**MGN XXX**

**DAMAGE STABILITY - ALTERNATIVE VERIFICATION METHOD FOR TANKERS - UK INTERPRETATIONS AND PROCEDURES**

**Notice to all UK Ship Operators, Ship Owners, Masters, Port State Control Officers (PSCOs), authorised Recognised Organisations (ROs), Insurance and Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Clubs, and Stability Consultants.**

*This notice should be read in conjunction with: - SI 1996/2154 The Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) Regulations 1996 as amended; SI 2018/68 The Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Pollution from Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk) Regulations 2018; IMO MSC.1/Circ.1461 “*Guidelines for Verification of Damage Stability Requirements for Tankers*”; IMO MSC/Circ.406/Rev.1 "*Guidelines for the Uniform Application of the Survival Requirements of the IBC and IGC Code*."*

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| **Summary**This notice clarifies areas of responsibility and UK procedures when applying the 2014 amendments to MARPOL Annex 1 chapter 1 regulation 3(6) and chapter 4 regulation 28(6) concerning the fitting of stability instruments on board oil tankers and the consequent amendments to the IOPP Certificate in APPENDIX II (Form B). Similar amendments on fitting stability instruments were made at the same time to the IBC Code, BCH or EGC Code, the IGC Code and the GC Code with equivalent modifications to their respective Certificates of Fitness.Experience gained in applying the associated IMO Guidelines, MSC.1/Circ.1461, since they came into force on 8th July 2013 indicates that there are still some matters requiring clarification and/or interpretation, for example the issuance of waivers from using a stability instrument and the appropriate methods of demonstrating compliance with the required damage stability regulations when such an instrument is not employed either on board or via links to a shore support station. The aim of this notice is to improve understanding and consistency of application of the Regulations and Guidelines and to re-emphasize that the MCA’s expectation is that all UK tankers should be fitting IACS URL5 – Type 3 stability instruments capable of verifying damage stability by direct calculation on the hull form and compartments rather than through use of tables or limiting KG/GM curves.**Only in limited case-by-case circumstances, when evidence is provided to the MCA/RO that the ship will still comply with the IMO requirements by using the alternative verification method, will a waiver be agreed to permit the non-fitment of a stability instrument.** |

**Note:** Text highlighted in yellow indicates where changes have been made since a preliminary consultation with MCA staff, the ROs, industry and the DfT earlier in 2018.

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**Definitions**

**“Tanker”**, where not otherwise specified, is taken to include oil tankers and chemical tankers (as defined in SI 1996/2154 Part 1.1(2)), gas carriers (SI 1994/2464 Part 1.1(2)) and ships carrying noxious liquid substances (NLS) (SI 2018/68 Part 1.3(1));

**“RO”** is a Recognised Organisation duly authorised by the MCA to undertake survey and approval work on its behalf under the terms of a survey agreement ([MSN1672](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/msn-1672-amendent-3) specifies). ROs may also be authorised by the MCA to issue waivers to UK vessels in accordance with this Notice~~;~~

**“Stability Instrument”** denotes an approved stability loading computer system covering all of the applicable intact and damage stability requirements, supplementing (but not replacing) the Stability Information Booklet (“SIB”) approved by the MCA/RO and always carried on board.

**“KG”** is the height of the vertical centre of gravity above the moulded baseline in metres. Where the KG is corrected for the free surface effects in partially-filled tanks it is denoted as KGf.

**“GM”** is the metacentric height, being the difference between the height of the metacentre (KM) above base and the KG (GM = KM – KG). Where the GM is corrected for the free surface effects in partially-filled tanks it is denoted as GMf.

It should be noted that the value of GM depends on KM, which varies with draught, trim and heel whereas KG is a fixed point based on the distribution of weight and so is independent of draught, trim and heel. Therefore, the equation GM = KM – KG is strictly only valid by using the KM value at a specified draught, trim and heel. In practice the variation in KM due to initial heel can be discounted provided it is limited to no more than 1 degree (MSC.1/Circ. 1461 Part 1 paragraph 4.4 refers) but the variation due to draught and trim can be significant especially on smaller ships.

**KG/GM limit curves** (ref. MSC.1/Circ. 1461 Part 1 Section 4.3) provide a method for the loading officer to assess whether a proposed loading condition complies with the relevant intact and damage stability criteria. The condition is deemed to comply if the KGf is less than the maximum allowable KG or the GMf is greater than the minimum required GM. For the reasons stated, KG and GM limit curves may not be exactly equivalent due to the influence of the variation of KM with draught and trim on the GM limit curves. Care should therefore be taken both in constructing and using the curves to allow for the effect of trim when making the comparison between “actual” and “limiting” KG/GM values.

**1.** **Introduction**

1.1 Amendments to MARPOL and the tanker Codes (IBC Code, BCH or EGC Code, IGC Code and GC Code) introduce the requirement to fit stability instruments to new tankers (i.e. those constructed on or after January 1, 2016) and existing tankers (constructed prior to that date), as shown in Annex A to this Notice. They include several references to “the Administration” which, for the UK, is the MCA or ROs when they are authorised to act on the MCA’s behalf. This MGN clarifies the MCA’s policies wherever the regulations may be subject to interpretation and to highlight any areas where ROs or PSCOs may need to refer to the MCA for decisions, for example issuing waivers on the fitting of stability instruments.

1.2 The process of ensuring that all tankers eventually fulfil the revised regulations is the responsibility of many organisations and individuals: -

• the shipyard/consultant/designer undertaking the stability calculations and producing the statutory intact and damage stability information books;

• the software and hardware engineers designing and producing the stability instruments;

• the owners and operators responsible for ensuring that stability verifications are correctly made on their tankers;

 • the approval authorities checking the stability and certifying the instruments;

• those on-board or at shore stations who use the instruments to ensure that the ship complies with the regulations and is safe to sail;

• the surveyors and auditors who check that suitable instruments are installed and working correctly, with appropriate documentary proof that agreed procedures are being followed;

• PSC officers concerned with ensuring that stability verifications are being made correctly on vessels calling at their ports.

1.3 This MGN sets out the background to IMO Circular MSC.1/Circ. 1461 and outlines the MCA’s positions on each of the areas of responsibility listed above; the two Annexes of this Notice (“A” with the regulatory text and “B” with more information on each topic) provide further detail as required.

**2. Background to IMO Circular MSC.1/Circ. 1461**

2.1 The Guidelines in MSC.1/ Circ.1461, dated July 8, 2013, “Guidelines for preparation and approval of tanker damage stability calculations” (the Guidelines) were developed at the IMO after deficiencies in existing tanker damage stability approvals and verification methods were identified during stability approvals, surveys and inspections. Loading to conditions not included in the approved stability information meant some ships had no means to verify that these loading conditions complied with the damage stability requirements.

2.2 A series of data gathering exercises provided evidence to support these concerns, raising doubts relating to damage stability approvals (refer to IMO SLF 52-9-1 for details). Examples of some of the shortcomings found were: -

• For an asymmetric vessel, only considering one side damaged – usually the “most favourable” side;

• For a vessel which is loaded asymmetrically, only considering one side damaged;

• For a vessel subject to two compartment damages (damage in way of a transverse bulkhead), only considering the two compartment damage cases whilst omitting single compartment damages as lesser (and possibly worse) cases;

• For tankers using the critical KG/GM method to demonstrate compliance, not ensuring that loading restrictions required to validate the data are applied;

• When considering the verification made by a stability instrument, it is unsafe to omit damage cases which give a less severe outcome when applied to the approved loading conditions in the SIB (and were omitted on this basis) as operations may not be restricted to these approved loading conditions alone, and a more severe result could occur if the actual loading conditions were to be substantially different from the approved ones.

2.3 Failure to comply with the statutory stability requirements introduces unacceptable risks; the changes to the regulations and this guidance are intended to mitigate those risks (refer to the ISM Code Section 1.2.2).

2.4 The Guidelines are in two parts: -

* **PART 1**: defines how approval of damage stability calculations or stability instruments for new oil tankers, chemical tankers and gas carriers constructed on or after 14 June 2013 should be conducted. Although it directly applies to new approvals, Part 1 summarises all pre-existing guidance with which any previous damage stability approvals should have originally been made, so it may also be used to assess the validity of an existing approval. Technically, an existing stability approval which does not follow the Guidelines is deficient as it does not follow the original instruments against which it is approved (e.g. MARPOL Annex 1). It includes details of the qualifications of the personnel involved, the plans and data to be supplied, the calculation procedures and advice regarding the need to consider all relevant damage cases, including lesser cases of damage to both sides of the vessel and the bottom. It also describes the permissible limits within which damage stability calculations or a damage stability instrument must lie when checked for accuracy.
* **PART 2**: is mainly intended for the guidance of third parties, such as ship operators, ships’ officers and PSCOs. Section 6 describes the records required to be kept on board all tankers and gas carriers to demonstrate damage stability compliance for the approved methods of verification listed in Section 4. The processes and records described here are also applicable to existing ships and Section 6 should be considered mandatory once re-certification of existing tankers is completed under the revised Instruments. Part 2 provides guidance for operators and ships’ officers to meet their obligations under the ISM Code, and to third parties such as PSCOs and ISM auditors.

2.5 To ensure that tanker crews can reliably verify damage stability on board they must either be fitted with an approved stability instrument (the default position for new ships unless there are compelling reasons not to comply) or, for existing tankers, certified to continue to use a validated and approved existing method. All existing damage stability approvals in place at the time the Guidelines came into force remain valid provided they meet the standards from Part 1 (as this repeats the required practice at the time of the original approval) and on condition that any guidance is being correctly followed.

2.6 The Guidelines were developed by the IMO well before the applicable enforcement date for the changes to MARPOL and the Codes (1/1/2016) and this allowed time for operators to assess what changes, if any, were required to the stability verification methods used on existing tankers and, if deemed necessary, to order new computer systems and have them approved in time to comply with the new regulations within the phase-in period.

2.7 Following the phase-in of changes to the applicable Instruments and re-certification, the default method of damage stability verification shall be carriage of a Type 3 stability instrument, capable of verification by direct calculation. Other acceptable methods of verification, if retained from before re-certification, must be validated against the Guidelines and then authorised under a waiver on the IOPP Form B or Certificate of Fitness (see Annex A). These accepted methods include operating the tanker closely in accordance with loading conditions taken from the approved SIB.

2.8 An issue arose during development of the Guidelines regarding what degree of variation may be permitted before a tanker cannot be considered as loaded “in accordance with” such a condition. Freedom to vary the loading safely will depend upon the margins of compliance of the approved baseline loading condition and upon guidance as to how this margin may be treated (see Annex B paragraphs 2.4.4, 4.7 and 5.2 of this Notice and Section 4 of the Appendix to Circular MSC.1/Circ.1461 for more details).

**3. Actions to Take - Shipyard/Designer/Naval Architect/Consultant responsible for producing the Stability Information Booklet for a Specific Tanker**

3.1 The minimum requirement for new tankers is possession of an intact stability booklet and (usually) a separate damage stability calculation book to demonstrate that the loading conditions included in the intact stability booklet will survive damages up to the maximum extent required by the applicable Convention or Code and achieve the minimum residual stability standard. The booklet(s) must then be assessed and approved by the MCA or the RO if authorised. If approval is granted subject to conditions given by letter or other document, such as a Design Appraisal Document (DAD), a copy of the authorisation letter or document showing those conditions must always be kept with the approved booklet(s).

3.2 The form and content of the intact stability booklet should conform to the requirements of the International Code on Intact Stability, 2008, as amended. For damage stability calculations, the type of tanker and the nature of its service will determine what is included and how compliance with the stability criteria is demonstrated. In general, the methodology and the content will be agreed between the MCA/RO and those responsible for producing the booklets on a case-by-case basis.

3.3 The primary IMO instruments to be referenced when compiling the intact and damage stability booklet(s) are listed in Part 1, Section 2 of MSC.1/Circ.1461. Sections 3.2 to 3.4 include information on the scope, assumptions used and required documentation to be submitted for review by the RO, including the lines plan, hydrostatics etc. Section 4 describes the consideration of operating limits, loading patterns, range of loading conditions and the preparation of KG/GM limit curves, as appropriate. Section 6 details the methodology to be used in performing the damage stability calculations.

**4. Actions to Take - Software and Hardware Engineers Producing Stability Instruments**

4.1 A brief historical introduction to the development of stability instruments and software is given in Annex B section 7 of this Notice. Full details of the various types of stability instrument, describing which are most appropriate for any particular type of tanker, are given in Annex B section 2. Much more detail on the calculation methodology, modelling tolerances etc. is to be found in Part 1, Section 4 paragraph 5, Section 5 and Section 6 of MSC.1/Circ.1461.

4.2 A stability instrument with Type 3 software is required for all new tankers constructed on or after 1 January 2016 and this is also the MCA’s preferred option for existing tankers which need to upgrade their hardware/software to meet the new regulations within the phase-in period of 1/1/2016 to 1/1/2021.

**5. Responsibility for issuing a Waiver**

5.1 Where stability approval has been delegated, and subject to the owner’s request, it is the RO’s responsibility to determine in accordance with this Notice, whether an existing tanker may retain the current method of damage stability verification under a waiver or must be provided with a stability instrument meeting the revised regulations.

5.2 In Annex B section 3 to this Notice, a simplified flow chart is included to assist all those involved with deciding whether an existing tanker must be fitted with a stability instrument to meet the latest regulatory requirements or if the existing verification method may be retained.

**6.** **Actions to Take - ROs Authorised to act on behalf of the MCA**

6.1 The MCA authorises ROs to undertake stability approval on its behalf through a written agreement between the MCA and the individual RO concerned (ref. Survey and Certification Instructions to Surveyors Part B, Chapter 8 Table 2). For oil tankers of greater than 100 metres in length and chemical and bulk gas carriers of any size, the MCA has authorised all ROs to undertake all stability approvals and certification (including stability instruments) necessary to show compliance with MARPOL and the tanker Codes, following the amendments shown in Annex A. It is the aim of this document to clarify the MCA’s policies where there is scope for interpretation of the amended regulations and Codes, to ensure consistency of authorised approvals with the MCA’s objectives.

6.2 One area of specific interest is the issue of waivers under MARPOL Annex 1, Chapter 1 regulation 3(6) and the equivalent paragraphs in the tanker Codes which allow scope for interpretation, in the sub-paragraph concerning existing tankers which demonstrate compliance using limiting KG/GM curves.

6.3 Details of how applications for waivers should be dealt with are given in Annex B, section 4 of this Notice, with attention drawn to paragraph 4.2. It should be borne in mind that the amended International Instruments make fitment of an approved stability instrument compulsory and that the issue of a waiver is not an automatic right but should only be considered where existing means of verification are confirmed by the RO to be equally effective. The MCA’s preference is for all UK tankers to have their damage stability verified by Type 3 stability instruments fitted on board or alternatively at shore stations (see also Annex B paragraph 4.9).

6.4 The MCA authorises all ROs to issue waivers for UK flagged tank vessels by following the guidance outlined in Annex B, sections 3, 4, 5, and 8 of this Notice.  In every case where a waiver is to be issued, the MCA should be notified in advance, and a copy of the resulting waiver document or approval letter provided for reference.

**7. Actions to Take - Ship or Shore-based Stations Carrying out Stability Verification**

7.1 Loading officers and their equivalent at shore stations must be familiar with the new requirements to fit stability instruments capable of verifying compliance with the intact and damage stability criteria prior to departure and at arrival (see Annex A of this Notice). Special attention should be paid on tankers with low margins, as indicated by the difference between the actual KG or GM and the limiting value. Where a tanker must ballast to compensate for consumables used during the voyage it is also necessary to confirm compliance with stability criteria at the beginning and end of the ballasting sequence (say with 5% and 95% of the total ballast used) with due allowance for the free surface effect. Part 2 Section 5 of MSC.1/Circ.1461 suggests some choices open to the operators should any proposed loading condition not comply with the intact and/or damage stability criteria.

7.2 Not all tankers will necessarily be fitted with a stability instrument. If not so fitted they should be certificated by the RO to confirm that this requirement has been waived and that a satisfactory alternative method may be used to demonstrate compliance with the stability criteria (see Annex B, paragraph 4.2). More information on demonstrating compliance is shown in Annex B, Section 5, which also contains a table showing the documentary evidence of compliance to be made available to surveyors and Port State Control Officers (PSCOs) depending on which verification method is being employed.

7.3 Attention is also drawn to Annex B, Section 6 regarding ISM procedures, including the need for checklists, and how these should ensure that appropriate records are available to demonstrate that a tanker crew has verified compliance with intact and damage stability criteria in accordance with the new Regulations. Co-operation between the loading officers, owners, surveyors and authorities is necessary to ensure that appropriate means are provided for this, that they are being correctly used and that documentary evidence is produced for inspection by surveyors and PSCOs. If any of the parties involved have doubts about any of these aspects the MCA or RO should be advised.

**8. Actions to Take – MCA Surveyors and Port State Control Officers (PSCOs)**

8.1 Surveyors and PSCOs boarding a tanker to conduct a renewal survey or routine inspection are advised to check that an approved stability instrument has been installed (see Flow Chart in Annex B, Section 3) and is working correctly or, if no stability instrument is fitted, that a valid waiver has been recorded and the specified alternative method for verifying the intact and damage stability prior to departure is satisfactory and is being correctly used.

8.2 If no certificate can be produced this is grounds for detention. If the certificate has been completed incorrectly this should be recorded as a deficiency to be rectified. If there is a waiver and the specified method is clearly wrong or incapable of making the necessary verification (for example, a waiver issued to allow the tanker to carry on using an old, ineffective system) then the tanker may be detained. If a new tanker has a waiver, this must be questioned but may not be a deficiency if the verification is satisfactory. See Annex B, Section 4 of this Notice for more information.

8.3 Section 5 of Annex B contains some checks which may be carried out to determine that the new damage stability regulations are being followed where no stability instrument is fitted; it also contains a tabular checklist of the documentation needed to demonstrate that one of the verification methods permitted by MSC.1/Circ.1461, Part 2 Section 6 is being employed.

8.4 For tankers already fitted with a stability instrument, attention is drawn to paragraphs 5.5.3 and 5.6.2 of Annex B, regarding appropriate documentation, and paragraph 7.1 regarding the requirement to ensure ship’s loading officers are aware of the need to verify compliance with the stability requirements prior to departure and the options available to them for corrective action should the proposed loading condition not fully comply.

8.5 Finally, Annex B Section 6 of this Notice contains some notes on what surveyors and PSCOs should look for as they check that the Guidelines are being followed, mentioning, in particular, the ISM Code requirements (e.g. Sections 1.2.2, 6.1, 6.2, 7, 10 and 12) with respect to the characteristics of Type 3 software.

**9. Summary and Conclusions**

9.1 This MGN is intended to promote a better understanding of the complexities of damage stability verification, the methods currently employed for this and their potential shortcomings, and why these have resulted in a change to the Regulations.

9.2 Although calculation of the damage stability of tankers is complex, recent advances in computer hardware and software have enabled it to be performed quickly and economically on board ship, which the MCA considers preferable to placing reliance upon shore-based stations. The recent amendments to MARPOL and the associated tanker Codes promote the use of these improved computer systems in preference to using simplified manual and semi-manual methods for verifying compliance with damage stability regulations.

9.3 The MCA prefers the use of stability instruments utilising Type 3 software on all tankers subject to these recent amendments even though existing approved methods of verification may still be permitted to be retained on tankers constructed before 1st January 2016.

9.4 It is intended that this MGN also shows why the MCA believes that running Type 3 software on an on-board stability instrument is the most reliable and cost-effective way for operators of tank vessels to ensure that they meet their statutory obligations to prevent loss of life and potential damage to the environment following incidents at sea and demonstrate this capability to third parties.



**ANNEX A – Amendments to MARPOL and the Tanker Codes**

1. MARPOL Annex 1 was amended on May 22, 2014 by the addition of Chapter 4 paragraph 28(6) and Chapter 1 paragraph 3(6), which state respectively that: -

*28.6 All oil tankers shall be fitted with a stability instrument, capable of verifying compliance with intact and damage stability requirements approved by the Administration having regard to the performance standards recommended by the Organization\*:*

*.1 oil tankers constructed before 1 January 2016 shall comply with this regulation at the first scheduled renewal survey of the ship on or after 1 January 2016 but not later than 1 January 2021;*

*.2 notwithstanding the requirements of subparagraph .1 a stability instrument fitted on an oil tanker constructed before 1 January 2016 need not be replaced provided it is capable of verifying compliance with intact and damage stability, to the satisfaction of the Administration; and*

*.3 for the purposes of control under regulation 11, the Administration shall issue a document of approval for the stability instrument.*

*\* Refer to part B, chapter 4, of the International Code on Intact Stability, 2008 (2008 IS Code), as amended; the Guidelines for the Approval of Stability Instruments (MSC.1/Circ.1229), annex, section 4, as amended; and the technical standards defined in part 1 of the Guidelines for verification of damage stability requirements for tankers (MSC.1/Circ.1461).*

*3.6 The Administration may waive the requirements of regulation 28(6) for the following oil tankers if loaded in accordance with the conditions approved by the Administration taking into account the guidelines developed by the Organization\*\*: -*

*.1 oil tankers which are on a dedicated service, with a limited number of permutations of loading such that all anticipated conditions have been approved in the stability information provided to the master in accordance with regulation 28(5);*

*.2 oil tankers where stability verification is made remotely by a means approved by the Administration;*

 *.3 oil tankers which are loaded within an approved range of loading conditions; or*

*.4 oil tankers constructed before 1 January 2016 provided with approved limiting KG/GM curves covering all applicable intact and damage stability requirements.*

*\*\* Refer to operational guidance provided in part 2 of the Guidelines for verification of damage stability requirements for tankers (MSC.1/Circ.1461).*

2. Ships constructed under the IBC Code, BCH or EGC Code before 1 January 2016 are also to be fitted with stability instruments at the first renewal survey after that date and no later than 1 January 2021.

3. For GC Code vessels, the compliance dates are the same but compliance is required at the first periodical (rather than renewal) survey after 1 January 2016.

4. For IGC Code vessels constructed prior to 1 July 2016 compliance is required at first renewal survey after this date and no later than 1 July 2021.

5. In addition, the MARPOL IOPP Certificate in Appendix II (Form B) now includes the following extra paragraphs: -

*5.7.5 The ship is provided with an Approved Stability Instrument in accordance with regulation 28(6) .……………………………………………………......…….…….....………. o*

*5.7.6 The requirements of regulation 28(6) are waived in respect of the ship in accordance with regulation 3.6. Stability is verified by one or more of the following means:*

*.1 loading only to approved conditions defined in the stability information provided to the master in accordance with regulation 28(5) ……………….………….………... o*

 *.2 verification is made remotely by a means approved by the Administration…. ….. o*

*.3 loading within an approved range of loading conditions defined in the stability information provided to the master in accordance with regulation 28(5)…………………………………………………..………………………………… o*

*.4 loading in accordance with approved limiting KG/GM curves covering all applicable intact and damage stability requirements defined in the stability information provided to the master in accordance with regulation 28(5) ................................. o*

6. Similar modifications were made to the Certificates of Fitness in the other Codes as follows: -

*That the ship must be loaded:*

*.1\* only in accordance with loading conditions verified compliant with intact and damage stability requirements using the approved stability instrument fitted in accordance with paragraph 2.2.6 of the Code;*

*.2\* where a waiver permitted by paragraph 2.2.7 of the Code is granted and the approved stability instrument required by paragraph 2.2.6 of the Code is not fitted, loading shall be made in accordance with the following approved methods:*

*(i) in accordance with the loading conditions provided in the approved loading manual, stamped and dated .................. and signed by a responsible officer of the Administration, or of an organization recognized by the Administration; or*

*(ii) in accordance with loading conditions verified remotely using an approved means …………………; or*

*(iii) in accordance with a loading condition which lies within an approved range of conditions defined in the approved loading manual referred to in (i) above; or*

*(iv) in accordance with a loading condition verified using approved critical KG/GM data defined in the approved loading manual referred to in (i) above;*

*.3\* in accordance with the loading limitations appended to this Certificate.*

*Where it is required to load the ship other than in accordance with the above instruction, then the necessary calculations to justify the proposed loading conditions shall be communicated to the certifying Administration who may authorize in writing the adoption of the proposed loading condition.*

*\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_*

*\* Delete as appropriate.*

7. The UK legislation covering the requirement to meet the damage stability criteria specified in MARPOL and supply loading information to the master is contained in SI 1996/2154 “The Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) Regulations” 1996, as amended: -

*29. (1) Every new oil tanker shall comply with the subdivision and damage stability criteria specified in Schedule 5, in Merchant Shipping Notice No. 1643/MARPOL 1.*

*(2) The master of every new oil tanker and the person in charge of a new non-self-propelled oil tanker to which these Regulations apply shall be supplied by the owner with—*

*(a) information relating to loading and distribution of cargo necessary to ensure compliance with the provision of this regulation; and*

*(b) data on the ability of the ship to comply with the damage stability criteria prescribed by this regulation, including the effect of any lesser requirements that may have been imposed by the Secretary of State.*

*Such information and data shall be supplied in an approved form.*

8. Tankers constructed on or after 1 January 2017 must also comply with the Polar Code (Ref. IMO resolution MEPC.264(68) or MSC.385(94)) when being operated in polar waters.

**ANNEX B – Background and Supplementary Notes**

**1.** **Introduction**

1.1 In 2005 the UK became concerned that high risk ships such as oil, chemical and gas tankers were regularly being operated in conditions of loading which had not been shown to comply with damage stability requirements. Evidence showed that vessels were frequently operating in conditions of loading different from their approved conditions but had no approved means on board to verify compliance with damage stability criteria, and that loading conditions were not being submitted to the MCA or the RO for verification as required. Similar issues were identified on foreign flag ships calling at UK ports.

1.2 It was also evident that it is difficult to demonstrate damage stability compliance for such vessels. This finding was inevitable where vessels were operating to loading conditions different from those in the approved SIB but had no means of making a damage stability verification. The UK gathered evidence from tanker operators, during port state control inspections and through discussions with ship operators to support a submission made to the SLF52 Sub-Committee at the IMO to highlight the issues (see SLF 52/9/1).

1.3 As a result, the IMO produced the “*Guidelines for verification of damage stability requirements for tankers*”, MSC.1/Circ.1461, dated 8th July 2013. The Guidelines represent a crucial element in the correct computation of tanker damage stability to ensure compliance with the mandatory Codes and Instruments. The MCA is also aware that there are areas of the Guidelines and the amendments to the Codes where there is scope for interpretation by the Administration. This MGN highlights these areas and clarifies any resulting issues to enhance consistency of application of the Guidelines and Codes by all parties.

**2. Characteristics of Approved Loading Computer Systems**

2.1 The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) had previously introduced a unified requirement relating to stability computation under URL5, with the objective that any loading instrument fitted on an IACS classed vessel contracted after 1 July 2005, which incorporates a stability element, should be approved for verification of all stability requirements that apply, including damage. The requirement that a stability instrument installed on board should cover all applicable stability requirements is also included in Part B Chapter 4 Reg. 4.1 of the IS Code 2008, which is recommendatory rather than mandatory in nature. URL5 only applies to ships contracted after 1 July 2005 and not to stability instruments fitted on existing ships after this date. Also, from a Classification perspective, new vessels did not need to have a loading instrument capable of checking stability at all, so a loading instrument which only checks longitudinal strength could still be fitted.

2.2 It is therefore important to underline what constitutes an IACS URL5 stability instrument in the context of verifying that the damage stability of tankers complies with the amended Codes and Instruments. The following are extracts from URL5 Rev. 3, entitled “*On-board Computers for Stability Calculations*”: -

***Application*** *“… stability software installed on board shall cover all mandatory class and statutory intact and damage stability requirements applicable to the ship. This UR requires approval of software, installed on on-board computers which is capable of performing stability calculations.”*

*3 “Four types of calculations performed by stability software are acceptable depending on a vessel’s stability requirements:*

***Type 1*** *– Software calculating intact stability only (for vessels not required to meet a damage stability criterion);*

***Type 2*** *– Software calculating intact stability and checking damage stability on the basis of a limit curve (e.g. for vessels to which SOLAS Part B-1 damage stability calculations etc. apply) or checking all the stability requirements (intact and damage stability) on the basis of a limit curve.*

***Type 3*** *– Software calculating intact stability and damage stability by direct application of pre-programmed damage cases based on the relevant Conventions or Codes for each loading condition (for some tankers etc.)*

***Type 4*** *– Software calculating damage stability associated with an actual loading condition and actual flooding case, using direct application of user-defined damage, for the purpose of providing operational information for safe return to port (SRtP).*

*Damage stability of both Type 3 and Type 4 stability software shall be based on a hull form model, that is, directly calculated from a full three-dimensional geometric model.”*

*4.1.2 “A clear warning shall be given on screen and in hard copy printout if any of the loading limitations are not complied with.*

 *Loading limitations shall include, but may not be limited to:*

* *Trim, draught, liquid densities, tank filling levels, initial heel;*
* *Use of limit KG/GM curves in conjunction with above for Type 2 ……..”*

*4.~~2~~ 1.3 “Type 3 software is to include pre-defined relevant damage cases according to the applicable rules for automatic check of a given loading condition”*

*4.1.7 For Type 3 (and Type 4) software, the system shall be pre-loaded with a detailed computer model of the complete hull, including appendages, all compartments, tanks and the relevant parts of the superstructure considered in the damage stability calculation, wind profile, down-flooding and up-flooding openings, cross-flooding arrangements, internal compartment connections and escape routes, as applicable and according to the type of stability software.*

*4.1.8 For Type 1 and Type 2 software, in case a full three-dimensional model is used for stability calculations, the requirements of the computer model are to be as per paragraph 4.1.7 above to the extent as applicable and according to the type of stability software.”*

2.3 It can be seen from the above definitions in URL5 that software only dealing with strength and/or with intact stability (**Type 1**) is insufficient to comply with the Guidelines even if fully approved and certified.

2.4 **Type 2** software is generally suitable for ships carrying dry cargo or passengers and which do not carry bulk liquid cargo. For these ships the consequences of damage are limited, and the worst-case scenarios usually occur when damage is applied to spaces which are initially assumed dry and empty and then fill up to the outside water-plane at final equilibrium. The procedures for calculating the results of these damages are fixed and well defined and relatively simple to conduct when compared to those involving the loss and replacement of an unknown existing liquid cargo by sea water. A ship, suffering asymmetric damage, will almost always list towards the damaged side. Dry cargo and passenger ships of this type may be supplied with **Type 2** software, which operates by comparing the live condition KG or GM with a limiting value interpolated from pre-calculated limiting KG/GM curves or tables obtained from the approved SIB and which ensure that all mandatory damage cases can be survived for the input draught and trim.

2.4.1 Although tankers may be provided with approved limiting KG/GM curves covering all possible cases of intact and damage stability in accordance with Part 1 Section 4.3 of the Guidelines, in practice these are expensive to produce, can be complex to use and often restrict operability and flexibility because they must err on the conservative side for safety. Another difficulty for certain types of tanker is in providing limiting KG/GM curves which cover all foreseeable combinations of loading and damage stability involving varying tank filling depths, cargo specific gravities (SG’s), draughts and trims etc. as required by MARPOL Annex 1, Regulation 3(6.4), for example.

2.4.2 To produce these curves or tables involves pre-calculating a very large number of damage/loading scenarios with no absolute guarantee that the full range of possible loading scenarios has been covered. In practice, extensive limit curve sets presented in a SIB may be used erroneously due to their complexity. Consequently, it is recommended that Type 3 stability software is installed for use on board, rather than using limit curve sets which would have been derived using a similar calculation approach (but with constraints and limitations).

***To avoid complications associated with developing suitable KG/GM limit curves and their potential restriction on operational capacity, the MCA strongly recommends that Type 3 stability software is fitted on board.***

2.4.3 Where operators choose to install **Type 2** software to meet the new carriage requirement for tankers, it should be appreciated that to meet the above concerns this will require any loading limitations needed to simplify the limiting KG/GM data to be rigidly defined, and for operational procedures to be put in place so these limitations can be demonstrated during audit or inspection.

2.4.4 Where waivers have been granted for tankers using consistent loading patterns (e.g. SG and tank filling) which have been approved in the SIB, it is important that such conditions are always adhered to. Tankers only loading to these approved conditions should preferably be provided with guidance indicating the tolerance of each parameter (e.g. draught, trim, KGf, tank filling and cargo SG). Alternatively, each loading condition should be submitted for approval, for which a fee may be charged.

2.4.5 Alternatively, as described in Part 1 Section 4.2 of the Guidelines, to afford more flexibility and to avoid the necessity of adhering closely to the approved loading conditions, tankers can be supplied with a matrix clearly defining the allowable ranges of loading parameters such as draught, trim and KGf for ensuring compliance with the intact and damage stability criteria. Such information should be included in the approved SIB.

2.5 For **Type 3** stability software, “direct calculation” means that the stability instrument utilises a full 3-D geometrical model of the ship including all damageable compartments, tanks and spaces, and is programmed to analyse all the potential damage scenarios required by the relevant Code or Instrument (including the Polar Code if operating in polar regions, see Annex A, paragraph 8) when applied to the proposed loading conditions. Prior to sailing, the proposed loading conditions for the voyage (departure and arrival and, possibly, intermediate to allow for in-voyage ballasting operations, for example) are input into the stability instrument for assessment against the appropriate intact and damage stability criteria.

2.5.1 Once the initial heel is less than 1 degree (see Part 1 paragraph 4.4 of the Guidelines) and the intact stability is satisfactory, the **Type 3** software must then automatically analyse all the pre-set damage scenarios for each loading condition using the actual filling depths and SG’s for all liquid-carrying tanks together with an assumed permeability for dry spaces such as the engine room and storerooms. The resulting damage stability residual GZ curves for each loading/damage scenario must be calculated to both port and starboard over a comprehensive range of heel angles, at the same time allowing the tanker to be free to trim, with due allowance being made for movement of free liquid surfaces in the undamaged tanks.

2.5.2 A simplifying assumption for the final equilibrium condition after damage is that where tanks containing liquids are damaged the tank contents are assumed to be completely lost and replaced with sea water up to the final equilibrium water-plane (see Part 1, paragraph 6.4.3 of the Guidelines). However, it is also necessary to calculate intermediate stages of damage which accounts for variation in SG within the tank over time as the tank contents mix and are replaced by the incoming sea water (see Part 1 paragraph 9.3 of the Guidelines) to show if a worse scenario could arise during flooding. In practice the lowest residual GZ curve normally occurs at final equilibrium when the cargo has been fully replaced by sea water.

2.5.3 For tankers it is not unusual for the list at final equilibrium to lie on the opposite side to the damage, depending on the SG of the lost liquid and/or the original tank filling depths. It is possible for a single damage case to cause list in different directions when applied to different loading conditions in the SIB. It is for this reason that all residual GZ curves must be calculated right across the range of angles to both port and starboard and assessment for compliance to be made on the “worst” side i.e. the one to which the ship finally achieves equilibrium (see Part 1 paragraph 8.2 of the Guidelines).

2.6 **Type 4** stability software is not mandatory for tankers but could be employed to compute damage stability for non-standard scenarios beyond those stipulated by MARPOL and the tanker codes provided that the basic functions of **Type 3** software are still available for routine verification purposes.

2.7 From the above it can be seen that the variability in the capabilities of existing on-board systems, even if approved and certified, means that their breadth of application needs to be well understood by ships’ officers, other users, certifying authorities and those undertaking Port State Control inspections. All need to have a thorough understanding of what the approval certificate should cover. To assist in this assessment, section 3 below contains a flow chart to help identify what may be on board any “existing” (as opposed to “new”) tanker in terms of hardware, software and certification and whether further actions, if any, are needed to comply fully with the modified Codes, Instruments and the Guidelines.

**3.** **Flow Chart to assess the suitability of existing tankers for issue of a waiver in accordance with the amended Codes, Instruments and Guidelines.**

3.1 Below is a flow chart to explain the process of assessing suitability for issue of a waiver. This is intended to be indicative and may not cover every eventuality. If in doubt, then advice may be sought from the RO, or the RO may seek advice from the MCA.

3.2 To be considered for the issue of a waiver, other than one issued for verification at a shore office, the following minimum conditions must be met: -

1. The operator must be able to show a continuous previous history of stability management of the vessel which ensures compliance with both intact and damaged stability requirements.

2. The method used for historical damage stability management can only be accepted for continued use under a waiver if it is validated by the RO as meeting all requirements of the Guidelines published under MSC.1/Circ.1461, and that there is evidence of continuous application as per 1 above.

3. If the method used historically does not meet the Guidelines, so does not fully demonstrate compliance with damage stability requirements, a stability instrument must be fitted.

3.3 Waivers may not be issued to UK vessels in respect of new methods of stability management proposed as an alternative to fitting the required stability instrument.

In the Flow Chart below: -

1. “MATRIX” refers to operating within a range of consistent loading conditions as described in paragraph 2.4.4 above.
2. “LOAD CONDS” refers to loading conditions in accordance with those included in the approved SIB as described in paragraph 4.7.
3. “Agree Guidance Records” requires confirmation that relevant procedures are in place

and suitable records maintained for audit purposes.

1. “Derive Guidance Limits” – see paragraph 4.7.4 for full details.

 

**4.** **Waivers – who can issue them and under what circumstances?**

4.1 Waivers may be issued by the MCA or the RO for the ship where stability approval has been delegated. The MCA will continue to assess the ability of the RO’s to meet UK expectations as part of the ongoing stability monitoring process. Following the phase-in of changes to stability instruments to meet the new regulations, the default method of damage stability verification on UK ships shall be carriage of an Instrument capable of verification by direct calculation i.e. an IACS URL5 – **Type 3**. Any new approval of such stability instruments made after the Guidelines were introduced on 14th May 2013 should follow this guidance, including those fitted on existing vessels.

4.2 Other methods of damage stability verification, if retained from before re-certification, must be validated against the Guidelines and then specified under a waiver on the IOPP Form B or Certificate of Fitness. Issuing a waiver is justifiable only if enforcing the installation of a new stability instrument on a vessel would be unreasonable because it already does effective damage stability verification by another accepted means. **Requesting a waiver to avoid fitting a new stability instrument is not acceptable and should not be sanctioned by MCA/ROs unless all appropriate checks have been made in accordance with the Guidelines. In case of doubt the MCA should be consulted.**

4.3 If new-style certification is issued in advance of the application dates specified in Section 2 above then it might not specify that a stability instrument is fitted. Such certification may include a waiver for continued use of existing stability information in which case validation of the verification and maintenance of records in accordance with the Guidelines is not compulsory until the date of application in the amended IMO Instrument.

4.4 PSCOs should be aware that for some tankers a lines plan may not be available from which a computer model can be prepared for use in a stability instrument. Under these circumstances the operators of such tankers may apply increased pressure to obtain a waiver, but the increased cost for compliance is on its own insufficient justification to issue a waiver – they would have to demonstrate that they already make satisfactory stability verification using another means.

4.5 Before a waiver can be considered and issued the operators must be able to demonstrate that there is in place an existing ability to verify damage stability by one of the six approved methods listed in Section 4 Part 2 of the Guidelines: -

.1 the tanker loads strictly in accordance with the conditions in the approved SIB (see 4.7);

.2 if not to be loaded in accordance with the approved SIB, all new, previously unapproved, loading conditions may be sent to the authorised RO for approval before departure;

.3 alternatively such unapproved loading conditions may be approved prior to departure by an appointed shore-based operating company authorised by the RO;

.4 if the tanker has an approved stability instrument with Type 2 stability software on board, it may be used to verify the loading conditions on board or at the authorised shore station, but see sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 above;

.5 use of an approved stability instrument must be authorised by the MCA/RO and the software approved and certified as either Type 2 or Type 3 (see section 3 above for details);

.6 alternatives such as operating within an approved range of loading conditions (see section 2.4.4 above) or using approved combined intact and damage stability KG/GM limit curves (see sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, above) are permitted provided that any restrictions in their use are observed and evidence of their regular use can be demonstrated on board (see section 5).

4.6 It should be noted that existing stability instruments, even those with approval certificates, may not fully comply with the new requirements in the Guidelines. For example, some existing systems are approved and certified but only for intact stability or strength calculations. It is essential that on-board stability instruments are approved and certified to undertake damage stability calculations as well as intact stability and/or strength as appropriate.

4.7 The most common waiver likely to be issued is one permitting continued loading “in accordance with” approved loading conditions. This is a valid method but relies upon several factors to ensure the safety of the vessel and to minimise pollution should a damage occur: -

1. Relates to the overall level of safety of the vessel, and this is provided by the margin of available stability over that required to meet the minimum residual stability standards. The margin is specific to the current loading condition and details should be available from the approved damage stability calculations.

2. Relates to the overall loading of the vessel since the margin of damage stability depends upon the remaining buoyancy of the hull and the tank fillings being maintained. For this reason, it is also important that significant increases in draught or trim or changes in tank filling are not permitted.

3. For this waiver to be issued the vessel would be expected to be on a limited service and loading a restricted number of cargoes only. It is not an appropriate waiver for application to a parcel tanker, bunker barge, or other vessel where partial loading is common, or where there is substantial variation in cargoes carried.

4. Where a waiver is issued for loading in accordance with approved loading conditions only, the operator must be able to demonstrate a continuous history of operation within the acceptable loading limits defined to enable issue of this waiver. The acceptable loading limits are as follows: -

* Total mass in any cargo or water ballast tank not to vary by more than 1.0% from that shown in the target loading condition being loaded.

* Free surface correction for any cargo or water ballast tank not to vary by more than 1.0% from that shown in the target loading condition being loaded.
* Loaded displacement not to be less than that of the arrival condition for the target loading condition being loaded.
* Loaded displacement not to exceed that of the departure condition for the target loading condition being loaded.

* Vessel trim to lie between those of the departure and arrival conditions for the target loading condition being loaded.
* Condition KGf (GMf) to lie below (above) the KGf (GMf) of the target loading condition being loaded (including any allowed margin), interpolated between the departure and arrival condition displacements at the actual loaded displacement.
* The above acceptable loading limits can be presented as a simple loading limit diagram, developed from each pair of approved departure and arrival conditions presented in the approved stability information (refer to SLF 54/5 Annex 5 Section 8 for full technical details), normally with no GG1 allowance made for margin. GG1 is the difference in KG (GM) between the actual KG (GM) of the loading condition and the limiting KG (GM) to ensure compliance with the “residual GZ Peak” and “area under the residual GZ curve” damage stability criteria. For cases where down-flooding through weathertight openings may occur, the margin refers to the residual freeboard of such openings above the equilibrium waterplane.



* Margin may be allowed at 50% of the known margin for a pair of approved departure and arrival loading conditions, subject to a maximum allowable limit of 100mm, but only if this margin can be determined directly from the approved stability information.
* Margin may also be directly calculated from the approved stability information provided this contains sufficient baseline data to complete the calculation shown in SLF 54/5 Annex 5, and if a relevant additional margin is determined for the residual freeboard of weathertight openings (air pipes). MCA must be consulted for agreement prior to issue of a waiver for loading to approved loading conditions where these are to include a directly calculated margin and shall approve any such calculations. A directly calculated margin may also be allowed at a rate of 50% up to a maximum allowable limit of 100mm.

4.8 The amendments to international instruments permit a waiver to be issued if the stability instrument is located at a shore office and not on board the vessel. The intention of this waiver is to allow one shore office to provide approved loading information to several ships in the same fleet, if this is what the operator requests.

4.9 Waivers for shore operation may be issued for UK vessels on the following conditions: -

.1 The stability instrument provided at the shore office must be fully compliant with the Guidelines as if it were being fitted on the vessel.

.2 The shore office must be under the direct control of the vessel operator and subject to audit by the MCA or an authorised RO through the DOC issued under ISM Code. Waivers may not be issued if verification is made by a third party.

.3 Shore-based calculations using non-approved stability instruments (including those performed by an independent naval architect) are not acceptable

4.10Section 5 of this Notice describes various checks which can be carried out to ensure that damage stability is being validated in accordance with the Guidelines prior to departure.

**5.** **Demonstration of Compliance with the Damage Stability Requirements**

5.1 It is possible to make various checks to determine whether the method of verification being applied on a vessel is fully in compliance with the Guidelines. Although these checks are more important to ensure that the method being employed under a waiver is compliant, some checks can also be applied where an approved stability instrument is being employed.

5.2 **For tankers not fitted with a stability instrument and loading only to approved conditions under a waiver** the following checks may be applied, having regard to paragraph

4.7: -

1. Examine the certification to ensure that the relevant waiver is issued.
2. Examine the damage stability calculations to determine if all relevant damage cases have been considered. Tankers with asymmetric tank divisions or asymmetric loading cases must be assessed for damage stability compliance for port and starboard damage cases. Damage cases which extend across one or more bulkheads must also be assessed for lesser damages for any single or multiple compartment combination as they may be more onerous. Any errors identified will render this means of verification invalid.
3. Compare the KGf (GMf) in the actual current loading condition against the KGf (GMf) from the target loading condition shown in the approved SIB. If the actual KGf is higher (or actual GMf is lower), then damage stability compliance may be compromised. This is more likely to occur on small parcel tankers which carry a mix of cargoes or any vessel which has deck tanks in use.
4. Compare the actual draught and trim with those from the target loading condition shown in the approved SIB. If the draught or trim is increased, then damage stability compliance may be compromised.

.5 Compare actual tank fillings for cargo and WB with those from the target loading condition shown in the approved SIB. If the cargo and WB are distributed differently, even though the total amount of carried is very similar, then damage stability compliance may be compromised. This applies especially if deck tanks shown empty are filled or where WB is not carried outboard of an empty cargo tank as shown in the target loading condition.

.6 It is also possible to examine the supporting damage stability calculations to determine the margin by which the target loading condition meets the required damage stability criteria. If the margin can be determined and is small, the possibility of differences shown above affecting damage stability compliance is increased considerably.

.7 Ideally, tankers loading only to approved conditions should be provided with advice regarding how closely they need to adhere to these loading conditions to remain compliant with the damage stability criteria.

5.3 **For tankers which verify damage stability compliance using critical KGf or GMf data** the following checks may be applied: -

1. Examine the certification to ensure that the relevant waiver is issued where a manual verification is made.
2. Examine the damage stability calculations to determine if all relevant damage cases have been considered. Tankers with asymmetric tank divisions must be assessed for damage stability compliance for port and starboard damage cases. Damage cases which extend across one or more bulkheads must also be assessed for lesser damages for any single or multiple compartment combination as they may be more onerous. Any errors identified will render this means of verification invalid.
3. Examine the approved SIB to determine if the critical KGf/GMf data being applied on board are subject to any loading restrictions required to validate them for use. Loading restrictions may include draught and/or trim limits, specified cargo distribution between tanks, tank filling levels and content densities. If loading restrictions are applied, then the vessel must have procedures in place to ensure these conditions are met in the actual loading condition. Where loading restrictions are not met the damage stability compliance may be compromised.
4. Where critical KGf/GMf data are applied, they must be applied for the actual draught and trim of the vessel as this is loaded, not at the assumed draught and trim obtained from the loading calculation. Applying critical KGf/GMf data at the wrong draught or trim may compromise damage stability compliance, so procedures should be in place to prevent this.

.5 These checks apply equally whether a manual check or verification using an approved stability instrument on board or ashore is being made. In the case where an approved stability instrument is used it also recommended to check that the critical KGf/GMf data stored in the stability instrument are the same as those presented in the approved SIB.

5.4 **For tankers which verify damage stability compliance by loading within a range of approved conditions** the following checks may be applied: -

1. Examine the certification to ensure that the relevant waiver is issued.
2. Examine the damage stability calculations to determine if all relevant damage cases have been considered. Tankers with asymmetric tank divisions must be assessed for damage stability compliance for port and starboard damage cases. Damage cases which extend across one or more bulkheads must also be assessed for lesser damages for any single or multiple compartment combination as they may be more onerous. Any errors identified will render this means of verification invalid.

.3 Examine the approved SIB to determine any specific advice on how loading within the approved range of loading conditions is determined, and whether any loading restrictions apply. Loading restrictions may include draught and/or trim limits, specified cargo distribution between tanks, tank filling levels and content densities. If loading restrictions are applied then the vessel must have procedures in place to ensure these conditions are met in the actual loading condition, and that the specific advice regarding validation that the actual condition falls within the range claimed is also met. Where either of these conditions are not met the damage stability compliance may be compromised.

5.5 **For tankers which verify damage stability compliance through remote means ashore, by submission to Flag or the RO for approval or verification at a shore office**, the following checks may be applied.

1. Examine the certification to ensure that the relevant waiver is issued.
2. Examine the damage stability verification report to determine if all relevant damage cases have been considered. Tankers with asymmetric tank divisions must be assessed for damage stability compliance for port and starboard damage cases. Damage cases which extend across one or more bulkheads must also be assessed for lesser damages for any single or multiple compartment combination as they may be more onerous. Any errors identified will render this means of verification invalid.
3. Verification should be made using an approved stability instrument and the approval certificate should be available for examination. It would be expected to be of Type 3, and the approval certificate should indicate all functions for which approval are given (see Annex B paragraph 8.1, below). This will normally be longitudinal strength, plus intact and damage stability verification.
4. The verification process should include a process to correct the calculation if the actual draught and trim are different from the calculated draught and trim based upon the tank fillings provided by the vessel.
5. All previous loading condition verification reports should be available as they are an auditable record for 3 years for ISM SMC purposes, and evidence should be available that verifications are being received on board prior to departure.
6. Where verification is made ashore and is not conducted by the Flag or RO, it must be made by a shore office of the operating company subject to IMO DOC audit.

5.6 **For tankers which verify damage stability compliance on board using a stability instrument**, the following checks may be applied.

1. Examine the damage stability instrument to determine if all relevant damage cases have been considered. This means all bottom damage cases and side damage cases to both port and starboard. Damage cases which extend across one or more bulkheads must also be assessed for lesser damages for any single or multiple compartment combination as they may be more onerous. Any errors identified will render this means of verification invalid.
2. Verification should be made using an approved stability instrument and the approval certificate should be available for examination. It would be expected to be of Type 3, and the approval certificate should indicate all functions for which approval are given (see Annex B paragraph 8.1, below). This will normally be longitudinal strength, plus intact and damage stability verification.
3. The verification process should include a process to correct the calculation if the actual draught and trim are different from the calculated draught and trim based upon the tank fillings provided by the vessel.

5.7 Approved document(s) should be available on board confirming that calculations of longitudinal strength (ILLC), intact stability (ILLC, MARPOL), damage stability (MARPOL, IBC & IGC) as applicable have been examined and approved. PSCOs should be aware that it is possible that the damage stability calculations may not have been specifically approved and their “approval” may be included under the general heading of “approved stability information” (see paragraph 5.9.1). If this is not clear from the documentation presented it should be confirmed with the RO or Administration which issued the approval.

It should be realised that approval of damage stability will generally only cover the conditions in the SIB and so the content of any damage stability documents in themselves cannot be assumed to represent a complete record of approval of all possible cases. For example, an “approved” booklet may only cover damage cases involving the maximum extent of damage and not those of a lesser extent (which may be more onerous).

5.8 Whichever method is used to demonstrate compliance with the damage stability requirements it is essential that the ship departs only when the loading conditions for the voyage ahead are fully compliant (see Part 2 Section 5 of MSC.1/Circ.1461 for details on steps to take to adjust the loading of the ship should this not be the case). PSCOs should ensure that the loading officers are fully aware of the various options available to them for taking corrective measures.

5.9 The two primary stability documents are: -

 .1 Approved intact stability information;

* + - * Contains proposed intact loading conditions

* + - * On approval, these intact loading conditions are themselves deemed to be “approved” for use.

.2 Approved damage stability calculations;

* + - * Usually a separate submission
			* Demonstrates that the approved intact loading conditions will survive damages up to the maximum extent required by the applicable Convention or Code and achieve the minimum residual stability standard.

If approval is made by letter or Design Appraisal Document (DAD), for example, a copy of this letter or document must be available for examination to ensure any conditions of approval are being met.

5.10 In addition to the two primary stability documents, further documentary evidence, as shown in tabular form on the next page, should be maintained and kept available for inspection depending upon which of the six methods of verification described in Section 4 of Part 2 of the Guidelines is employed: -



**Key to asterisks in the above table**

\* The Administration must specify this in their waiver (see 6.2.1) as they cannot issue unless they satisfy themselves that the vessel is closely loading historically, otherwise the vessel has no guidance on what this means. We have a UK standard we could also apply to define where we think permitted deviation is excessive, and lack of guidance is a deficiency in itself.

\*\* Issue of full certificate – no waiver – implies fitment of new Type 3 generally (but could be Type 2) or retention of existing stability instrument which may be of Type 2 or 3.

\*\*\* Checks must be made on board and in shore office. Shore office is supposed to be an office under control of the operator and which is subject to ISM audit through DOC. It should not be a third party. Any use of a third party (other than MCA or RO) should be flagged up to MCA or RO.

**6.** **What to look out for when assessing compliance with the Guidelines**

6.1 ISM certification requires that companies identify and assess risks, establish appropriate safeguards and put procedures in place, including checklists if appropriate, to ensure that statutory requirements are met. This requirement now more clearly extends to verification of intact and damage stability compliance on a tanker prior to departure from port.

6.2 It is clear from previous inspections of tankers that some company safety management systems rarely formalised this requirement and, in some cases, included no provision to make relevant verification checks. It is also seen that errors and omissions in this critical operation are rarely identified by internal or external ISM audits, despite stability verification being a critical mandatory operational procedure for all ships.

6.3 Inspections and audits have regularly identified intact loading conditions signed off by the master which carry warnings such as “*This loading condition complies with intact stability only, damage stability to be verified also*”, or similar. This should no longer be possible if correct action is taken by companies to update equipment and procedures to comply with revised legislation and the damage stability Guidelines.

6.4 Where safety concerns in relation to tanker damage stability verification are identified, a PSCO may ask what operational procedures are defined to cover this task within the safety management system. The PSCO may need to determine whether these meet the objectives of the ISM Code and if an ISM related deficiency should be issued.

6.5 The safety management system commonly assigns responsibility for the calculation of stability to the mate, but there are often no supporting procedures or checklists which detail how the task is to be performed and recorded.

6.6 In the absence of an approved stability instrument on board (or access to one via a shore station) there must be procedures in place to ensure any alternative system of compliance (authorised by waiver) is being correctly used and appropriate records kept demonstrating that effective intact and damage stability verification is being undertaken. Should the PSCO have any doubts as to the stability verification method being used, the operators and MCA/RO should be alerted so that any necessary corrective measures can be agreed upon and actioned.

6.7 The complexity involved and risk of operator error with supplying and using an alternative verification method, is one of the main reasons why it is the MCA’s strong preference and firm recommendation that approved Type 3 software be installed on an on-board stability instrument or accessible via a shore station (see also 2.4.2 above).

**7 Historical Background**

7.1 The first loading instruments used on board tankers to compute and verify intact and damage stability were based on the use of pre-determined tabular data for hydrostatics, cross curves of stability, tank calibrations and critical KGf/GMf’s. Just as for manual interrogation of the approved SIB, the computer would simply interpolate into the tables to produce all the output required to confirm and demonstrate compliance.

7.2 As computing power increased, some software developers started to use 3D models for the calculations, but the utilization of the model was limited in those days by the lack of availability of cheap processing power to fulfil the potential for direct computation of damage stability within a reasonable time.

7.3 Software steadily improved and computers speeded up so that eventually **Type 3** assessment (direct damage computation) became a realistic possibility in terms of cost and response time. The software on tankers existing at that time, which still used tabular data to a greater or lesser degree, was often not completely replaced but rather a new damage stability module using a full 3D definition of hull and compartments would be added. So, for example, the intact condition prior to damage could still be derived from tabular data, but the damaged calculations were based upon real fluid shifts and 3D hull properties.

7.4 These “hybrid” systems with an added 3D damage stability module were approved at that time for existing tankers and certified by administrations as they were based on a previously approved tabular system. However, they are not truly using **Type 3** software of the type envisaged by the Guidelines and so the certification and any accompanying documentation (e.g. Design Appraisal Document (DAD)) both need to be checked very carefully, particularly on older tankers, to fully ascertain the degree to which they comply. Cases have been found, for example, where even the added **Type 3** modules are still using tabular computation methods rather than performing direct damage stability calculations on a 3D geometrical computer model.

**8. Considerations for ROs approving Waivers**

8.1 To show whether a tanker is using the **Type 3** software effectively on its stability instrument ROs should consider the following: -

* the intact stability hydrostatics, cross curves of stability and tank filling details are being directly computed from the 3D geometrical computer model and not by interpolation from tables;
* the tank free surface effects for the intact ship are being directly calculated from the tank geometry taking heel into account;
* for the damaged ship, the free surfaces in the undamaged tanks and spaces are being similarly directly calculated, accounting for both trim and list;

* the residual GZ curve and final equilibrium water-plane characteristics (if any) are being directly calculated, including intermediate stages of flooding when required, and details of down-flooding opening submersion points;

* compliance is being demonstrated by direct comparison with all individual criterion for each loading/damage scenario and not just by indicating compliance with the overall limiting KGf/GMf data.

In case of doubt over any or all the above points or over whether a “hybrid” computer is not fully functioning as a Type 3 stability instrument, for example, the case should be referred to the MCA for further consideration.

8.2 For tankers which are loading to approved conditions or within a limited range of operating parameters only, the approving authority should ensure that all relevant damage cases and loading scenarios are included in the SIB and operators that the ship operates closely to the target approved loading condition/range.

8.3 The following examples suggest some points to look out for when examining the damage stability calculations submitted for approval: -

8.3.1 Care should be taken to ensure that the damage cases included cover both the port and starboard sides, particularly on tankers which themselves may have some degree of design asymmetry or, as is more likely, are not loaded symmetrically. The damage cases covered may include both two-compartment and one-compartment scenarios but if checking damage is limited to the port side only, for example, the loading conditions (and the tanker itself) all must be fully symmetrical for the damage stability approval to remain valid in all damage cases (port and starboard).

8.3.2 Considering the worst case of damage for an approved loading condition it is possible that this has no safety margin, meaning that one criterion is on the limit. If the tank fillings in the damaged tanks vary between port and starboard for this condition and damage was only assessed to one side, then there is a possibility that the unevaluated damage on the other side will be non-compliant.

8.3.3 It may be borne in mind that a tanker damaged on the port side cargo tank could finish up listing to starboard, depending on the filling depth of the damaged tank and/or the SG of their cargo contents. In these circumstances the stability verification should be made to starboard and not to port.

8.3.4 To reduce the volume of paperwork involved, a designer or consultant may consider the worst damage cases from a large array and from these only present a limited few of the “most severe” cases for approval by the authorities. There is a limitation here as the most severe damages are those which give the worst result when applied to the proposed loading conditions presented in the intact SIB, and other damages may become even more severe if alternative loading conditions are proposed. For example, the most severe cases may include several two-compartment damages and few one-compartment damages. If the considered loading conditions normally employ counter-ballasting in the wing tank outboard of an empty cargo tank to reduce list post-damage and this counter-ballasting is not actually present in service, the one-compartment damage cases may become the most severe (through damage now occurring to two empty tanks). Consideration of limited damage cases on this basis is not acceptable for a **Type 3** stability instrument, since this would leave the vessel unable to effectively assess conditions of loading which are different from the approved conditions from those presented in the approved intact stability information.

**9. Some final questions**

During the consultation process on earlier drafts of this MGN a number of questions arose which it is thought worthwhile to discuss here, even though some of them may already have been answered in the amendments now included in this draft. Some repetition occurs in the following.

**Q1 (2.4)**  **Approved Damage Information/SIB not compatible with stability instrument**

 It should be clarified under which circumstances damage stability studies of existing vessels should be re-issued and approved. It is often found that damage stability studies of existing vessels do not comply with the Guidelines (since they were issued well before the Guidelines were created) and often assert compliance with the regulations of loading conditions that are shown not to be compliant by the loading instrument when the latter is correctly following the Guidelines. Class advised that these loading conditions should be considered as compliant nevertheless, by virtue of the fact that the damage stability study and the T&S Book of existing ships cannot be replaced by the loading instrument, even when the approved loading instrument clearly showed them as not compliant according to the Guidelines. Should Class not force the owner to correct and re-issue the damage stability study and the T&S Book for existing ships?

**A1**  It is noted that it is possible for a new Type 3 stability instrument to be installed on a ship with an old stability information booklet and that the instrument may provide different or more accurate results than the originally approved stability information. In this case, the approving authority shall seek to understand why the differences have arisen. If the differences are attributable to modern and more accurate calculation methodologies in comparison with, for example, the use of look-up tables in the SIB, the instrument may be approved, and the damage information/SIB will not require to be revised and re-approved. If the differences are due to fundamental changes to the stability information for the ship (including, but not limited to, items such as openings, arrangement, maximum draught etc.), then the original SIB must be revised and re‐approved.

In general, the SIB includes loading conditions covering the intact situation which are aligned with those in the stability instrument. If the damage stability calculations are not in accordance with the Guidelines, then the SIB is invalidated for the purpose of evaluating any condition of loading and cannot be used. The results from the approved stability instrument take precedence and the SIB should be set aside.

For further clarification, new tankers constructed on or after 1 January 2016 must have a SIB fully compliant with the Guidelines and approved accordingly as well as an approved stability instrument fitted with Type 3 software. The legal verification that each loading condition complies with the intact and damage stability requirements before the tanker departs is made by the approved stability instrument. Only on those occasions when the tanker loads exactly in accordance with a condition in the approved SIB would it be expected that the results would align precisely. More usually, the approved stability instrument can be relied upon to give accurate and reliable results for all loading conditions, whether or not they are included in the approved SIB.

Tankers constructed before 1 January 2016 are required, by 2021, to validate stability by a stability instrument approved in accordance with the Guidelines or by any other existing method which is also validated against the Guidelines. Only one validated system is required. An existing SIB cannot generally be used for this purpose with the one exception of where the tanker is always loaded in accordance with approved loading conditions, which for many ships would be highly restrictive operationally.

**Q2** **(2.8)** **What does “closely in accordance with loading conditions taken from the approved SIB” actually mean?**

There should be explicit tolerances given to densities, weights, CG locations and fill levels for this to be uniformly enforceable. I do not see these tolerances explicitly mentioned in this document.

**A2.**  See Annex B Section 4.7.4. For a fuller explanation refer to SLF 54/5 Annex 5 Section 8. Although explicit tolerances of the parameters mentioned by the questioner were not agreed at IMO the MCA will apply the principles outlined in the SLF paper and in Annex B Section 4.7 of this MGN.

**Q2A**

One other issue in the attempt to compare SIB and LI results is that of the ambiguity of the definition of allowable tolerances in Table 1 of MSC.1/Circ.1229. The “/” symbol between absolute and % tolerance values should NOT mean that BOTH tolerances need to be met. Rather, it seems obvious that only the LARGER of the two should be met. MSC.1/Circ.1461 Annex has tried to clarify this issue. However, the wording in this set of guidelines is as ambiguous as the table itself and should be modified. Similarly, it should be clarified what parameters should the tolerances in Circ.1461 be applied to. For instance, is it reasonable to apply them to GM Required/KG Max?

**A2A.**

A tolerance of 1%/50cm max is a tolerance of 1% but which must not be taken to be more than 50cm, so when the KML exceeds 50m the tolerance stays at 50cm. Tolerance can be “massaged” by moving the reference point. If LCG crosses zero at midships the tolerance vanishes. If you take LCG from AP, the tolerance is larger, so the absolute limit should be applied where this is justified.

For GM Required/KG Max on stability instruments with Type 2 software where comparison is made between the limiting value of KG/GM and the calculated value of KGf/GMf, the input limiting values should be the same as those in the approved SIB; for the calculated values see paragraph 4.5 of MSC.1/Circ.1229. For stability instruments with Type 3 software, see paragraph 4.6 of the circular for a full explanation of the permitted tolerances.

**Q3** **(Annex B 2.5.2) Intermediate Stage Flooding**

Is it the intention to require Type 3 programs to analyze intermediate stage of flooding as well?  If so, this will significantly increase the time required for the program to analyze a loading condition.  Instead, this can be analyzed in the stability study and review to determine if this is going to be a controlling factor in the calculations.

**A3.**  Yes, IS flooding should be analysed – see Section 9 of MSC.1/Circ.1461. It is tempting to argue that the final stage of equilibrium is always the worst in terms of residual stability, but this is not always the case and so it would be inadvisable to omit the capability for calculating IS flooding from the stability instrument even though it is likely to increase calculation time.

**Q3A** The guidelines recommend only one method to generate and assess intermediate phases of flooding, however they also allow for pretty much any other method. Clearly, this puts the LI in the impossible position of having to match any such method as applied in the SIB, a task further complicated by the fact that no SIB details the specifics of the particular algorithm used to generate and assess its intermediate phases. We believe that the guidelines should only allow ONE methodology to generate and assess intermediate phases of flooding, specifically the one currently recommended.

**A3A.** As explained in Q1, for existing ships the results from the approved stability instrument have precedence over those in the SIB. For new ships, the calculations should be undertaken and approved for compliance with the Guidelines and both the SIB and the stability instrument should use the method recommended in the Guidelines (ref. Part 1 Section 9.3).

It is most important that the stability instrument should adhere strictly to the Guidelines in MSC.1/Circ. 1461 and no attempt made to adjust the software to try to match whatever method may have been used in the SIB if this is not in accordance with the Guidelines. It is essential that following amendments all stability is approved to a common set of Guidelines. There must not be any chance of flexibility or interpretation, and the whole purpose is lost if new approvals were to be undertaken by repeating poor practice identified in the original approval.

**Q4** **(Annex B 3.3)**

Does this wording (*Waivers may not be issued to UK vessels in respect of new methods of stability management proposed as an alternative to fitting the required stability instrument*) mean waivers aren’t allowed for UK flagged ships, and they must have type 3?

**A4.**  It means that where existing methods of demonstrating compliance are deemed deficient in some way then the solution is to fit a Type 3 stability instrument and not seek a waiver based on employing another alternative method.

**Q5** **(Annex B 4.7.4)**

Could you clarify what you mean here by Margin? Is it weight, freeboard/draught? And GG1 here stands for what?

**A5.** GG1 is the difference in KG (GM) between the actual KG (GM) of the loading condition and the limiting KG (GM) to ensure compliance with the “residual GZ Peak” and “area under the residual GZ curve” damage stability criteria. A diagram taken from SLF 54/5 Annex 5 Section 8 is now included in the text under Annex B Section 4.7.4 but there is a very full explanation of the concept of “margin” in that paper with many numerical examples. For cases where down-flooding through weathertight or unprotected openings may occur, “margin” here refers to the residual freeboard of such openings above the equilibrium waterplane.

**Q5A**

Another issue linked to the practical use of LI on board is that of appropriate guidance to the master. In this sense, it should be noted that the concept of GM margin is not as useful in guiding the master of a tanker as it would be to the master of – say – a container ship or a cruise liner. The reason is that the majority of non-compliance cases for a tanker are caused by the submergence of a downflooding point, often as a result of trim and sinkage, rather than heel. In cases like this, there is NO WAY of correcting the situation simply by lowering the KG, thus making the GM Margin a meaningless concept. In this sense, it is also hard to find a single parameter to rank MARPOL damage cases or find the governing one.

**A5A.** It is agreed that lowering the KG will have no impact where “margin” refers to submergence of an opening due to sinkage and/or trim and where the only “solution” will be to reduce or re-distribute the loading. The greatest concern with tankers lies with those which have no margin on the conditions in the SIB, which is characterised by a residual GZ on the limit of 100mm. What we are looking for in this instance is a “stop” or “go” validation regarding loading of the vessel. The margins will be low. Such vessels may have considerable difficulty getting a “go” if loaded to the mark.

**Q6 (General – omission of less onerous damage cases)**

The omission of certain damage conditions based on lesser extents of damage that have been proven to never be a controlling condition has been accepted in the past.    The reduction of these damage cases shortens the calculation time without affecting the results.    Considering that limitation, is this practice still acceptable?

**A6** The current MCA position is that a stability instrument should include all damage cases because removal of any one damage case introduces a risk of impacting the accuracy or validity of the instrument’s output.  Identifying which damage cases could be removed would be an extremely difficult task to undertake and at present we are uncertain as to how that might accurately and realistically be undertaken to a justifiable and safe conclusion.

For example, to demonstrate that the most onerous damage cases have been included, it would be necessary to set out clear assumptions that have been used in the selection process. This would have to be accompanied by calculations to support these assumptions. It would not be a simple task and would involve a complex matrix approach to the loading permutations. The onus would be on the owner/operator or software supplier to supply this study on the severity of damage cases for assessment by the approving authority.

If such a procedure were to be adopted, it should be noted that any reduction in damage cases would be ship‐specific and would not set out generic assumptions thereby setting a precedent for all future Type 3 stability instruments.

It is also emphasised that although the SIB remains the officially approved stability document whereas the stability instrument is a tool to assist the Master in decision making, if discrepancies arise between the two due, for example, to the omission of damage cases, these should be reviewed by the RO to identify the root causes and to consider appropriate action relevant to the extent and significance of any such discrepancies.

**Q7 (General - training)**

Did you want to mention training at all, or have some record of training of Users permitted to generate conditions? Section 6 touches on procedures. I know from speaking with Seasafe in the past that they often trained people at the time of an installation and on returning a few weeks later everyone was new.

**A7** Part 1 Section 3.1 of IMO MSC.1/Circ. 1461 covers education and training of staff involved with damage stability verification and it is felt that this should be incorporated into the ISM procedures for each tanker and verified at intervals by PSCOs. Section 6.3 of the ISM Code states: -

*6.3 The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new assignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarization with their duties. Instructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given*.

The point about changing personnel could be covered by including statements in the ISM procedures such as those in the latest IMO Guidelines for providing damage stability information to the Master on passenger ships (ref. MSC.1/Circ.1532 paragraphs 21-24): -

“21 *At least two crew members should be competent in the operation of the system, including the communication links to the shore-based support. They should be capable of interpreting the output of the system to provide the required operational information to the master*.

*22 When shore-based support is provided in accordance with regulation II-1/8-1.3.2, there should be a contract for the supply of shore-based support at all times during the validity of the ship's certificate.*

*23 When shore-based support is provided in accordance with regulation II-1/8-1.3.2, the shore-based support should be manned by adequately qualified persons with regard to stability and ship strength; no less than two qualified persons should be available to be on call at all times.*

*24 When shore-based support is provided in accordance with regulation II-1/8-1.3.2, the shore-based support should be operational within one hour (i.e. with the ability to input details of the condition of the ship, including structural damage, as instructed).*

**Q8 - (General – change of operational profile)**

Do you feel you capture the situation where a vessel may change operational profile or Owner?

With the waiver options this seems a real concern in that an assessment option such as ‘loading between existing conditions’ may be given a waiver after demonstration it was done in practice, but then a change to operational profile means they start to load outside the limits. How long before it might be picked up by PSCO? It is safe to assume a regular review would identify it, or would many surveyors just check the method on the waiver was in use and not the figures in detail?

**A8.** Although any waiver should clearly specify any operational limitations, this pointillustrates why the MCA’s preference is to avoid waivers wherever possible and encourage all tanker owners/operators to utilize Type 3 software on an approved stability instrument. Otherwise, if the operator fails to notify the approving authorities of a change of profile, we rely on the alertness and competence of PSCOs to pick up any such changes since the last inspection.

**Q9 – (Progressive flooding into “small” tanks)**

A source of contention when comparing SIB and LI is the provision in the guidelines allowing for “small” tanks and spaces to be flooded through downflooding points if they are submerged at equilibrium. In this sense, it should be noted that determining dynamically when such eventuality might occur in a LI is not allowed. This leaves the LI with an impossible decision to make, since the inclusion of the “small” tank in a given damage case might not be appropriate for all loading conditions.

**A9 -** It is noted that the stability information booklets of some tanker designs were approved at the new construction stage with specific progressive flooding being permitted in order to avoid failure of damage stability criteria through the immersion of an opening (see Part 1, paragraphs 6.9 and 10.1.5 of the Guidelines in MSC.1/Circular 1461).

Where the use of progressive flooding is granted in the approval of the stability information booklet then this should be clearly stated in an appropriately located comment in the stability information booklet and/or the Damage Control Booklet in accordance with the Guidelines Part 1 paragraph 3.4.2. For existing ships, where such comments are not included, then the damage information should be updated accordingly and re-approved.

It is important that the stability instrument reflects the basis of the approval of the stability information booklet in order to ensure that it is a useful tool for onboard use and does not indicate a “failure” in situations where the SIB permits some degree of progressive flooding in accordance with the Guidelines. In these cases, the approved use of progressive flooding may be modelled in the stability instrument by, for example, adding a discrete compartment(s) to a damage case, to the satisfaction of the approving authorities. However, it is not permissible to extrapolate this to further progressive flooding to other compartments to reduce the number of damage cases in the stability instrument.

**Q10 - (Damage extents / raking damage)**

The regulations do not give a precise indication of what type of minor damages are valid and which are not. In MSC.1/Circ.1461, there is an example of a very simple single-compartment damage that does not help much. Seemingly, the only type of damages that it seems to exclude are the internal damages (i.e. damages to watertight spaces that are not in contact with the outer shell). In more realistic ship geometries, the number of permutations of damaged spaces can grow very big and some of the resulting minor damages might be physically improbable or downright impossible.

We believe that the regulations should define the allowed minor damages by restricting the type of shapes that a colliding body can have. Ideally, this should be the same box-shape assumed by the SOLAS damage stability regulations. If this is deemed to be too restrictive, then damage cases should be limited to those that can be created by a convex body penetrating the vessel from the outside, such as tetrahedrons and pyramids the base of which is on the vessel outer skin, and that are fully contained in the maximum extent box. In any case, the regulations should NOT allow the generation of minor damages as all the permutations of damaged compartments affected by the maximum extent of damage, since this generates several damage cases that are simply not plausible.

We also believe that the guideline should allow the exclusion of all minor damages that can be proven to be less onerous than others already included in the set. A damage that excludes, for example, a bosun’s store is clearly going to be less onerous than one in which the space is included and so should be eliminated from the set.

**A10**

The creation of lesser extent damages under the applicable rules is open to interpretation due to a certain lack of clarity in the Codes and associated Guidelines. This is reflected in the Guidelines in MSC.1/Circ. 1461, Part 1, paragraph 4.5.4 where it states: “*Sufficient damages, taking into account lesser damages, and variation of draft, cargo density, tank‐loading patterns and extents of tank filling shall be performed to ensure that for any possible loading condition the most onerous damages have been examined according to the relevant criteria*”.

The meaning of “*lesser extents*” is clarified in Part 1, Section 7.2 of the Guidelines where it states, “*If any damage of a lesser extent than the maximum damage specified in Table 3 would result in a more severe condition, such damage shall be considered (see section 4.5.4).*”

Table 3 of MSC.1/Circ. 1461, defining the maximum extents of all damages, is therefore interpreted to mean that lesser extent damages shall be applied to side and bottom damage and bottom raking damage wherever these would result in a more severe condition.

The definition of lesser extents is further explained in MSC/Circular.406 (Section 3 under guidelines for unified interpretation) where it states:

“.1 *“Lesser extent" means the reduction of any one of the three maximum dimensions of damage singly or in combination and also the assessment of the effect of damage affecting any combination of compartments with the maximum extent of damage*.”

With respect to the shape of the damages, they are assumed to be box-shaped with maximum dimensions according to the Regulations. The lesser extent damages are then, in accordance with MSC/Circular.406, generated by the scaling of the dimensions of that box-shaped damage in any or all three directions. There is no consideration given to considering damages by other 3D shapes; for example, choosing a convex body to simulate a ship’s bow.

Certain damages which are automatically generated by specialised software applications may not lie within the spirit of the Regulations and so may be discounted, for example: -

1. damaged compartment(s) above the waterline without any compartments damaged below the waterline;

2. compartment(s) above the waterline which, according to the approved stability information booklet, have no relevant openings may always be considered damaged in the related damage cases; i.e. damage cases which consider those compartment(s) as buoyant may be disregarded.

3. internal compartments with no shell plate boundary being considered as damaged when no compartments bounding the shell are damaged;

4. pairs of compartments which are diagonally opposite one another.

However, the following damages shall be included in the damage case list: -

1. Both port and starboard damages to account for any asymmetry in the design of the vessel;

2. “L‐shaped” lesser extent damages; for example: -



3. Damages which are based on the applicable regulations, but which may be perceived to never realistically happen in the view of the designer or operators.

**Q11 (How to deal with very small tanks in a large space such as an ER?)**

There should be a guideline explicitly specifying that all tanks and other watertight spaces smaller than 5 m3 or 0.5% of the displacement volume at Summer load line draft should either not be modelled or should be included as damaged in all damage cases that involve the compartment that contains them.

Doing this will ensure that the damage cases required on the LI are well defined and identical to the set submitted in the damage calculation booklet. This will significantly simplify the LI approval and all but remove the risk of the LI showing non-compliance of the vessel in its designed loading conditions.

**A11**

We have sympathy for this argument, but it can only be formally addressed if IACS proposes an amendment which specifies a process to be followed to demonstrate how some damage cases can be excluded as they are not “worse” than the overall case. Any such system must be formalised to be able to be seen and taken into account by PSCOs. Until this occurs our recommendation is that the approving authorities use discretion to limit the possibility of the stability instrument analysing an excessive number of damage cases which produce almost identical results.

Equally, such small tanks and spaces could be excluded altogether on the basis that they will make little difference to the overall result and by acknowledging that the damage calculation itself is just an estimate based upon an assumption of 85% permeability. No damage is exactly as it is defined as each damage will have substantive internal buoyant elements (the other 15%) and there is no guarantee this is all symmetric.

**Q12 - (Minimizing the number of damage cases)**

Why are minor damages so important?

We believe it is immediately evident why the minor damage cases should be well defined, since including in the LI minor damages that were not considered in the SIB can and has created cases in which the ship was shown to pass in the official documents but not by the loading instrument.

However, in terms of practical use of LI on board, it is also important that the number of minor damages is kept to a minimum. The reason for this is that the runtime needed to complete a damage stability check is directly proportional to the number of damage cases that need checking, and the number of intermediate phases. In cases where in excess of 500 minor damages are required and five intermediate phases, each check would entail the calculation of 2500 damage cases, needing in the range of an hour to complete on a modern PC. This is certainly unacceptable to a crew who might have to verify several loading conditions in preparation of a trip. In turn, this means that an excessive number of minor damages and intermediate phases might well force the crew not to use the LI in practice.

**Q12A**

The one area that I would really like the MCA to firm up is the requirement to include all of the damage conditions that are considered ‘valid’ (including lesser cases) within in the damage calculation booklet submitted by the shipyard to the Administration/RO/Owner at the original design stage. Doing this will ensure that the damage cases required on the computer loading instrument (CLI) is clear as they should be identical to the cases submitted in the damage calculation booklet. This will remove a lot of issues related to the CLI approval e.g. disagreement over ‘valid’ cases and potential non-compliance of the vessel to meet the damage requirements in its designed loading conditions in the CLI that have already been approved in the T&S/damage calculation which had lesser cases. This is an issue we are experiencing where the shipyard submitted a booklet with 18 cases and the RO required 560 for CLI approval. Can this be clearly stated in the MGN?

**A12**

Matching the damage cases included in the SIB with those in the approved stability instrument should be relatively straightforward for “new” tankers constructed on or after 1 January 2016 as both should follow and be approved in accordance with the Guidelines in MSC.1/Circ.1461 with only limited scope for varying the number of damage cases to be considered in both the SIB and the stability instrument.

There may well be difficulties where a new stability instrument is being installed on an existing tanker with a previously approved SIB. For example, older SIBs often: -

* only contain a very limited number of damage cases,
* only show damages on one side,
* only account for maximum damage extents
* take no account of intermediate phases of flooding.

This can result in the stability instrument showing non-compliances for approved loading conditions which lie close to the ship’s limits. If these indications of non-compliance are persistent then the owner/operator/naval architect should try to identify the causes and, if possible, make the necessary corrections to the loading conditions – for example by imposing deadweight restrictions – in consultation with the ROs. There is no real point is re-issuing the SIB if such problems emerge though it may be advisable to remove it from circulation, so that it is no longer used by the loading officers who can then rely completely on the approved stability instrument for validating the ship’s stability.

The whole purpose of the new provisions in MARPOL etc. regarding fitting of stability instruments is to improve the calculation methods and consistency of approach, recognizing that what had gone before may not always have conformed to the standards required by the regulations. MSC.1/Circ. 1461 added more details as to how this could be achieved by placing more reliance on stability instruments which can provide a much more reliable and comprehensive method of dealing with the complexity of damage stability calculations than a SIB.

**Q13 - (Cargo outflow)**

Issues are encountered when the SIB incorrectly calculates the residual GZ curve without taking into account the intact content outflow. In this respect, the guidelines should be changed to take a precise position on the subject and indicating that “The new floating position MUST be determined by assuming that the damaged displacement is equal to the intact displacement (constant displacement) minus the weight of liquids which were contained in the damaged compartments” (ref. MSC.1/Circ. 1461 Part 1 paragraph 6.1.4.

It is vital that the crew appreciates the role of intact content outflow in tanker damage stability.

**A13**

The guidelines (ref. MSC.1/Circ.1461 Part 1 para 6.1.4) are quite specific on how to treat cargo outflow as subsequent sections Part 1 6.3, 6.4.3 and 9.3.4 show. For example: -

9.3.4 “*Noting that calculation of stability in the final damage condition assumes both the liquid cargo and the buoyancy of the damaged spaces to be lost, it is therefore considered both reasonable and consistent to base the residual GZ curve at each intermediate stage on the intact displacement minus total liquid cargo loss at each stage*.”

Paragraphs 6.1 & 9.3 of Part 1 give details on how added weight is used during intermediate tank flooding and 6.3.2 specifies use of the lost buoyancy at final equilibrium, with a detailed example in Appendix 5.

If the issue of intact content outflow and its effect on the residual GZ curve has not been allowed for correctly in the damage stability calculations accompanying the SIB, then the results from the approved stability instrument will have precedence. For an existing ship, if a waiver from installation of a stability instrument has been issued and evidence is found that cargo outflow has not been correctly allowed for in the accordance with the Guidelines, then the damage stability calculations must be corrected and re-submitted for approval along with a revised SIB.

It is agreed that the crew must appreciate the role of cargo outflow – see Q7 on training.

**Q14 - Free surface effect**

The regulations impose that Minimum FS values for each consumable group should be applied. However, this is often not done in older SIB. Furthermore, a number of SIB have different FS treatment assumptions for the intact definition of the loading condition (standard FS) and the damage calculations (Transference). SIB that are found to be inconsistent in this sense should be re-issued and re-approved.

**A14**

Inconsistencies in the approved SIB, such as standard free surfaces in the intact condition and weight transference for damage stability are an issue but Part 1 Sections 6.5 and 9.4 of the Guidelines in MSC.1/Circ.1461 are fairly clear on the treatment of the free surface effects in intact and damaged spaces. As long as they are adhered to in the approved stability instrument then the results will take precedence over those in the SIB wherever any discrepancies arise. There is no need to re-issue and re-approve the SIB to match the stability instrument.