



# Asylum Migration and Integration Fund United Kingdom Interim Evaluation report December 2017

AMIF UK Responsible Authority  
AMIFEnquiries@homeoffice.gov.uk

## AMIF INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT

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Title	United Kingdom National Programme AMIF
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Time period covered	01/01/2014 - 30/06/2017

Evaluation experts from Home Office Analysis and Insight (HOAI): Migration and Border Analysis (MBA) were commissioned by the Responsible Authority (UKRA) for the administration of the AMIF Fund in the UK. HOAI and MBA is functionally independent of the Responsible Authority, the Audit Authority, and the Delegated Authority. MBA is a specialist analytical department within the Home Office, staffed by evaluation specialists, social researchers, economists and statisticians. It provides high quality analysis and evidence on Migration for customers across the Home Office. All MBA research staff abide by professional and ethical standards established by the Government Social Research Unit.

Terms of Reference (ToR) were drawn up and agreed by the end of April 2017. The evaluation team were contracted to conduct the interim evaluation and to perform any further analysis to inform the Mid-Term review due in June 2018. All members of the evaluation team were in place by May 2017.

Data collection for the Interim evaluation began in May 2017 and was concluded in September 2017.

The interim evaluation comprised two core components; a process evaluation and an outcome evaluation. Unfortunately, due to time constraints and the type/quality of data available to beneficiaries it has not been possible to collect genuine outcome data. Analysis of project outputs has been used instead.

- The process evaluation aimed to provide information on the horizontal indicators and to examine the way in which the fund was administered, monitored, and managed.
- The output evaluation was designed to answer the result and output indicators stipulated by the EC.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This evaluation reports on the interim progress of the UK for the implementation and progress of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) from the period of 1st January 2014 until 30th June 2017. Independent evaluators from Home Office Analysis and Insight (HOAI): Migration and Border Analysis (MBA) were commissioned by the UKRA to complete the evaluation.

### *Context*

The UK experienced high levels of inward migration in the 2014-2017 programming period. World events, such as the civil war in Syria, & from 2015 the European Migration Crisis, continue to influence migratory pressures & the profile of countries from which those seeking asylum originate, in the UK as in the rest of Europe.

### *Challenges.*

Notable challenges were encountered during the implementation of AMIF

1. The process of agreeing the National Programme with the EC and the UKRA proved to be lengthy.
2. The operating environment for returns projects has continued to be challenging.

### *Methods*

#### **Evaluation aims**

The interim evaluation comprised two core components; a process evaluation & an output evaluation.

- The process evaluation aimed to provide information on the horizontal indicators & to examine the way in which the fund was administered, monitored, & managed.
- The output evaluation was designed to answer the result & output indicators stipulated by the EC.

#### **Methodology**

##### *a) Process evaluation*

The process evaluation was comprised of two parts, semi-structured qualitative interviews & documentary analysis.

Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with 38 key UKRA staff & AMIF beneficiaries.

Documentary Analysis - a selection of UKRA administrative documents (financial records, audit processes, calls for funding & application documents, quarterly monitoring reports, & HR data) were collated & analysed.

##### *b) Output analysis*

## Management Information (MI)

The main element of the evaluation is analysis of monitoring & management information (MI) provided by the AMIF beneficiaries. Project Managers of all live & completed projects (43 projects) were contacted requesting all available project monitoring data.

### *Effectiveness*

#### Asylum

The Fund has enabled considerable progress in strengthening and developing the UK's asylum systems and building capacity in line with both national and international asylum policies and procedures.

The National Programme target of 27,800 persons assisted over the 6 years of the fund has been exceeded (69,764 have been supported) in 3.5 years.

For training, three co-financed projects 1st April 2014 to 30th June 2017 provided training related activities. A number of training modules were developed including: Asylum Operations Training; FGM Training; and Safeguarding Awareness.

Two projects were co-financed 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017 that included activities to develop, monitor and evaluate UK asylum policies and procedures.

Six fact finding missions were completed and as of 30th June 2017 four COI products were completed.

Three projects were co-financed 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017 that included activities related to the establishment, development and implementation of national resettlement programmes and strategies, and other humanitarian admission programmes.

#### Integration

The Fund has enabled co-financed projects to provide integration assistance to 4,714 individuals, which equates to 11% of the target set in the National Programme. At the time of preparing the National Programme the UK only had one well established integration service provider covering different areas within England - Gateway.

Five projects were co-financed 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017 that included activities aimed at promoting the effective integration of third-country nationals.

#### Returns

The National Programme set a target of 16,660 voluntary returns and 13,160 enforced returns per year (100,000 voluntary returns and 79,000 enforced returns over 6 years). As of 30th June 2017, 27,380 returnees had their return co-financed by the Fund. Of these, 21,220 individuals have returned voluntarily and 6,160 were enforced removals. However, the balance of voluntary to enforced removals co-financed by the fund was in the desired direction, with voluntary returns comprising just over three quarters (78%) of all co-financed returns.

Progress on returns training has been very limited, with 13 individuals trained as of 30th

June 2017 & very few applications from projects to provide training.

### ***Efficiency***

43 projects have been funded at a total proposed cost of £317,363,980.77, with a total cost to the EU of £247,095,268.61. So far the UK has claimed costs of £88,517,357.93.

The cost per beneficiary of completed projects under AMIF is £2867.82 (all these projects are working on returns initiatives). This compares favourably to the average unit cost under SOLID of £3453.64.

Projects only recorded output data which did not include dates that outcomes were achieved so an analysis of the time to outcome for individual interventions is not possible.

It is difficult to accurately account for administrative and human resource costs associated with delivery of the fund. In the early stages of the Fund, projects struggled to obtain the information required to provide accurate records on staffing levels or how much time they spent delivering the services. In many cases applications had not effectively costed staff time into their bids.

### ***Relevance***

There have been some changes in the specific focus of the programme. However, the overall priorities outlined in the National Programme still remain largely the same. While working to return people to their country of origin is still the top priority, the biggest change in need since the start of AMIF is the need to focus on asylum applications and dealing with these in the fairest, most efficient and effective way possible.

### ***Coherence***

The UKRA have developed a series of robust procedures to ensure coherence across the work program both within the Home Office and across wider UK government.

- Better systems for identifying the strategic and national objectives targeted by the project bid.
- Projects monitored closely by UKRA Account Managers to understand the work being completed.
- The introduction of an informal pre-application meeting
- The adoption of Direct Award Funding Model

### ***Complementarity***

Where there has been a shift in policy priorities over the course of AMIF, such as the creation of a compliant environment and a greater need for asylum support than initially anticipated, the UKRA have responded to this quickly and decisively. These responses have included:

- tailored calls for funding to address gaps,
- holding events for potential and existing beneficiaries, and
- the process of making changes to the programme as part of the mid-term review.

### ***Added Value***

AMIF has contributed to the UK programme of work in a number of ways; providing a mechanism to improve the scope, aim and processes of migration work in the UK.

### ***Sustainability***

Sustainability was a core focus of the National Programme and to manage this checks were built into the application and assessment process of projects. There have been improvements in the sustainability of offering voluntary returns by the implementation of projects encouraging this. Asylum and administrative processes have improved under AMIF and these improvements will continue into the future. Close partnership working in the field of integration meant that comprehensive integration support exists. This has benefitted those under AMIF and will continue to do so for other refugees being resettled in the UK in the future.

### ***Reduction of administrative burden***

The innovative procedures introduced by the fund had mixed success in bringing about simplification for the beneficiaries.

The simplified cost option was not effectively operationalised. Multi-annual programming provided a significant advantage in the running of AMIF. The ability of the UKRA to allow funds to roll over from one year to the next gave the UKRA additional flexibility and added discretion in the projects that were funded.

The UK has not sought to make changes to the national eligibility rules. Primarily this is due to auditing requirements making any flexibility difficult to implement in practice. As a result the systems under AMIF have tended to fall back to a similar EU administration model implemented under SOLID.

### ***Conclusions***

1. Overall the UK has made good progress addressing the primary objectives within the National Programme.
2. If the success or otherwise of AMIF needs to be demonstrated then the evaluation aims and objectives need to be clearly outlined from the programming phase of the fund by the EC.
3. Flexibility in the SLAs regarding targets should be considered for projects.
4. The UKRA have been committed to continuous improvement.
5. The UKRA has funded a range of projects which address the needs of strategic objectives in different and innovative ways.

### ***Recommendations***

1. Sufficient time and guidance allowed for the development the National Programme and implementation plans.
2. Incorporate evaluators or evaluation expertise in the design and decision making process of funding applications.

3. There should be a way in which projects can revise their targets and associated costs once funding has been awarded without going through a new application process.
4. The good practice of continuous improvement should be maintained. Critical evaluation of processes and systems must be ongoing.
5. For the strategic objectives of returns and integration efforts should be made to broaden the scope and innovation of funded projects.



## SECTION I: CONTEXT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF AMIF DURING 01/01/2014 - 30/06/2017

The UK continued to experience high levels of inward migration in the 2014-2017 programming period. World events, such as the civil war in Syria, & from 2015 the European Migration Crisis, continue to influence migratory pressures & the profile of countries from which those seeking asylum originate, in the UK as in the rest of Europe.

After a steady increase in the period 2011-2014, the number of asylum applications declined in 2016-17 (from 44,844 in year ending June 2016 to 35,103 in year ending June 2017 – including dependants). However, the number of asylum applications from Syria has continued to increase year on year, with 966 applications from Syrian nationals in the year ending June 2017, in addition to those accepted through resettlement schemes (see below). Across all nationalities in 2016 and 2017, the largest number of asylum applications came from nationals from Pakistan, Iran and Iraq.

Whilst the UK has no centralised integration strategy resettlement schemes are offered to those who have been referred to the Home Office by The United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). On 7 September 2015, an expansion to the existing Syrian Vulnerable Person Resettlement Scheme (VPRS) was announced. Through this expansion, it was proposed that 20,000 Syrians in need of protection be resettled in the UK by 2020. A total of 5,706 people have been granted humanitarian protection under the Syrian VPRS since the scheme began, & in 2016, 4,369 people were resettled. The UK also operates the Vulnerable Children's Resettlement Scheme (VCRS). Launched in 2016, the commitment is to resettle up to 3,000 individuals from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region that qualify under the Children at Risk UNHCR vulnerability category.

The continuing relatively high level of asylum applications, of whom only around half (52%) are accepted for protection even following appeal, underlines the need for an affective returns strategy to manage those with no legal basis to stay. In the period 2014 to June 2017 the UK's priority was to continue to encourage voluntary return as the preferred option. The number of voluntary departures fluctuated around an average figure annually of 26,000 over the period 2014 to 2017 while the number of enforced removals has decreased year on year (14,395 in year ending June 2014 to 12,193 in year ending June 2016).

## SECTION II: CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME

Several challenges were encountered that impacted on the implementation of the National Programme.

The process of agreeing the National Programme with the EC and the UKRA receiving designation proved to be lengthy. Whilst the UK was one of the first MS to obtain agreement of the National Programme this was not achieved until March 2015, 15 months after the inception of AMIF. The UKRA did not receive interim designation until 12 months after the inception of AMIF. Both factors restricted ability to allocate funds to projects in the first 12-15 months. In order to mitigate the adverse impact of these delays, agreement was made with the EC to run some projects ‘at risk’ (mainly projects funded under the previous SOLID funding) with monies backdated once agreement of designation and the National Programme was obtained.

For the first 15 months, funding was restricted to projects that were well established and had been funded under SOLID. As restrictions were lifted, a broader range of potential projects submitted proposals. Overall however, calls for Strategic Objective 1 – Asylum attracted more interest for new and innovative projects (Epione, Safeguarding, Modern Slavery, Asylum Seeking Children’s Service, Asylum Childcare Provision) in comparison to calls for Strategic Objective 2 – Integration (Post Grant Appointment Service and Integration Transition Grant) and Strategic Objective 3 – Returns (Returns Facilitation at Immigration Removal Centres). Thus, as of 30th June 2017 co-financed returns projects are largely focused on expanding and improving business objectives. This has limited the ability to meet some of the UK National Programme targets for some indicators, particularly training.

The operating environment for returns projects has continued to be challenging. Evaluation of SOLID RF noted that the number of available returnees was subject to considerable variation and sensitive to a number of external factors such as changes in the FNO prison population. These factors continue to influence the performance of projects such as FRS that apply strict eligibility criteria. The Return of Irregular Migrants by Charter Flight (RIMCF) project has also continued to face challenges beyond the control of project staff. In combination, a number of factors have resulted in projects experiencing difficulties reaching intended targets. Further details are provided in questions 1.3

**SECTION III: DEVIATIONS IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAMMES IN COMPARISON WITH WHAT WAS INITIALLY PLANNED (IF ANY)**

None

**SECTION IV: EVALUATION QUESTIONS**

1	Effectiveness
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1.1	Specific objective 1: Asylum - Strengthen and develop all aspects of the Common European Asylum System.
	The overall question: How did the Fund contribute to strengthening and developing all aspects of the Common European Asylum System, including its external dimension?
	<p>The response to this and questions 1.1.1 through to 1.1.5 has drawn upon project MI data, quarterly progress reports, staff interviews and applications for funding documentation.</p> <p>The UK has opted out of the recast Asylum Directives, but remains bound by the measures in the first phase of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and is committed to working within the spirit of these measures. The UK has opted into the recast Dublin and Eurodac Regulations.</p> <p>The Fund has enabled considerable progress in strengthening and developing the UK’s asylum systems and building capacity in line with both national and international asylum policies and procedures. Most progress has been made by projects co-financed to better enable asylum seekers with special needs and/or vulnerabilities to receive necessary support (in line with the revised Asylum Procedures Directive). Almost all projects co-financed under Strategic Objective 1 (Asylum) engaged in activities that focussed on particular needs or vulnerabilities, with a successful new pilot project for female asylum seekers who have experienced gender-based violence (Epione), a project providing assistance to potential victims of modern slavery, and four projects focussing on unaccompanied asylum seeking children.</p> <p>Fewer projects have applied for funding to enhance asylum procedures and practices through development and provision of training activities, which has impacted on the ability to meet these targets set in the National Programme so far. However, the Fund has enabled one project to significantly revise training products which supports the UKs focus on enhancing provision available to those with specific vulnerabilities.</p> <p>As with training, only two projects have engaged in activities that could enhance MS capacity to develop, monitor and/or evaluate their asylum policies and procedures. However, the targets set out in the National Programme have been</p>

	<p>met, with four COI products developed and shared with other MS and countries.</p> <p>For re-settlement, the Fund has enabled three co-financed projects to make good progress towards the targets set in the National Programme for this indicator achieving 50% of the target to date.</p>
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1.1.1	<p>What progress was made towards strengthening and developing the asylum procedures, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p><b>Relevant projects</b></p> <p>Eight projects were co-financed 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017 that included activities (both directly and indirectly) aimed at providing assistance in the field of reception and asylum systems.</p> <p>One project - Asylum Applications Support (ASA) facilitated access to statutory financial support and accommodation for eligible adult asylum seekers through assistance with English language, application processes and eligibility checking.</p> <p>A further six projects included activities for asylum seekers with specific vulnerabilities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Epione established a pilot counselling service for women who have experienced gender-based violence and have entered the asylum system.</li> <li>• Modern Slavery provided adult asylum seekers who are a potential victim of modern slavery with a comprehensive package of care and support.</li> <li>• Safeguarding established a safeguarding hub to implement the Adults at Risk Safeguarding Strategy to complement the Safeguarding Children Strategy. The project also included training activities.</li> <li>• National Transfer Scheme (NTS) focused on improving systems and processes to ensure that the best interests of, and appropriate levels of support are available to Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Children (UASC).</li> <li>• Asylum Seeking Children’s Service (ASCS) provided Unaccompanied Children claiming Asylum with support and assistance, including independent advice and signposting to facilitate better access to housing, welfare benefits and healthcare.</li> <li>• Dublin UASC built on an initial small scale pilot designed to implement the Prime Minister’s announcement that the UK will undertake to accept the relocation of a number of Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Children (UASC) from other EU Member States (MS) under the Dublin</li> </ul>

Regulations.

One project, Asylum Childcare Provision offered childcare for children who would otherwise be present at Asylum interview.

For training, three co-financed projects 1st April 2014 to 30th June 2017 provided training related activities.

- Asylum Operations Training aims to review and expand existing UKVI Asylum Operations training modules, with a view to redevelop, reinvigorate and professionalise the materials, delivery and structure (in particular the 5-week Foundation Training Programme).
- Mental health training aims provide a training course for asylum interviewers, decision makers, screening officers and staff who deal with asylum claimants to assist in identifying potential undisclosed mental health issues.
- Safeguarding (see above) provided training activities on safeguarding related issues.

**Output Results**

a. Support and assistance

R1: Number of target group persons provided with assistance through projects in the field of reception and asylum systems supported under the fund: 69,764

R1 (i) number of target persons benefiting from information and assistance throughout asylum procedures: 10,677

R1 (ii) number of target group persons benefiting from legal assistance and representation: 0

R1 (iii) number of vulnerable persons and unaccompanied minors benefiting from specific assistance: 7,049

a. Training

R3 Number of persons trained in asylum-related topics with the assistance of the fund: 620

That number as a percentage of the total number of staff trained in these topics: We have no available data on non co-financed staff trained in asylum related topics to calculate the percentage.

	<p><b>Progress in relation to National Programme Targets, Priorities and Outputs</b></p> <p>a) Support and assistance</p> <p>Co-financed projects made considerable progress in providing support and assistance to asylum seekers. The National Programme target of 27,800 persons assisted over the 6 years of the fund has been exceeded (69,764 have been supported) in 3.5 years. Good progress has also been made in developing support services, processes &amp; procedures for the most vulnerable, with six (out of the eight relevant projects) focussing on asylum seekers with specific vulnerabilities.</p> <p>b) Training in asylum related topics</p> <p>Three co-financed projects engaged in training activities, with one focussing exclusively on developing a range of modules on asylum related topics. A number of training modules were developed including: Asylum Support Training; FGM Training; and Safeguarding Awareness. The new training modules offer the potential for significant long term benefits for new &amp; existing staff to update their skills &amp; be better equipped to respond to asylum seekers with specific vulnerabilities in particular.</p> <p>The National Programme contains what could be regarded as an ambitious target of 3,500 staff trained over the 6 years of the fund, equating to 95% of staff. As of 30th June 2017 co-financed projects had trained 620 staff, (which equates to 18% of the National Programme target). However, progress needs to be considered in the context of fewer applications from projects including training activities and the delayed start of the funding.</p>
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1.1.2	<p>What progress was made towards strengthening and developing the reception conditions, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p>As stated in the National Programme, the UK does not operate reception centres for individuals claiming asylum. Rather, housing for those seeking asylum is assessed on a case by case basis with contracts with private partners to provide accommodation for asylum seekers as required.</p> <p>Three potential beneficiaries approached the UKRA to discuss AMIF funding for activities that could have potentially strengthened reception conditions, mainly refurbishment of existing accommodation so that it could be used as intake units</p>

	<p>when asylum seekers are found by the UK police. However, as of 30th June 2017 no applications had been received that met the criteria to be awarded AMIF funding.</p> <p>Therefore, no projects or actions were funded that would contribute to indicators:</p> <p>R2 – Capacity (i.e. number of places) of new reception accommodation infrastructure set up in line with the common requirements for reception conditions as set out in the Union acquis and of existing reception accommodation infrastructure improved in accordance with the same requirements as a result of projects supported under the fund; and</p> <p>R4 – number of places adapted for unaccompanied minors (UAM) supported by the fund as compared to the total number of places adapted for unaccompanied minors; in the period 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017.</p>
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1.1.3	<p>What progress was made towards the achievement of a successful implementation of the legal framework of the qualification directive (and its subsequent modifications), and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p>No projects or actions were funded that would contribute to this indicator in the period 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017.</p>

1.1.4	<p>What progress was made towards enhancing Member State capacity to develop, monitor and evaluate their asylum policies and procedures, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p><b>Relevant Projects</b></p> <p>Two projects were co-financed 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017 that included activities to develop, monitor and evaluate UK asylum policies and procedures.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis of Country Information Needs and Fact Finding Research produced updated country of origin information (COI) for key asylum</li> </ul>



intake countries to assist decision makers and revise guidance.

- Overseas Document Verification Leads (ODVL) also focussed on country of origin information, working with officials in a number of countries to produce guidance on documents commonly submitted as evidence in asylum claims.

### **Output results**

C4 Number of COI information products and fact finding missions conducted with the assistance of the fund:

Six fact finding missions were completed: two to Sudan; one each to Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. As of 30th June 2017 four COI products were completed - one each for Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sri Lanka and Sudan.

C5 Number of projects supported under the fund to develop, monitor and evaluate asylum policies in member states:

One project, Overseas Document Verification Leads (ODVL) aimed to get experts to help verify immigration documents of migrants from a number of countries and help the UK identify genuine documents. 204 interviews were conducted under this project and 98 documents were identified as being non-genuine.

### **Progress in relation to National Programme Targets, Priorities and Outputs**

Significant progress has been made with respect to the National Programme targets for the two indicators above. The COI project produced four COI products (meeting the national target) for countries that the UK previously lacked COI information for. Asylum applications from Eritrean nationals in particular increased during 2014 and 2015, making the COI products timely.

Thus, the COI products enhance the UK's focus on strengthening assistance to the most vulnerable. Whilst it has not been possible to evaluate the impact of these products, they have been made available to other European Member States and additional countries for information purposes.

For indicator C5, limited progress has been made towards the National Programme target of four projects funded to develop, monitor and evaluate

	<p>asylum policies in member states, with one project funded as at 30th June 2017. However, this is the only project that has applied for funding so far.</p>
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1.1.5	<p>What progress was made towards the establishment, development and implementation of national resettlement programmes and strategies, and other humanitarian admission programmes, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p><b>Relevant Projects</b></p> <p>Three projects were co-financed 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017 that included activities related to the establishment, development and implementation of national resettlement programmes and strategies, and other humanitarian admission programmes.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gateway Statutory Service Provision (SSP) worked together with statutory service providers to provide health, education and social benefit provision for UK asylum seekers.</li> <li>• Gateway Pre-arrival provided pre-integration support including collection of biometrics to enable visas to enter the UK to be issued, and delivery of cultural orientation i.e. sessions delivered to explain the process of resettlement and what life is like in the UK (including rights and responsibilities).</li> <li>• The Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme (SVPRS) worked with statutory service providers to provide health, education and social benefit provision to Syrian Asylum Seekers. Before a policy change removed it from the AMIF remit.</li> </ul> <p><b>Output results</b></p> <p>C6 Number of persons resettled with the assistance of the fund: 3,323</p> <p><b>Progress in relation to National Programme Targets, Priorities and Outputs</b></p> <p>The three co-financed projects have made good progress towards the targets set in the National Programme for this indicator achieving 50% of the target to date. This is despite the SVPRS project ending earlier than planned due to a policy change in September 2015. The resulting expansion to the Scheme (it was proposed that 20,000 Syrians in need of protection were to be resettled in the UK by 2020) resulted in SVPRS receiving funding from the Overseas Development Institution.</p>

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1.2	Specific objective 2: Integration/legal migration - Support legal migration to the Member States in line with their economic and social needs such as labour market needs, while safeguarding the integrity of the immigration systems of Member States, and promote the effective integration of third-country nationals.
	The overall question: How did the Fund contribute to supporting legal migration to the Member States in accordance with their economic and social needs, such as labour market needs, while safeguarding the integrity of the immigration systems of Member States, and to promoting the effective integration of third-country nationals?
	<p>The response to this and questions 1.2.1 through to 1.2.4 has drawn upon project MI data, quarterly progress reports, staff interviews and applications for funding documentation.</p> <p>The mix of migrants coming to the UK is such that it was thought most effective to focus work on the integration of refugees. Although refugees are only a small minority of Third Country Nationals coming to the UK (the majority of new long-term arrivals are students, followed by skilled workers) it was thought that the benefit of additional investment would provide support for those who may already have arrived in the UK.</p> <p>The Fund has enabled co-financed projects to provide integration assistance to 4,714 individuals, which equates to 11% of the target set in the National Programme. At the time of preparing the National Programme the UK only had one well established integration service provider covering different areas within England - Gateway. The SVPRS was initially co-financed under AMIF and would have continued to contribute towards indicator R2 if not for the policy change in 2015 (see question 1.1.5). Gateway and SVPRS were the only projects to apply for funding under Strategic Objective 2 (integration) until 2016, but two projects have more recently been funded to address this shortfall in number of individuals supported - Integration Transition Grant and Post Grant Appointment Service. Both projects started in April 2017 and are available to all those who have been resettled in the UK.</p> <p>The UK has no centralised integration strategy and responsibility for integration in the UK is shared between the Home Office (HO), Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Devolved Administrations and Local Authorities. Under the Localism Act 2011 the UK approach is for Devolved Administrations and Local Authorities to determine local needs and</p>

	<p>priorities.</p> <p>Thus, whilst the UK National Programme has set targets for indicators C3, C4 &amp; C5 no projects have applied for funding as yet to address these objectives. However, the UK has made progress in this in some areas with the work of resettling unaccompanied minors under the Dublin Regulations, a project funded by AMIF (see question 1.1.1).</p>
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1.2.1	<p>What progress was made towards supporting legal migration to the Member States in accordance with their economic and social needs, such as labour market needs, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p><b>Relevant projects</b></p> <p>Five projects were co-financed 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017 that included activities aimed at supporting legal migration to the Member States in accordance with their economic and social needs, such as labour market needs.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gateway Statutory Service Provision worked together with statutory service providers to provide health, education and social benefit provision for UK asylum seekers.</li> <li>• Gateway Post-arrival provided integration support including housing, GP registration and other identified needs to UK asylum seekers.</li> <li>• SVPRS worked with statutory service providers to provide health, education and social benefit provision to Syrian Asylum Seekers.</li> <li>• Post Grant Appointment Service supports UK asylum seekers granted refugee status with application for state benefits during the statutory support timeframe of 28 days so that they receive consistent financial support when being settled in the UK</li> <li>• Integration Transition Grant aims to prevent destitution by paying 28 days financial support to UK asylum seekers in receipt of a grant of leave, allowing them sufficient time to apply for mainstream state benefits paid by other UK Government departments</li> </ul> <p><b>Output results</b></p> <p>R1: Number of target group persons who participated in pre-departure measures supported under the fund: 0</p> <p>The UKRA has not funded any projects under this objective.</p>

	<p>R2: Number of target persons assisted by the fund through integration measures in the framework of national, local and regional strategies: 4,714</p> <p>i. Number of target persons assisted through measures focusing on education and training, including language training and preparatory actions to facilitate actions to the labour market: 4,156</p> <p>ii. Number of target group persons supported through the provision of advice and assistance in the areas of housing: 4,714</p> <p>iii. Number of target group persons assisted through the provision of health and social care: 4,156</p> <p>iv. Number of target persons assisted through measures related to democratic participation: No projects were funded that included these measures in their activities.</p> <p><b>Progress in relation to National Programme Targets, Priorities and Outputs</b></p> <p>As of 30th June 2017, AMIF co-financed projects had provided integration assistance to 4,714 individuals, which equates to 11% of the target set in the National Programme. However, the National Programme has what could be considered an ambitious target for indicator R2, of 42,000 individuals over the six years of the fund. At the time of preparing the National Programme the UK only had one well established integration service provider covering different areas within England - Gateway. The SVPRS was initially co-financed by AMIF and would have continued to contribute towards indicator R2 if not for the policy change in 2015 (see question 1.1.5). Gateway and SVPRS were the only projects to apply for AMIF funding under objective SO2 (integration) until 2016, but two projects have more recently been funded to address this shortfall in number of individuals supported - Integration Transition Grant and Post Grant Appointment Service. Both projects started in April 2017 and are available to all those who have been granted refugee status in the UK.</p>
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1.2.2	What progress was made towards promoting the effective integration of third-country nationals, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?
	<b>Relevant projects</b>

Five projects were co-financed 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017 that included activities aimed at promoting the effective integration of third-country nationals.

Relevant projects are as for question 1.2.1.

### **Output Results**

R2: Number of target persons assisted by the fund through integration measures in the framework of national, local and regional strategies total: 4,714

i. Number of target persons assisted through measures focusing on education and training, including language training and preparatory actions to facilitate actions to the labour market : 4,156

ii. Number of target group persons supported through the provision of advice and assistance in the areas of housing: 4,714

iii. Number of target group persons assisted through the provision of health and social care: 4,156

iv. Number of target persons assisted through measures related to democratic participation: No projects were funded that included these measures in their activities

### **Progress in relation to National Programme Targets, Priorities and Outputs**

As of 30th June 2017, AMIF co-financed projects had provided integration assistance to 4,714 individuals, which equates to 11% of the target set in the National Programme. However, the National Programme has what could be considered an ambitious target for indicator R2, of 42,000 individuals over the six years of the fund. At the time of preparing the National Programme the UK only had one well established integration service provider covering different areas within England - Gateway. The SVPRS was initially co-financed by AMIF and would have continued to contribute towards indicator R2 if not for the policy change in 2015 (see question 1.1.5). Gateway and SVPRS were the only projects to apply for AMIF funding under objective SO2 (Integration) until 2016, but two projects have more recently been funded to address the shortfall in number of individuals supported - Integration Transition Grant and Post Grant Appointment Service. Both projects started in April 2017 and are available to all those who have been resettled in the UK.

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1.2.3	<p>What progress was made towards supporting co-operation among the Member States, with a view to safeguarding the integrity of the immigration systems of Member States, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p><b>Relevant Projects</b></p> <p>No projects or actions were co-financed that would contribute to this indicator 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017. Therefore, the output results for the two indicators below are 0.</p> <p>C3: Number of local, regional and national policy frameworks/measures/ tools in place for integration of TCN and involving civil society and migrant communities, as well as other relevant stakeholder as a result of the measures supported by the fund.</p> <p>C4: Number of cooperation projects with other MS on the integration of TCNs and involving civil society and migrant communities, as well as other relevant stakeholders, as a result of the measures supported by the fund.</p> <p><b>Progress in relation to National Programme Targets, Priorities and Outputs</b></p> <p>The UK has no centralised integration strategy and responsibility for integration in the UK is shared between the Home Office (HO), Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), Devolved Administrations and Local Authorities. Under the Localism Act 2011 the UK approach is for Devolved Administrations and Local Authorities to determine local needs and priorities. Thus, whilst the UK National Programme has set targets for both of the indicators above (9 for C3 and 3 for C4) no projects have applied for funding as yet to address these objectives. However, the UK has made progress in this in some areas with the work of resettling unaccompanied minors under the Dublin Regulations, a project funded by AMIF (see question 1.1.1).</p>

1.2.4	<p>What progress was made towards building capacity on integration and legal migration within the Member States, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
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	<p><b>Relevant Projects</b></p> <p>No projects or actions were co-financed 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017 that would contribute to the two indicators relevant to this question (see below)</p> <p>C3: Number of local, regional and national policy frameworks/measures/ tools in place for integration of TCN and involving civil society and migrant communities, as well as other relevant stakeholder as a result of the measures supported by the fund.</p> <p>C5: Number of projects supported by the fund to develop, monitor and evaluate integration policies in the MS</p> <p><b>Progress in relation to National Programme Targets, Priorities and Outputs</b></p> <p>As with Question 1.2.3 above, the UK National Programme target for indicators C3 and C5 is 9 and 4 respectively, however no projects have applied for funding to address these objectives as of 30th June 2017.</p>
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1.3	<p>Specific objective 3: Return - Enhance fair and effective return strategies in the Member States, which contribute to combating illegal immigration, with an emphasis on sustainability of return and effective readmission in the countries of origin and transit.</p>
	<p>The overall question: How did the Fund contribute to enhancing fair and effective return strategies in the Member States which contribute to combating illegal immigration, with an emphasis on sustainability of return and effective readmission in the countries of origin and transit?</p>
	<p>The response to this &amp; questions 1.3.1 through 1.3.5 has drawn upon project MI data, quarterly progress reports, staff interviews &amp; applications for funding documentation.</p> <p>The Fund enabled some progress towards enhancing fair &amp; effective return strategies in the UK. Projects were co-financed which focused on voluntary &amp; enforced returns, with specific schemes for families (Family Returns Unit), asylum &amp; non asylum (VRS &amp; AVR), Foreign National Offenders (FNOs) through the Facilitated Returns Scheme (FRS) &amp; Charter Flights (RIMCF).</p>



	<p>Overall, 27,380 returnees were co-financed by the Fund. Whilst this represents limited progress against targets in the UK National Programme voluntary returns comprise just over three quarters of all co-financed returns. Nine co-financed projects provided return reintegration assistance to 14,460 individuals, two-thirds (68%) of those co-financed voluntary returns.</p> <p>Returns projects struggled to meet targets citing changes to eligibility criteria, legal challenges to enforced removals, &amp; disruption to charter flights by protesters, as factors. However, the number of returns overall in the 3.5 year period is comparable to the 23,415 returns achieved 2011-2013 co-financed by SOLID RF funds. Additionally, just over a quarter (28.5%) of all co-financed charter flights were conducted in the framework of joint operations, accounting for a quarter of all co-financed forced removals. This suggests that the Fund has enabled prior progress to be maintained in what continues to be a challenging and complex environment.</p> <p>Progress on returns training has been very limited, with 13 individuals trained as of 30th June 2017 &amp; very few applications from projects to provide training.</p> <p>While the UK is a full participant in the REG group’s work, it does not participate in the EU Returns Directive (2008/115/EC) &amp; commensurate with the priorities set out in the UK National Programme, no projects have been funded to create or renovate detention centre places.</p> <p>In contrast to Asylum related projects, the majority of co-financed returns projects were based on developing business objectives. However, Returns Facilitation at Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) has used the Fund to significantly develop &amp; expand, offering returns advice and support to individuals in three (formerly one) IRCs &amp; to expand its scope to work with men as well as women (see Section Five).</p>
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1.3 .1	What progress was made towards supporting the measures accompanying return procedures, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?
	<b>Relevant projects</b>

Nine projects were co-financed 1st January 2014 through to 30th June 2017 that included activities which aimed to contribute to supporting the measures accompanying return procedures.

1. Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) provides pre and post re-integration advice and assistance to asylum seekers and irregular migrants. For more details see the case study in section five.

2 & 3. Voluntary Return Scheme (VRS 1 & 2) is the replacement programme for AVR. It facilitates three types of voluntary returns which include reintegration assistance up to the value of £2,000 for eligible individuals.

4, 5 & 6. Facilitated Returns Scheme (FRS 1, 2 & 3) offers reintegration assistance to eligible Foreign National Offenders (FNOs). The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is the third party supplier contracted to provide assistance in the country of origin.

7. Cedars Family Pre-Departure Accommodation provided pre-departure accommodation and support, including identification of welfare and safeguarding needs.

8. & 9 Returns Facilitation at Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) provides return (with an emphasis on voluntary return options) advice and assistance (welfare, small amounts of reintegration assistance, access to medical care) to individuals in Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs).

## **Output Results**

R2: Number of returnees who received pre or post integration support co-financed: 14,460

R7: a. Number of returnees who received pre or post return reintegration assistance co-financed by the fund: 14,460

b. persons who returned voluntarily (and who were co-financed by the fund): 21,220

Number of returnees who have received pre or post return reintegration assistance (fund), vs total number of voluntary returns supported by the fund: 68%

R4: Number of monitored removal operations co-financed by the fund: No projects or activities have been co-financed addressing this indicator.

R8. a. Number of places in detention centres created/ renovated with support from

	<p>the fund:</p> <p>b. total number of places in detention</p> <p>Number of places in detention renovated/ created by the fund vs in total In keeping with the priorities and targets outlined in the UK National Programme, no projects or activities were co-financed addressing this indicator.</p> <p><b>Progress in relation to National Programme Targets, Priorities and Outputs</b></p> <p>As of 30th June 2017, co-financed projects had made some progress in providing pre and/or post return reintegration assistance, with 14,460 individuals assisted. In total co-financed projects facilitated 21,220 voluntary returns and the number receiving reintegration assistance equates to just over two-thirds (68%) of co-financed voluntary returns. The UK National Programme target is 56,000 individuals (just under 10,000 individuals per year of the fund) receiving reintegration assistance. As with other targets for returns (see responses to Questions 1.3.2-1.3.4) this target appears to be ambitious particularly since the context of fluctuating business need and eligibility for reintegration assistance is acknowledged.</p> <p>The UK does not participate in the EU Returns Directive (2008/115/EC) within which Article 8 (6) directed that MS must provide for an effective forced-return monitoring system. However, Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) are subject to oversight and inspection by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons (HMIP) and the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration. Given this, the target of 177,000 monitored removal operations specified in the UK National Programme seems unrealistic, and it is unclear how or why this figure has been set (see question 3).</p>
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1.3.2	<p>What progress was made towards effective implementation of return measures (voluntary and forced), and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p><b>Relevant projects</b></p> <p>Thirteen projects were co-financed 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017 that included activities intended to ensure effective implementation of return measures.</p> <p>Commensurate with the UK's preference for facilitating voluntary returns, 11 projects were funded to address this objective.</p>

1 & 2. The Family Returns Unit (FRU 1 & 2) assist with the return of families whose appeal rights are exhausted. Voluntary return options are encouraged as a first option but the project also processes enforced returns.

3. Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) provides pre and post reintegration advice and assistance to asylum seeker and irregular migrants. For more details see the case study in section five.

4. Central Volunteering Departure Team (CDVT) provided activities at promoting and removing barriers to voluntary return.

5 & 6 Voluntary Return Scheme (VRS 1 & 2) is the replacement programme for AVR. It facilitates three types of voluntary returns which include reintegration assistance up to the value of £2,000 for eligible individuals.

7. National Community Engagement Leads (NCEL) provided community outreach and engagement activities to facilitate voluntary returns.

8-11. Facilitated returns scheme (FRS 1, 2 & 3) offers reintegration assistance to eligible Foreign National Offenders (FNOs).

Three projects included activities that were dedicated to processing enforced returns.

- Return of Irregular Migrants by Charter Flight (RIMCF) operates charter flight services with escort for enforced removals of irregular migrants.
- Family Returns Unit (FRU) also facilitates enforced returns where voluntary options have not been taken up by families whose appeal rights are exhausted.
- National Returns Command (NRC) aims to facilitate the return of non EU or EEA Third Country National (TCNs) who are detained for an enforced return by identifying any barriers (e.g. missing documents, legal barriers etc.)

### **Output results**

R3: a. Persons who returned voluntarily: 21,220

b. persons who were removed: 6,160

Number of returnees whose removal was co-financed by AMIF: 27,380

R5: a. Persons who were removed (and was co-financed by the fund): 6,160

	<p>b. Total number of returns following order to leave: This information was not identifiable from project MI data.</p> <p>Number of removals supported by the fund vs total number of orders received: cannot be calculated due to the lack of data available.</p> <p><b>Progress in relation to National Programme Targets, Priorities and Outputs</b></p> <p>The context of delays in finalising the UK National Programme and the somewhat ambitious nature of the targets set within it, particularly for Returns necessitates caution in assessing progress against these targets.</p> <p>The National Programme set a target of 16,660 voluntary returns and 13,160 enforced returns per year (100,000 voluntary returns and 79,000 enforced returns over 6 years). As of 30th June 2017, 27,380 returnees had their return co-financed by the Fund. Of these, 21,220 individuals have returned voluntarily and 6,160 were enforced removals.</p> <p>Returns focused projects did struggle to meet project targets and a number of reasons were cited for this, including changes to eligibility criteria, legal challenges to enforced removals, lack of escorts and anti-return demonstrations at airports.</p> <p>However, the balance of voluntary to enforced removals co-financed by the fund was in the desired direction, with voluntary returns comprising just over three quarters (78%) of all co-financed returns. Additionally, the number of returns overall (27,380) in the 3.5 year period is comparable to the 23,415 returns achieved 2011-2013 co-financed by SOLID RF funds. This suggests that the Fund has enabled prior progress to be maintained in what continues to be a challenging and complex environment.</p>
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1.3.3	<p>What progress was made towards enhancing practical co-operation between Member States and/or with authorities of third countries on return measures, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?</p>
	<p><b>Relevant projects</b></p> <p>One project co-financed 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017, RIMCF, includes activities involving co-operation and joint working with other Member States.</p>

	<p>The project conducts joint charter flights (with France), removing Albanian irregular migrants.</p> <p><b>Output results</b></p> <p>R6 a. Number of persons returned in the framework of joint return operations (assisted-voluntary and forced) supported by the fund: 30 joint chartered flights were operated removing a total of 1,487 individuals.</p> <p>b. number of returnees who were co-financed by the fund: 27,380</p> <p>Number of people returned in the framework of the joint return operations supported by the fund vs total number of returns: 5% of all co-financed returns (1,487 out of 27,380) and 24% of all co-financed forced removals (1,487 out of 6,160).</p> <p><b>Progress in relation to National Programme Targets, Priorities and Outputs</b></p> <p>There were no explicit targets set for this indicator in the UK National Programme, however, such joint working is recognised as being beneficial to all parties as it facilitates sharing of knowledge and good practice and also offers potential to improve efficiency of operations. The fund has enabled good progress in this respect with just over a quarter (29%, 30 flights out of 105) of all co-financed charter flights conducted in the framework of joint operations, accounting for a quarter of all co-financed forced removals.</p>
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1.3.4	What progress was made towards building capacity on return, and how did the Fund contribute to achieving this progress?
	<p><b>Relevant projects</b></p> <p>Two projects were co-financed 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017 that included training and capacity on return building activities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Criminal Casework Investigations Intervention (CCII) engaged in activities to expand the skill set of staff working on challenging and complex cases involving non-European Economic Area (non-EEA) FNOs. The training comprised existing Professionalising Investigation</li> </ul>

	<p>Programme (PIP) modules.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Return Command (NRC) aims to professionalise detained casework through revising existing learning and development materials for detained casework in order to provide a new modular learning framework that will be rolled out to all existing and new staff.</li> </ul> <p><b>Output results</b></p> <p>R1: Number of people trained on returns initiatives by the funds: 13</p> <p>C4: Number of projects supported by the fund to develop, monitor and evaluate return policies in member states. In keeping with the priorities and targets outlined in the UK National Programme, no projects or activities have been co-financed addressing this indicator.</p> <p><b>Progress in relation to National Programme Targets, Priorities and Outputs</b></p> <p>CCII almost met its target of providing training for 14 individuals, with 13 police officers completing their Professionalising Investigation Programme (PIP) training. The second project NRC commenced 1st April 2017 and as of end of Quarter 1 development of training had commenced but it had not yet reached the delivery stage. Thus, at the time of evaluation, progress towards returns focused training targets as set out in the UK National Programme (650 over 6 years) is limited. However, analysis of potential projects responding to funding calls demonstrates that no others have either discussed or submitted applications for projects with a training component in the field of returns.</p>
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1.4	Specific objective 4: Solidarity - Enhance the solidarity and responsibility sharing between the Member States, in particular towards those most affected by migration and asylum flows, including through practical cooperation.
	The overall question: How did the Fund contribute to enhancing solidarity and responsibility-sharing between the Member States, in particular towards those most affected by migration and asylum flows, including through practical cooperation?
	While the UK are actively engaged in solidarity and joint cooperation with other Member States it is not part of the UK National Programme to provide funding solely from the UK Allocation of AMIF for such actions. Therefore, no projects or actions were funded that would contribute to these indicators or questions in the period 1st January 2014 to 30th June 2017.

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1.4.1	How did the Fund contribute to the transfer of asylum applicants (relocation as per Council Decisions (EU) 2015/1253 and 2015/1601)?
	<i>See 1.4</i>

1.4.2	How did the Fund contribute to the transfer between Member States of beneficiaries of international protection?
	<i>See 1.4</i>

2	Efficiency
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2	The overall question: Were the general objectives of the Fund achieved at reasonable cost?
	<p>NB. Efficiency has been measured in GBP as euro conversion rates would have fluctuated wildly over the time of the analysis. Tables for the Cost Benefit Analysis are included in an Annexe.</p> <p>So far 43 projects have been funded at a total proposed cost of £317,363,980.77, with a total cost to the EU of £247,095,268.61. However, a number of projects were terminated before completion for not meeting targets (Table 1).</p> <p>So far the UK has claimed costs of £88,517,357.93. Cost benefit analysis of price per beneficiary (PPB) is based on finished projects, as it is only possible to work out the PPB accurately once the project has finished. The reason for this is a number of projects have had funds disallowed for not providing sufficient evidence; 16 projects in 2015 &amp; 15 projects in 2016. Including projects where the finances have not been agreed with the EC in the formal cost benefit analysis would distort the findings. The methodology was calculating the total costs of the project and dividing them by the number of beneficiaries that the project had worked with. It is not possible from the data provided by projects to determine if</p>



someone has had more than one AMIF intervention so this should be considered when examining results.

The projects in Table 2 refer to projects working in returns. The cost per beneficiary of a return under AMIF is £2867.82 This compares favourably to the average unit cost under SOLID of £3453.64.

To demonstrate efficiency more broadly across AMIF analysis was performed on the proposed cost per beneficiary (using the same method as above) across all AMIF projects that worked directly with individual beneficiaries using projected costs and targets. However, given the level of disallowed funding to date these findings are tentative (Table 3). Cost per beneficiary is also independent of the outcomes achieved as a result.

These results indicate the average cost per beneficiary for the three Strategic Objectives is £4,347.98 (with a cost to the EU of £3,272.13). For asylum the average cost is £2,070.88 (EU £1,553.16). Due to the varied nature of asylum work the UK does not have an average figure for comparison, but most of the asylum work in AMIF have been delivered for low cost. Where higher costs are incurred these are projects that have focused on resettlement aims.

For integration the proposed average cost under AMIF is £4,994.44 (EU £3,745.83) This compares to the average cost of £3,157 for the Refugee Fund under SOLID. The higher cost reflects a more comprehensive package of support (including health, education, employment & welfare) offered to refugees under the new Gateway model.

For returns the proposed cost is £6,538.25 (EU £4,932.06). The average unit cost for returns for all projects under SOLID was £3,453.64. This high value is not necessarily what the unit cost will be, as the proposals from projects at the beginning were not accurate with their target setting & the cost for completed projects is only £2867.82, so it is likely this figure is somewhat inaccurate. Equally the inflated costs reflect the high costs proposed by NRC whose aim is to return difficult to reach FNOs.

Projects only recorded output data which did not include dates that outcomes were achieved so an analysis of the time to outcome for individual interventions is not possible.

The majority of asylum projects were delivered at relatively low cost. Most delivering interventions for a few hundred pounds. Where higher costs were

	<p>incurred on projects this reflected more comprehensive levels of support rather than discrete interventions.</p> <p>For integration the support delivered under AMIF is running at a slightly higher cost than previously under SOLID. However, this additional cost is likely to reflect the more bespoke and broader package of support offered to refugees under the revised Gateway programme.</p> <p>The completed returns projects appear to offer improved efficiency with the average cost of a return from completed projects being delivered at lower cost than under SOLID. The high figure in the proposed costs analysis is likely to reflect problems with the target setting in the bids. This coupled with the fact that no monies can be claimed without sufficient evidence suggests that this proposed cost is likely to reduce considerably.</p> <p>As well as the actual costs there were a number of areas where the implementation of the Fund excelled in achieving efficiency.</p> <p>AMIF monies have been used more cautiously than under SOLID. The UKRA elected during the programming stage to spend an equal amount each year under AMIF. This, along with the addition of the multi annual programming (Section 8) allowed the UKRA to be more discerning about the projects it has funded.</p> <p>UKRA has also reduced the number of bids accepted to be able to elicit effective control and oversight using the Direct Award funding model.</p>
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2.1	To what extent were the results of the Fund achieved at reasonable cost in terms of deployed financial and human resources?
	<p>It is difficult to accurately account for administrative and human resource costs associated with delivery of the fund. In the early stages of the Fund, projects struggled to obtain the information required to provide accurate records on staffing levels or how much time they spent delivering the services.</p> <p>These difficulties were due to a number of reasons. In many cases applications had not effectively costed staff time into their bids. For example there were almost no projects (although Hibiscus is one exception) that accurately costed resource for administrative support. This meant that the projects could not claim for this work and they struggled to meet their administrative responsibilities</p>

under AMIF.

In some cases, Project Managers were omitted from project costings. As a result any work completed by the Project Manager was not claimed for because it was not budgeted for and evidence of this work was hard to demonstrate. The UKRA repeatedly advised against this model of working but Project Managers often took responsibility for AMIF projects as additional tasks on top of their existing responsibilities and could not always justify to their managers that a good proportion of their time would be spent on AMIF.

The keeping of accurate human resource records was another challenge over the course of AMIF. It was reported in the qualitative interviews that the work completed by a number of projects was often done in conjunction with other work. For example, identifying women who were eligible for Epione for the asylum case workers would often be done as part of wider case work. This made it difficult to account for exactly how much time was spent specifically working on the project funded by AMIF. This was reported for a number of projects that work on a case management basis as they may work on many cases a day, some interventions funded by AMIF and some not. This made accurately accounting for that resource alone impossible.

Financial resources were much more rigorously accounted for. The fund achieved efficiency because the UKRA were able to design and develop stringent financial checks which meant that all work completed under AMIF had to be properly evidenced. Projects were required to submit quarterly toolkits which standardised the financial instruments across the AMIF programme. This made the management of financial resources efficient. Equally the Audit Authority and the UKRA have worked well together with the Audit Authority helping the UKRA meet any changes and adaptations to the EU regulations in a quick and efficient manner.

However, these financial controls had some impacts on the projects. There were a number of projects with monies disallowed because they fell foul of the regulations or were not able to evidence the spend correctly. While this certainly provides evidence of efficient financial regulation it also meant that some of the costs associated with projects have had to be supported by UK Home Office monies, above the 25% outlined in the co-financed funding model.

There were also reports from Project Managers that in a number of cases they had not submitted some expenses that they knew would not be accepted because they were not able to evidence them. The exact amounts of these costs are not known but they were reported to be smaller costs. While these would certainly mean that projects would appear to offer greater value for money for the EU

	<p>these costs have to be met by the UK business areas and the true costs of delivering projects will not have been effectively captured.</p> <p>The UKRA are working to improve this by outlining to potential applicants the resources needed to run a project and the evidence required to receive payment from AMIF. By equipping the projects with this knowledge in future there should be fewer disallowed payments and therefore a more accurate record of the financial and human resources associated with AMIF delivery.</p>
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2.2	<p>What measures were put in place to prevent, detect, report and follow up on cases of fraud and other irregularities, and how did they perform?</p>
	<p>According to the qualitative data, there are two key ways of detecting fraud and other irregularities in AMIF. The first is UKRA’s stringent management control structure, which begins with the application process and carries on throughout the lifespan of the respective projects. Due to this structure, Account Managers were much more involved with the projects and their development than they had been under SOLID, with rigorous quarterly reporting and regularly scheduled meetings to discuss progress and undertake project activity observation. The toolkits provided in the quarterly returns were scrutinised by the UKRA finance teams with questions and clarifications sought when needed.</p> <p>The second key way of detecting fraud and other irregularities is the auditing process. The auditors have three pillars of audit and they occur yearly. However, due to the size of the fund, they use a sample approach in deciding which projects to audit. Auditing work on the Fund has broadly been in line with the auditing conducted with other European funds, which provides a consistency of approach for the auditors, applicants and beneficiaries. This is part of the Commission’s push to standardise auditing approaches across different European funding streams. Because of the size of the Fund, the Audit Authority isn’t expected to review every single project or claim. The auditors are asked to take into account the guidance that’s available, and then use a system, such as monetary unit sampling, that takes into account the size and variability of the costs in that accounting year. The auditing structure for AMIF posed some minor issues, as the relatively low number of projects makes full statistical sampling more difficult for the auditors, especially as they tried ensuring that the audit burden was proportionate. This coupled with the checks from the UKRA provided a thorough system for detecting irregularities.</p>

The Audit Authority also developed clear procedures for detecting fraud and clear processes for reporting projects or persons who appear to be abusing these.

However, the audit measures could be difficult to implement. Project Managers generally reported that while they had a good relationship with their respective auditors they perceived the process to be overly strict, time-consuming and labour-intensive. Project Managers reported that money was disallowed for small items, such as claims associated with travel and subsistence, if they were not sufficiently evidenced. Other Project Managers noted that the auditing process was stressful, especially as the auditors asked for things like paper rail tickets, even though the ticket barriers in the UK automatically keep tickets when an individual passes through the gate. Auditors also frequently asked for paper plane tickets, when projects only had e-tickets as is standard practice through the standard Home Office travel organisation. The auditing process was found to be a very steep learning curve for many of the Project Managers, who were not clearly apprised of the level of evidence that was required. One project team actually went to their first audit meeting thinking that they were making excellent progress, only to be told that they were at risk of being terminated as the evidencing wasn't sufficient. Further, there was one project that had been operating for two years before the costs were audited. The project was then informed it that its records were not appropriate, which led to a very painful few months where the project tried to ensure that it was creating the right amount of evidence to keep their funding. Building from this, the key issue of the auditing process seems to be, over time, that there was a substantial degree of difference in perception (and, presumably, activity) between the projects that had been audited and those that hadn't. Greater simplification or clarity and more systematisation of practice, across all projects, is probably needed in order to ensure that each project is at the same level of expectation and evidence retention. The UKRA are addressing these issues with potential Project Managers in the pre-application meetings.

There have been several disallowed payments of varying sizes across the projects. In 2015, 16 projects had monies disallowed and a further 15 in 2016. Usually these were small amounts but in one case it amounted to £2,000,000 (which cost then had to be met by the Home Office). Generally, there were quite a few areas that projects had money disallowed for. The most common errors tended to be around procurement and other indirect costs, like ineligibility of staffing costs.

3	Relevance
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3	The overall question: Did the objectives of the interventions funded by the Fund correspond to the actual needs?
	<p>Responses to questions in this section are informed by the National Programme, the qualitative interviews as part of the process evaluation, and current UK policy documentation.</p> <p>The questions on relevance will examine the needs and priorities of the UK under AMIF and examine whether or not these needs and priorities still reflect the problems being faced within the UK immigration systems dealing with asylum integration and returns.</p> <p>When the UK National Programme was drafted there were a number of errors and/or an inflation in the targets stated as being the overall aim, such as the targets for monitored returns (see Q4.1). This meant that the National Programme was not a completely accurate reflection of UKRA needs when it was drafted.</p> <p>It is also important to acknowledge changes in the context of immigration across the EU since the inception of AMIF in 2014. The migration crisis across Europe from 2015 onwards has meant that there has been a substantial change in the immigration environment which has impacted on the priority areas of immigration for the UK under AMIF.</p> <p>More specifically, while the initial focus of the National Programme was heavily weighted in terms of returning people voluntarily to their countries of origin more recently the focus has shifted to making asylum systems more streamlined to respond to the spike in asylum applications in 2015. Equally, the outbreak of the Syrian war in 2011 and the subsequent numbers of refugees escaping from the country has necessitated an integration programme focused specifically re-homing people from Syria within the UK changing from a few hundred outlined in the National Programme to 20,000 under a different funding model.</p> <p>However, while there have been some changes in focus the overall priorities outlined in the National Programme still remain largely the same. While working to return people to their country of origin is still the top priority the numbers for this are decreasing. Additionally even though Syrian refugees can no longer be integrated into the UK under Gateway many other nationalities can. The biggest change in need since the start of AMIF is the need to focus on asylum</p>

	applications and dealing with these in the fairest, most efficient and effective way possible.
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3.1	Did the objectives set by the Member State in the National Programme respond to the identified needs?
	<p>Question 4.1 highlights that there were a number of problems with the targets set in the National Programme. Some figures appear to be particularly ambitious and in the absence of a formal record of the evidence base to inform the needs assessment and benchmarking exercises conducted, the foundation for the targets remains unclear. Thus, while the overall aims and objectives did broadly respond to the needs and the policy priorities of the UK the figures quoted in some areas did not accurately reflect the need or the existing flows within the UK immigration system (for example, monitored returns and reception accommodation). These initial errors have had an effect on the ability of the UKRA to meet the targets outlined in the National Programme.</p> <p>Of the three strategic objectives only asylum has met the targets outlined in the programme document. In fact, it has greatly exceeded the target for the entire programme (achieving 69,764 over a target value of 27,000). This over performance reflected in particular the work of one particular project; Asylum Applications Support which offered advice to everyone applying for asylum assistance. The UK has also performed well with regards to asylum support for vulnerable groups supporting 7,049 individuals with a range of identified vulnerabilities within the asylum process. These figures do reflect a positive outcome and demonstrate some of the excellent work completed by the asylum projects. However, the needs assessment outlined in the National Programme may no longer be reflective of the current asylum caseload in the UK.</p> <p>Projects co-financed under the integration and returns strategic objectives fell short of the targets in the National Programme. However, the National Programme targets seemed particularly ambitious. For integration, a target of 42,000 was set for offering integration support. However, at the time of drafting the National Programme the UK offered one flagship integration programme, Gateway, whose capacity was to help resettle 750 refugees per year. Given this, it is difficult to determine how the figure of 42,000 could be met without significant expansion of existing provision and the development of new projects targeting those already within the UK to improve integration. However, this role largely provided by different government departments within the UK rather than the Home Office. Projects would have to work across government to successfully address this aim which would take time to set up. This may help to explain why there have been fewer bids to address this area of work. Whilst two new projects</p>

	<p>have been funded such as the Post-Grant appointment service, it is unlikely that at this stage in the funding programme targets for integration are going to be met. The same is true of a number of returns targets outlined in the programme document (see Q1.3).</p> <p>Additional problems include the setting of targets that are not reflective of the work that the UK do. As mentioned in Question 5.2 this includes targets for reception accommodation places and monitored returns, neither of which is conducted as part of the UK immigration program.</p> <p>These inaccurate figures in the National Programme also had a knock-on effect for projects. Project managers reported that they had the perception that they needed to submit applications with inflated targets in order to address the perceived need. Projects were then unable to meet these targets and were terminated, having to reapply using more realistic and achievable targets.</p> <p>As a result it appears that the UK has been not very successful at implementing the AMIF programme of delivery against the National Programme when, in reality, the initial needs assessment was not clear enough in its aims and their relation to the current context of the UK. The UKRA acknowledge that this has been a problem and are taking steps to rectify this.</p> <p>The main step taken to rectify this is to address these issues as part of the mid-term review. The UKRA are planning to overhaul their targets and shift some of the focus of AMIF funds away from returns and into asylum. However, the problems with the National Programme targets were identified extremely early in the process, as soon as applications started to be submitted and it has been a source of frustration that very little could be done to alter or adapt these figures until the mid term of the funding period. A more flexible method of programme planning would have been beneficial as the current UK National Programme is not completely reflective of the needs of the UK and could be argued, has never been a completely accurate reflection of the work that needs to be completed under AMIF.</p>
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3.2	Which measures did the Member State put in place to address changing needs?
	There are two separate components needed to answer this question, the changing



needs of the UK and the changing needs of the projects.

### **The UK.**

In addition to the problems with the figures outlined in Q 3.1, there are some other important changes to the policy context which have needed to be responded to over the course of AMIF.

Asylum applications have fluctuated since 2011 with an increase up until 2016 & then a decrease to year end June 2017. However, against this there are a higher number of asylum seekers from countries such as Syria (see Section 1) & a higher proportion of successful applications. These changes reflect the changing migration situation in Europe.

Returns has seen decreases in both voluntary and enforced returns (voluntary; in 2014 =25,784 & in 2016 = 24,202, enforced; 2014 = 14,395 & in 2016 = 12,193). This partly reflects a change in UK policy regarding returns. From 2015 a number of legislative & non-legislative measures have been introduced to create a compliant environment. Measures include immigration checks to rent accommodation & receive medical treatment. The intention is to encourage those with irregular status to either regularise their status or leave the UK, and to deter illegal migration.

The UKRA were limited in terms of how they could respond to these changing needs because of the rigidity of the National Programme and therefore decided to wait until the midterm review to make changes. However, to try and address these over the course of AMIF funding so far the UKRA have issued tailored calls for funding to encourage bids that cover certain strategic objectives to better respond to the needs as they change & address identified gaps in the National Programme.

### **Projects**

For the projects that have bid for AMIF they have also have to be responsive to the changing needs of the UK and its priorities. Arguably they can be more flexible than the UKRA as they are able to respond to different calls for funding & design their projects to reflect any changing needs.

There is some evidence that projects have done this with an increase in the number and variety of projects applying under the strategic objective addressing Asylum. This has been in response to the revised & tailored calls for proposals issued by the UKRA.

For projects that are already running reacting to a changing need or operating environment has been more difficult. Once a bid has been accepted projects are tied into delivering those targets even if there are changes to policy or eligibility criteria over the course of the project. This was a problem highlighted by a number of Project Managers. While it is clear that there needs to be effective target setting, the inability to sensibly adjust targets as the project progresses and potentially meets different challenges was especially harmful for the fund to meet changing needs. For example during the delivery period of Charter Flight return project, Afghanistan was deemed to no longer be a safe country of return making the possible pool of returnees smaller. Equally legal changes to eligibility criteria impacted other returns projects. This meant that these projects were not able to meet their targets and were ultimately terminated. Most did apply again under another funding call with revised & more realistic targets. However, this is an administratively onerous way of working and it would be far more effective if there was flexibility in the inception of the project in terms of meeting the targets agreed.

There is another important point in terms of relevance & responding effectively to an identified need. Project Managers expressed their frustration with the evidence requirements needed by the EC to demonstrate they had delivered the work. This became particularly difficult when trying to capture some of the softer outcomes associated with the work that was being completed. In some cases there was enough flexibility to find a solution. The FRS IOM project, for example, had a target of getting 25% of the stories of the vulnerable women that came through the project, though the percentage of women prepared to share their stories was much lower. They were, however, able to negotiate to get 25% of the stories of the women who consented, which made for a much more manageable target, & allowed the project to continue without additional evidence-based hindrance. But for the majority similar adaptations were not able to be agreed.

It is worth considering, with a fund that encourages innovation and new ways of working, that there is sufficient flexibility in order to be able to trial new ways of working and engaging groups that have not previously been targeted. It is acknowledged that there does need to be some form of performance management but the addition of built in flexibility to targets while projects are delivering would help projects to be more innovative and respond more efficiently to changing needs & policy contexts.

4	Coherence
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4	<p>The overall question: Were the objectives set in the national programme coherent with the ones set in other programmes funded by EU resources and applying to similar areas of work? Was the coherence ensured also during the implementation of the Fund?</p>
	<p>The evaluation of ‘coherence’ aims to explore how well the projects funded under AMIF work together with other Home Office projects (both funded by AMIF and other sources). The information used to answer these questions is taken from the Process Evaluation (qualitative interviews with key staff), examination of the current working model, the UK National Programme and findings from the previous EU fund, SOLID.</p> <p>Following the completion of the SOLID evaluation the UKRA embraced a number of lessons learnt in terms of improving the coherence of the projects funded by AMIF. The following actions were taken:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The National Programme was drafted by a policy team after a series of benchmarking exercises to identify the UKs priorities (see Q4.1).</li> <li>• The UKRA recruited other government departments in receipt of European monies on the monitoring committee but engagement with the department responsible for integration work has been limited. The UKRA had a commitment to continuous improvement and as a result they developed an increasingly rigorous process of vetting and assessment of potential beneficiaries in the pre application and application stages (See Q4.2).</li> <li>• Under AMIF the UKRA adopted the Direct Award Model of funding. Awards were made solely to business areas within the Home Office (although sub contractors could be included in bids). This meant that the work carried out reflected Home Office priorities and there was a natural coherence to the projects being bid for (see Q4.3).</li> <li>• The UKRA held a series of events for existing AMIF Project Managers and potential beneficiaries to discuss the current ways of working and highlight the current work programme and where there were any gaps.</li> <li>• There were no formal mechanisms to ensure coherence other than the inclusion of other government departments in the monitoring committee.</li> </ul> <p>The UKRA have embraced the lessons learnt from previous EU funding and have made a commitment to continuous improvement within their processes. As a result the UKRA have developed a series of robust procedures to ensure coherence across the work program both within the Home Office and across wider UK government.</p>

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4.1	Was an assessment of other interventions with similar objectives carried out and taken into account during the programming stage?
	<p>The National Programme was drafted by the International Policy Directorate within the Home Office. They were responsible for outlining the priorities of the UK to be addressed under AMIF. The UK prioritised returns with 55% of the funding, a further 20% each to focus on asylum and integration. A series of benchmarking exercises were completed on the three strategic objectives to determine the priorities of the UK. The details of these benchmarking exercises are not available as staff involved in this element of drafting the National Programme have moved into different positions and were not available to contribute to the evaluation, records on this process were also not kept.</p> <p>There were some problems encountered when drafting the National Programme. Delays in specific guidance from the EC meant that there was a number of iterations of the document before it was agreed. The final programme was accepted approximately 15 months after the start of AMIF.</p> <p>While the UK National Programme does represent the policy priorities at the time of writing (although due to external factors this has now changed, see Q3). There appears to be an issue with some of the targets that have been quoted within the programme. Some of the targets outlined at the start of AMIF are not reflective of the work that is completed within the UK. For example a high number was proposed for monitored returns (177,000) even though the UK does not operate this model. Additionally it indicated that 500 reception accommodation places would be developed under AMIF. The UK does not operate a reception accommodation model. Accommodation for asylum seekers is decided on a case by case basis (see Q4.3).</p> <p>The evaluation of SOLID made a recommendation on the importance of conducting a thorough needs assessment at project level, as a lever to underpin performance. Following these recommendations the UKRA implemented needs assessments during the application process for potential beneficiaries. The introduction of pre-application meetings and more stringent assessment and vetting processes meant that the coherence of the work completed under AMIF was continually monitored at the point of application. The introduction of these new measures is discussed further in Question 4.2.</p> <p>There are a number of lessons that can be applied in relation to needs</p>

assessments and ensuring coherence of the projects funded under AMIF.

- Clear records kept of benchmarking exercises and the process in which policy priorities and programme targets are decided upon

The evaluators found anecdotal evidence of benchmarking exercises being undertaken as part of a needs assessment in the national programming phase. However, the details of the procedure in which UK priorities and the evidence base for the target figures that were decided on were not recorded. In future detailed records need to be kept on these processes to allow a thorough audit and evaluation of how these numbers were arrived at. The UKRA are aware of this problem and since the inception of AMIF have started to introduce more robust record-keeping.

- Sufficient time allowed to complete the needs assessment

Drafting the National Programme did not start until October 2013, a mere two months before AMIF was due to 'go live'. This meant that any needs assessments would have been conducted under severe time pressure and therefore may not be as comprehensive as it should have been. This time pressure may also explain why more detailed recording of the process did not happen. Additionally, once a comprehensive needs assessment has been completed the results of this should be accepted. It appears that input from the EC meant a number of targets were set that may not adequately or fully reflect the needs of the UK in the fields of asylum, integration and returns.

- Prompt and accurate guidance from the EC

Guidance on completing the National Programme was not available until well into the drafting process and thereafter there were a number of changes within this guidance. This meant there were a large number of iterations of the National Programme to respond to this guidance. Any guidance on format and inclusion criteria should ideally be outlined prior to a needs assessment being undertaken.

- Flexibility during the funding period to respond to changing policy priorities.

During the course of AMIF there have been a number of contextual and world events which have necessitated the change in UK immigration priorities. Programmes should have sufficient flexibility in order to respond to these changing needs. Equally, flexibility within the programme design would mean that any errors in the programme could be addressed quickly.

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4.2	Were co-ordination mechanisms between the Fund and other interventions with similar objectives established for the implementation period?
	<p>There were a number of critical processes implemented within the UKRA model that helped to ensure coherence between the work undertaken by AMIF and other interventions. The first discussed below ensured that there was coherence within the Home Office in terms of the projects bid for and the last measure reported was to look at co-ordination with other UK government departments.</p> <p>The first was the adoption of the Direct Award funding model. This model meant that funding could only be awarded to UK Home Office business areas. Due to the implementation of this model there was less need for co-ordination mechanisms because the work is being conducted as an extension of the work conducted under SOLID and therefore there is much less chance of duplication or work that is not coherent with existing programmes currently being operated.</p> <p>In order to facilitate this coordination the UKRA held a number of events. ‘AMIF Forums’ were held where Project Managers could meet to discuss the work that they were completing under AMIF and give them a chance to network and discuss potential future projects. These events were not an initial part of the work plan but were identified by the UKRA as a need once AMIF started. Additionally staff working on AMIF projects addressing returns met monthly to discuss the work being conducted. While these stopped in early 2017 due to a lack of need they were deemed to be very helpful in the early days of the funding.</p> <p>The second process designed to maximise co-ordination is the development of more rigorous assessment and applications system implemented over the first half on AMIF by the UKRA. These improvements have included</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Better systems for identifying the strategic and national objectives targeted by the project bid.</li> <li>• Projects monitored closely by UKRA Account Managers to understand the work being completed.</li> <li>• The introduction of an informal pre-application meeting in which the aims of the project being proposed could be discussed with key UKRA personnel and advice offered on how that would work in practice and how the project can address the UK’s national priorities.</li> </ul>

As a result of these activities potential beneficiaries started to look more strategically at the work that would be conducted under AMIF and bid for money to fund more comprehensive and coordinated pieces of work. For example the Voluntary Returns Service was a project that combined a number of different voluntary returns initiatives under one project making the programme more streamlined.

To ensure coordination with other work being conducted outside the Home Office, potentially being funded by other EU monies, the UKRA recruited a member of staff who is based within the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, to sit on the decision panel (the panel that decides whether AMIF should be awarded). Inclusion of an external stakeholder within this panel allows for a more objective evaluation of the programme of work.. Other government departments in receipt of European funding have been included in the monitoring committee as a means of ensuring coherence. However, engagement with the department that manages integration has been limited, due to lack of interest from the other department which has limited the effectiveness of this.

The UKRA have implemented a number of processes which help ensure coherence of the programme of work being conducted under AMIF. Lessons learnt from previous EU funding have driven the need to design these processes and as a result AMIF has run an extremely coherent programme. The UKRAs commitment to continuous improvement should ensure that these processes will be further refined or new processes developed to ensure this continues.

There is an area that the evaluation team have identified to improve the working model a little further. This is outlined below.

- Designing a mechanism to capture people that may receive several AMIF interventions as part of the immigration process.

Most immigration procedures involve a process to which there are several different stages. For example when someone is returned they may spend some time at an IRC before being returned on a charter flight and then receive resettlement support in their country of origin. Finding a way to capture when somebody may receive a number of interventions from projects funded by AMIF would have a number of advantages. The first is to see how well the projects funded by AMIF link together and how comprehensive and co-ordinated the support is across each immigration area supported by the fund. It would also allow for an analysis of any duplication of work to ensure that the model being

	offered by the Home Office is as streamlined as possible.
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4.3	Were the actions implemented through the Fund coherent with and non-contradictory to other interventions with similar objectives?
	<p>As discussed in Question 4.2 the UKRA implemented a number of systems and processes over the duration of AMIF to ensure that there was coherence in the programme being delivered in the UK.</p> <p>The most important part of these processes is at the application stage. The application forms designed by the UKRA have become more specific in terms of identifying exactly what National Programme aim(s) is/are being addressed by the project design. By collecting more information about which objectives are being addressed by projects the UKRA have a better understanding of the coherence and comprehensiveness of the current program that is being delivered. This has helped the UKRA to address the key priorities outlined in the National Programme. For example one UK priority was to identify and support people in the asylum system that are perceived to be vulnerable. By having robust systems in place to monitor projects at the application stage the UKRA has managed to fund projects which deal with the following vulnerabilities, gender-based violence, mental health, unaccompanied minors and modern slavery.</p> <p>It could be argued however that the delivery of a coherent programme of work that reflects that National Programme has had differing levels of success across the three strategic objectives.</p> <p>For projects working on returns and integration these appear to have the most comprehensive and complimentary packages of support. AMIF projects are able to offer different support at most points along this process suggesting that the work programme under these strategic objectives is a little more coherent. Asylum projects funded under AMIF seem to reflect a slightly more disjointed package of support due to the nature of the applications that have been received and have been successful in the application process. Asylum projects tend to focus only on one element of support and there does not appear to be such a well developed end to end package of support. However, this is likely to be because the returns and integration programme of work was well developed under SOLID and this method of working has continued on. Asylum projects were working to new priorities so it makes sense that a coherent package of support would take longer to develop. Conversely, the asylum projects have had the space to be more innovative with the interventions that they offer.</p> <p>There has also been some differing performance in terms of meeting the national objectives. There are a number of national objectives that have yet to be sufficiently addressed by the program of work in the UK. These are objectives relating to training of staff, reception of asylum seekers and evaluation work on existing policies. While there is evidence that there have been projects that have</p>



	<p>applied for AMIF support under reception places (4 projects, 3 unsuccessful, 1 did not submit an application) training (1 bid, unsuccessful) and evaluation (1 unsuccessful bid) these projects have not been developed enough to get through the stringent application process. This suggests that the UKRAs tailored calls for funding (see Q5.2) do provide applications in the areas of the National Programme not yet addressed, but it does not necessarily follow that those applications submitted are going to represent feasible or well-designed projects. The UKRA can only award money to beneficiaries that apply or to projects that they believe to be viable.</p> <p>To ensure that the entire work programme is covered during the duration of the AMIF funding period the UKRA could focus on encouraging bids that would cover these previously under resourced areas further. Having further events that specifically focus on responding to tailored calls for proposals, offering advice on how to bid on these areas of work would be useful, particularly if this encourages the use of external expertise.</p>
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5	Complementarity
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5	<p>The overall question: Were the objectives set in the national programme and the corresponding implemented actions complementary to those set in the framework of other policies, in particular those pursued by the Member State?</p>
	<p>Complementarity is explored by looking at how the EU supports policies within the UK &amp; MS. Responses for these questions draws from the National Programme, qualitative interviews in the Process evaluation, and the Annual Implementation Report.</p> <p>The overall aims of the programme of work were complementary to the UK's current policies and priorities. A number of lessons were learnt following the SOLID evaluation about the work programme within the UK &amp; what programmes could be put in place to support any gaps and to address current policy issues. The Direct Award funding model meant that AMIF has funded some elements of Home Office business developed under SOLID which naturally aligns with UK policies &amp; priorities.</p> <p>Priorities have started to shift under AMIF, such as a move away from returns to the creation of a compliant environment &amp; a greater need for asylum support than initially anticipated, the UKRA have responded to this quickly &amp; decisively. These responses have included tailored calls for funding to address gaps, holding</p>

	<p>events for potential &amp; existing beneficiaries, &amp; being in the process of making changes to the programme as part of the mid-term review.</p> <p>One area where AMIF has been very complimentary to UK policy is to provide support for vulnerable groups moving through the asylum process. This has supported the UK's Adults at Risk Safeguarding Strategy &amp; Children's Safeguarding policies (2015).</p> <p>There is some evidence that elements of the programme completed under AMIF have supported work that is pursued in other MS. More specifically work on the Charter Flights project; this provides flights to return people with no leave to remain in the UK. The UK &amp; France partnered on some of these flights. Flights leaving from the UK would stop in France to pick up people that the French government were removing back to their country of origin.</p> <p>Equally there has been some joint working with other MS when offering support to unaccompanied minors in the Dublin project. This project offered the resettlement for 6000 unaccompanied minors in the UK from other MS under the Dublin Regulations.</p> <p>Overall AMIF has acted in a complimentary way to UK policy. Where work could be developed further is to explore more ways in which MS &amp; the UK could work together in the future, although of course it should be recognised that this occurs already in other fora &amp; routine interactions.</p>
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5.1	Was an assessment of other interventions with complementary objectives carried out and taken into account during the programming stage?
	<p>As discussed in Question 3 there is anecdotal evidence that a series of benchmarking exercises took place within the International Policy Directorate when the National Programme was being devised. However, the exact nature of these bench-marking exercises is not recorded.</p> <p>However, there are a number of steps that the UKRA did take in the programming model which helped to ensure complementarity. The first is that the AMIF programme was devised with lessons learnt from the SOLID evaluation a key feature of the decisions made. The UKRA took the important</p>

lessons from SOLID and made sure that these were addressed in the AMIF programme. These lessons included having tighter management on the projects being commissioned and what was being paid for, monitoring projects closely through the work of the Account Managers, having a smaller number of larger projects in order to make this management process more efficient and streamlined.

The most crucial change in the model of working from previous EU funds was the adoption of the Direct Award funding model (see Question 4). Previously a number of small projects had been commissioned that were run by a range of external providers (under the EIF only). This model made keeping track of how UK policy and priorities were being addressed difficult. The Direct Award funding model meant that all the projects funded under AMIF were contracted out to Home Office business areas (including sub contractors if required). As well as the learning taken from the SOLID evaluation there were two other crucial reasons to adopt this model. The first is that Asylum and returns work has to be conducted within the Home Office and the second was with the UKs imminent departure from the EU having lots of contracts with external providers would make any withdrawal a lot more complex for the UKRA to manage.

The adoption of the Direct Award funding model helped to ensure complementarity within the AMIF programme as the projects bid for by Home Office business areas are naturally a reflection of the current policy priorities within the UK. It also meant that there is natural co-ordination between the business areas running the three strategic objectives so overlap between projects or projects addressing non-complimentary or competing objectives are extremely unlikely.

There was evidence of how this Direct Award funding model encouraged closer joint working between the business areas working under the three strategic objectives. For projects addressing the strategic objective of Asylum a lot of the work was co-ordinated and supported through one key contact. This staff member would act as a support for projects who wanted to apply, were going through the application process and to collect evidence and claim costs for their projects. Business areas that were managing returns projects starting meeting once a month to discuss the work programme that was being completed under AMIF. This allowed information sharing and joint working opportunities to be explored.

The UKRA also worked closely with other Member States during the programming phase to support and information share to help develop the National Programmes. A key UKRA staff member visited Bulgaria to help them draft their National Programme. Recipricol bilateral visits with the Swedish RA early in the programme allowed for information sharing. Additionally the UK led

	<p>on training sessions for the European Academy.</p> <p>To summarise, evidence of a comprehensive benchmarking exercise for complementarity (and relevance) is limited, partly due to recording oversight probably attributable to the tight timelines needed to complete the exercise and lack of specificity in the requirement on this front. However, the UKRA did, as a matter of course, implement key processes to help to ensure complementarity across the AMIF programme. The first was learning lessons from previous rounds of EU funding; the second was the adoption of the Direct Award funding model. These have promoted joint working and ensured that monitoring of the projects and how they compliment UK priorities and policies.</p> <p>There is more limited evidence of close working with other MS during the programming phase but the UKRA has been able to share its experience of working with EU funds with other MS.</p> <p>It is also worth noting that the UKRA adopted a number of interventions and processes that were implemented during the running of the AMIF programme to ensure that this complementarity continued to run across the first half of the AMIF funding period.</p>
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5.2	<p>Were co-ordination mechanisms between the Fund and other interventions with similar objectives established to ensure their complementarity for the implementing period?</p>
	<p>As part of the Direct Award funding model all projects funded by AMIF would receive 75% EU funding and 25% funding from the Home Office (co-financing was stipulated by the EC). This mechanism ensured that business areas were financially invested in ensuring that they delivered work in line with their policy priorities. It also ensured that business areas would have oversight of the financial resources needed to complete AMIF projects so there would not be overlap between AMIF projects &amp; other interventions targeting the strategic objectives within the business area.</p> <p>There were a number of mechanisms in place to ensure that the complementarity of the AMIF programme continued within the UK over the AMIF evaluation period (See Q 5.1). These are below:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The UKRA had an ethos of continuous improvement &amp; as a result</li> </ul>

implemented new procedures & practices for application & assessment processes.

These included the introduction of the pre-application meeting. This informal meeting took place between UKRA representatives & potential project beneficiaries to advise them on meeting the UK priorities & how they could operate their model under the AMIF regulations. This meant that when projects did decide to put in an application the quality of the applications was much improved.

Additionally the UKRA developed more robust procedures to assess which objectives the projects would be addressing. This way the UKRA could check that the projects that were running were complimentary to the National Programme

- Account Managers within the UKRA offered continued support and guidance to projects

The Account Manager's role was not just to collect evidence & financial information from the projects but to act as a source of support for the AMIF beneficiaries. This support included regular communication & site visits to monitor & better understand the activities being conducted with AMIF monies. Once Account Managers had a strong grasp of the work that was being done they were able to offer advice & assistance to projects that may have been struggling to meet their targets or demonstrate the work that they were doing. Project Managers, in general, found this support extremely helpful

*"I would just say that they have been incredibly helpful, very helpful, & they're, you know, always there sort of thing at the end of the phone or email or whatever."*

Manager

Project

Account Managers then share information with each other so that all Account Managers within the UKRA have a strong understanding of the full range of work being completed under the AMIF programme.

This model of working ensures that AMIF beneficiaries are getting a constant steer on the UKRA priorities & ensure that the work across the programme is complementary.

- Events to promote joint working & information sharing for project beneficiaries

The UKRA held a series of events to bring together existing & potential beneficiaries to discuss the work programme & give those involved a chance to share ideas, develop collaborative working practices & problem solve common problems & issues that the projects were having. These events have been extremely well received.

- Tailored calls for proposals

To address any gaps in the National Programme (see Q4.1) the UKRA ran tailored calls for proposals to address these gaps. This helped to ensure as much of the work programme as possible was addressed & that any new projects complimented the existing work stream.

There is less evidence for complementary working with other MS as a direct result of this programme, although this collaboration occurs in a wide variety of other ways. Two projects did collaborate with other MS to deliver part of their programme. The UK & France worked together to return people with no leave to remain on the same charter flights in order to save costs & the Dublin project settled unaccompanied minors from other MS in the UK. Additionally the Country Information & fact finding mission produce reports on countries that can be accessed by other MS.

Additionally the UKRA have recently taken part in an information sharing visit with Ireland. This was to discuss to the progress of AMIF, the UKRAs control mechanisms, & share any lessons learnt so far.

A number of mechanisms have been introduced in the implementation phase of the project to ensure that the UKRAs programme of work under AMIF has been complementary to UK core policy & priorities. In future work could be done to capture how projects complement each other in terms of people moving through multiple AMIF interventions to demonstrate more concrete evidence the complementarity of the UK AMIF programme.

While there is some evidence of working with MS on joint policy objectives this

	is something that could be developed in the future. However, any work undertaken in this area is likely to be impacted by the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.
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5.3	Were mechanisms aimed to prevent overlapping of financial instruments put in place?
	<p>In Question 5.2 the Direct Award funding model adopted by the UK was outlined. Co-financing between the UK and the EC ensured that the business areas within the Home Office had financial obligations and engagement within AMIF ensured that there were extra checks to make sure work was not being duplicated or monies were being drawn from different sources to fund the same work. This model also means that the financial arrangement only exists between the Home Office and the UKRA. This means that tighter financial control can be kept on the contracts than an external model of funding.</p> <p>As part of the application process potential beneficiaries are required to outline any other sources of funding or monies being used to support the activities proposed.</p> <p>Additionally the AMIF Audit Authority implemented a system of stringent financial checks to ensure that the projects were delivering the required outcomes, evidencing their work correctly and ensuring that there were no overlapping financial instruments.</p> <p>The AMIF Audit Authority offer financial checks across three pillars; audits of operations, project audits and systems audits. These are completed annually and the AMIF Audit Authority operates a sample methodology. The Audit Authority reported that they work in a collaborative way with the EU Audit Authority. This has allowed them to respond effectively to changes in EU regulations with regard to financial obligations under AMIF. Reports from the Audit Authority suggest this relationship has been productive and the communication flows have been good.</p> <p>These checks ensured that there were well developed processes to detect fraud and those projects were required to submit detailed financial information in the form of quarterly toolkits outlining their project expenditure. These are submitted in arrears so that no money is claimed in advance and therefore does</p>

not have to be claimed back later if disallowed.

The UKRA have responded positively to recommendations and findings suggested by the Audit Authority and have implemented the suggestions that they have made. In some cases this has meant that projects have had to go back and collect further information to satisfy these new requirements.

Some Project Managers argued that these financial checks were overly burdensome as they required information over and above what was required for the UK Home Office. This was particularly the case when it came to accounting for people's time or evidencing small costs within travel and subsistence.

*“Quite a lot of red tape to actually get the, to the end game whereby, the commercial teams to be able to get onto account details, etc, quite difficult. Sometimes trawling through the Redfern accounts with regard to T&S were difficult as well. And then obviously you're asking people what, were having access to very minute details of staff's bank information or salary information, down to you know, how much overtime they've had, you know knowing to every penny what people, people earn and going into very much detail. Which I can appreciate is necessary, but no I don't think sometimes that's very popular with the staff involved.”*

Manager

Project

This did lead to some problems with some financial elements being refused as they were not evidenced clearly enough. Predominantly the main problems seemed to be around accounting for staff time when they were working part-time on AMIF activities and the second was around the procuring of external goods and services. In some cases there was not enough evidence of the correct procurement processes being in place. This is particularly the case where existing sub contracting relationships were in place prior to being awarded AMIF monies. Some 16 projects in 2015 had some monies disallowed and a further 15 projects in 2016. Mostly these were small amounts but in one case this was an amount of £2,000,000.

These stringent financial checks also meant that projects under AMIF tended to collect data with audit requirements in mind and therefore outcome data and other important data collection techniques were somewhat overlooked. This does hamper the ability to explore the impacts of AMIF funded interventions. The research team is working with AMIF beneficiaries to try and tailor their data collection activities to overcome this as AMIF moves forward.



	<p>However, there were some advantages of applying these rigorous financial standards. A number of Project Managers indicated in their interviews that these had forced them to develop much more robust financial recording mechanisms to demonstrate the work that had been completed. These more robust procedures had continued even after the AMIF funding had ended. There were also reports that AMIF felt much more organised and controlled than previous EU funding mechanisms.</p>
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6	EU added value
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6	The overall question: Was any added value brought about by the EU support?
	<p>The responses to these questions draw on the qualitative interviews.</p> <p>AMIF has contributed to the UK programme of work in a number of ways; providing a mechanism to improve the scope, aim &amp; processes of migration work in the UK.</p> <p>As well as delivering the projects so far for good value for money. AMIF is more regulated than its predecessor, as the projects are subject to more scrutiny &amp; offered more support by the UKRA. The intensity of the administrative demands enabled some projects, for example the Modern Slavery programme, to look further into the granularity of the nature &amp; cost of the support they were offering which then pushed them to do better data analysis, which could then be passed on to other Home Office staff for more detailed analysis.</p> <p>Generally the monitoring &amp; administrative processes implemented under AMIF had meant that projects, by necessity, had been compelled to design more robust systems of monitoring their activities &amp; many Project Managers stated that now those processes were in place they would continue to be used.</p> <p>The implementation of the Fund witnessed the development of new projects &amp; initiatives that may not have otherwise been financed. Examples include Summary Methodology &amp; Country Information Needs projects. Without AMIF</p>

	<p>the resources would not have been available to complete these activities.</p> <p>One project noted how the Fund had enabled the project team the time &amp; space to think about the variables that made a training programme dynamic &amp; engaging, while still giving the required knowledge, skills &amp; practical expertise. In particular, new technology &amp; methods were trialled &amp; utilised to develop a better product.</p> <p>A subcontractor noted that the Fund gave more certainty to the project they were running, previously they were existing year-to-year but the implementation of AMIF allowed them to think a few years into the future &amp; to better administer their resources. It enabled them, for instance, to develop literature for their beneficiaries, something that they had previously discounted as they were not sure how long they would be able to operate for. There were many projects of value that were funded by the Fund in terms of innovation &amp; developing work in UK priority areas. A number of projects were innovative or extended &amp; broadened the provision of support which is unlikely to have occurred without AMIF support.</p>
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6.1	<p>What are the main types of added value resulting from the support by the Fund (volume, scope, role, process)?</p>
	<p>The answers in this section outline the four categories of added value identified by the EC.</p> <p><u>Volume</u></p> <p>Asylum projects in particular performed well against the National Programme targets achieving 69,764 people receiving support against a target of 27,800. Volumes for integration and returns work, while not meeting the national programme targets (see Question 3), have maintained the level of volumes achieved under SOLID. Suggesting that AMIF has continued to add value to the UK programme of work as SOLID did previously.</p> <p><u>Scope</u></p>

With integration and returns AMIF has delivered a range of projects which reflects the aims and objectives of the National Programme. A number of projects, especially under these two strategic objectives, reflected work that would have been occurring anyway. This has not necessarily increased the scope of work in these areas under AMIF but has continued to deliver the added value gained under the development of SOLID.

Innovative ways of working were developed under the UK programme, largely but not entirely under the strategic objective of Asylum. Epione has already been outlined as a project developing an innovative model of working that improved the range of people who were receiving support. Other projects in asylum that have broadened the scope of work in the UK under AMIF includes provision of childcare for parents undertaking asylum interviews, support for those with mental health problems and more effectively identifying victims of modern slavery.

#### Role

In terms of role, AMIF often provided the UK additional monies to support both work initially developed under SOLID and, in some cases, to trial innovative ways of working, improving infrastructure and completing visits to third countries that would otherwise not have happened.

AMIF provided projects much needed space and resources to effectively assess the area that they are working in and make informed, long-term decisions about resources and structure. One project noted how the Fund had enabled the project team the time and space to think about the variables that made a training programme dynamic and engaging, while still giving the required knowledge, skills and practical expertise.

The role that AMIF has played in the UK has increased the value, range and innovation of the work that the UK does in relation to asylum, integration and returns. Respondents from all groups in the qualitative interviews indicated that AMIF (and funding from the European Commission more generally) was an important part of delivering the work that they expected to and helped them to function more effectively, innovatively and widely. Despite the issues highlighted in terms of meeting the administrative burden generated by AMIF (see Question 8) the vast majority felt that the worth of the fund over rode these concerns.

	<p><u>Process</u></p> <p>AMIF increased value in a number of ways around process, particularly in terms of project management (both within the RA and for the project beneficiaries themselves). Following the previous EU funding mechanism SOLID there were a number of issues with the management and delivery of this funding. However, under AMIF the UKRA developed more rigorous and robust procedures for managing the projects. Account Managers were much more ‘hands on’ with beneficiaries to support them with the delivery of the projects and the financial instruments to monitor spending were robust. The UKRA have also made a commitment to continuous improvement and as a result the processes around application and assessment of projects have continued to improve over the duration of AMIF so far.</p> <p>For beneficiaries processes around evidence collection and robust administration systems improved greatly under AMIF. These improvements were largely necessitated by the increasing oversight of the UKRA and ensuring that their evidence was sufficient to trigger payments. Whatever the underlying reasons for these improvements the UKRA has stated that the more robust systems implemented under AMIF will continue into the future and improve their areas of work going forward.</p>
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6.2	<p>Would the Member State have carried out the actions required to implement the EU policies in areas supported by the Fund without its financial support?</p> <p>Overall, the interviews with key staff suggest that the UK would have funded some of the chosen interventions without AMIF assistance. Nevertheless the Fund itself helped the Home Office, in particular, save finance that it could use elsewhere. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that the volumes addressed while AMIF was running have increased and that certain activities were funded (overseas visits, additional support to vulnerable groups, and infrastructure improvements) that would otherwise would not have taken place.</p> <p>Under AMIF, there are three strands of funding: asylum, integration and returns. Under Commission rules, UKRA had to spend a minimum of 20% of its allotted funds on projects concerned with asylum and integration, while the rest could be divided as it saw fit. UKRA chose to spend 55% of its funds on returns programmes, which was the prime UK priority when the fund was being set up.</p>
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	<p>The funds were initially delayed, due to reasons outlined in Question 4, and the subsequent agreement between UKRA and the Commission meant that certain projects could be run at a financial risk. Because this was the case the UKRA decided to initially fund existing returns and integration initiatives that were already running and successful as a way to minimise the risk of starting the funding stream without formal EC approval. It could therefore be argued that these projects; Charters, Gateway, AVR, and others would have run without the support of AMIF. However, the evidence suggests the money supplied by AMIF allowed for an increased volume in delivering these objectives and allowed funds to be diverted to other core areas of Home Office business. Equally there is limited change that can be made to existing programmes that have been shown to work. However, AMIF has supported the streamlining of some of the returns initiatives and allowed provision of a more comprehensive reintegration support which has added value to a well developed area of work within the UK.</p> <p>Once the fund had been agreed with the EC the UKRA then broadened its scope to include a range of projects that would not have occurred without the fund. Particularly the work with different vulnerable groups under the asylum strategic objective.</p> <p>Furthermore, some of the asylum projects have clearly benefitted from AMIF funding in the sense that it gave them license to either buy equipment that there wasn't otherwise the budget for, and to try more experimental projects that wouldn't have otherwise been funded. A good example here is the Country Information project, which the Home Office had not financed, which AMIF then supported to fruition. More experimental work was conducted in asylum and integration, as projects like Epione, the Asylum Training and the interviewing project all became innovative additions to the portfolio. Particular areas of innovation have been in the area of improving support to vulnerable groups. With the support of AMIF time and money has been available to address the needs of this target group, which reflects the UK priorities within the National Programme.</p>
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6.3	What would be the most likely consequences of an interruption of the support provided by the Fund?
	AMIF has become an integral part of UK asylum, integration and returns strategy; the SOLID funding stream enabled a considered, long term investment platform into these key areas, which was then carried on into the AMIF period. EU funding, on this score, has been a vital component of the facilitation of the UK government's migration strategy for well over a decade now.

	<p>However, due in part to the initial decision to run a number of projects at a risk – where the UK government accepted liability in case AMIF could not fund them – many of those accepted earlier on were projects that the UK government would have wanted to continue after being developed under SOLID. These included major returns projects, which the UK government saw as a key interest.</p> <p>Projects on integration (through the Gateway programme) have been running since 2004, before EU funding was secured so some form of integration programme would continue without the Fund’s intervention. However, under AMIF the Gateway programme has developed considerably and any changes might mean the programme would have to be streamlined for efficiency which could lead to the loss of some crucial support mechanisms for those resettling in the UK if there was a sudden interruption in funding, such as a reduction in the amount of time available for receiving support. Additionally under the integration objective some of the projects offering discrete interventions to ensure that refugees are able to negotiate the welfare system and avoid destitution might not have been run.</p> <p>One of the key dynamics that emerged across the qualitative data was that the additional support from the AMIF had provided the space and opportunity for some projects (particularly within the asylum area) to develop innovative (or, as one respondent said, “experimental”) methods or aims that would otherwise not have been trialled or put forward by the Home Office as part of its usual funding processes. Examples in this direction include Epione, asylum childcare provision and the Country Fact Finding project as well as the Asylum Training project.</p> <p>A number of subcontractors were utilised in the delivery of these projects, in some cases small charitable organisations. These small organisations are an integral part of the delivery of some objectives because they have specific areas of expertise that can inform and improve the work of the UK Home Office. However, these organisations often run on extremely small budgets and short term sources of funding which can make their continued functioning somewhat tenuous. Having available a more sustained funding source has been essential to some of these organisations’ ability to operate.</p>
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6.4	To which extent have actions supported by the Fund resulted in a benefit at the Union level?
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The extent to which actions have resulted in a benefit at Union level depends on the nature of the project activities. Some projects were better situated, by their design or level of contact with other Members States, to have more direct benefits at the Union level, whereas others were comparatively more UK-focused in their aim. Indeed, the majority of projects were domestically-focused, which had a minimal amount of Union-level added value.

However, the fund did enable some projects to closely coordinate with colleagues from other EU Member States. A good example on this regard is the Dublin Project. The commission allowed considerable travel between this project and partner MS as respective colleagues on the continent, as they found it much easier to get agreements about resettling unaccompanied minors when they were able to meet other key stakeholders face to face. Overall, this quickened the process of transporting unaccompanied minors from one country to the next as the project had a better understanding of the partners in the other countries and their needs.

Additionally Charter flights were able to perform joint operations with France. Returning migrants of countries of origin (mostly Albania) in a more cost effective and less resource intensive way.

Country Information and Fact Finding missions have allowed the UK to conduct fact finding missions and produce information reports on countries which have been made available to other countries so that the knowledge can be shared.

The UKRA have also shared their expertise of working with the EC to other MS. Both Sweden and Bulgaria received support from the UKRA in the early stages of AMIF with the development of the National Programme and projects. The UKRA have also worked closely with Ireland, including an information sharing visit in order to share good practise and ways of working.

Overall AMIF has provided some value to the wider EU, even though most of the projects have been domestically focused. As AMIF moves into the second phase this may be an area that could be specified more clearly in advance and developed further. Possibly by the introduction of more joint projects with other MS.

7	Sustainability
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7	The overall question: Are the positive effects of the projects supported by the Fund likely to last when its support will be over?
	<p>The response to these questions is drawn from the qualitative data conducted as part of the evaluation and the MI data provided by projects on the outputs that they have achieved.</p> <p>In the areas of integration and returns AMIF in the beginning tended to fund projects delivering areas of business that had been developed under SOLID. This did ensure great complementarity and coherence with existing National Programmes, but it also means that there are few individualised outcomes that we can attribute directly and solely to the AMIF process. Although, as these business areas are well developed these work areas will continue on. AMIF has also allowed these business objectives to run at greater volumes and divert resources to other complementary activities that otherwise would not have happened. The evaluation is unable to quantify these other activities as information on these were not collected by Project Managers and business areas but the qualitative interviews indicated that AMIF monies supporting core objectives had helped to support diversification in the work in integration and returns.</p> <p>There were, nevertheless, projects that were innovative and allowed new models of provision that may not have come about without the intervention of AMIF, this was particularly evident under the strategic objective of asylum. Work with vulnerable groups has been particularly well developed and there are plans to develop this work area further, in particular Epione. Project Managers are keen to run additional projects and activities to support women that have experienced gender-based violence.</p> <p>However, the lack of available data on the outcomes achieved by the projects quantifying or evidencing sustainability in the outcomes is not possible.</p> <p>It is clear that the increased administrative process developed responsibility and discipline around the expenditure of money in the business environment. The intensity of the financial accountability and evidence collection has been adopted into the business areas as a new standard, and the Government Internal Auditing authority had a good opportunity to expand their knowledge portfolio interacting with the EU auditors on the fund.</p>



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7.1	<p>What were the main measures adopted by the Member State to ensure the sustainability of the results of the projects implemented with support of the Fund (both at programming and implementation stage)?</p>
	<p>The National Programme focused on developing sustainability in the area of voluntary returns specifically. The aim was to try and design measures that would increase the proportion of voluntary returns both over the course of the project and beyond. The plans for integration projects focused on delivering objectives that would help settle people in the UK with a long term focus, such as English language provision, employment and education. Other areas of the programme addressing sustainability was the desire by the UK to develop end to end service provision for those coming through the UK immigration system which would make the process more efficient and sustainable.</p> <p>There is evidence of sustainability being considered at the implementation stage. Assessments of bids focus on whether or not the projects meet the aims and objectives outlined in the National Programme and that they are able to deliver. Questions specifically on the sustainability of the project are also asked. Projects are required to demonstrate how the work they complete under AMIF will have a sustainable impact on the work area after the project has come to a close.</p> <p>The key issue that has hindered sustainability, or at least the measuring of how sustainable the projects funded under AMIF, is the lack of data available to projects to measure the outcomes of the interventions. The majority of projects only kept information pertaining to the outputs of the projects. Without being able to measure the outcomes a project achieves it is then impossible to determine how those outcomes may continue into the future. As a result the evaluation team will continue to work with the UKRA and projects following the completion of the interim evaluation to ensure that measures to capture outcomes are included in the project design.</p> <p>Organisational issues also hindered sustainability. The first issue is around recruitment and retention of key project staff. The applications would often appoint a Project Manager during the pre-application period, or even as the project started, and then that person could be changed with someone else, which caused instability for the project in that early period.</p> <p>Information access issues were also a concern, as there was no common system that all parties were using. In this way, poor knowledge retention and transfer means that the project outcomes are not likely to be sustainable as important</p>

	<p>messages are not being passed on to other key staff in the business area. Again, though, the target-setting process was a significant disadvantage to the sustainability of the effects of the Fund. Too often, projects bid with targets that were unrealistic, unprepared for the stringency by which they would be held to, and they would then be terminated, only to be sometimes brought back in the next quarter with the same activities but with reduced targets. A key reoccurring issue here was that the expectations of Project Managers are often at odds with the actual expectations of the funding stream. Many participants responded that AMIF funds were treated like an add-on to existing responsibilities, rather than an end unto themselves. This caused a number of project terminations, as the targets set were often too high.</p> <p>Another Project Manager noted how the legacy of AMIF for their project was that it had pushed his project team to keep more stringent records. This attention to increased record keeping was also mirrored by some of the responses from UKRA, whom detailed that they had requested that Project Managers fill in extra toolkits even though they weren't strictly necessary in accordance to EC regulations. Indeed, during the AMIF process, UKRA are "forever updating [their] processes ... [and] always reviewing [their] processes." (Project Manager)</p> <p>It was noted that UKRA had a much more positive relationship with this Audit Authority compared to the previous one under SOLID. Furthermore, the rigorous management and control system that was put into place after the early part of the AMIF funding period is something that will also be taken forwards into the wider business area.</p> <p>To improve in this area in future the UKRA are working to support projects to develop data collection methods that allow for the capture of outcomes and are reviewing the National Programme targets so that potential beneficiaries are able to bid for monies with viable plans. It is also worth the UKRA encouraging potential beneficiaries to think about methods of knowledge transfer and sharing best practice to ensure that lessons learnt to improve the sustainability of an outcome can be shared.</p>
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7.2	Were mechanisms put in place to ensure a sustainability check at programming and implementation stage?
	There is little concrete evidence that explicit sustainability checks were carried out at programming stage. However, as discussed in Question 7.1 the National Programme was designed with encouraging sustainable outcomes across all three

strategic objectives. Lessons have been learnt from the SOLID evaluation in terms of choosing objectives to which sustainable outcomes are likely to be achieved. This is particularly relevant to the design of the integration support suggested for refugees under Strategic Objective 2 and the focus on moving towards more voluntary rather than enforced returns. The encouragement of voluntary returns will make returning people from the UK cheaper and more dignified and respectful and ultimately therefore becomes a more sustainable method for removals in the long term.

The adoption of the Direct Award funding model also encourages sustainability. The evaluation of SOLID determined that external providers were unlikely to be able to continue their activities if there was no external funding available. By situating the service level agreements within the Home Office business areas means that the work started by AMIF funding is likely to continue on even if the specific intervention has come to an end.

One of the issues of checking sustainability at the implementation stage is the need to address the targets outlined in the report. As the UKRA were working to targets which they believed to be informed by business areas at the beginning of the fund they were approving projects that had provided targets that were unachievable. This happened because beneficiaries applying for the fund perceived the need to make their bids more attractive and address the perceived need outlined in the National Programme. This made a number of projects unsustainable as they were unable to meet their targets. Although a number did reapply for funding with revised and more realistic targets once the error had been realised.

The UKRA became aware of this problem and put in place some checks for sustainability in the application stage. As part of the pre-application meeting projects are encouraged to spend sufficient time and resources exploring the likely outcomes of the project so that they bid for realistic targets and ensure the project runs for its proposed duration. Equally during the assessment phase projects are examined in terms of how they plan to meet their targets and how they plan to evidence them and ask them to explicitly state what they believe the longer term outcomes of the project will be.

As discussed in Question 7.1 the main issue around checking sustainability should be based on the clear and accurate measuring of project outcomes. Once the outcomes have been established for a project whether these outcomes can be sustained can be properly analysed.

Overall while there were a few checks specifically related to sustainability the UKRA have learnt lessons over the initial phase of the funding regarding the

	<p>proposed figures and targets provided by beneficiaries. As a result much more attention is not paid to how projects will achieve their targets and if they are able to effectively monitor the work that they have completed. These improvements in the processes should improve the quality and the accuracy of the applications for AMIF and mean that fewer projects have to be terminated in the future.</p>
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7.3	<p>To what extent are the outcomes/benefits of the actions sustained by the Fund expected to continue thereafter?</p>
	<p>There were instances where the funds allowed parts of the business area to develop closer and more effective communication strategies, due to the additional demands that AMIF placed on the teams. For instance, the Modern Slavery project, which was working in a new area with an incomplete research base, stated that they felt they would now see more asylum seekers who are potential victims of modern slavery coming into programmes of support than before they did before AMIF funding as they have had the opportunity to work on systems and processes to better identify individuals at risk. Furthermore, the intense pressure on targets they faced, and the added bureaucratic accountability, the communication and messaging around the Modern Slavery Unit has also improved, as more people are better informed than before about the issues around modern slavery and how to identify members of that target group.</p> <p>There were a number of projects that used the Fund, which sought to develop innovative approaches, methodologies, or were seeking to intervene in news areas that may not have otherwise be considered in this time period. For example, the Criminal Casework Investigations project will see its three completed objectives continue after the end of the funding period. Indeed, once the prosecution team mentoring accreditation process is completed in October 2017, which forms a key part of what the funds were used for in this case, then those trained will form a fully functioning team that will continue to do prosecutions in the foreseeable future.</p> <p>The funding has allowed the Asylum Training Project time and space to think about changing up and diversifying the content, structure and delivery of asylum training courses. It has further led to significant improvements to the training courses, by, in particular, bridging some of the gaps in the prospectus. Additionally, beneficial impacts to project users, like the individuals aided by the Epione project, will continue after the project has ended. Other outputs will continue to give beneficial impacts after the end of the project both to the UK and to other countries, such as the country information and fact finding project.</p>

	<p>Other projects have been able to upgrade their technical infrastructure, such as the Asylum Interviewing project, which was able to significantly upgrade the interview infrastructure at sites across the UK, introducing digital software that will help speed up the process of the interview.</p> <p>Work completed with refugees to ensure their smooth transition into UK life should mean that their wellbeing is sustained. The lessons learnt in delivering this project and cross organisational working encouraged by this intervention will mean that refugees arriving to the UK in the future should experience a quicker, more efficient and more comprehensive package of support than those who have come before them.</p> <p>AMIF has created strong levels of fiscal responsibility and discipline about how money is managed, which will continue to resonate in the business area after the end of the Fund. UKRA has a much more positive relationship with the Audit Authority now, than compared with the SOLID era.</p> <p>Overall the UK has delivered sustainability under AMIF, while the quantitative evidence of outcome sustainability is not able to be provided due to lack of data projects have worked to develop better systems and processes to deliver measures across all strategic objectives. In the asylum objective this has focused on more effective ways to identify and support vulnerable people where the knowledge gained will continue to benefit people applying into the future. For integration Gateway has built long lasting relationships with a range of local providers to ensure that resettlement in the UK can be a smooth transition. Now these relationships exist they will continue to develop further and help further cohorts of refugees being resettled in the UK. For returns the continuation of lessons learnt under SOLID and the increase in the proportion of voluntary returns suggest that this work will continue into the future.</p>
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8	Simplification and reduction of administrative burden
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8	The overall question: Were the Fund management procedures simplified and the administrative burden reduced for its beneficiaries?
	AMIF had mixed success in terms of simplification. Responses for this section

	<p>are drawn from the qualitative interviews and UKRA financial records.</p> <p>Respondent groups had differing views on whether AMIF had reduced administrative burden: The UKRA Account Managers generally found the fund management procedures to be less resource intensive to manage, compared to SOLID, and there is evidence that the system of management put into place by UKRA for AMIF was highly effective in ensuring the accountability and fiscal responsibility of projects. Subcontractors also found that the management procedures had been streamlined and simplified. Although there were two subcontractors that reported added demands from their Home Office partners. This reduction was due to the direct funding model as Home Office Business areas picked up much of the administration on their behalf.</p> <p>The administrative burden at the project level was much higher than initially expected by Project Managers. It was frequently perceived to be one of the more difficult elements of the AMIF process (although perhaps no more than under the previous fund's regime). This administrative burden can be explained in two ways: the first is that there is a misunderstanding of expectations of Project Managers in relation to the fund. Project Managers had initially considered the role to involve only a small amount of work. As a result project managers were often required to deliver their projects in conjunction with their other full time job responsibilities. This led to under-staffing and under-resourcing in respect to meeting the fund's administrative and evidence requirements. Resources were generally not included in applications at the start of the programme to manage the administrative elements of projects. Second, there are differences between the working practices of the Home Office and the expectations of the fund. For example, the detailed evidencing of small costs, or moderate costs like train tickets, required a level of administration that is not required by the UK Home Office itself. In some cases this led to money being disallowed from projects due to insufficient evidence (see Q5.3). Many Project Managers also found the auditing process to be more labour intensive compared to what they were used to; some also noted that both the AMIF auditors and the UKRA auditors could come at similar times, without any coordination.</p>
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8.1	Did the innovative procedures introduced by the Fund (simplified cost option, multiannual programming, national eligibility rules, more comprehensive national programmes allowing for flexibility) bring about simplification for the beneficiaries of the Fund?
	The innovative procedures introduced by the fund had mixed success in providing simplification for beneficiaries.

The simplified cost option was not operationalised for two reasons, firstly guidance on this option was only produced after the fund had started making it difficult to implement retrospectively. Equally where simplified costs were implemented it did not tend to satisfy the requirements of the auditors who required more stringent evidence. One project, Gateway, is in the process of setting up the simplified cost option for the integration programme but this has yet to be finalised. Depending on the success of this roll out other projects may take up this option in the future.

Multi-annual programming provided a significant advantage in the running of AMIF. The ability of the UKRA to allow funds to roll over from one year to the next gave the UKRA additional flexibility & added discretion in the projects that were funding. Knowing that the funds would be available consistently allowed the UKRA to adopt more rigorous assessment processes & make effective decisions on the projects that were funded rather than feeling pressure to ensure the money was spent in a certain timeframe. There is no explicit evidence that this has improved the quality of the projects but what is clear is that projects are being rejected if they do not meet the required standard or are able to be given time to redevelop & refine their bids to ensure that they are of the highest quality. Although there was no direct evidence that this reduced the administrative burden it did help AMIF run more efficiently as the projects that achieved a funding award were more thoroughly designed, had clearer aims & objectives and had the correct resourcing in place to manage the project.

Other than the simplified cost option being explored for Gateway the UK has not sought to implement the changes to the national eligibility rules. Interviews suggest the UKRA appreciated the added flexibility afforded but in reality have struggled to implement changes. Primarily this is due to auditing requirements making any flexibility difficult to implement in practice. As a result the systems under AMIF have tended to fall back to a similar EU administration model implemented under SOLID. Therefore there was no evidence that this element of AMIF reduced administration burden in practice.

There was not a clear link between the more comprehensive National Programme & added flexibility. The effectiveness of the National Programme is related to the process by which it came about. There were two major factors that led to the development of UKRA as it is constituted today. First, the earlier SOLID fund had not been resourced properly & it had significantly fallen behind its expected workload, which had resulted in oversight & control being stripped down to the “bare minimum.” The second factor was the process of developing & rolling out the National Programme in the first place. The lack of clarity in the development of the figures of the National Programme which in some cases were inaccurate mitigated some of the flexibility because the UKRA were working to targets in some areas that were going to be impossible to achieve (see Q4.1)

*“I’m not sure we recorded things properly in terms of what we put in our [national] programme. Some of the targets are just ‘where has this come from? Why I have got this for a figure? [We then] look[ed] for projects that we’[d] try*

*and fit to help us meet our targets.”*

UKRA Strategic Staff

UKRA also struggled to efficiently roll out its initial programme due to delays in it being cleared, by which time a number of projects had been running, at a financial risk to the Home Office for a considerable period of time. However, the UKRA were able to respond flexibly over the course of AMIF by operating tailored calls for funding to address specific areas in the National Programme & address the growing number of asylum applications in the UK.

In response, UKRA developed a new and improved management structure, which effected rigorous operational controls for all projects (not just a selection). The flexibility initially designed by the EC in the new administration processes tended to be over taken by the needs of the Commission auditors who require a higher level of evidence than these new working practices would allow. So while the aim of the EC to bring more flexibility into the process has been successful in some cases, such as multi annual programming, other measures such as the simplified cost option & changes to national eligibility rules have been harder to implement in practice. Therefore, on balance the reduction of the administration burden envisaged by the EC has not been completely achieved.



## SECTION V: PROJECT EXAMPLES

Description of three 'success stories', among all the projects funded

### Example 1

We consider Returns Facilitation at Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) an example of a successful project as it has utilised AMIF funding to expand the scope of its activities.

#### Background/context

The project has received two funding awards under AMIF. The first funding period ran from 1st April 2015 through to 31st March 2016 (at this time the project was called Hibiscus Initiatives – the total amount awarded was €460,000 with €345,000 from AMIF) & the second started on the 1st April 2016 continuing to 31st March 2019 (total award amount is €1,439,525.08 with €1,079,643.81 from AMIF). Whilst the project has HO Project Managers, the activities are provided by a third-party supplier – Hibiscus. In both funding periods the project worked with individuals detained in one of three IRCs – Yarl's Wood, Colnbrook & Harmondsworth. Prior to AMIF the third party supplier, Hibiscus delivered an existing project providing support & assistance to women in Yarl's Wood IRC. It is this that they developed with AMIF funding across 3 IRCS. In the first funding period the project target was to work with 600 individuals & 1,872 in the second.

#### Activity

Detainees are encouraged to contact Hibiscus project workers on arrival at the IRC. Project workers engage in a range of activities aimed at providing independent assistance to detained individuals.

- Advice & support is provided to assist individuals to understand their cases including signposting to legal advice.
- 'Returns counselling', which includes discussion of return options & strategies, particularly the voluntary schemes that are available.
- Returns preparation involves both returns counselling, which is emotional & psychological support as well as more practical forms of assistance, such as purchasing luggage, mobile phone tops ups so individuals can contact family members /friends, & clothing, especially culturally specific clothing:

*You know, we have had ladies who have been in the UK for a while & are wearing western clothes but they say to us when they go back, they'll need to go back in appropriately religious attire. (Project Worker).*

## Example 1

The project can also offer small amounts of financial assistance to support return & reintegration. Money can be used to secure accommodation, food, & onward travel once returned. If the project has contacts with NGOs in the country of return then detainees are provided with these contacts to facilitate & increase the sustainability of reintegration.

### Results

The project overachieved against targets set in the first funding period, providing assistance to 682 detainees. The project has continued to meet targets set in the second funding period. As of 30th June 2017 the project has provided advice & assistance to 2,899 individuals (clients).

Of these, 1,725 are men (60%) & 1,167 (40%) are women (where gender has been recorded). The top five nationalities of clients are:

Indian: n=424 (15%)

Pakistani: n=396 (14%)

Albanian: n=209 (7%)

Bangladeshi: n=206 (7%)

Nigerian: n= 203 (7%)

Just under a fifth of clients (530, 18%) have received specific welfare assistance ranging from small amounts of money for reintegration needs, luggage for travel, clothing, through to courier payments to collect personal items ahead of return.

The project has also used funding to develop a range of information booklets on Return for detainees, & to further develop NGO contacts in Return Countries. Funding has enabled a visit to China with useful contacts made with NGOs who can support Chinese returnees both now & in the future. The Project Manager viewed the longer term AMIF funding as essential for developing this:

*“Had they not had the certainty of having the twelve months & then the three years funding, they may not have said, “We’ll do a really expensive trip to China.” I think the ...three years [funding] gave them the confidence to go a little bit further afield & to go somewhere that’s*

### **Example 1**

*a bit more challenging & make those links.” (Project Manager)*

#### **Lessons Learned**

Independent third-party suppliers may be more successful in developing collaborative relationships with returnees in comparison to HO staff & consideration could be given to greater use of external providers where appropriate.

Longer term funding can result in engagement in activities that significantly contribute to both the success of the project & provide sustainability beyond the end of the funding period. The field trip to China is an example of this, as this generated key contacts that can benefit returnees both now & in the future.

Whilst the project has been a successful & innovative addition to the core UK returns initiatives Project Managers & staff struggled with putting the bid together. Defining & evidencing what a ‘contribution’ to a return is, & how this can be evidenced is challenging. More support could be provided to assist projects in defining/evidencing the outcomes of their activities rather than just the outputs.

### **Example 2**

Epione is an innovative project delivered at a low cost.

#### **Background**

Epione applied for AMIF in January 2016. The project ran from April 2016 for 12 months at a cost of €50,517.20 (€37,887.90 provided by AMIF). The project was run collaboratively between the Home Office (HO) & The Refugee Council (RC; a subcontractor).

Epione was bid for under Strategic Objective 1, National Objective 1 (Asylum and reception) while addressing another key UK priority, supporting vulnerable groups. In this case the project offered support to 200 women who had been victims of gender-based violence, one of the actions outlined in the UK governments Violence Against Women Action Plan 2014. Gender-based violence in this project included physical/ sexual assault, Female Genital Mutilation, Forced Marriage &/or domestic violence.

## **Example 2**

### **Activity**

Epione offered women, identified as members of the target group, a maximum of 12 sessions of counselling (either 1-2-1 or group sessions). Women were identified as target group members by information given at their initial asylum interview. They were then referred to the RC by the HO through a secure online portal.

### **Results**

Epione met their target of referring 200 women for support.

Unfortunately, 28 women referred to the service were not contactable, due to contact information being incorrect or the women not responding. However, on average women spent over 5 weeks in the service receiving support. The most popular support was 1-2-1 sessions with women receiving between 4 & 5 1-2-1 sessions, with 84 women opting only for 1-2-1 interactions with the RC. On average women had between 3-4 sessions of group support but no woman used only this type of support. Only 23 of the women completed 12 sessions of the counselling, perhaps suggesting that a 12 session programme may be too long. 72 of the women had between 5-11 sessions.

As well as the support offered in-house the RC were able to refer 98 women to other support services including further counselling, sexual health & FGM support, as well more practical support such as help with benefits & asylum claims.

Self report questionnaires given to the women who had taken part in the counselling found that all the women who had engaged with the service found the support extremely helpful. It allowed them to address issues that they had not been able to discuss or seek help with before. They welcomed that they were able to receive support on an issue not directly related to their asylum claim.

Workers within the RC were extremely positive about the initiative as it has meant they have been able to offer vulnerable women support that previously has not been available. The previous mechanism was that women identified as being victims of gender-based violence would have to try and receive services through their GP. It has also enabled the workers involved to become more culturally aware in their practices & have had to become more innovative in the way they offer services to people wanting support.

## Example 2

*“I feel very privileged that this opportunity came along....I think we’re one of the first to develop a very short project but with huge empowerment for the women and I would love for something to come around again., I think it would really, really help the Home Office”*

RC worker

## Lessons Learnt

The project was a success as it trialled a new model of working with an independent contractor. It was felt that this model could be developed further with any future bids offering an improvement in the volumes of women who are referred to the service for support. It was also proposed that the RC would be able to offer HO Asylum staff training on identifying women in this target group, understanding cultural issues & sensitivities when approaching this subject, & offering clinical supervision to those HO workers who find dealing with this subject difficult to cope with.

Despite the success of this project there were one or two problems encountered, largely based on the delivery by the provider which provide some important learning points.

- The counselling service was under-resourced.

A counsellor was recruited for 3 days a week. This made seeing all the women & delivering all the sessions for that one counsellor extremely difficult. The RC was able to overcome this through offering group sessions & bringing in volunteers.

- The evaluation was interested in establishing which women accepted this voluntary service & which women refused. In future records should be kept on women who were offered the service & refused. This would allow tailoring of the offer of support to make it more appealing to more women in the target group.
- There were some issues with women being able to attend the RCs offices for support. This could be addressed in two ways; larger geographical areas should be covered by the provider or more money put in bids for travel.

## Example 3

Gateway has been chosen as a success because it is an example of excellent joint working relationships between the EU, the Home Office and external providers.

### **Example 3**

#### **Background/context**

Gateway is a programme that has been running since 2004. The aim of Gateway is to resettle 750 refugees within the UK each year.

#### **Activity**

Since the start of AMIF, Gateway has been funded twice under two separate contracts. The first ran from April 2014 until March 2017 (€3,757,573.89). 1507 refugees were resettled under the first project. With 753 resettled in 2014 and 754 resettled in 2015 with 12 months support offered after the resettlement date.

The second project runs from April 2016 until March 2019 (€940,586.69) with 2397 refugees resettled up until 15th July 2017. For the second contract the 12 months support offered to those resettled under the programme focuses on providing accommodation, accessing health services, welfare benefits, and employment and education support (including English language provision).

The Gateway programme is operated by three providers based in the North of England. These are Horton Housing, Sheffield Council and the North West partnership (formed of 6 partner organisations). Between these providers they resettle refugees in Bolton, Bradford, Sheffield, Hull, Stockport, Oldham, Bury and Tameside.

The nationalities of those resettled under Gateway are Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Iraq, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Syria (now supported by SVPRS), Burundi and Uganda. The majority of those resettled are women (59%) with dependent children (65%) with 31% having a family size larger than 5 members. The average age of the primary applicant being resettled is 34 years old. The vast majority of applications for refugee status have been made due to suffering violence (84%).

The existing model of working has been in place since the inception of Gateway in the early 2000's. Under AMIF the model has changed slightly with providers having a Service Level Agreement with the Home Office and the Home Office acting as a Project Manager that provides evidence and financial information to the UKRA. This model has been well received with the Gateway providers as it has reduced the administration burden on them and has meant they can channel their resources more effectively into resettling refugees. This new model has increased the administration burden on the Home Office but as the project

### **Example 3**

has continued this process has become more robust and the Home Office is able to collect the appropriate evidence and information on the targets.

*“The Home Office had a grant agreement with the responsible authority; we are responsible for every penny that is spent even though we aren’t the ones spending it”*

Home Office Project

Manager

### **Results**

One of Gateway’s key successes has been the ability of the providers to forge relationships with key local providers in order to be able to offer the package of support required under the contract. For example good relationships with local housing authorities have meant local affordable housing can be sourced for the refugees before they arrive in the UK.

### **Lessons learned**

There are some elements of this model that need to be developed further or to be considered in future working models.

The first is standardising data collection on the outcomes for refugees resettled under the Gateway programme. Currently the three providers all collect data on the work that they do and the support that is provided on refugees in different databases and in different ways. Standardising the data collection across the Gateway programme will allow future evaluations to carry out more robust analysis of the integration indicators. This will be able to provide more detailed information on the process of integration of refugees into the UK. The evaluation team are currently working with the Gateway providers to put the structure of this into place.

The second concern is the payment method utilised for the providers under the current model. Payment is made retrospectively for evidenced work. Sometimes the burden of evidence is not proportional to the money that can be claimed back and this means that providers may not be paid for some work that they do. In comparison, a similar programme of resettlement operated in the UK; The Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement scheme, operates a flat rate payment for every refugee settled. During interviews with providers it was indicated that this model is a more preferable working model for them. If Gateway carries on with the current model this may mean that providers will opt to provide support under the Syrian Programme instead of Gateway. This carries the risk that a lot of the good local working relationships will start to dismantle.

<b>Example 3</b>



### **Example**

We consider the Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) programme to offer lessons to be learned due, in part, to problems with data collection.

#### **Background/context**

The purpose of the AVR programme was to facilitate return for individuals who wished to undertake a voluntary return to their country of origin. The programme received EC funding in the 2008-10, and 2011-13 SOLID funding period, and had facilitated the voluntary return of 11,219 individuals in the period 2011-13.

AVR received a further funding award under AMIF from 1st April 2014 to 31st December 2015. The total project cost was €19,242,498.74 (€14,431,874.06 from AMIF). Home Office staff managed the project but activities were delivered by a third party supplier. Under AMIF funding, AVR continued to operate as three sub-programmes:

- Voluntary Assisted Return and Reintegration Programme (VARRP) for those who had sought asylum in the UK. Returnees received support in acquiring travel documentation, flight to the country of origin and onward domestic transport, airport assistance at departure and arrival airports and up to £1,500 worth of reintegration assistance per person, including up to £500 relocation grant on departure for immediate resettlement needs, additional luggage allowance and a range of reintegration options once home.
- Assisted Voluntary Returns for Families and Children (AVRFC) for families comprising a maximum of two adult parents or legal guardians and at least one child, and for unaccompanied children who either sought asylum or who were in the UK illegally, and wished to return home. Returnees received support in acquiring travel documentation, flight to the country of origin and onward domestic transport, airport assistance at departure and arrival airports and up to £2,000 worth of reintegration assistance per person, including up to £500 relocation grant on departure for immediate resettlement needs, additional luggage allowance and a range of reintegration options once home.
- Assisted Voluntary Return for Irregular Migrants (AVRIM) for migrants who had not sought asylum, but who were in the UK illegally and wished to return home. Returnees received support in acquiring travel documentation, flight to the country of origin and onward domestic transport, airport assistance at departure and arrival airports. Those who were deemed vulnerable (for example, trafficked women) were also eligible for a cash relocation grant of up to £1,000.

#### **Results**

When the project ended, AVR had fallen just short of achieving the target set by the Home Office project team with 2,886 voluntary returns achieved (out of a target of 3,300 – or 87%). Performance against project targets over the period and in previous years were one of a number of factors which led the Home Office to re-evaluate both the targets set under AMIF and how the project was configured. Their decision was to bring the scope of activities ‘in house’.

**Example**

Unfortunately only limited data had been collected and retained by the Home Office project management team. This affected the subsequent Interim Evaluation of projects, as no further data could be obtained for this project by evaluators, for example relating to who had accessed the project and been returned. Audit records have been used in project output counts.

**Key lessons learned**

A number of lessons can be learned from this.

For UKRA: it is important for Project Managers and staff to be told up front that all required project data will be both collected and should be retained for appropriate clearly specified period of time. A review of existing systems and processes could be conducted to establish if a standardised approach could be implemented and appropriate guidance written and distributed to current and future potential beneficiaries.

It would also be useful to review at pre-application meeting stage what resources are required for AMIF beneficiaries to collect, collate and store project data to ensure these are realistically costed into funding applications.

For Home Office Project Managers: the example above underscores the importance of ensuring that the relevant information and data is collected from the outset of the project.

## SECTION VI: METHODOLOGY

### **Evaluation aims**

The interim evaluation comprised two core components; a process evaluation & an outcome evaluation.

- The process evaluation aimed to provide information on the horizontal indicators & to examine the way in which the fund was administered, monitored, & managed.
- The output evaluation was designed to answer the result & output indicators stipulated by the EC.

### **Methodology**

#### *a) Process evaluation*

The process evaluation was comprised of two parts, semi-structured qualitative interviews & documentary analysis.

Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with 38 key UKRA staff & AMIF beneficiaries (HO Project Managers & third party subcontractors). Interviews were 15 - 70 minutes long. Where permission was granted interviews were recorded & transcribed in full.

Once transcribed interview transcripts were analysed using thematic analysis. A draft coding frame was devised using the EC interim evaluation questions as a starting point & refined through subsequent re-readings of transcripts. A synthesis of key themes from the interview data has been used to answer questions on efficiency, coherence, relevance, complementarity, added value & sustainability. Where relevant, interview data has also been used to supplement the questions on effectiveness, challenges in implementing the National Programme & the case studies.

Documentary Analysis - a selection of UKRA administrative documents (including financial records, audit processes, calls for funding & application documents, quarterly monitoring reports, & HR data) were collated & analysed to ascertain UKRA processes & the money and resources used so far.

#### *b) Output analysis*

#### Management Information (MI)

The main element of the evaluation is analysis of monitoring & management information

(MI) provided by the AMIF beneficiaries. This data has been used to answer the key indicators provided in the EC evaluation report, particularly the progress questions.

HO Project Managers of all live & completed projects (43 projects) were contacted requesting all available project monitoring data (such as details of all individuals worked with - gender, age, nationality; case outcomes; number of training sessions & trainees; number & type of information products produced) as well as any additional outcome data they could provide on the activities that their projects had undertaken. The amount & type of data that projects had collected &, particularly in the case of completed projects, still held, varied considerably. However, at least some project data was received from all projects except one (see Example 4 for further details). Data from a further three projects (all returns) was provided but significant gaps & inconsistencies resulted in excluding this data from the evaluation.

All data received was collated according to Strategic Objective & activity type, entered into spreadsheets, cleaned & analysed. Further analysis is intended to provide more detail for the mid-term review.

#### Counterfactual analysis

The evaluation team explored options to identify & obtain data on counterfactual groups with the aim of conducting propensity score matching (PSM) and/or a pre-post comparison if data were available. Given the short timescales for the evaluation it was not possible to source suitable data held across the HO or create data sharing agreements with other government departments. However, whilst it may not be possible to identify counterfactual groups options will continue to be explored in preparation for the final evaluation.

#### Planned but not completed elements

- A case tracking exercise was designed to examine how many people receive multiple AMIF interventions. However the case management system in the HO was not detailed enough to allow this analysis.
- Staff views on effective policy levers to promote voluntary return were sought by a short email questionnaire. A low response rate made this data insufficiently robust to include in the analysis.

#### Additional elements

In order to maximise the resources and expertise within the team, an external contractor, The National Centre for Social Research were procured to complete more detailed analysis of the data provided by Gateway. Due to the limited data available for this element the procured

work focused on producing a literature review outlining the key recent findings in research addressing issues around integration & using publicly available secondary data to provide a local area context in which refugees are resettled within the UK. This work was delivered on time & on budget & the findings will be used to help Gateway providers in different areas in the UK tailor their support package to best reflect the needs & limitations of being able to offer support in their local area. It also helped provide information to inform the case study as part of the evaluation.

## SECTION VII: MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Main conclusions

#### Conclusion 1

Overall the UK has made good progress addressing the primary objectives within the National Programme.

The strategic objective of asylum has overachieved against the targets and integration and returns are a little way from reaching the projected targets. However, the UKRA has made good progress in addressing the overall aims and objectives outlined in the National Programme. Where there appears to be a particular shortfall in reaching the outlined targets (training, monitored returns) this was due to problems encountered when the National programme was written in terms of bench marking baseline figures in some areas of the programme design.

#### Conclusion 2

If the success or otherwise of AMIF needs to be demonstrated then the evaluation aims and objectives need to be clearly outlined from the programming phase of the fund by the EC.

Guidance on the evaluation was not issued until well into the programme and after a number of projects had been delivering services for some time. As a result projects were not aware that they had to collect outcome data on the work that they were doing. This has made quantifying the success of these projects difficult as the data is not available or not sufficient enough to complete an evaluative analysis.

Projects need to know from the outset that they need to capture outcome data so that successes can be evaluated effectively.

#### Conclusion 3

### **Conclusion 3**

Flexibility in the SLAs regarding targets should be considered for projects.

There were a number of projects in the UKRA that were not able to meet their targets. This was partly due to trying to meet the inaccurate figures outlined in the National Programme. It was also partly attributable to changes in UK policy and eligibility criteria which affected projects abilities to be able to deliver against their targets, through no fault of their own. Adding in flexible measures to monitor and review targets (and the associated costs) while projects are running, rather than terminating them, would make for a more efficient form of delivery.

### **Conclusion 4**

The UKRA have been committed to continuous improvement.

The UKRA have learnt from their experiences of delivering the previous EU fund SOLID and taken that learning forward for AMIF. As well as the lessons learnt previously the UKRA have been critically evaluating their processes as AMIF has been developed. Through this critical evaluation the UKRA have continued to improve and develop their processes and procedures to improve how AMIF has been delivered in the UK. The most prominent areas that have improved are the application and assessment process but also include the role of the Account Managers, financial instruments, communication strategies and information collection and storage.

### **Conclusion 5**

The UKRA has funded a range of projects which address the needs of strategic objectives in different and innovative ways.

Projects addressing the asylum programme have had the space to be more innovative as it was the least developed area at the start of AMIF. Asylum has over performed against its programme targets, partly due to the spike in asylum applications in 2015 but also because of the work targeting vulnerable groups. While this area of work is not quite in a position to offer comprehensive end to end support real progress has been made towards that aim.

## **Conclusion 5**

Returns and integration projects have appeared to be less innovative (with one or two exceptions). This is largely due to the well developed programme of work in this area that already existed within the UK. They have also been more impacted by the delay of the start of AMIF as these were the projects that were run 'at risk'. Therefore they focus on business developed under SOLID that the UKRA were confident could deliver. The work in this area has still been delivered to a high standard.



## Recommendations

### Recommendations 1

Sufficient time and guidance allowed for the development the National Programme and implementation plans.

In order to do an effective needs assessment and an accurate baseline of the current gaps in provision sufficient time should be given for the completion of this. Six months would be the minimum recommended. Equally in order that this document is completed as efficiently as possible final guidance from the EC on this process should be issued to Responsible Authorities at least two months before the needs assessment process is due to start.

### Recommendations 2

Incorporate evaluators or evaluation expertise in the design and decision making process of funding applications.

If an evaluation is going to effectively measure outcomes and impact these considerations need to be taken into account as early as possible. Ideally in the programming phase. The Commission need to be clear to Responsible Authorities about what outcomes and impacts are going to need to be measured at the earliest possible opportunity.

For the UKRA it is proposed that someone with evaluation expertise sits on the decision panel in order to support projects to design data monitoring systems in the inception phase of the project that will effectively capture outcomes. Projects should be advised to seek evaluation advice at the pre-application stage (or have an evaluator at the pre-application meeting) with a focus on helping projects to design Theory of Change or logic models to their project ideas. Evaluators could also play a role in monitoring the quarterly submission of projects to make sure the data projects capture is able to be utilised for evaluation purposes.

### Recommendations 3

### **Recommendations 3**

There should be a way in which projects can revise their targets and associated costs once funding has been awarded without going through a new application process.

Flexibility in the delivery of the projects should be considered. A system can be implemented in which regular reviews of targets could take place and potential changes to those targets (and the associated costs) allowed. It is believed that this would promote more innovative project ideas and bids. This model would allow potential beneficiaries to try new areas of working without being compelled to hit targets that may be impacted by external factors outside of their control.

### **Recommendations 4**

The good practice of continuous improvement should be carried on. Critical evaluation of processes and systems must be ongoing.

The evaluation has revealed that the UKRA has implemented a strong culture of continuous improvement. In order that the delivery of AMIF continues to become more rigorous and robust this practice should continue.

### **Recommendations 5**

For the strategic objectives of returns and integration efforts should be made to broaden the scope and innovation of funded projects.

The UKRA should expand on their systems of tailored proposals to try and encourage more innovative bids under the strategic objectives of integration and returns. This would help to move away from the funding of core business in these areas (which is largely the case currently). The implementation of recommendation 3 should also support this to occur.

## SECTION VIII: MID-TERM REVIEW

**Provide an assessment of the mid-term review carried out in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 514/2014. If relevant, summarize the main changes having an impact on your activities in the policy areas covered by the Fund, and how your National Programme was/will be adjusted.**

Since the policy dialogue, the baseline situation in the UK has changed. The number of returns has fallen from the 2013 baseline figure of 32178 voluntary and 13311 enforced returns to 27732 and 12370 in 2016, an overall decline of approximately 12% (using UK published statistics).

During the same period the number of asylum applications in the UK has risen from 29877 in 2013 to 38517 in 2016, an increase of 23%. The numbers granted asylum rose significantly in 2014/15, and the UK increased the number of resettlement cases with the guarantee to resettle 20000 Syrians by 2020.

The UK believes that there needs to be a slight re-prioritisation of funding from Returns to the Integration specific objective to provide additional support to the increased number of refugees in the UK to assist in their swift integration into society.

The Responsible Authority intends to work closely with the UK Home Office Resettlement, Asylum Support and Integration Unit to focus on priorities in terms of location and type of support required to best achieve the aims of assisting refugees into the labour market, or to play an active role in their local environment via NGO's, educational establishments and local/regional authorities.

This will assist the UK to achieve a greater number of outputs under Common Indicator 2.2, although the set aim in the National Programme of 42000 is likely to still be unachievable, the additional allocation will provide extra impetus for the objective.

This is also driven by the Casey Review into integration in the UK, prepared for the UK Government and published in 2017, setting out measures to be taken to increase the levels of integration among migrants to the UK, establishing the matter as one of increasing priority for the government.

**SECTION IX: COMMON RESULT AND IMPACT INDICATORS**

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## 1 - Indicators by specific objectives

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
SO1	R	SO1R1	Number of target group persons provided with assistance through projects in the field of reception and asylum systems supported under the Fund:	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C1)	16,148.00
SO1	R	SO1R1	i) number of target group persons benefiting from information and assistance throughout the asylum procedures	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C1.a)	5,910.00
SO1	R	SO1R1	ii) number of target group persons benefiting from legal assistance and representation	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C1.b)	0.00
SO1	R	SO1R1	iii) number of vulnerable persons and unaccompanied minors benefiting from specific assistance	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C1.c)	3,123.00
SO1	R	SO1R2	Capacity (i.e. number of places) of new reception accommodation infrastructure set up in line with the common requirements for reception conditions as set out in the Union acquis and of existing reception accommodation infrastructure improved in accordance with the same requirements as a result of the projects supported under the Fund.	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C2.1)	0.00
SO1	R	SO1R2	The percentage in the total reception accommodation capacity	Percentage	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C2.2)	0.00
SO1	R	SO1R3	Number of persons trained in asylum-related topics with the assistance of	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C3.1)	361.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
			the Fund				
SO1	R	SO1R3	That number as a percentage of the total number of staff trained in those topics	Percentage	0.00	AIR (indicator SO1 C3.2)	0.00
SO1	R	SO1R4	(a) Number of places adapted for unaccompanied minors (UAM) supported by the Fund	Number	0.00	Project Reporting	0.00
SO1	R	SO1R4	(b) Total number of places adapted for unaccompanied minors	Number	0.00	Member States	0.00
SO1	R	SO1R4	Number of places adapted for unaccompanied minors (UAM) supported by the Fund as compared to the total number of places adapted for unaccompanied minors.	Percentage		/	0.00
SO1	I	SO1I1	Stock of pending cases at first instance, less than 6 months	Number		EASO (EPS Indicator 2)	
SO1	I	SO1I1	Stock of pending cases at first instance, more than 6 months	Number		EASO (EPS Indicator 2)	
SO1	I	SO1I2	Share of final positive decisions at the appeal stage	Percentage	36.21	Eurostat (migr_asydcfina)	
SO1	I	SO1I3	Number of persons in the reception system (stock at end of the reporting period)	Number		EASO (EPS Indicator 7)	
SO1	I	SO1I4	(a) Number of persons in the reception system	Number		EASO (EPS Indicator 7)	
SO1	I	SO1I4	(b) Number of asylum and first time asylum applicants	Number	30,585.00	Eurostat (migr_asyappctza)	

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
SO1	I	SO1I4	Number of persons in the reception system as compared to the number of asylum applicants	Ratio		/	
SO1	I	SO1I5	(a) Number of accommodation places adapted for unaccompanied minors	Number	0.00	Member States	0.00
SO1	I	SO1I5	(b) Number of asylum applicants considered to be unaccompanied minors (Eurostat migr_asyunaa)	Number	1,265.00	Eurostat (migr_asyunaa)	
SO1	I	SO1I5	Number of accommodation places adapted for unaccompanied minors (UAM) as compared to the number of unaccompanied minors	Ratio		/	0.00
SO1	I	SO1I6	Convergence of first instance/final instance recognition rates by Member States for asylum applicants from a same third country	Percentage points	-32.08	Eurostat (migr_asydcfina)	
SO2	R	SO2R1	Number of target group persons who participated in pre-departure measures supported by the Fund	Number	0.00	AIR (Indicator SO2 C1)	0.00
SO2	R	SO2R2	Number of target group persons assisted by the Fund through integration measures in the framework of national, local and regional strategies	Number	0.00	AIR (Indicator SO2 C2)	2,767.00
SO2	R	SO2R2	i) number of target group persons assisted through measures focusing on education and training, including language training and preparatory actions to facilitate access to the labour market	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO2 C2.a)	2,209.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
SO2	R	SO2R2	ii) number of target group persons supported through the provision of advice and assistance in the area of housing	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO2 C2.b)	2,767.00
SO2	R	SO2R2	iii) number of target group persons assisted through the provision of health and psychological care	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO2 C2.c)	2,209.00
SO2	R	SO2R2	iv) number of target group persons assisted through measures related to democratic participation	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO2 C2.d)	0.00
SO2	I	SO2I1	Share of third-country nationals (TCNs) having received long-term residence status out of all TCNs	Percentage		Eurostat (migr_reslas)	
SO2	I	SO2I2	Employment rate: gap between third-country nationals and host-country nationals	Percentage points	-13.50	Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) (lfsa_argan) (lfsa_ergacob)	
SO2	I	SO2I3	Unemployment rate: gap between third-country nationals and host-country nationals	Percentage points	4.20	Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) (lfsa_urgan) (lfsa_urgacob)	
SO2	I	SO2I4	Activity rate: gap between third-country nationals and host-country nationals	Percentage points	-11.30	Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) (lfsa_argan) (lfsa_argacob)	
SO2	I	SO2I5	Share of early leavers from education and training: gap between third country nationals and host-country nationals	Percentage points	-4.70	Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) (edat_lfse_02)	
SO2	I	SO2I6	Share of 30 to 34-years-olds with tertiary educational attainment: gap between third country nationals and host-country nationals	Percentage points	18.70	Eurostat (edat_lfs_9911)	



SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
SO2	I	SO2I7	Share of population at risk of social poverty or social exclusion: gap between third-country nationals and host-country nationals	Percentage points	12.80	Eurostat (Labour Force Survey) (ilc_peps05)	
SO3	R	SO3R1	Number of persons trained on return-related topics with the assistance of the Fund	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO3 C1)	13.00
SO3	R	SO3R2	Number of returnees who received pre or post return reintegration assistance co-financed by the Fund	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO3 C2)	2,517.00
SO3	R	SO3R3	(a) persons who returned voluntarily	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO3 C3)	2,236.00
SO3	R	SO3R3	(b) and persons who were removed	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO3 C4)	1,420.00
SO3	R	SO3R3	Number of returnees whose return was co-financed by the Fund	Number		AIR	3,656.00
SO3	R	SO3R4	Number of monitored removal operations co-financed by the Fund	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO3 C5)	0.00
SO3	R	SO3R5	(a) Persons who were removed (and whose return was co-financed by the Fund)	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO3 C4)	1,420.00
SO3	R	SO3R5	(b) Total number of returns following an order to leave	Number	54,960.00	Eurostat (migr_eirtn)	
SO3	R	SO3R5	Numbers of removals supported by the Fund, as compared to the total number of returns following an order to leave	Ratio		/	0.00
SO3	R	SO3R6	(a) Number of persons returned in the framework of joint return operations (assisted-voluntary and forced)	Number	0.00	Project Reporting	117.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
			supported by the Fund				
SO3	R	SO3R6	(b) Number of returnees whose return was co-financed by the Fund	Number		AIR	3,656.00
SO3	R	SO3R6	Number of persons returned in the framework of the joint return operations supported by the Fund as compared to the total number of returns supported by the Fund	Ratio		/	0.03
SO3	R	SO3R7	(a) Number of returnees who received pre or post return reintegration assistance co-financed by the Fund	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO3 C2)	2,517.00
SO3	R	SO3R7	(b) Persons who returned voluntarily (and whose return was co-financed by the Fund)	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO3 C3)	2,236.00
SO3	R	SO3R7	Number of returnees who have received pre or post return reintegration assistance co-financed by the Fund, as compared to the total number of voluntary returns supported by the Fund	Ratio		/	1.13
SO3	R	SO3R8	(a) Number of places in detention centres created/renovated with support from the Fund	Number	0.00	Project Reporting	0.00
SO3	R	SO3R8	(b) Total number of places in detention centres	Number	3,500.00	Member States	3,500.00
SO3	R	SO3R8	Number of places in detention centres created/renovated with support from the Fund, as compared to the total number of places in detention centres	Ratio		/	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
SO3	I	SO3I1	(a) Number of third-country nationals returned following an order to leave (migr_eirtn)	Number	54,960.00	Eurostat (migr_eirtn)	
SO3	I	SO3I1	(b) Number of third-country nationals ordered to leave (migr_eiord)	Number	57,415.00	Eurostat (migr_eiord)	
SO3	I	SO3I1	Number of returns following an order to leave compared to the number of third-country nationals ordered to leave	Ratio		/	
SO3	I	SO3I2	Return decisions issued to rejected asylum applicants	Number		EASO (EPS Indicator 8a)	
SO3	I	SO3I3	Effective returns of rejected asylum applicants	Number		EASO (EPS Indicator 8b)	
SO4	R	SO4R1	Number of applicants and beneficiaries of international protection transferred from one Member State to another with support of the Fund.	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO4 C1)	0.00
SO4	R	SO4R2	Number of cooperation projects with other Member States on enhancing solidarity and responsibility sharing between the Member States supported under the Fund.	Number	0.00	AIR (indicator SO4 C2)	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
SO1	R	SO1R1	Number of target group persons provided with assistance through projects in the field of reception and asylum systems supported under the	Number	52,775.00		

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
			Fund:				
SO1	R	SO1R1	i) number of target group persons benefiting from information and assistance throughout the asylum procedures	Number	3,910.00		
SO1	R	SO1R1	ii) number of target group persons benefiting from legal assistance and representation	Number			
SO1	R	SO1R1	iii) number of vulnerable persons and unaccompanied minors benefiting from specific assistance	Number	3,910.00		
SO1	R	SO1R2	Capacity (i.e. number of places) of new reception accommodation infrastructure set up in line with the common requirements for reception conditions as set out in the Union acquis and of existing reception accommodation infrastructure improved in accordance with the same requirements as a result of the projects supported under the Fund.	Number			
SO1	R	SO1R2	The percentage in the total reception accommodation capacity	Percentage			
SO1	R	SO1R3	Number of persons trained in asylum-related topics with the assistance of the Fund	Number			
SO1	R	SO1R3	That number as a percentage of the total number of staff trained in those topics	Percentage			
SO1	R	SO1R4	(a) Number of places adapted for unaccompanied minors (UAM)	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
			supported by the Fund				
SO1	R	SO1R4	(b) Total number of places adapted for unaccompanied minors	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO1	R	SO1R4	Number of places adapted for unaccompanied minors (UAM) supported by the Fund as compared to the total number of places adapted for unaccompanied minors.	Percentage	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO1	I	SO1I1	Stock of pending cases at first instance, less than 6 months	Number	16,704.00	16,127.00	9,025.00
SO1	I	SO1I1	Stock of pending cases at first instance, more than 6 months	Number	10,228.00	6,366.00	9,328.00
SO1	I	SO1I2	Share of final positive decisions at the appeal stage	Percentage	52.00	37.77	32.94
SO1	I	SO1I3	Number of persons in the reception system (stock at end of the reporting period)	Number			
SO1	I	SO1I4	(a) Number of persons in the reception system	Number			
SO1	I	SO1I4	(b) Number of asylum and first time asylum applicants	Number	39,071.00	38,624.00	25,955.00
SO1	I	SO1I4	Number of persons in the reception system as compared to the number of asylum applicants	Ratio	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO1	I	SO1I5	(a) Number of accommodation places adapted for unaccompanied minors	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
SO1	I	SO1I5	(b) Number of asylum applicants considered to be unaccompanied minors (Eurostat migr_asyunaa)	Number	3,192.00	2,982.00	1,540.00
SO1	I	SO1I5	Number of accommodation places adapted for unaccompanied minors (UAM) as compared to the number of unaccompanied minors	Ratio	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO1	I	SO1I6	Convergence of first instance/final instance recognition rates by Member States for asylum applicants from a same third country	Percentage points	-27.88	-44.66	-38.02
SO2	R	SO2R1	Number of target group persons who participated in pre-departure measures supported by the Fund	Number			
SO2	R	SO2R2	Number of target group persons assisted by the Fund through integration measures in the framework of national, local and regional strategies	Number	700.00	1,247.00	
SO2	R	SO2R2	i) number of target group persons assisted through measures focusing on education and training, including language training and preparatory actions to facilitate access to the labour market	Number			
SO2	R	SO2R2	ii) number of target group persons supported through the provision of advice and assistance in the area of housing	Number			
SO2	R	SO2R2	iii) number of target group persons assisted through the provision of	Number			

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
			health and psychological care				
SO2	R	SO2R2	iv) number of target group persons assisted through measures related to democratic participation	Number			
SO2	I	SO2I1	Share of third-country nationals (TCNs) having received long-term residence status out of all TCNs	Percentage			
SO2	I	SO2I2	Employment rate: gap between third-country nationals and host-country nationals	Percentage points	-14.40	-13.80	-13.90
SO2	I	SO2I3	Unemployment rate: gap between third-country nationals and host-country nationals	Percentage points	3.20	3.50	3.40
SO2	I	SO2I4	Activity rate: gap between third-country nationals and host-country nationals	Percentage points	-12.40	-11.60	-11.90
SO2	I	SO2I5	Share of early leavers from education and training: gap between third country nationals and host-country nationals	Percentage points	-4.50	-6.10	-4.40
SO2	I	SO2I6	Share of 30 to 34-years-olds with tertiary educational attainment: gap between third country nationals and host-country nationals	Percentage points	20.10	19.10	18.20
SO2	I	SO2I7	Share of population at risk of social poverty or social exclusion: gap between third-country nationals and host-country nationals	Percentage points		13.80	13.10
SO3	R	SO3R1	Number of persons trained on return-related topics with the	Number			

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
			assistance of the Fund				
SO3	R	SO3R2	Number of returnees who received pre or post return reintegration assistance co-financed by the Fund	Number	7,841.00	3,174.00	
SO3	R	SO3R3	(a) persons who returned voluntarily	Number	10,172.00	7,251.00	
SO3	R	SO3R3	(b) and persons who were removed	Number	1,615.00	3,314.00	
SO3	R	SO3R3	Number of returnees whose return was co-financed by the Fund	Number	11,787.00	10,565.00	
SO3	R	SO3R4	Number of monitored removal operations co-financed by the Fund	Number			
SO3	R	SO3R5	(a) Persons who were removed (and whose return was co-financed by the Fund)	Number	1,615.00	3,314.00	
SO3	R	SO3R5	(b) Total number of returns following an order to leave	Number	48,009.00	51,381.00	39,520.00
SO3	R	SO3R5	Numbers of removals supported by the Fund, as compared to the total number of returns following an order to leave	Ratio	0.03	0.06	0.00
SO3	R	SO3R6	(a) Number of persons returned in the framework of joint return operations (assisted-voluntary and forced) supported by the Fund	Number	673.00	611.00	82.00
SO3	R	SO3R6	(b) Number of returnees whose return was co-financed by the Fund	Number	11,787.00	10,565.00	
SO3	R	SO3R6	Number of persons returned in the framework of the joint return	Ratio	0.06	0.06	0.00



SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
			operations supported by the Fund as compared to the total number of returns supported by the Fund				
SO3	R	SO3R7	(a) Number of returnees who received pre or post return reintegration assistance co-financed by the Fund	Number	7,841.00	3,174.00	
SO3	R	SO3R7	(b) Persons who returned voluntarily (and whose return was co-financed by the Fund)	Number	10,172.00	7,251.00	
SO3	R	SO3R7	Number of returnees who have received pre or post return reintegration assistance co-financed by the Fund, as compared to the total number of voluntary returns supported by the Fund	Ratio	0.77	0.44	
SO3	R	SO3R8	(a) Number of places in detention centres created/renovated with support from the Fund	Number	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO3	R	SO3R8	(b) Total number of places in detention centres	Number	3,500.00	3,500.00	3,500.00
SO3	R	SO3R8	Number of places in detention centres created/renovated with support from the Fund, as compared to the total number of places in detention centres	Ratio	0.00	0.00	0.00
SO3	I	SO3I1	(a) Number of third-country nationals returned following an order to leave (migr_eirtn)	Number	48,009.00	51,381.00	39,520.00
SO3	I	SO3I1	(b) Number of third-country nationals ordered to leave	Number	62,004.00	69,050.00	51,747.00

SO	Type	Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
			(migr_eiord)				
SO3	I	SO3I1	Number of returns following an order to leave compared to the number of third-country nationals ordered to leave	Ratio	0.77	0.74	0.76
SO3	I	SO3I2	Return decisions issued to rejected asylum applicants	Number			
SO3	I	SO3I3	Effective returns of rejected asylum applicants	Number			
SO4	R	SO4R1	Number of applicants and beneficiaries of international protection transferred from one Member State to another with support of the Fund.	Number			
SO4	R	SO4R2	Number of cooperation projects with other Member States on enhancing solidarity and responsibility sharing between the Member States supported under the Fund.	Number			

## 2 - Indicators on efficiency, added value and sustainability, as foreseen in Regulation (EU) No 514/2014

Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	Baseline value	Source of data	2017
H1	Number of Full Time Equivalent in the Responsible Authority, the Delegated Authority and the Audit Authority working on the implementation of the Fund and paid by the technical assistance or national budgets as compared to:	Number	0.00	Member States	33.00
H1	(a) the number of projects implemented	Number	0.00	AIR	10.00
H1	(b) the amount of the funds claimed for the financial year	Amount in EUR	0.00	Accounts	1,002,369.00
H2	(a) Technical assistance plus the administrative (indirect) cost	Amount in EUR	0.00	Member States	1,354,197.00
H2	(b) Amount of funds claimed for the financial year	Amount in EUR	0.00	Accounts	1,002,369.00
H2	Technical assistance plus the administrative (indirect) cost of projects as compared to the amount of funds claimed for the financial year	Ratio		/	1.35
H3	Amount of the annual expenditure submitted by the Member State compared to the	Amount in EUR	0.00	Accounts	1,002,369.00
H3	Total amount of funds allocated to the national programme.	Amount in EUR	0.00	Accounts	54,233,991.00
H3	Absorption rate of the Fund	Ratio		/	0.02

Ind ID	Indicator description	Meas unit	2016	2015	2014
H1	Number of Full Time Equivalent in the Responsible Authority, the Delegated Authority and the Audit Authority working on the implementation of the Fund and paid by the technical assistance or national budgets as compared to:	Number	29.00	36.00	37.00
H1	(a) the number of projects implemented	Number			
H1	(b) the amount of the funds claimed for the financial year	Amount in EUR			
H2	(a) Technical assistance plus the administrative (indirect) cost	Amount in EUR	1,825,105.00	345,060.00	0.00
H2	(b) Amount of funds claimed for the financial year	Amount in EUR			
H2	Technical assistance plus the administrative (indirect) cost of projects as compared to the amount of funds claimed for the financial year	Ratio	0.00	0.00	0.00
H3	Amount of the annual expenditure submitted by the Member State compared to the	Amount in EUR			
H3	Total amount of funds allocated to the national programme.	Amount in EUR			
H3	Absorption rate of the Fund	Ratio			

ANNEX: DATA

**Table 1: Progress in financial implementation, by specific objectives (in Euro)**

<b>National objective / Specific Action</b>	<b>A Total paid</b>	<b>B Total paid</b>	<b>Total paid (A+B/SO) programmed (%)</b>
SO1.NO1 Reception/asylum	3,604,450.72	616,408.53	6.80%
SO1.NO2 Evaluation	30,269.91	39,495.33	1.40%
SO1.NO3 Resettlement	0.00	0.00	0.00%
<b>TOTAL NO SO1</b>	<b>3,634,720.63</b>	<b>655,903.86</b>	<b>5.79%</b>
<b>TOTAL SO1</b>	<b>3,634,720.63</b>	<b>655,903.86</b>	<b>5.79%</b>
SO2.NO2 Integration	0.00	0.00	0.00%
<b>TOTAL NO SO2</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
<b>TOTAL SO2</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>0.00%</b>
SO3.NO1 Accompanying measures	5,348,079.03	0.00	35.65%
SO3.NO2 Return measures	56,155,068.43	5,689,748.22	34.20%
<b>TOTAL NO SO3</b>	<b>61,503,147.46</b>	<b>5,689,748.22</b>	<b>33.45%</b>
<b>TOTAL SO3</b>	<b>61,503,147.46</b>	<b>5,689,748.22</b>	<b>33.45%</b>
<b>TOTAL NO SO4</b>			
<b>TOTAL SO4</b>			
Pledges (Union priorities)	20,400,000.00	19,000,000.00	113.38%
Pledges (Others)	1,800,000.00	1,800,000.00	43.64%
Transfers & relocations		0.00	
Admission from Turkey		0.00	
<b>TOTAL Special Cases</b>	<b>22,200,000.00</b>	<b>20,800,000.00</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
Technical Assistance	1,396,787.15	1,284,031.56	6.23%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>88,734,655.24</b>	<b>28,429,683.64</b>	<b>28.34%</b>

**Table 2: Number of projects and EU contribution to finished and open projects, by specific objectives (in Euro)**

	<b>Number of projects and EU contribution</b>			
	<b>01/01/2014-15/10/2016</b>			
	<b>Total Nr of finished projects</b>	<b>Total EU contribution to finished projects</b>	<b>Total Nr of open projects</b>	<b>Total EU contribution to open projects</b>
SO1 - Asylum	0	0.00	18	3,634,720.63
SO2 - Integration/legal migration	0	0.00	2	0.00
SO3 - Return	8	51,842,486.83	10	9,660,660.63
SO4 - Solidarity	0	0.00	0	0.00
SO5 - Technical assistance	0	0.00	0	0.00
<b>Total 1</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>51,842,486.83</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>13,295,381.26</b>

	<b>Number of projects and EU contribution</b>			
	<b>16/10/2016-30/06/2017</b>			
	<b>Total Nr of finished projects</b>	<b>Total EU contribution to finished projects</b>	<b>Total Nr of open projects</b>	<b>Total EU contribution to open projects</b>
SO1 - Asylum	1	38,359.52	19	42,265,784.01
SO2 - Integration/legal migration	0	0.00	5	28,601,353.18
SO3 - Return	2	1,430,917.70	12	86,070,300.26
SO4 - Solidarity	0	0.00	0	0.00
SO5 - Technical assistance	0	0.00	0	0.00
<b>Total 2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1,469,277.22</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>156,937,437.45</b>
<b>Total 1+2</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>53,311,764.05</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>170,232,818.71</b>

**Table 3: Number of projects and EU contribution, by types of beneficiaries and by specific objectives (in Euro)**

		Project beneficiaries 01/01/2014-15/10/2016			
		SO1: Asylum	SO2: Integration / Legal migration	SO3: Return	SO4: Solidarity
State/federal authorities	Nr of projects	18	2	18	0
State/federal authorities	EU contribution	3,634,720.63	0.00	61,503,147.46	0.00
Local public bodies	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
Local public bodies	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Non-governmental organisations	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
Non-governmental organisations	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
International public organisations	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
International public organisations	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
National Red Cross	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
National Red Cross	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
International Committee of the Red Cross	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
International Committee of the Red Cross	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Private and public law companies	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
Private and public law companies	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Education/research organisations	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
Education/research organisations	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

		<b>Project beneficiaries 16/10/2016-30/06/2017</b>			
		<b>SO1: Asylum</b>	<b>SO2: Integration / Legal migration</b>	<b>SO3: Return</b>	<b>SO4: Solidarity</b>
State/federal authorities	Nr of projects	20	5	14	0
State/federal authorities	EU contribution	64,530,521.79	38,953,342.00	86,070,300.26	0.00
Local public bodies	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
Local public bodies	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Non-governmental organisations	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
Non-governmental organisations	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
International public organisations	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
International public organisations	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
National Red Cross	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
National Red Cross	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
International Committee of the Red Cross	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
International Committee of the Red Cross	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Private and public law companies	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
Private and public law companies	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Education/research organisations	Nr of projects	0	0	0	0
Education/research organisations	EU contribution	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00



**Table 4: Special cases**

Special cases		2014-2015	2016-2017	2018-2020	Total
Resettlement Union Priorities	Pledged				
Resettlement Union Priorities	Actual	0.00	20,400,000.0 0		20,400,000.0 0
Resettlement Others	Pledged	22,200,000.0 0	20,800,000.0 0		43,000,000.0 0
Resettlement Others	Actual	0.00	1,800,000.00		1,800,000.00
Transfer & relocation	Pledged				
Transfer & relocation	Actual				
Admission from Turkey	Pledged				
Admission from Turkey	Actual				
Total	Pledged	22,200,000.0 0	20,800,000.0 0	0.00	43,000,000.0 0
Total	Actual	0.00	22,200,000.0 0	0.00	22,200,000.0 0

