office, Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, UK Visas & Immigration, Companies House, Charity Commission, National Trading Standards, Security Industry Authority, Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Food Standards Agency, Gambling Commissions, Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency, Insolvency Service, Gangmasters & Labour Abuse Authority, NHS Protect, Environment Agency, ACRO Criminal Records Office. The Police Service of Northern Ireland and Police Scotland are not core members of GAIN but work with the network on a case-by-case basis.

## Firearms and Drugs

We work nationally to reduce the threat to the UK from the criminal use of firearms, and with our international partners and across law enforcement to disrupt firearms trafficking into the UK. Our focus on the heightened threat from firearms has evolved over recent years. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, in which automatic weapons were used to inflict mass casualties, we increased the pace and breadth of our work.

In 2016 Operation DRAGONROOT tested the intelligence processes and operational response to the firearms threat. Led by the NCA and Counter-Terrorism (CT) Policing, it brought together national level coordination and operational support to the ROCUs, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), Border Force, the National Ballistics Intelligence Service and the UK Armed Forces. The lessons learnt from the operation led to the establishment of a multi-agency firearms unit led jointly by the NCA and CT Policing. The unit coordinates law enforcement activity to improve our understanding of the threat from firearms. This includes focusing our international footprint on source countries of firearms trafficked into the UK and joint-working across law enforcement to disrupt supply. We are also taking action to improve firearms controls to prevent firearms being diverted from lawful ownership to the criminal marketplace. This includes greater regulation of antique firearms, statutory guidance for the police on firearms and shotgun licensing, and new offences on unlawfully converting imitation firearms and making defectively deactivated firearms available for sale.

There has been an upward trend in firearms offences since 2014, although they are still 32% below a decade ago and 43% lower than their peak in 2005/6. The Serious Violence Strategy sets out the drivers behind recent increases in serious violence including gun crime. Major factors include changes in the drugs market, including an increase in cocaine supply, an increase in the use of crack cocaine and the development of county lines networks as a means of drugs distribution. Tackling underlying issues such as misuse of drugs, county lines and criminal finances form part of the objectives outlined in this strategy.

As set out also in the Serious Violence Strategy, we have established a new National County Lines Co-ordination Centre (NCLCC) to help bring together the law enforcement effort against criminal gangs and organised crime groups involved in county lines drug dealing. The NCA provides a central point at which intelligence and information is shared and the links with criminal exploitation and illegal drugs markets are identified. Using this national capability has resulted in a clearer picture of the threat, enhanced intelligence, and provision of support for operational policing. The Home Office will support the work of the NPCC and NCA to develop the NCLCC by providing funding of £3.6 million over the next two years.

## Maximising our ability to intervene upstream and at our borders

88 The border remains a unique intervention point for stopping criminals and harmful goods coming to our shores, and the UK has advanced capabilities to identify and prevent people and harmful goods arriving in the UK.

89 The UK is part of the Common Travel Area (CTA) with Ireland, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, reflecting our close historical ties. This arrangement will be maintained after the UK exits the EU. The UK will continue to work closely with Ireland and the Crown Dependencies to further improve security at the external border of the CTA.

90 A wide range of organisations work together to maintain the UK's maritime security and the security of our territorial waters. The Joint Maritime Operations Centre, established in 2016, has now been expanded into a Joint Maritime Operations Co-ordination Centre (JMOC) involving the Home Office, Royal Navy, Border Force, Police, NCA, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Marine Management Organisation and other maritime agencies. The police, Border Force, NCA and the Royal Navy use their powers to enforce UK criminal law at sea. This includes surveillance, deterring unlawful activity and interdicting suspect vessels. Police forces use local knowledge to respond to maritime threats in their region. Border Force's maritime fleet is active in protecting the UK's territorial waters and works with regions and maritime professionals, UK-wide, to combat illegal activity. Border Force continues deployments in the Central Mediterranean and Aegean in support of efforts to combat organised immigration crime.

91 The first opportunity to intervene is prior to travel. We carry out 100% of checks on passengers arriving at the border on scheduled services from outside of the CTA. The UK has also developed the use of biometric visas, advance passenger information and the Authority to Carry ('No Fly') scheme to identify and prevent individuals of concern travelling to the UK. We use freight data, provided ahead of arrival, to target consignments of concern. This supplements world leading screening and detection technologies deployed at the border, including detection dogs.

92 We will now work to require more complete and accurate data from aviation, maritime and rail carriers about passengers and freight, whilst upgrading our ability to analyse the data at pace to detect and target threats before they come to the UK. We will continue to trial and develop the use of innovative biometric technologies to increase our ability to verify travellers' identities.

93 Border controls are undermined by corruption, with port workers in the UK and overseas often the target of corruption by serious and organised crime networks. The smuggling of illegal commodities, particularly Class A drugs, is the most common activity of corrupt insiders at ports.<sup>44</sup> The government's Anti-Corruption Strategy includes a comprehensive programme to understand, manage and mitigate this threat.<sup>45</sup> Law enforcement agencies will target those who use corruption, collusion and coercion at our airports and ports. We will also strengthen information sharing about those working in sensitive environments in airports to ensure they are not of security concern.

94 A priority for all agencies remains breaking the cycle of organised crime groups focused on moving people and commodities into the UK illegally, selling the proceeds and laundering the money through a variety of means, including cross-border movement of physical cash. Intelligence development of illegal cash movement is focused on the abuse of particular methodologies and transport routes and will inform the progression of a comprehensive multi-agency, illicit cash management plan. Seed funding has also been provided to scope the creation of a dedicated multi-agency, cash focused intelligence cell, which will increase attention on this significant illicit finance risk.

44 National Crime Agency, 'National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2017', June 2017.

45 Online at: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/667221/6\\_3323\\_Anti-Corruption\\_Strategy\\_WEB.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/667221/6_3323_Anti-Corruption_Strategy_WEB.pdf)

95 Immigration Enforcement is critical in disrupting organised crime groups and tackling organised immigration crime, modern slavery and human trafficking. Immigration Enforcement disrupted 417 organised crime groups in 2017/18. We will maximise the use of nationality and immigration powers against individuals involved in serious and organised crime. Where appropriate, this includes depriving individuals of their British citizenship and excluding foreign nationals from the UK whose presence here would not be conducive to the public good.

### Organised Immigration Crime

Organised immigration crime involves the illegal facilitation by organised crime groups of migrants to access or remain illegally in the UK through a variety of methods and routes: by air, clandestinely over land and sea, using false documents or by abusing legitimate means of entry such as visa abuse and sham marriages. These organised crime groups are also routinely involved in other types of serious and organised crime.

The UK plays a leading role in identifying and pursuing the groups involved in immigration crime by following a whole-of-route approach from source, in-transit and destination countries including the UK and other EU Member States. We tackle the threat upstream, and have a considerable overseas presence operating across the globe. Our staff use the intelligence gathered and developed in the course of their work to focus on disrupting and dismantling the criminal business model behind organised immigration crime. We also raise awareness of the realities of engaging in this type of crime to prevent the exploitation of vulnerable individuals from the outset. Migrants are also at great risk of modern slavery; the UK law enforcement response therefore includes identifying and safeguarding vulnerable individuals and victims encountered to ensure they receive the most appropriate care.

The UK uses all available sources, from local communities in the UK to transit countries upstream, to build a comprehensive intelligence picture on the organised immigration crime threat. Engagement through bilateral relationships, international forums and law enforcement institutions allows the UK to collaborate internationally with partners and coordinate joint operations across the globe. Since 2015, the UK has added further resources through the Organised Immigration Crime Taskforce (Project INVIGOR), which has staff from the NCA, Immigration Enforcement, Border Force, CPS and Home Office deployed in 17 countries. This is designed to further improve our intelligence picture, investigate and disrupt the organised crime groups involved, build the capacity of source and transit countries to tackle organised immigration crime, disrupt the use of enablers and disrupt and recover illicit finances.

UK law enforcement is also developing and transforming its capabilities and networks in order to respond flexibly to the threat, as organised crime groups become more advanced. We are currently mobilising a whole-of-government approach against organised immigration crime by going beyond traditional law enforcement responses, where organised crime remains a key obstacle to local economic development, legal employment and long-term stability in certain parts of Africa from which migrants try to enter the UK illegally.

## Measuring success

96 We aim to demonstrate that we have significantly raised the risk of operating for the highest harm serious and organised criminals, both within the UK and overseas, online and offline. Success will mean that new data and intelligence capabilities will have penetrated and disrupted individuals and networks in new ways, meaning that we are arresting and prosecuting high harm criminals, stopping them from abusing, denying them their money and assets, dismantling their networks and breaking their business model. We will measure our success through a combination of operational data and qualitative assessment, including: numbers and impact of disruptions carried out by law enforcement; arrest, charge and convictions data; assets seized relating to serious and organised crime; and progress in delivering new capabilities such as the NECC, NDEC, NAC and a reformed SARs regime.

## Testing and Exercising

Testing and exercising helps us to assess and improve the effectiveness of our response. We will expand the Serious and Organised Crime Exercise (SOCX) Programme, established in 2014, to do this. It will drive improvements in our response, focusing on the areas of highest threat and vulnerability where we need more assurance in getting the right collective cross-system response. This programme will also allow us to test new capabilities and operating models resulting from this strategy, informing and shaping their development.

Our exercises to date have involved dozens of police forces and their corresponding ROCUs in England and in Wales, Police Scotland, the Police Service of Northern Ireland, Counter Terrorism Units, the NCA, HMRC, the NCSC and many other organisations from the public, private and voluntary sectors. For example, in 2015 the SOCX Programme delivered the first national, multi-agency, 'live-play' exercise to test the interoperability of policing, law enforcement agencies and other partners in a simulated NCA-led surveillance operation on a subject of interest travelling around the UK for a series of clandestine meetings with associates.

Our plan to expand the SOCX Programme will deliver:

- an increased number of national exercises, including testing collaboration on counter-terrorism and serious and organised crime, and sharing of capabilities to surge resources in times of need;
- a dedicated cyber exercising team – working with the NCSC and NCCU – which will deliver the first national live-play cyber crime exercise to tests how we recover, share and analyse intelligence digital evidence;
- exercise packages that regional and local partners can deliver themselves to help build local and regional resilience and embed lessons identified; and
- international exercising that improves the effectiveness of our upstream interventions.



## **Objective 2: Building the highest levels of defence and resilience in vulnerable people, communities, businesses and systems**

97 Our citizens, businesses and public sector organisations should build the highest levels of defence against organised criminals. Vulnerable people and communities who are most impacted or who are at risk of being exploited or intimidated by serious and organised criminals need protection and support. Some of the most prominent harms to our citizens are from child sexual exploitation and abuse, cyber crime, fraud and modern slavery, all of which are increasingly practised online on a significant scale.

### **Building resilience in vulnerable people and communities**

#### **Child sexual exploitation and abuse**

98 While child sexual exploitation and abuse and other crimes involving exploitation may be hidden from view, the harm caused can take an enormous and often life-long toll on victims, their families and communities at large. Victims of child sexual exploitation and abuse are more likely to suffer from mental health problems, attempt suicide and develop substance dependencies.<sup>46</sup> Those who are abused as children are more likely to be re-victimised later in life.<sup>47</sup> There are serious and wide-ranging physical and mental health impacts of modern slavery. Poor mental health has been found to be prevalent among victims of human trafficking, particularly Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, anxiety and stress.<sup>48</sup>

99 To strengthen the resilience of children and young people, the Home Office has launched a £13 million Trusted Relationship fund for England which will support projects which help those who may be at risk of exploitation and abuse to build positive and genuinely trusted relationships with professionals in their lives. The Home Office will continue to run the 'Disrespect NoBody' campaign, now in its third phase, with an additional £850,000 of funding which aims to improve young people's confidence in their understanding of consent and healthy relationships.<sup>49</sup>

100 The Department for Education (DfE) is introducing compulsory Relationships Education in primary schools and Relationships and Sex Education in secondary schools. These subjects will help ensure all young people understand the characteristics of healthy relationships, signs of unhealthy relationships, how to keep themselves safe and how to seek help and support. From September 2018, all schools in England must have regard to revised statutory guidance 'Keeping Children Safe in Education'<sup>50</sup> which includes a specific section covering child on child sexual violence and sexual harassment.

46 Department of Health and Chanon Consulting, 'Health impacts of child sexual exploitation', January 2014.

47 Office for National Statistics, 'People who are abused as children are more likely to be abused as an adult', 27 September 2017. Online at: <http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/articles/peoplewhowereabusedaschildrenaremorelikelytobeabusedasanadult/2017-09-27>

48 Public Health England, 'Modern Slavery and Public Health', 7 December 2017. Online at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/modern-slavery-and-public-health>

49 Further information on the campaign is online at: <https://www.disrespectnobody.co.uk>

50 Department for Education, 'Keeping children safe in education: Statutory guidance for schools and colleges', September 2018. Online at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/741314/Keeping\\_Children\\_Safe\\_in\\_Education\\_3\\_September\\_2018\\_14.09.18.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/741314/Keeping_Children_Safe_in_Education_3_September_2018_14.09.18.pdf)

101 In February 2017, DfE introduced a new definition of child sexual exploitation, to remove ambiguity and allow all practitioners to work to the same definition, and issued practice guidance for professionals. DfE is intending to contract a new response service to provide support to multi-agency partners in local areas to help them address child sexual exploitation, together with other threats involving child exploitation such as gangs, county lines, modern slavery of children and child trafficking. It will launch in 2019 with funding of up to £2 million. Public Health England has also published guidance<sup>51</sup> to support local public health leaders to prevent and intervene early in cases of child sexual exploitation.

102 With many people now conducting their personal relationships online, technology has enabled criminals who exploit vulnerable people to groom their victims with unprecedented speed and to devastating effect. We will continue to invest in tailored communications aimed at supporting young people to act in a safe, responsible and legal way online. For example we will continue to work with the IWF and Marie Collins Foundation on a joint campaign to educate young people on the law and encourage reporting of illegal material. To date, the campaign has been viewed over nine million times helping to double the visits to the IWF website (containing reporting guidance and mechanisms) from 22,617 in March 2017 to 48,144 in March 2018. We will evolve our approach to communications, testing new tools and techniques to keep pace with the evolving nature of child sexual exploitation and abuse offending to deter involvement and protect victims from harm.

103 Given the increased scale and complexity of child sexual exploitation and abuse online, it is vital for the government and its partners to work together. The Home Office has already invested in Project Arachnid, run by the Canadian Centre for Child Protection, which is a crawler that searches the open web for material relating to child sexual exploitation and abuse. It has analysed around 52 billion images and 1.3 billion URLs for suspected child sexual exploitation and abuse material and issued more than 900,000 take down notices. We will maximise our partners' efforts by improving levels of information sharing on online child sexual exploitation and abuse. The government will build a platform to exchange information with partners to help them make children less vulnerable to abuse, recognise suspicious activity and report it, and to make it harder for offenders to act. GCHQ is assisting with ways to make information available to a wide range of partners, such as industry and civil society, and ensure they are able to take action against prolific offenders.

104 It is important for the private sector not only to make referrals to law enforcement agencies, but also to proactively prevent offending taking place on online platforms, allowing law enforcement agencies to focus on the highest harm offending. We will solicit companies to proactively take action in order to protect users and deny offenders the opportunity to use online platforms and services to access children and child sexual exploitation and abuse content. This is aligned with the objectives of CONTEST and the forthcoming Online Harms White Paper. This requires companies to proactively identify and act on content or conduct to prevent offending; it requires them to develop and apply advances in technology to automate these approaches, including through artificial intelligence; and it requires those in the vanguard to show a greater level of transparency and share tools and techniques with other companies. This approach must move beyond taking down material to blocking it at the point of upload, stopping online grooming, shutting down live streaming of child sexual exploitation and abuse, stopping offenders engaging with each other, and being more forward leaning in helping law

51 Public Health England, 'Child sexual exploitation: How public health can support prevention and intervention', July 2017. Online at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/629315/PHE\\_child\\_exploitation\\_report.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/629315/PHE_child_exploitation_report.pdf)

enforcement agencies to respond to these types of crimes. Early in 2018, the Home Office undertook proofs of concept on artificial intelligence in partnership with industry. We will start introducing operational capability to policing in 2019.

### WePROTECT Global Alliance

The UK launched WePROTECT in 2014 to galvanise global political will to combat online child sexual exploitation abuse. In 2015 the initiative merged with the US and EU-led Global Alliance Against Child Sexual Abuse Online to create an even stronger coalition. The WePROTECT Global Alliance now has 82 countries, eight regional organisations, 20 technology and industry bodies, and 24 international civil society organisations under its banner. To date WePROTECT Global Alliance has achieved:

- WePROTECT Hackathon: In 2014, over 60 companies came together to generate ideas for technical solutions to prevent children from being sexually exploited online.
- Model National Response: Launched in 2016, a new globally recognised toolkit instructing countries on what they need to do to tackle child sexual exploitation and abuse. This has improved country performance in key areas such as building specialised law enforcement capabilities and reporting mechanisms.
- Funding of £40 million pledged by the UK from 2016 to 2020 to support national and international capacity to respond to online child sexual exploitation and abuse. The first £20 million has already supported over 30 projects including a new online reporting portal for victims in Tanzania, training for government officials in Jordan so that they can more effectively investigate child sexual exploitation and abuse, and supporting an NGO in the Philippines.
- In 2018, the first ever Global Threat Assessment on online child sexual exploitation and abuse in partnership with NCA, Interpol and US Department of Justice. This provides a deeper understanding of the online threat at the global level and how it is evolving, and creates a baseline to monitor the positive impact of interventions.

Looking ahead, the WePROTECT Global Alliance will produce a Global Strategic Response to set out the action needed at transnational level to tackle online child sexual abuse. This will provide guidance for governments, international institutions and civil society organisations on how to collaborate across borders.

### Support to vulnerable communities

**105** Organised crime groups particularly exploit communities that are already vulnerable or have poor relations with the state. These criminals can create an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, which over time becomes the norm, ruining lives and driving out legitimate businesses. In some cases, they undermine the functions of the state by providing alternative forms of security and employment, combined with retribution.

**106** While community policing has a long history, the concept of building the resilience of communities to serious and organised crime is still developing. Several forces are successfully working with local authorities to help communities develop resistance. An increasing number of forces are also linking local policing with local intelligence on serious and organised crime to ensure community policing efforts are aimed at those areas of concern. Current work in this area is focused around local police officers engaging communities, guided by Serious and Organised Crime Local Profiles, introduced as part of the 2013 SOC Strategy, which give

them the information they need to understand the particular challenges in their area. In 2019, we will publish updated guidance to ensure local profiles reflect the changing nature of the threat, and complement the Modern Slavery Strategy and Serious Violence Strategy.

**107** There is a range of existing work across government helping to build community resilience. In England, the government's Integrated Communities Strategy aims to bring people together, whatever their background.<sup>52</sup> The Troubled Families Programme provides support to families with complex needs. DfE is also working in England to improve pupil attendance and behaviour in schools, which are of particular relevance given links between low educational attainment and involvement in serious and organised crime. In Wales, the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 encourages public bodies in Wales to think more about the long-term, work better with people and communities and each other, look to prevent problems and take a more joined-up approach.

**108** To ensure there is a single, coherent response at a local level that brings together all the existing support of the state to help community resilience, the Home Office is introducing Serious and Organised Crime Community Coordinators in England and in Wales, initially in five priority locations in 2018: Bradford, Brighton, Newport, Sedgemoor and Speke/Halton. The community coordinators will also have access to new project funding to deliver further targeted local interventions to raise awareness, build resilience in communities and draw vulnerable people away from serious and organised crime. The Home Office will also publish a toolkit for practitioners (such as local and neighbourhood policing, community safety managers, local authority housing leads), with a set of evaluated approaches to building community resilience which they can use.

**109** To strengthen the resilience of communities to modern slavery, the Home Office has worked with Nigerian communities in Manchester and Barking & Dagenham to co-create and pilot communications activity designed to help this community spot the signs of domestic servitude and encourage them to report suspicions. Initial evaluation was positive in that those who recognised the campaign also scored highly on knowing where to direct victims and how to spot the signs of slavery. We will use the learning from this approach to introduce further targeted communications about specific types of modern slavery in local communities, to encourage reporting.

### **Reducing public tolerance and tackling criminal markets**

**110** Serious and organised crime is often disguised as legitimate businesses or as 'low level' crime. For instance, some nail bars or car wash employees are exploited for their labour. People may buy cheap cigarettes or alcohol or use illicit goods or services such as drugs or prostitution, thinking that the harm to others is negligible. But these trades generate millions of pounds every year for transnational criminal enterprises, who use these profits, combined with violence and exploitation of the most vulnerable, to generate more crime (Figure 4).

**111** We want the public to play a key role in helping reduce demand for illicit goods and services. We want our citizens to spot and stop using goods and services linked to serious and organised crime. We have made early progress through the Modern Slavery Act and subsequent publications<sup>53</sup> by obliging certain businesses to disclose annually the steps they take to tackle slavery in their supply chains.<sup>54</sup>


<sup>52</sup> HM Government, 'Integrated Communities Strategy Green Paper', March 2018.

<sup>53</sup> 'Code of Practice: Ethical Employment in Supply Chains' (Wales) and 'Transparency in Supply Chains: A practical guide' (England).

<sup>54</sup> The Transparency in Supply Chains Provision in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 places this obligation on businesses with annual turnover of £36 million or higher.

112 Through increased targeted Home Office led communications campaigns, we will increase awareness of how serious and organised crime manifests itself, and the relationship between illegal goods and the harm caused to vulnerable children and adults. Strategic communications on modern slavery will target vulnerable communities, to raise awareness, reduce tolerance and drive reporting of victims and perpetrators.

Figure 4 – Examples of criminal markets impacting the UK



## Building our defences

113 Our approach to building our defences will align with the protections set out in wider relevant government strategies, in particular the NCSS, the Modern Crime Prevention Strategy<sup>55</sup> and the Anti-Corruption Strategy. In addition, we will develop technical online solutions to strengthen our systems and better integrate our response with the private sector to 'design out' crime. Building on work to date, we will also look to expand global partnerships with industry and like-minded countries.

114 We will improve regulatory frameworks and make sure businesses and public sector bodies have the advice they need to better protect their organisations. As set out in the Anti-Corruption Strategy, this includes measures to build greater resilience against corruption, addressing the threat from both corrupt officials and those who seek to use corruption to further their criminal aims or to gain a business advantage. Priority sectors include borders, prisons, policing and local government, with specific measures to improve awareness, training, intelligence-sharing and reporting to reduce overall levels of vulnerability.

55 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/modern-crime-prevention-strategy>

## Cyber crime

115 Most online activity occurs without incident. However anyone can fall prey to cyber criminals if they do not take basic security precautions. According to data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales, less than half of individuals download software and patches whenever prompted.<sup>56</sup> Meanwhile, the 2018 Cyber Security Breaches Survey found that only 27% of business had a formal policy that covers cyber security risks.<sup>57</sup>

116 The NCSC was created in 2016 to help protect our critical services from cyber attacks, manage major incidents and improve the underlying security of the UK internet. Active Cyber Defence is a NCSC programme which is intended to tackle the high-volume attacks that affect people's everyday lives. It is already delivering in four main areas across the public sector: blocking fake emails; stopping government systems using malicious websites; providing web checks for public sector organisations to identify common vulnerabilities and fix simple issues on their websites; and takedown notifications where malicious content is found. The programme is looking to expand further in the public sector and increase adoption in the private sector.<sup>58</sup>

117 The government is determined to strengthen cyber security skills and industry in the UK. DCMS is developing a cyber skills strategy to draw together a range of government led initiatives. One of the key commitments in the NCSS is to ensure the right ecosystem exists to support a thriving cyber security sector. The NCSC Cyber Accelerator helps to keep businesses and the public safe from cyber attacks by driving innovation in the cyber security sector. The London Office for Rapid Cybersecurity Advancement was opened in June 2018 to support innovators in cybersecurity and will be delivered by Plexal, working with the Centre for Secure Information Technologies (CSIT) and Deloitte.

118 We will work with the private sector to 'design out' crime. Through its Secure by Design<sup>59</sup> work, the government is working to ensure that the consumer Internet of Things is secure by default, with security built in from the start. We will encourage individuals and businesses to build resilience against the threat from cyber crime, through the government's Cyber Aware and Take Five campaigns which encourage the public, and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to adopt more secure online behaviour. Cyber Aware is supported by 590 private and public sector partners who encourage good cyber security behaviours through their own channels. An estimated 11 million adults and 1.4 million SMEs claimed they were more likely to maintain or take up key cyber security behaviours as a result of Cyber Aware at the end of 2016/17.

119 Within the NCA, the NCCU is the UK lead for tackling the threat from cyber crime. The NCCU has the responsibility and capability to lead the operational response, coordinate activity across a range of partners and provide specialist cyber support and expertise across law enforcement. We will build dedicated specialist cyber crime units in all police forces, which will be regionally managed and locally delivered. We have also created a network of regional Protect officers based in ROCUs to create the link between the local and national tiers in law enforcement. The network delivers consistent and coherent cyber security advice to citizens and businesses, based on the latest understanding of the threat from the NCSC. The officers engage with vulnerable groups, SMEs, schools and other public bodies, and deliver targeted

56 Online at: [https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/adhocs/007804\\_proportionofadultinternetusersadoptingvariousonlinesecuritymeasuresbyageandsexyearendingmarch2014toyearendingmarch2017csew](https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/adhocs/007804_proportionofadultinternetusersadoptingvariousonlinesecuritymeasuresbyageandsexyearendingmarch2014toyearendingmarch2017csew)

57 Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, 'Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2018', April 2018.

58 Further information on Active Cyber Defence is online at <https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/active-cyber-defence>.

59 Further information is online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/secure-by-design>

interventions where specific vulnerabilities are identified. Police Scotland and the Police Service of Northern Ireland have adopted a similar model to ensure this approach is broadly replicated across the UK. NCSP has funded Police Scotland's Protect officers to extend their work in this area.

120 Despite the success of these interventions, the lack of comprehensive nationwide adoption of basic cyber security leaves individuals and businesses at risk; many cyber threats can be prevented, or at least the impact reduced, by adopting basic cyber security measures.<sup>60</sup> However, it can be confusing for the public and businesses to know what measures are done automatically, and what they need to do themselves. To tackle this we will take a whole-of-government approach to deliver a step change in attitudes and behaviours on cyber security, alongside focused policy interventions to address vulnerabilities, from personal computers to the most sophisticated networks. We will create a dedicated cross-government team to ensure integrated delivery across all relevant departments and agencies. The team will use all available levers, from nudge techniques to legislative action, to bring the full weight of government to bear on delivering the further change required.

## Fraud

121 Fraud and cyber crime continue to be among the most commonly experienced crimes in the UK, with 3.3 million incidents of fraud recorded in the year ending June 2018.<sup>61</sup> The cost to businesses and the public sector from organised fraud is no less than £5.9 billion.<sup>62</sup> In 2016 the government set up the Joint Fraud Taskforce (JFT) to bring together industry, law enforcement and government to protect the public from fraud. This builds on the work of the City of London Police who run Action Fraud, the online and telephone reporting centre for fraud and financially-motivated cyber crime, and the delivery of the NCSS which is galvanising existing work at the national and regional level. We will now prioritise 'designing out' fraud online, and improving our support to vulnerable and susceptible victims. The JFT will deliver a cross-industry plan to significantly reduce 'Card Not Present' fraud by 2019 by removing loopholes and strengthening customer authentication on online transactions.<sup>63</sup>

## Supporting victims and witnesses

122 Our overarching aim is to protect our citizens by leaving no safe space for serious and organised criminals. But for those who unfortunately become victims or witnesses, we will identify faster those who are harmed and support them to a consistently high standard. We will invest in particular in three key areas of highest harm: child sexual exploitation and abuse, modern slavery and human trafficking, and fraud.

123 The Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (Victims' Code) sets out the services that must be provided to victims of crimes (including serious and organised crime) by organisations in England and in Wales, and sets a minimum standard for these services.<sup>64</sup> Victims of crime should be treated in a respectful, sensitive, tailored and professional manner

60 National Cyber Security Centre, 'The Cyber Threat to UK Businesses: 2017-18' Report, April 2018.

61 Office for National Statistics, 'Crime in England and Wales: year ending June 2018', October 2018.

62 Home Office, 'Understanding organised crime: Estimating the scale and the social and economic costs', November 2018.

63 'Card Not Present' fraud is the most common form of payment card fraud in the UK; it occurs when an individual uses a card (or card details) to make payments online, over the telephone or via mail order without the cardholder's authorisation.

64 Further information is online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-code-of-practice-for-victims-of-crime>. Code of Practice for Victims of Crime – published October 2015 pursuant to Part 3 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 is a statutory code of practice which sets out the services that must by law be provided to victims of crime in England and Wales by criminal justice agencies.

without discrimination of any kind. They should receive appropriate support to help them, as far as possible, to cope and recover and be protected from becoming victims again. Victims need to know what information and support is available to them. Chapter 3 (Children and Young People) of the Victims' Code specifically covers child victims of crime so young people get the additional support they need at all stages of the criminal justice system.<sup>65</sup> The cross-government Victims Strategy, published in September 2018, sets out the government's approach to supporting all victims of crime.<sup>66</sup>

### Child sexual exploitation and abuse

**124** In recent years, we have increased investment and support for victims of child sexual exploitation and abuse. Since 2016, we have protected £7.2 million of MoJ funding for specialist rape support services in England and in Wales, to provide independent specialist support to victims of both recent and historic sexual violence. We are also providing £68 million per year to Police and Crime Commissioners to deliver or commission support services for victims of crime in their area, based on need. This includes support services for victims of sexual violence and child sexual exploitation and abuse.

**125** The government is committed to making sure the victims and survivors of child sexual exploitation and abuse are able to access the right support. In 2018/19, the Home Office will provide £600,000 to the Supporting Victims and Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse fund to enable national services aimed at supporting victims in England and in Wales.<sup>67</sup> This year will also see the launch of the pilot of the 'Child House' model of victim support. This aims to bring a broad range of services, from therapeutic support to legal and criminal justice services, under one roof in a child-friendly environment, to minimise the additional trauma that can be caused to victims from relating their experiences to different service providers. We are supporting the pilot as part of our work to provide evidence of promising new practices in supporting victims.

**126** It can be difficult for those who commission services to be sure that they are commissioning effectively, and for people working in those services to ensure victims are properly referred to the right services at the right time. We will produce and publish a Commissioning Framework for people who commission services for victims of child sexual exploitation and abuse, to improve the quality and consistency of commissioning practice. The framework will set out how to assess need and commission against it, so victims and survivors can be assured they are receiving good-quality support wherever they live and whatever form of child sexual exploitation and abuse they have suffered. The Home Office will also work across government to remove gaps and duplication between victim support services across the health, social care, housing, legal and justice sectors in England.

### Modern slavery and human trafficking

**127** In October 2017, the UK government announced reforms to the NRM – our system for identifying and providing access to support for victims of modern slavery. The reforms focus on decision making within the system, ensuring that victims are better identified and supported, and the specific vulnerabilities of children are recognised. This includes introducing 'places of safety' for those leaving situations of exploitation, tripling the period of move-on support provided to confirmed victims, and introducing drop-in hubs across England for

65 Online at: [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/267982/u18-victims-code-leaflet.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/267982/u18-victims-code-leaflet.pdf).

66 Online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/victims-strategy>

67 Awarded through the MoJ Victims Fund and allocated by the Home Office.



victims for up to six months after they leave central government funded support. The Home Office will also be trialling approaches with six local authorities to transition victims out of care and support them to better integrate back into communities and access local services.<sup>68</sup>

**128** Other existing initiatives continue to improve support for victims of human trafficking or modern slavery. These include a specialist care contract for adult victims of modern slavery in England and in Wales; the full national roll-out of Independent Child Trafficking Advocates (ICTAs) in England and Wales to provide specialist support to trafficked children; and a £2.2 million investment from the Home Office Child Trafficking Protection Fund to protect vulnerable children in the UK and overseas at risk of trafficking.

## Fraud and cyber crime

### Action Fraud

Action Fraud is operated by City of London Police and is the UK's national reporting centre for fraud and cyber crime. It also provides a central point of contact for information about fraud and financially motivated cyber crime. Action Fraud receives and triages reports from victims improving efficiency by recording and analysing fraud reports nationally rather than locally. The service is run alongside the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), which is responsible for analysing and assessing reports and identifying serial offenders and organised crime networks. It then disseminates intelligence to the relevant law enforcement or partner agencies for investigation, as well as fraud alerts to inform businesses and the public of emerging threats. From April 2016 to March 2017 the NFIB disseminated 46,000 reports for further action on intelligence, prevention or victim care and submitted 170,856 requests to partners to close bank accounts, websites and phone numbers suspected of facilitating fraud.

The government will continue to work with law enforcement to strengthen the central reporting, triage, advice and victim support services for policing provided by City of London Police. Improvements to the Action Fraud reporting system were completed in 2018/19.

**129** The government is committed to improving the response to victims of fraud and cyber crime. Through the JFT, we have focused on ensuring a consistent response from the banking sector through the development and implementation of a British Standards Institution standard for victim care, which is now being adopted by all the major banks. We have also supported the development and roll-out of the Banking Protocol, through which bank staff are trained to recognise signs of fraud in branch, and a direct law enforcement response is guaranteed following receipt of a report. The Banking Protocol has now been adopted by all police forces in England and Wales and, at end of April 2017, had stopped over £21.5 million in fraud losses and led directly to 180 arrests.

**130** In partnership with the private sector, law enforcement and victim care agencies, our focus will now be to establish integrated national to local support for victims of fraud and cyber crime, initially through a series of national and local level pilots. Victims are often vulnerable and risk being targeted multiple times, becoming repeat victims, yet some receive little to no direct support after they report a crime. Through these pilots, victims will receive

<sup>68</sup> The six local authorities are Croydon, Redbridge, Leeds, Birmingham, Nottingham and Derby.

a triaged service based on their personal situation and the level of support they require. The aim is to improve the overall level of service for victims and to reduce the levels of repeat victimisation. If the pilots are successful, we will look to roll out this approach across policing.

**131** At the national level, an Economic Crime Victim Care Unit (ECVCU) pilot will look to ensure that the right support is provided to victims by the right organisation, dependent on their individual need. ECVCU will be staffed with a specialist team of trained advocates with a strong understanding of the needs of vulnerable victims. As part of the pilot, victims of fraud and cyber crime reported to Action Fraud will be triaged to assess the victim's individual vulnerability and support needs. To those who require limited support, advice will be offered on their case and how to protect themselves from further harm. For victims identified as requiring further support, the ECVCU advocates will make direct contact to provide more detailed advice and guidance. In cases where the victim is identified as being at particular risk, the ECVCU advocates may refer the individual to locally based safeguarding organisations.

**132** To improve this local level response, the Home Office will pilot two Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH) in 2018/19. A key role of the MASH will be to involve victim care organisations such as Victim Support, Citizen Advice Consumer Service, and local authorities. This will provide a level of care that addresses both immediate and longer term victim needs to mitigate the impact, and reduce the levels of repeat victimisation. The multi-agency model will also trial greater information sharing between the police and victim care agencies on victim data. The aim is to more effectively identify vulnerable victims and disseminate prevention advice, and forms part of the government's approach to reducing overall levels of fraud and cyber crime in the UK.

**133** The JFT is also committed to assessing the legal and regulatory barriers currently stopping victims being reimbursed following their loss. We will work with the private sector and regulators to develop an approach which will see a greater number of victims having their losses returned to them and potentially stopping millions of pounds getting into the hands of criminals.

## Supporting witnesses

**134** In 2013 we established the UK Protected Person Service (UKPPS), overhauling previous witness protection arrangements and developing a ROCU based Protected Person Unit network. The UKPPS provides protection and care to victims and witnesses who are considered by law enforcement agencies to be at risk of serious harm. This specialist covert tactic, operating in an extremely high risk area, is a key tool in fighting serious and organised crime, securing convictions against the most harmful offenders, and ensuring victims, witnesses and communities are protected. In order to develop a national capability which functions on behalf of the system as a whole, we will transfer the UKPPS to the NCA in April 2019.<sup>69</sup>

## Measuring success

**135** We will demonstrate success by removing vulnerabilities in our systems and organisations, giving criminals fewer opportunities to target and exploit. Success will mean our citizens better recognise the techniques of criminals and take steps to protect themselves. Communities will be better prepared for and more resilient to the threat, and less tolerant of illegal activity. We will identify faster those who are harmed and support them to a consistently high standard.

<sup>69</sup> The UKPPS will oversee the Protected Person Units within all ROCUs and the Police Service of Northern Ireland. It will continue to align and work closely with the MPS and Police Scotland.

## **Objective 3: Stopping the problem at source, identifying and supporting those at risk of engaging in criminality**

136 The 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy set out the importance of increasing preventative action to help reduce the threat. Since then we have funded Prevent initiatives in England and in Wales which have focused on diverting young people into education, training and legitimate employment. This work forms one part of the wider government focus on early intervention to prevent crime and improve prospects for young people, including the work outlined in the Serious Violence Strategy, the Trusted Relationships Fund and the government's wider youth justice work.

137 We now intend to reach a significantly larger number of young people to help prevent their recruitment into serious and organised crime. We will prioritise four areas of offending: drug trafficking and distribution; cyber crime; child sexual exploitation and abuse; and professional enablers. Offenders in each of these four areas are drawn into their criminal behaviour for different reasons, so our approach in each case will be different. In developing these approaches we will work with partners in DfE, the Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC), the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), DCMS, Ministry of Justice (MoJ) and the devolved administrations, as well as law enforcement (in line with the Policing Vision 2025<sup>70</sup>). We will bring together academic research and knowledge from the 'what works' centres (particularly the College of Policing, the Early Intervention Foundation and the Youth Justice Board) to develop a clearer picture of which interventions work best across the range of crime types.

## **Tailored approaches to interventions**

### **Drug trafficking and distribution**

138 We will prioritise areas of the country where there are high instances of drug trafficking and distribution. We will combine large-scale outreach work with tailored interventions. Difficult family backgrounds (particularly involving abuse, domestic violence and familial drug taking) increase the chances of young people getting involved in serious and organised crime.<sup>71</sup> To reach young people in this situation, we will undertake large-scale outreach work. In 2015, we published an educational toolkit designed for frontline staff to use in their interactions with 11-18 year olds at potential risk of being drawn into drug-related serious and organised crime (and its associated violence). This was initially disseminated to over 6,000 frontline professionals across the country. Overall evaluation findings are positive, with 95% of practitioners regarding the toolkit as useful in supporting young people. We will develop an online version of this work to reach more young people at risk of involvement. We will also work with other intervention providers (such as the Troubled Families Programme and the Trusted Relationships Fund in England) to ensure tackling drugs related serious and organised crime is included in their interventions where appropriate.

139 For those young people at particular risk (who have family or close friends involved in serious and organised crime) we will use a tailored approach. We will continue to fund interventions through our existing fund (covering England and Wales) and through extra funding in five priority areas (Bradford, Brighton, Newport, Sedgemoor and Speke/Halton) where we will look to upscale targeted Prevent work in partnership with law

70 Online at: <http://www.npcc.police.uk/documents/policing%20vision.pdf>

71 National Crime Agency, 'Intelligence Assessment: Pathways into Serious and Organised Crime', February 2016.

enforcement, local authorities and the private sector (with total funding of £1.65 million). This will complement preventative work set out in the Serious Violence Strategy, notably the £22 million Early Intervention Youth Fund which will support youth and community groups working with children and young people in England and in Wales. In addition, in October 2018 the Home Secretary announced further new measures to tackle serious violence including: a consultation on a proposed new legal duty to underpin a ‘public health’ approach to tackling serious violence; a new £200 million youth endowment fund to focus on young people at risk of crime and violence; and an independent review of drug misuse, to ensure law enforcement agencies and policy are effectively targeting and preventing the drug-related causes of violent crime.

## Operation Guardian

**Dioddefwyr nid troseddwy?**

Cydnabod y dylai plant ac oedolion sy'n agored i niwed ac sy'n cael eu gorfodi i droseddu gan grwpiau o droseddwyr cyfundrefnol, gael eu diogelu ac nid eu cosbi.

**Troseddoldeb Llinellau'r Sir**

Os ydych chi eiddoedd i'w byddhau, baid ddiol ac oedolion sy'n agored i niwed ac sy'n cael eu gorfodi i droseddu gan grwpiau o droseddwyr cyfundrefnol, gael eu diogelu ac nid eu cosbi.

**Wardio eu gwelwch chi'n cael niwed, niwed i'w diol. Rhwyd chi'n gorfodi i droseddu gan grwpiau o droseddwyr cyfundrefnol, gael eu diogelu ac nid eu cosbi.**

**If you suspect a child or young person is being exploited, REPORT IT.**

**Victims not criminals?**

Recognising that children and vulnerable adults who are forced to commit crime by organised crime groups should be protected not punished.

**County Lines Criminality**

Recognising that children and vulnerable adults who are forced and coerced to commit crime should be protected not punished.

Children as young as 12 are being sexually exploited and exploited by organised crime groups and trafficked from across our country, drugs, weapons and money.

**If you suspect a child or young person is being exploited, REPORT IT.**

101  
St Giles Trust  
CRIME STOPPERS  
0800 555 111  
Guardian

Operation Guardian is a campaign launched by South Wales Police in response to county lines, asking officers and partners to recognise that in many cases the people they deal with in relation to county lines criminality are victims not criminals – children and vulnerable adults who commit crime through coercion and intimidation.

## Cyber crime

140 Financial gain is not necessarily a priority for young cyber crime offenders who are also motivated by the pursuit of a challenge and proving themselves to peers.<sup>72</sup> Emboldened by perceived anonymity and a lack of a visible law enforcement presence online, low level cyber criminals may progress to higher level offending without considering or fully comprehending the consequences of their offences.<sup>73</sup> In 2017 we introduced a national network of Prevent officers within ROCUs, coordinated by the NCA's NCCU, to deter individuals becoming involved (or continuing their involvement) in cyber crime. They support individual projects, provide advice and resources to education and local authorities, and identify local private and third sector partners who can help promote messaging. Since the network was set up, NCCU has seen a dramatic increase in referrals from ROCUs for early intervention through the Prevent network. We will build on this work and pilot a Cyber Prevent Intervention Partnership Panel in the London Metropolitan area. This will bring together the different expertise and skills of law enforcement, academia, the private sector and voluntary sector, to more effectively identify at-risk individuals, and deter them from getting involved or continuing in cyber crime.

## Child sexual exploitation and abuse

141 Preventative approaches for child sexual exploitation and abuse are at a relatively early stage of development. In 2017 the government established the Centre of Expertise on Child Sexual Abuse with £7.5 million of funding. Headed by Barnardo's, the centre works to improve

72 National Crime Agency, 'Intelligence Assessment: Pathways Into Cyber Crime', January 2017.

73 National Crime Agency, 'Intelligence Assessment: Pathways Into Cyber Crime', January 2017.

our understanding of the scale and nature of pathways into child sexual offending and what works to prevent and tackle it. One of the key elements of the centre's work is to develop a new evidence base of the typology of child sexual offending. Not all child sexual offending is motivated by a sexual interest in children, and sexual offending can manifest itself in many different ways. This, with the Centre's wider work to support the evaluation of current practice, will ensure that statutory professionals, the technology industry, the third sector and other partners are all able to identify what works in tackling forms of exploitation and abuse, and can target resourcing and disruption efforts most effectively.

### Professional enablers

142 Improving our understanding of offending pathways for professional enablers is a key priority due to their critical role in enabling the illicit finance which underpins serious and organised crime and allows serious and organised criminals to hide their profits and diversify their criminal activity. The Home Office will undertake work with HM Treasury to better understand the pathways for professional enablers with the aim of developing interventions for those at risk. We will work with professional associations in the legal and accountancy sectors to ensure any interventions meet the needs of their members.

## Lifetime management of serious and organised criminals

143 There are around 6,500 serious and organised crime offenders in prisons in England and Wales, representing around 8% of the prison population and representing over 20% of those known to law enforcement agencies as being serious and organised criminals. Some offenders are committed to continuing their criminal activity in our prisons. This offending is enabled by the use of tens of thousands of illicit mobile phones and SIM cards smuggled into prisons each year. In some cases serious and organised criminals have used phones to undertake drug trafficking operations, or coordinate the murder of rival gang members. As well as reducing the number of people drawn into offending in the first place, we also want to reduce the level of offending within prison and reoffending following release. Currently nearly half of all serious and organised crime offenders go on to re-offend within a year of their release from custody.

144 In 2015 the government invested over £28 million over five years to establish the National Prisons Intelligence Coordination Centre (NPICC), a national intelligence network bringing together multi-agency expertise, capability and skills in counter-terrorism and serious and organised crime to identify, prevent and disrupt priority offenders in our prisons. We will continue to build on intelligence and enforcement capability in prisons by working with police and partners to integrate, coordinate and strengthen not only prisons intelligence, but also the range of national and regional tasking, operational and performance functions in prisons. This will include: establishing a national and regional prisons tasking process; delivering a consistent regional prisons intelligence unit model; and implementing a national performance framework.

145 In 2018 the NPCC Serious and Organised Crime Board established a new Lifetime Offender Management portfolio and appointed a senior lead to work across policing and partners to coordinate and drive the implementation of lifetime offender management of priority offenders before, during and after custody.

146 The MoJ and HM Prisons and Probation Service (HMPPS) will also ensure priority serious and organised crime offenders in prisons in England and Wales are risk-assessed, categorised and allocated to the right prisons with the right security measures and capability

to prevent and disrupt their offending. They are investing in a new security directorate and £14 million annually to transform intelligence, search and disruption capability in prisons. In 2016 the government introduced legislation giving courts the power to remotely disconnect mobile phones in use in prisons. We have recently invested in technology to increase the use of these powers, and will review the effectiveness of this legislation in 2019. MoJ and HMPPS will continue to invest in cutting-edge mobile phone denying technology in prisons.

**147** In order to ensure closer management of those unwilling to cease their involvement in serious and organised crime, we will implement in 2019 a new lifetime management framework, designed to better integrate the work of police forces and HMPPS. The framework will set out clear roles and responsibilities across law enforcement at all levels to prevent and disrupt offending in our prisons and by those on probation, and will integrate information sharing between policing and HMPPS. As a result, law enforcement will be able to track and manage priority serious and organised crime offenders through their entire journey in the criminal justice system and beyond, irrespective of where they live or where they are in prison. We will put in place performance reporting and pilots to evaluate the effectiveness of this approach.

**148** We will increase the use of civil powers, such as Serious Crime Prevention Orders (SCPOs) and Slavery and Trafficking Prevention Orders (STPOs)<sup>74</sup>. SCPOs commence when an offender leaves custody and impose targeted measures to prevent further involvement in crime in our communities. Breaching the terms of an SCPO or STPO is a criminal offence which carries a maximum custodial sentence of five years. We will ensure SCPOs are applied to best effect by publishing guidance for their targeted use against priority offenders as well as case-managing and monitoring the effectiveness of SCPOs through a new national database.

**149** When offenders enter the criminal justice system, and particularly if they serve a prison sentence or are on probation, we have the opportunity to work with them to disengage. We will build evidence around what is effective, and what the barriers are that keep offenders from disengaging. We will explore this opportunity through undertaking academic research on pathways out of serious and organised crime, in order to subsequently test potential interventions.

### Measuring success

**150** Success will mean we are using preventative methods and education to divert more young people from a life of serious and organised crime and reduce reoffending. We will know we have been successful if fewer young people are engaging in criminal activity, and fewer convicted serious and organised criminals continue to offend and cause harm in the prison estate or go on to reoffend. We will measure our success through a combination of baseline assessments of the current situation and evaluation of our interventions and communications campaigns.


<sup>74</sup> STPOs can be made in respect of an individual who has not been convicted of a slavery or trafficking offence but is believed to be at risk of committing such an offence, to prevent serious harm to the public.

## Objective 4: Establishing a single, whole-system approach

151 Responding to the breadth of serious and organised crime is beyond the capacity and capabilities of any one body and requires a single whole-system approach. We will align all the law enforcement and government bodies who are involved in confronting the threats we face, ensuring they work together based on a single picture of the demand on the system, and respond using shared capabilities that are built and organised to be used against a range of threats and not just one. We will also ensure all agencies are working together to make best possible use of the full range of powers at our disposal.

152 We will use all available strategic levers to deliver these new capabilities by improving operational governance and coordination at all levels, including increased accountability for delivery, reviewing the Strategic Policing Requirement and proposing amendments if appropriate, introducing a new national tasking framework and exploring a more sustainable funding model.<sup>75</sup> We will also expand our overseas capabilities to make sure we are using our global reach and influence to tackle both international criminal networks and the underlying drivers of serious and organised crime. In this country, we will make sure our response is drawing on the skills, expertise and resources of the private sector.

**Figure 5 – Overview of law enforcement and government bodies involved in tackling serious and organised crime**



75 Further information on the Strategic Policing Requirement is available online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/strategic-policing-requirement>

## Demand

153 While we have made significant progress since the introduction of the 2013 Serious and Organised Crime Strategy and the establishment in the same year of the NCA, the threat is increasing in both volume and complexity. We will establish clear sight across the system of the demand on resources across government and law enforcement to tackle the threat. We will continually review the threat via the NAC using local, regional and national intelligence capabilities to produce a shared picture. And we will match this with regular cross-system monitoring of how this is affecting demand on the system, capturing performance and where we have allocated resource.

## Capabilities and powers

154 Too often, capabilities can be developed in silos (for example against specific threats or separately in different agencies) risking duplication and inefficiency. The Home Office and NCA will develop a system-wide Serious and Organised Crime Capability Strategy, to improve our overall understanding of where our collective capabilities lie, and to improve our understanding of where capabilities are most in need of development. The strategy will provide a common understanding of our capabilities and will be prepared with the support of all partners. Filling a number of known capability gaps, as outlined in this strategy, will form the immediate priorities and include key areas such as data, skills and technologies.


155 Decisions about where and how to invest in new capability, and how to fund it, will be made jointly with the starting point that any new capabilities should be fully interoperable, with consistent operating procedures. Collaboration – including with counter-terrorism policing – will be the default starting position. Specialist capabilities and services (existing examples include the NCA's Modern Slavery Human Trafficking Unit or UKPPS) will be delivered once, nationally, and be accessible to all those who need to use them.

156 This approach to capabilities will ensure that we have a coherent, end-to-end response to complex threats such as drug trafficking and distribution via county lines, for example. Overseas, the NCA's international network will work to prevent the drugs fuelling the problem from leaving source and transit countries: Border Force will stop the drugs entering the UK; NDEC will help identify key hotspots of activity; and regional Dark Web capabilities within ROCUs will inform a more effective neighbourhood response to disrupt offenders and protect vulnerable people.

157 As set out in Objective One, there are extensive criminal and civil powers available to law enforcement and other operational agencies to combat serious and organised crime. We will take a more coordinated and systematic approach to using to their fullest extent the range of powers to disrupt serious and organised criminals and bring them to justice. We will ensure partners are applying new legislation and new provisions, producing further guidance and removing barriers to their use where needed.



Figure 6 – A single, whole-system approach



### Strategic Levers

158 To deliver these new capabilities – and to achieve the whole-system approach set out in Figure 6 – we will use all the strategic levers at our disposal. In September 2017 we established the Serious and Organised Crime Inter Ministerial Group, chaired by the Home Secretary. The group brings together Secretaries of State on the National Security Council (NSC) and the Social Reform Committee,<sup>76</sup> alongside key officials to act as a single decision making body on serious and organised crime. We will use the Inter Ministerial Group to align our overall efforts and ensure we are deploying the full power of the state, society and business to bear down on the threats we face.

159 It is the NCA’s statutory responsibility to lead the overall law enforcement response to serious and organised crime, in partnership with UK law enforcement. In line with this responsibility, and where appropriate to do so, the directed tasking and assistance arrangements available to the NCA (under the Crime and Courts Act 2013) will be used, ensuring that strategic priorities are met. The NCA discharges its statutory leadership responsibility through two processes: National Strategic Tasking and Coordination and National Tactical Tasking and Coordination. Each involves a set of national meetings, chaired by the NCA and attended by senior representatives from the NCA, police and other law enforcement agencies, which set the priorities for law enforcement. The NCA is leading the development of the new tasking model required to deliver a single, whole-system approach. This will amplify our collective response by ensuring UK law enforcement targets its national, regional and local capabilities in areas where we can have the greatest impact and in line with an agreed shared set of priorities.

76 Further information on the National Security Council and the Social Reform Committee is set out in Part Four.

160 ROCUs will lead the operational response to serious and organised crime on behalf of forces within their regions, taking tasking from the NCA on national priorities, and working together in a more networked way, allowing capacity and capability to be shared where appropriate. We will focus on gaining greater consistency across the ROCUs in sharing and exploiting data and intelligence; assessment of threat; and reporting of impact and performance.

161 Police forces, under the oversight of their Police and Crime Commissioners in England and in Wales, will continue to be key to the operational response, working with their ROCUs. The 2017 HMICFRS PEEL Effectiveness Report found that tackling serious and organised crime is something that most England and Wales police forces, working with ROCUs, do well.<sup>77</sup> The 2017 inspection was the third consecutive year in which HMICFRS has inspected serious and organised crime. In 2015, 35 forces were graded as good or outstanding, with the number rising to 38 in 2017.<sup>78</sup> Durham Constabulary, Merseyside Police and Derbyshire Constabulary have retained an outstanding grade since 2015. A list of individual force judgements for serious and organised crime is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7 – HMICFRS PEEL Effectiveness judgement for serious and organised crime

	2015	2016	2017
Avon & Somerset	Good	Requires Improvement	Good
Bedfordshire	Requires Improvement	Requires Improvement	Good
Cambridgeshire	Good	Good	Good
Cheshire	Requires Improvement	Good	Good
City of London	Good	Requires Improvement	Good
Cleveland	Good	Good	Good
Cumbria	Requires Improvement	Good	Good
Derbyshire	Outstanding	Outstanding	Outstanding
Devon & Cornwall	Good	Good	Good
Dorset	Good	Good	Good
Durham	Outstanding	Outstanding	Outstanding
Dyfed-Powys	Good	Good	Good
Essex	Good	Good	Good
Gloucestershire	Requires Improvement	Inadequate	Requires Improvement
Greater Manchester	Good	Outstanding	Outstanding
Gwent	Good	Requires Improvement	Requires Improvement
Hampshire	Good	Good	Good
Hertfordshire	Good	Good	Good
Humberside	Good	Good	Good
Kent	Good	Good	Good
Lancashire	Good	Good	Good
Leicestershire	Good	Good	Good

77 HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, 'PEEL: Police Effectiveness 2017, A National Overview', March 2018.

78 HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, 'PEEL: Police Effectiveness 2015, A National Overview', February 2016; HM Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, 'PEEL: Police Effectiveness 2017, A National Overview', March 2018.

	2015	2016	2017
Lincolnshire	Good	Good	Good
Merseyside	Outstanding	Outstanding	Outstanding
MPS	Good	Requires Improvement	Good
Norfolk	Good	Good	Good
North Wales	Good	Good	Good
North Yorkshire	Good	Requires Improvement	Good
Northamptonshire	Requires Improvement	Requires Improvement	Requires Improvement
Northumbria	Good	Good	Good
Nottinghamshire	Good	Good	Good
South Wales	Good	Good	Good
South Yorkshire	Good	Good	Good
Staffordshire	Good	Requires Improvement	Good
Suffolk	Good	Good	Good
Surrey	Requires Improvement	Good	Good
Sussex	Good	Good	Good
Thames Valley	Good	Good	Good
Warwickshire	Requires Improvement	Good	Requires Improvement
West Mercia	Requires Improvement	Requires Improvement	Inadequate
West Midlands	Good	Good	Good
West Yorkshire	Good	Good	Good
Wiltshire	Good	Good	Good

Source: HMICFRS PEEL Effectiveness reports, 2015-2017

162 We will encourage greater consistency and ambition in how forces in England and Wales work against serious and organised crime. Police and Crime Commissioners must have regard to the Strategic Policing Requirement when preparing their Police and Crime Plans. Serious and organised crime is one of the threats in the Strategic Policing Requirement, and we expect Police and Crime Commissioners to ensure they are delivering an effective response. We will set out more clearly what an effective response involves, including through reviewing the Strategic Policing Requirement and making amendments if appropriate.

## Funding

163 We are increasing investment to build new capabilities to address the growing scale and complexity of the threat. Currently there is no dedicated serious and organised crime funding stream; funds are allocated from a range of sources, spread across the many different agencies involved, and often bid for on an annual basis from specific programme budgets. This restricts our ability to ensure investment is focused on those areas of highest priority. To remedy this, investment needs to be placed on a sustainable footing and consideration given to how and where capabilities are built across the system and resources best directed and allocated. Therefore, we will explore a new funding model that is able to commit investment over multiple years, including for ROCUs to cement their position and support the development of the whole system. We will also look to the private sector to invest jointly in developing new capabilities, notably in those areas of the commercial and financial sectors that are particularly affected by economic crime.

164 Alongside this, we will continue to focus funding on our highest priorities and improve lines of accountability, offering greater assurance that our investments will yield the expected benefits. The further work we are doing on tasking, governance, roles and responsibilities will help to guide and inform funding.

### Measuring success

165 Success in this part of the objective will mean that our collective UK response is more aligned, effective and efficient, and delivers maximum impact and value for money with the resources available. We will measure success by monitoring implementation of the revised operating model and capability strategy; and through HMICFRS PEEL Effectiveness judgements on the effectiveness of the police responses to serious and organised crime.

## Expanding our global reach and influence

166 Our international work has focused on disrupting and prosecuting serious and organised criminals upstream. This has included operational cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies and capacity building support to those agencies where required. The NCA, HMRC, Immigration Enforcement, Border Force and the CPS have large international networks to facilitate this, with over 300 officers deployed overseas. Their work has given us the global reach and network of international partnerships and alliances necessary to carry out significant disruption of serious and organised criminals who are a threat to the UK.

167 We will expand our overseas work, drawing on all our levers (including political, law enforcement, diplomatic, security, and military) to help dismantle the business models of high harm transnational organised crime groups and stop abusers travelling and operating online. We will place particular focus on multilateral global campaigns to raise awareness of, and improve global resilience to, priority issues for the UK such as illicit financial flows, child sexual exploitation and abuse, anti-corruption and modern slavery. These are areas of particular concern where concerted and large scale action is needed across the international community to raise global standards of protection. We will continue to ensure persistent and significant disruption of serious and organised criminals posing threats to the UK or crime being perpetrated overseas by UK nationals. We will also seek to create resilience in countries vulnerable to transnational crime.

### Enhancing our global insight and reach

168 The NCA will continue to lead UK law enforcement's disruption of serious and organised criminals overseas who are a threat to the UK, supported by Immigration Enforcement, HMRC and the CPS. We will ensure they can make full use of the range of international Pursue cooperation tools available, such as sharing information, intelligence, and evidence, recovering the assets of serious and organised criminals, and ensuring fugitives are brought to justice to face trial.

169 We will develop a new overseas analytical process called Serious and Organised Crime Joint Analysis (SOCJA). SOCJA assessments will illuminate the shape, nature and enablers of illicit markets, improving our understanding of the drivers of serious and organised crime so we design better targeted or new interventions. This work will be led by the Stabilisation Unit,<sup>79</sup> working with the Home Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DFID), and will support and be driven by the NAC. It will be funded

79 Further information is online at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/stabilisation-unit>

through the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF). We will also increase the body of evidence available to us through enhanced engagement with the private sector, civil society, NGOs, think-tanks and other relevant development and academic partners.

170 A new FCO-led network of Joint Serious and Organised Crime Platforms (JSOCs) will be established in over 80 countries by April 2019 to align and coordinate the implementation of our overseas response. We will also establish a new cross-government overseas policy specialists network (SOCnet), jointly run by the Home Office, FCO and DFID, to complement the operational work of existing law enforcement networks. SOCnet will be operational early in 2019 and will be funded through the CSSF. This network will reinforce our present law enforcement approach by building up our ability to use all our overt diplomatic, military, political and development levers within our overseas network to counter serious and organised crime. Joint work with individual international partners, including the EU, the Five Eyes<sup>80</sup> community and multilateral agencies, will be central to delivery.

171 The Home Office will also pilot an overseas Prevent programme aimed at overseas communities which we know feed recruits into organised criminal groups active in the UK. An initial pilot is already underway in Albania and pilots will continue in 2019/20, after which the decision will be taken on whether to scale up the activity. DFID will also scope, design and deliver an overseas Protect and Prepare programme to address socio-economic, governance and criminal justice factors that inhibit the ability of key countries or regimes to tackle serious and organised crime. Through programming work with communities and in locations vulnerable to serious and organised crime, DFID will pilot new approaches to tackling illicit networks and flows, police and judicial reform, community empowerment to promote a culture of lawfulness, and support to civil society, promoting a free press and alternative livelihoods. We will create a pool of deployable experts drawn from the public and private sectors and civil society groups to deliver elements of the programmes.

172 We will also expand existing, and deliver new, ministerial-led multilateral global campaigns. These will raise awareness of priority issues for the UK, will be delivered in conjunction with international partners, and will improve global resilience to specific threats.

173 We will deliver a comprehensive international illicit finance campaign, designed to protect our people, prosperity and global influence by strengthening the global response to illicit finance. We will seek to maintain and strengthen international standards, regulations and norms and their implementation. This will involve pushing for targeted changes to the FATF standards where necessary. It will also involve using multilateral forums (such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, G7 and G20) to drive delivery of existing international standards, particularly on tax transparency, beneficial ownership, asset recovery, anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing.

174 We will also drive up political will to address vulnerabilities in jurisdictions of risk, enhancing resilience and strengthening operational cooperation. We will take a similar approach in emerging economies and jurisdictions of risk to UK development work, with a view to supporting sustainable development. Delivery will be supported by SOCnet (once established in early 2019), particularly through its sub-network of illicit finance experts located in global financial centres, and through its broader network, which offers coverage of other jurisdictions of risk. It will also be supported by the NECC, and the NCA and HMRC international liaison officer networks, and CPS criminal justice advisors and liaison magistrates.

80 The Five Eyes is a security partnership consisting of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US.

175 Thanks to the work of the IWF, less than 1% of child sexual exploitation and abuse content is now hosted on UK platforms. But that means we must also focus our attention internationally. We are investing £40 million of overseas development aid into the End Violence Against Children Fund to 2019/20 to raise international capacity on tackling online child sexual exploitation and abuse. We have already supported dozens of projects globally, ranging from funding the IWF to provide reporting portals in 30 developing countries, to establishing a sex offender and national image database in Jordan and rescuing and rehabilitating abused children in the Philippines.

176 We will secure a long-term future for the WePROTECT Global Alliance, leading its transition from a UK-driven initiative into a fully internationally owned independent entity, providing tools and guidance to strengthen and coordinate international action on online child sexual exploitation. We will continue to collaborate with like-minded partners; the next Five Country Ministerial<sup>81</sup> meeting, to be chaired by the Home Secretary in 2019, will prioritise child sexual exploitation and abuse.

177 On modern slavery, the government has established strong relationships with other governments, law enforcement agencies and civil society to improve our understanding of the modern slavery context, and increased law enforcement cooperation through greater intelligence sharing and establishing joint investigation teams. The FCO is mobilising its global network of missions to help drive progress to address modern slavery and human trafficking in different regions. In September 2017, the Prime Minister, world leaders and the United Nations (UN) Secretary General launched a 'Call to Action to End Forced Labour, Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking' at the UN General Assembly, which over 80 countries have now endorsed.

178 We will continue to build our bilateral relationships with the key source countries whose nationals present most frequently in the UK, as well as work with countries where there is a high global incidence of slavery. We will also work in multilateral forums such as the UN and the G7 to bring about the necessary step change in global action against modern slavery.

179 The illegal wildlife trade (IWT) is an urgent global issue, which threatens some of the world's most precious species with extinction. Wildlife crime is a serious criminal industry fuelled by corruption, which damages economic growth and sustainable development, undermining good governance and the rule of law. The UK convened a high-level international conference in October 2018 to combat the illegal wildlife trade. The London Conference helped to mobilise the international community, increase collaboration across and between continents to tackle IWT-associated illicit financial flows and corruption. We will strengthen networks of IWT law enforcement experts, helping countries to coordinate across the trade routes, and improve our understanding of the linkages to wider security challenges.

180 In addition to working with and through multilateral organisations and forums, the Home Office, FCO and DFID, will work with other relevant departments including HM Treasury to use ministerial summits and conferences to mobilise the international community in support of serious and organised crime objectives. For example, in July 2018 the UK hosted the Berlin Process Western Balkans Summit, bringing together interior ministers from the Western Balkans and European partners. This resulted in a joint declaration on information, a Small Arms and Light Weapons Roadmap, endorsement of the Prime Minister's Call to Action on Modern Slavery, and a series of anti-corruption pledges.

81 The Five Country Ministerial meeting is attended by ministers from the Five Eyes security partners (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK and US).

## Measuring success

181 Success in this part of the objective will mean that high harm transnational serious and organised criminals are less able to operate and to inflict harm on the UK. There will be less impact from serious and organised crime on governance and stability. We will measure success through baseline assessments of the current situation and ongoing evaluation, using both quantitative measures (including disruptions data, and independent third-party indices) and qualitative assessments.

## Pooling skills, expertise and resource with the private sector

182 Businesses are frequently the target of serious and organised crime, but they also play a critical role in the response. Serious and organised crime causes direct losses to industry (particularly as a result of economic crime), a loss of market share (as criminals provide goods and services on the black and grey markets) and reputational damage (as a result of data breaches or laundering criminal proceeds). Through public-private partnerships, we can improve our shared understanding of threats, design out vulnerabilities in products and services and enhance the resilience of the private sector.

183 Engagement between government and the private sector to tackle serious and organised crime is most mature in relation to money laundering and economic crime. Initiatives to develop public-private partnerships, including the JMLIT and JFT, have become an integral part of our response and have provided a model for other countries to follow.

### Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT)

The JMLIT is a public-private partnership between law enforcement, the government and the financial sector, established in February 2015. It brings together law enforcement, the regulator, and over 30 UK and international financial institutions to exchange and analyse information and intelligence to detect, prevent and disrupt money laundering and wider economic crime threats against the UK.

Genuine partnership is at the heart of the model, based on the benefits of collaboration to all sides, and a clear overlap of interest between law enforcement and the financial sector. For law enforcement, this includes access to the data and intelligence needed to tackle priorities and a forum to discuss what we are trying to achieve and get advice on how to get there. For financial institutions, this includes better access to information on threats and emerging trends, as well as allowing them to focus and target anti-money laundering resources and to mitigate risks.

Work is primarily focused against the four key priority areas of bribery and corruption, trade based money laundering, organised immigration crime and human trafficking and terrorist financing.

From April 2015 to December 2017, 99 arrests were made, facilitated, or supported by JMLIT activity. JMLIT enquiries identified over 3000 bank accounts that were previously unknown to law enforcement, and over 100 new suspects in criminal investigations, 27 JMLIT alerts were distributed to all UK Finance members and other relevant industry bodies, and funds valued at a total of £9 million were restrained.

184 We will continue to enhance our engagement with the financial sector, integrating JMLIT into the NECC, boosting its resources and analytical capabilities, and opening membership to other sectors (including the legal and accountancy professions). We will also expand the JFT to include a broader range of private sector partners, and deliver a cross-industry plan to significantly reduce 'Card Not Present' fraud, by removing loopholes and strengthening customer authentication on online transactions. We will integrate private sector representatives into our approach to economic crime, including co-locating public-private teams in UK Finance to deliver reform of the SARs regime.

### Expanding partnership working

185 We will build on this good record of engagement with the financial sector and expand it to other sectors to deliver mutual aims. Through co-designing our approach with the private sector we can ensure serious and organised criminals are less able to target businesses or exploit enablers to facilitate criminality, including corrupt or complicit insiders.

186 Our immediate priority will be engagement with the information and communications technology industry. This will be crucial to reducing cyber crime and online child sexual exploitation and abuse, as set out in Objectives One and Two, as well as to prevent criminals from targeting potential victims of fraud, modern slavery, and a range of other crimes. Aligned with the objectives of CONTEST and the Internet Safety Strategy, we will ask companies to proactively take action in order to protect users and deny serious and organised criminals the opportunity to abuse online platforms and services. This will require companies to proactively identify and act on content or conduct to prevent offending, and to develop and apply tools to automate these approaches (including through artificial intelligence).

187 We will ensure the private sector is integrated into our response to specific threats. In the waste sector, for example, the Environment Agency is setting up an intelligence sharing concordat with the industry to tackle illegal waste carriers. We will also expand our engagement with the private sector beyond specific sectors, to broaden collaboration on cross-cutting threats and design out vulnerabilities. At the local level, the Serious and Organised Crime Community Coordinators will seek to integrate local business associations, and Local Enterprise Partnerships in England, as part of the multi-agency response within communities. At the national level, we will create a dedicated hub within the Home Office to provide a focal point for the department's work with the private sector on a wide range of crime types, including serious and organised crime. At the international level, we will look to set the global agenda on public-private partnerships. We will promote the UK model internationally through SOCnet, sharing best practice (particularly on engaging with the financial sector) and standardising public-private partnerships as an approach (i.e. at the UN, and through capacity building in third countries).

188 Our integration with the private sector will also be facilitated by the Joint Security and Resilience Centre (JSaRC). In 2016 the Home Office invested £11 million in JSaRC over four years to improve collaboration between government and the security industry and drive innovation. JSaRC is the operational arm of the Security and Resilience Partnership, and is supported by an alliance of UK security and resilience organisations (RISC).

### Measuring success

189 Success in this part of the objective will mean that there is effective information sharing, shared ownership and collaborative action between government and the private sector. We will measure success through baseline assessments of the current situation and ongoing evaluation of the level and quality of engagement.





# Part Four: Implementation

190 This section describes how we will ensure the effective implementation of this strategy, including governance and performance.

## Governance and oversight

### Ministerial responsibilities

191 The NSC, chaired by the Prime Minister, will oversee the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy, taking regular reports on its progress; it will also consider emerging risks, review the collective impact of our work, and agree our response and resourcing accordingly.

192 The NSC will be supported in its oversight role by a cross-government decision-making body, the Serious and Organised Crime Inter Ministerial Group. The Group brings together Secretaries of State from both the NSC and the Social Reform Committee to align our collective efforts and ensure we bring a whole-of-government response to tackling serious and organised crime.<sup>82</sup>

193 The Home Secretary is responsible for the overall coordination of the UK government's response to serious and organised crime, has oversight of the NCA and MI5 and is accountable to Parliament for policing in England and Wales.

194 Ministerial responsibility for some aspects of this strategy sits outside of the Home Secretary's remit:

- The Foreign Secretary is responsible for UK foreign policy and government activity overseas, including international elements of the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy. The Foreign Secretary also has oversight of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and GCHQ and is accountable to Parliament for their activities.
- The Chancellor of the Exchequer is responsible for regulating the financial and banking sectors, for the Money Laundering Regulations and overseeing anti-money laundering supervision, and for ensuring that financial sanctions are implemented and enforced.

<sup>82</sup> The NSC is attended by Cabinet ministers, the Chief of the Defence Staff and Heads of Intelligence Agencies when required. The Social Reform Cabinet Committee is chaired by the Prime Minister and constitutes Secretaries of State from nine government departments.

- The Defence Secretary is responsible for the Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence's contribution to countering serious and organised crime including, where appropriate and available, using interdiction capabilities to ensure threats cannot reach the UK.
- The Attorney General provides legal advice to government and oversees the main independent prosecuting departments – the CPS and SFO.
- The International Development Secretary leads the UK's work to end extreme poverty and to deliver programmes to tackle insecurity and conflict in developing countries. This includes addressing underlying social and economic problems (such as corruption) that enable serious and organised crime to flourish.
- The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice is responsible for the criminal justice system, including the prison and probation service and ensuring the system is responsive for victims and the public.
- The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care is responsible for the policy relating to the recovery from drug dependence and for ensuring the health sector use their unique position to identify and safeguard victims of serious and organised crime, raise awareness of its consequences and share information with partners to help tackle it.
- The Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy is responsible for policy relating to business, including by ensuring there is transparency around who ultimately owns and controls a company, which is an important part of the global fight against corruption, money laundering and terrorist financing.
- The Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government sets the overarching framework for local government and coordinates work with local authorities in England to, for example, support complex families with children at risk of involvement in crime and build safer communities that have a greater resilience to serious and organised crime.
- The Secretary of State for Education is responsible for children's services and the education of young people, including activity delivered by the education sector to divert young people away from becoming involved in serious and organised crime, either as a victim or potential offender.
- The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is responsible for safeguarding our natural environment and supporting our food and farming industry, and has a lead role in tackling waste and wildlife crime.
- The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions is responsible for protecting the welfare and benefits systems from fraud, including fraud committed by serious and organised criminals.
- The Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport leads the government's relations with the technology industry, including communications service providers, while also overseeing the development of the Digital Charter as part of efforts to make the UK the safest place in the world to be online.

**195** Annex A provides further detail on the roles and responsibilities of each department and agency involved in delivering this strategy.

## Oversight

196 The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy of Parliament has oversight of the National Security Strategy, of which our response to serious and organised crime forms part. The Home Affairs Select Committee and the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament also provide oversight of aspects of our response, for example on asset recovery performance.

197 The Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament has, in broad terms, oversight of the security and intelligence activities of the UK, with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner providing independent oversight of the investigatory work of the security and intelligence agencies.

## Devolved administrations

198 As set out earlier in this strategy, policing and crime matters are devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland and the responsibility of the Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Executive. Both jurisdictions work to their own respective strategies and have their own oversight arrangements to which they are accountable for delivery and performance. Many of the local delivery mechanisms, such as those covering health, education and local government, are devolved in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales.

199 The UK government, the devolved administrations and Police and Crime Commissioners will continue to work together and with a shared recognition of the threat posed across the UK by serious and organised crime ensuring that our respective strategic responses are aligned. This close collaboration will help to ensure that we are collectively able to fulfil the objectives of this strategy and the respective Scotland and Northern Ireland strategies across the UK.

## Departmental coordination

200 The response to serious and organised crime across the UK government is overseen by a Director General currently in the Home Office, who acts as Senior Responsible Owner (SRO). Home Office officials support the Home Secretary and the SRO in developing, coordinating, implementing and evaluating this strategy.

201 Our response to serious and organised crime is continually managed and monitored. The SRO chairs a National Security Strategy and Implementation Group for Serious and Organised Crime, which brings together senior operational and policy leaders from across government, the devolved administrations, law enforcement agencies and the security and intelligence agencies to coordinate activity and ensure implementation and evaluation of the strategy.

## Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories

202 As outlined in the 2012 White Paper 'The Overseas Territories: Security, Success and Sustainability', the UK government is committed to working in partnership with the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories to tackle threats arising from serious and organised crime. Although the Governors of the Overseas Territories are responsible for their responses to serious and organised crime, the UK government will support and collaborate with them where necessary to develop strategies, and subsequent capability building and planning, through the relevant government departments.

## People and culture

**203** Our people and culture are integral to the success of our strategy, policy, and operations. Being effective in tackling serious and organised crime requires recruiting, training, and retaining high-calibre people in all areas and ensuring they work well together. It is also contingent on understanding, listening to, and working in partnership with individuals, groups, and communities with a range of backgrounds and characteristics, including gender, ethnicity, religion, and social background.

**204** The 2015 SDSR established a security and defence diversity network. Its work has complemented other departmental and civil service-wide efforts to ensure that all those who work on national security are aware that diversity and inclusion is critical to how we work. We will improve external engagement and internal representation among those who work to tackle serious and organised crime. We will proactively embed more inclusive approaches throughout our work, including encouraging constructive challenge and different ways of thinking, and improving our resilience, to help us better respond to the complex threats that we face.

## Performance

**205** This strategy is monitored against a set of key performance indicators, supplemented by the detailed evaluation of specific programmes. The National Serious and Organised Crime Performance Framework, developed by the Home Office and NCA in conjunction with stakeholders from across law enforcement and wider government, will deliver a quantitative and qualitative approach to understanding the impact of the UK's overseas and domestic response to serious and organised crime.

**206** The data collected in the framework will be used to monitor progress towards the strategic objectives and to make informed decisions about the most effective, efficient way to allocate resources to counter serious and organised crime and achieve value for money. We intend to improve performance and management data across the system to improve our decision making and agility.

**207** The NCA assesses the impact of its operational activity, as well as assessing progress towards its mission and the health of the organisation. This assessment is reviewed quarterly and overseen by the NCA Board. The Director General of the NCA reports directly to the Home Secretary on the performance of the NCA. The NCA also contribute to a wider cross-law enforcement assessment of performance against serious and organised crime, and take the lead in reporting to the Home Secretary on the national law enforcement response.

# Annex A: Roles and responsibilities

**Action Fraud:** The UK's single point of reporting for fraud and cyber crime.

**The Attorney General's Office (AGO):** The AGO supports the Attorney General and the Solicitor General in their duty to provide legal advice to the government and to oversee the main prosecution authorities – the CPS and SFO.

**Cabinet Office (CO):** The Cabinet Office supports the work of the National Security Council (NSC) through the National Security Secretariat. The Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) is the government's crisis response mechanism, including for incidents of serious and organised crime that require a crisis management response. The Joint Intelligence Committee is a cross-government committee, based at the Cabinet Office, providing ministers and senior officials with strategic assessments, primarily about security, defence and foreign affairs. The Cabinet Office is also responsible for the delivery of the NCSS.

**Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI):** CPNI is the national technical authority for physical and personnel protective security measures, providing protective security advice to organisations. It works closely with the NCSC, which leads on cyber security advice.

**Crown Prosecution Service (CPS):** The CPS prosecutes serious and organised crime cases in England and Wales. CPS pursues all confiscation proceedings flowing from criminal investigations conducted by NCA and HMRC, and undertakes both criminal confiscation and civil recovery proceedings in conjunction with ROCUs and police forces. CPS also deploys a network of international prosecutors, conducts extradition proceedings on behalf of foreign authorities and is responsible for obtaining European Arrest Warrants, issuing extradition requests, and wider international justice cooperation (including the gathering of evidence overseas).

**Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS):** BEIS is responsible for policy relating to business, including ensuring there is transparency around who ultimately owns and controls a company, which is an important part of the global fight against corruption, money laundering and terrorist financing. This can assist law enforcement in their investigations of alleged criminal behaviour and additionally act as a deterrent.

**Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS):** DCMS leads the government's relations with the technology industry, including with communications service providers, while also overseeing the development of the Digital Charter as part of efforts to make the UK the safest place in the world to be online.

**Department for Education (DfE):** DfE is responsible for children’s services and the education of young people, including activity delivered by the education sector to divert young people away from becoming involved in serious and organised crime, either as a victim or potential offender.

**Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra):** Defra is responsible for safeguarding our natural environment and supporting our food and farming industry, and has a lead role in tackling waste and wildlife crime.

**Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC):** DHSC is responsible for the policy relating to the recovery from drug dependence and also for ensuring the health sector use their unique position to identify and safeguard victims of serious and organised crime, raise awareness of its consequences and share information with partners to help tackle it.

**Department for International Development (DFID):** DFID leads the UK’s work to end extreme poverty and to deliver programmes to tackle insecurity and conflict in developing countries. This includes addressing underlying social and economic problems (such as corruption) that enable serious and organised crime to flourish.

**Department for Transport (DfT):** DfT is the security regulator for the transport sector and for the transportation of dangerous goods. DfT’s security regulations are intended to protect the travelling public, transport facilities and those employed in the transport industry, regulations which can also serve to disrupt serious and organised crime.

**Department for Work and Pensions (DWP):** DWP is responsible for protecting the welfare and benefits systems from fraud, including fraud committed by serious and organised criminals.

**Devolved Administrations (DAs):** DAs are responsible in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales for the functions which have been devolved to them according to their different devolution settlements. Policing and justice are devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

**Financial Conduct Authority (FCA):** The FCA regulates the financial sector and financial advisers, and will pursue criminal prosecutions, including for insider dealing and market manipulation.

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO):** The FCO is responsible for delivering diplomatic and practical support to our priorities on serious and organised crime overseas.

**Government Agency Intelligence Networks (GAIN):** GAIN operates across regions to facilitate the sharing of information and intelligence between government, law enforcement and in some instances the private sector to help tackle the threat from serious and organised crime.

**Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ):** GCHQ provides intelligence support to law enforcement in tackling serious and organised crime, as well as providing practical technical assistance to combat online threats, particularly online child sexual exploitation and abuse.

**Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service (HMPPS):** HMPPS is an executive agency of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) responsible for the correctional services in England and Wales.

**HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC):** HMRC is the UK’s tax and customs authority, responsible for tackling fiscal fraud, with civil and criminal powers to investigate organised criminals. HMRC also has an international network of Fiscal Crime Liaison Officers.

**HM Treasury:** HM Treasury is responsible for regulating the financial and banking sectors, for the Money Laundering Regulations and overseeing anti-money laundering supervision, and for ensuring that financial sanctions are implemented and enforced.

**Home Office (HO):** The Home Office is responsible for leading the UK's response to serious and organised crime, working closely with the police, security and intelligence agencies and across government to do this. The Home Secretary and Minister of State for Security and Economic Crime have ministerial oversight for devising and coordinating the delivery of this strategy, as well as oversight of the NCA. Through Border Force, UK Visas & Immigration, Immigration Enforcement and Her Majesty's Passport Office, the Home Office has responsibility for the security of our border and immigration system and works closely with the NCA and police to ensure the border and immigration system can help to tackle the threat from serious and organised crime.

**Intellectual Property Office (IPO):** The national coordinator on intellectual property crime (counterfeiting and piracy). The IPO's Intelligence Hub coordinates and exchanges intelligence between intellectual property enforcement agencies and the private sector in the UK and overseas.

**Joint Fraud Taskforce (JFT):** The JFT was set up in 2016, together with the private sector, law enforcement and government to protect the public from fraud.

**Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT):** Since 2014 the JMLIT has provided a mechanism for law enforcement and the financial sector to share information and work more closely together to detect, prevent and disrupt money laundering and wider economic crime.

**Ministry of Defence (MOD):** MOD supports this strategy by building capacity in priority countries and where appropriate and available, using interdiction capabilities to ensure threats cannot reach the UK.

**Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG):** MHCLG sets the overarching framework for local government and coordinates work with local authorities in England to, for example, support complex families with children at risk of involvement in crime, and build safer communities that have a greater resilience to serious and organised crime.

**Ministry of Justice (MoJ):** MoJ works to protect the public and reduce reoffending, and to provide a more effective, transparent and responsive criminal justice system for victims and the public. It is also responsible for ensuring that prison and probation services disrupt serious and organised crime related activity as part of a lifetime offender management approach.

**National Crime Agency (NCA):** The NCA leads and coordinates UK law enforcement's response to serious and organised crime and is responsible for developing a single authoritative view of the threat. It leads the operational response to some of the highest priority threats and supports ROCUs and police with their operations to counter serious and organised crime. The NCA also has a network of international liaison officers and is responsible for a number of national functions, including responsibility for liaising with Europol and Interpol. The NCA is led by a Director General and overseen by the Home Secretary, but is operationally independent.

**The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC):** NCSC was created in 2016 to help protect our critical services from cyber attacks, manage major incidents and improve the underlying security of the UK internet.



**National Economic Crime Centre (NECC):** The NECC will act as the national authority for the UK's operational response to economic crime, drawing on operational capabilities in the public and private sector to tackle the greatest threats.

**Police Forces:** Most of the operational work against serious and organised crime in this country will continue to be conducted by the 43 police forces in England and Wales at a regional and local level. The Police remain operationally independent but work in close conjunction with both the Home Office and the NCA alongside other operational partners and are closely supported by local authorities and their agencies.

**Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs):** Police and Crime Commissioners are elected officials in England and Wales charged with the efficient and effective policing of their area. They also hold Chief Constables to account for the delivery of the police and crime plan in their area. Police and Crime Commissioners are also charged with holding the police fund (from which all policing of the area is financed) and raising the local policing precept from council tax.

**Regional Organised Crime Units (ROCU):** ROCUs are regional police units that have a number of specialist capabilities used to investigate and disrupt serious and organised crime. There are nine ROCUs in England and in Wales and they are the principal interface between the NCA and police forces. Police forces are able to draw on the ROCUs specialist capabilities through an established tasking mechanism.

**Serious Fraud Office (SFO):** The SFO is a specialist law enforcement agency which investigates and prosecutes the top level of serious and complex fraud, bribery and corruption, and associated money laundering. The SFO is part of the criminal justice system covering England, Wales and Northern Ireland but not Scotland, the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands.

**Secret Intelligence Service (SIS):** SIS collects intelligence overseas to promote and defend the national security and economic well-being of the UK.

**Security Service (MI5):** MI5 is responsible for protecting UK national security against threats including terrorism and serious and organised crime.

**The UK Protected Person Service (UKPPS):** UKPPS provides protection and care to victims of, and witnesses to, serious and organised crime who are considered by law enforcement agencies to be at risk of serious harm.

