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[null,null,null,null,"Living framework for the assessment of fiscal and pricing policies to improve public health "]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"v1.0"]
[]
[]
[]
[null,null,null,null,"Introduction"]
[null,null,null,null," Pages in this tool"]
[null,null,null,null,"  • Introduction",null,">>","Overview of the tool"]
[null,null,null,null,"  • User Guide",null,">>","Instructions and guidance on how to use the tool"]
[null,null,null,null,"  • Glossary",null,">>","Glossary of economic terms"]
[null,null,null,null,"  • All Areas Combined",null,">>","Information on policies and studies for all policy areas combined"]
[null,null,null,null,"  • 9 last tabs",null,">>","The subsequent nine tabs collect information on policies and studies from one specific policy area."]
[]
[]
[null,null,null,null,"Fiscal policies framework"]
[null,null,null,null,"• This framework contains evidence identified by a literature review, carried out to assess fiscal and pricing policies that aim to improve health outcomes through both impacting individual consumers’ behaviour and the production of goods and services. \n• The focus is policies that directly impact the health outcomes of individuals and/or their behaviour, rather than policies that do this through wider means, such as income benefits, and the focus was both government initiatives or scalable interventions. \n• This overarching framework allows policies in different policy areas to be comparable in terms of their impacts on health, as well as the policies’ potential impacts on other areas, such as inequalities, substitution effects, cost of implementation, government revenues etc.\n "]
[null,null,null,null," Target audience"]
[null,null,null,null,"  • Internal PHE staff and the wider public health community, who want to quickly and easily understand the evidence of fiscal and pricing policies in a specific area"]
[null,null,null,null,"  • This framework will aid policy and decision-makers, including finance officials,  when considering the introduction of new fiscal and pricing policies, or amendments to existing policies"]
[]
[null,null,null,null," Coverage"]
[null,null,null,null,"  • The Fiscal and Pricing Policies framework provides evidence across 9 policy areas associated with public health:"]
[null,null,null,null,"  • Diet and obesity; Physical activity; Environment; Housing; Gambling; Healthy workplaces; Secondary prevention activities; Tobacco; Alcohol"]

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[null,null,null,null,"Living framework for the assessment of fiscal and pricing policies to improve public health "]
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[null,null,null,null,"User Guide","Suggestions for use",null,"The format of each of these frameworks is identical and is set up so  that each row represents a policy result, and each column represents a dimension of the policy that was extracted from the publications and reports. These dimensions or columns are split into 3 sections (See Appendix A fo the corresponding report \"Fiscal and pricing policies to improve public health\"): The first set of columns describe the policy, the second describe the outcomes of the policy and the final set provide additional information on the context external to the policy, as well as the references and links to publications from which the information was extracted.  "]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"There are three main ways in which this framework can be queried: The framework in MS Excel is designed to be searched using the filtering options available for each column."]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"One option is to focus on results within a particular policy area and sort on a specific policy type using the filter option in the Mechanism type field, and selecting one subset of fiscal and pricing policies (e.g. Financial incentives). This will narrow the results down to only financial incentive policies. Further filtering can then be applied, for example, to the  Target risk factor/behaviour/commodity (e.g. Health screens)  to focus on a specific subset of financial incentives. It is also possible to filter on the Target Population/ demographics field, or the Setting to further refine the subset of financial incentive policies.  "]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"Conversely, it is possible to filter firstly  on the Target risk factor/behaviour/commodity  and look through the evidence for all types of policies aimed at a specific commodity (e.g. all policies targeting F&V (Fruit and Vegetables))."]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"One further option is to apply the same methods but to the All Areas Combined tab to look through the evidence across policy areas, in the same ways as the example above."]
[]
[null,null,null,null,null,"Visualisation",null,"Modify row heights and column width to the most comfortable format for viewing the evidence."]
[]
[null,null,null,null,null,"Filtering",null,"If looking for specific country OR locality type ( local, regional etc), use search option  in \"Settings\" filter options "]
[]
[null,null,null,null,null,"References",null,"The last two columns provide the reference and links to the full-text articles and sources of information used for each policy extracted. Where available freely, this links to PDF location, or provides links if multiple sources were used. If the PDF was not freely available, the link to the reference is included."]
[]
[null,null,null,null,null,"Contact",null,"This is a live framework, and if you are aware of literature that would fit our criteria and could be added to the framework, please contact healtheconomics@phe.gov.uk"]

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[null,null,null,null,"Living framework for the assessment of fiscal and pricing policies to improve public health "]
[null,null,null,null,null,null,null,null,"v1.0"]
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[]
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[null,null,null,null," Glossary of terms"]
[null,null,null,null,"AOR","Adjusted Odds Ratio"]
[null,null,null,null,"AUD","Australian Dollar"]
[null,null,null,null,"BIC","Breakfast In the Classroom"]
[null,null,null,null,"BMI","Body Mass Index"]
[null,null,null,null,"BRL","Brasilian Real"]
[null,null,null,null,"BXL ","Brussels"]
[null,null,null,null,"CAD","Canadian Dollar"]
[null,null,null,null,"CCZ ","Congestion Charging Zone "]
[null,null,null,null,"CE","Cost-Effectiveness"]
[null,null,null,null,"CFTC","Children's Fitness Tax Credit"]
[null,null,null,null,"CHD","Coronary Heart Disease"]
[null,null,null,null,"CI","Confidence Interval"]
[null,null,null,null,"CMD ","CardioMetabolic Deaths"]
[null,null,null,null,"CO","Cotinine"]
[null,null,null,null,"CO ","Carbon Dioxide"]
[null,null,null,null,"CVD","CardioVascular Disease"]
[null,null,null,null,"CVV","Cash-Value Vouchers "]
[null,null,null,null,"DALY","Disability adjusted life year (A measure for the overall disease burden. It is designed to quantify the impact of premature death and disability on a population bycombining them into a single, comparable measure.)"]
[null,null,null,null,"DKK","Danish Kroner"]
[null,null,null,null,"DPP","Deaths Prevented or Postponed "]
[null,null,null,null,"EBT","Electronic Benefit Transfer "]
[null,null,null,null,"EC ","Emission Concetrations"]
[null,null,null,null,"EGM ","Electronic Gaming Machines"]
[null,null,null,null,"EUR","Euro"]
[null,null,null,null,"F&V/FV","Fruit and Vegetables"]
[null,null,null,null,"FDA","Federal Drug Administration"]
[null,null,null,null,"FFVP","Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Programme"]
[null,null,null,null,"FIT","Faecial Immuno Testing "]
[null,null,null,null,"FOBT ","Faecal Occult Blood Test"]
[null,null,null,null,"FSA ","Food Standards Agency"]
[null,null,null,null,"FTB-A ","Family Tax Benefit Part A"]
[null,null,null,null,"FYR","First Year Rates"]
[null,null,null,null,"GDP","Gross Domestic Product"]
[null,null,null,null,"HALY","Health-Adjusted Life Years"]
[null,null,null,null,"HAZ","Height for Age Z-score"]
[null,null,null,null,"HC ","Hydrocarbons"]
[null,null,null,null,"HCA","Human Capital Approach"]
[null,null,null,null,"HIP","Healthy Incentives Pilot "]
[null,null,null,null,"HR","Hazard Ratio"]
[null,null,null,null,"HUD","US Department of Housing and Urban Development "]
[null,null,null,null,"HUD-VASH","Housing and Urban Development–Veterans Affairs Supported Housing  "]
[null,null,null,null,"HUF ","Hungarian Forint"]
[null,null,null,null,"ICD-10","International Classification of Diseases - 10"]
[null,null,null,null,"ICER","Incremental Cost-Effectiveness Ratio"]
[null,null,null,null,"IFPRI ","International Food Policy Research Institute "]
[null,null,null,null,"IRR","Incidence Rate Ratio"]
[null,null,null,null,"LAL","Litre of ALcohol"]
[null,null,null,null,"LDL-C","Low-Density Lipoprotein Cholesterol"]
[null,null,null,null,"LIC","Low-Income Consumers "]
[null,null,null,null,"MET","Metabolic Equivalent of Task"]
[null,null,null,null,"MI","Myocardial Infarction"]
[null,null,null,null,"MTO","Moving To Opportunity study"]
[null,null,null,null,"MUP","Minimum Unit Price"]
[null,null,null,null,"MVPA","Moderate to Vigorous Physical Activity"]
[null,null,null,null,"NCBI","Non-Contingent Behavioral Incentives"]
[null,null,null,null,"NLSP","National School Lunch Programme"]
[null,null,null,null,"NO","Nitrogen Oxide"]
[null,null,null,null,"NRT","Nicotine Replacement Therapy "]
[null,null,null,null,"NS","Non Significant (Statistically)"]
[null,null,null,null,"OH","Alcohol"]
[null,null,null,null,"OR","Odds Ratio"]
[null,null,null,null,"PA","Physical Activity"]
[null,null,null,null,"PAL","Physical Activity Level"]
[null,null,null,null,"PHPT ","Public Health Product Tax"]
[null,null,null,null,"PM","Particulate Matter"]
[null,null,null,null,"PPPY ","Per Patient Per Year (costs)"]
[null,null,null,null,"PT","Public Transpork"]
[null,null,null,null,"PTSD","Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder"]
[null,null,null,null,"PUFAS","Poly Unsaturated Fatty Acids"]
[null,null,null,null,"QBE","Question–Behaviour Effect (Questionnaire)"]
[null,null,null,null,"QALY","Quality adjusted life year (A measure of the state of health of a person or group in which the benefits, in terms of length of life, are adjusted to reflect the quality of life. One QALY is equal to 1 year of life in perfect health. QALYs are calculated by estimating the years of life remaining for a patient following a particular treatment or intervention and weighting each year with a quality of life score (on a 0-1 scale).)"]
[null,null,null,null,"RCT","Randomised controlled trial (A study in which a number of similar people are randomly assigned to two (or more) groups to test a specific drug, treatment or other)."]
[null,null,null,null,"SBP","School Breakfast Programme"]
[null,null,null,null,"SBP","Systolic Blood Pressure"]
[null,null,null,null,"SD","Standard Deviation"]
[null,null,null,null,"SEK","Swedisk Kroner"]
[null,null,null,null,"SES","Socio-Economic Status"]
[null,null,null,null,"SMS","Short Message Service (Text message)"]
[null,null,null,null,"SNAP","Special Supplemental Nutrition Program"]
[null,null,null,null,"SSB","Sugar -sweetened beverage"]
[null,null,null,null,"STI","Sexualy-Transmitted Infection"]
[null,null,null,null,"UI","Uncertainty Interval"]
[null,null,null,null,"USDA","United States Department for Agriculture"]
[null,null,null,null,"USD","United States Dollar"]
[null,null,null,null,"VAT","Value Added Tax"]
[null,null,null,null,"VED","Vehicle Excise Duty "]
[null,null,null,null,"WAZ","Weight for Age Z-score"]
[null,null,null,null,"WFP","Winter Fuel Payment "]
[null,null,null,null,"WIC","Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children"]
[null,null,null,null,"YLD","Years of Life with Disease"]
[null,null,null,null,"YLG","Years of Life Gained"]

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["ID number","Policy area","Policy name","Evidence type","Policy owner","Mechanism type","Mechanism details ","Target risk factor/behaviour/commodity","Target population / demographics","Setting (Geographical)","Year of implementation","Timeline(s) for the policy's impact assessment","Policy implementation (policy owner, voluntary vs mandatory policy, implementation mechanism (if implemented), overlap with other policies and cost of implementation)","Follow-up actions for policy","Type of analysis","Policy outcomes (health or intermediate impact)","Quantitative outcomes (health or intermediate)","Distributional effects","Type of economic evaluation analyses ","Quantitative economic evaluation results","Other impacts (co-benefits, unintended/perverse effects) ","Revenue information (amount, beneficiary and utilisation/earmarking)","Policy context","National policy presence","Reference to original sources","Reference link","Digital Object Identifier"]
["ID number","Policy area the policy relates to","Name given to policy, if no name is established, name in the following format: [Country or country region]_[commodity or policy area]_[policy type]","Note if a policy, an academic study (eg a modelling study, RCT or smaller scale study) or a small scale programme","Name of the organisation responsible for designing and/or implementing the policy","What is (are) the mechanism(s) of the policy?","Add detail about the specifics of the policy mechanism","Which risk factor/product/commodity/behaviour is the policy aimed at?","Which segment of the population is the policy targeted at?","Country - region/locality - setting level ( Local - Regional - National - International)","Start year of the policy. If this is not available, note the year of the oldest publication on this policy followed by an asterisk e.g. 2008*."," What are the timelines for the policy’s impact assessment/follow-up?","Information on whether the policy was implemented, whether it was voluntary or mandatory, what mechanism was used for passing the policy, whether it overlaps with any other policies and any information on the cost if implementation","Combination of follow-up actions and any sunset clause","Type of analysis used to derive the outcome information","List of health or intermediate outcomes reported for the policy","The quantitative results on health and intermediate impacts achieved by the policy (values)","What distributional effects are reported on for this policy?","What type of economic evaluation analysis was undertaken?","List or paste the quantitative results from economic evaluations.","Information on any co-benefits, other unintended perverse effects, and other non-health impacts of the policy ","Combination of  fields (Revenue, beneficiary of revenues, utilisation of revenues)","Information provided on the context around the policy, including opponents and proponents.","Has the policy been implemented nationally in England (or UK country if specified). Yes, No, NA(if not a national policy) and ? If unclear","Reference used to extract information about the policy","Hyperlink to PDF if freely available; URL if not.","DOI for publications if available"]
[1,"1 Diet and obesity","Mexico_SSB_Tax","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 1-peso-per-liter tax (equivalent to 10% price increase on drinks containing added sugar) implemented nationally on all sugar added-drinks. Health was a primary aim, specifically the prevention and control of obesity.","SSB","General population","Mexico - National",2014,"2 years","• Policy overlaps with strategy for the prevention and control of overweight, obesity and diabetes\n• Passed through legislation (Law on the Special Tax on Production and Services)\n","An energy dense food tax came in. ","Empirical assessment","• Purchasing of drinks\n• Consumption of drinks\n• Population BMI\n• Overweight and obesity prevalence\n• diagnosed diabetes averted cases \n","• In total, during 2014 the average urban Mexican purchased 4241 mL (seven 600 mL or 20 oz bottles) fewer taxed beverages than expected (based on pretax trends). This was related to a decrease in purchases of non-carbonated sugar sweetened beverages (−17% relative to the counterfactual) and taxed sodas (−1.2% relative to the counterfactual). For untaxed beverages, there was an average increase in the purchase of 36 mL/capita/day (4% relative to the counterfactual), which translates to the purchase of 12 827 mL (21 600 mL or 20 oz bottles) more untaxed beverages by the average urban Mexican over 2014 than expected.\n• Between 2012 and 2014 there was a significant decrease in the proportion of households that purchased SSBs and a concurrent increase in the proportion of households that purchased water. Overall, water consumption continued to grow at a constant rate during the two years. \n• Modelling population BMI  decreasing by 0.15 kg/m2 under average and 0.29 kg/m2 under peak monthly tax effects  Younger adults showed the largest reduction in BMI; the 10% tax increase would induce a 0.18 kg/m2 reduction under average and 0.33 kg/m2 under peak monthly tax effect over 10 years.\n• After 10 years, under the average tax effect the simulations indicate that the prevalence of obesity would decrease by 2.54%, while overweight and normal weight would increase 0.51% and 2.25%, respectively. Under the peak monthly tax effect, obesity prevalence would decrease by 6.38%, while overweight (0.42%), and normal weight (6.66%) would increase. \n• These changes would translate into 86K to 134K averted cases by 2030 under average and 161K to 251K averted cases under peak monthly effect.  These would increase to 225K to 324K averted cases by 2050 under the average effect, and 421K to 605K under the peak monthly effect\n• In another modelling study:  the tax will likely prevent approximately 189,300 new cases of type 2 diabetes, 20,400 incident strokes and heart attacks, and 18,900 deaths over 10 years among adults 35–94 years of age\n","• The authors found that a price increase in all SSBs would be associated with a greater consumption of water, milk and a decrease consumption of candies, snacks and traditional snacks. They found higher elasticities among households living in rural areas (for soft drinks), in more marginalized areas and with lower income, so they expected that implementation of a tax to SSBs could decrease consumption particularly among the poor. They concluded that substitutions and complementarities with other food and beverages should be evaluated to assess the potential impact on total calories consumed.  \n• Between 2012 and 2014 among the three poorest income quintiles, the percentage of households that reported consuming these beverages decreased. This contrasts with the previous increasing trends in the percentage of households buying SSBs in these quintiles, particularly until 2008. This was not the case among households in the richest quintile whose consumption slightly increased during this time frame. \n• Taxed beverage purchasing: In the post-tax period both the absolute and the relative differences in predicted post-tax purchases compared with the counterfactual were largest for households of low socioeconomic status, while the purchase levels of untaxed beverages before the tax were stable across all socioeconomic status households.\n• Baseline BMI was higher among high-SES participants, yet low-SES participants experienced larger BMI reductions than all others (0.20 kg/m2 and 0.37 kg/m2 for average and peak monthly effect, respectively) after 10 years.\n","Only 1 study did some cost estimations","A population-wide 10% reduction in SSB intake (with 39% calorie compensation) is projected to reduce the number of new cases of diabetes by 189,300 (95% UI 155,400–218,100) for the time period 2013 to 2022, a 4.9% lower incidence than what is projected when assuming no change in SSB consumption (Table 2). The resulting reduction in diabetes burden would amount to a total savings in direct healthcare costs incurred by diabetes patients of about 983 million international dollars (95% UI $769 million–$1.2 billion) over 10 y","Not reported","Mexico raises most revenues at around 0.38% of total tax revenue government the tax revenue has not been specifically earmarked, the senate made a resolution to use part of the taxes for providing potable water to public schools, particularly in low income areas.  The tax is expected to result in 983 million international dollars in savings in healthcare costs because of the prevention of diabetes cases over 10 years in modelling study.","Government, public health institutes, civil society organisation (farmers etc) and medical academic institutions support this.  The opposition came from the beverage and food industry, sugar companies, bottling companies, and some allies in the executive and legislative branches of government, as well as lobbyists and civil society organizations.  Press campaigns  raising obesity and need for revenue and reducing the weight of oil in government revenues. ","Yes","• Barrientos-Gutierrez T, Zepeda-Tello R, Rodrigues ER, Colchero-Aragonés A, Rojas-Martínez R, Lazcano-Ponce E, et al. Expected population weight and diabetes impact of the 1-peso-per-litre tax to sugar sweetened beverages in Mexico. PloS one. 2017;12(5):e0176336.\n• Bonilla-Chacín ME, Iglesias R, Suaya A, Trezza C, Macías C. Learning from the Mexican Experience with Taxes on Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Energy-dense Foods of Low Nutritional Value: Poverty and Social Impact Analysis: World Bank; 2016.\n• Colchero MA, Molina M, Guerrero-Lopez CM. After Mexico Implemented a Tax, Purchases of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Decreased and Water Increased: Difference by Place of Residence, Household Composition, and Income Level. J Nutr. 2017;147:1552-7.\n• Colchero MA, Popkin BM, Rivera JA, Ng SW. Beverage purchases from stores in Mexico under the excise tax on sugar sweetened beverages: observational study. bmj. 2016;352:h6704.\n• Colchero MA, Rivera-Dommarco J, Popkin BM, Ng SW. In Mexico, evidence of sustained consumer response two years after implementing a sugar-sweetened beverage tax. Health Affairs. 2017;36(3):564-71.\n• New Zealand Ministry of Health. Mexican Sugar Tax - Evidence of Impact 2015. Health Report Number: 20151086].\n• Sánchez-Romero LM, Penko J, Coxson PG, Fernández A, Mason A, Moran AE, et al. Projected impact of Mexico’s sugar-sweetened beverage tax policy on diabetes and cardiovascular disease: a modeling study. PLoS medicine. 2016;13(11):e1002158.\n\n\n","• http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0176336\n• https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/24701/Learning0from00cial0impact0analysis.pdf?sequence=1\n• https://academic.oup.com/jn/article-abstract/147/8/1552/4669734\n• https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/352/bmj.h6704.full.pdf\n• https://europepmc.org/backend/ptpmcrender.fcgi?accid=PMC5442881&blobtype=pdf\n• https://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/pages/hr20151086.pdf\n• http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002158\n","•10.1371/journal.pone.0176336\n• 10.1596/24701\n• 10.3945/jn.117.251892\n• 10.1136/bmj.h6704\n• 10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1231\n• NA\n• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002158"]
[2,"1 Diet and obesity","Mexico_energydensefood_tax","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory ad-valorem tax of 8 % of the value of high-calorie foods of low nutritional value, defined as foods containing 275 kcal or more per 100 grams. This includes chips and snacks, candies and sweets, chocolate, puddings, peanut and hazelnut butters, ice cream and ice pops and cereal-based products with substantial added sugar. Health was a primary aim (prevention and control of obesity) ","Unhealthy food","General population","Mexico - National",2014,"2 years","• Policy overlaps with strategy for the prevention and control of overweight, obesity and diabetes\n• Passed through legislation (Law on the Special Tax on Production and Services)\n","Adjustments were made to the coding of healthy/unhealthy foods.","Empirical assessment","• Purchases (energy-dense non-essential foods)\n• Purchases (non-taxed foods)\n","• Purchases (energy-dense non-essential foods): after 1 year 5.1% reduction in mean purchasing of taxed foods (equivalent to 25g/capita/month(12; 38) or 70 to 110 kcal/month); 2-year mean decline of 6% in taxed foods. This 2-year average varied by household purchasing pattern: unhealthy purchasers ( high taxed foods/low untaxed foods) reduced purchasing of taxed foods by 12.3%. Low purchasers of both taxed and untaxed reduced by 5.3% and high purchasers of both taxed and untaxed foods reduced their taxed food purchases by 4.4%.\n• Purchases (non-taxed foods): no changes in purchasing of untaxed foods, overall or by household purchasing pattern\n","Low SES households' purchases of taxed foods declined by 10.2% and medium SES households by 5.8%, whereas high SES did not change","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The gross revenue raised specifically collected for the non-essential food tax in 2014 and 2015 was 29.6 billion Mexican pesos (approximately 2 billion USD)","Government, public health institutes, civil society organisation (farmers etc) and medical academic institutions support this.  The opposition came from the beverage and food industry, sugar companies, bottling companies, and some allies in the executive and legislative branches of government, as well as lobbyists and civil society organizations.  Press campaigns  raising obesity and need for revenue and reducing the weight of oil in government revenues. ","Yes","• Batis C, Rivera JA, Popkin BM, Taillie LS. First-year evaluation of Mexico’s tax on nonessential energy-dense foods: an observational study. PLoS medicine. 2016;13(7):e1002057.\n• Bonilla-Chacín ME, Iglesias R, Suaya A, Trezza C, Macías C. Learning from the Mexican Experience with Taxes on Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Energy-dense Foods of Low Nutritional Value: Poverty and Social Impact Analysis: World Bank; 2016.\n• Taillie LS, Rivera JA, Popkin BM, Batis C. Do high vs. low purchasers respond differently to a nonessential energy-dense food tax? Two-year evaluation of Mexico's 8% nonessential food tax. Preventive medicine. 2017;105:S37-S42.\n\n","• http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002057\n• https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/24701/Learning0from00cial0impact0analysis.pdf?sequence=1\n• https://europepmc.org/abstract/med/28729195\n","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002057\n• 10.1596/24701\n• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2017.07.009"]
[3,"1 Diet and obesity","FRANCE_soda_Tax","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory  tax on SSBs, with the aim of a reduction in obesity. The rate was adjusted every 1st of January in order to be in line with the growth rate of the consumption’s price index of the second year preceding the levy: In 2012: EUR 7.16 / hectolitre of SSB; in  2013: EUR7.31/ hectolitre of SSBs; in 2014: EUR7.45/ hectolitre of SSBs. ","SSB","General population","France - National",2012,"1 year","Passed through legislation","Tax of EUR 1/litre of energy drinks came in in 2014 (Energy drinks defined as beverages with caffeine content ≥220mg/l) ","Behavioural insights  and price changes","• Reductions in consumption\n• Substitution effects\n","• A decrease in demand of 6.7% for regular cola and 6.1% for low calorie cola for 2012 and 2013 combined.\n• The available literature on the French tax on sugared and non-sugar-sweetened soft drinks concludes that no substitution effect is observed from soft drinks towards other food product categories\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","One industry interviewee in the case study mentioned that due to the decreased consumption and product substitution resulting from the tax on sugared and non-sugar-sweetened soft drinks, the tax could have a negative impact on employment. However no figures or specific experiences were obtained in either the EU level interviews or the France case study.","After 6 months, the tax was fully shifted to soda prices, while there was a significant under-shifting of the tax to the prices of flavoured water and a slight under-shifting to the prices of fruit-flavoured drink.","Supported by health experts, opposed by industry","Yes","• Berardi N, Sevestre P, Tepaut M, Vigneron A. The impact of a ‘soda tax’on prices: evidence from French micro data. Applied Economics. 2016;48(41):3976-94.\n• ECORYS. Food taxes and their impact on competitiveness in the agri-food sector - Final report. Ref Ares(2014)2365745. 2014:1-82.\n","•https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036846.2016.1150946\n•http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/5827/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/pdf\n","• 10.1080/00036846.2016.1150946\n• NA"]
[4,"1 Diet and obesity","Hungary Public Health Product (Chips) Tax","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory public health tax that applies to certain categories of pre-packed food which are high in salt, sugar or caffeine. The basis of the tax is the quantity of the product, not the price. Exemption applies if the merchant sells less than 50 litres or 50 kilograms per year of the otherwise taxable product. Whether a product is taxable or not depends only on its ingredients, thus the tax does not discriminate for example among producers. In 2012, the tax base and rate was extended to different food categories. See PDF link Table 1 for very detailed information about the tax by product category.","Unhealthy food","General population","Hungary - National",2011,"4 years","Passed through legislation. Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (From 18 February 2014, it is prohibited to release such a food product which contains more than 2% of trans fat within its total fat content. A second set of regulations came into effect in January 2015 which ensure that the food and drink offered at public canteens satisfy some health requirements. For example, sugared soft drinks and high fat meat are prohibited, and salt and sugar are forbidden to be displayed on the tables)","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","1. Nutritional status\n2. Purchasing/sales\n","1. \n• A higher proportion of overweight and obese adults than of adults who were underweight or of normal weight changed their consumption habits.\n• Overweight and obese adults were 1.8–2.7 times more likely to change their consumption than adults who were underweight or of normal weight (independently of sex and age).\n• With regard to different product groups, overweight and obese adults were even more likely (1.5–4.3 times) to reduce their consumption than adults who were underweight or of normal weight.\n2. \n• Most consumers (59–73%) sustained reduced consumption of the target products. • The consumption of 19–36% of the participants was even lower than in the first impact assessment.\n• The consumption of 19–36% of the participants was even lower than in the first impact assessment.\n• Among those who changed their consumption: 7–16% chose cheaper products,  5–16% consumed less, 5–11% chose another brand of the product,  2–6% substituted other types of food product\n• Most of those who made substitutions chose a healthier alternative. The most frequent healthier alternatives were mineral water (63%), fresh fruit and vegetables (82–86%), home-made sweets (95%) and green herbs and spices (84%).\n","Progressive for health: For each product group, a higher proportion of adults with primary education than of those with higher education changed their consumption.\n• A higher proportion of adults with a lower level of education than of those with higher education chose a cheaper product (two to seven times more, depending on the product group).\n• A significantly higher proportion of adults with a lower level of education chose a different brand (three to ten times more, depending on the product group).\n• The proportion of adults who reduced their consumption did not differ significantly by level of education for any product group.\n• Only 0–20% of people with a lower level of education reduced their consumption because they learnt that the product was unhealthy).\n","Not reported","Not reported","The health literacy of consumers has improved over that in the first impact assessment.  In the second assessment, significantly more people had reduced their consumption because they learnt that the product was unhealthy rather than because of the price increase.\nThe higher price of sugary soft drinks became the second reason for reduced consumption.\n ","Since the introduction of the PHPT, HUF 61.3 billion (€200 million) have been generated, corresponding to the planned revenue.\n• The top 50 tax-paying companies paid 90% of the total tax revenue, and the proportion remained similar over the years.\n• Tax on four product groups accounted for 90% of the total PHPT revenue and, in 2014, for half the total revenue generated on pre-packaged sugar-sweetened products, 16% on salty snacks, 14% on salty condiments and 9% on soft drinks. These proportions did not change significantly over the years.\n• Sugar-sweetened soft drinks (kg/L) represent the highest proportion (65%) of the trade that forms the basis of the reported tax. The second highest component is pre-packaged sweets (19%) and the third, energy drinks (8%). Salty snacks and powdered soups and salty condiments each contributed 3% to the total PHPT.\n Health sector to benefit as income from the tax used for wage increases of 95,000 health workers.","The food industry opposes this: The Federation of Hungarian Food Industries issued an announcement soon after the introduction of the junk food tax, claiming that the tax enforces the producers to substitute natural ingredients (salt and sugar) with artificial ingredients. This was followed by other announcements, stating that the tax is detrimental for the industry, resulting in financial losses and layoffs. The Hungarian Chocolate and Confectionery Manufacturers also claim that while the junk food tax has minor effect on the salt and sugar intake, it substantially increases the losses in the affected industries.","No","• Bíró A. Did the junk food tax make the Hungarians eat healthier? Food Policy. 2015;54:107-15.\n• WHO Europe. Assessment of the impact of a public health product tax. Final report. 2016:30.","• https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/19730752/Biro_A_Did_the_junk_food_tax_make_the_Hungarians_eat_healthier_2015.pdf\n• http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/disease-prevention/nutrition/publications/2017/assessment-of-the-impact-of-a-public-health-product-tax-hungary-2016.\n","• 10.1016/j.foodpol.2015.05.003\n• NA"]
[5,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_F&V_subsidy","Programme","Health body (Aboriginal Medical Corporations/Associations/Health Clinics)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy programme established by the Bulgarr Ngaru Medical Aboriginal Corporation as a response to poor nutrition among low-income families visiting health services . Weekly, eligible families pay AUD 5 contribution to the programme in the fruit and vegetable shops and collect for a box of fruit and vegetables worth AUD40 (88% subsidy), or AUD 60 if 5 children or more in the household. The box contains more fruit than vegetables and families could exchange some unwanted fruit and vegetable for alternative fruit and vegetable. This subsidy is combined with annual health assessment organised by the medical corporation, including dental and hearing check-ups. ","F&V","Socio-economic groups (disadvantaged Aboriginal communities)","Australia - New South Wales - Local",2005,"1 year","• Policy overlaps with annual check-ups at health clinics\n• Implemented by community organisation\n","Ongoing as of 2013 ","Epidemiological study","• Health services usage\n• Anthropometric changes\n• Changes in haemoglobin and iron status\n• Nutrient intakes\n","• There was a significant decrease in oral antibiotics prescribed (-0.5 prescriptions/year; 95% CI, -0.8 to -0.2) during 12 months of participation in the program compared with the 12 months before the program and reductions in the number of annual  illness-related health service or hospital visits - 0.6 (- 1.2 to - 0.001)\n• The proportion of children classified as overweight or obese at baseline was 28.3% (38/134) and the proportion in each weight category did not change (P=0.721) after 12 months.\n• A small but significant increase in mean haemoglobin level (3.1 g/L; 95% CI, 1.4–4.8g/L) was shown, although the proportion with iron deficiency (baseline, 41%; follow-up, 37%; P=0.440) and anaemia (baseline, 8%; follow-up, 5%; P=0.453) did not change significantly.\n• Significant increases (P,0·05) in b-cryptoxanthin (28·9 nmol/l, 18 %), vitamin C (10·1mmol/l, 21%) and lutein–zeaxanthin (39·3 nmol/l, 11%) levels were observed at the 12-month follow-up in 115 children, although the self-reported F&V intake was unchanged. The improvements in the levels of biomarkers of F&V intake demonstrated in the present study are consistent with increased F&V intake.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Black AP, Vally H, Morris P, Daniel M, Esterman A, Karschimkus CS, et al. Nutritional impacts of a fruit and vegetable subsidy programme for disadvantaged Australian Aboriginal children. British Journal of Nutrition. 2013;110(12):2309-17.\n• Black AP, Vally H, Morris PS, Daniel M, Esterman AJ, Smith FE, et al. Health outcomes of a subsidised fruit and vegetable program for Aboriginal children in northern New South Wales. Med J Aust. 2013;199(1):46-50.\n","• https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/bitstream/handle/11343/41868/Nutritional%20impacts_British%20Journal%20of%20Nutrition.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y\n• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_01_080713/bla10445_fm.pdf\n","• 10.1017/S0007114513001700\n• 10.5694/mja13.10445"]
[6,"1 Diet and obesity","Danish saturated fat tax","Policy","Government (Fiscal Affairs Committee)","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax levied on food manufacturers and food importers, but expected to be transmitted onto the consumer prices. The tax on saturated fat amounted to 16 DKK/kg saturated fat (2.14€/kg) in the following foods meant for human consumption if the level of saturated fat exceeded 2.3 g/100 g: meat, dairy products, animal fats that were rendered or extracted in other ways, edible oils and fats, margarine and spreads. The tax was topped up by 25% value added tax (VAT). To simplify administration for companies and producers, a fixed rate was determined by type of meat, regardless of the saturated fat content. The tax was to be paid on the amount of fat used for production rather than the actual fat content of the final product. Foods determined for exports or animal fodders were exempt from the tax. Health was an indirect aim, revenue was primary aim.","Saturated fat","General population","Denmark - National",2011,"15 months","Passed through legislation. Policy overlaps with other fiscal policy (Planned extension of existing sugar tax to include more foodstuffs - eventually cancelled in 2013 and part of a larger reform aimed at reducing income tax) ","Abolished late 2012","Empirical analysis of consumer panel and sales data for impact on consumption and modelling (comparative risk assessment) for impact on health ","1. Number of disease incidences averted and number of deaths averted\n2. Purchasing/sales\n","\n1.\n• One estimate of a total 0.2% increase in the risk of Ischemic Heart disease (40 extra cases per year)\n• One estimate of a total 0.3% decrease in the risk of Ischemic Heart disease (50 cases averted per year)\n•  123 (95%CI 59;187) yearly deaths averted or delayed, 76 (95%CI 51;100) of which in under 75 year olds.\n• 109 (95%CI 47–170) cardiovascular disease cases avoided; 0 diabetes cases avoided ; 14 (95%CI 1–25) total cancer cases avoided.\n2. \nShort run effects: \n• 10-15% decrease in the consumption of butter, blends, margarine and oils compared to intake levels before the introduction of the tax\nLonger term effects:\n• 4.0% reduction in saturated fat intake (1.6% for older men to 4.9% for middle aged women)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Projected to be 1 billion DKK (approx 184 USD million) for the Government. The overall aim of this reform was to reduce the pressure of income taxation rates for all people actively participating in the labour market and to finance this by, among other things, increased energy and environmental taxes and increased taxes to reduce adverse health behaviour.","The law passed with 96% of votes in 2011, but soon after, some political party members who lost the concurrent Danish elections stated that they regretted passing the fat tax). There was originally cross-party support and only the neo-liberal party opposed the tax  (96% of vote) and public health professionals, although public health professionals were not actively involved in the tax design process. Only one statement was found for a proponent in the public debate after the development of the tax (the chair of the Disease Prevention Commission). Opponents included the food industry, trade associations (heavily involved in the tax legislation process) and later the media with negative press coverage. Three prominent nutrition researchers claimed that the tax on fat would be harmful to health, as it would increase consumption of carbohydrates and thus also increase the risk of type 2 diabetes and heart disease. The fact that the tax did not differentiate between lean and fat meat products was also criticised for having adverse health effects, as people were expected to substitute the more expensive lean products with cheaper and fattier meat. The fat tax received substantial negative media coverage focusing on the illogical design of the tax. Intense political lobbying by trade association and the industry left to a loss of public popularity Food industry, trade associations  conducted lobbying under various guises: threatening lawsuits, predicting welfare losses, casting doubt on evidence of a public health effect, diverting focus, requesting postponements and joining forces with other lobbying groups. Industry and trade were heavily involved in the consultation and tax design political process. ","No","• Bødker M, Pisinger C, Toft U, Jørgensen T. The Danish fat tax—Effects on consumption patterns and risk of ischaemic heart disease. Preventive medicine. 2015;77:200-3.\n• Bødker M, Pisinger C, Toft U, Jørgensen T. The rise and fall of the world's first fat tax. Health policy. 2015;119(6):737-42.\n• Jensen JD, Smed S. The Danish tax on saturated fat–short run effects on consumption, substitution patterns and consumer prices of fats. Food Policy. 2013;42:18-31.\n• Smed S, Scarborough P, Rayner M, Jensen JD. The effects of the Danish saturated fat tax on food and nutrient intake and modelled health outcomes: an econometric and comparative risk assessment evaluation. European journal of clinical nutrition. 2016;70(6):681.\n• Vallgårda S, Holm L, Jensen JD. The Danish tax on saturated fat: why it did not survive. European journal of clinical nutrition. 2015;69(2):223.\n\n","• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0091743515001589\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168851015000706\n• http://okonomi.foi.dk/workingpapers/wppdf/wp2012/wp_2012_14_danish_fat_tax.pdf\n• https://www.nature.com/articles/ejcn20166\n• https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Signild_Vallgarda/publication/267741946_The_Danish_Tax_on_Saturated_Fat_Why_It_Did_Not_Survive/links/54d38d680cf28e0697285d45.pdf\n\n","• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2015.03.031\n• 10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.03.003\n• 10.1016/j.foodpol.2013.06.004\n• 10.1038/ejcn.2016.6\n• 10.1038/ejcn.2014.224"]
[7,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_F&V_discount","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy programme to provide a 20% price discount on all fresh and frozen fruit and vegetables (excluding frozen potato products), all bottled water and all artificially sweetened soft drinks applied at point of sale and promoted in participating stores in the area, as part of an RCT. The aim was to increased purchase of F&V in the short-term in disadvantaged communities. This programme overlaps with another non-fiscal policy of consumer education as one arm of the RCT.","F&V, artificially sweetened drinks","Socio-economic groups (disadvantaged Aboriginal communities)","Australia - Northern Territory - Local","2012-2014","6 months","Not reported","Not reported","RCT","Purchasing of fruit and vegetables ","• Price discount alone was associated with a 12·7% (95% CI 4·1–22·1) increase in purchases in grams of fruit and vegetables combined (primary outcome), and a 19·8% (6·2–35·1) increase post discount (after vs before); an effect of 12 g and 18 g per capita per day. Sensitivity analyses did not modify the results for the primary outcome measure.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Brimblecombe J, Ferguson M, Chatfield MD, Liberato SC, Gunther A, Ball K, et al. Effect of a price discount and consumer education strategy on food and beverage purchases in remote Indigenous Australia: a stepped-wedge randomised controlled trial. The Lancet Public Health. 2017;2(2):e82-e95.\n• Brimblecombe J, Ferguson M, Liberato SC, Ball K, Moodie ML, Magnus A, et al. Stores Healthy Options Project in Remote Indigenous Communities (SHOP@ RIC): a protocol of a randomised trial promoting healthy food and beverage purchases through price discounts and in-store nutrition education. BMC Public Health. 2013;13(1):744\n","• http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lanpub/PIIS2468-2667(16)30043-3.pdf\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3751924/pdf/1471-2458-13-744.pdf\n","• 10.1016/S2468-2667(16)30043-3\n• 10.1186/1471-2458-13-744"]
[8,"1 Diet and obesity","Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC)","Programme","Government (Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children  as part of the US Federal grants to States for supplemental foods, health care referrals, and nutrition education for low-income pregnant, breastfeeding, and non-breastfeeding postpartum women, and to infants and children up to age five who are found to be at nutritional risk. Health was therefore the primary aim. Participants receive fixed cash-value vouchers (CVV) for the purchase of fruits and vegetables and quantity-based WIC food vouchers, cheques or electronic benefit cards for other foods. The 2009 revisions aimed to promote breast-feeding and increase consumption of fruits, vegetables and whole grains while reducing intakes of saturated fat, cholesterol and sugar. Revisions to the benefits to participants include \n• Reduced total maximum milk prescription and cheese substitution allowance; \n• Increased availability of soy products; \n• Disallowance of whole milk prescription for women and children over age 2; \n• Addition of a cash value voucher (CVV) exclusively for fruit and vegetable purchases;\n• Reduced maximum egg prescription; \n• Allowance of whole grain bread and cereal products; \n• Allowance of canned beans as replacements for dry beans and/or peanut butter; and\n• Increased low-mercury (non-tuna) canned fish options.\n","Prenatal diet / Breastfeeding / Healthy diet","Socio-economic (low income population - mothers and children)","USA - National",2009,"Varied (multiple studies)","• Implementation costs: $6 billion budget \n• Overlaps with other policies in the package including promoting breastfeeding to all pregnant women, provides nutrition education and health and social service referrals to eligible participants \n• Passed through legislation\n","Policy was revised in 2009; Trump administration plans to move WIC from USDA remit to Health and Human services.","Empirical assessment","1. Pregnancy and birth outcomes\n2. Infant mortality\n3. Nutrition\n4. Breastfeeding initiation and infant feeding practices\n5. Food insecurity\n6. Immunization rates\n","1. Nutrition\n• Average scores for young, low-income children on the Healthy Eating Index — a measure of diet quality that assesses conformance to the Dietary Guidelines for Americans — increased more than twice as much (11 %) among WIC participants as among non-participants (5 %) between 2003-2008 (before implementation) and 2011-2012 (after implementation).\n2. Breastfeeding initiation and infant feeding practices\n• Between 2002 and 2013, the percentage of all children who were breastfed increased from 71.4 % to 81.1 %. Over roughly the same period, from 2002 to 2014, the percentage of infants participating in WIC who were breastfed increased from 48.3 percent to 69.8 %.\n• 20% of mothers participating in WIC introduce cereals, fruits, vegetables, or meat before 4 months, compared to at least 60 % 20 years ago\n• cow’s milk is introduced to most infants near their first birthday, consistent with current guidance: at 8 months of age, only 10 % of infants have consumed cow’s milk, and by 11 months, 37 % have.\n• several studies have found that participation in WIC is associated with increased iron intake.\n3. Food insecurity\n• Participation in WIC reduces the prevalence of food insecurity among children by at least 20 %.\n4. Immunization rates\n• Low-income children who have never participated in WIC have immunization rates ranging from 5 to 19 percent lower than current participants, while children who remain in WIC tend to have immunization coverage comparable to higher-income children.\n","Progressive for health: Rate of 9.6 per 1,000 live births among African-American WIC participants compared to 21.0 among non-WIC African-American participant.","Not reported","Not reported"," 1. School performance\n• New research suggests that prenatal and early childhood participation in WIC is associated with improved cognitive development and academic achievement. WIC is quite effective in reaching women during, rather than after, their pregnancy: 83 percent of new mothers. \n• Children whose mothers participated in WIC while pregnant scored higher on assessments of mental development at age 2 than similar children whose mothers did not participate. The benefit associated with WIC participation persisted into the school years, as children whose mothers participated in WIC when they were in utero performed better on reading assessments.\n2. Neighbouring food environments\n• Multiple studies, conducted in various locations using different study designs, have consistently found that availability of healthy foods increased after implementation.\n  ","Not reported","Not reported","?","• Carlson, Steven, and Zoë Neuberger. 2015. “WIC Works : Addressing the Nutrition and Health Needs of Low-Income Families for 40 Years.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities: 1–23.  \n• Fox, Mary Kay, William Hamilton, and Biing-Hwan Lin. 2004. “Effects of Food Assistance and Nutrition Programs on Nutrition and Health: Volume 4, Executive Summary of the Literature Review.” United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service: 118. \n• Colman S, Nichols-Barrer IP, Redline JE, Devaney BL, Ansell SV. Nutrition Assistance Program Report Series Effects of the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC): A Review of Recent Research. 2012.\n• Nestle M. Food Politics. Food Politics. 2018. \n","• http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/5-4-15fa.pdf.\n• https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/46575/30211_fanrr19-4a_002.pdf?v=41479\n• https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/-/media/publications/pdfs/nutrition/wic_research_review.pdf\n• https://www.foodpolitics.com/tag/wic/\n","• NA\n• NA \n• NA\n• NA"]
[9,"1 Diet and obesity","USA_Berkley_ SSB_tax","Policy","Government ","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax levied: $0.01 -per-ounce tax on the distribution of SSBs, including soda, energy, sports and fruit-flavoured drinks; sweetened water, coffee and tea, and syrups used to make SSBs.  Health was a primary aim (prevention and control of obesity).","SSB","General population","USA - Berkeley - Local",2015,"5 months","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","obesity reductions and disease cases avoided","After passage of Berkeley’s SSB tax, adjusted consumption of SSBs decreased in Berkeley (–21%) and increased in the comparison cities (+4%); Figure 2; P= .046). Specifically, adjusted consumption ofregular soda decreased by 26% in Berkeley and increased by 10% in the comparison cities (P= .05), and adjusted consumption ofsports drinks decreased by 36% in Berkeley and increased by 21% in the comparison com- munities (P= .02).\n In addition, as illustrated in Figure 2, water consumption increased more in Berkeley (+63%) than in comparison cities (+19%; P< .01).  In addition, of the 124 (22%) who reported changing drinking habits because of the tax, 101 (82%) reported drinking SSBs less frequently and 48 (40%) reported drinking smaller sizes because of the tax.","Effects more pronounced in higher SES groups","Not reported","Not reported","The tax is quite local so some respondents reported switching purchasing place to avoid tax.","Not reported","The Berkeley protax campaign—“Berkeley vs. Big Soda”—achieved success, which has been attributed to early and diverse coalition building, reflected in the campaign having prominently featured community representatives and endorsements from a wide range of supporters. Campaign messages focused not only on health harms of SSBs, but also on inappropriate behaviour by the SSB industry. Campaign exposure, knowledge that the tax passed by a high margin (76%) of votes, or awareness of widespread support for the tax may have altered social norms, but the publications did not assess social norm.","NA","• Cawley J, Frisvold DE. The Pass‐Through of Taxes on Sugar‐Sweetened Beverages to Retail Prices: The Case of Berkeley, California. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 2017;36(2):303-26.\n• Falbe J, Thompson HR, Becker CM, Rojas N, McCulloch CE, Madsen KA. Impact of the Berkeley excise tax on sugar-sweetened beverage consumption. American journal of public health. 2016;106(10):1865-71.\n• Silver LD, Ng SW, Ryan-Ibarra S, Taillie LS, Induni M, Miles DR, et al. Changes in prices, sales, consumer spending, and beverage consumption one year after a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages in Berkeley, California, US: A before-and-after study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(4):e1002283.\n","• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/pam.21960\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5024386/pdf/AJPH.2016.303362.pdf\n• http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002283","• 10.1002/pam.21960\n• 10.2105/AJPH.2016.303362\n• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002283"]
[10,"1 Diet and obesity","Mexico conditional cash transfer (Oportunidades)","Policy","Government","Financial incentive","Voluntary programme of financial incentives to promote healthy behaviours: The three chief components of Oportunidades are education, health, and nutrition. Under the education component, grants are provided for primary school through to high school. The grants increase as children progress to higher grades and, beginning at the secondary level, are slightly higher for girls than for boys. The amounts of the monthly grants range from about $10.50 (105 pesos) in the third grade of primary to about $58 (580 pesos) for boys and $66 (660 pesos) for girls in the third year of high school. Beginning with secondary school, the grants are higher for girls to remain in school because they tend to have a higher drop-out rate; the health component provides basic health care for all members of the family, with a particular emphasis on preventive health care. This service is provided by government public health institutions. The nutrition component includes a fixed monetary transfer, equal to about $15.50 (155 pesos) monthly, for improved food consumption, as well as nutritional supplements for children between the ages of four months and two years, malnourished children aged 2 to 4, and pregnant and lactating women. Health was a primary aim, this was designed to provide incentives in the form of cash transfers to poor families, to improve the use of preventive and other basic health services, nutrition counselling, and supplementary foods and to increase school enrolment and attendance.","Overall diet","Socio-economic (low income population and remote deprived communities)","Mexico - National",1997,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 18 years most assessments are shorter","Implementation costs: Expenditures on Progesa totalled about $770 million per year by 1999 and $1 billion in 2000, translating into fully 0.2 percent of the country's GDP and about 20 percent of the federal budget. Of that, administrative costs are estimated to absorb about 9 percent of total program costs.   ","Programme was renamed twice (Prospera to Oportunidades to now Prospera); There have been two principal modifications in Oportunidades, in large part, due to the IFPRI evaluation. First, the program has been extended to urban areas. Oportunidades was originally a rural program focused on primary and secondary education, although its plan was to first achieve a generalized coverage in rural areas and then slowly extend to poor urban areas. This is exactly the pattern that has evolved. The second important change has been the extension of education grants to the high school level.","Multiple epidemiological, RCTs","• Hypertension\n• General health\n• Child growth /nutritional status\n• BMI\n• Maternal health\n","• Adults in intervention communities had a lower combined prevalence of uncontrolled hypertension (33.80% vs 34.52%, P = .008) and lower Mean systolic (β = –2.60, P < .001) and diastolic (β = –2.84, P < .001) blood pressures\n• A decline of 11.8 percentage points in the incidence of anemia among children under age two; Children under 5 in Progresa, had a 12 percent lower incidence of illness\n• increased height-for-age z-scores; decreased levels of stunting, and levels of children being overweight; an increase of 16 percent in mean growth rate per year (corresponding to 1 cm) for children who received treatment between 12 and 36 months of age\n• BMI was lower in adults from intervention communities than in those from control com-munities (26.57 kg/m2 vs 27.16 kg/m2, P < .001), as was the prevalence of obesity (20.28% vs 25.31%, P < .001) and overweight (59.24% vs 63.04%, P = .03);  \n• Oportunidades was not associated with pregnancy experience among adolescents.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","• Young male beneficiaries of Progresa have on average 0.85 years or nearly 10 additional months of schooling and young women participants on average have 0.65 years or nearly eight additional months of schooling. The largest impacts were reported on children who enter secondary school, where impacts represent a percentage increase of Enrolment over 20 percent for girls and 10 percent for boys.\n• Adult beneficiaries of Progresa between 18 and 50 years had 19 percent fewer days of difficulty with daily activities due to illness than their non-Progresa counterparts.\n• For beneficiaries over 50 years, those in Progresa had 19 percent fewer days of difficulty with daily activities, 17 fewer days incapacitated, and 22 percent fewer days in bed, compared with similar individuals who did not receive program benefits.\n\n  ","Not reported","Not reported","No","• Center for Global Development. CASE 9: Improving the health of the poor in Mexico. Available from: https://www.cgdev.org/doc/millions/MS_case_9.pdf.\n• Darney BG, Weaver MR, Sosa-Rubi SG, Walker D, Servan-Mori E, Prager S, et al. The oportunidades conditional cash transfer program: effects on pregnancy and contraceptive use among young rural women in Mexico. International perspectives on sexual and reproductive health. 2013;39(4):205.\n• Fernald LC, Gertler PJ, Neufeld LM. 10-year effect of Oportunidades, Mexico's conditional cash transfer programme, on child growth, cognition, language, and behaviour: a longitudinal follow-up study. The Lancet. 2009;374(9706):1997-2005.\n• Fernald LC, Hou X, Gertler PJ. Oportunidades program participation and body mass index, blood pressure, and self-reported health in Mexican adults. Prev Chronic Dis. 2008;5(3):A81.\n• Newcommer AJ. The Long-Term Effects of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs on Health: An Analysis of Mexico’s Oportunidades: University of Pittsburgh; 2017.\n• Parker SW. Mexico’s Oportunidades Program. Shanghai Poverty Conference. 2004;50:1-3.\n• The World Bank. A Model from Mexico for the World 2014. Available from: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/19/un-modelo-de-mexico-para-el-mundo.\n\n","• https://www.cgdev.org/doc/millions/MS_case_9.pdf.\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4096692/pdf/nihms577217.pdf\n• http://www.cegadev.org/assets/cega_research_projects/65/Cash_Transfers_and_Child_Development.pdf\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2483550/pdf/PCD53A81.pdf\n• http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/33595/1/Newcomer_BPhil_Pitt_Dec2017.pdf\n• http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00819C/WEB/PDF/CASE_-62.PDF.\n• http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/19/un-modelo-de-mexico-para-el-mundo.\n\n","• NA\n• 10.1363/3920513\n• 10.1016/S0140-6736(09)61676-7\n• NA\n• NA\n• NA\n• NA"]
[11,"1 Diet and obesity","National School Lunch Program (NSLP)","Policy","Government (federally-funded. The Food and Nutrition Service, an agency of the USDA administers NLSP at federal level, then usually Department for Education at state level)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The voluntary means-tested component of the National School Lunch Programme (NSLP) targets students from households with low income relative to national standards, and it now accounts for over half of the total number of program participants and subsidized school lunches. The aim is to reduce undernourishment in children and increase their ability to resist infections. Participating school districts and independent schools receive cash subsidies and USDA Foods for each reimbursable meal they serve. In exchange, NSLP institutions must serve lunches that meet Federal meal pattern requirements and offer the lunches at a free or reduced price to eligible children. School food authorities can also be reimbursed for snacks served to children who participate in an approved afterschool program including an educational or enrichment activity. Children may be determined “categorically eligible” for free meals through participation in certain Federal Assistance Programs, such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or based on their status as a homeless, migrant, runaway, or foster child. Eligible students pay 40 cents or less, or nothing for school lunches if they come from a household with income below 185% or 135% of the Federal poverty guidelines, respectively. All NSLP lunches must meet Federal requirements, though decisions about the specific foods to serve and the methods of preparation are made by local school food authorities. Information about the NSLP nutrition standards, along with technical assistance and guidance materials, may be found on the School Meals website: https://www.fns.usda.gov/school-meals/nutritionstandards-school-mealsThe local average treatment effect for children receiving full and partial subsidies is an additional 10.8 servings of fruit per week, 3.1 servings of green salad per week, 5.6 servings of carrots per week, 5.2 servings of other vegetables per week, and 10.2 servings of 100% fruit juice per week.","School lunch","Children (school age)","USA - National",1946,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 13 years","• Implementation costs: $11.1 billion in 2011\n• Policy overlaps with school breakfast program) \n• Passed through legislation (National School Lunch Act 1946)\n","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","• Nutritional status\n• Nutrient availability & dietary intakes\n","• Estimates indicate significant positive associations between NSLP means-tested subsidies and children’s consumption of fruit, carrots, other vegetables, and 100% fruit juice by a magnitude in the range of 0.5–1.2 servings per week; how- ever, the association is strongest among the pop- ulation of children receiving full school lunch subsidies.\n• NSLP reduces food insufficiency among low-income households with children. In summer months when the NSLP is not available, the food insuffi-ciency rate among recipients is about .7 percentage points higher than that in non-summer months. Since the average monthly food insufficiency rate is 3.9% in the sample, our finding indicates that the NSLP participation is associated with a 14% reduction in the risk of experiencing food insufficiency; & significant increases in the number of servings of fruit, green salad, carrots, other vegetables, and 100% fruit juice consumed in 1 week for subsidized children relative to unsubsidized children: an additional 10.8 servings of fruit per week, 3.1 servings of green salad per week, 5.6 servings of carrots per week, 5.2 servings of other vegetables per week, and 10.2 servings of 100% fruit juice per week.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","• Howard LL, Prakash N. Do school lunch subsidies change the dietary patterns of children from low‐income households? Contemporary Economic Policy. 2012;30(3):362-81.\n• Huang J, Barnidge E. Low-income Children's participation in the National School Lunch Program and household food insufficiency. Social Science & Medicine. 2016;150:8-14.","Link","• 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2011.00264.x\n• 10.1016/j.socscimed.2015.12.020"]
[12,"1 Diet and obesity","DEU_SSB_TAX","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","A mandatory 20% sales excise tax (in addition to VAT) on sugar sweetened beverage, with health as a primary aim , specifically the reduction overweight/obesity AND an impact on caries.","SSB","General population","Germany - National",2015,"<6 months","Not reported ","A second study looked at 10yrs","Modelling (Monte Carlo simulations)","• reductions in consumption\n• change in BMI\n• incidence of caries\n• Price elasticities\n","• Based on our simulations, a 20% SSB tax reduced daily energy consumption in males and, to a lesser degree, females\n• On the population level, taxation avoided 1,028,000 (−3%) overweight individuals and 479,000 (−4%) obese individuals. The benefit of a tax for reducing the prevalence of overweight and obesity was largest in those aged 20–29 years and male groups (Table 5). Obesity was also reduced mainly in male populations. \n• Taxation reduced caries increment in most males but not most females (Table 2), with the same applying to treatment costs. Caries and cost reduction were higher in younger than older groups and in low- than in middle- or high-income individuals. The greatest reduction in caries increment (>10%) was observed in males from low- or middle-income backgrounds. By contrast, taxation was disadvantageous for low-income older females, for whom increases in caries increment and costs were both seen— because SSB consumption in that group was low, while that of juices was relatively high. Based on cross-price elasticities, sugar intake via juices (among others) increased considerably, while decreases through reduced SSB consumption were low;  Over 10 y, total mean (SD) caries increment at the population level was estimated to be 82.27 (1.15) million and 83.02 (1.08) million new lesions at 20% and 0% SSB tax, respectively.\n• Mean SSB price elasticity for low or middle income stratum -1.21 (-3.87 to -0.69) and for high income stratum -0.908 (-2.903 to -0.518)\n","Taxation also decreased the BMI in groups with low rather than high income, and males rather than females.","Not reported","Caries generated costs of 2.64 (0.39) billion and 2.72 (0.35) billion euro, respectively. Additional tax revenue for a 20% SSB tax (including altered revenue for the VAT) was 37.99 (3.41) billion euro over the 10 years","Not reported","For caries\n• Revenue = 37.99  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Base case Caries increment +50% Revenue = 37.99  billion euro over the 10 y\n• 0.4% caries increment change per 1 g of sugar daily Revenue = 37.99  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Pass-on 80% Revenue = 34.00  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Restoration with anaesthesia, moisture control Revenue = 37.99  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Required restorations involve 3 surfaces Revenue = 37.99  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Discount 0% Revenue = 43.65  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Discount 5% Revenue = 35.28  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Discounting health outcomes 3% Revenue = 37.99  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Cross-price elasticity of SSBs also for water, tea, coffee Revenue = 50.78  billion euro over the 10 y\nNo revenue for overweight/obesity reduction due to short time horizon\n ","This tax has been blocked in Germany. It is supported by Health experts, but opposed by industry and also the government.","Yes","• Schwendicke F, Stolpe M. Taxing sugar-sweetened beverages: impact on overweight and obesity in Germany. BMC public health. 2017;17(1):88.\n• Schwendicke F, Thomson W, Broadbent J, Stolpe M. Effects of taxing sugar-sweetened beverages on caries and treatment costs. Journal of dental research. 2016;95(12):1327-32.\n","• https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-016-3938-4\n• https://europepmc.org/abstract/med/27671690\n","• 10.1186%2Fs12889-016-3938-4\n• 10.1177/0022034516660278"]
[13,"1 Diet and obesity","AUS_SSB_Tax (20%)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","A mandatory 20% tax on SSBs. Health was a primary aim, specifically a reduction in obesity – disease and costs associated but also gains in productivity (paid and unpaid work) as a result of obesity reduction.","SSB","General population (modelled age >=20yrs)","Australia - National",2010,"25 years","Implementation costs: AUD 27.6 million ","Not reported ","Modelling (multi-state life table Markov model)","Life years, DALYS, % reduction in obesity","The 20% increase in price would result in an average change in consumption of SSBs from 141 g/day to 124 g/day across the Australian adult male population and from 76 to 67 g/day for women, representing a 12.6% decrease. Average energy intake would go down by 16 kJ/day for men and 9 kJ/day for women, and average body mass index of men by 0.10 kg/m2 (0.09–0.11), which is about 320g for 1.78m males. Women would lose 0.06 kg/m2 (0.06–0.07), or about 170g, assuming a height of1.63m. The reductions in BMI would be larger for younger age groups (who consume higher volumes of SSBs) than older age groups. The tax could result in a decline in the prevalence of obesity of about 2.7% (0.7 percentage point) among men, and 1.2% (0.3 percentage point) among women, compared to business as usual. Over the lifetime of Australian adults alive in 2010, these seemingly modest changes in body mass translated to gains of 112,000 health-adjusted life years for men (95% uncertainty interval [UI]: 73,000–155,000) and 56,000 (95% UI: 36,000–76,000) for women. The annual gains rise almost linearly over the first 25 years after the start of the tax. The estimated benefit for 20–24 year old males is the equivalent of about 7.6 days in full health, of which 4.9 in life extension and 2.7 in improved quality of life. For their female peers the model predicts 3.7 health-adjusted days gained, of which 2.2 from increased longevity. \nMost notably, the 20% tax would reduce the number of type 2 diabetes cases, with incidence down by approximately 800 per year. This is roughly a 0.6% reduction com- pared to the number expected without the tax (approximately 130,000 per year). The annual number of new cases of heart disease and stroke would be reduced by 240 and 70, respectively. After 25 years there would be 16,000 less prevalent cases of diabetes, 4,400 fewer cases of IHD and 1,100 of stroke. In total, an estimated 1600 fewer deaths will occur by year 25, with heart disease accounting for the largest share of this postponed mortality.\nThe SSB tax was estimated to reduce the number of people with obesity by 437,000 persons (95% CI: 400,000 persons to 473,000 persons) which was 1.96% of the entire population, and to reduce the number of workers with obesity by 317,000 persons (95% CI: 290,000 workers to 343,000 workers).\nThe Tax would also result in 25,000 extra life years (LYs) for men (95% CI: 18,000–32,000 LYs) and 10,000 LYs gained for women (95% CI: 8000–14,000 LYs). Over the lifetime, 43,000 DALYs could be gained for men (95% CI: 28,000–60,000 DALYs) and 20,000 for women (95% CI: 14,000–28,000 DALYs). The reduction in the healthcare costs (savings) over the lifetime of the 2010 population aged 20 years or older was AU$427 million (95% CI: AU$305 million to AU$554 million)","Not reported","Human capital approach, and fricton cost approach","The total additional weeks in the paid and unpaid sectors due to the tax on SSBs were 363,000 weeks (95% CI: 275,000 weeks to 453,000 weeks). The additional hours of paid work as a proportion of the total hours worked per year by the Australian population in 2010 is 0.04% [52]. The total productivity gains in the working- age population due to the tax on SSBs was estimated to be AU$751 million (95% CI: AU$565 million to AU$954 mil- lion), using the HCA. \nThe HCA were sustained over the first 5 years, reaching around AU$23 million per year (95% CI: AU$16 million to AU$30 million), and then decreased over time. This is because the participation in paid work decreases rapidly around the retirement age (65 years).\nThe annual total productivity gains in the unpaid sector increased to around AU$25 million per year (95% CI: AU$20 million to AU$31 million) after the first 25 years. The total productivity gain of household work that could be achieved was AU$1042 million (95% CI: AU$826 million to AU$1276 million) over the lifetime. In addition, the total productivity gain in volunteer and community work was AU$129 mil- lion (95% CI: AU$103 million to AU$159 million) over the lifetime. The productivity gains (including those in the paid sector using the HCA and those in the unpaid sector) that could potentially be achieved summed to AU$1922 million (95% CI: AU$1494 million to AU$2389 million).  The reduction in the healthcare costs (savings) over the lifetime of the 2010 population aged 20 years or older was AU$427 million (95% CI: AU$305 million to AU$554 million) (Table 2). If we add healthcare cost savings to those in paid and unpaid sectors, the over- all potential economic gain due to the hypothetical tax of 20% on SSBs was estimated to be AU$2347 million (95% CI: AU$1802 million to AU$2935 million) over the lifetime (Table 2). This productivity gain is equivalent to AU$5375 over the lifetime per person whose obesity is prevented or cured by the intervention. ","Not reported","A 20% tax on these products would raise taxation revenue in excess ofAUD400 million each year. The modelling study but suggest can be put towards promotion activities or used to subsidise healthy foods.","Not implemented but politically an SSB tax is not seem as acceptable in Australia. Proponents would be health experts, while government, industry reps oppose it.","Yes","• Veerman JL, Sacks G, Antonopoulos N, Martin J. The impact of a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages on health and health care costs: a modelling study. PloS one. 2016;11(4):e0151460.\n• Nomaguchi T, Cunich M, Zapata-Diomedi B, Veerman JL. The impact on productivity of a hypothetical tax on sugar-sweetened beverages. Health Policy. 2017;121(6):715-25.\n","• http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0151460\n• https://www.healthpolicyjrnl.com/article/S0168-8510(17)30094-5/fulltext\n","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0151460\n• 10.1016/j.healthpol.2017.04.001"]
[14,"1 Diet and obesity","France_sugar_price_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory ad-valorem tax of 10% on  full-fat and 5% on semi-skimmed yoghurts, fromages blancs and dessert yoghurts. Health was a primary aim.","Fat (in yoghurts)","General population","France - National",2007,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (structural econometric model)","Price elasticities- purchasing of yoghurt products","Price elasticities: Ignoring producer price responses, reudction in fat pruchases of 300-3025g ( around 38%). After accounting for producer price responses - down to 76.5g (9.1% reduction). ","Other (Fat tax affects all demogrpahic groups similarly (8% to 10% reduction, taking into account producer strategic price response). However, reduced elasticities if main shopper is a man (6.4% reduction))","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Allais O, Etile F, Lecocq S. Mandatory labels, taxes and market forces: An empirical evaluation of fat policies. J Health Econ. 2015;43:27-44.","Link","• 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.06.003"]
[15,"1 Diet and obesity","Barbados_SSB_Tax (10%)","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% excise tax (ad valorem) on SSBs. Health was a primary aim, in particular the reduction in obesity.","SSB","General population ","Barbados - National",2015,"2013-2016","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Empirical assessment (looked at differences between pace of growth in SSB and non-SSB prices leading up to and immediately following the tax implementation","Drink prices","In the three quarters prior to the introduction of the tax, SSBs and non-SSBs experienced very similar year-over-year price growth of approximately 1% for both beverage categories, and had parallel patterns of fluctuation. During the third quarter of 2015, at the end of which the SSB tax took effect, the trends diverged. At that time, the growth in SSB prices approached 3%while the growth innon-SSBprices decreased; thereafter, thechange in SSB prices outpaced that ofnon-SSBs. In the two quarters after the tax took effect, the growth in average SSB prices compared to the previous year reached 5.9%, while stayingmostly flat, between 0 and 1%, for non- SSBs.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Alvarado M, Kostova D, Suhrcke M, Hambleton I, Hassell T, Samuels TA, et al. Trends in beverage prices following the introduction of a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages in Barbados. Preventive medicine. 2017;105:S23-S5.","Link","• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2017.07.013"]
[16,"1 Diet and obesity","India_palmoil_tax","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 20% excise tax on palm oil purchases. Health was a primary aim, specifically the reduction of the consumption of saturated fats.","Palm oil","General population","India - National",2014,"9 years","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Modelling (discrete time microsimulation model)","Number of disease incidences averted and number of deaths averted","\"A 20% palm oil tax without substitution with other oils would lower saturated fat intake per person in India by about 1.3 (95% confidence interval 0.8 to 1.8) g/day and lower polyunsaturated fatty acid consumption by about 0.2 (0.1 to 0.3) g/day.\" The change in cholesterol from the palm oil tax would be expected to avert approximately 251 000 (171 000 to 331 000) deaths from myocardial infarction (1.4% (0.6% to 2.1%) of myocardial infarction deaths) and 112 000 (76 000 to 148 000) deaths from stroke (0.8% (0.5% to 1.1%) of stroke deaths) over the 10 year period from 2014 to 2023\". Also look at substitution with other oils and under a pessimistic scenario still reduces deaths from MI and strokes.","\"In terms of health equity, much of the decline in deaths is concentrated among men and urban dwellers, reflecting the heightened prevalence of major risk factors such as hypertension and hyperlipidemia among this group. This, combined with the worst case scenario of increased food insecurity, suggests that a palm oil tax may cause a net transfer of health from rural to urban populations and from women to men.\"","Not reported","Not reported","A 20% palm oil tax along with substitution with other oils would be expected to result in a reduction of intake of 13.1 kilocalories per person per day in India and an increase in food insecurity by about 0.59% (0.50% to 0.68%), leading to new chronic food insecurity for 73 000 (46 000 to 100 000) Indians, after changes in household expenditure due to the tax and kilocalorie differences among oils have been accounted for.","Not reported","Not reported","No","Basu S, Babiarz KS, Ebrahim S, Vellakkal S, Stuckler D, Goldhaber-Fiebert JD. Palm oil taxes and cardiovascular disease mortality in India: economic-epidemiologic model. BMJ. 2013;347:f6048.","Link","• 10.1136/bmj.f6048 "]
[17,"1 Diet and obesity","US_Sugar_cap_and_trade","Modelling study","NA","Other (Cap and trade)","Mandatory policy in which sugar trading is capped In the same way as emissions trading works in environmental policy: “added-sugar emissions” of food manufacturers into the food supply would be capped by creating tradable added-sugar permits, which manufacturers must secure and surrender in numbers equal to their added-sugar emissions into the food supply. Manufacturers whose added-sugar levels fall below their permitted level may sell surplus permits to other manufacturers, whereas manufacturers exceeding their permitted level must buy permits or reformulate their products to reduce added-sugar content, creating an incentive to lower added-sugar emissions into the food supply. The overall cap on sugar emissions would be lowered over time a 20% reduction over 20 years (at a linear rate of 1% from the starting level annually) )by requiring a proportion of all permits to be retired  to meet dietary recommendations and allow sufficient time to detect chronic disease effects. Health was a primary aim (the study aimed to evaluate the impact on the consumption and disease and how much it might cost food manufacturers and consumers) ","Added sugar","General population","USA - National",2010,"20 years","Not reported ","The overall cap on sugar emissions would be lowered over time by requiring a proportion of all permits to be retired periodically, aiming toward a reduction target set by an independent scientific panel.","Modelling (a stochastic, discrete-time, agent-based mathematical model)","• Weight reduction\n• Obesity reduction\n• Diabetes incidence avoided\n• Healthcare costs avoided\n","• The  reduced added-sugar emissions would be expected to lower weight among people in the United States by 3.0 pounds on average over 20 years (95% CI=2.8, 3.2)\n• this reduction in body weight would correspond to a 1.7-percentage-point lower expected obesity prevalence rate than in the scenario without the cap-and-trade policy (95% CI =0.9, 2.4), representing a 4.6% decrease\n• The reduced added-sugar emissions would also be expected to lower type 2 diabetes incidence by 21.7 cases per 100 000 people (95% CI =12.9, 30.6), a 4.2% lower incidence rate\n• On the basis of recent health care cost estimates for obesity the cap-and-trade system would be expected to avert $9.7 billion in health care spending over the 20-year simulation period (95% CI=$4.5 billion, $14.9 bil-lion), at a standard 3% annual discount rate. \n","Heterogeneous effects among different demographic groups; racial/ethnic minorities generally experienced the largest declines in obesity prevalence and type 2 diabetes incidence under the simulated policy.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The sum of the added-sugar permits purchased by industry averaged $3.7 billion over the same simulation period (95% CI =$3.6 billion, $3.8 billion), when also tabulated at a 3% annual discount rate.  ","Not reported","?","Basu S, Lewis K. Reducing added sugars in the food supply through a cap-and-trade approach. American journal of public health. 2014;104(12):2432-8.","Link","• 10.2105/AJPH.2014.302170"]
[18,"1 Diet and obesity","France_sugar_price_model","Modelling study","NA","Other (Floor price removal)","Mandatory reduction in the reference price for sugar (the floor price) by 36% over a 4 year period . Health as a secondary aim (sugar price reduction).","Sugar","General population","EU - International",2006,"1 year","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Modelling (structural econometric model)","Price elasticities; consumption of SSBs","Price elasticities: 36% decrease in the sugar price which generates a decrease in the production cost of 2 EURO cents for regular products (1.79 to 2.68 EURO cent, depending on sugar content).  Assuming a full transmission of the production cost decrease to the final price, consumer prices of regular products decrease by more than 3.4% in average (1.7 to 6.5% depending on products modelled).  Decreases in prices lead to  an increase in agggregate market share of 7.5& for regular products, a decrease of 3.5% for diet products. Consumption: Average consumption of regular products increases by 1.16 liters while the average consumption\nof diet products remains roughly identical. Consumption of added sugar would raise by 124 grams per person and per year. ","Health- regressive (The presence of overweight or obese individuals in the household plays a role in consumption changed. For households where less than half of the members are overweight and obese, the increase is about 1.3 liters of regular soft drinks and 141 grams of added sugar, which are statistically di¤erent from the results of an average househol: 1.16L and 124 g added sugar.)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Bonnet C, Requillart V. Does the EU sugar policy reform increase added sugar consumption? An empirical evidence on the soft drink market. Health Econ. 2010;20:1012-24.  ","Link","• 10.1002/hec.1721"]
[19,"1 Diet and obesity","UK_SSB_Tax(model)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tiered taxation of SSB with different taxation levels depending on the sugar content of beverages. High-sugar drinks have more than 8 g of sugar per 100 mL, mid-sugar drinks have 5–8 g of sugar per 100 mL, and low-sugar drinks have less than 5 g of sugar per 100 mL. Three possible industry responses were modelled: First, reformulation to reduce sugar concentration; second, a rise in price; and third, activities to change the relative market share of high-sugar, mid-sugar, and low-sugar drinks. For each response the better-case and worse-case scenarios for reduction of sugar consumption resulted in six scenarios\n1. Scenario 1: The better-case reformulation scenario assumed that industry would reduce the sugar con- centration of high-sugar drinks by 30% and mid-sugar drinks by 15%. \n2. Scenario 2: the worse-case scenario, we assumed a 5% reduction in sugar concentration of both high-sugar and mid-sugar drinks.  Under both scenarios 1 & 2, the volume consumed is assumed to remain constant\n3. Scenario 3: assumed that the tax is passed on only through SSBs. \n4. Scenario 4: we assume that the levy is passed on evenly across all soft drinks (both diet beverages and SSBs), fruit juice, and bottled water, resulting in a 6% price rise.\n5. Scenario 5: we assume the market share of high-sugar drinks would need to fall by 12% alongside a 6% increase for each of mid-sugar and low-sugar drinks, \n6. Scenario 6: acknowledges that increased marketing of new mid-sugar drinks might lead consumers to switch to this category from low-sugar drinks. We assume that mid-sugar drinks double their market share alongside equal reductions in the market share of high-sugar and low-sugar drinks.\n","SSB","General population","UK - National",2014,"NA","Passed through legislation","Not reported","Modelling (monte carlo modelling)","obesity reductions and disease cases avoided","The better case for reformulation (scenario 1) resulted in a fall in mean sugar content of SSBs equivalent to a reduction of 58·5 mL (95% uncertainty interval [95% UI 54·5–62·6; 10 kcal [9–10]) of SSBs per person per day. This reduction is the largest among scenarios modelled. All simulated scenarios led to a fall in equivalised SSB consumption except for the worse case for market share, which resulted in a small increase. The largest falls for both sexes were among 11–18-year-olds who consume the largest volume of SSBs.\nThe reduction in obesity prevalence resulting from each scenario is estimated to be greatest after scenario 1. Results varied by age, with larger reductions in the number of children with obesity than in that of adults in scenario 1. The relative reduction in obesity prevalence was predicted to be greater in male individuals than in female individuals because male individuals consume a greater volume of SSBs. Effect size estimates were significantly increased when an energy balance equation was used. Across the scenarios modelled, the pattern of results seen with obesity is repeated for type 2 diabetes. \nScenario 1 (better case for reformulation) resulted in an estimated 19 094 (95% UI 6920–32 678; incidence reduction of 31·1 per 100 000 person-years) fewer new cases of diabetes per year and scenario 6 (worse case for change in market share) led to an increase of 1238 (455–2359; incidence increase of 2·0 per 100 000 person-years) cases per year. However, by contrast with the obesity results, adults aged older than 65 years saw the largest absolute reduction in diabetes incidence, reflecting the positive association between age and disease burden.\nReduction in the number of obese individuals with each scenario\n• Scenario 1: 144,383 (0.9%)\n• Scenario 2: 26,774 (0.2%)\n• Scenario 3: 81,594 (0.5%)\n• Scenario 4: 29,555 (0.2%)\n• Scenario 5: 91,042 (0.6%)\n• Scenario 6: -9,211 (-0.1%)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","~£500 million for the Government. In England, the new levy revenue will be invested in giving school-aged children a brighter and healthier future, including programmes to encourage physical activity and balanced diets. For Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Barnett formula will be applied to spending on these new initiatives in the normal way.","Over 60 public health organisations have called for a tax on sugary drinks. This includes Public Health England, The British Medical Association and the Royal Society for Public Health. Dame Sally Davies, Chief Medical Officer for England, has said that reformulation and resizing are the key wins for tackling obesity. Manufacturing and industry reps  are opponents. Media campaigns have been used to attempt to change political opinion and promote the levy.","Yes","Briggs AD, Mytton OT, Kehlbacher A, Tiffin R, Elhussein A, Rayner M, et al. Health impact assessment of the UK soft drinks industry levy: a comparative risk assessment modelling study. The Lancet Public Health. 2017;2(1):e15-e22.","Link","• 10.1016/S2468-2667(16)30037-8"]
[20,"1 Diet and obesity","EU School Fruit Scheme","Programme","Government (in-country dependent: in Italy implemented by Italian Ministry of Agriculture jointly with the Ministry of Education and Research)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Campaign consisting of the distribution of products to children at school and provision of information on a correct and healthy diet to children, teachers and parents. In Italy the varieties of fruit and vegetables distributed were slightly different across regions. The following products were distributed across all schools: oranges, strawberries, kiwi, apples, pears, carrots, fennels and cherry tomatoes. Voluntary activities included visits to farms, working in the school garden, games associated to the consumption of fruit and vegetables, and homework activities focusing on the healthy properties of fruit and vegetables. Health was a primary aim, to increase children’s intake of fruit and vegetables and to promote healthy diet habits and more balanced nutrition patterns.","F&V","Children ","International - 24 EU Member states in 2010/2011",2010,"1 year","• Implementation costs: 90million Euros in 2010/2011\n• Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (education, activities, farm visits etc)\n","Scheme replaced in Aug 2017 by a school fruit, vegetables and milk scheme under a single legal framework.","Empirical assessment (case - control study in Rome 2009-2011 looking at supermarkets matched with intervention schools vs non-intervention schools and analysing sales of snacks)","Reduction in consumption","\"Compared to the control group, the sales of snacks in the treated group declined mildly (-4.6 percent) after the treatment, although the estimated difference is not statistically significant.\" \"Stores in wealthier areas include both regular and discount stores. Since we expect higher income consumers to shop mainly in regular stores, we distinguish between these stores in high income areas and other stores (stores in low income areas and discounts in high income areas). ...the relative effect of the campaign on the consumption of unhealthy food has been negative and sizeable in the former group of shops (-12.2 percent) and close to zero in the latter group.\"","Health- regressive (The presence of overweight or obese individuals in the household plays a role in consumption changed. For households where less than half of the members are overweight and obese, the increase is about 1.3 liters of regular soft drinks)","Not reported","Not reported","Sales patterns of snacks returned to pre-intervention levels at end of implementation (only implemented Feb-July in Italy)","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Brunello G, De Paola M, Labartino G. More apples fewer chips? The effect of school fruit schemes on the consumption of junk food. Health policy. 2014;118(1):114-26. ","Link","• 10.1016/j.healthpol.2014.03.012"]
[21,"1 Diet and obesity","Brasil Bolsa Familia","Programme","Government","Financial incentive","Conditional cash transfers to families which are voluntary and conditional on fulfilling some requirements in participation in health and educational activities. Transfers of  R$15 (now R$22) per child or pregnant/breastfeeding mother per month to eligible families, up to maximum of R$95/month (now R$200/month or US$95. Conditionalities include school attendance rate of at least 85% for children age 7-15; vaccinations for children age 0-6 years; prenatal care visits required for pregnant women. Eligibility criteria included families with monthly per capita income below R$120 ($57). Households “likely to be eligible” were registered in national registry . Health was a secondary aim (cash was given to promote health and education).","Food insecurity","Socio-economic (low income population)","Brasil - Paraiba - Towns of Sao Jose dos Ramos and Nova Floresta - Local",2003,"Varied (multiple studies)","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Epidemiological studies and RCT","• Prenatal care\n• Nutritional status\n• Vaccinations\n• Health visits \n• Food availability\n","• Prenatal care: Bolsa Família increased pregnant mothers’ use of prenatal care by 1.5 prenatal care visits on average. \n• Nutritional status: Bolsa Família had no impact on mean HAZ, WAZ, stunting prevalence or wasting. However, Bolsa increased mean BMI-for-age z-scores by 0.4 standard deviations.  \n• Vaccinations: Bolsa Família increased the probability that a child receives all seven vaccines required by age 6 months by 12-15 percentage points. However, on-time vaccination rates remain low in Bolsa and non-Bolsa households\n• Health visits:  Bolsa Família has increased the odds of children’s visits to the health post for preventive services; associated with increased odds for growth monitoring (OR = 3.1; 95% CI 1.9-5.1), vaccinations (OR = 2.8; 95% CI 1.4-5.4), and checkups (OR = 1.6; 95% CI 0.98-2.5). There were positive spillover effects on older siblings (ages 7-17) no longer required to meet the health conditionalities. Bolsa Família increased their odds for growth monitoring (OR = 2.5; 95% CI 1.3-4.9) and checkups (OR = 1.7; 95% CI 0.9-3.2) and improved psychosocial health (β = 2.6; p = 0.007).\n• Compared to non-beneficiaries, the beneficiaries households had 6 % higher food expenditure (p = 0.015) and 9.4 % higher total energy availability (p = 0.010). It was found a 7.3 % higher expenditure on minimally processed foods and 10.4 % higher expenditure on culinary ingredients among the Bolsa Família Program families. No statistically significant differences were found regarding the expenditure and the availability of processed and ultra-processed food and drink products. In the in natura or minimally processed foods group, the expenditure and the availability of meat, tubers and vegetables were higher among the Bolsa Família Program beneficiaries.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Among girls, the program significantly increases school participation (by 8 percentage points) and grade progression (by 10 percentage points), with large, significant effects across both younger and older girls in rural areas but concentrated among girls aged 15–17 years in urban areas. There were few significant impacts found among boys.\n  ","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Cabral CS, Lopes AG, Lopes JM, Vianna RPdT. Food security, income, and the Bolsa Família program: a cohort study of municipalities in Paraíba State, Brazil, 2005-2011. Cadernos de saude publica. 2014;30(2):393-402.","Link","• 10.1590/0102-311X00140112"]
[22,"1 Diet and obesity","Colombia_SSB_tax","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 20%  ad valorem tax on SSBs. Health was a primary aim (reduction in obesity).","SSB","General population ","Colombia - National",2017,"3 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling ","• Reduction in consumption\n• Price elasticities\n","• Our study shows that a 20% SSB tax would reduce significantly their consumption (roughly1,197 million liters), and therefore may meaningfully lower the prevalence ofobesity and related non-communicable diseases, and reducing associated healthcare costs.\n• We found own-price elasticities of-1.62 for SSBs, -1.05 for unsweetened unflavored milks, -1.35 for coffee and tea, -0.80 for sweets and candies (including sugar), -0.94 for dairy based products, -0.85 for grain based staples, -0.84 for animal based products, -0.96 for fruits and vegetables, and -1.01 for condiments and snacks.\n","Low SES households have higher own-price elasticities for sweets and desserts and SSBs (as well as for fruits and vegetables, condiments and snacks, milk, tea water and coffee, and dairy products), meaning that their consumption ofSSBs after a tax would reduce relatively more than in mid-high SES households. Furthermore, these results reflect that households from different SES have significantly different underlying preferences. One particular example is given from the fact that in mid-high SES households, SSBs and milk are complements, while the same relationship is not significant in the low SES group","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Policy would provide the Colombian government with an additional 1% of total revenues per year on average. Authors suggest investment in public health but no clear mention of hypothecation.","Not reported","Yes","Caro JC, Ng SW, Bonilla R, Tovar J, Popkin BM. Sugary drinks taxation, projected consumption and fiscal revenues in Colombia: Evidence from a QUAIDS model. PloS one. 2017;12(12):e0189026.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0189026"]
[23,"1 Diet and obesity","Chile_food_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 40% price tax on SSB (17% higher than current 13% tax). (One scenario from many in publication)","SSB","General population","Chile - National",2011,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric QUAIDS model)","Nutrient availability","• 40% tax on SSB: change in energy (+36 kcal/person/d), carbohydrates (+12g/person/d), sugar (-3g/person/d), sodium (17 mg/person/d), fats (-2g/person/day), saturated fats (-0.6g/person/day) and protein (+0.91 g/person/day)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Caro JC, Ng SW, Taillie LS, Popkin BM. Designing a tax to discourage unhealthy food and beverage purchases: The case of Chile. Food Policy. 2017;71:86-100.","Link","• 10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.08.001"]
[24,"1 Diet and obesity","Chile_food_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax of  5 cents per gram of sugar on products with added sugar.  (One scenario from many in publication)","Added sugar","General population","Chile - National",2011,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric QUAIDS model)","Nutrient availability","• 5 cents per g sugar: change in energy (-23 kcal/person/d), carbohydrates (9g/person/day), sugar (-10g/person/d), sodium (-24 mg/person/d), fats (-6g/person/day), saturated fats (-2/person/day) and protein (-0.68 g/person/day)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Caro JC, Ng SW, Taillie LS, Popkin BM. Designing a tax to discourage unhealthy food and beverage purchases: The case of Chile. Food Policy. 2017;71:86-100.","Link","• 10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.08.001"]
[25,"1 Diet and obesity","Chile_food_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 30% price tax on all marketing controlled foods and beverages(unhealthy/junk & SSBs)  (One scenario from many in publication)","Unhealthy food, SSB","General population","Chile - National",2011,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric QUAIDS model)","Nutrient availability","• 30% tax on junk food and SSBs: change in energy (-383 kcal/person/d), carbohydrates (-34g/person/d), sugar (-15g/person/d), sodium (-302 mg/person/d), fats (-11g/person/day), saturated fats (-4g/person/day) and protein (-13g/person/day)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Caro JC, Ng SW, Taillie LS, Popkin BM. Designing a tax to discourage unhealthy food and beverage purchases: The case of Chile. Food Policy. 2017;71:86-100.","Link","• 10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.08.001"]
[26,"1 Diet and obesity","Catalonia SSB tax","Policy","Government (Catalan Parliament)","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax on sugar sweetened beverages (soda drinks, fruit juices, sport drinks, teas and coffees, energetic drinks, sweetened milks and shakes, vegetable drinks, and flavoured waters, excluding natural fruit or vegetable juices,  drinkable yogurts, drinkable fermented milks, products used for medical reasons, and alcoholic drinks). Tax per litre, depending on the beverage’s sugar content: 0-5g/100ml are exempt, 5-8 g/100ml are taxed at 0.08EUR/L and >8g/100ml: are taxed at 0.12EUR/L. The law requires the tax pass-through rate to be 100% transferred to the final consumer. The tax affects the consumption of SSB’s in the entire Catalan territory independently of the place where the SSBs have been produced. Health was a primary aim, specifically to reduce the consumption of these beverages given the negative effects of excessive sugar consumption on population health.","SSB","General population","Spain - Catalonia - Regional",2017,"1 year","Passed through legislation (Law (5/2017))","Not reported ","Epidemiological (using scanner data)","• Price change\n• Consumption \n","• Price change: More specifically, prices increase between 5-10% for smaller recipients (cans) and around 20% for bigger recipients: for SSBs in two litre recipients, the price increases on average by around 23%. \n• Consumption: consumption of SSBs decreased by 22% vis-à-vis zero/lights but the reduction was much more pronounced for big recipients (-26%) than for small recipients (-16%), following the differences reported in price increases. This effect is partly due to the reduction in SSB consumption and partly due to increases in zero/light drinks (substitution effect) whose prices remained stable.\n","The impact is stronger in non-touristic regions as well as in areas with a higher incidence of obesity rates. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Castelló JV, Lopez Casasnovas G. Impact of Ssb Taxes on Consumption. CRES-UPFWorkingPaper#201804-110. 2018.","Link","• NA"]
[27,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_taxes","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory  tax on saturated fat:  AUD1.37/100g ( in foods with >2.3% saturated fat, excluding drinking milk ","Saturated fat","General population","Australia - National",2010,"Lifetime (100 years)","Implementation costs: AUD 22 million (95% Uncertainty Interval: AUD14 to 31 million) (one-off up-front cost) ","Modelling individual until everyone is dead or has reached 100 (maximum timeline 100 years)","Modelling (multi-state lifetable)","Disability-adjusted life years","Mean, net DALY averted for saturated fat tax: 97,000 (95%Uncertainty Interval: 77,000 to 120,000)","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Dominant (net health gain and net cost-saving)","Not reported","Mean disease costs offsets for saturated fat tax: AUD 1.3 billion ( 95%UI:AUD 0.9 to 1.8 billion).  ","Not reported","No","Cobiac LJ, Tam K, Veerman L, Blakely T. Taxes and subsidies for improving diet and population health in Australia: a cost-effectiveness modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(2):e1002232.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002232"]
[28,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_taxes","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelled mandatory excess salt tax: AUD0.3/1g  sodium in excess of Australian max recommended levels, excluding fresh fruits, vegetables, meats and dairy products ","Sodium","General population","Australia - National",2010,"Lifetime (100 years)","Implementation costs: AUD 22 million (95% Uncertainty Interval: AUD14 to 31 million) (one-off up-front cost) ","Modelling individual until everyone is dead or has reached 100 (maximum timeline 100 years)","Modelling (multi-state lifetable)","Disability-adjusted life years","Mean, net DALY averted for excesssodium tax: 130,000 (95%Uncertainty Interval: 120,000 to 140,000)","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Dominant (net health gain and net cost-saving)","Not reported","Mean disease costs offsets for excess salt tax: AUD 1.6 billion ( 95%UI:AUD 1.1 to 1.9 billion).  ","Not reported","No","Cobiac LJ, Tam K, Veerman L, Blakely T. Taxes and subsidies for improving diet and population health in Australia: a cost-effectiveness modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(2):e1002232.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002232"]
[29,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_taxes","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelled mandatory  SSB tax: AUD0.47/L of soft, energy, fruit drinks and cordials ","SSB","General population","Australia - National",2010,"Lifetime (100 years)","Implementation costs: AUD 22 million (95% Uncertainty Interval: AUD14 to 31 million) (one-off up-front cost) ","Modelling individual until everyone is dead or has reached 100 (maximum timeline 100 years)","Modelling (multi-state lifetable)","Disability-adjusted life years","Mean, net DALY averted for SSB tax: 12,000 (95%Uncertainty Interval: 2,100 to 21,000)","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Dominant (net health gain and net cost-saving)","Not reported"," Mean disease costs offsets for SSB tax: AUD 0.14 billion ( 95%UI:AUD 0.03 to 0.3 billion).  ","Not reported","No","Cobiac LJ, Tam K, Veerman L, Blakely T. Taxes and subsidies for improving diet and population health in Australia: a cost-effectiveness modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(2):e1002232.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002232"]
[30,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_taxes","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelled mandatory sugar tax: AUD0.94/100ml ice cream containing >10g sugar per 100g or all other products AUD0.85/100g sugar content in excess of 10g per 100g , excluding fresh fruits, vegetables, and unflavoured dairy products.","Sugar","General population","Australia - National",2010,"Lifetime (100 years)","Implementation costs: AUD 22 million (95% Uncertainty Interval: AUD14 to 31 million) (one-off up-front cost) ","Modelling individual until everyone is dead or has reached 100 (maximum timeline 100 years)","Modelling (multi-state lifetable)","Disability-adjusted life years","Mean, net DALY averted for sugar tax: 270,000 (95%Uncertainty Interval: 250,000 to 290,000)","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Dominant (net health gain and net cost-saving)","Not reported","Mean disease costs offsets for sugar tax: AUD 2.7 billion ( 95%UI:AUD 1.9 to 3.5 billion).  ","Not reported","No","Cobiac LJ, Tam K, Veerman L, Blakely T. Taxes and subsidies for improving diet and population health in Australia: a cost-effectiveness modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(2):e1002232.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002232"]
[31,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_taxes","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Modelled fruit and vegetable subsidy: AUD0.14/100g for all fresh and preserved fruits and vegetables.","F&V","General population","Australia - National",2010,"Lifetime (100 years)","Implementation costs: AUD 22 million (95% Uncertainty Interval: AUD14 to 31 million) (one-off up-front cost) ","Modelling individual until everyone is dead or has reached 100 (maximum timeline 100 years)","Modelling (multi-state lifetable)","Disability-adjusted life years","Mean, net DALY averted for fruit and vegetable subsidy: -13,000 (95%Uncertainty Interval: -44,000 to 18,000)","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Dominated (no health improvement and no reduction in disease treatment costs)","Not reported","Mean disease costs offsets for fruit and vegetable subsidy: - AUD 0.9 billion ( 95%UI:AUD -0.4 to -1.4 billion).  ","Not reported","No","Cobiac LJ, Tam K, Veerman L, Blakely T. Taxes and subsidies for improving diet and population health in Australia: a cost-effectiveness modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(2):e1002232.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002232"]
[32,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_taxes","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelled mandatory fiscal policies range of foods:\n1. Saturated fat tax: AUD1.37/100g in foods with >2.3% saturated fat, excluding drinking milk; \n2. Excess salt tax: AUD0.3/1g  sodium in excess of Australian max recommended levels, excluding fresh fruits, vegetables, meats and dairy products; \n3. SSB tax: AUD0.47/L of soft, energy, fruit drinks and cordials; \n4. Sugar tax: AUD0.94/100ml ice cream containing >10g sugar per 100g or all other products AUD0.85/100g sugar content in excess of 10g per 100g , excluding fresh fruits, vegetables, and unflavoured dairy products; \n5. Fruit and vegetable subsidy: AUD0.14/100g for all fresh and preserved fruits and vegetables.\n Health as a primary aim (as it was specified to reduce unhealthy food intake) \n","Combination of saturated fat, sugar, sodium, SSB, F&V","General population","Australia - National",2010,"Lifetime (100 years)","Implementation costs: AUD 22 million (95% Uncertainty Interval: AUD14 to 31 million) (one-off up-front cost) ","Modelling individual until everyone is dead or has reached 100 (maximum timeline 100 years)","Modelling (multi-state lifetable)","Disability-adjusted life years","Mean, net DALY averted for combined intervention package: 470,000 (95%Uncertainty Interval: 420,000 to 510,000)","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Dominant (net health gain and net cost-saving)","Not reported","Mean disease costs offsets for combined intervention package: AUD 3.4 billion ( 95%UI:AUD 2.4 to 4.6 billion).  ","Not reported","No","Cobiac LJ, Tam K, Veerman L, Blakely T. Taxes and subsidies for improving diet and population health in Australia: a cost-effectiveness modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(2):e1002232.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002232"]
[33,"1 Diet and obesity","USA_NY_schoolbreakfast  Breakfast in the Classroom","Programme","Government ","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Programme of provision of breakfast in the classroom (BIC). The Federal Government subsidises school breakfast, but BICis  implemented by schools. Not every school implements BIC school-wide - and this may be classroom dependent.  Breakfast is handed out in the first 10-20 mins of class, which differs from the national School Breakfast programme which provides food in the cafeteria before school hours. The intent of BIC is to increase breakfast participation among students who are unable or unwilling to arrive early to school, and to reduce stigma associated with visiting the cafeteria before school for a subsidized meal. BIC meals usually consist of cold, prepacked items such as cereal, fresh fruit, or bagels. Health was a secondary aim (goal is to increase participation and ensure no child starts the school day hungry) ","School breakfast","Children (elementary & middle school)","USA - 18 states (This study: New York City) - Regional",2007,"1-4 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","BMI ","In grades 6 through 8, there is somewhat of an upward trend in BMI and obesity prior to program adoption, which halts after BIC adoption, although differences from year zero are again statistically insignificant. All other analyses of BMI and BIC find no statistically significant association.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Academic achievement: no significant difference was found: \"We find no evidence of an impact of BIC on achievement in either subject [maths or English language]. Point estimates are again small in absolute value, imprecisely estimated, and vary in sign. The only statistically significant effect we observe is for middle school math, for schools with at least 25 percent of classrooms covered (but not full BIC), a positive 0.007 SD per 100 days (P < 0.05).\" Increased school breakfast participation: \"we find BIC increased SBP participation rates by 4.4 percentage points, on average, when BIC is offered in fewer than 25 percent of classrooms. On a baseline rate of 20.1, this represents an increase of 22 percent. When BIC is offered in 25 percent or more classes but not schoolwide, the increase in participation is 19.5 points—a near doubling. Finally, in schools reporting that they offered BIC schoolwide, we observe a 30.2 point increase in the SBP participation rate\" ","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Corcoran SP, Elbel B, Schwartz AE. The effect of breakfast in the classroom on obesity and academic performance: Evidence from New York City. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 2016;35(3):509-32.","Link","• NA"]
[34,"1 Diet and obesity","UK Magic Breakfast","Programme","Government ","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary programme. The Magic Breakfast project provided schools with support and resources to offer a free, universal, before-school breakfast club, including to all Year 2 and Year 6 pupils. Schools were provided with free food, support from a Magic Breakfast school change leader, and a £300 grant towards up-front costs. The intervention itself was delivered by school staff and volunteers. In terms of the trial design: Schools were randomly allocated to one of two groups; the intervention group, who received support and resources to establish a universal free breakfast club before school in the academic year 2014/2015, and the control group, who received support and resources for the two following academic years (2015/2016 and 2016/2017).The project was jointly funded by the Department for Education and the Education Endowment Foundation and delivered by the charity Magic Breakfast)","School breakfast","Children (relatively high proportion of disadvantaged pupils)","UK - England -106 schools  - Local",2005,"1 year","• Implementation costs: The cost per pupil per year over three years is £11.86, averaged across all pupils in the breakfast club schools. The total cost was, on average, £4,462.11 per school.\n• Policy overlaps with activities thought to increase take-up of the breakfast provision included promoting it to parents and encouraging all children to attend while sensitively targeting pupils most likely to benefit\n• Passed through legislation\n","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","• Negative effect on BMI \n• Reported hunger\n","• fewer students  with a 'healthy' BMI\n• Not significantly different between intervention and control for Year 2, and p=0.080 for Year 6 (then if exclude Ramadan pupils, p=0.039)\n","Socially progressive :From this subgroup analysis we conclude that the effect for non-FSM students is stronger than for FSM students at KS1 and KS2, although the provision of a breakfast club had a positive effect for both groups.","Not reported","Not reported","Greater academic achievement: \"Breakfast club provision has positive, statistically significant impacts on KS1 scores in maths, reading, and writing. Progress in maths and writing was moderately enhanced by the intervention; scores in intervention schools were on average 0.14–0.15 standard deviations higher, equivalent to about two months’ progress. The impact for KS1 reading was a slightly smaller, though still significant, at 0.10 standard deviations.\" \"At KS2, the effects of intervention on primary outcomes are smaller and not statistically significant. KS2 reading scores were affected to a similar degree as reading scores at KS1, but a larger degree of uncertainty means that the KS2 results are not statistically different from zero. Maths results at KS2 were positively affected but by a small amount (0.07 standard deviations) that is not significantly different from zero\" - this could be because 91% of control groups offered free school breakfasts to year 6s in the run up to their KS2 tests. \"Pupil behaviour, as measured by a teacher survey, improved in breakfast club schools. This is interesting because it shows that breakfast clubs may improve outcomes for children who do not even attend breakfast club, by improving classroom environments.\" \"Attendance at school also improved for children in breakfast club schools, resulting in about 26 fewer half-days of absence per year for a class of 30.\" \"Students in intervention schools were less likely to be recorded as ‘healthy weight’ and had higher BMIs, on average, although these results are not statistically significant. ...These results could imply that schools implementing a breakfast club should be mindful that students could over-consume, although the results here are not conclusive enough to give a strong recommendation.\"","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Crawford et al (2016) Magic Breakfast - Evaluation report and executive summary (report)","Link","• NA"]
[35,"1 Diet and obesity","France F&V public policy model","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory reduction in VAT on fruit and vegetables from 5.5% (the current level) to 2.1%. This new rate corresponds to the minimum value allowed by the European tax policy.","F&V","General population","France - National",2006,"1 year","Implementation costs:  EUR 465 million (corresponds to the loss of tax revenues due to the VAT reduction)  and overlaps with other fiscal policy (‘National Nutrition and Health Program’ has been carried out by health authorities since 2001) ","Not reported ","Modelling (economic log linear model with Monte Carlo simulations)","• Deaths avoided\n• Years of life saved\n• Change in fruit and vegetable consumption (g/day)\n","• 363 (95% CI 200 to 582) Deaths avoided\n• 5024 (95% CI 2711 to 8132) Years of life saved\n• 4.8 (95% CI 3.1 to 7.1) g/d\n","Not reported","• Cost per death avoided\n• Cost per  year of life saved\n","• EUR 1379,000 ( 95% CI 799,000 to 2322,000)\n• EUR 100,000 (95% CI 57,000 to 171,000) \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Dallongeville J, Dauchet L, de Mouzon O, Requillart V, Soler L-G. Increasing fruit and vegetable consumption: a cost-effectiveness analysis of public policies. European Journal of Public Health. 2010;21(1):69-73.","Link","• 10.1093/eurpub/ckq013"]
[36,"1 Diet and obesity","France F&V public policy model","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy programme to increase F&V consumption through F&V stamps given to low-income consumers (LIC):  EUR100/year/person F&V stamps, considered as an increase in the income of targeted consumers.","F&V","Socio-economic (low income population)","France - National",2006,"1 year","• Implementation costs: EUR 465 million were used to subsidize F&V consumption . This represents a EUR100/year/person F&V stamp. \n• Policy overlaps with other fiscal policy (National Nutrition and Health Program has been carried out by health authorities since 2001)  \n","Not reported ","modelling (economic log linear model with Monte Carlo simulations)","• Deaths avoided\n• Years of life saved\n• Change in fruit and vegetable consumption (g/day)\n","• 77 (95% CI 48 to 116) Deaths avoided\n• 1032 (95% CI 634 to 1554)Years of life saved\n• 0.4 (95% CI 0.2 to 0.6) g/d\n","Not reported","• Cost per death avoided\n• Cost per  year of life saved\n","• EUR 6316,000 (95% CI 4015,000 to 9663,000)\n• EUR 474,000 (95% CI 299,000 to 733,000) \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Dallongeville J, Dauchet L, de Mouzon O, Requillart V, Soler L-G. Increasing fruit and vegetable consumption: a cost-effectiveness analysis of public policies. European Journal of Public Health. 2010;21(1):69-73.","Link","• 10.1093/eurpub/ckq013"]
[37,"1 Diet and obesity","USA_Bronx_subsidised_supermarket","Programme","Government (assessment of application to build supermarket by New York City Industrial Development Agency - local government)","Other (Tax exemptions)","NYC Food retail expansion to support health (FRESH) programme financial are open to grocery store operators renovating existing retail space or developers seeking to construct or renovate retail space that will be leased by a full-line grocery store operator. NY City designates zones lacking in full-service supermarkets and retailers can apply for voluntary financial and zoning incentives to defray costs of operating in these high-need zones. To qualify, a store must meet basic nutrition criteria, including dedicating at least 30% of floor space to perishable food items and designating 500 ft2 (46·45m2) to fresh produce. \nBenefits of the FRESH incentives programme include: 1) building taxes may be stabilized at pre-improvement real estate tax amounts for up to 25 years (with benefits phasing out at not more than 20% per year); 2) Land taxes may be fully abated for up to 25 years (with benefits phasing out at not more than 20% per year); 3)The 8.875% city and state sales tax may be waived on materials used to construct, renovate, or equip facilities; 4) The mortgage recording tax applicable to a project mortgage may be reduced from 2.8% to 0.3%, lowering upfront costs Health as a primary aim (part of a collection of obesity prevention efforts initiated in New York City to improve the food environment in underserved neighbourhoods) \n","Supermarket zoning in food insecure areas","Socio-economic groups (food insecure households)","USA - Bronx - Local",2011,"9 months","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (https://www.nycedc.com/program/food-retail-expansion-support-health-fresh)","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","• Food availability at home\n• Dietary intake\n","No appreciable differences in availability of healthful or unhealthful foods at home, or in children’s dietary intake as a result of the supermarket zoning initiative.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Elbel B, Moran A, Dixon LB, Kiszko K, Cantor J, Abrams C, et al. Assessment of a government-subsidized supermarket in a high-need area on household food availability and children’s dietary intakes. Public health nutrition. 2015;18(15):2881-90.","Link","• 10.1017/S1368980015000282"]
[38,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_discount","Programme","Non-governmental (Retail management company)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary 10% price discount on grocery, fresh fruit and diet soft-drinks in Outback stores in disadvantaged communities","Grocery, F&V and artificially sweetened beverages","Socio-economic groups (disadvantaged Aboriginal communities)","Australia - Northern Territory and Western Australia - Local",2010,"1 year","Implemented by retail mangement decision","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","Purchasing/sales","No discernible impact of the discounts on groceries, fresh fruit and veteables and diet soft-frinks  on store turnover was detected.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Ferguson M, O'dea K, Holden S, Miles E, Brimblecombe J. Food and beverage price discounts to improve health in remote Aboriginal communities: mixed method evaluation of a natural experiment. Australian and New Zealand journal of public health. 2017;41(1):32-7.","Link","• 10.1111/1753-6405.12616"]
[39,"1 Diet and obesity","Tax model (comparing 3 fiscal policies)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% tax on unhealthy food in the UK (soft drinks and snack foods, but other specific foods were included). Health was a primary aim (overweight and obesity reduction) ","Unhealthy food, SSB","General population (overweight and obese)","UK - National",2010,"9-15 years","No implementation cost","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric)","%age point reduction in overweight-obesity","9% point reduction in overweight-obesity from 57% without the policy to 48%.","Not reported","Cost-benefit","GBP12,241 Million Benefit (avoidable healthcare costs)+ revenue","Not reported","GBP818 Million in revenue  ","Not reported","No","Flores M, Rivas J. Cash incentives and unhealthy food consumption. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2017;69(1):42-56.","Link","• 10.1111/boer.12085"]
[40,"1 Diet and obesity","Subsidy model (comparing 3 fiscal policies)","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary 10% subsidy for healthy food (not specified) in the UK Health as a primary aim (overweight and obesity reduction) ","Healthy food","General population (overweight and obese)","UK - National",2010,"9-15 years","Implementation costs: GBP 102 million","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric)","%age point reduction in overweight-obesity","50% point reduction in overweight-obesity from 57% without the policy to 7%.","Not reported","Cost-benefit","GBP56,3271 Million Benefit (avoidable healthcare costs)- price of subsidies","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Flores M, Rivas J. Cash incentives and unhealthy food consumption. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2017;69(1):42-56.","Link","• 10.1111/boer.12085"]
[41,"1 Diet and obesity","Cash incentive (comparing 3 fiscal policies)","Modelling study","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary cash incentive (money given to consumers each quarter equalling the difference between the quarterly cost of consuming healthy food and the quarterly cost of consuming unhealthy food) in the UK. Health as a primary aim (overweight and obesity reduction) ","Healthy food","General population (overweight and obese)","UK - National",2010,"9-15 years","Implementation costs: GBP 158,266 million","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric)","%age point reduction in overweight-obesity","56% point reduction in overweight-obesity from 57% without the policy to 48%.","Not reported","Cost-benefit","GBP -29,159 Million Benefit (avoidable healthcare costs) - costs of implementing incentives","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Flores M, Rivas J. Cash incentives and unhealthy food consumption. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2017;69(1):42-56.","Link","• 10.1111/boer.12085"]
[42,"1 Diet and obesity","Tax model (comparing 3 fiscal policies)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% tax on unhealthy food in the USA (soft drinks and snack foods, but other specific foods were included) Health was a primary aim (overweight and obesity reduction) ","Unhealthy food, SSB","General population (overweight and obese)","USA - National",2010,"9-15 years","No implementation cost","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric)","%age point reduction in overweight-obesity","11% point reduction in overweight-obesity from 68% without the policy to 57%.","Not reported","Cost-benefit","$191,426  Million Benefit (avoidable healthcare costs)+ revenue","Not reported","GBP13,350 Million in revenue  ","Not reported","No","Flores M, Rivas J. Cash incentives and unhealthy food consumption. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2017;69(1):42-56.","Link","• 10.1111/boer.12085"]
[43,"1 Diet and obesity","Subsidy model (comparing 3 fiscal policies)","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary 10% subsidy for healthy food in the USA ( food type not specified) Health as a primary aim (overweight and obesity reduction) ","Healthy food","General population (overweight and obese)","USA - National",2010,"9-15 years","Implementation cost: $86,426 million","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric)","%age point reduction in overweight-obesity","60% point reduction in overweight-obesity from 68% without the policy to 8%.","Not reported","Cost-benefit","$874,355 Million Benefit (avoidable healthcare costs)- price of subsidies","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Flores M, Rivas J. Cash incentives and unhealthy food consumption. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2017;69(1):42-56.","Link","• 10.1111/boer.12085"]
[44,"1 Diet and obesity","Cash incentive (comparing 3 fiscal policies)","Modelling study","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary cash incentive (money given to consumers each quarter equalling the difference between the quarterly cost of consuming healthy food and the quarterly cost of consuming unhealthy food) in the USA. Health as a primary aim (overweight and obesity reduction) ","Healthy food","General population (overweight and obese)","USA - National",2010,"9-15 years","Implementation costs:  $2,606,856 million","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric)","%age point reduction in overweight-obesity","67% point reduction in overweightg-obesity from 68% without the policy to 1%.","Not reported","Cost-benefit","$-743,447  Million Benefit (avoidable healthcare costs) - costs of implementing incentives","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Flores M, Rivas J. Cash incentives and unhealthy food consumption. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2017;69(1):42-56.","Link","• 10.1111/boer.12085"]
[45,"1 Diet and obesity","Tiffin & Arnoult (2011)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Mandatory increase in the price of fatty foods by 1% for every percent of saturated fats they contain (ceiling 15%); subsidy on fruit & vegetables to offset tax burden .","Saturated fat, F&V","General population","UK - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","• Disease\n• Consumption\n","• Negligible effect on disease: the model suggests a 2-3% reduction in coronary heart disease, stroke and lung cancer.)\n• Small effect (shift in consumption toward recommendations, ≈15% fruit & vegetable subsidy effective in increasing average intakes to recommended intakes) Ineffective (negligible effect on disease)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article:  Tiffin R, Arnoult M. The public health impacts of a fat tax. Eur J Clin Nutr. 2011;65:427–433. ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[46,"1 Diet and obesity","Zhen et al. (2011)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory  0.5 cents per ounce tax on regular carbonated soft drink, diet carbonated soft drink, whole milk, low-fat milk, bottled water, sports & energy drinks, fruit juice, coffee & tea, sugar-sweetened fruit drinks ","Beverages","General population","USA - National ","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","Effective [long-run household sugar-sweetened beverages ↓118–135 12-oz cans/y (low-income); ↓110–128 12-oz cans/y (high-income)]","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article:  Zhen C, Wohlgenant MK, Karns S, et al. Habit formation and demand for sugar- sweetened beverages. Am J Agric Econ. 2011;93:175–193. ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[47,"1 Diet and obesity","France fat, sugar and ready meals tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10 % tax on foods in the cheese-butter category,  as well as high sugar- high fat products, and ready meals. ","Fats and ready-meals","General population","France - National","2010*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","All tax rises decreased total energy and saturated fat intake; taxing both sugar and fat products and cheese and butter products increased polyunsaturated fat use; taxing all three food groups gave weight decrease of 1.3 kg/year","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Allais O, Bertail P, Nichele V. The effects of a fat tax on French households’ purchases: a nutritional approach. Am J Agric Econ. 2010;92:228–245 ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[48,"1 Diet and obesity","France sugar and SSB subsidy model","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory removal of the floor price, import duties, export subsidies, & quotas for sugar. This resulted in the price decreasing by 36% in 2006–2009, leading to 3% decrease in soft drink price.","Sugar","General population","France - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","Effective (consumption of regular soft drinks ↑1 L /person/y, added sugar ↑124 g/ person/y)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Bonnet C, Réquillart V. Does the EU sugar policy reform increase added sugar consumption? An empirical evidence on the soft drink market. Health Econ. 2011;20:1012–1024. ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[49,"1 Diet and obesity","France sugar and SSB tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax of 0.0716 euros per L for soft drinks which approximates to a tax of 10% on carbonated soft drinks.","SSB","General population","France - National","2012*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","Effective (soft drink consumption ↓3 L /person/y. Sugar-sweetened beverage consumption decreases more with sugar-sweetened beverages-only tax)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Bonnet C, Réquillart V. Sugar Policy Reform, Tax Policy and Price Transmission in the Soft Drink Industry. Working Paper No. 4, Transparency of Food Pricing (TRANSFOP) project. Brussels: European Commission; 2012 ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[50,"1 Diet and obesity","Dong & Lin USA F&V subsidy model","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary 10% subsidy on the price of fruit and vegetables  available for households who are income-eligible for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program—that is, households with an income below 130 percent of Federal poverty guidelines ","F&V","Socio-economic (low income population)","USA - National","2009*","Within year","Implementation costs: : US$ 308 million for fruit subsidy, US$ 274 million for vegetable subsidy","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","Effective but very small (fruit consumption ↑2.1–5.2%; vegetables ↑2.1–4.9%)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Dong D, Lin BH. Fruit and Vegetable Consumption by Low-Income Americans: Would a Price Reduction Make a Difference? Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture; 2009. ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[51,"1 Diet and obesity","Norway SSB tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory increase in VAT from 13% to 25%  on sugar-sweetened carbonated soft drinks ","SSB","General population","Norway - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Purchase; calories","Effective (low-purchasing households reduce purchases by ≈5 L, high-purchasing households by ≈20 L (NS); Price increase of 10.6% = ↓10.8% reduction in purchase","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Gustavsen GW, Rickertsen K. The effects of taxes on purchases of sugar- sweetened carbonated soft drinks: a quantile regression approach. Appl Econ. 2011;43:707–716.  ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[52,"1 Diet and obesity","Khan et al. (2012)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory  5–10% price increase on milk.","Milk","General population","USA - National","2012*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (behaviours)","Consumption","Effective (1% increase in price of whole milk decreased consumption by 2.73% (shift to lower-fat milk).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Khan R, Misra K, Singh V. Will a Fat Tax Work?Paper presented at: Summer Institute in Competitive Strategy 2012; July 9–13, 2012; Berkeley, CA ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[53,"1 Diet and obesity","Kotakorpi et al. (2011)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Mandatory tax of 1 euro per kilogram of added sugar (price ↑9.2% for sugar/sweet); abolition of the current VAT on fresh fruit, vegetables, & fish (price ↓11.5%).","Added sugar, F&V, fish","General population","Finland - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","Effective (sugar tax: sugar & sweet ↓23%. VAT cut: fruit & vegetable demand ↑5%; fish ↑11%; combined tax & subsidy had slightly larger effect)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Kotakorpi K, Härkänen T, Pietinen P, et al. The welfare effects of health-based food tax policy. CESifoWorking Paper No. 3633. Paper presented at: CESifo Area Conference ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[54,"1 Diet and obesity","Lin et al. (2010)","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory 10% price subsidy on healthy food: fruits (juice & non-juice), vegetables, & fluid milk","F&V, milk","General population","USA - National","2010*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","Effective but small (consumption: vegetables ↑4.7%, fruits ↑7.0%, dairy products ↑4.22%)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Lin BH, Yen ST, Dong D, et al. Economic incentives for dietary improvement among food stamp recipients. Contemp Econ Policy. 2010;28:524–536","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[55,"1 Diet and obesity","Miao et al. (2011)35","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory product tax of 39.30% on “sweetener products”, 27.47% on sugars, 42.95% on corn sweeteners, & a very small rate on other sweeteners aimed at reducing caloric sweetener consumption by 10% ","Added sugar","General population","USA - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (behaviours)","Consumption","Effective (10% reduction in caloric sweetener consumption, by design; tax on inputs minimizes loss of consumer welfare)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Miao Z, Beghin JC, Jensen HH. Taxing sweets: sweetener input tax or final con- sumption tax? Contemp Econ Policy. 2011; doi: 10.1111/j.1465- 7287.2011.00278. ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[56,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand Shop N Go subsidy ","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy of 12.5% of the price of core (healthier) foods that met the program criteria through the  Shop’N Go shops. RCT tested set of interventions in 4 groups: price discounts on healthier foods, tailored nutrition education, discounts plus education, control).","Healthy food","General population","New Zealand - Local","2010*","6 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Purchase volume of healthy foods\n• Purchase volume of saturated fat\n","• Effective (healthier foods at 6 mo ↑11%; at 12 mo ↑5%); \n• Ineffective (no effect on saturated fat purchased)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Ni Mhurchu C, Blakely T, Jiang Y, et al. Effects of price discounts and tailored nutrition education on supermarket purchases: a randomized controlled trial. Am J Clin Nutr. 2010;91:736–747 ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[57,"1 Diet and obesity","Nnoaham et al. (2009)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory17.5% VAT on major sources of saturated fat","Saturated fat","General population","UK - National","2009*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (spreadsheet-based model)","• CVD and cancer mortality\n• Consumption\n","• no mortality reduction\n• Ineffective: Calories ↓0.5%, saturated fat↓2.4%, salt ↑0.2%, fruit & vegetables ↓2.7%\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Nnoaham KE, Sacks G, Rayner M, et al. Modelling income group differences in the health and economic impacts of targeted food taxes and subsidies. Int J Epidemiol. 2009;38:1324–1333 ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[58,"1 Diet and obesity","Nnoaham et al. (2009)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 17.5% VAT on unhealthy foods ","Unhealthy food","General population","UK - National","2009*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (spreadsheet-based model)","• CVD and cancer mortality\n• Consumption\n","• CVD and cancer deaths increased by 35–1300 per year; \n• Ineffective: Calories ↓2.4%, saturated fat↓3.1%, salt ↓1.9%, fruit & vegetables ↓1.5%\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Nnoaham KE, Sacks G, Rayner M, et al. Modelling income group differences in the health and economic impacts of targeted food taxes and subsidies. Int J Epidemiol. 2009;38:1324–1333 abstract/72/9/551/1859025?redirectedFrom=fulltext.","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[59,"1 Diet and obesity","Nnoaham et al. (2009)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Mandatory 17.5% VAT on unhealthy foods & 17.5% subsidy on fruit & vegetables","Unhealthy food, F&V","General population","UK - National","2009*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (spreadsheet-based model)","• CVD and cancer mortality\n• Consumption\n","• up to 2900 CVD and cancer deaths averted per year; \n• Effective: Calories ↓0.9%, saturated fat ↓1%, salt ↓1.1%, fruit & vegetables ↑4.8%\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Nnoaham KE, Sacks G, Rayner M, et al. Modelling income group differences in the health and economic impacts of targeted food taxes and subsidies. Int J Epidemiol. 2009;38:1324–1333 ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[60,"1 Diet and obesity","Nnoaham et al. (2009)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Mandatory 17.5% VAT on unhealthy foods & 32.5% subsidy (revenue neutral) on fruit & vegetables","Unhealthy food, F&V","General population","UK - National","2009*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (spreadsheet-based model)","• CVD and cancer mortality\n• Consumption\n","• up to 6400 CVD and cancer deaths averted per; \n• Effective: calories ↑0.4%, saturated fat↓0.8%, salt ↓0.5%, fruit & vegetables ↑11%\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Nnoaham KE, Sacks G, Rayner M, et al. Modelling income group differences in the health and economic impacts of targeted food taxes and subsidies. Int J Epidemiol. 2009;38:1324–1333 abstract/72/9/551/1859025?redirectedFrom=fulltext.","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[61,"1 Diet and obesity","Okrent & Alston (2011)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)"," Modelled the effects of a range of voluntary subsidies and mandatory taxes: Removal of all grain subsidies; removal of all agricultural subsidies, including border measures; implementation of 10% fruit & vegetable product & commodity subsidies; $0.005 tax per gram of fat, $0.002688 tax per gram of sugar, & $0.000165 tax per calorie (designed to cause equivalent calorie reduction).","Agricultural products","General population","USA - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (behaviours)","Calories","• Farm subsidy removal ineffective (negligible effect)\n• Taxes may be effective [calorie consumption ↓19,642 kcal/adult/y (more than half from food away from home): calorie tax least distortionary]: a fat tax of USD$0.15 and $0.23 per pound may reduce calorie consumption of est. 20,000 kcal/adult/year and a sugar tax of USD$1.67 and $1.73 per pound reduced calorie consumption of est. 3,000 kcal/adult/year\n• Subsidy ineffective (increase in fruit & vegetable consumption, increase in calories by ≈1%; commodity subsidy less distortionary than product subsidy)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Okrent A, Alston JM. The Effects of Farm Commodity and Retail Food Policies on Obesity and Economic Welfare in the United States.Working Paper no. 1101. Davis, CA: Robert Mondavi Institute, Center forWine Economics; 2011 ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[62,"1 Diet and obesity","Schroeter et al. 200832","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% tax on soft drinks; Health was a primary aim (target behaviour is diet, obesity and chronic disease) ","SSB","General population","USA - National","2008*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (dietary intake)","Body weight","2) 0.099% (0.086 kg) decrease in men and 0.122% (0.091 kg) decrease in women indaily weight\n\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Schroeter et al. 2008 ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[63,"1 Diet and obesity","Schroeter et al. 200832","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory 10% subsidy for fruit and vegetables; Health was a primary aim (target behaviour is diet, obesity and chronic disease) ","F&V","General population","USA - National","2008*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (dietary intake)","Body weight","3) 0.222% increase: 0.193 kg in men and 0.166 kg in women daitly weight change","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Schroeter et al. 2008 ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[64,"1 Diet and obesity","Schroeter et al. 200832","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory 10% subsidy for diet soft drinks.  Health was a primary aim (target behaviour is diet, obesity and chronic disease) ","Artificially sweetened beverages","General population","USA - National","2008*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (dietary intake)","Body weight","4) 0.071% decrease in daily weight\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Schroeter et al. 2008 ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[65,"1 Diet and obesity","Schroeter et al. 200832","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% tax or subsidy on food away from home; Health was a primary aim (target behaviour is diet, obesity and chronic disease).","Takeaway","General population","USA - National","2008*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (dietary intake)","Body weight","1) 0.196% increase in daily weight","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Schroeter et al. 2008   ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[66,"1 Diet and obesity","Khan et al. (2012)44","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% price increase on fast food.","Unhealthy food","General population","USA - National","2012*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (behaviours)","Consumption","Effective (frequency of  weekly fast food consumption ↓5.7%)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article:Khan T, Powell LM, Wada R. Fast food consumption and food prices: evidence from panel data on 5th and 8th grade children. J Obes. 2012; doi: 10.1155/2012/ 857697 ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[67,"1 Diet and obesity","Miao et al. (2011)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Model scenario that would result in a reduction in calories by same amount as a soda tax of 1 cent per liquid ounce:  Food items with higher values than the reference (average) value in food group are classified as high fat/high sugar, while foods with equal or lower values than the reference are classified as low fat/low sugar.  ","Added sugar","General population","USA - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (behaviours)","Consumption","Effective (calorie intake ↓2.19%, by design; internal composition of food groups changes toward leaner & lighter choices to abate the taxes) Sugar tax: “Soft drinks, carbonated,”“Sugars & sweets,”“Coffee & tea” ↓16% or more; “Fruit juices” 1%","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Miao Z, Beghin J, Jensen HH. Accounting for Product Substitution in the Analysis of Food Taxes Targeting Obesity.Working paper no. 10-WP 518. Ames, IA: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development; 2011. ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[68,"1 Diet and obesity","Danish selective food taxation model","Modelling study","Government","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Mandatory halving of the rate of value-added tax (VAT) on fruit and vegetables (from 25% to 12.5%) and increasing taxation on fat  to approximately DKK 8.00 (EUR 1.08) per kilogram of fat and sugar to approximately DKK 5.60 (EUR 0.75) per kilogram of sugar). Health was a primary aim (specify).","Fat and F&V","General population","Denmark - National",2012,"Within year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment)","DALYs","The biggest reduction in burden of disease could be obtained through changed demand for fruit and vegetables (32.9 DALY per 100 000 people), followed by fibre (11.0 DALY per 100 000 people), fat (2.4 DALY per 100 000 people) and saturated fat (1.8 DALY per 100 000 people). The health impact of the selective taxation scenario thus differed for the included dietary risk factors.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Holm AL, Laursen M-B, Koch M, Jensen JD, Diderichsen F. The health benefits of selective taxation as an economic instrument in relation to IHD and nutrition-related cancers. Public health nutrition. 2013;16(12):2124-31.","Link","• 10.1017/S1368980013000153"]
[69,"1 Diet and obesity","AUS_SSB_Tax (20%)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 20% sales tax on SSBs. Health was a primary aim (reduction in obesity, and looking at impact on life expectancy).","SSB","General population","Australia - National","2011-12","10 years","Implementation costs: AUD12.69 million (assumed to be the same as the costs of the plain packaging for tobacco)","Not reported ","Modelling (CRE- Obesity model (to estimate how a change in the distribution of the prevalence of overweight and obesity caused by an intervention impacts the epidemiology of several obesity-related diseases, which in turn influence the total HALYs in the population))","HALYs","As a result ofa 20% SSB tax, the Australian population was estimated to gain 175,300 HALYs (95% CI: 68,700; 277,800) and save 111,700 years of life (95% CI: 43,600; 175,800) (Table 3). The HALY gains were highest in the 2 most disadvantaged quintiles, with 49.4% of the total HALYs gained accruing to these quintiles. Quintile 5 had the lowest HALYs gained and years of life saved for men and women.","Enacting a 20% SSB sales tax in Australia was estimated to result in greater decreases in weight for the 3 most disadvantaged quintiles than for the 2 least disadvantaged quintiles for both men and women, with larger decreases in men. Quintile 5 (least disadvantaged) had the lowest predicted","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","The tax was estimated to be cost saving across all intervention scenarios (sensitivity analyses) and all quintiles. Over the lifetime ofthe population cohort, expected healthcare cost sav- ings were AU$1.73 billion, intervention costs were estimated to be AU$119.6m (95% CI: $91.9m; $162.1m)—approximately $4.8m (95% CI: $3.9m; $6.1m) in the first year and $3.7m 95% CI: $2.8m; $5.0m) in subsequent years, discounted at 3%. For every dollar invested in the first 10 years, the tax would result in AU$17 (95% CI: $9; $19) in healthcare cost savings. The tax revenue generated at the population level was estimated to be AU$642.9m annually (95% CI: $348.2m; $1,117.2m). For the total population, the out-of-pocket healthcare costs saved were estimated to be AU\n$299.4m (95% CI: $113.8m; $476.2m). Healthcare cost savings as a percentage ofhousehold expenditure by quintile were highest in the most disadvantaged groups. Per capita, the most disadvantaged quintile was estimated to incur the most tax, at an estimated AU$35.40 (95% CI: $18.70; $62.80) per year, or 0.54% ofexpenditure on food and non-alcoholic drinks.","Not reported","The tax revenue raised outweighed the DWL for the total Australian population, with an estimated net deadweight impact of+AU$587.9m (95% CI: +$329.2m, +$1,027.6m) per year. ","High obesity levels, universal healthcare, ageing population Not implemented but politically no, an SSB tax is not seem as acceptable in Australia Health experts Government, industry reps  (comparisons across other nations who have done it is quite common) ","Yes","Lal, Anita, et al. \"Modelled health benefits of a sugar-sweetened beverage tax across different socioeconomic groups in Australia: A cost-effectiveness and equity analysis.\" PLoS medicine 14.6 (2017): e1002326.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002326"]
[70,"1 Diet and obesity","Brazil_fat_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling a mandatory linear symmetric revenue neutral tax on saturated fat. The rate calculated for each food group, so that no net revenue to the public sector is achieved. ","Saturated fat","General population","Brazil - National",2008,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric model)","Change in weight","3,558,036 lbs lost in total population","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No revenue for the Government.","Not reported","No","Leifert RM, Lucinda CR. Linear Symmetric “Fat Taxes”: Evidence from Brazil. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. 2015;37(4):634-66.","Link","• 10.1093/aepp/ppu062"]
[71,"1 Diet and obesity","Brazil_fat_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling mandatory 1% price increase for each gram of saturated fat for each of these 8 food group (sugars, poultry, meat, processed meats, flour and pasta, dairy,  oils and fats, baked). \n\n","Saturated fat, grains, F&V and tubers","General population","Brazil - National",2008,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric model)","Change in weight","1,096,342 lbs lost in total population","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","BRL 91,591,085 to the Government.","Not reported","No","Leifert RM, Lucinda CR. Linear Symmetric “Fat Taxes”: Evidence from Brazil. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. 2015;37(4):634-66.","Link","• 10.1093/aepp/ppu062"]
[72,"1 Diet and obesity","Brazil_fat_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling a voluntary 5% price subsidy for grains, fruits, vegetables and tubers.\n","Saturated fat, grains, F&V and tubers","General population","Brazil - National",2008,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric model)","Change in weight","1.210,773 lbs lost in total population","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","BRL 52,931,163 to the Government.","Not reported","No","Leifert RM, Lucinda CR. Linear Symmetric “Fat Taxes”: Evidence from Brazil. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. 2015;37(4):634-66.","Link","• 10.1093/aepp/ppu062"]
[73,"1 Diet and obesity","Brazil_fat_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 1% price increase for each gram of saturated fatty acids for each of these 12 food group (sugars, poultry, meat, processed meats, grains, flour and pasta, fruits, dairy, vegetables, oils and fats, baked, tubers) Health was a secondary aim  Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year)","Saturated fat","General population","Brazil - National",2008,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric model)","Change in weight","998,930 lbs lost in total population","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","BRL 138,912,593 to the Government/","Not reported","No","Leifert RM, Lucinda CR. Linear Symmetric “Fat Taxes”: Evidence from Brazil. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. 2015;37(4):634-66.","Link","• 10.1093/aepp/ppu062"]
[74,"1 Diet and obesity","Brazil_fat_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 1% price increase for each gram of saturated fatty acids for each of these 8 food group (sugars, poultry, meat, processed meats,  flour and pasta,  dairy,  oils and fats, baked). Grains, fruits, vegetables and tubers are exempt. Health was a secondary aim.","Saturated fat","General population","Brazil - National",2008,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric model)","Change in weight","985,679 lbs lost in total population","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","BRL 127,550,872 to the Government.","Not reported","No","Leifert RM, Lucinda CR. Linear Symmetric “Fat Taxes”: Evidence from Brazil. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. 2015;37(4):634-66.","Link","• 10.1093/aepp/ppu062"]
[75,"1 Diet and obesity","Mexico conditional cash transfer (Programa de Apoyo Alimentario)","Programme","Government","Financial incentive","Voluntary conditional cash transfer programme targeted to communities that do not receive benefits from other federal food aid programs, have ,2500 inhabitants, and have a high level of marginalization.  The program provided beneficiary households either a cash transfer of 150 Mexican pesos/month (equivalent to ~14 USD at the time) or a monthly food basket with a cost to the program of 150 pesos. The basket was designed to contribute 450 kcal (1883 kJ)/d per adult in an average-sized household. Households received the transfer once every 2 mo. required to attend nutrition and health education sessions and had to participate in program-related logistic activities to receive the benefits. These program conditions, however, were not strictly enforced. Health was a primary aim (To attend to the needs of communities with limited access to education or health services) ","Overall diet","Socio-economic (low income population and remote deprived communities)","Mexico - National",2003,"14 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study (cohort follow-up)","Energy, nutrient intake","• PAL was associated with increases (P<0.01) in the consumption of total energy (5–9% increase), energy from fruits and vegetables (24–28% increase), and energy from animal source foods (24–39% increase) in both the cash and the basket transfer. \n• PAL increased the consumption of all macro- and micronutrients (P<0.05) (iron, zinc, and vitamin A and C consumption (P <0.05)) with the exception of heme iron in the cash group. \n• The consumption of energy and all nutrients was greater in the food basket group (P<0.05) except for fiber, which did not differ.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Leroy, J L, P Gadsden, S Rodriguez-Ramirez, and T G de Cossio. 2010. “Cash and in-Kind Transfers in Poor Rural Communities in Mexico Increase Household Fruit, Vegetable, and Micronutrient Consumption but Also Lead to Excess Energy Consumption.” J Nutr 140(3): 612–17. ","Link","• 10.3945/jn.109.116285"]
[76,"1 Diet and obesity","SA_SSB_tax","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 20% SSB tax for a period of 20 years with 100% pass on rate. The implemented tax is fixed at 2.1 cents per gram of sugar content that exceeds 4g per 100ml.  Health was a primary aim (prevention and control of obesity) ","SSB","General population","South Africa - National",2018,"20 years","• Policy overlaps with Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs, 2013–2017\n• Passed through legislation\n","Not reported ","Modelling (Markov modelling)","Number of disease incidences averted (e.g. strokes, etc.)","• Our model estimates that without the tax intervention, there would be approximately 6 400 000 new adult stroke cases over 20 years, compared to 6 300 000 cases with the intervention. This translates to relative changes of between 1.0 and 1.8 %\n• The tax is predicted to reduce the number of prevalent stroke cases in adults by approximately 13 000 (95 % UI: 8 400–17 000) by year 20. We estimate that over 72 000 deaths may be averted by the tax over the same period (95 %UI: 51 000–98 000)\n• The model estimates that about 550 000 stroke-related DALYs will be averted over a 20 year period (9 5 % UI: 361 000–767 000). \n","Not reported","Costs avoided","In year 20 of the intervention, a potential ZAR342 million (USD27 million) (95 % UI: ZAR222–463 million, USD 18– 37 million) may be saved, compared to ZAR30 million (USD2 million) (95 % UI: ZAR21–ZAR39 million, USD1.7–3.1 million) in year one, for a total of over ZAR5 billion (USD 400 million) over the entire 20 year period (95 % UI: ZAR3.7–7.2 billion, USD296–576 million","Not reported","Not reported","This policy was delayed by a year for more consultations. Proponents include government, public health bodies while opponents include industry groups  (note, at publication, the tax was only 3 months old) ","No","Manyema, Mercy, et al. \"Modelling the potential impact of a sugar-sweetened beverage tax on stroke mortality, costs and health-adjusted life years in South Africa.\" BMC public health 16.1 (2016): 405.","Link","• 10.1186/s12889-016-3085-y"]
[77,"1 Diet and obesity","France_fish_tax_subsidy","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a health taxation/subsidy program  alongside providing information on fish consumption and consumers’ welfare. Both a per-unit tax would be imposed on tuna to reduce population exposure to methylmercury, and a per-unit subsidy supplied for sardines because of omega-3 are selected to maximize welfare by taking into account a costly information policy. Health was a primary aim (reduce consumption of high-containing methylmercury fish and increase consumption of high omega-3 fish) ","Fish (tuna and sardines)","General population","France - National",2002,"NA","Policy overlaps  with  providing information to consumers about the health implications of methylmercury\n","Not reported ","Modelling (quasilinear utility function. Combine willingness to pay (coming from the experiment) with the calibrated partial equilibrium model measuring imperfect substitution between sardines and tuna)","consumers’ welfare ( no further details as to what welfare entails, but discuss the impact of omega-3 on reducing the risk of cardio-vascular diseases and its contrinution to brain development and growth of children, as well as the impacts of methylmercury on a lack of brain development in the fetus and children.\n","\"for most cases, a per-unit tax on tuna and a per-unit subsidy on sardines without any information revealed to consumers lead to the highest welfare, because both the tax and subsidy directly internalize health characteristics. The information policy combined with a per-unit tax on tuna and a per-unit subsidy on sardines is socially profitable only if a large proportion of consumers (greater than 95%) receives health information.\"","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The general population The revenues collected by the tax on tuna are used to subsidise sardines in Fiscal model 2. \"Fiscal program 1 will maximize the regulatory program without balancing the budget linked to the regulation on the fish market. In other words, the fiscal deficit B(tt , ss, I × C)< 0(or surplus B(tt , ss, I × C)> 0) is financed by a lump-sum tax (or leads to a lump-sum transfer) accounted for in the overall welfare (see Crespi and Marette 2001). This may correspond to a transfer coming from a more general health policy decided by a state.\"","Not reported","No","Marette S, Roosen J, Blanchemanche S. Taxes and subsidies to change eating habits when information is not enough: an application to fish consumption. Journal of Regulatory Economics. 2008 Oct 1;34(2):119-43.","Link","• 10.1007/s11149-008-9057-0"]
[78,"1 Diet and obesity","Healthy Start (UK)","Policy","Government (Department of Health)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Women who are at least ten weeks pregnant and families with children up to their fourth birthday can register for Healthy Start if they receive qualifying welfare benefits or qualifying tax credits with a household income of £16,190 or less (2013/14), or they are pregnant and aged under 18 irrespective of benefits or tax credits. Those registered for Healthy Start receive vouchers which can be exchanged for fresh or frozen fruit and vegetables, plain cows’ milk or infant formula, and coupons for free vitamin supplements. The current voucher value is £3.10 per week for pregnant women and children between the ages of one and four, and £6.20 per week for children up to their first birthday. Health was a primary aim (improve nutritional status of pregnant women and their children) ","Food insecurity","Socio-economic groups (food insecure households)","UK - Yorkshire and the Humber, and London - Regional",2006,"NA","• Policy overlaps with any public health policies that are targeted at pregnant women/children \n• Passed through legislation\n","Not reported ","Empirical assessment (qualitative interviews)","Increasing nutritional status","Both beneficiaries and practitioners valued the contribution of Healthy Start food vouchers to improve the diets of pregnant women, mothers and young children under four years-old in low-income families. Women reported that food vouchers increased the quantity and range of fruit and vegetables eaten by them and their children. This was said to improve the quality of family diets while receiving food vouchers and to establish good habits for the future. The influence of food vouchers appeared to have particular salience for teenage pregnant women who may not otherwise have had autonomy or access to resources to buy nutritious food.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","For those eligible for the programme, barriers to registration meant that not all those who could benefit from food vouchers received them. These barriers included complex eligibility criteria that are difficult for women and health practitioners to understand, inappropriate targeting of information about the programme by health practitioners to those they judge to be eligible and low level of awareness of the programme among the general population. Additionally a complex application process led to some potential beneficiaries losing out and caused delays in receiving time-limited vouchers for others.","Not reported","Not reported","NA","McFadden A, Green JM, Williams V, McLeish J, McCormick F, Fox-Rushby J, Renfrew MJ. Can food vouchers improve nutrition and reduce health inequalities in low-income mothers and young children: A multi-method evaluation of the experiences of beneficiaries and practitioners of the Healthy Start programme in England. BMC public health. 2014 Dec;14(1):148.","Link","• 10.1186/1471-2458-14-148"]
[79,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand School Breakfast Programme - trial","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","RCT evaluation of a voluntary school breakfast programme. Eligible primary schools did not have an existing breakfast programme and agreed to start one in the 2010 school year. Schools needed to be of sufficient size that they estimated at least 25 students would attend a breakfast programme each day. Eligible participants were children aged 5-13 years who planned to attend the SBP and did not have a diagnosed food allergy. Only one child per household could take part. no attempts were made to standardise the intervention or its delivery in schools, other than requesting that the programme be available 5 days/week. Health as a secondary aim (primary outcome was children’s school attendance. Secondary outcomes were academic achievement, self- reported grades, sense of belonging at school, behaviour, short-term hunger, breakfast habits and food security)","School breakfast","Children","New Zealand - 14 schools in Auckland, Waikato and Wellington - Local",2010,"1 year","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","Reduced reported hunger","There was a significant decrease in children’s self-reported short- term hunger during the intervention phase compared with the control phase, demonstrated by an increase of 8.6 units on the Freddy satiety scale (95% CI 3.4 to 13.7, p=0.001).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No significant effect of intervention on attendance - in fact attendance dropped through the school year (likely unrelated). The odds of children achieving an attendance rate <95% was 0.76 (95% CI 0.56 to 1.02) during the intervention phase and 0.93 (95% CI 0.67 to 1.31) during the control phase, giving an OR of 0.81 (95% CI 0.59 to 1.11, p value 0.19).","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Mhurchu CN, Gorton D, Turley M, Jiang Y, Michie J, Maddison R, Hattie J. Effects of a free school breakfast programme on children's attendance, academic achievement and short-term hunger: results from a stepped-wedge, cluster randomised controlled trial. J Epidemiol Community Health. 2012 Oct 6:jech-2012.","Link","• 10.1136/jech-2012-201540"]
[80,"1 Diet and obesity","Welsh Government’s Primary School Free Breakfast Initiative (PSFBI)","Programme","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary school breakfast initiative. Offers all primary schools resources and guidance to provide free, healthy breakfasts before the start of the school day without any cost being borne by parents. A particular focus was placed upon limiting available food choices to breakfast items considered to be healthful. Breakfasts provided included items from four food types: non-sugar coated cereals, bread, milk products and fruits, in addition to drinks. Schools were provided with guidelines regarding how the scheme should be run, in terms of staff to student ratios and the food to be provided, but were given a reasonable degree of autonomy in the operation of the scheme. Health was a primary aim (breakfast consumption and improvement of the nutritional quality of children’s breakfasts) Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year)  An estimated three-quarters of primary schools throughout Wales have taken up this scheme to date.","School breakfast","Children (9-11 year old)","UK - Wales - Regional",2005,"1 year","Passed through legislation (School Standards & Organisation (Wales) Act 2013)","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","dietary intake at breakfast","Children in intervention schools ate a greater number of healthy items for breakfast than children in control schools (on average 0.25; servings 95% CI 0.07, 0.44) ","There were larger increases observed in number of servings of healthy items for breakfast in more deprived schools.A significant interaction was observed, indicating declines in breakfast skipping in more deprived schools and households. No significant influence on inequality was observed for the remaining outcomes.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Moore, G F et al. 2014. “Impacts of the Primary School Free Breakfast Initiative on Socio-Economic Inequalities in Breakfast Consumption among 9-11-Year-Old Schoolchildren in Wales.” Public Health Nutr 17(6): 1280–89. ","Link","• 10.1017/S1368980013003133"]
[81,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand fiscal policy models","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a 20% flat rate fruit and vegetable subsidy on total cost of fruit and vegetables (dried, canned, frozen, and fresh).  Health was a primary aim (The aim was to estimate the effects of health-related food taxes and subsidies on deaths prevented or postponed (DPP) in New Zealand.) ","F&V","General population","New Zealand - National",2007,"Immediate (counterfactual in year)","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment Macrosimulation)","• Changes in mortality from diet-related diseases at national level\n• Changes in food and nutrient purchases\n\n","• Fruit and vegetable subsidy: 467 (321, 612) CVD deaths averted; 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) diabetes deaths averted; 88 (55, 116) diet-related cancer deaths averted; 555 (402, 702) early deaths averted; 1.9% annual deaths\n• Fruit and vegetable subsidy: 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) % change in total energy; -0.98 (-1.12, -0.83) % change in saturated fat; -0.61 (-0.77, -0.45) % change in sodium; 11.66 (9.58, 13.64) % change in fruit; 17.68 (16.47, 18.93 )% change in vegetables\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Ni Mhurchu, C et al. 2015. “Effects of Health-Related Food Taxes and Subsidies on Mortality from Diet-Related Disease in New Zealand: An Econometric-Epidemiologic Modelling Study.” PLoS One 10(7): e0128477. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0128477"]
[82,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand fiscal policy models","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory 20% saturated fat tax on total cost of major food contributors to saturated fat intakes  (butter; cakes and biscuits; cheese and cream; pastry cook products; beef, lamb and hogget; poultry; and prepared, preserved, and processed meat). Health was a primary aim (The aim was to estimate the effects of health-related food taxes and subsidies on deaths prevented or postponed (DPP) in New Zealand.) ","Saturated fat","General population","New Zealand - National",2007,"Immediate (counterfactual in year)","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment Macrosimulation)","• Changes in mortality from diet-related diseases at national level\n• Changes in food and nutrient purchases\n","• Saturated fat tax: 1034 (552, 1622) CVD deaths averted; 206 (153, 256) diabetes deaths averted; 153 (114, 193) diet-related cancer deaths averted; 1451 (948, 2051) early deaths averted; 5.0% annual deaths\n• Saturated fat tax: -4.69 (-5.36, -4.01) % change in total energy; -5.83 (-7.12, -4.56) % change in saturated fat; -6.02 (-6.77, -5.25) % change in sodium; -3.36 (-5.43, -1.26) % change in fruit; -2.79 (-4.77, -0.79)% change in vegetables\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Ni Mhurchu, C et al. 2015. “Effects of Health-Related Food Taxes and Subsidies on Mortality from Diet-Related Disease in New Zealand: An Econometric-Epidemiologic Modelling Study.” PLoS One 10(7): e0128477. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0128477"]
[83,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand fiscal policy models","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory 20% sodium tax on total cost of major food contributors to sodium intakes  (bread and breakfast cereals; prepared, preserved and processed meat; sauces and condiments; beef, lamb, and hogget; poultry; and takeaway foods and beverages). Health was a primary aim (The aim was to estimate the effects of health-related food taxes and subsidies on deaths prevented or postponed (DPP) in New Zealand.) ","Sodium","General population","New Zealand - National",2007,"Immediate (counterfactual in year)","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment Macrosimulation)","• Changes in mortality from diet-related diseases at national level\n• Changes in food and nutrient purchases\n","• Sodium tax: 1363 (683, 2,116) CVD deaths averted; 280 (206, 336) diabetes deaths averted; 256 (205, 304) diet-related cancer deaths averted; 1977 (1289, 2745) early deaths averted; 6.8% annual deaths\n• Sodium tax: -7.17 (-7.63, -6.70) % change in total energy; 2.19 (1.53, 2.87) % change in saturated fat; -10.77 (-11.35, -10.16) % change in sodium; 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) % change in fruit; -1.90 (-3.38, -0.38) % change in vegetables\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Ni Mhurchu, C et al. 2015. “Effects of Health-Related Food Taxes and Subsidies on Mortality from Diet-Related Disease in New Zealand: An Econometric-Epidemiologic Modelling Study.” PLoS One 10(7): e0128477. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0128477"]
[84,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand fiscal policy models","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory combination of taxes and  subsidy: 20% subsidy total cost of fruit and vegetables with a 20% tax on major food group contributors to saturated fat and sodium intakes (maximum 20% tax subsidy was applied to foods high in both saturated fat and sodium). Health was a primary aim (The aim was to estimate the effects of health-related food taxes and subsidies on deaths prevented or postponed (DPP) in New Zealand.) ","F&V, saturated fat, sodium","General population","New Zealand - National",2007,"Immediate (counterfactual in year)","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment Macrosimulation)","• Changes in mortality from diet-related diseases at national level\n• Changes in food and nutrient purchases\n","• Combination scenario: 1720 (1,150, 2,363) CVD deaths averted; 252 (187, 309) diabetes deaths averted; 309 (253, 362) diet-related cancer deaths averted; 2352 (1755, 2996) early deaths averted; 8.1% annual deaths\n• Combination scenario: -6.15 (-6.89, -5.38) % change in total energy; -3.64 (-4.92, -2.36) % change in saturated fat; -10.79 (-11.58, -9.94) % change in sodium; 11.66 (9.62, 13.62 % change in fruit; 14.89 (12.52, 17.25) % change in vegetables\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Ni Mhurchu, C et al. 2015. “Effects of Health-Related Food Taxes and Subsidies on Mortality from Diet-Related Disease in New Zealand: An Econometric-Epidemiologic Modelling Study.” PLoS One 10(7): e0128477. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0128477"]
[85,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand fiscal policy models","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory greenhouse gas tax: 20% tax on total cost of major food group contributors to carbon emissions (milk, yoghurt and eggs; cheese and cream; butter; ice cream; beef, lamb and hogget; pork; prepared, preserved and processed meat; and poultry).Health was a primary aim (The aim was to estimate the effects of health-related food taxes and subsidies on deaths prevented or postponed (DPP) in New Zealand.) ","Green house gas","General population","New Zealand - National",2007,"Immediate (counterfactual in year)","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment Macrosimulation)","• Changes in mortality from diet-related diseases at national level\n• Changes in food and nutrient purchases\n","• Greenhouse gas emissions tax: 826 (430, 1,348) CVD deaths averted; 166 (124, 210) diabetes deaths averted; 125 (93, 158) diet-related cancer deaths averted; 1163 (749, 1696) early deaths averted; 4.0% annual deaths\n• Greenhouse gas emissions tax: -3.58 (-4.20, -2.96) % change in total energy; -3.72 (-4.72, -2.69) % change in saturated fat; -3.08 (-3.73, -2.42) % change in sodium; 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) % change in fruit; -2.53 (-5.04, 0.03) % change in vegetables\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Ni Mhurchu, C et al. 2015. “Effects of Health-Related Food Taxes and Subsidies on Mortality from Diet-Related Disease in New Zealand: An Econometric-Epidemiologic Modelling Study.” PLoS One 10(7): e0128477. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0128477"]
[86,"1 Diet and obesity","Sweden_grain_tax_modelling VAT reform 1","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory removal of the VAT on wholesome bread and breakfast cereals, while keeping the VAT on all other grain products at the initial 10.71 %  Health was a secondary aim (the main aim was to simulate the impact on the average household of tax reforms entailing either a subsidy on commodities particularly rich in fibre or a subsidy of the fibre density in grain products) ","Whole grain","General population","Sweden - National",2003,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (demand equations from Almost Ideal Demand System model)","• Consumption of wholesome bread and breakfast cereals\n• Consumption of unhealthy bakery products and ready meals\n• Fibre consumption\n","• removing the VAT on wholesome bread and breakfast cereals results in the average household achieving the recommendation that half of bread and breakfast cereal consumption should be wholesome. However, the increase in amounts of bread and breakfast cereals consumed is small, only 3%, \n• Average household’s consumption of bakery products and ready meals would increase by 1 %. \n• The fiber density of the grain diet increases from 3.32g per 100g to 3.37g per 100g for the average household which is also shown in the moderate increase in fiber consumption, just 4% and there are slight decreases in the density of all other (unhealthy) nutrients. \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","A 30 % decrease in public revenues from VAT on grain products consumed by the average household.","Not reported","No","Nordstrom, J, and L Thunstrom. 2009. “The Impact of Tax Reforms Designed to Encourage Healthier Grain Consumption.” J Health Econ 28(3): 622–34.","Link","• 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.02.005"]
[87,"1 Diet and obesity","Sweden_grain_tax_modelling VAT reform 2","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory 50% subsidy of the price of wholesome bread and breakfast cereals (this comes in the form of extensive VAT reform, designed to increase the fibre intake of the average household by the recommended 3%). Health was a secondary aim (the main aim was to simulate the impact on the average household of tax reforms entailing either a subsidy on commodities particularly rich in fibre or a subsidy of the fibre density in grain products) ","Whole grain","General population","Sweden - National",2003,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (demand equations from Almost Ideal Demand System model)","• Consumption of wholesome bread and breakfast cereals\n• Consumption of unhealthy bakery products and ready meals\n• Fibre consumption\n","• Consumption of wholesome bread and breakfast cereals: the proportion of wholesome bread and break- fast cereals consumed, out of total bread and breakfast cereals, rises to almost 70 percent.\n• Consumption of unhealthy bakery products and ready meals: The proportion of bakery products and ready meals, of total grain consumption, does not change, however. The amount consumed of bread and breakfast cereal would increase by 40 percent.\n• Fibre consumption: The impact on dietary quality as measured by the density of the nutrients is also mixed. The density of fiber increases to 3.80g per 100g from 3.32g per 100g at baseline, but achieve the recommended 38 percent increase in fiber intake. The increase in salt and sugar intake is particularly high: 25 percent. Also, the intake of kilojoules increases by 20 percent. whereas the density of all other nutrients decreases.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The reform turns out to be costly, measured by public revenues lost: revenues from VAT on grain products paid by the average household decrease by 160 percent. \n ","Not reported","No","Nordstrom, J, and L Thunstrom. 2009. “The Impact of Tax Reforms Designed to Encourage Healthier Grain Consumption.” J Health Econ 28(3): 622–34.","Link","• 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.02.005"]
[88,"1 Diet and obesity","Sweden_grain_tax_modelling subsidy","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory  SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram of fibre per kilogram of grain product , designed to increase the fibre intake of the average household by 38%: Health was a secondary aim (the main aim was to simulate the impact on the average household of tax reforms entailing either a subsidy on commodities particularly rich in fibre or a subsidy of the fibre density in grain products) ","Whole grain","General population","Sweden - National",2003,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (demand equations from Almost Ideal Demand System model)","• Consumption of wholesome bread and breakfast cereals\n• Consumption of unhealthy bakery products and ready meals\n• Fibre consumption\n","• Consumption of wholesome bread and breakfast cereals: the proportion increases so that the nutritional recommendation is attained for the average household: the amount of bread and breakfast cereals consumed would increase by 11% under the fiber subsidy reform, which is much less than under VAT reform\n• Consumption of unhealthy bakery products and ready meals: the amount consumed of bakery products and ready meals would decrease by 4 %.\n• Fibre consumption: 38 percent increase in fiber intake; the density of kilojoules would increase substantially to 989kJ per 100g, whereas the density of salt, sugar, and added sugar would decrease substantially. There would be only small changes in the density of fat and saturated fat compared to baseline. The rise in the intake of fat, saturated fat, kilojoules ,and added sugar would be higher than under VAT reform , whereas the increase in the intake of salt and sugar would be lower.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The fibre subsidy reform is less costly, though it still imposes a sizeable burden on public revenues: the VAT and excise duty paid by the average house hold would decrease by 129 percent ","Not reported","No","Nordstrom, J, and L Thunstrom. 2009. “The Impact of Tax Reforms Designed to Encourage Healthier Grain Consumption.” J Health Econ 28(3): 622–34.","Link","• 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.02.005"]
[89,"1 Diet and obesity","Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP)","Programme","Government (US Department of Agriculture)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The FFVP provides participating schools with $50 to $75 per student per year—roughly $2 per student per week—for the purchase, preparation, and serving of fresh fruit and vegetable. Schools are granted substantial discretion in implementation, with no target number of fruit and vegetable servings or specific types of fruit and vegetable to be provided. Regulations require that the fresh fruit and vegetable must be served outside of school meals, but there are no rules about how frequently or at what times of day they should be offered. FFVP is offered in selected low-income elementary schools with high rates of free and reduced-price meal enrolment.  Health was a primary aim (The evaluation assessed FFVP effects on student fruit and vegetable consumption and total energy intake in and out of school.)","F&V","General population","USA - National",2008,"1 year","• Intervention costs: $101 million in 2010-2011, the year in which data for this evaluation were collected. Funding increased to $150 million in the 2011-2012 school year, to continue at that level thereafter, indexed for inflation  \n• Passed through legislation  (2008 Farm Bill,19 the Richard B. Russell national School Lunch Act was amended to authorize the expansion of the existing FFVP pilot to selected schools nationwide)\n","Not reported ","Epidemiological study (regression discontinuity)","Fruit and vegetable consumption ","• Students in FFVP schools consumed approximately 1/3 of a cup (0.32 cups per day; P<0.001) more F/V on FFVP days than students in comparable schools not participating in the program.\n• The effect of FFVP on adjusted mean daily total F/V consumption in school was 0.26 cups per day\n• the effect on adjusted mean daily fresh F/V consumption in school was 0.25 cups per day in both cases, this represents about 80% of the total 0.32-cup per day difference observed on FFVP days. The remainder of the difference came from a difference in adjusted mean consumption out of school (0.05-cup per day effect on adjusted mean total F/V intake,P=0.125; 0.06-cup per day effect on adjusted mean fresh F/V intake; P=0.043).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes?","Olsho, L E et al. 2015. “Increasing Child Fruit and Vegetable Intake: Findings from the US Department of Agriculture Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program.” J Acad Nutr Diet 115(8): 1283–90.","Link","• 10.1016/j.jand.2014.12.026"]
[90,"1 Diet and obesity","CVD fiscal policies modelling - F&V subsidy","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a voluntary, national subsidy to reduce fruit and vegetables prices by 10% compared to baseline scenario of “no intervention” assuming that recent and current trends in consumption simply continue. Another scenario looked at a SNAP-specific subsidy to reduce fruit and vegetables prices by 30%, similar to the successful US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP) in Massachusetts compared to baseline scenario of “no intervention” assuming that recent and current trends in consumption simply continue. Health was a primary aim (aimed to quantify and compare the potential effects on total CVD mortality and disparities of specific dietary policies to increase fruit and vegetable consumption in the US) ","F&V","General population","USA - National",2015,"15 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (US IMPACT Food Policy model based on CHD IMPACT BAM)","• CVD deaths prevented or postponed (DPP)\n• Dietary intake of fruits\n• Dietary intake of vegetables\n• Dietary intake of SSBs\n","•10% FV subsidy:  4.04 (3.80–4.26) DPP per 100,000;  30% SNAP FV subsidy: 0.94 (0.85–1.01) DPP per 100,000\n• 10% FV subsidy:  29.7% increase in fruit intake, 30% SNAP FV subsidy: 23.2% increase in fruit intake,\n• 10% FV subsidy:  14.4% increase  in vegetable intake; 30% SNAP FV subsidy: 9% increase  in vegetable intake;\n• 10% FV subsidy:  36.5% reduction in SSB intake. 30% SNAP FV subsidy: 36.5% reduction in SSB intake.\n","The targeted SNAP 30% F&V subsidy would yield the largest number of averted deaths in SNAP participants, yielding approximately 35,100 DPPs (95% UI 31,700–37,500). This represents a reduction in CVD mortality of 9.5/100,000 in this group compared to those ineligible for SNAP. the targeted SNAP 30% F&V subsidy would also be the most effective in reducing CVD disparities; while the national F&V subsidy would reduce CVD disparities between SNAP participants and the SNAP-ineligible population, but less than the targeted 30% F&V subsidy.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Pearson-Stuttard, J et al. 2017. “Reducing US Cardiovascular Disease Burden and Disparities through National and Targeted Dietary Policies: A Modelling Study.” PLoS Med 14(6): e1002311. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002311"]
[91,"1 Diet and obesity","CVD fiscal policies modelling- SSB tax","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory, national tax to increase SSB prices by 10%compared to baseline scenario of “no intervention” assuming that recent and current trends in consumption simply continue. Health was a primary aim (aimed to quantify and compare the potential effects on total CVD mortality and disparities of specific dietary policies to reduce sugar-sweetened beverage consumption in the US) ","SSB","General population","USA - National",2015,"16 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (US IMPACT Food Policy model based on CHD IMPACT BAM)","• CVD deaths prevented or postponed (DPP)\n• Dietary intake of fruits\n• Dietary intake of vegetables\n• Dietary intake of SSBs\n","• 0.83 (0.72–0.95) DPPs per 100,000\n• 13% increase in fruit intake\n• 0.4% reduction in vegetable intake; \n• 41.3% reduction in SSB intake.\n","The targeted SNAP 30% F&V subsidy would yield the largest number of averted deaths in SNAP participants, yielding approximately 35,100 DPPs (95% UI 31,700–37,500). This represents a reduction in CVD mortality of 9.5/100,000 in this group compared to those ineligible for SNAP. the targeted SNAP 30% F&V subsidy would also be the most effective in reducing CVD disparities; while the national F&V subsidy would reduce CVD disparities between SNAP participants and the SNAP-ineligible population, but less than the targeted 30% F&V subsidy.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Pearson-Stuttard, J et al. 2017. “Reducing US Cardiovascular Disease Burden and Disparities through National and Targeted Dietary Policies: A Modelling Study.” PLoS Med 14(6): e1002311. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002311"]
[92,"1 Diet and obesity","US-Food tax_subsidy_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory tax to increase the price of 4 foods  and a subsidy to decrease the price of 3 foods associated with cardiometabolic outcomes: 10% increase in price of SSB, processed and unprocessed meats and 10% decrease in price of fruits, vegetables, whole grains, nuts/seeds. Health was a primary aim (estimate the impact of specific dietary taxes and subsidies on CMD deaths and disparities in the US) ","SSBs, processed meat, F&V, wholegrains, nuts and seeds","General population","USA - National",2012,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment)","• Number of cardiometabolic deaths (CHD, hypertensive Heart disease, stroke and diabetes) prevented per year\n• Proportion of cardiometabolic deaths prevented \n","• Total 23,174 deaths/year (95% UI 22,024–24,595) prevented (111 CMD deaths per million US adults could be potentially prevented)\n• 3.4% (95% UI 3.2–3.6) of all CMD deaths in the US (the greatest estimated impact was for reducing the price of vegetables (6294 fewer CMD deaths/year), fruits (5265), and nuts/seeds (3413), and increasing the price of SSBs (4647). By cause, diabetes deaths would be most influenced by price changes in SSBs (1.5% reduction in deaths) and processed meats (0.7% reduction); while CHD deaths would be most influenced by price changes in SSBs (1% reduction) and nuts/seeds (0.9% reduction). The largest effect was observed for stroke by subsidizing fruits and vegetables (2.4% and 2.8% reduction, respectively)","• When stratified by educational attainment, a generally larger estimated proportion of CMD deaths would be prevented among those with lower than high school (< HS), high school or some college (HS), compared to those with higher education level. Under the scenario of a low SES gradient in price responsiveness, a joint 10% price change would avert approximately 3.1% of CMD deaths among those with < HS, 3.6% among those with HS, and 2.9% among those with COL. Applying a higher SES gradient in price-responsiveness, the corresponding estimated reductions were 3.7%, 3.6%, and 2.5%, respectively. \n• Under the scenario of a higher SES gradient in price responsiveness, price changes in these seven dietary targets would reduce disparities in all outcomes. Under the scenario of a low SES gradient in price-responsiveness, these pricing interventions tended to reduce disparities for CHD, and total CMD, but not stroke, although none of these differences were statistically significant. In comparison, current disparities in diabetes mortality would be significantly reduced by any of the pricing scenarios.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Peñalvo, José L. et al. 2017. “The Potential Impact of Food Taxes and Subsidies on Cardiovascular Disease and Diabetes Burden and Disparities in the United States.” BMC Medicine 15(1): 1–13.","Link","• 10.1186/s12916-017-0971-9"]
[93,"1 Diet and obesity","US-Food tax_subsidy_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory tax to increase the price of 4 foods and a subsidy to decrease the price of 3 foods associated with cardiometabolic outcomes: 30% increase in price of SSB, processed and unprocessed meats and 30% decrease in price of fruits, vegetables, whole grains, nuts/seeds. Health was a primary aim (estimate the impact of specific dietary taxes and subsidies on CMD deaths and disparities in the US) ","SSBs, processed meat, F&V, wholegrains, nuts and seeds","General population","USA - National",2012,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment)","• Number of cardiometabolic deaths (CHD, hypertensive Heart disease, stroke and diabetes) prevented per year\n• Propotion of cardiometabolic deaths prevented \n","• 63,268 deaths/year (95% UI 60,425–66,719) (303 deaths/million could be potentially prevented)\n• 9.2% (95% UI 8.8–9.7) of all CMD deaths\n","• When stratified by educational attainment, a generally larger estimated proportion of CMD deaths would be prevented among those with lower than high school (< HS), high school or some college (HS), compared to those with higher education level. Under the scenario of a low SES gradient in price responsiveness, a joint 30% price change would avert approximately 10% of CMD deaths among those with < HS, 9.8% among those with HS, and 6.7% among those with COL. \n• Under the scenario of a higher SES gradi- ent in price-responsiveness, price changes in these seven dietary targets would reduce disparities in all outcomes. Under the scenario of a low SES gradient in price-responsiveness, these pricing interventions tended to reduce disparities for CHD, and total CMD, but not stroke, although none of these differences were statistically significant. In comparison, current disparities in diabetes mortality would be significantly reduced by any of the pricing scenarios.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Peñalvo, José L. et al. 2017. “The Potential Impact of Food Taxes and Subsidies on Cardiovascular Disease and Diabetes Burden and Disparities in the United States.” BMC Medicine 15(1): 1–13.","Link","• 10.1186/s12916-017-0971-9"]
[94,"1 Diet and obesity","SSB tax on alcohol intake model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory tax on SSB on the consumption of alcohol.\nThe tax structure matches the proposed levy on sugary drinks producers in the UK which will be enacted in 2018, which categorises the sugar content of SSBs into: \n• high-sugar SSBs include >8g of sugar per 100mL\n• medium- sugar SSBs include 5–8g of sugar/100mL \n• low-sugar SSBs have <5g of sugar/100mL.\n Health was a primary aim (The research presented here is the first to provide a direct analysis of the relationship between price increases for SSBs and alcohol purchases, across income groups) \n","SSB","General population","UK - England - National",2012,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) applied to household expenditure data0","• Alcoholic beverage purchases","• A 1% increase in the price of high-sugar SSBs: 0.7% and 0.24% reduction in high sugar SSB and medium SSBs, and 0.18% reduction in spirits acting as complements. Increase in purchasing for low sugar SSBs (0.06%), juice (0.15%) and lager (0.23%) acting as supplements.\n• A 1% increase in the price of medium-sugar SSBs results in reduction in purchasing for all beverage categories (0.04% high sugar SSBs, 0.75% medium sugar SSBs, 0.09% juice, 0.11% water, 0.12% beer, 0.13% lager and 0.03% wines) except for spirits (0.29% increase in purchasing)\n• A 1% increase in the price of low-sugar SSBs results in an increase in purchasing for all beverage types, expect a reduction in low sugar SSBs (0.61%) and in spirits (0.68%): increase for juice (0.13%),  milk-based drunks (0.69%), water (0.40%), beer (0.36%), lager (0.27%), cider (0.28%), wines (0.29%).\n","In the high-income group, increases in the price of high-sugar SSBs decreases the purchase of cider (0·5% for 1% price increase), in the middle- income group it reduces the purchases of spirits (0.2% for 1% price increase) no decrease is evident in alcohol purchases in the low-income group. For medium-income groups there is also an increase in lager purchase if the price of high-sugar SSB increases. For an increase in the price of medium-sugar drinks, a common pattern is seen of complementary purchases, predominantly with juice and lager, across all income groups; although of different magnitudes.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No?","Quirmbach, Diana et al. 2018. “Effect of Increasing the Price of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages on Alcoholic Beverage Purchases: An Economic Analysis of Sales Data.” Journal of epidemiology and community health: jech-2017-209791. ","Link","• 10.1136/jech-2017-209791"]
[95,"1 Diet and obesity","Weight loss incentive pilot  Pounds for Pounds","Programme","Government (NHS)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The voluntary Pounds for Pounds (P4P) programme tied rewards directly to weight loss results The programme itself was provided by a commercial company, ‘Weight Wins’.Participants chose a weight loss plan based on their target weight. Plans ranged from 15 lb (6.8 kg) weight loss over 3 months to 50 lb (22.7 kg) weight loss over 7 months, with optional additional ‘maintenance’ periods. Rewards, which were received after successful plan completion, ranged from £70 to £425 per year. P4P credited participants monthly for cumulative weight loss up to a maximum target weight loss rate of 7.1 lb (3.2 kg) per month, and for maintenance of weight loss. Participants received their accumulated financial rewards, plus a bonus equal to 50% of the total maximum reward if they had achieved their final target weight at plan completion. Participants were provided with a booklet of weight loss tips. Health was a primary aim (pilot financial incentive scheme for weight loss was instituted as part of their health promotion strategy)","Weight loss","General adult population (obese)","UK - NHS Eastern and Coastal Kent - Local",2009,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 7 months","Not reported ","Pilot programme, further commissioning could be possible","Epidemiological study (cohort follow-up)","Weight change","• Clinically significant weight loss (≥5%) occurred in 44.8% [95% confidence interval (CI): 40.0–49.7%] of participants. \n• Estimated mean weight loss at 12 months was 4.0 kg (95% CI: 2.4–5.6 kg) under the assumption of return-to-baseline weight for those who had left the programme before reporting a 12 month weight\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Relton, C, M Strong, and J Li. 2011. “The ‘Pounds for Pounds’ Weight Loss Financial Incentive Scheme: An Evaluation of a Pilot in NHS Eastern and Coastal Kent.” J Public Health (Oxf) 33(4): 536–42. ","Link","• 10.1093/pubmed/fdr030"]
[96,"1 Diet and obesity","Aus_Junkfoodtax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% price increase on tax on foods in selected ‘unhealthy’ food categories (sweet bakery products such as biscuits, cakes, pastries and pies, snack foods, confectionery and soft drinks). The policy was assumed to be operating in steady- state (running at  full effectiveness potential) and were measured against current practice in Australia where these foods, along with the majority of processed foods, attract 10% goods and services tax, but are not subject to other sales or excise taxes Health was a primary aim (This analysis formed part of the Assessing the Cost-Effectiveness of Preventive interventions (ACE-Prevention) project, which aimed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the comparative cost-effectiveness of over 100 preventive intervention options addressing the non-communicable disease burden in Australia.","Unhealthy food","General adult population","Australia - National",2003,"NA","Implementation costs: AUD18 million (95% UI: 14.4; 21.6)   ","Not reported ","Modelling (behaviours)","• DALYS\n• Consumption\n","• Predicted that tax resulted in DALYs averted (559,000)\n• Predicted that tax resulted in reduced mean weight (1.6 kg) and suggest these benefits are attributable to reduced energy intake of 121-175 kJ\n","The intervention is likely to be regressive; however, the health benefits of the tax are also likely to be relatively greater in lower income groups.","Cost-effectiveness (ICER)","Junk food taxation was found to be dominant compared to current baseline scenario","Not reported","Based on national household expenditure data in 2003/2004,44 expenditure on cakes and biscuits, soft drinks and confectionery amounted to AUD21 per household per week, indicating that a 10% tax on these products would raise taxation revenue in excess of AUD855 million each year (not taking into account changes in consumption in response to the tax). ","Not reported","No","Sacks, G, J L Veerman, M Moodie, and B Swinburn. 2011. “‘Traffic-Light’ Nutrition Labelling and ‘Junk-Food’ Tax: A Modelled Comparison of Cost-Effectiveness for Obesity Prevention.” Int J Obes (Lond) 35(7): 1001–9. ","Link","• 10.1038/ijo.2010.228"]
[97,"1 Diet and obesity","Netherlands Schoolgruiten Fruit and Vegetable subsidy","Programme","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The Schoolgruiten intervention's main strategy to improve fruit and vegetable intake was by means of better availability and accessibility of fruit and vegetables at school through a free fruit and vegetables scheme. The Schoolgruiten intervention lasted for 2 school years (starting in grade 5 (10 years old) and continuing in grade 6 (11–12 years old)) and did not include a family component nor a computer tailored feedback tool) . Health was a secondary aim (The study aimed to provide an example of how these calculations can be done, by using the data of two existing Dutch intervention programs, and to estimate cost-effectiveness for these two intervention programs.)","F&V","Children (school age)","Netherlands - National",2008,"Cohort lifetime (up to 100 years)","• Implementation costs: nationwide implementation among all 10 years old will come to EUR7.1 million for the Schoolgruiten intervention. \n• Voluntarily, the schools were encouraged, but not obliged, to use a curriculum to increase knowledge and skills related to fruit and vegetables consumption. \n","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment)","• DALYs saved\n• Daily fruit and vegetable intake\n","• 236 DALYs/100,000 children (292 DALYs/100,000 boys and 178 DALYs/100,000 girls)\n• the children in the intervention group reported a 29.6 g/day (95% CI 14.3–45.0) intake at follow-up compared to children in the control group, adjusted for baseline intake levels at 1 year and  17.4 g/day (95% CI-0.9 to 35.6) at 2 year follow-up\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (ICER)","• The savings for the Schoolgruiten intervention were estimated to be EUR2.3 million\n• The ICER is EUR10,674/DALY for the Schoolgruiten intervention in comparison with no intervention\n• For the decision threshold of EUR19,600 the probability that the interventions are cost-effective compared to no intervention is 67% for Schoolgruiten.\n","Not reported","The NMB in comparison with no intervention was estimated to be EUR4.0 million for the Schoolgruiten intervention.","Not reported","Yes?","Sacks, G, J L Veerman, M Moodie, and B Swinburn. 2011. “‘Traffic-Light’ Nutrition Labelling and ‘Junk-Food’ Tax: A Modelled Comparison of Cost-Effectiveness for Obesity Prevention.” Int J Obes (Lond) 35(7): 1001–9. ","Link","• 10.1038/ijo.2010.228"]
[98,"1 Diet and obesity","UK_fat_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory increase the price of fatty foods by 1% for every percent of saturated fats they contain; for instance, milk which contains 1.72%of saturated fats will see its price increasing by 1.72%. A ceiling on the price increase of 15% was implemented. To offset this tax burden and to encourage consumption of fruit and vegetables, a subsidy on fruit and vegetables is introduced, so as to exactly cancel the costs of the fat tax paid by consumers (-14.78% for all fruit and vegetable). Health was a primary aim (study explores the impacts of such a policy in achieving Department of Health guidelines and on the risk of being affected by diet-related diseases) ","Saturated fat, F&V","General population","UK - National",2005,"1 year","Implementation costs not reported  but policy planned to be revenue neutral","Not reported ","Modelling (demand equations from Almost Ideal Demand System model)","• Impact on diet-related diseases (average odds of being affected by a condition across the population relative to a situation in which the whole population conforms to dietary guidelines)\n• achieving Department of Health guidelines and on the risk of being affected by diet-related diseases\n","• average odds of being affected by a condition across the population relative to a situation in which the whole population conforms to dietary guidelines are reduced by 0 to 27%, depending on nutrient  and health condition of interest. These relatively small changes in health status are understandable when, for example, it is recognised that the effect of the subsidy on fruit and vegetable consumption is to only reduce the proportion of the population that consumes less than 100 g of fruit and vegetables per day from 13 to 12%.\n• The subsidy brings mean levels of fruit and vegetable consumption in line with dietary recommendations, but the tax is insufficient to achieve this goal for fat intakes.:  Tax reduced intake of all fats but does not bring them in line with the recommendation, including PUFAS, which should be increased to meet guidelines but intake is decreased, for salt and fibre intakes.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Tax and subsidy were designed as a revenue-neutral scheme.","Not reported","No","Smith, C, W R Parnell, R C Brown, and A R Gray. 2013. “Providing Additional Money to Food-Insecure Households and Its Effect on Food Expenditure: A Randomized Controlled Trial.” Public Health Nutr 16(8): 1507–15.","Link","• 10.1017/S1368980012003680"]
[99,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand Spend Study","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Evaluating the impact of food vouchers (coupons) from a supermarket for 4 weeks, with a value adjusted for age and sex of each member of the family, based on five dollars per adult female per week. Vouchers were posted weekly and the food preparer was asked to spend the voucher within two weeks or one week for the final voucher.  Health was a primary aim (the main objective of the present study was to examine the effect of additional money (in the form of supermarket vouchers) on food expenditure in food-insecure households with children).","Food insecurity","Socio-economic (low income population)","New Zealand - Dunedin - Local",2009,"1 month","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","Food and healthy food purchasing","• The voucher group spent $NZ 15.20 (95% CI 1.46, 28.94) more per week on food during the intervention phase compared with the control group (P=0.030). \n• There were no differences in expenditure between the voucher and the control group for the food groups ‘fruit and vegetables’ (mean difference: $NZ 0.46; 95% CI 21.97, 2.89; P=0.709), ‘meat and poultry’ (mean difference: $NZ 0.29; 95% CI 23.07, 3.64; P=0.866) and ‘dairy’ (mean difference: $NZ 0.82; 95% CI 20.75, 2.42; P=0.302).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Smith, C, W R Parnell, R C Brown, and A R Gray. 2013. “Providing Additional Money to Food-Insecure Households and Its Effect on Food Expenditure: A Randomized Controlled Trial.” Public Health Nutr 16(8): 1507–15.","Link","• 10.1017/S1368980012003680"]
[100,"1 Diet and obesity","US_sodium_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the health benefits and costs, in terms of risk for myocardial infarction and stroke, of 3 governmental strategies to reduce sodium intake in the United States, including 2 modelled on the United Kingdom experience, and a tax on sodium used for food production. The study estimated that collaboration) with industry (strategy 1 would decrease sodium intake by the same amount as in the United Kingdom (9.5%), with a range of 5% to 40% (the United Kingdom goal is to decrease sodium intake by 37%) (9–11). A tax was modelled (strategy 2) an excise tax on sodium used for food production at the industrial level that would increase the price of salty foods by 40%, a level similar to the cigarette tax. A tax on sodium at the industrial level (strategy 3) simplifies the administration of the tax, and taxing foods exceeding a threshold might simply induce manufacturers to change the serving size. The study assumed that producers would pass the cost of the tax on to consumers in the price of foods but not change the sodium content of food products. An increase in price of 40% was estimated to result in a decrease in sodium intake of 6.0% (range, 1.2% to 21.6%). Health was a primary aim (prevention of stroke & MI) ","Sodium","General adult population (40 to 85 years)","USA - National",2008,"Lifetime (100 years)","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (computer-simulated, state-transition\n(Markov cohort) model)","• Number of disease incidences averted (e.g. strokes, and Myocardial infarctions (MI))\n• QALYs\n","Tax on sodium  decreases population sodium intake by 6%, averts 327 892 strokes, 306 137 MIs, and increases  QALYs by 1.3 million and over the cohort lifetime.","Low-income persons would benefit as the tax revenue would subsidize the cost of lower-sodium foods for low-income persons.","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Lifetime Predicted Cumulative Health and Economic Consequences in Adults Aged 40 to 85 Years: 2,060,790 QALYs gained, $32.1bn saved in medical costs using collaboration with industry, and 1,313,304 QALY's gained, $22.4bn saved in medical costs using sodium tax.","Not reported"," Total savings in medical costs, $$22.4 billion over cohort lifetime. ","The model is based on the UK sodium experience \"The United Kingdom Food Standards Agency, an independent government department that monitors food safety, began working with manufacturers in 2003 to cut sodium in processed foods by developing voluntary maxi- mum sodium targets for specific foods.","No","Smith-Spangler CM, Juusola JL, Enns EA, Owens DK, Garber AM. Population strategies to decrease sodium intake and the burden of cardiovascular disease: a cost-effectiveness analysis. Annals of internal medicine. 2010 Apr 20;152(8):481-7.","Link","• 10.7326/0003-4819-152-8-201004200-00212"]
[101,"1 Diet and obesity","Advertising tax US model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling a mandatory elimination of the tax subsidy of TV advertising costs for nutritionally poor foods and beverages advertised to children and adolescents. The intervention would apply to TV programming watched on traditional TV and to TV advertising aired during children’s programming defined as >35% child-audience share 1 ads seen on children’s programming advertising aired during children’s programming defined as >35% child-audience share.  Children’s programming defined as>35% child-audience share. Ads seen on children’s programming account for >40% of total exposure to food and beverage TV advertising for children aged 2–11 years. The effect of changes in advertising exposure to adults or the impact of changes in non-TV forms of digital advertising and marketing were not modelled.  Health was a primary aim (models the effect of a national intervention that eliminates the tax subsidy of advertising nutritionally poor foods and beverages on TV to children aged 2–19 years) ","Unhealthy food advertising","General population","USA - National",2014,"10 years","Implementation costs: minimal costs and included those related to processing and auditing the new tax. Overhead costs of the tax system included administrative costs and expenses related to tax audits and litigation and were estimated at the cost of five full-time federal employees. These estimates were based on the assumption that 20%–25% of the 44 food companies responsible for the majority of expenditures for food and beverage marketing to children would be audited for compliance. Fify year cost: $1.05 Million (95%CI 0.69; 1.42); ten year cost $9.26 Million (95%CI 6.03; 12.51);   (Modelling study) ","Not reported ","Modelling (modification of Australian ACE model, US Childhood Obesity Intervention Cost Effectiveness Study (CHOICES) model and markov modelling)","• Total population reached (millions)\n• Mean per capita BMI unit reduction for youth 2–19 years of age\n• Total BMI units reduced for youth 2–19 years of age (millions)\n• Cost per BMI unit reduced for youth 2–19 years of age ($)a\n• Total QALYs gained\n• Healthcare costs avoided ($ millions)\n","• 74 millions population reached\n• 0.028 (0.011, 0.046) Mean per capita BMI unit reduction for youth 2–19 years of age\n• 2.13 million (0.83, 3.52) Total BMI units reduced for youth 2–19 years of age \n• $1.16 (0.51, 2.63) Cost per BMI unit reduced for youth 2–19 years of age \n• 4,540 (1,750, 7,490) Total QALYs gained\n• $352 million (138; 581) healthcare costs avoided \n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (ICER)","Cost-saving","  Reformulation may improve quality of snack foods/sweets/drinks Benefit to adults who watch mixed programming or those who are parents of children and adolescents as a result of reduced pester power. Media advertising may increase  or increased advertising costs may be offset by increased food prices.","Over the 2015–2025 period, these BMI reductions would result in $352 million (95% UI¼$138 million, $581 million) in healthcare cost savings and a $343 million (95% UI¼$129 million, $572 million) reduction in net societal costs. The policy change would lead to increases in QALYs: 4,540 (95% UI¼1,750, 7,490). The intervention was “cost saving,” as it would result in an increase in QALYs and reduction in total costs compared with current practice. The intervention would save an estimated $38.0 (95% UI¼ $14.3, $74.3) for every dollar spent on the intervention.  Overall,  the cost-saving intervention would likely have a significant societal impact. The tax policy change would also generate additional tax revenue of an estimated $80 million during the first year, with continuing additional revenue in later years.  "," Eliminating the tax subsidy of advertising expenses would likely be met with great opposition from the food industry and great support from the public.  Public and parents are proponents, Food industry are opponents. This is legally plausible and feasible. If it is implemented it will likely be challenged in court. Poor compliance would be possible without audits. ","No","Sonneville, K R et al. 2015. “BMI and Healthcare Cost Impact of Eliminating Tax Subsidy for Advertising Unhealthy Food to Youth.” Am J Prev Med 49(1): 124–34. ","Link","• 10.1016/j.amepre.2015.02.026"]
[102,"1 Diet and obesity","South Africa insurance Healthy Food Program cash rebate","Programme","Health body (South African Health Insurer Discovery, as part of its health promotion program, Vitality)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary scheme whereby all Vitality members  (insurance scheme members) are eligible for a healthy food benefıt at no additional cost to them, but they have to activate the benefıt online or by phone. Following activation, members immediately receive a 10% rebate for healthy foods, which increases to a 25% rebate on completion of an online health risk assessment questionnaire. The rebate is capped at a maximum monthly purchase amount of 4000 rands (approximately $480) per household and a limit related to participation in health promotion activities.  Food items eligible for the rebate program were based on nutrition guidelines on healthy nutrition. Some items are eligible only in certain forms:  raw or minimally processed fruits and vegetables are eligible, but not those pre-pared with added sugars or salt; only non-fat dairy products are eligible. All foods not specifıcally classifıed as either healthy or less desirable were considered neutral and were neither encouraged nor discouraged.   Health was a primary aim (Evaluate the impact of a rebate for health food in purchasing) ","Healthy food","General population  (eligible for Healthy Food program through Health insurer's Vitality health scheme)","South Africa - National",2009,"3 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study using scanner data","Healthy food purchasing","Rebates of 10% and 25% for healthy foods were associated with an increase in the ratio of expenditure on healthy foods to total food expenditure by 6.0% (95% CI 5.3, 6.8) and 9.3% (95% CI 8.5, 10.0); an increase in the ratio of expenditure on fruit and vegetables to total food expenditure by 5.7% (95% CI 4.5, 6.9) and 8.5% (95% CI 7.3, 9.7); and a decrease in the ratio of expenditure on less-desirable to total food expenditure by 5.6% (95% CI 4.7, 6.5) and 7.2% (95% CI 6.3, 8.1).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Sturm, R, R An, D Segal, and D Patel. 2013. “A Cash-Back Rebate Program for Healthy Food Purchases in South Africa: Results from Scanner Data.” Am J Prev Med 44(6): 567–72. ","Link","• 10.1016/j.amepre.2013.02.011"]
[103,"1 Diet and obesity","Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP)","RCT","Government (Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary programme where for every dollar of SNAP benefits spent on targeted fruits and vegetables (TFVs) at participating retailers, SNAP households received a 30-cent incentive on their SNAP Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) card. Health was a primary aim (making fruits and vegetables more affordable for participants in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)) ","F&V","Socio-economic groups (SNAP participants)","USA -  Massachusetts - Hampden - Local",2011,"13 months","• Implementation costs of pilot: Total costs for the pilot were $4.4 million. System changes accounted for a little over half of all costs. Incentive payments to HIP participants represented just 6 % of total costs ($263,043). Retailer recruitment, participant notifications and training, and expenses for management and oversight of HIP accounted for the remaining costs. \n• Implementation costs: Projected start-up costs to expand HIP nationwide are estimated to be $89.8 million. The projected value of incentives with nationwide expansion, based on plausible scenarios about SP households’ fruit and vegetable spending, ranges from $0.8 billion to $4.5 billion annually.\n• Passed through legislation (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 authorized funds for pilot projects to determine if providing financial incentives to SP recipients at the point of sale would increase their consumption of fruits, vegetables, or other healthful foods\n","The experience in Hampden County demonstrated that implementing and operating HIP was both technically and operationally feasible. Expansion of HIP would require developing a framework for implementation that would include legislation, regulations, and industry standards. ","RCT","• Fruit and vegetable consumption \n• SNAP benefits expenditure\n","• HIP participants consumed almost a quarter of a cup more targeted fruits and vegetables than non-HIP participants. This 26 % increase in consumption over non-HIP participants\n• HIP households spent $78.17 each month on all fruits and vegetables in all types of stores and with cash as well as SNAP benefits. In contrast, non-HIP households reported spending $72.02 each month, which was $6.15 (or 8.5 %) less than spending reported by HIP households.\n","HIP impacts were not affected by the presence of children in the household, employment status, age, or amount of the household’s SNAP benefit. Some evidence indicated that impacts were larger for households who before HIP had more positive attitudes about fruits and vegetables.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","USDA. 2010. Evaluation of the Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP): Data Collection Instruments:","Link","• NA"]
[104,"1 Diet and obesity","Breast feeding financial incentive ","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT testing the impact of financial incentive to promote breast feeding in low income, WIC participants. In addition to usual WIC services and periodic assessments, participants in the incentive group were asked to demonstrate breastfeeding in front of research staff at monthly sessions completed either at a WIC office or participant’s home and received financial incentives (cash) if breastfeeding was demonstrated. The incentive amount was $20 at the end of the first month and increased by $10 every month until the end of 6 months. The maximum potential earning from monthly financial incentives during the course of the study was $270 for participants who breastfed for all 6 months. When a participant did not demonstrate breastfeeding or pumping, she did not receive the incentive. The participant was given an opportunity to demonstrate breastfeeding within a week to be eligible for the monthly incentive. Health was a primary aim (breastfeeding maintenance) ","Breastfeeding","Socio-economic groups (low-income Hispanic women)","USA - Philadelphia - Local",2015,"6 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","breastfeeding rates and infant outcomes","Significantly higher percentages of breastfeeding mothers in the incentive group at each time point compared with those in the control group (89% vs 44%, P = .01 at 1 month; 89% vs 17%, P < .001 at 3 months; 72% vs 0%, P < .001 at 6 months). No significant differences were detected at any time point between study groups for self-reported exclusive breastfeeding rate and infant outcomes (ie, weight, emergency department visits)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Washio Y, Humphreys M, Colchado E, Sierra-Ortiz M, Zhang Z, Collins BN, Kilby LM, Chapman DJ, Higgins ST, Kirby KC. Incentive-based intervention to maintain breastfeeding among low-income Puerto Rican mothers. Paediatrics. 2017 Feb 6:e20163119.","Link","• 10.1542/peds.2016-3119"]
[105,"1 Diet and obesity","Canada dietary tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a 10% subsidy on consumption of fruits and vegetables.  Health was a primary aim (Modelling four dietary tax regimes on household expenditure and health. ","F&V","General population","Canada - National",2001,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (regression modelling)","Energy and nutrient intake","1. A 10% subsidy on fruits and vegetables causes consumption of fruits and vegetables to increase, it increases energy intake and consumption of other nutrients. For low income households, consumption of high calorie foods, such as meat, fish, dairy, eggs, and oils increases due to increased consumption of fruits and vegetables. Hence, a policy of subsidising fruits and vegetables at 10% would potentially increase calorie consumption by 18.17 kcal (24.73 kcal, 26.76 kcal) per day for an average adult in a low (medium, high) income household","A subsidy on fruits and vegetables is the most progressive policy, and it would potentially improve consumer welfare for all income groups at the expense of higher government costs. Among the rest of the food policies, a lump-sum transfer is the most economically efficient and progressive approach, followed by using collected revenues to subsidise fruits and vegetables. A stand-alone fat tax with collected revenue discarded is the least economically efficient and most regressive approach.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Xiang, Di. 2015. Ph.D. “Estimating the Impact of Behaviour Altering Taxes on Household Consumption.” University of Manitoba. ","Link","• NA"]
[106,"1 Diet and obesity","Canada dietary tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory 10% tax on SSBs, salt-fat products, sugar-fat products, and prepared meals. Health was a primary aim (Modelling four dietary tax regimes on household expenditure and health. ","Unhealthy food, SSB","General population","Canada - National",2001,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (regression modelling)","Energy and nutrient intake","2. A 10% tax on SSBs, salt-fat products, sugar-fat products, and prepared meals decreases total energy intake for low (medium, high) income households by 1.51% (1.88%, 2.13%). As a result, the fat tax decreases calorie consumption of high income households by 44.33/day, followed by a reduction in medium income households of 38.43/day, and a reduction in low income households of 29.51 /day. Further, the fat tax decreases protein, sugar, fat, saturated fat, and sodium consumption.","A subsidy on fruits and vegetables is the most progressive policy, and it would potentially improve consumer welfare for all income groups at the expense of higher government costs. Among the rest of the food policies, a lump-sum transfer is the most economically efficient and progressive approach, followed by using collected revenues to subsidise fruits and vegetables. A stand-alone fat tax with collected revenue discarded is the least economically efficient and most regressive approach.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Xiang, Di. 2015. Ph.D. “Estimating the Impact of Behaviour Altering Taxes on Household Consumption.” University of Manitoba. ","Link","• NA"]
[107,"1 Diet and obesity","Canada dietary tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory cash transfer: revenues from a 10% fat tax are returned to each household as a lump-sum transfer. Assuming a revenue-neutral scenario (the collected fat tax revenue is fully used to fund either a lump-sum transfer).  Health was a primary aim (Modelling four dietary tax regimes on household expenditure and health. ","Unhealthy food, SSB","General population","Canada - National",2001,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (regression modelling)","Energy and nutrient intake","3. A tax with a revenue-neutral lump-sum transfer decreases energy intake by 1.51% (1.88%, 2.13%) for low (medium, high) income households. The results are equivalent to a stand-alone fat tax, as the overall impact of the transferred money on calorie and nutrient intake is trivial—only 12 cents/day (6.6 cents/day, 3.9 cents/day) of the transferred money is used for food purchases for low (medium, high) income households, including both healthy and unhealthy food spending.\n","A subsidy on fruits and vegetables is the most progressive policy, and it would potentially improve consumer welfare for all income groups at the expense of higher government costs. Among the rest of the food policies, a lump-sum transfer is the most economically efficient and progressive approach, followed by using collected revenues to subsidise fruits and vegetables. A stand-alone fat tax with collected revenue discarded is the least economically efficient and most regressive approach.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Xiang, Di. 2015. Ph.D. “Estimating the Impact of Behaviour Altering Taxes on Household Consumption.” University of Manitoba. ","Link","• NA"]
[108,"1 Diet and obesity","Canada dietary tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory cash transfer: revenues from a 10% fat tax are returned to each household as a lump-sum transfer, where the revenues are used to subsidise fruit and vegetable purchases. Assuming a revenue-neutral scenario (the collected fat tax revenue is fully used to subsidise fruit and vegetable purchases). Health was a primary aim (Modelling four dietary tax regimes on household expenditure and health).","Unhealthy food, F&V","General population","Canada - National",2001,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (regression modelling)","Energy and nutrient intake","4. A tax with a revenue used to subsidise fruits and vegetables decreases household energy and nutrient consumption, by decreasing expenditures on unhealthy food  reduces the price of fruit and vegetables causes households to increase consumption of other foods thus increasing energy and nutrient consumption. As a result, the impact of food taxes in decreasing energy intake is not prominent\n\n","A subsidy on fruits and vegetables is the most progressive policy, and it would potentially improve consumer welfare for all income groups at the expense of higher government costs. Among the rest of the food policies, a lump-sum transfer is the most economically efficient and progressive approach, followed by using collected revenues to subsidise fruits and vegetables. A stand-alone fat tax with collected revenue discarded is the least economically efficient and most regressive approach.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Xiang, Di. 2015. Ph.D. “Estimating the Impact of Behaviour Altering Taxes on Household Consumption.” University of Manitoba. ","Link","• NA"]
[109,"2 Physical activity","National Bus Pass","Programme","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary National Bus Pass was introduced for people aged 60 years and older in England in 2006, entitling holders to free local bus travel in their area of residence after 9:30 AM on weekdays, and all day on weekends and public holidays. Since April 2008 this has been extended to apply to travel on all local buses anywhere in England .","Active travel","Elderly (low SES groups)","UK - England - National",2006,"2 years","• Implementation costs:  £1.1 billion or approx. £100 per pass (on average) \n• Passed through legislation","Not reported","Epidemiological study","Active travel","• The % of respondents with a free pass rose from 56.8% in 2005 to 74.7% in 2008 and this  increased across all categories of age, gender, SES, and area population size. \n• A significant positive association (AOR =1.15; 95% CI= 1.07, 1.12; P<.001) between having a bus pass and walking 3 or more times a week \n• In the fully adjusted models, having a bus pass was associated with a greater rate of active travel among those who rented their homes (incidence rate ratio [IRR] =1.14; 95% CI= 1.04, 1.24; P<.001), but not among those who owned their home (IRR =1.08;95% CI = 1.00, 1.17; P<.068). The odds of doing any active travel were similar among pass holders who owned their homes (AOR =4.72; 95% CI=3.99, 5.59; P<.001) and those who rented their homes (AOR =4.06; 95% CI = 3.35, 4.86; P< .001\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","PT use - which can improve PT infrastructure and reduce dependency on cars. Free bus pass eligibility is associated with a 50% higher likelihood of using public transport in England, and 40% of trips on public transport by pensioners in the West Midlands would not have been undertaken without the concessionary pass, with the majority of travel for shopping trips by those on low incomes .","Not reported","Climate of austerity and budget concerns. Amongst the population some groups show different patterns of use that is,  more people used active transport- eg 40% of trips on public transport by pensioners in the West Midlands would not have been undertaken without the concession pass. ","Yes (England) ? (Scotland, Wales & NI)","• Coronini-Cronberg, Sophie, et al. \"The impact of a free older persons’ bus pass on active travel and regular walking in England.\" American Journal of Public Health 102.11 (2012): 2141-2148. \n• Webb, Elizabeth, Gopalakrishnan Netuveli, and Christopher Millett. \"Free bus passes, use of public transport and obesity among older people in England.\" J Epidemiol Community Health 66.2 (2012): 176-180.\n","• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3477933/pdf/AJPH.2012.300946.pdf\n• http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.844.642&rep=rep1&type=pdf\n","• 10.2105/AJPH.2012.300946\n• 10.1136/jech.2011.133165"]
[110,"2 Physical activity","subsidized public transport passes_Eng","Policy","Government (Greater London Authority)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Free travels on buses for adolescents. Health was a secondary aim (as the first aim was to promote use of public transport, embed more environmentally sound travel habits) ","Active travel","Adolescents (12-16 year olds)","UK - England - London - Regional","2005-2006","1 year","Implemented by Transport for London decision","No fare exemption extended a year later to 17yr olds in full time education and now includes all <18 and some 19yr olds in full time education or on a work-based learning scheme (2010).","Behavioural insights "," Walking behaviours","• Mixed results which demonstrate that this policy intervention does not, straightforwardly or exclusively, encourage travel ‘passivity’ but instead facilitates ‘active,’ health-promoting experiences. These include walking to/ from/between bus stops instead of being driven in a private vehicle (especially in more suburban areas); increased numbers of walking trips as part of the additional journeys undertaken as a result of having a free bus pass; and more walking, and even running, within the ‘bus journey’ itself as young people are more inclined to interchange buses given there is no longer a financial cost in doing so.  Bus use replaces walking for short trips: ‘because it’s there, and it’s free’.\n• For some, having free bus travel generated additional walking journeys that would either have not been undertaken without the fare exemption or would have been carried out as a car passenger. By the same token, other journeys might be undertaken less often if free bus travel was not available. Universal free bus travel for young people removes a key potential financial barrier to social inclusion: that of transport costs.\n• Free travel not only opened-up the range of places that young people could go in London, but it also enabled young people to maintain friendship groups (important for mental health)\n","Allows more participation amongst the disadvantaged","Not reported","Not reported","Plausible impacts include: changes in levels of active transport, depending on whether bus trips replaced walking or car use; changes in road injury, as young people are more or less exposed to road danger as pedestrians; changes in assaults, as young people’s exposure to risk changes; increases in access to education, training or work; decreases in social exclusion; decreasing dependence on future car travel; changes in access to bus travel for other users displaced by increased numbers of young people.","Not reported","With the rising obesity crisis people thing that the policy should be scrapped to promote more active methods of travel (cycling or walking). Tension is rising with suggestions that free bus travel contributes to the obesity epidemic.","NA","• Martin A, Suhrcke M, Ogilvie D. Financial incentives to promote active travel: an evidence review and economic framework. American journal of preventive medicine. 2012 Dec 1;43(6):e45-57.\n• Jones, Alasdair, et al. \"Rethinking passive transport: bus fare exemptions and young people's wellbeing.\" Health & place 18.3 (2012): 605-612.\n","• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379712006228\n• http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/20703/1/sa2012Jones_OTBhealth.pdf\n","• 10.1016/j.amepre.2012.09.001\n• 10.1016/j.healthplace.2012.01.003"]
[111,"2 Physical activity","Gym incentives_Uni_students_US","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary financial incentive intervention:  During 12 weeks in the fall semester, participants in the continued-incentive condition received weekly monetary payments for meeting fitness-centre attendance goals, using an escalating rewards plus reset schedule. Students received $5.00 per visit in week 1, which increased by $.25 each week. The reset part of the design meant that if participants missed a goal 1 week, their payment was returned to the beginning of the payment scheme for 2 subsequent weeks. This scheme was used to discourage ‘‘holidays’’ from goal behaviour.  This intervention was compared to the discontinued-Incentive Condition receiving weekly incentives during fall semester 2011, and no incentives during spring semester 2012. Both arms of this RCT were compared to a control condition receiving no incentives for meeting fitness-centre attendance goals.","Physical activity programme participation","Adolescents (18-19yr olds)","USA - Local",2011,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","Fitness centre attendance goal","• During the fall semester the control condition met the fitness center attendance goals 13% of the time, whereas the continued-incentive condition met the goal 62% of the time and the discontinued-incentive group met the goal 64% of the time. The difference between the control condition and the incentive conditions was significant\n• During the spring semester, the control condition met the fitness center attendance goal 3% of the time, as did the discontinued-incentive condition. The continued-incentive condition met the goal number of fitness center visits 39% of the time in the spring semester. The difference between the continued-incentive condition and the other two conditions was also significant\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Study results contradict the criticism that incentives negatively impact people’s intrinsic motives to exercise. ","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Pope, Lizzy, and Jean Harvey. \"The impact of incentives on intrinsic and extrinsic motives for fitness-center attendance in college first-year students.\" American Journal of Health Promotion29.3 (2015): 192-199.\n• Pope, Lizzy, and Jean Harvey. \"The efficacy of incentives to motivate continued fitness-center attendance in college first-year students: a randomized controlled trial.\" Journal of American College Health 62.2 (2014): 81-90.\n","• http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.4278/ajhp.140408-QUAN-135?url_ver=Z39.88-2003&rfr_id=ori:rid:crossref.org&rfr_dat=cr_pub%3dpubmed\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24456510\n","• 10.4278/ajhp.140408-QUAN-135\n• 10.1080/07448481.2013.847840"]
[112,"2 Physical activity","Children’s Fitness Tax Credit (CTFC)_Canada","Policy","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary national programme (Children's Fitness Tax Credit), in which all parents were eligible to claim a non-refundable tax credit to cover the cost of organized physical activity programs for children, in this case up to age16 years (or 18 years for children eligible for a disability tax credit). The maximum claim is $500, resulting in a tax credit of up to $75 per child (i.e., 15%) at current rates. Provincial expenditures for PA type taxes varied across provinces: \n• Manitoba (2007) – Fitness Tax Credit -> non –refundable and budget cost $3 mil\n• Nova Scotia (2005) – Healthy living tax credit -> non –refundable and budget cost $2.2 mil\n• Ontario (2010) – Children’s activity tax credit -> refundable budget cost $75 mil\n• Saskatchewan (2009) Active Families benefit -> refundable budget cost $18 mil\n• Yukon (2007) – Yukon child tax credit -> non-refundable budget cost $0.2 mil\nHealth was a primary aim (to promote an increase in child uptake of physical activity) \n","Physical activity programme participation","Adolescents","Canada - National",2007,"9 years","• Implementation costs: CFTC is estimated to cost the federal government approximately $90 million to $115 million each year in forgone tax revenue \n• Passed through legislation\n","The scheme ended 2016 Yes, it was increased after a few years and was changed to be refundable so that people paid no income tax could get money back rather.","Behavioural insights ","Physical activity levels","• 25.6% parents reported having children enroled in organized PA programs that would be eligible for the CFTC. Less than half of respondents were aware of the CFTC (42.8%), had claimed it for 2007 (12.3%), or planned to claim it for the 2008 tax year (15.5%). \n• Among parents with children between the ages of 2 to 18 years, 54.4% stated their child was enroled in organized PA and they appeared to have higher levels of awareness of the CFTC (55.5%), claims for 2007 (26.1%), and plans to claim for 2008 (33.1%) than Canadians in general. Among parents who had claimed the CFTC for 2007, 15.6% agreed the CFTC had increased their child's participation in organized PA.\n• Regression analysis show the CFTC had no effect on children’s overall participation in physical activity. For time varying effects, the estimate for the CFTC’s impact in the first year after the policy (i.e. 2007) is positive and statistically significant, but its magnitude is small. The magnitude of 0.02 means that the CFTC raised physical activity by only 2 percentage points\n","• It appears a tax credit such as the CFTC will only benefit those people who can afford to pay the costs of registration for a PA program and carry that burden through to the end of the tax year.  For instance 28.2% of parents in the lowest income quartile had claimed the CFTC for the 2007 tax year while approximately 55% of parents in the highest income quartile had claimed it. \n• A related concern is that a tax credit will not provide an equal benefit or incentive to all families and in particular may not have much effect on lower-income groups. In fact, early evidence on use of the credit shows that lower income households are less likely to be aware of the credit or to use it.71,72 In the first 2 years of the federal credit, rates of use ranged from less than 1% of taxpayers in the lowest income categories to around 20% in the highest category\n","Not reported","Not reported","Policy was not widely well known, especially amongst disadvantaged communities.. Of the provinces that charge additional sales tax, most provide an exemption for children’s clothing and footwear. However, these exemptions are designed to minimize the tax payable on  essential goods for families, and they are not intended to achieve objectives related to public health or physical activity. In fact, most provinces specifically exclude clothing and footwear designed for use in sports from the exemption","The Department of Finance reports that the CFTC benefits roughly 1.4 million Canadian families each Year and costs the government about $100 million in foregone tax revenue. ","Other provinces had done this before and implemented at different levels. ","No","• Spence, John C., et al. \"Uptake and effectiveness of the Children's Fitness Tax Credit in Canada: the rich get richer.\" BMC Public Health 10.1 (2010): 356.\n• Nguyen, Hai V., and Paul Grootendorst. \"Does Child Fitness Tax Credit Program Make Children More Active?.\" (2012).\n• Von Tigerstrom, Barbara, Tamara Larre, and JoAnne Sauder. \"Using the tax system to promote physical activity: critical analysis of Canadian initiatives.\" American journal of public health 101.8 (2011): e10-e16.    \n• Government of Canada. Children’s Fitness and Arts Tax Credit 2016. Available from: https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/programs/about-canada-revenue-agency-cra/federal-government-budgets/budget-2016-growing-middle-class/childrens-fitness-arts-tax-credits.html.\n\n","• https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2458-10-356\n• http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.700.7914&rep=rep1&type=pdf\n• https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2011.300201?journalCode=ajph\n• https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/programs/about-canada-revenue-agency-cra/federal-government-budgets/budget-2016-growing-middle-class/childrens-fitness-arts-tax-credits.html.\n","• 10.1186/1471-2458-10-356\n• NA\n• 10.2105/AJPH.2011.300201\n• NA"]
[113,"2 Physical activity","Pol_attendence at fitness centre_US","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Financial incentives studies: In study 1, 2 groups are compared: all participants are paid $25 to attend the gym once a week and people in the one of these two groups were then paid an additional $100 to attend the gym eight more times in the following four weeks. In study 2: People were invited to have their biometric measures taken and be given a  handout regarding the benefits of exercise. They were paid $75 for this part, and were then invited to come twice more, 4 weeks later and 16 weeks later, so that we could obtain their biometrics information. They were promised $50 for each of the two later meetings. Participants were then split randomly into three groups. There were no additional requirements for the people in the control group. Participants in the second group were required to attend the gym once during the one-month intervention period, and participants in the third group were required to attend the gym eight times during the intervention period. \n Health was a primary aim (PA levels) Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year)","Physical activity programme participation","Other (university students)","USA - Regional",2008,"2 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Anthropometric markers (weight, body fat etc)\n• Gym attendance\n","• Significant differences across treatments in the change in these levels over time for body fat percentage, weight, waist size, BMI, and pulse rate. Overall, with the exception of the blood-pressure measures, we see that the eight-times group improved significantly in their biometric measures relative to both the control group and, with the further exception of the pulse rate, the one-time group. Thus, it appears that there are real health benefits that accrue from paying people to go to the gym eight times in a month. There are also some differences between the control and one-time group, but these tend to have lower significance levels; perhaps there is a slight benefit from merely requiring one visit\n• The rate of gym visits after the intervention increased significantly in both studies: Participants who did not attend the gym before our study began to do so during our intervention and continued to go after it was concluded\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Strohacker, Kelley, Omar Galarraga, and David M. Williams. \"The impact of incentives on exercise behaviour: a systematic review of randomized controlled trials.\" Annals of behavioural Medicine48.1 (2013): 92-99.      \n• Charness, Gary, and Uri Gneezy. \"Incentives to exercise.\" Econometrica 77.3 (2009): 909-931.","• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4412849/pdf/nihms678470.pdf\n• https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/66ef/8c8c2006032914c76d3bbf0ff95ac6cb89f9.pdf","• 10.1007/s12160-013-9577-4\n• 10.3982/ECTA7416 "]
[114,"2 Physical activity","Spitsmijden - Rewarding travellers for avoiding peak period_NI","Programme","Government (Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management)","Financial incentive","Voluntary scheme where €3 to €7 could be earned by not using the car during the morning peak between 7.30 and 9.30 am. The amount of the reward changed over time. For three weeks, participants could earn 3 euros each day they avoided the morning peak by car. For another 4 weeks they could earn 7 euros each day, and for yet another 3 weeks they could earn 3 euros if they were not detected in the middle of the peak (8am to 9am) increased to 7 euros if they were not detected at all in the complete morning peak. \nParticipants could not change their route in order to earn a reward, as all routes from Zoetermeer to The Hague were monitored. Hence, the only alternatives available are different departure times, different travel modes, and choosing not to travel. \nThe rewarding experiment was conducted from October to December 2006 during 10 consecutive weeks. The participants were also monitored two weeks two week prior and one week after the rewarding period.  Examples of such programmes were developed at different times: in 2006 in Zoetermeer in the Netherlands. This first project primarily aimed to scientifically investigate the behavioural responses of travellers towards a reward. With only a small number of participants, around 300, it was not intended to solve any congestion problems. \nIn 2007 and 2008 two real projects were defined and put into practice with larger numbers of participants (several thousands) with the aim to influence traffic conditions. Construction and maintenance works on two bridges, Hollandse Brug east of Amsterdam and Moerdijk Brug south of Rotterdam, were the reason of initiating the rewarding projects, in which severe congestion was expected due to the road works. By paying volunteering travellers who often use one of these bridges in the peak period a reward for not travelling by car during the peak period, the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management aimed to relief the increase of congestion.\n","Active travel","General population (car drivers)","Netherlands - Regional","2006-2008","Zoetermeer- 13 weeks (10 weeks of intervention, 2 weeks prior to intervention, 1 week after)\nHollandse Brug – 1 yr\nMoerdijk Brug – 2.5  months\n\n","Policy implemented as a traffic savings measure by government for road works","Modification, the longer you were part of the experiment the more rewards you could get.","Empirical assessment","• Active transport behaviours split by area and incentive value","This experiment showed that travel behaviour could be significantly influenced by such monetary rewards. In particular, the amount of car travel in the peak by participants was reduced by about 50%.\n€3 reward – Zoetermeer\n• Travelled outside peak hours -> 35%;  Public transport -> 9%;  Cycling -> 1%; Work at home -> 1%; No change -> 54%\n€7 reward – Zoetermeer\n• Travelled outside peak hours -> 44%;  Public transport -> 13%;  Cycling -> 1%;  Work at home -> 3%;  No change -> 39%\n€4 reward (base rate) – Hollandse Brug\n• Travelled outside peak hours -> 18%;  Other route -> 9%;  Public transport -> 6%;  Cycling -> 1%;  Work at home -> 5%;  Cancelling activities -> 1%;  No change -> 60%\n€4 reward (base rate )– Moerdijk Brug\n• Travelled outside peak hours -> 15%;  Other route -> 28%;  Public transport -> 2%;  Car sharing -> 3%;  Work at home -> 6%;  No change -> 46%\n\n","Activities such as work from home or cancelling plans was only available to those with flexible working arrangements","Not reported","Not reported","Congestion from travellers departing earlier or later (avoiding peak travel times) was higher.","Not reported","There are congestion charges already in place and further being considered in various jurisdictions in the UK.","NA","Bliemer, Michiel, Matthijs Dicke-Ogenia, and Dick Ettema. \"Rewarding for avoiding the peak period: A synthesis of three studies in the Netherlands.\" European Transport Conference 2009. 2009.","Link","• NA"]
[115,"2 Physical activity","walking_incentives_olderadults_US","Modelling study","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary scheme that added incentives to a 3-days-per-week/30-minute-per-day walking program, the model predicts that an incentive of $9 cash per week ($468 per year) would increase the likelihood of participation by 31% (to 23%; p>0.001). The likelihood of participation for the same program in a formal group is almost 10% lower (p>0.001) and is also less responsive to incentives. Because of the sampling frame, no respondents were participating in moderate activity at the level of public health recommendations (5 days per week, 30 minutes per day); however, the same $9-per-week incentive would increase the stated likelihood of participation to >5% (p>0.001). Health was the primary aim. ","Physical activity programme participation","General population (>=50yrs)","USA - National",2006,"3 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Random-utility model","Participation in walking programs","• The most-preferred walking program was three 20-minute walks per week conducted outside of a for- mal group setting. Longer durations of walking time per day were less preferred, although the difference be- tween 20 and 30 minutes was insignificant. Subjects were strongly averse to walks of 75 minutes per day. The sample also strongly preferred walking programs that did not involve a formal group.\n• For frequency of activity, 3 days per week was significantly preferred to 2 days. Subjects strongly preferred the frequency of both 2 and 3 days per week to the frequency of 5 days per week.\n• The cash compensations required to make an average sedentary adult in the sample indifferent between engaging in a specified 3-month walking program and not engaging in the program are shown in Table 2. A program with three 20-minute walks per week that is conducted outside of a formal group setting—the most preferred program—required the smallest utility compensation, $9.30 per week. Increasing to 30 minutes per day required slightly more than doubling the incentive to $19.60. Adult public health guidelines recommend >=30 minutes per day of moderate-intensity physical activity on 5 or more days per week. Outside of a formal group, this level would require $36.30 per week of cash compensation to offset the utility loss associated with participation. Adding a group requirement to any program requires an additional payment of $37.30 per week in cash.\n• Adding incentives to a 3-days-per-week/30-minute-per-day walking program, the model predicts that an incentive of $9 cash per week ($468 per year) would increase the likelihood of participation by 31%. The likelihood of participation for the same program in a formal group is almost 10% lower and is also less responsive to incentives.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Brown, Derek S., et al. \"Estimating older adults' preferences for walking programs via conjoint analysis.\" American Journal of Preventive Medicine 36.3 (2009): 201-207.","Link","• 10.1016/j.amepre.2008.10.014"]
[116,"2 Physical activity","Women's Active Living Kits (WALK)_Aus","Programme","Research body (Central Queensland University with funding from Australian Office for Women (Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","WALK Community Grant Scheme to increase local capacity to promote and engage priority women in health-related physical activity by implementing a small grant program whereby community groups or individuals could apply for and receive up to AU$1,500 in grant funds. These small grants where intended to (a) support the development of women’s walking groups; (b) increase the physical activity participation levels in Australian women from priority groups, including women with young children, women with busy careers, women from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities, and indigenous women; and (c) support innovative community ideas for increasing priority women’s physical activity by improving social structures and local environments.","Physical activity programme participation","Women","Australia - National"," 2010*","10 months","• Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (10,000 steps program) \n• Pilot study using government grant\n","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","Community partnerships and programs that were aimed at improving PA were funded at local levels","• Of the micro-grants awarded to the 48 community groups and organizations, 4 went to promote activity in CALD women, 8 went to support physical activity in indigenous women’s groups, 11 went to support mothers with young children, 9 went to older women’s groups, 10 promoted activity in working women, 5 grants supported initiatives in groups made up of young to middle-aged women, and 1 grant was awarded to a disabled women’s group\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Community engagement:  The distribution of the WALK Community Grant also assisted us with building partnerships with com- munity organizations and groups outside of our own local area, as well as organizations and groups whom we would not traditionally be linked to. For instance, as a result of the WALK Community Grant Scheme, we have built ongoing partnerships with a learning center located in VIC, a retirement village located in NSW, and a non-incorporated neighbourhood group located in Far North Queensland. The significance of these partnerships cannot be understated as they provided us with an opportunity to reach a large variety of people who we may not necessarily reach through our traditional channels of communication.  ","Not reported","Not reported","?","Caperchione C, Mummery WK, Joyner K. WALK Community Grants Scheme: lessons learned in developing and administering a health promotion microgrants program. Health promotion practice. 2010 Sep;11(5):637-44.","Link","• 10.1177/1524839908328996"]
[117,"2 Physical activity","Financial_incentives_ gym memberships_US","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","The experiment randomized all new members who enrolled in a gym over the course of an 8 month period into one of four arms: a control group and 3 incentive groups. For all of the incentive groups, subjects earned incentives by attending the gym at least 9 times in the first 6 weeks of membership (i.e., an average of 1.5 visits per week) Among the incentive groups, subjects in one group earned $30 in an Amazon.com gift card for reaching the threshold, subjects in one group similarly earned $60 in an Amazon.com gift card, and subjects in the last group earned a specific but subject-chosen item sold by Amazon.com worth approximately $30. Control group: received a $30 Amazon gift card after six weeks unconditionally. Money $30 group: received a $30 Amazon gift card if attended gym at least 9 days in their first 6 weeks of membership.  Money $60 group: received $60 Amazon gift card if attended gym at least 9 days in their first 6 weeks of membership.  Item group: received a self-chosen item worth approximately $30 from Amazon if attended gym at least 9 days in their first 6 weeks of membership.","Physical activity programme participation","general population","USA - Large midwestern city - Local",2015,"8 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT - intention to treat analysis","Gym attendance","• We conclude that the provision of moderately-sized financial incentives only moderately helped new gym members establish better habits for using the gym. This suggests that, at least for exercise, timing financial incentives to align with endogenous attempts at behaviour change may not be the most successful strategy for improving exercise habits.\n• The most glaring pattern is the downward trend in visits over time for new members.\n• This highlights why an intervention aiming to encourage members to come frequently or consistently might be useful. Eight weeks into their membership, new members go half as frequently as they did in the first week of their membership.\n• The control group visit rates fell from an average of 2 visits during the first week of membership to around 1 visit per week by the end of the second month of membership.\n• The average visit rates for the members assigned to one of the three incentive groups were somewhat higher over the first 6 weeks of membership, consistent with the presence of incentives. The differences, however, were quite modest. On average, across the first six weeks, the members assigned to the incentive treatments made 0.14 more visits per week than the control group. The largest difference was in week 2 when the control group made an average of 1.5 visits while the incentivized groups averaged 1.73 visits. Interestingly, there was a modest bump in visit rates for the incentivized group in the 6th week of membership, which was the last week during which this group could make visits to count toward the 9 visit incentive threshold. From week 10 on, the average visit rates for the incentivized groups and control groups were very similar and hover around 1 visit per week.\n• The average visit rates for the Item group were higher than those of control in all but week 10 suggesting that the Item incentive might have had a larger effect on attendance than the other incentives.\n• that members facing an incentive were 9-10 percentage points more likely to reach the threshold of nine visits in the first six weeks than control group subjects. This result is statistically significant and substantial relative to the control group’s 48 percent probability of meeting the threshold. The increase in the average number of visits, however, is less pronounced and only marginally statistically significant with controls\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Carrera, Mariana, et al. Can Financial Incentives Help People Trying to Establish New Habits? Experimental Evidence with New Gym Members. No. w23567. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.","Link","• 10.3386/w23567"]
[118,"2 Physical activity","ACTIVE (Active Children through Incentive Vouchers - Evaluation)","Programme","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The intervention involved provision of £25 of vouchers (five vouchers in increments of £5) per month for six months. Vouchers could be used to voluntarily: i) enrol in existing activities; ii) fund coaches or new activities directly in communities or at their school, such as Zumba and Boxercise and iii) purchase new sporting equipment for themselves or their school. Recognised providers (i.e., leisure centres, clubs, and dance providers) were recruited during development stages, and their logos were printed on the vouchers to enable easy identification of where they could be used. Vouchers were numbered and contained the participant’s name with a section to complete the type and duration of activity and the signature of the participant and provider. Vouchers were treated like a cash transaction, but no change was provided in order to prevent non-physical activity-related purchases. At the end of the month, all vouchers were collected from each provider with accompanying invoices for monetary reimbursement.","Physical activity programme participation","Adolescents (low socio-economic groups)","UK - South Wales - 1 secondary school in a deprived catchment area - Local","2016*","6 months","Not reported ","One follow-up action required was increasing accessibility of existing activities such as improved PT to distant facilities/reducing dependence on parents for transportation","Behavioural insights ","• Increases in PA type - more moderate-to-vigorous PA, decrease in sedentary behaviour, social changes such as interest in PA, increased competence/body image, increases social interaction","Increases in PA type - more moderate-to-vigorous PA, decrease in sedentary behaviour, social changes such as interest in PA, increased competence/body image, increases social interaction","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Anecdotally increased use of facilities/equipment means increased retail/economic benefits   ","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Christian D, Todd C, Hill R, Rance J, Mackintosh K, Stratton G, et al. Active children through incentive vouchers–evaluation (ACTIVE): a mixed-method feasibility study. BMC public health. 2016;16(1):890.","Link","• 10.1186/s12889-016-3381-6"]
[119,"2 Physical activity","Transport modelling_Belgium","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory increase in car fuel prices with 20%. Health was a primary aim (physical activity, outdoor air pollution and risk of road traffic injury for the current situation).","Fuel price","General population","Belgium - Regional",2007,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling","• DALYs\n• YLDs \n• cases of mortality/disease cases avoided\n• air pollution exposure estimates\n","• The estimated decrease in attributable deaths from EC concentrations was around 2.5%, from 3982 (1367–6441) to 3882 (1333–6274) in the base and fuel scenario respectively, and 0.46% for cardiovascular hospital admissions, from 2800 (1426–4554) to 2788 (1418–4535) admissions. Deaths prevented due to active travel increased from 1526 (1000–2620) to 1567 (1060–2645) or an increase of on average 2.6%. The number of deaths and severely injured by traffic crashes was estimated to decline from438 in the base scenario to 416 in the fuel scenario and from 3913 to 3773, or a decrease of 5.02% and 3.58% respectively. Of all causes considered, mortality due to EC concentrations are responsible for most of the attributable deaths, more than traffic fatalities and deaths prevented due to active travel\n• The fuel scenario leads to an estimated overall gain of 1650 (1010–2330) DALY. Regarding morbidity (YLD), the burden of disease due to extra cardiovascular hospitalizations is rather small with 60 YLD (7–255), while also the health gain is negligible (Table 4). Road traffic injuries result in 5640 YLD (3040–9360) and decrease with 200 (120–290) fewer YLD. The highest health gain is seen in the younger age group, while at later age a slightly negative impact is observed.\n• A total of 1450 (890–2040) YLG were calculated for the fuel scenario, or an increase of 13 (9–18) and 8 (5–12) extra days in life expectancy, for males and females respectively. Air quality results in a total of 21,300 (7200–34,700) YLL, equal to a loss of 7 months of life expectancy for both genders. The gain was estimated at 530 (180–880) YLG, equal to a 5 day increase in life expectancy for each of the genders. Active travel currently adds 7204 (5205–11,258) life years, which increased with an additional 171 (124–251) years, or an extra 3 (2–4) and 1 (1–2) day(s) in life expectancy, for male and females respectively. In both air quality and active travel most life years are gained at older age. Traffic safety accounted for a total of 13,000 YLL (12,400–13,600) and changed with 750 (590–910) YLG. Males accounted for most of the health gain due to prevented traffic fatalities. The large health gain is due the age at which the deaths are prevented. In young and middle-aged males, there is a steeper in- crease in YLG (Fig. 5) compared to women. Despite the higher number of YLG, the fewer deaths prevented for traffic safety lead to an increase in life expectancy for the general population similar to the air quality results, i.e. an increase of5 days in life expectancy for males and an in- crease with 2 days for females.\n","The elderly showed a health impact close to null and even negative.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Dhondt, Stijn, et al. \"Integrated health impact assessment of travel behaviour: model exploration and application to a fuel price increase.\" Environment international 51 (2013): 45-58.","Link","• 10.1016/j.envint.2012.10.005"]
[120,"2 Physical activity","After school physical activity programs_taxcredits_US","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","RCT where participants that were randomly selected to take part in the treatment group were given a letter stating that they will receive up to $200 reimbursement following the enrolment of their elementary school-aged child in a qualified after-school physical activity program of their choice.  Health was a primary aim (increase in PA).","Physical activity programme participation","children","USA - California - Regional","2015*","1.5 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• enrolment in after-school PA\n• frequency in afterschool PA participation\n• time spent in afterschool PA programs \n• Overall moderate to vigorous intensity PA.\n","• After controlling for covariates, group differences in after-school physical activity program enrolment were not statistically significant for either time point. However, the OR was 1.8 (95% CI = 0.2–17.2) for after- school physical activity program enrolment at post-intervention suggesting that children in the intervention group were 80% more likely to be enroled in an after-school physical activity program at the end of the intervention than the control group. The direction of effect shifted when examining continued after-school physical activity program enrolment at the 6-week follow-up (OR = 0.8, 95% CI = 0.6–9.7), with the intervention group being 20% less likely to continue to enrol after 6 weeks.\n• After controlling for covariates, group differences in times per week of attendance to after-school physical activity programs were not statistically significant.\n• After controlling for covariates, group differences in average MVPA min·day−1 were not statistically significant for either time point.\n","MUP will have a regressive impact:\n• spending increases representing 2.7% of income for consumers in the lowest-income quintile, compared with 0.3% of income for those in the highest-income quintile. \n• The predicted change in mean alcohol consumption per","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Dunton, Genevieve, et al. \"The use of refundable tax credits to increase low-income children’s after-school physical activity level.\" Journal of Physical Activity and Health 12.6 (2015): 840-853.","Link","• 10.1123/jpah.2014-0058"]
[121,"2 Physical activity","Active_minutes_cash_incentives_USA","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT where participants assigned to the control group were offered a fixed payment of $75 for attending a 90-minute kickoff meeting, wearing a pedometer daily, and returning all study materials. The treatment group was offered $50 for base participation in the study (the same requirements as for the control group), as well as a variable incentive payment depending on participants' aerobic minutes during each of the 4 weeks of the study: \n• $0 if averaging less than 15 aerobic minutes per day each week, \n• $10 if averaging at least 15 and less than 25 aerobic minutes per day each week, \n• $15 if averaging at least 25 and less than 40 aerobic minutes per day each week, \n• $25 if averaging 40 or more aerobic minutes per day each week.\n For example, a treatment group participant who walked averages of 12, 28, 40, and 20 aerobic minutes per day during weeks 1–4, respectively, would earn a total incentive payment of $0+$15+$25+$10=$50. Including the base payment of $50, a maximum pay out of $150 for the entire study was possible for those in the treatment group. To qualify as aerobic minutes, the participant's continuous walking, jogging, or running had to be at a rate of 60+ steps per minute, involve no more than a 60-second pause, and last 10 min or longer. ","Physical activity levels","General adult population ( >50yrs, sedentary)","USA - North Carolina - Raleigh Durham - Local",2007,"1 month","Not reported ","Activity was capped at 75 mins so there is a max payment you can receive.","RCT","Aerobic minutes","• In the control arm, 20% of participants logged 30 or more aerobic minutes at least 3 days per week during the study period, a figure that climbed to 57% for those in the treatment arm. Only 6.7% of control participants met the public health recommendations for moderate physical activity (5 days per week for N30 minutes per day), while 38% of treatment participants met or exceeded this level. Finally, none of the control participants logged the high threshold of at least 30 min, 7 days a week, throughout the study, but 19% of treatment participants did so. \n• Participants in the control arm averaged just under 20 aerobic minutes per day over the 4-week study period and showed a slight decrease in average walking over the 4 weeks. The treatment arm averaged 35 aerobic minutes per day during the 4 weeks of the study, or 79% more minutes; average weekly minutes were essentially unchanged for this group over the 4 weeks. After controlling for socio-demographics, the adjusted treatment effect is just over 16 more aerobic minutes per day  for those in the treatment arm\n","After controlling for socio-demographics, the adjusted treatment effect is just over 16 more aerobic minutes per day for those in the treatment arm. College graduates logged 11 fewer minutes of aerobic activity than those who did not complete college and those with household incomes above $50,000 logged over 8 fewer aerobic minutes, suggesting that higher income individuals may be less motivated by incentives. Full-time employees also logged fewer aerobic minutes than part time employees or retirees, possibly reflecting a higher opportunity cost of their scarce free time. Although differences between full-time employees and retirees were not statistically significant at conventional levels, this was likely driven by the relatively small samples within these groups.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Finkelstein EA, Brown DS, Brown DR, Buchner DM. A randomized study of financial incentives to increase physical activity among sedentary older adults. Preventive medicine. 2008 Aug 1;47(2):182-7.","Link","• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2008.05.002"]
[122,"2 Physical activity","USA_PA_Incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT looking at the impact of financial incentives: A lottery with a 3 in 10 chance of winning $50 and a 3 in 100 chance of winning $200 every week if walking goals were met in at least 5 of the past 7 days (expected value for the lottery - approx. $21) and nonfinancial incentive: -peer network through an online message board.  Control group: participants receiving weekly feedback on the achievement of walking goals.  All participants receive pedometer. ","Physical activity levels","Elderly (>=65 from a general population who voluntary responded to the advertisement (n= 92) Mean age: 72y Sex: M (30%))","USA - National","2011-2012","2 months","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","Mean proportion of days walking goals","• NO significant results on the effectiveness of financial incentives:\n• Financial incentives, and financial incentives combined with peer network, did not result in a significantly higher mean proportion of days walking goals were met during the 16-week intervention. Also peer networking alone was ineffective.\n• During the post-intervention 8-week follow-up period, there was no significant decrease in mean proportion of days walking goals were met. Still, there was no significant difference between the intervention group and the control group in mean proportion of days walking goals were met.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From the Systematic review: Tambor M, Pavlova M, Golinowska S, Arsenijevic J, Groot W. Financial incentives for a healthy life style and disease prevention among older people: a systematic literature review. BMC health services research. 2016 Aug;16(5):426. individual article: Kullgren JT, Harkins KA, Bellamy SL, Gonzales A, Tao Y, Zhu J, et al. A mixed-methods randomized controlled trial of financial incentives and peer networks to promote walking among older adults. Health Educ Behav. 2014;41(1 suppl):43S–50S  ","Link","• 10.1186/s12913-016-1517-0"]
[123,"2 Physical activity","USA_PA_Incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT of a lottery with changes to win $1-$100, for each day the target number of steps was met + motivational weekly meetings + $5 gift car for each week of participation + $20 for participation in evaluation at the end of the intervention Control group: motivational weekly meetings + $5 gift car for each week of participation + $20 for participation in evaluation at the end of the intervention\n ","Physical activity levels","Elderly (sedentary (walking < 6000 steps per day) older adults (55-75y) from a general population who voluntary responded to the advertisement (n= 45) Mean age: 63y Sex: M (8-24%))","USA - National","2013*","3 months","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","Number of days walking goal were met","• Significant results on the effectiveness of financial incentives:\n• Financial incentives resulted in a significantly higher number of days walking goal were met.\n• In 12-week post intervention follow-up, there was reduction in number of steps, yet there was still significant difference between intervention group and control group\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From the Systematic review: Tambor M, Pavlova M, Golinowska S, Arsenijevic J, Groot W. Financial incentives for a healthy life style and disease prevention among older people: a systematic literature review. BMC health services research. 2016 Aug;16(5):426. individual article Petry NM, Andrade LF, Barry D, Byrne S. A randomized study of reinforcing ambulatory exercise in older adults. Psychol Aging. 2013;28(4):1164  ","Link","• 10.1186/s12913-016-1517-0"]
[124,"2 Physical activity","Sweden_cycling_RCT","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","RCT involving subsidising bicycle price.  The intervention programme consisted of all aspects of standard care combined with a more intensive behavioural counselling package:\n • Three individual 30min sessions with a physician experienced in behaviour change theory and practice at baseline, 6 and 12 months, including detailed physical activity prescriptions (specifically developed by Swedish authorities to promote physical activity within the national health care system, ‘PaP, Physical activity on Prescription’). The prescriptions focused on increased cycling and walking, mainly between work and home. The physician meetings aimed at changing PA behaviour. For example enhancing motivation for physically active commuting, especially bicycling, routine building, overcoming barriers, strengthening self-efficacy, relapse prevention and preventing injurie\n • Two added 2h group counselling sessions during the cycling season (at months 2 and 14). \n• A new ladies model bicycle (Crescent CTC 670, 2005 model, Varberg, Sweden) complete with 7 gears, basket, trip meter, foot brake and helmet (retail cost SEK 6000, approx $900) with free of charge bicycle service.\n Health was a primary aim (increasing the number of cycling km/d) \n","Active travel","Female population (healthy with abdominal obesity, 30-60 years old)","Sweden - National",2005,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 18 months","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (uses measures called the physical activity prescriptions specifically developed by Swedish authorities to promote physical activity within the national health care system, ‘PaP, Physical activity on Prescription’))  ","Not reported ","RCT","Active travel","• Walking increased in both groups over time, with no difference between groups. The intervention group recorded 8692 steps per day at baseline and 10129 steps per day at 18 months (using baseline carried forward). The corresponding values were 8249 steps per day at baseline and 9086 steps per day at follow up in the control group. Using completers only data the 18-month averages were 10568 steps per day in the intervention group and 10050 steps per day in the control group\n• In our main analysis the proportion of participants in each group above the cut-off for cycling treatment success (X2 km/d) was 38.7% in the intervention group and 8.9% in the control group (odds ratio¼7.8 (95% CI: 4.0 to 15.0)). Using a 4km/d cut-off the percentages decreased to 24.8 and 4.6% in the intervention and the control groups, respectively, and remained statistically significant. There was no difference between groups for achieving the secondary outcome of walking 10 000 steps per day: 45.7% in the intervention group and 39.3% in the control group (odds ratio¼1.2 (95% CI: 0.7 to 2.0))\n• In terms of commuting modes, the mean proportion of participants using the bicycle at least once per week during months 2–18 was 29.4% in the intervention group, com- pared with 8.0% in the control group. There was no difference between groups for commuting by walking during the same time period: 40.4% in the intervention group and 47.4% in the control group. During months 2–18, the mean proportion of commuting by car was 25.2% in the intervention group and 28.9% in the control group. Commuting by public transport were 55.5% in both groups during the same time period. In a whole-sample post hoc analysis there was a 34.1% decrease in mean number of commuting journeys by car per participant, and a 37.1% reduction in number of commuting journeys by public transport. Both groups achieved similar reductions in waist circumference and sagittal abdominal diameter after 6 months, which were maintained at 18 months, whereas body weight did not change\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Hemmingsson, Erik, et al. \"Increased physical activity in abdominally obese women through support for changed commuting habits: a randomized clinical trial.\" International journal of obesity 33.6 (2009): 645.","Link","• 10.1038/ijo.2009.77"]
[125,"2 Physical activity","Gasoline price_active travel_US","Observational study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Observational study linking the price of gasoline increase and physical activity data:  Linked data from the CARDIA study to gasoline price data from the Council for Community and Economic Research. At each examination, frequency of participation in 13 categories of moderate and vigorous recreational sports, exercise, leisure, and occupational PA over the previous 12 months was ascertained by an interviewer-administered questionnaire designed for CARDIA. PA scores were calculated in exercise units (EU) based on frequency and intensity of participation for each of the 13 PA categories. Of specific interest, the walking score ranged from zero to 144 EU (regular walking ≥4 hour/ week at 4 MET); biking score ranged from zero to 216 EU (regular, vigorous bicycling at ≥2 hour/week at 6 MET). The calculated scores for all 13 categories were then summarized for a total PA score. The Study modelled walking and bicycling separately given the potential for substitution in transportation modes (from driving to walking or bicycling).  Health was a primary aim (PA) ","Fuel price","General population","USA - National","1985-1986","15 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling","Physical activity ","• Using random-effect longitudinal models, we observed a significant positive association between gasoline price and total PA, after controlling for relevant covariates. A 25-cent increase in inflation-adjusted gasoline price was associated with a 9.9 exercise units (EU) increase in total PA (p=0.01), which was about 3% of total PA.\n• After controlling for all covariates, a 25-cent increase in gasoline price was associated with 1.3 exercise units increase in walking score (p=0.2), which can be translated to an additional 3-min walking per week (Figure 1). Three out of 11 PA sub-categories were significantly associated with gasoline price (positive association: non-strenuous sports; inverse associations: vigorous racket sports and bowling)\n• We observed a positive longitudinal association between gasoline price and total PA. Essentially, a 25-cent increase in inflation-adjusted gasoline price was associated with 9.9 EU increase in total PA (p=0.03). For example, since 144 EU represents regular walking at ≥4 hr/wk (≥240 min/wk), 9.9 EU translates to about 7% of 144 EU or 240min×7%=17min walking per week, a substantial population-level impact. We also observed some evidence of substitution of home-based physical activity (e.g., jogging, walking, and non-strenuous sports) as opposed to physical activities that require driving to a particular location (e.g., bowling and racket sports).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Gas price changes: On average, gasoline price was relatively stable in the 1980s and 1990s ranging from $1.06– 1.25 including tax, with substantial spatial variation across the US. Since the new millennium, the price has increased significantly (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2006). However, relative to many other countries, gasoline prices are considerably low in the US. not reported  not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Hou, Ningqi, et al. \"Longitudinal trends in gasoline price and physical activity: the CARDIA study.\" Preventive medicine 52.5 (2011): 365-369.","Link","• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2011.02.007"]
[126,"2 Physical activity","Physical Activity Loyalty Card_Northern Ireland","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","Financial incentive for physical activity. Participants used their PAL card to self-monitor PA levels, and minutes of PA were converted to points (1 minute=1 point; capped at 30 points per day) over the 12-week intervention period. Points were redeemed for rewards at Week 6 and Week 12. Through successful engagement with the retail sector, rewards were various “in kind” vouchers from local businesses. Health was a primary aim (PA) ","Physical activity levels","Working population","UK - Northern Ireland - Local",2011,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 6 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Quasi-experimental study","Minutes of PA","• Using a novel loyalty card scheme that included financial incentives did not significantly increase PA in adults compared to self-monitoring PA alone.\n• At 12 weeks, participants in the Incentive Group recorded 17.52 minutes of PA/week (95% CI¼12.49, 22.56) compared to 16.63 minutes/week (95% CI¼11.76, 21.51) in the No Incentive Group.  At Week 6, participants in the Incentive Group recorded 26.18 minutes of PA/week (95% CI¼20.06, 32.29) compared to 24.00 minutes/week (95% CI¼17.45, 30.54) in the No Incentive Group. \n• At 6 months participants in the Incentive Group completed a mean of 22.49 minutes/week workplace PA compared to mean of 35.02 minutes/week in the No Incentive Group, measured using the GPAQ (work domain\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The Public Health Responsibility Deal, supported by the UK government, encouraged public health to work collaboratively with business, fostering links between researchers, government, and industry. This study provides an example of how researchers can successfully engage with the business sector in public health. ","NA","Hunter RF, Tully MA, Davis M, Stevenson M, Kee F. Physical activity loyalty cards for behaviour change: a quasi-experimental study. American journal of preventive medicine. 2013 Jul 1;45(1):56-63.","Link","• 10.1016/j.amepre.2013.02.022"]
[127,"2 Physical activity","public transport passes_US","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Transcard program in place at the time of the survey provided up to US$100 in subsidy per month for public transport. Health was a primary aim (PA)","Active travel","General population (car drivers/working age - 16-70yrs)","USA - Metropolitan Atlanta - Local",2002,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Multinomial logistic regression","Meeting PA guidelines","Summary: transit users record fewer driver trips and slightly more passenger trips than non-users and also have lower car availability. As income increases, transit users take slightly fewer trips by transit and more by car. Transit users also accumulate greater total walking distance across income groups. Higher-income transit users report the most walking.\n• In our sample, 2.6% met the physical activity recommendation solely by walking for transportation, 8.3% recorded some walking, and 89.2% recorded no walk trips.\n• We measured only moderate physical activity related to transportation on the street network, whereas overall physical activity captures many other kinds of activity that are not transportation-related. We found that 5.4% of the sample used transit, reflecting the low mode share of transit (among all possible modes of transportation) in the Atlanta region\n• We found that 8.7% of our sample had and used an employer-sponsored transit pass, and 11.1% were eligible for such a program but did not use it\n• Having and making use of an employer-sponsored transit pass was both positively and significantly associated with meeting the physical activity recommendation (OR:4.96, CI:2.8–8.9) but was not significantly associated with being a moderate walker. Having access to, but not using, an employer-sponsored transit pass had a non- significant relationship with being a moderate walker and a significant OR of 2.2 (CI:1.15–4.3) of meeting the physical activity recommendation. When estimating OR of meeting the physical activity recommendation with moderate walkers as a reference category (column 5), trips as driver (OR:0.86, CI:0.76–0.98) and car availability (OR:0.25, CI:0.09–0.69) were negatively associated. Public transit trips and having and using an employer-sponsored transit pass (OR:3.6, CI:1.83–7.1) remained positive and significant.\n• Living in a lower density neighbourhood was significantly and negatively associated with being a moderate walker and with meeting recommendation after adjusting for other variables in the\n","Higher- income individuals, on average, took fewer transit trips when they did use transit, and made more car trips as drivers. Interestingly, higher-income transit users reported walking greater distances than other transit users and non-users of transit model. Living within 450m (0.28 miles) of a bus stop or rail station was not associated with walking when only transit users were considered. However, transit users living between 450 and 1,000m (0.6 miles) of transit were more likely to be moderate walkers than those living farther away from transit.","Not reported","Not reported","When the presence of retail stores within a 10- min walk from the workplace is introduced into the model, the OR of using a pass and meeting the recommendation stays relatively constant, but the OR of not using the available program decreases considerably, giving credence to the importance of the built environment at the place of employment for walking.","Not reported","Employers located in areas well served by transit are more likely to consider offering transit pass programs.  Sponsored transit pass programs are attractive to both employer and employee because they are tax-free to employees and tax-deductible for the employer. Furthermore, they may reduce demand on parking space for employers and contribute to employee retention.","NA","Lachapelle, Ugo, and Lawrence D. Frank. \"Transit and health: mode of transport, employer-sponsored public transit pass programs, and physical activity.\" Journal of public health policy30.1 (2009): S73-S94.","Link","• 10.1057/jphp.2008.52"]
[128,"2 Physical activity","commuting subsidies_Belgium","Policy","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy (need to apply for subsidy)  based  on govt based tax rates (commuter subsidies)\n• Car driver/ own car (no reimbursement) -> subsidy in % of costs 0.0%\n• Car driver/ own car (conventional reimbursement) -> subsidy in % of costs 3.8%\n• Car driver/ company car ->subsidy in % of costs 34.7%\n• Train (third payer) -> subsidy in % of costs 50.4%\n• Train (conventional) ->subsidy in % of costs 29.4%\n• BTM (BXL region) -> subsidy in % of costs 37.9%\n• moto ->subsidy in % of costs 2.4%\n• bike -> subsidy in % of costs 34.1%\n Health was a primary aim (move away from car use) ","Active travel","Other (commuters)","Belgium - National",2012,"NA","• Implementation costs: EUR 380 million\n• Passed through legislation \n","Ad hoc tax changes","Modelling","Commuting trips","• Not surprisingly, reverting to the low exemption level for car transport would decrease car use. The 0.4% drop in market share is rather high, which may be explained by the fact that a large number of people is hit by such a policy. Not only commuters by private car are affected, but those commuting by company car, too. All other modes gain, with the closest substitutes (rail and car passenger) relatively more. Bus (and tram) travel, which in PLANET is highly sensitive to congestion, is indirectly favoured by rising speed levels, hence the rise in kilometres by Bus Tram Metro. \n• Abolishing the direct subsidy to rail commuters in the third payer system would obviously have a negative impact on rail travel. Total pkm by rail drops by almost 5%, while its market share in commuting drops by one half percentage point. Speed is negatively affected. This simulation illustrates the importance of current public transport subsidies to alleviate congestion levels. Since congestion is high, there is a case to subsidize public transport, be it through operational subsidies to the railway company, directly to commuters through the third payer system, or indirect ones through the personal income tax system.\n• Lowering the personal income tax level would make the tax exemption of reimbursements less valuable to the employee. Since cars are highly subsidised in absolute terms due to the company car regime, this would erode the subsidy to car commuting more quickly than for other modes, leading to a slight shift away from the car to other modes.\n• Abolishing all exemptions for commuting reimbursements while maintaining the current imputed value for company cars leads to a moderate rise in car use, while rail, bike and BTM lose. For BTM, this is due to lower subsidies as well as higher congestion. These two negative effects dominate, even though their most direct substitute, bike, loses even more in relative terms. The simulation shows how the tax system attempts to favour public modes compared to private modes, at least when the favourable regime for company cars is not taken into account.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","• policy 1: would yield 105 million euros in revenue\n• policy 4: The total gain in tax revenue is estimated at 340 million euros\n","Not reported","?","Laine, Benoît, and Alex Van Steenbergen. Working Paper 11-16-Commuting subsidies in Belgium-Implementation in the PLANET model. No. 1611. 2016.","Link","• NA"]
[129,"2 Physical activity","US_cash incentives for step targets_workplace","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary financial incentives programme for the workplace tested via RCT: The control arm received no other interventions. In the three financial incentive arms, a drawing was held every other day during the 13-week intervention period, in which one team in each arm was chosen at random as the winning team. This design provided variable reinforcement, which has been demonstrated to be more effective for changing behaviour than constant reinforcement.42 In the individual incentive arm, each participant on a winning team was eligible to collect $50, but only if he or she had at least 7000 steps on the prior day. In the team incentive arm, each participant on the winning team was eligible to collect $50 only if all four members of their team had each achieved at least 7000 steps on the prior day. In the combined incentive arm, each participant on the winning team was eligible to collect $20 if he or she had at least 7000 steps on the prior day and then an additional $10 for each team member who also had at least 7000 steps on the prior day.   \nHealth was a primary aim (increase daily step count) \n","Physical activity levels","Working population","USA - Philadelphia - Local",2014,"6 months","Policy overlaps with other fiscal policy (Affordable care act)  ","Not reported","RCT - intention to treat analysis","Step goals reached","• The mean proportion of participant-days achieving the 7000 steps goal peaked at about 0.45 in the combined incentive arm and 0.33 in the individual incentive arm, but was never greater than 0.23 in the team incentive arm or control. These levels declined over the intervention period for all arms\n• Compared to control during the intervention period, the mean proportion of participant-days achieving the 7000 step goal was significantly greater for the combined incentive (0.35 vs. 0.18, difference: 0.17, 95 % confidence interval [CI]: 0.07–0.28, p< 0.0,01) but not for the individual incentive (0.25 vs 0.18, difference: 0.08, 95 % CI: -0.02–0.18, p= 0.13) or the team incentive (0.17 vs 0.18, difference: -0.003, 95 % CI: -0.11–0.10, p= .96). \n• The combined incentive was also significantly greater than the team incentive (0.35 vs. 0.17, difference: 0.18, 95 % CI: 0.08–0.28, p< 0.001), but not the individual incentive (0.35 vs. 0.25, difference: 0.10, 95 % CI: -0.001–0.19, p=0.05).\n• In the main adjusted model during the intervention period, the combined incentive arm had higher odds of achieving goal compared to the control arm (Odds Ratio [OR]: 3.54, 95 % CI: 1.56–8.06, p=0.003) and the team-based incentive arm (OR: 3.02, 95 % CI: 1.37–6.68, p=0.006) \n• Compared to the control group during the intervention period, the mean daily steps were significantly greater for the combined incentive (5280 vs. 3929, adjusted difference: 1446, 95 % CI: 448–2444, p= 0.005), but not for the individual incentive (4516 vs. 3929, adjusted difference: 602, 95 % CI: -393–1596, p= 0.24) or the team incentive (3930 vs. 3929, adjusted difference: 193, 95 % CI: -819–1205, p= 0.71)\nAmong the 70 % that completed the study, mean weight loss was 3.2 kg and 30 % of them lost more than 5 % of their initial weight.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Patel, Mitesh S., et al. \"Individual versus team-based financial incentives to increase physical activity: a randomized, controlled trial.\" Journal of general internal medicine 31.7 (2016): 746-754.","Link","• 10.1007/s11606-016-3627-0"]
[130,"2 Physical activity","Gasoline price__US","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Nominal gasoline prices more than tripled between 2003 and the last quarter of 2008: Increase in gas prices with time and due to events like Hurricane Katrina\nRegression models with state and time effects and other demographic and socio-economic controls are estimated to explore the association between higher gasoline prices and individual level physical activities.\nThe following types of physical activities are considered: \n• Walking, running, bicycling or rollerblading as part of ‘recreational’ or ‘leisure time’ activities. \n• Walking or bicycling as the primary form of transport to commute to work or errands. (\n• Playing with Children.\n• Doing housework that qualifies as at least moderately active \n• Total time spent on all physical activity that meets or exceeds the definition of being ‘moderately active’\n Health was a primary aim (PA) \n","Fuel price","General population","USA - National","2003-2008","5 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Regression modelling","Increases in PA levels","• In the full sample, a little more than 61 percent report at least some level of moderate physical activity in the past 24 hours. However, only about 6.6 percent report leisure time walking, running or bicycling, while about 13 percent report at least some walking or bicycling to do errands. About 42 percent report participating in some form of MEIHW\n• Results indicate that, with the exception of playing with children, there is a statistically significant increase in the time spent on each of the physical activities of interest associated with a $1 increase in gasoline prices. However, the association is only weakly significant and somewhat sensitive to model specification in case of walking/biking to work or errands increases in the probability of any participation for activities like recreational walking/biking/running as well as MEIHW in all models.18 The OLS regression models show that the average estimated increases in the different physical\n• activities associated with a $1 increase in gasoline prices are as follows: 1.29 – 1.55 minutes in recreational walking/running/bicycling; 0.57-0.74 minutes in walking or bicycling to errands (not statistically significant when time-trends interacted with state dummies are included); 7.74-8.66 minutes in MEIHW; and 10.39- 10.74 minutes in overall MEIPA in a 24 hour period. The association between increased gasoline prices and time spent playing with children actually appears to be negative, though it is insignificant in most models\n• In terms of change in participation probabilities, the Probit Models show that a $1 increase in gasoline prices is associated with an estimated 1 percentage points in the probability of recreational walking/biking/running, an estimated 1.5-2.0 percentage point increase in the probability of any MEIHW, and a 2.4-2.8 percentage point increase in the probability of participation in any MEIPA. Overall, it appears that the changes in participation as well as time spent on activities like walking or bicycling are not large, and sometimes statistically weak\n","associations are weaker for minorities and those with relatively low socio-economic status - gas prices effect people differently ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Sen, Bisakha. \"Is there an association between gasoline prices and physical activity? Evidence from American time use data.\" Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31.2 (2012): 338-366.","Link","• 10.1002/pam.21601 "]
[131,"2 Physical activity/Environment","Australia fuel tax_obesity reduction","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax defined as an AUD0.10 per litre increase in the national fuel excise tax which as of June 2010 was AUD 0.38143 cents per litre.  Health was a primary aim (as this was thought to promote active travel to work, and thereby reduce obesity levels in the populations.","Fuel price","Working population","Australia - National",2010,"NA","Implementation costs:  AUD 4,381,691 in 2010 Authors note that the intervention costs were regarded as minimal given that (i) fuel excise taxation with bi-annual indexation already occurs within Australia and (ii) the excise is levied at the point of production or import and there are relatively few producers/importers of transport fuels in Australia. It is therefore expected that the administrative and compliance burden of the tax would be relatively low","Not reported ","Modelling (Markov)","• Health adjusted life years (HALYs))\n• PA per week\n","• 237 HALYs would be gained as a result of the intervention (95% UI 138–351). The intervention would result in an overall decrease in mortality and morbidity from traffic accidents (3 deaths averted and 79 years lived with disability (YLDs) averted).. \n• Estimates suggest that walking to access PT for commuting purposes could increase walking for transport on average by 90 min per week.\n","Suggestions that the intervention would therefore results in greater financial impact on middle and low-income households than high-income households. ","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per HALY)","A total of AUD2.6 M in healthcare costs would be averted (95% UI AUD1.3 M–3.9 M) \nThe ICER suggests that the intervention would be cost-effective over the lifetime, with a median ICER of 7702 (95% UI 1366–22,125). The probability of the intervention being dominant (cost saving) however is only 0.8%.)","  not explicitly stated but it reasons that reduced emissions due to reduced car journeys  not reported","The approximately AUD1.7B in revenue that the Australian Government would stand to collect on an annual basis through the increase (AUD1.5B in additional excise based on assumed intervention effect and passenger vehicle petrol consumption in 2010 [90] and AUD154M in additional GST) .   Hypothecation/earmarking would be undertaken for a specific expenditure to make increase active transport/PA.","Not reported","No","Brown V, Moodie M, Cobiac L, Herrera AM, Carter R. Obesity-related health impacts of fuel excise taxation-an evidence review and cost-effectiveness study. BMC public health. 2017;17(1):359.","Link","• 10.1186/s12889-017-4271-2"]
[132,"2 Physical activity/Environment","Transport modelling_Belgium","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 20% increase in car fuel prices. Health was a primary aim (physical activity, outdoor air pollution and risk of road traffic injury for the current situation) ","Fuel price","General population","Belgium - Regional",2007,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling","• DALYs\n• YLDs \n• cases of mortality/disease cases avoided\n• air pollution exposure estimates\n","• The estimated decrease in attributable deaths from EC concentrations was around 2.5%, from 3982 (1367–6441) to 3882 (1333–6274) in the base and fuel scenario respectively, and 0.46% for cardiovascular hospital admissions, from 2800 (1426–4554) to 2788 (1418–4535) admissions. Deaths prevented due to active travel increased from 1526 (1000–2620) to 1567 (1060–2645) or an increase of on average 2.6%. The number of deaths and severely injured by traffic crashes was estimated to decline from438 in the base scenario to 416 in the fuel scenario and from 3913 to 3773, or a decrease of 5.02% and 3.58% respectively. Of all causes considered, mortality due to EC concentrations are responsible for most of the attributable deaths, more than traffic fatalities and deaths prevented due to active travel\n• The fuel scenario leads to an estimated overall gain of 1650 (1010–2330) DALY. Regarding morbidity (YLD), the burden of disease due to extra cardiovascular hospitalizations is rather small with 60 YLD (7–255), while also the health gain is negligible (Table 4). Road traffic injuries result in 5640 YLD (3040–9360) and decrease with 200 (120–290) fewer YLD. The highest health gain is seen in the younger age group, while at later age a slightly negative impact is observed.\n• A total of 1450 (890–2040) YLG were calculated for the fuel scenario, or an increase of 13 (9–18) and 8 (5–12) extra days in life expectancy, for males and females respectively. Air quality results in a total of 21,300 (7200–34,700) YLL, equal to a loss of 7 months of life expectancy for both genders. The gain was estimated at 530 (180–880) YLG, equal to a 5 day increase in life expectancy for each of the genders. Active travel currently adds 7204 (5205–11,258) life years, which increased with an additional 171 (124–251) years, or an extra 3 (2–4) and 1 (1–2) day(s) in life expectancy, for male and females respectively. In both air quality and active travel most life years are gained at older age. Traffic safety accounted for a total of 13,000 YLL (12,400–13,600) and changed with 750 (590–910) YLG. Males accounted for most of the health gain due to prevented traffic fatalities. The large health gain is due the age at which the deaths are prevented. In young and middle-aged males, there is a steeper in- crease in YLG (Fig. 5) compared to women. Despite the higher number of YLG, the fewer deaths prevented for traffic safety lead to an increase in life expectancy for the general population similar to the air quality results, i.e. an increase of5 days in life expectancy for males and an in- crease with 2 days for females.\n• The population weighted exposure to EC decreased from 1.17 to 1.14 μg/m3 or a decrease of 2.31%. Local EC concentrations decreased with 1.99%, but as concentrations at work locations and in transport decreased most, people are exposed to lower concentrations, than what is expected from a change in local residential concentrations only (Table\n• Kilometres travelled with active modes increase on average with 2%, equivalent to 100,500 additional trips per day (Fig. 3). The median trip duration was estimated at 35 min for walking trips and 30 min for cycling trips in both scenarios\n","The elderly showed a health impact close to null and even negative.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Dhondt, Stijn, et al. \"Integrated health impact assessment of travel behaviour: model exploration and application to a fuel price increase.\" Environment international 51 (2013): 45-58.","Link","• 10.1016/j.envint.2012.10.005"]
[133,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","Workplace cycle scheme Australia","Programme","Non-governmental (Workplaces in Australia)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary scheme whereby participants were provided with a mountain bike equipped with lights, lock, cycle computer and helmet. The study promoted four periods of regular moderate exercise per week for one-year using the physical incentive of a loan bike. Participants in the study were drawn from 11 CBD-based organisations who were willing to sponsor their own staff at the rate of $400 per rider. The project recruited 100 riders (36 females, 64 males) with an average age of 39 year Health was a primary aim (to increase the proportion of trips made by bike).","Physical activity levels","General adult population (targeting those who live close to work)","Australia - Local",1999,"12 months","Not reported","Not reported","Empirical assessment","• Coronary risk ration and Total cholesterol and aerobic fitness\n• cycling Km travelled/ reduced CO2\n","• Physical Work Capacity: increased p = 0.042. This indicates that aerobic fitness was significantly improved after the year long cycling intervention. Those people in the low fitness category dropped from eight to five people and those in the high fitness category jumped from 24 to 32 people;\n• The cyclists replaced over 121,000 kilometres of car commuting with cycling equating to a reduction of 37 tonnes of “greenhouse” gases (C02 equivalent).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Although corporate sponsorship to fund this project was secured, the process was extremely difficult to achieve. Over 70 organisations approached the DEP for information but only 11 offered funding.","Not reported","Although corporate sponsorship to fund this project was secured, the process was extremely difficult to achieve. Over 70 organisations approached the DEP for information but only 11 offered funding.","NA","• Marshall, Graham, and Janelle Booth. \"The Western Australian Cycling 100 Project.\"\n• Martin A, Suhrcke M, Ogilvie D. Financial incentives to promote active travel: an evidence review and economic framework. American journal of preventive medicine. 2012 Dec 1;43(6):e45-57.\n• Bauman, Adrian Ernest, et al. Cycling: Getting Australia Moving: Barriers, facilitators and interventions to get more Australians physically active through cycling. Melbourne: Cycling Promotion Fund, 2008. \n• Gold Coast City Council. Health & Physical Benefits of Cycling Available from: http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/documents/bf/bnop-report_section2.pdf.\n\n","• http://www.academia.edu/19383471/The_Western_Australian_Cycling_100_Project\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379712006228\n• http://atrf.info/papers/2008/2008_Bauman_Rissel_Garrard_Ker_Spiedel_Fishman.pdf\n• http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/documents/bf/bnop-report_section2.pdf\n","• NA\n• 10.1016/j.amepre.2012.09.001\n• NA\n• NA"]
[134,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","US_PA_incentive","Modelling study","NA","Financial incentive","Modelling the impact of financial incentives employed across 3000 work place schemes, constructing demand curves of a simulated employee population participating in a physical activity program for a direct cash incentive. Analysis used a modelling framework that systematically identifies how to optimize marginal return on investment from programs incentivising behaviour change by integrating commonly-collected data on health behaviours and associated costs. Estimation of the optimal incentive level at $367. Health was a primary aim ","Physical activity levels","Working population","USA - 3000 employers (not specified) - Local","2005-2010","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling","• Increase in physical activity\n• Annual per employee healthcare cost reduction \n","• The model estimated that physical activity among participants in the incentive program would average 4.2 days per week (95% CI: 2.7–6.3), up from a baseline of 2.6 days per week pre-incentive (95% CI: 0.5-3.9).\n• The model estimated an annual $144 (95% CI: $16–314) per employee healthcare cost reduction due to the incentive program\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Basu S, Kiernan M. A simulation modeling framework to optimize programs using financial incentives to motivate health behaviour change. Medical Decision Making. 2016 Jan;36(1):48-58.","Link","• 10.1177/0272989X15585984"]
[135,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","NorthernIreland_physicalactivity_incentive(points to be redeemed for retail vouchers)","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT of a voluntary physical activity incentive in the workplace. Employees used a ‘loyalty card’ to objectively monitor their physical activity at work over 12 weeks. The Incentive Group collected points and received rewards for minutes of physical activity completed. Each time a participant swiped their card at the entrance to a gym and exercise studio, within the grounds of the workplace, a timestamp was created, recording the date and time of each swipe. The minutes between each timestamp were then aggregated, to give the total minutes of physical activity for each bout completed. Minutes of physical activity were  converted into points (1 minute = 1 point; capped at 30 points per day) and these points could be redeemed for rewards (retail vouchers) at week 6 and 12 .The No Incentive Group self-monitored their physical activity only. Collection of loyalty points for minutes of physical activity. Health was a primary aim (increase in employees physical activity)","Physical activity levels","General population","UK - Northern Ireland - Main government offices - Local",2011,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 6 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Increase in physical activity\n• QoL\n","• At week 6 the Incentive Group performed more minutes of physical activity/week (26.18 mins; 95% CI 20.06, 32.29) than the No Incentive Group (24.00 mins; 95% CI 17.45, 30.54) but the difference was not significant (p=0.45). Similarly, at week 12 the Incentive Group performed more physical activity/week (17.52 mins; 95% CI 12.49, 22.56) than the No Incentive Group (16.63 mins; 95% CI 11.76, 21.51) but again the difference was not significant (p=0.59).\n• the Incentive Group reported greater gains in utility at 6 months (0.03; 95% CI 0.01, 0.05) compared to the No Incentive Group (0.02; 95% CI 0.00, 0.04) although these were not significant (p=0.40).\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness analysis (ICER)","The Incentive Group cost more than the No Incentive Group but it was also more effective resulting in a mean ICER of £2,900/QALY (95% CI −28,000,32,000)","After converting EQ-5D scores into productivity estimates, employees in the Incentive Group improved their level of productivity over 6 months more (1.13%; 95% CI 0.34%, 1.92%) than the employees within the No Incentive Group (0.5%; 95% CI −0.39%, 1.39%) but the difference was not significant (p=0.30).","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Dallat MA, Hunter RF, Tully MA, Cairns KJ, Kee F. A lesson in business: cost-effectiveness analysis of a novel financial incentive intervention for increasing physical activity in the workplace. BMC Public Health. 2013 Dec;13(1):953.","Link","• 10.1186/1471-2458-13-953"]
[136,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","Singapore_activity_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary Financial incentive of S$15 for reaching between 50,000 and 70,000 steps, and S$30 for reaching more than 70,000 steps. Health was a primary aim (specify) Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year)","Physical activity levels","General population","Singapore - 13 organisations spanning many industries and sectors of government - Local",2013,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 1 year","Not reported ","Intervention stopped at 6 months but follow-up up to 12 months","RCT","• Physical activity MVPA at 6 months\n• Physical activity MVPA at 12 months\n• Health outcomes (weight, blood pressure, and quality-of-life measures)\n","• The cash incentive was most effective at increasing MVPA bout min per week at 6 months, but when comparing increases in MVPA bout min per week in the cash groups  to those who also had a Fitbit but no cash incentives, the differences were not significantly greater.\n• At 12 months, a decrease in physical activity of –23 MVPA bout min per week (95% CI –42 to –4; p=0·0184) was seen when comparing the incentive group with the Fitbit only group.\n• There were no improvements in any health outcomes (weight, blood pressure, etc) at either assessment.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Finkelstein EA, Haaland BA, Bilger M, Sahasranaman A, Sloan RA, Nang EE, Evenson KR. Effectiveness of activity trackers with and without incentives to increase physical activity (TRIPPA): a randomised controlled trial. The Lancet Diabetes & endocrinology. 2016 Dec 1;4(12):983-95.","Link","• 10.1016/S2213-8587(16)30284-4"]
[137,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","US_PA_incentive","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","This study was designed to determine whether engagement in stair taking can be increased in a worksite setting through the provision of an employer-sponsored, behaviour based incentive system in which employees (members) accumulate points that can be redeemed for merchandise.. This stairs incentive offering was part of a larger health and wellness incentive program where employees from one company could earn up to $150 in points annually if they completed a variety of health and wellness activities. These activities included completing a health risk assessment, biometric testing and feedback, participation in weight loss and healthy lifestyle programs, engaging in health education classes, and utilizing generic medications. Collection of bonus points is based on stair utilisation. Bonus points were awarded for additional stair usage. Final collection of points could be redeemed for merchandise","Physical activity levels","Working population","USA - 1 company (not specified) - Local",2011,"6 months","• Implementation costs: overall cost of incentives for the program was $3,739.30 – this doesn't include admin and set up costs \n• Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (health risk assessment, biometric testing and feed- back, participation in weight loss and healthy lifestyle programs, engaging in health education classes, and utilizing generic medications)\n","Not reported","Nonrandomized evaluation study","Stair usage","The number of total stair transactions for all members for all days monitored increased from 5,070 to 38,900, and the average number of stair transactions per day rose from 39 to 301, representing over a 600% increase. • This effect was substantial and immediate the first month after implementation and sustained throughout all subsequent months. \n• number of new stair takers from baseline to the intervention period also significantly increased by 85 members from 128 to 213 or 66.4%. All but three members recorded at least one stair transaction during the intervention period. \n• The number of total stair transactions for all members from baseline to intervention periods increased from 5,070 to 38,900. On average, each member increased their total stair usage from 23 stair transactions during baseline to 180 stair transactions during the intervention period and from almost no daily stair usage (0.2 times per day) to more than one (1.4 stair transactions) per day.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Schumacher JE, Utley J, Sutton L, Horton T, Hamer T, You Z, Klapow JC. Boosting workplace stair utilization: a study of incremental reinforcement. Rehabilitation psychology. 2013 Feb;58(1):81.","Link","• 10.1037/a0031764"]
[138,"3 Environment","Stockholm_congestion_charge","Policy","Government (Stockholm city council)","Price increase (Charge)","The Stockholm Trial consisted of three parts extended public transport (16 new bus lines), congestion tax and more park-and-ride sites in the city and the county. The total public transport service was extended by 7% and the park-and-ride capacity was extended by 29%.  A mandatory congestion charge was implemented: The highest amount due was 20 SEK (corresponding to 2.2 EUR) during rush hours and lowest amount (10 SEK) early in the morning or in the evening. Maximum amount to pay for one day was 60 SEK. Night-time, holidays and weekends were free of charge. Taxis, buses, motorcycles, and cars classified as environmental vehicles (e.g. driven by electricity or bio fuels) were exempted. Health as a secondary aim, as a reduction in air pollution was the main aim of the charge.","Congestion","General population","Sweden - Stockholm - Local",2006,"6 months","Trial possible through legislation ( 2004 the Swedish Parliament adopted a law that made it possible to charge a congestion tax in Stockholm up to July 31, 2006)\n","Not reported ","Dispersion modelling","• Mortality\n• Life expectancy \n• NOx concentrations \n• PM10 concentrations\n","• With the reduction in population weighted NOx concentration for Greater Stockholm, 27 (20–37 lives, considering the 95% confidence interval of ER factor of Nafstad et al., 2004) premature deaths per year are gained\n• 11.2 years of life gained for each premature death. This means that 27 less deaths during one year would correspond to 20.6 years of life gained per 100 000 people with the full effects of the exposure reduction\n• Compared with the situation in 2006 with no Stockholm Trial, NOx emissions in the Greater Stockholm area would decrease by 55 ±16 tonnes as result of reduced traffic. Most of this reduction occurs in Stockholm’s inner city, 45 ± 13 tonnes. For PM10, the corresponding reduction would be 30 ± 9 tonnes, of which about two-thirds would be the result of reductions in emissions in the inner city. The increased NOx emission from buses compensate for some of the reduction in emissions from passenger cars. This is the reason for NOx emissions to be reduced by only 8.5% in the inner city, while total road use is reduced by 15%. \n• The mean PM10 values for the 7-month periods show no systematic trend, but the mean for 2006 is substantially lower than any of the other years. But the reduction on Hornsgatan and Sveavagen is larger than can be explained by lower traffic emissions.\nLargest reductions are seen in the city centre, where concentrations are estimated to fall by up to 2 mgm± 3 for both NOx and PM10. Total PM10 concentrations with the Stockholm Trial are estimated to decrease by 4%– 7% on four of the streets and remain unchanged on one street. For NOx the corresponding decrease is 2%–12%, being unchanged on one street. It is interesting to note that the reductions are not large enough to achieve the limit values.\n• The people in the city centre will have the largest reduction in exposure. Annual mean decrease in population weighted concentrations in the inner city is 10%, 7.6% and 10% for NOx, PM10 and PM exhaust, respectively. The corresponding absolute values are 0.81, 0.21and 0.022mgm3, i.e. very small changes concentrations. \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The reduction in total number of vehicle passages across the charge cordon over 24 h was 22%, corresponding to nearly 100 000 fewer passages to/from the inner city.","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Burman L, Johansson C. The effects of the congestion tax on emissions and air quality: evaluation until, and including, the year 2008. SLB. 2010.\n• Johansson C, Burman L, Forsberg B. The effects of congestions tax on air quality and health. Atmospheric Environment. 2009;43(31):4843-54.\n• Brown V, Moodie M, Carter R. Congestion pricing and active transport–evidence from five opportunities for natural experiment. Journal of Transport & Health. 2015;2(4):568-79.\n","• https://trid.trb.org/view/1215560\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1352231008008091\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214140515006738\n","• NA\n• 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2008.09.015\n• 10.1016/j.jth.2015.08.002"]
[139,"3 Environment","Milan Ecopass Scheme (congestion charge)","Policy","Government","Price increase (Charge)","Mandatory congestion change.  In January 2008 the Ecopass programme was launched in the central ‘‘Cerchia dei Bastioni’’ area of 8.2 km2 from 7:30 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. on weekdays. The charge depends on a vehicle’s engine emissions standard with fees varying from €2to €10. Free access to the ‘‘zone a traffico limitato’’ (ZTL) was granted to motorbikes, to several types of alternative fuel vehicles, and to conventional fuel vehicles compliant with at least the European emission Euro3 and Euro4 standards. Residents within the zone were exempted only if driving higher emission standard vehicles with owners of vehicles with older more polluting engines were only given a discount if they bought an annual pass costing up to €250 dependant on the vehicle’s engine emission standards. Enforcement was carried out through digital cameras located at 43 electronic gates, with fines for offenders varying from €70 to €275 • Hybrid/ LPG/Methane and Gasoline Euro 2,4 or more recent and Diesel  Euro 4 with Anti-particulate filters are not subject to the congestion tariff.\n• Gasoline Euro 1 and 2 have a daily charge of €2 and a yearly pass for residents of €50. Discounted multiple entries (max 100 per year) will cost €50 for the first 50 entries and €60 for the next 50\n• Gasoline Euro; 0 Diesel cars Euro 1, 2 and 3; Diesel goods vehicles Euro 3; Diesel buses Euro 4 and 5; have a daily charge of €5 and a yearly pass for residents of €125. Discounted multiple entries (max 100 per year) will cost €125 for the first 50 entries and €150 for the next 50\n• Diesel cars Euro 0; Goods vehicles Euro 0, 1 and 2 Diesel buses Euro 0, 1, 2 and 3; have a daily charge of €10 and a yearly pass for residents of €250. Discounted multiple entries (max 100 per year) will cost €250 for the first 50 entries and €300 for the next 50\nThe one-year policy was later extended the end of 2009, and then to 2011.\n Health was an indirect aim (Air pollution reduction was the focus) \n","Congestion","General population","Italy - Milan - Local",2008,"< 1 year","• Implementation costs: Official data on the MES implementation costs are not available yet, but, according to informal sources, total infrastructure costs amount to €7 million, while annual management costs are €0.6 million \n• Passed through legislation\n","Not reported ","Modelling (regression)","pollution","It is claimed that the MES reduced air emissions of PM10 by 19%, of NOx by 14%, and of CO2 by 15%\nNine months after the introduction of the MES the number of vehicles entering the charging area had decreased by 14.2% \nAccording to AMMA (2008), after nine months of implementation, traffic decreased by 3.6%within the MES area, and by 12.3% outside the MES area. Congestion measured as traffic flow/capacity ratio decreased on average by 4.7%, while the network extension with a flow/capacity ratio higher than 0.9 decreased by 25.1%. Private vehicles’ speed within the charging area increased by 4%, while bus speed increased from 8.67 to 9.34 km/h (+7.8%). Such a difference is probably due to the accompanying traffic management policies such as new bus lanes, revised traffic directions and reduced illegal and on-street parking.\nWe find that the charges significantly decreased the concentration of some pollutants, especially carbon monoxide and particulates, but only in the short run. One week after its implementation, pollution returned to its pre-treatment levels.","Not reported","Cost- benefit","The MES is estimated to generate an annual net benefit of €15.7 million. Transport users as a whole have a net gain equal to €8.4 million (= 3.9-3.5+8.6-0.2). The distribution of this net benefit among user categories is differentiated. Because of data limitations, we could distinguish only by type of vehicle (not by type of user, as in London), between passenger cars and freight vehicles. Passenger cars gain a net benefit of €3.7 million (net of deterred trips), mainly due to time savings (€14.6 million). Freight vehicles instead suffer a loss of €3.5 million. Bus users have a net benefit of €8.6 million\nreduction in accidents, the second most important source of social benefit, has been computed at €6.6 million based on the estimated reduction of accidents in the charging area.\n","A loss to private parking companies. The charging under Area C was temporarily suspended between 25 July and 17 September 2012 because of a ruling by the Council of State following protests by parking space owners in the city centre. ","€9 million to the Government","London has a similar charge. Political acceptability is a low priority since the number of negatively affected users is high: firstly, the ones which are forced to cancel their trip or to change mode; secondly, the users who have a value of travel time saving lower than the toll; and filly those who do not pay the toll but are impacted by the increase in traffic due to transfers to other modes or to other times of the day. The only users who benefit from the toll are those who have a value of travel time savings higher than the toll. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that the politicians were rather reluctant. In a public consultation on June 13 2011, the 79% of voters approved the adoption of the Ecopass, which was re-established on January 16 2012 under the me Area C with its focus purely on congestion mitigation. not reported not reported not reported not reported not reported not reported","NA","• Rotaris, Lucia, et al. \"The urban road pricing scheme to curb pollution in Milan, Italy: Description, impacts and preliminary cost–benefit analysis assessment.\" Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 44.5 (2010): 359-375.\n• Percoco, Marco. \"Is road pricing effective in abating pollution? Evidence from Milan.\" Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 25 (2013): 112-118.\n","• https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/30908809/wp122.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1533059367&Signature=uMh1nBsYO%2BPybaCe4fxuuPc1T60%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DThe_urban_road_pricing_scheme_to_curb_po.pdf\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1361920913001235\n","• 10.1016/j.tra.2010.03.008\n• 10.1016/j.trd.2013.09.004"]
[140,"3 Environment","London_congestion_charge","Policy","Government","Price increase (Charge)","Mandatory congestion charge covering  approximately 21km2 and containing a resident population of 200,000 compared with the over 7 million residents of Greater London (Government Office Region) . The charge is in operation Monday to Friday 07:00-18:00 and does not apply at weekends, Bank Holidays, or the days between Christmas Day and New Year’s Day, when traffic levels are lighter.  The Congestion Charge is an £11.50 daily tariff and payment enables motorists to drive around, leave and re-enter the charging zone as many times as required in one day.  There are no barriers or tollbooths; instead drivers are paying to register their Vehicle Registration Number (VRN) on a database. Cameras read a vehicle’s number plate as it enters, leaves or drives within the charging zone and checks it against the database of those who have paid the charge or those who do not have to pay (because they are exempt or registered for a 100 per cent discount).  Drivers have up to midnight on the day of travel to pay the £11.50 charge or £14.00 if they pay the next charging day after travelling in the zone. The charge can also be paid via Congestion Charging Auto Pay which is an automated payment system that has a discounted daily charge rate of £10.50.  Drivers who have not paid the charge by midnight on the next charging day after they travel in the zone, will be issued with a Penalty Charge Notice of £160, which is reduced to £80 if paid within 14 days. Health was an indirect aim (reduction in Air pollution/ more active travel were the main aims of the policy). ","Congestion","General population","UK - England - Local",2003,"2 years","• Policy overlaps with introduction of d bus lanes, the use of larger bendy busses, particle traps to  diesel busses, increased bus frequency and changes to traffic light phases) \n• Passed by Transport for London \n","The Western extension was introduced in February 2007, but was removed in January 2011.","Range of different studies (geometric mean analysis, emission dispersion modelling)","air pollution emissions","• There have been modest beneficial impacts to emissions of key road traffic pollutants, with estimated scheme-attributable reductions inside the western extension zone of 2.5 percent to oxides of nitrogen (NOX), 4.2 percent to fine particles (PM10), and 6.5 percent for carbon dioxide (CO2). \n• Trends in measured ambient outdoor air quality across central and inner London continue to primarily reflect factors external to the scheme, such as the weather and vehicle technology changes, not all of which have been beneficial. No clear scheme impacts from either the original central or western extension zones can therefore be discerned.\n• The Greater London population was predicted to gain 26 years of life per 100,000 from the modelled reduction in NO2. Within the congestion charging zone (CCZ wards), the predicted years of life gained (YLG) per 100,000 was 183, while the benefit was only 18 in the remaining wards. \n• The CCZ wards had a smaller population however; and total predicted YLG within the CCZ wards was smaller compared to the remaining wards. Though predicted YLG were modest in magnitude, there was a consistent socioeconomic patterning of benefits.\n• Changes in concentrations of NO2 and PM10 due to traffic reductions were modest across Greater London. Both absolute and relative reductions in concentrations were greatest within the CCZ wards reflecting the localized nature of the scheme. \n• Traffic monitoring indicates an appreciable decrease in annual average daily traffic for cars (26%) and heavy goods vehicles (7%) between the pre and post-CCS periods within the charging zone, a small increase in redirected traffic along the IRR, and no systematic change in traffic on local roadways surrounding the zone.\n• Reductions in NO2 concentrations were greater than for PM10, a pollutant with many non-traffic sources, which would have remained unaffected by the scheme. Based on our model, road-traffic contributes roughly 25% of NO2 concentrations across Greater London, but less than 10% of PM10; though the road- traffic contribution is greater for both pollutants in Central London where vehicle emissions are dominant sources. \n•\n• While the total predicted health benefits were largest for Greater London, the life expectancy gained per 100,000 was greatest within the CCZ wards. Although small in magnitude, this analysis suggests there would be an extension of life expectancy due to reduced traffic-related air pollution from the introduction of the CCS. \n• Furthermore, the scheme appears to have led to a modest reduction in socioeconomic inequalities in air pollution exposures and associated mortality.\n","There was a consistent socioeconomic gradient in concentrations of NO2 and PM10 such that higher concentrations occurred in more deprived areas. The gradient was smaller for PM10, as expected given its relatively homogenous spatial distribution. \n• A more pronounced socioeconomic gradient in YLG was predicted reflecting the greater reduction in exposure and higher baseline mortality among more deprived groups. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","All revenue generated by the Congestion Charge is reinvested in transport in the Capital. Over the last 14 years, the £1.7bn net revenue has been generated and re-invested in the Capital’s transport infrastructure.  Some £1.3bn of has been spent on improvements to the bus network, £196m on roads and bridges, £80m on road safety, £90m on local transport/borough plans and £64m on sustainable transport and the environment.","Not reported","NA","• Transport for London. Freedom of Information request detail - Request ID: FOI-2271-1617 2017. Available from: https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/transparency/freedom-of-information/foi-request-detail?referenceId=FOI-2271-1617.\n• Brown V, Moodie M, Carter R. Congestion pricing and active transport–evidence from five opportunities for natural experiment. Journal of Transport & Health. 2015;2(4):568-79.\n• Atkinson, Richard W., et al. \"The impact of the congestion charging scheme on ambient air pollution concentrations in London.\" Atmospheric Environment 43.34 (2009): 5493-5500.\n• Tonne, Cathryn, et al. \"Air pollution and mortality benefits of the London Congestion Charge: spatial and socioeconomic inequalities.\" Occupational and Environmental Medicine 65.9 (2008): 620-627.\n• Transport for london: Central London congestion charging: Impacts monitoring. Sixth Annual report, July 2008\n","• https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/transparency/freedom-of-information/foi-request-detail?referenceId=FOI-2271-1617.\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214140515006738\n• http://web.mit.edu/cron/Backup/project/urban-sustainability/Discouraging%20Driving_Patrick%20Lynch/Misc/Atkinson%20et%20al%20(2008)%20The%20impacts%20of%20the%20congestion%20charging%20scheme%20on%20ambient%20air%20pollution%20concetrations%20in%20London.pdf\n• http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1016.8304&rep=rep1&type=pdf\n• http://content.tfl.gov.uk/central-london-congestion-charging-impacts-monitoring-sixth-annual-report.pdf\n","• NA\n• 10.1016/j.jth.2015.08.002\n• 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2009.07.023\n• 10.1136/oem.2007.036533\n• NA"]
[141,"3 Environment","Various road policies_portugal","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Range of examples of mandatory taxes based on the average vehicle age, fuel type (gasoline or diesel), engine size (<1.4l, 1.4-2L, >2L), all part of the EU changes to reduce air pollution.  ","Travel","General population","Portugal - National",2001,"1 year","• Policy overlaps with other fiscal policy (EU taxes/incentives to reduce air pollution) \n• Passed through with EU legislation\n","Not reported ","Modelling (emission modelling)","Emissions","Since 2001, a continuous decreasing trend of the EF for all pollutants is observed except for CO2. Between the first and the last year analysed, emission reduction for local pollutant ranges between 57 and 62% for HC, 58–61% for CO, 28–41% for NOx,32–39% for PM (Fig. 4a1–c1). However, if we had a counterfactual scenario in 2011 the emission reduction would be 20–80% higher than the baseline scenario (Fig. 3a2–c2). For CO2, a slight increase was observed (1.5%) for an average speeds lower than 60 km hr but an increase was observed (4.2%) for an average speed of 100 km h?1.\nDuring the period of analysis, EF decreased 28 to 62% for all local pollutants (HC, CO, NOx, PM), nevertheless, if a counterfactual scenario would implemented, the reduction would be 20 to 80% higher than the baseline scenario. \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Fontes, T., and S. R. Pereira. \"Impact assessment of road fleet transitions on emissions: The case study of a medium European size country.\" Energy Policy 72 (2014): 175-185.","Link","• 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.04.044"]
[142,"3 Environment","Fuel_toll_pricing_EU","Policy","Government","Price increase (Charge)","Mandatory toll charge on motorways and roads, with different systems of implementation. In the first group (G1), the A1, A2, A5 and A8 motorways were originally tolled with conventional pay tolls as well as electronic toll collection systems (entitled “Green Lane”). In this system, vehicles have to decelerate from 120 km/h to 60 km/h to pass the toll booth infra- structure. In the second group (G2), the A17, A22, A25 and A29 motorways have recent systems equipped with electronic tolls. In this system, vehicles pass through the tolls without stopping or decelerating, since there is not a physical infrastructure (the transponder placed inside the vehicle is activated each time the vehicle passes a roadside sensor).  Health was an indirect aim as this is mainly a revenue generating policy, but the impact on air pollutants is measured. ","Travel","General population","Portugal - National",1990,"3 years","Not reported ","More roads were added as infrastructure developed","Modelling (ex-post analysis)","Pollutants: Hydrocarbons (HC), NOx and particles (PM)","• A high reduction of emission costs is observed for all scenarios, in particular for G2 motorways after tolls introduction. In this group, A17 and A29 motorways records differences between emission costs of approximately 50%. In both cases, some of the traffic flow seems to returns to other options, in this case to A1 motorway.\n• First, although the majority of the motorways (62.5%) have recorded an increase in traffic volumes between 2008 and 2009 (1-20% increase), a general reduction of emission costs was observed in the studied motorways. \n• This reduction is justified with the improvement of the vehicle fleet efficiency in Portugal. In the following years although this trend was similar, the main factors for such reduction were different. These factors were related not only with the reduction of traffic volumes on the studied motorways but also with some stabilization of the emission factors from 2009 to 2011. \n• Secondly, although all the studied motorways have presented highest emission values during July and August, driven by the increase in traffic volumes (1-32% depending of the motorway and year), the A5 motorway has an opposite pattern. This reduction in emissions is justified with the decrease of 16% in traffic volume during this month. \n• Third, since 2008 all the studied motorways present a reduction in the emission costs over time. Nevertheless, in some of them such as in A1, there is a slight evidence to a stabilization of such costs. Such pattern can be related with the gains of traffic when in 2010 tolls were introduced in A17 and A29 (both alter- natives of A1). Since this period, A1 seems to start recovering the traffic lost some years before. \n• Lastly, the comparison of emission costs between the G1 and G2 motorways shows different trends between both groups. After the introduction of tolls, a high reduction of emissions is observed in G2 motorways, but the effect on G1 was smoother. These reductions are particularly strong for the new motorways A17 and A29 (with emission cost reduction of  approximately 50%). In both cases the A1 motorway is an alternative for these motorways. On the other hand, for the A22 and A25 motorways any motorway alternative exists. In such cases the pattern is very similar to the observed in the motorways of G1 group\n•\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Traffic changes  Almost 75% of the motorways traffic flow shows a high statistical significance correlation (p < 0.05) with toll prices but the correlation with fuel prices is only statistically significant (p < 0.05) for 38-50% of the motorways. This suggests that motorway traffic volumes are mainly affected by toll prices Globally, a negative low correlation was found (|rs| < 50%) between travel demand and prices. To A17 and A29 a moderate or strong correlation is observed (|rs| > 50% or |rs|> 75%) with high statistical significance (p < 0.05). Although, only 12.5% of the motorways have moderate correlation with toll price (|rs|j > 50%), 62.5% A29) (p < 0.05) of them show high statistical significance (A5, A8, A17, A25 and A29)(p<0.05). About 37.5% of the traffic volume on motorways, have moderate or strong correlation with toll price (|rs|j > 50% or |rs|j > 75%) but 75% of them show high statistical significance (A1, A5, A8, A17, A25 and A29) (p < 0.05). Thus, these results suggest that traffic volume can be more affected by toll prices but also that new motorways (previously, without tolls) are more affected by prices than oldest ones.","Not reported","Not reported","No","Fontes, T., et al. \"Assessment of the effectiveness of fuel and toll pricing policies in motorway emissions: An ex-post analysis.\" Research in Transportation Economics 51 (2015): 83-93.","Link","• 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.04.044"]
[143,"3 Environment","Emissions trading_Portugal","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory  uniform tax on emissions (single tax rate for the region). Health was an indirect aim (Air pollution) ","Emissions","General population","USA - National","2014*","NA","Not reported","Not reported ","Modelling (log-linear or log-log C-R relationship between fine particulate concentrations and adult mortality) ","• Number of deaths averted \n• air pollution emissions\n","• The model solves for three abatement policies: efficient abatement, a uniform pollution concentration standard across the region, and a uniform emissions tax. With the efficient abatement policy, concentration reductions (2.2 µg m−3 (log linear) and 3.6 µg m−3 (log-log)) would reduce annual expected deaths across the region by 4,000 with log-linear versus 8,950 for log-log, With a log-log C-R function the total emissions from the efficient abatement policy are only 11% less than with the “best” uniform standard; however, the efficient policy is able to achieve a 52% greater reduction in expected mortality across the region compared with the uniform standard.\n• With the efficient abatement policy, across the 1,000 runs, the median emission reduction is 22% and 38% with log-linear and log-log C-R functions, respectively. With the uniform standards, emissions are reduced by 18% (log-linear C-R) and 30% (log-log). For both policies, total emissions and population-weighted average concentrations are lower for the log-log than for the log-linear C-R function\n","Not reported","Marginal cost analysis","In the median model run, net benefits with a log-linear C-R function are $13 billion for the efficient abatement policy and $5.8 billion for the “best” uniform standard. For the loglog C-R function, net benefits are $26 billion (efficient policy) and $13 billion (uniform standard)\nUnder the efficient abatement policy with both the log-linear and log-log C-R functional forms, marginal damages at the 95th percentile are nearly 3.5 times larger than at the 5th percentile. With a log-log C-R function the marginal damages are approximately 59% greater than with log-linear ($34,700 (log-linear), $55,100 (log-log), median marginal damages per ton)\n\nAcross the 1,000 model runs, the “best” uniform tax policy requires slightly greater emission reductions (23% for log-linear and 39% for log-log) than the efficient policy (22% for log-linear and 38% for log-log), yet the efficient policy has a greater impact on the population weighted average concentration (10.0 µg m−3 (log-linear), 8.6 µg m−3 (log-log)) compared to the uniform tax (10.3 µg m−3 (log-linear), 9.0 µg m−3 (log-log); see Figure 3.7). The efficient policy generates 33% greater net benefits than the uniform tax with a log-linear C-R function, and 27% greater net benefits with log-log model.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Use of transport might be different in the USA compared to the UK.","No","Goodkind, Andrew Lloyd. Economics of air pollution: policy, mortality concentration-response, and increasing marginal benefits of abatement. Diss. University of Minnesota, 2014.","Link","• NA"]
[144,"3 Environment","Air passenger duty_UK","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax on passengers departing from UK airports, first levied in 1994. Since 2009, the tax has varied according to distance flown (divided into four bands) and the class of flight. Distance is determined by the distance between London and the capital city of the destination country. There are exemptions for those flying on very small aircraft, aged under two, flying from airports in the Scottish Highlands and Islands, and for transfer/transit passengers. Passengers flying from Northern Ireland also pay the short- haul (Band A) rate regardless of distance, because of concerns about lower passenger taxes in the Irish Republic. \n• ≤2,000 miles £13 (economy) £26 (other) \n• 2,001‒4,000 miles £65 (economy) £130 (other) \n• 4,001‒6,000 miles £81 (economy) £162 (other) \n• ≥6,001 miles £92 (economy) £184 (other)\n Health as an indirect aim (Air pollution impacts of an air transport tax) \n","Travel","General population","UK - National",1994,"NA","• Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (Other transport taxes, fuel duties) \n• Passed through legislation\n","Policy has developed over time\nRates for 1 april 2018 have updated:\nBand A (London to <2000 miles)- Standard rate £26\nBand B (london >2000 miles)- Standard rate £156\n","Impact assessment","Other (noise, CO2 emissions)","Noise annoyance is increasing, air pollution persistently breaches legal limits around Heathrow","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported ","£2.7billion in transport taxes, and particularly fuel duty, dominate UK environmental tax receipts. Excluding VAT, fuel duty accounted for £26.9 billion of revenue in 2011, 62% of total green taxes. Including VAT, fuel duty made up 75% of green revenues. Other transport taxes, VED and APD, accounted for 19% of revenues, meaning that altogether transport-based green taxes made up 94% of environmental receipts. By contrast, other green taxes are quite small. Energy-based taxes and resource-based taxes each accounted for about 3% of receipts.","More and more seen as less acceptable as UK consumers and travellers are paying the highest level of aviation tax in the EU.","Yes","Leicester, Andrew. \"Environmental taxes: economic principles and the UK experience.\" (2013).","Link","• NA"]
[145,"3 Environment","Vehicle excise duty_UK","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory annual ownership tax for road vehicles. Rates vary according to the type of vehicle. Since 2001 the rate for cars has depended on fuel efficiency (measured as carbon dioxide emissions per kilometre driven). Cars are currently allocated to one of 13 bands. Since 2010, new cars have also paid a different rate in their first year of registration, with much stronger differentials in this first year rate across emissions bands.\nCars registered before 2001 pay VED according to the engine size of the vehicle.\n• Registered in or after March 2001 £0‒£475 per year according to vehicle emissions (£0‒£1,030 in first year).\n• Registered before March 2001 £135 (engine ≤1,549cc) £220 (engine ≥1,550cc)\n Health as an indirect aim (Air pollution impacts of a road tax)\n","Travel","General population","UK - National",2001,"20 years","Passed through legislation","Policy has developed over time - latest modification is change to first year rates (FYR)","Impact assessment","Report on CO2 but mentions impact on other pollutants (see bold) ","The latest reforms to vehicle excise duty (VED), including  first year rates (FYRs), are estimated to deliver carbon savings of around 0.9 million tonnes of CO2 by 2020, compared with making no changes to the VED regime. These measures will help ensure that the environmental signal of FYRs is not weakened, and that the forecast carbon benefits are realised. The estimated carbon savings can be valued (in terms of the avoided damage costs of climate change from fewer tonnes of CO2 emitted) using the ‘shadow price of carbon’ recommended by the Department of Energy and Climate Change for use in policy appraisal2 . Using these values gives an average annual benefit of around £1.75 million over the 10-year period 2010-11 to 2020-21 from the FYR element of the VED reform package. The NPV of the FYR carbon savings over this period is estimated at around £15 million (in current prices). There will also be effects on other air pollutants, such as oxides of nitrogen and particulates, but these have not been quantified in this impact assessment.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported ","£5.8 billion ","Not reported","Yes","• Leicester, Andrew. \"Environmental taxes: economic principles and the UK experience.\" (2013).• Leicester, Andrew. \"Environmental taxes: economic principles and the UK experience.\" (2013).\n• HM Treasury. Impact Assessment of reforms to the Vehicle Excise Duty rules on refunds and six month licences 2009. Available from: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2009/115/pdfs/ukia_20090115_en.pdf.\n","• https://www.ifs.org.uk/conferences/Leicester_Environmentaltaxes2012.pdf\n• https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2009/115/pdfs/ukia_20090115_en.pdf\n","• NA\n• NA"]
[146,"3 Environment","Fuel prices_US","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory price increases for fuel. Modelling of various scenarios developed around the baseline current situation using: 10% and 50% as increases in gas prices; 40,965 and 44,065 as numbers of deaths in the year before the price increase (minimum and maximum figures reported by the CDC11 between 1999 and 2003 for motor vehicle crash deaths); and 0.16 and 0.29 as price elasticities for vehicle deaths.","Fuel price","General population","USA - National",2003,"12 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Monte-carlo)","Number of deaths averted ","In the first simulation, which assumed only a 20% increase in price together with alternative assumptions on elasticity, pollution, and deaths, 95% of the reduction in combined deaths was between 1747 and 3714. In the second simulation, which allowed 10%, 20%, and 50% increases in price together with alternative assumptions, 95% of the reduction in combined deaths was between 1547 and 5824. • 1994 fewer deaths; possible range, 997 to 4984) due to highway crashes. Plausible changes in increased gas prices from 10% to 50% had the greatest effect on the estimate of decreased numbers of deaths. \n• The decreased numbers of deaths due to particulate matter in air pollution was 600 fewer deaths; possible range (300 to 1500 ).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Policy changed gas prices (historical data). Mention that automakers and their unions may experience economic declines. ","Study mentions that higher fuel prices, can mean more active transport and reductions in air pollutants. ","Use of transport might be different in the USA compared to the UK.","No","Leigh, J. Paul, and Estella M. Geraghty. \"High gasoline prices and mortality from motor vehicle crashes and air pollution.\" Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 50.3 (2008): 249-254.","Link","• 10.1097/JOM.0b013e318162f5c4"]
[147,"3 Environment","Road user charging_ congestion/air pollution_UK","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Charge)","Mandatory congestion charge: inner cordon charge was set to £3, deemed politically acceptable by the local government, but below the £5 toll levied in London (current toll is £8). A second test splits this fee over two cordons, which increases trip suppression as more trips are affected by the outer cordon. Using real monetary values in SATEASY, a revenue of £97,000 for 470,000 PCU kilometres travelled is generated. From this a 20 p/km toll is derived that is consistent with tests elsewhere) but gives a trip suppression likely to be far from the economic optimum, even if externality effects were valued highly. Additional distance charges were thus set at half the 20 p/km charge, and at an order of magnitude lower, the latter giving a trip suppression similar to the initial inner cordon charge. All charges were levied according to passenger Car Unit’s with no attempt to differentiate by vehicle type. Health was secondary aim, the main aim was to impact road use  and emissions, in particular NOx) ","Congestion","General population","UK - Leeds - Local",2005,"1 year","Not reported","Potential to explore changing speed. The emissions and speed relationship is U shaped","Modelling (traffic)","other (car trips)","Depending upon the pollutant, distance charging reduces total road traffic emissions by c. 10% under a 2 p/km charge, 42–49% under a 10 p/km charge, and 52–59% under a 20 p/km charge, illustrating a diminishing marginal return in emission abatement with the distance charge. AND suppresses trip demand, improves trip speeds and reduces total vehicle kilometres travelled on the network","Not reported","Considered how traffic trips changed by different cordon charge","City centre (inner orbital) cordon: £3 -> 7.0 (2.0) % reduction in trips\nDouble cordon: £2 inner and £1 outer ->18.5 (17.2) % reduction in trips\nDistance charge: 2 p/km ->8.8 (11.1) % reduction in trips\nDistance charge: 10 p/km -> 47.0 (46.1) % reduction in trips\nDistance charge: 20 p/km -> 62.5 (55.7) % reduction in trips\n","Not reported","Using real monetary values in SATEASY, a revenue of £97,000 for 470,000 PCU kilometres travelled is generated.","Not reported","NA","Namdeo, Anil, and Gordon Mitchell. \"An empirical study of estimating vehicle emissions under cordon and distance based road user charging in Leeds, UK.\" Environmental monitoring and assessment 136.1-3 (2008): 45-51.","Link","• 10.1007/s10661-007-9719-x"]
[148,"3 Environment","Biomass_burning_Greece","Ecological","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Voluntary. Over the last couple of years, the use of biomass as heating source was allowed in Greece as a CO2-neutral means of space heating in the large metropolitan areas of Athens and Thessaloniki affecting more than half of the country's population. At the same time the use of light heating diesel was heavily taxed apparently to combat illegal trafficking of heating diesel. In the same period Greece faced a financial crisis with significant repercussions on the average household income. That combination of parameters resulted in increased use of biomass for residential heating in year. Health was a secondary aim (exposure to PM10 and PM2.5).","Heating (biomass use)","General population","Greece - large metropolitan areas of Athens and Thessaloniki - Local",2012,"1 year","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Modelling","Number of deaths averted ","Overall, the number of excess deaths attributed to PM exposure in the metropolitan area of Thessaloniki (with a population of more than 1 m inhabitants) for 2011 are 1369, while the respective number for 2012 is 1287.\nThus, the air pollution burden associated with particulate matter during the cold season of2012–2013 resulted in an estimate of more than 200 excess premature deaths attributable to airborne PM exposure than in the corresponding period in 2011–2012. Excess mortality during the cold period of the year corresponds to 3540 years of life lost  taking into account the population age distribution\n","Note that socioeconomically disadvantaged people use more heating fuel","Cost- benefit","The additional health burden corresponds to an average cost ranging between 200–250 million euros (up to 1.2 billion). Morbidity, expressed in new cases of chronic bronchitis, cardiovascular disease and respiratory problems, corresponds to a financial cost on the order of 30 million euros.","Based on the results of the study and taking into account the importance of public health and the related socioeconomic cost, specific interventions are recommended, such as:\n– Reduction of the price of light heating diesel through relaxation of the related excise tax\n– Financial incentives for light heating diesel replacement by natural gas or electricity\n– Enhancement of the support given to residential energy conservation schemes and simplification of the relevant regulatory framework to ease the access of larger numbers of households to such programs.","On the contrary, the revenues from excise tax and VAT imposed on heating oil from the over-taxation were 187 million euros less than the previous year in Greece. This was due to the lower amount of heating oil taxed (2,629,931 kt in 2011–2012 compared to 1,335,083 kt in 2012–2013).","Natural experiment during the Greek Austerity which was not popular.","NA","Sarigiannis, Dimosthenis Α., Spyros P. Karakitsios, and Marianthi V. Kermenidou. \"Health impact and monetary cost of exposure to particulate matter emitted from biomass burning in large cities.\" Science of The Total Environment 524 (2015): 319-330.","Link","• 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2015.02.108"]
[149,"3 Environment","Germany road taxes and infrastructure","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Charge)","Mandatory \n• Policy 1: commuters allowed to deduct individual commuting expenses at rates higher than 0.3 €/k\n• Policy 2: direct and uniform commuting subside with rate x per kilo granted by the federal government\n• Policy 3: time cost subsidy- represents an additional investment in road capacity in the city characterised by an increase in the share of land allocated to roads in the city. Implies that capacity is increased by providing additional road infrastructure. \n• Policy 4: subsidy on automobile use by reducing the energy tax on gasoline. A 0.65 €/litre is applied\n• Policy 5: urban public transport characterized by a reduction of the sales tax rate on transit fare where public fare is 0.07 and the German sales tax rate of general consumption is 0.19. \n Health was an secondary aim (Air pollution reduction was the main aim) \n","Travel","General population","Germany - National","2012*","1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (various- spatial methodologies)","Welfare","All polices contribute to an increase in the imbalance of the spatial allocation of residences of jobs because the suburbanization of residents is stronger than the suburbanisation of jobs. As a consequence , all polices indeed strengthen urban sprawl according to the definition of sprawl used here.\nAggregate urban welfare the funding scheme hardly affects the relative advantageousness of a policy compared to the other policies. However, stronger distortions accruing under income tax funding suggest that welfare gains (losses) of urban residents and landowners are smaller (higher)  under income tax funding compared to lump-sum funding.\n","Policy induced distributional effects among urban residents and landowners are considerably large and depend crucially on the funding scheme. In particular high-skilled workers are aaversely affected by income tax funding. ","Not reported","Not reported","People combined errands and commuting with more costly fuel/tax scenarios- reduced congestion.","Not reported","Not reported","No","Tscharaktschiew, Stefan, and Georg Hirte. \"Should subsidies to urban passenger transport be increased? A spatial CGE analysis for a German metropolitan area.\" Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 46.2 (2012): 285-309.","Link","• 10419/48165"]
[150,"4 Housing","Children’s Health in Asthma: Research to Improve Status by Modifying Accommodation (CHARISMA) study","RCT","Government (Local Authority as part of a RCT)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy in the form of a tailored package of housing improvements designed to provide adequate ventilation and heating, and thus reduce mould spores: the local authority installed a new ventilation system in the roof space of each house. This comprises two insulated flexible pipes: one delivers fresh air from outside the house through a cleaning filter to first-floor bedrooms; the other removes stale air from the house, and warms the fresh air. This process stabilises humidity and temperature, as moist air is rapidly replaced by fresh air. The system has a heat-recovery efficiency of up to 70%, and running costs are about £15 a year. If necessary, contractors also improved or replaced central heating systems to bring them to the standard defined by the housing officer. Families did not pay for these improvements.  Health was a primary aim, in particular, the reduction of asthma.","Housing conditions","Children (asthmatics 5-14 years)","UK - North Wales -Wrexham - Local",2004,"2 years","Implementation costs: £151,152 for housing improvement to 88 households (ventilation only for 63 = £57, 507 and ventilation plus heating for 25 = £93,645). Local authority costs depend on the home improvement system required for each house. As this study takes a public-sector perspective, it has not included the running costs of ventilation systems, estimated at £15 a year, or costs to families of running central heating. The cost to Wrexham County Borough Council was £1,718 per child in the intervention group, or £12,300 per child shifted from ‘severe’ to ‘moderate’","First, a multicentre trial is recommended, following children for at least 2 years and measuring a wider range of benefits, including benefits to other members of the family. Second, NICE should commission research to measure utility in children","RCT and CE analysis","Parent-reported asthma module of PedsQL - a validated quality of life measure for children with asthma. The total score for asthma related quality of life on a 100 point scale. ","After 12months, the PedsQL showed a mean (adjusted) improvement of 8.65 in the intervention group and 1.58 in the control group. The resulting difference of 7.07 (95%CI = 2.79 to 11.36) between groups is equivalent to a standardised effect size of 0.42. Intervention therefore moved 17% of children in the intervention group from below the original median (‘severe asthma’) to above that median (‘moderate asthma’), while only 3% of controls moved from ‘severe’ to ‘moderate’. Thus, a net 14% of children (or 29% of children with ‘severe’ asthma) became ‘moderate’. ","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","The difference between groups in mean total cost (£1657) was divided by the difference between groups in mean effect (7.07PedsQLpoints), to yield an estimated ICER of £234 per unit change in the PedsQL asthma-specific quality-of-life score. The ICER and estimated probability that housing modifications are effective depends on local building costs. The authors estimate that in Wales, where the study took place, the intervention has an ICER of £234 (95% CI = £140 to £590); with the same effectiveness, this intervention in London would have an ICER of £294 (95%CI = £174 to £770), and in Northern Ireland, the ICER would be £166 (95%CI = £98 to £430)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Edwards RT, Neal RD, Linck P, Bruce N, Mullock L, Nelhans N, Pasterfield D, Russell D, Russell I, Woodfine L. Enhancing ventilation in homes of children with asthma: cost-effectiveness study alongside randomised controlled trial. Br J Gen Pract. 2011 Nov 1;61(592):e733-41.\n• From Systematic Review: Thomson, H et al. 2013. “Housing Improvements for Health and Associated Socio- Economic Outcomes ( Review ) Housing Improvements for Health and Associated Socio- Economic Outcomes.” The Cochrane database of systematic reviews (3), individual article: Woodfine, Louise et al. 2011. “Enhancing Ventilation in Homes of Children with Asthma: Pragmatic Randomised Controlled Trial.” British Journal of General Practice 61(592): 724–32.  \n","• https://bjgp.org/content/bjgp/61/592/e733.full.pdf\n• http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/856558/1/CD008657.pdf\n","• 10.3399/bjgp11X606645\n• 10.1002/14651858.CD008657.pub2"]
[151,"4 Housing","Warm Up New Zealand: Heat Smart","Programme","Government (administered by the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy programme providing partial funding for the purchase and installation of eligible products by approved providers for pre-2000 housing. Depending on their existing insulation and heating, and the characteristics of the house, applications to the fund may be for funding for insulation and clean heat, insulation only, or clean heat only: Eligibility is broad, but the level of subsidy depends on economic status: 1)Homeowners who hold Community Services Cards ( economically disadvantaged) are eligible for insulation, subsidised at 60% of the total cost or more, and $1200 in clean heating subsidy (including tax); 2)Landlords with tenants who hold Community Services Cards are eligible for insulation, subsidised at 60% of the total cost or more, and $500 in clean heating (including tax); 3) all other eligible houses are eligible for insulation, subsidised at 33% of the total cost up to $1300 and $500 in clean heating (including tax). Health was a primary aim, since the programme was designed to improve productivity and health outcomes, reduce energy costs and stimulate the economy by generating jobs for New Zealanders involved in producing and installing insulation and clean heating.","Housing conditions","General population","New Zealand - National",2009,"2 years","• Implementation costs: $340 million dollar multi-year year programme ($45.2 million in 2012-2013)\n• Passed through legislation \n","Not reported ","Epidemiological study (retrospective cohort study)","• Hospitalisation rates \n• Mortality  rates among those who had been hospitalised \n• Total mortality rate\n• Total hospitalisation costs ","• Hospitalisation rates were higher in the treatment group than in the control group, both before and after treatment.\n• Among those in the mortality sub-cohort who had been hospitalised with respiratory conditions (ICD-10 chapter X), there was no significant difference in mortality rate after treatment between the treatment and control groups.\n• Lower mortality rate in the treatment compared to the control group, among those who had been hospitalised with circulatory conditions: prevented about 18 deaths (95%CI 0 to 45) among those aged 65 and over.\n• Estimated annual reduction of 0.852 deaths per 1000 households each containing 3.61 individuals, valued at $439.95 per year per treated household.\n• a saving of approximately $64.44 in total hospitalisation costs per year for a household that received some combination of ceiling or floor insulation.\n• We predict an on-going annual benefit of $563.18 (95% CI $123.23 - $889.07) for retrofitted insulation and only $4.64 for improved heating when combining the change in total hospitalisations and total pharmaceuticals with reductions in mortality and benefits imputed from previous studies. \n• (It is important to note that these benefits do not include any improvements in comfort, which are separate from health-related benefits, and so these calculated benefits should be treated as conservative.)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","$951 million in net benefits for the government .","Not reported","Yes?","• Grimes, Arthur et al. 2012. “Cost Benefit Analysis of the Warm Up New Zealand : Heat Smart Programme Ministry of Economic Development.” \n• Barnard, Lucy Telfar et al. 2011. “The Impact of Retrofitted Insulation and New Heaters on Health Services Utilisation and Costs , Pharmaceutical Costs and Mortality. Evaluation of Warm Up New Zealand : Heat Smart.”  \n• Healthy Housing He Kainga Oranga (University of Otago, Wellington). “Evaluation of Warm Up New Zealand: Heat Smart.” http://www.healthyhousing.org.nz/research/past-research/evaluation-of-warm-up-new-zealand-heat-smart/ and https://www.energywise.govt.nz/funding-and-support/funding-for-insulation/\n• Howden-Chapman, Philippa, et al. \"Tackling cold housing and fuel poverty in New Zealand: a review of policies, research, and health impacts.\" Energy Policy 49 (2012): 134-142.\n","• http://sustainablecities.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/NZIF_CBA_report2.pdf\n• http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/sectors-industries/energy/energy-efficiency-environment/documents-library/energy-efficiency-docs/nzif-health-report.pdf\n• http://www.healthyhousing.org.nz/research/past-research/evaluation-of-warm-up-new-zealand-heat-smart/ and https://www.energywise.govt.nz/funding-and-support/funding-for-insulation/\n• https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/39804781/Tackling_cold_housing_and_fuel_poverty_i20151108-10105-w4kgci.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1533058884&Signature=O%2BkmicCeh9CmV3wlQg2WZbv3y2M%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DTackling_cold_housing_and_fuel_poverty_i.pdf\n","• NA\n• NA\n• NA\n• 10.1016/j.enpol.2011.09.044"]
[152,"4 Housing","Housing Choice Voucher Program (section 8 vouchers) / USA_housing_voucher","Programme","Government (US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The housing choice voucher program is the federal government's major program for assisting very low-income families, the elderly, and the disabled to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private market. Participants locate their own housing. A housing subsidy is paid to the landlord directly by the PHA on behalf of the participating family. Family pays the difference. In some cases can be used to purchase a home. Health was a secondary aim as the main aim was to enable very low-income families, the elderly, and the disabled to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private market.","Access to accommodation","Socio-economic (low income population)","USA - National",1937,"5 years","Passed through legislation (Housing Act of 1937)","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","nutritional status","Among food-insecure households, children whose families were not receiving a housing subsidy were 2.11 times (95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.34-3.32) likelier to have a weight (standardized for age) more than 2 SDs below the median weight","In the late 1990s, 14.8% of voucher recipients lived in high-poverty neighbourhoods (poverty rate>30%) compared with 53.6% of public housing residents.\"","Not reported","Not reported","Less overcrowding was mentioned as a benefit.","Not reported","Not reported","?","• Meyers A, Cutts D, Frank DA, Levenson S, Skalicky A, Heeren T, Cook J, Berkowitz C, Black M, Casey P, Zaldivar N. Subsidized housing and children's nutritional status: data from a multisite surveillance study. Archives of pediatrics & adolescent medicine. 2005 Jun 1;159(6):551-6.\n• Lindberg RA, Shenassa ED, Acevedo-Garcia D, Popkin SJ, Villaveces A, Morley RL. Housing interventions at the neighbourhood level and health: a review of the evidence. Journal of Public Health Management and Practice. 2010 Sep 1;16(5):S44-52.\n","• https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapediatrics/fullarticle/486034\n• https://journals.lww.com/jphmp/Fulltext/2010/09001/Housing_Interventions_at_the_neighbourhood_Level.8.aspx\n","• 10.1001/archpedi.159.6.551\n• 10.1097/PHH.0b013e3181dfbb72"]
[153,"4 Housing","Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing Demonstration project (MTO)","Programme","Government (US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The MTO study randomized low-income families to receive a housing voucher to subsidize a private rental apartment and move out of public housing, thereby improving their neighbourhood and housing environment compared to controls. MTO treatment arms: the “regular Section 8” treatment group was offered Section 8 housing vouchers to subsidize a private market rental apartment in any neighbourhood; the “low-poverty-neighbourhood” treatment group was offered Section 8 vouchers redeemable only in low-poverty neighbourhoods (<10% of Census Tract in poverty) along with housing counselling services to aid relocation; the control group was offered no further assistance but could remain in public housing, Health was a secondary aim, as the main outcome was access to better housing.","Housing conditions","Socio-economic (low income population)","USA - 5 cities (Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, LA, New York) - Local",1994,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 7 years","• Implementation costs: $70 million .\n• The MTO demonstration was authorized by the U.S. Congress in section 152 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992\n","Not reported ","RCT","1. Risk behaviour index (drugs/sexual health behaviours)\n2. Mental health\n3. Housing standards and adult depression\n4. Adolescent depression\n5. Obesity\n6. Morbid obesity\n7. Diabetes\n8. Asthma\n9. Subjective well-being\n\n","1. MTO was associated with non significant risk behaviour index for girls, but harmful RBI for boys.\n2. MTO was associated with better mental health for girls, engagement in fewer risk behaviours ( when matched with a control sample) \n3. MTO was associated with improved housing and lowered adult depression, \n4. MTO in boys  was associated with increased rates of major depression (7.1% vs 3.5%; odds ratio (OR), 2.2 [95% CI, 1.2-3.9]), PTSD (6.2% vs 1.9%; OR, 3.4 [95% CI, 1.6-7.4]), and conduct disorder (6.4% vs 2.1%; OR, 3.1 [95% CI, 1.7-5.8]). Boys in the traditional voucher group had increased rates of PTSD compared with the control group (4.9% vs 1.9%, OR, 2.7 [95% CI, 1.2-5.8]). However, compared with the control group, girls in the traditional voucher group had a decreased rate of conduct disorder (0.3% vs 2.9%; OR, 0.1 [95% CI, 0.0-0.4]).\n5. MTO was associated with lower prevalence of obesity: of 4.61 percentage points (95% confidence interval [CI], −8.54 to −0.69)\n6. MTO was associated with lower prevalence of morbid obesity ) 3.38 percentage points difference (95% CI, −6.39 to −0.36)\n7. MTO was associated with lowered odds of having aa glycated haemoglobin level of 6.5%  or more (.31 percentage points difference (95% CI, −7.82 to −0.80)\n8. MTO had a harmful main effect vs. controls for self-reported asthma diagnosis (b = 0.24, p = 0.06), past-year asthma attack (b = 0.44, p = 0.02), and past-year wheezing (b = 0.17, p = 0.17).\n9. A 1–standard deviation decline in neighbourhood poverty (13 percentage points) increases subjective well-being by an amount equal to the gap in subjective well-being between people whose annual incomes differ by $13,000—a large amount given that the average control group income is $20,000. Subjective well-being is more strongly affected by changes in neighbourhood economic disadvantage than racial segregation, which is important because racial segregation has been declining since 1970, but income segregation has been increasing.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Socio-economic, education, income impacts of moving to a lower-poverty neighbourhood significantly improves college attendance rates and earnings for children who were young (below age 13) when their families moved. These children also live in better neighbourhoods themselves as adults and are less likely to become single parents. The treatment effects are substantial: children whose families take up an experimental voucher to move to a lower-poverty area when they are less than 13 years old have an annual income that is $3,477 (31%) higher on average relative to a mean of $11,270 in the control group in their mid-twenties. In contrast, the same moves have, if anything, negative long-term impacts on children who are more than 13 years old when their families move, perhaps because of the disruption effects of moving to a very different environment.   ","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Sanbonmatsu L, Katz LF, Ludwig J, Gennetian LA, Duncan GJ, Kessler RC, Adam EK, McDade T, Lindau ST. Moving to opportunity for fair housing demonstration program: Final impacts evaluation.\n• Schmidt NM, Lincoln AK, Nguyen QC, Acevedo-Garcia D, Osypuk TL. Examining mediators of housing mobility on adolescent asthma: results from a housing voucher experiment. Social Science & Medicine. 2014 Apr 1;107:136-44.\n• Gennetian LA, Sanbonmatsu L, Ludwig J. An overview of moving to opportunity: A random assignment housing mobility study in five US cities. neighbourhood and life chances: How place matters in modern America. 2011 Feb 17:163.\n• Chetty R, Hendren N, Katz LF. The effects of exposure to better neighbourhoods on children: New evidence from the Moving to Opportunity experiment. American Economic Review. 2016 Apr;106(4):855-902.\n• Leventhal, Tama, and Véronique Dupéré. \"Moving to Opportunity: Does long-term exposure to ‘low-poverty’neighbourhoods make a difference for adolescents?.\" Social science & medicine 73.5 (2011): 737-743.\n• Glymour MM, Nguyen Q, Matsouaka R, Tchetgen EJ, Schmidt NM, Osypuk TL. Does mother know best? Treatment adherence as a function of anticipated treatment benefit. Epidemiology (Cambridge, Mass.). 2016 Mar;27(2):265.\n• Lindberg RA, Shenassa ED, Acevedo-Garcia D, Popkin SJ, Villaveces A, Morley RL. Housing interventions at the neighbourhood level and health: a review of the evidence. Journal of Public Health Management and Practice. 2010 Sep 1;16(5):S44-52.\n• Schmidt NM, Glymour MM, Osypuk TL. Adolescence is a sensitive period for housing mobility to influence risky behaviours: an experimental design. Journal of Adolescent Health. 2017 Apr 1;60(4):431-7.\n• Ludwig J, Sanbonmatsu L, Gennetian L, Adam E, Duncan GJ, Katz LF, Kessler RC, Kling JR, Lindau ST, Whitaker RC, McDade TW. neighbourhoods, obesity, and diabetes—a randomized social experiment. New England journal of medicine. 2011 Oct 20;365(16):1509-19.\n• Ludwig J, Duncan GJ, Gennetian LA, Katz LF, Kessler RC, Kling JR, Sanbonmatsu L. neighbourhood effects on the long-term well-being of low-income adults. Science. 2012 Sep 21;337(6101):1505-10.\n• Kessler RC, Duncan GJ, Gennetian LA, Katz LF, Kling JR, Sampson NA, Sanbonmatsu L, Zaslavsky AM, Ludwig J. Associations of housing mobility interventions for children in high-poverty neighbourhoods with subsequent mental disorders during adolescence. Jama. 2014 Mar 5;311(9):937-47.\n","• https://www.scholars.northwestern.edu/en/publications/moving-to-opportunity-for-fair-housing-demonstration-program-fina\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4070421/pdf/nihms569065.pdf\n• https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=HFAi0f8gKMQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA163&dq=related:Z5BTqbd-fxUJ:scholar.google.com/&ots=V2Okc1jH9J&sig=WRkFE9y3iVP_G-Q8I7Gu6Amc58M&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false\n• https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/30367426/46646672.pdf?sequence=1\n• http://www.medsp.umontreal.ca/IRSPUM_DB/pdf/26198.pdf\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5124504/pdf/nihms828680.pdf\n• https://journals.lww.com/jphmp/Fulltext/2010/09001/Housing_Interventions_at_the_neighbourhood_Level.8.aspx\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5366094/\n• https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/Nejmsa1103216\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3491569/pdf/nihms403688.pdf\n• https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/1835504\n.\n","• NA\n• 10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.02.020\n• NA\n• 10.1257/aer.20150572\n• 10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.06.042\n• 10.1097/EDE.0000000000000431\n• 10.1097/PHH.0b013e3181dfbb72\n• 10.1016/j.jadohealth.2016.10.022\n• 10.1056/NEJMsa1103216\n• 10.1126/science.1224648\n• 10.1001/jama.2014.607"]
[154,"4 Housing","USA_GA_housing_voucher","Programme","Government (Atlanta Housing Authority - AHA)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Residents as part of the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA) moved to voucher-subsidized rental units in the private market, and could choose any unit provided that it met AHA standards (e.g., no overcrowding, <40 % of units in multifamily communities be supported by Sections 8 or 9). Health was a secondary aim (housing considered obsolete/distressed and unsuitable for housing purposes but indirect effects of the programme were assessed in particular the reduction of depression & perceived community violence . ","Housing conditions","Socio-economic groups (in social housing, African-American adults)","USA - Georgia - Atlanta - Local","2008-2010","3 years","Passed through legislation (Amended United States Housing Act of 1937)","No end date for voucher subsidy stated, but everyone moved out of blocks for demolition.","Empirical assessment","• depression/ mental health\n• Units of alcohol consumed \n• illicit drugs consumed\n","• Depression CES-D scores mean (SD) from 23.8 (9.3) at baseline to 14.7 (11.0) at wave 4 follow-up (CES-D's cutpoint for mild depression =16; cutpoint for major depression =27).  Multivariate analyses suggest that pre-/post relocation improvements in economic conditions predict reductions in depressive symptoms, and that this relationship is mediated by reduced perceived community violence.\n• Binge drinking >=2x in last 30 days from 38% (63/172) to 19% (29/156).\n• Use of illicit drugs weekly or more in last 6 months from 30% (50/172) to 19% (29/156). \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The policy reduced ethnic segregation - not directly described in paper. Decreased ethnic segregation, between waves 1 and 2 participants moved to voucher-subsidized rental units in substantially less poor and socially disordered census tracts. Increased rate of homelessness - at baseline 0/172 (0%) were homeless, compared to 10/156 (6%) at wave 4 follow-up.","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Cooper HL, Hunter-Jones J, Kelley ME, Karnes C, Haley DF, Ross Z, Rothenberg R, Bonney LE. The aftermath of public housing relocations: relationships between changes in local socioeconomic conditions and depressive symptoms in a cohort of adult relocaters. Journal of urban health. 2014 Apr 1;91(2):223-41.","Link","• 10.1007/s11524-013-9844-5"]
[155,"4 Housing","Winter fuel Payment (WFP)_UK","Programme","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The Winter Fuel Program is a labelled but unconditional cash transfer subsidy to households containing an older person (male or female) above the female state pension age 2016 to reduce the cost of keeping the dwelling warn. This means that  health was a secondary aim .","Housing conditions","General population (>65yrs - female state pension age)","UK - National","2000-2001","1 year","Passed through legislation","Age of female pension changes, 2010-60 rose to 65yrs in 2018 and expected to be 67 by 2028","Epidemiological study","1. self-reports of chest infection in the last 3 weeks \n2. hypertension \n3. inflammation/ acute phase: serum values of C-reactive protein (CRP) in excess of 10.\n4. inflammation/ acute phase: Serum values of Fibrinogen equal or in excess of 4.\n","1. Significant reduction in reports of chest infection: beta  -.024 [-.049; .001]\n2. No significant reduction in hypertension: beta -.018 [-.049; .012]\n3. No significant impact on C-reactive protein: beta -.012 [-.044; .020]\n4. Significant impact in reducing fibrinogen: beta -.055 [-.077; -.033]\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Crossley TF, Zilio F. The health benefits of a targeted cash transfer: The UK Winter Fuel Payment. Health economics. 2017 Aug 15.","Link","• 10.1002/hec.3666"]
[156,"4 Housing","Housing Choice Voucher / Public housing / multifamily housing (moving to opportunity)","Programme","Government (US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Housing Choice Vouchers  to allow very low-income families, the elderly, and the disabled to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private market.  In the USA, public housing rent is determined based on family composition and income . The US department of Housing and URvan Development administers Federal aid to local housing agencies that manage the housing for low-income residents at rents they can afford. Multifamily Housing supports the development, rehabilitation and maintenance of multiple-unit housing through mortgage insurance programs and preservation of affordable housing through Project-Based Rental Assistance and other programs. This policy of subsidising housing  has indirect effects  on health.","Access to accommodation","Socio-economic (low income population)","USA - National",1937,"NA","Passed through legislation (Housing Act of 1937)","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","•  reported health status\n• psychological distress\n","• Current residents had lower odds of fair or poor health than did future public housing residents (1.05 × 0.73 = 0.77; 95% CI = 0.58, 0.99). Current multifamily housing residents also had lower odds of fair or poor health than did future residents (OR = 0.77; 95% CI = 0.60, 0.98).\n• Current residents had lower odds of serious psychological distress than did future public housing residents (OR = 0.59; 95% CI = 0.40, 0.88). We did not find a difference in psychological distress between current and future recipients of housing choice vouchers or residents of multifamily housing\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Results were unable to demonstrate consistent health benefits for recipients of housing choice vouchers. This may partially reflect heterogeneity in the effect of vouchers across subgroups which may make it difficult to identify effects.\"","Not reported","Not reported","?","Fenelon A, Mayne P, Simon AE, Rossen LM, Helms V, Lloyd P, et al. Housing assistance programs and adult health in the United States. American journal of public health. 2017;107(4):571-8.","Link","• 10.2105/AJPH.2016.303649"]
[157,"4 Housing","USA_GA_housing_accom","Programme","Government (Georgia Campaign for Adolescent Power and Potential & Georgia Department of Human Resources)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Subsidy for free accommodation in specific housing.  Second Chance Home (SCH) Network was set up to provide homes operated by community-based organisations - each home takes 5-7  parenting girls (<21yo) and their children at a time, as well as some pregnant girls (who stay after delivery). Girls are referred by family organisations as well as courts, schools, shelters, relatives. Average length of stay 2001-2012 was 8.9 months. Intensive case management is provided to ensure that residents are receiving needed supports and resources. Core services also include housing, educational support, relationship support, parenting education, and transportation to health services. The aim of this policy was to help young women become nurturing and self-sufficient parents, to avoid repeat teenage pregnancies, and to promote healthy development of their children).","Access to accommodation","Other (teenage mothers)","USA - Georgia - Local",2001,"2 years","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (as well as housing residents receive \"educational support, relationship support, parenting education, and transportation to health services.\")","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","Proportion with health care and with immunisations","Children having a regular source of health care rose from 91% at intake to 97% at discharge, and children with age appropriate immunisations went from 76% to 96% at discharge.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Improved education and employment of mothers:~50% of past residents had graduated from high school/GED programme compared to a quoted 38% of mothers =<18yo generally. 5% employed at intake, 26% at discharge and 50% 2years post-discharge (57% of 18yos). Increased empathy of mothers Not necessarily associated - didn't say %s of those with custody of their children outside of the SCH network, but \"There was a decline in the percentage of children in the custody of their teenage mothers from intake to discharge to first follow-up, from 76 percent to 56 percent.\" Slightly increased after that to ~66% at 2 year follow up.","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Hudgins R, Erickson S, Walker D. Everyone deserves a second chance: A decade of supports for teenage mothers. Health & social work. 2014 May 1;39(2):101-8.","Link","• 10.1093/hsw/hlu014"]
[158,"4 Housing","Health housing Programme/ NZ_HHP_housing","Policy","Government (Housing New Zealand Corporation (HNZC - the provider of government-funded housing) and Counties Manukau, Auckland, Hutt Valley and Northland District Health Boards)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary, subsidised housing. The Healthy Housing Programme aims to improve access to healthcare, reduce housing related health issues, provide a link with social/welfare care if needed. A key part of the Healthy Housing Programme is the joint assessment undertaken by an area co-coordinator (housing) and a public health nurse (health). Interventions included educating families about health risks, referrals to local health providers, making the house dryer and warmer by installing insulation, modifying houses to address health and disability needs, transferring families to other houses to address overcrowding or, in some instances, increasing the number of bedrooms in the house. Improve housing conditions in response to research which found that children had high rates of infectious diseases when living in crowded housing. Health was a primary aim (to improve the housing conditions of families living in Housing New Zealand homes).","Housing conditions","Socio-economic (low income population)","New Zealand -South Auckland - Local",2000,"9 years","• Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (alongside family education about health risks)\n• Joint initiative between Housing NZ Corporation and County health boards\n","Not reported ","Empirical assessment (The Cox proportional hazard model was used with the Andersen-Gill counting method to estimate crude and adjusted HRs associated with the exposure status in all three categories)","Other (reduction in number of acute hospitalisations)","For 0-4 year olds, acute hospitalisations reduced by 11% post-intervention (HR 0.89, 95% CI 0.79 to 0.99), while admissions among 5-34 year olds reduced by 23% (HR 0.77, 95% CI 0.70 to 0.85). Hospitalisations among adults aged 35 years and over did not change significantly after the intervention (HR 1.04, 95% CI 0.95 to 1.15).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Jackson G, Thornley S, Woolston J, Papa D, Bernacchi A, Moore T. Reduced acute hospitalisation with the healthy housing programme. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health. 2011 Jul 1;65(7):588-93.","Link","• 10.1136/jech.2009.107441"]
[159,"4 Housing","CAN_housing_subsidy_foodinsecurity","Programme","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary, subsidized market rental accommodations for low-income families. Health was a secondary aim, but a primary  aim of the study as it assessed the association between housing status and food insecurity.","Access to accommodation","Socio-economic (low income population)","Canada - Toronto - Local ",2005,"NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","Other (nutritional status)","\"Over the past 12 months, 61.7% of families in market housing were food-insecure compared to 68.9% of those in subsidized housing. After adjusting for household sociodemographic characteristics, there was no association between whether families received housing subsidies and their food security status (OR=0.73, 95% CI=0.50–1.08). However, the odds of food insecurity were lower among subsidized families compared to only those market households on a waiting list for subsidized housing (OR=0.51, 95% CI=0.30–0.86).\"","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kirkpatrick SI, Tarasuk V. Housing circumstances are associated with household food access among low-income urban families. Journal of urban health. 2011 Apr 1;88(2):284-96.","Link","• 1007/s11524-010-9535-4"]
[160,"4 Housing","SPA_housing_subsidy","Programme","Non-governmental (Caritas Diocesana de Barcelona)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Subsidy for housing improvement. Population included those assisted by the Caritas Housing Mediation Service (HMS), which helps individuals at risk of being evicted from their owned or rented dwelling, or by the Direct Assistance Service (DAS), focused on individuals facing economic difficulties.  Participants assisted by social worker from Caritas and some received economic / social assistance from Caritas.  The aim of the study reports was to compare changes in health between those having improved or not improved their situation according to the different dimensions of the conceptual framework: socioeconomic, physical housing, or neighbourhood conditions, regardless of this change being attributable to Caritas, the public administration, or other causes. ","Housing conditions","Socio-economic (low income population)","Spain - Barcelona - Local",2012,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","• Reduced stress\n• Mental health\n","• In the last year worried about not having sufficient money for food - DAS from 75.5% to 63.3%, and HMS from 78.3% to 70.7%\n• No change in average mental health score (GHQ). Fair or poor self-reported health unchanged/ worse: DAS 46.4% both time points, and HMS 53.5% to 57.6%.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Novoa AM, Amat J, Malmusi D, Díaz F, Darnell M, Trilla C, Bosch J, Borrell C. Changes in health following housing improvement in a vulnerable population in spain: a follow-up study. International Journal of Health Services. 2017 Jan;47(1):83-107.","Link","• 10.1177/0020731416676228"]
[161,"4 Housing","USA_housing_subsidy_homeless","Programme","Government (US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy: RCT to assess the impact of receiving intensive social care management (ICM) and social housing vouchers. In addition ICM to participants in the Housing and Urban Development–Veterans Affairs Supported Housing  (HUD-VASH) condition were given priority access to a Section 8 housing voucher and assistance from case managers to obtain a housing voucher and locate an apartment. A total of 460 veterans at four sites were randomly assigned to HUD-VASH (N=182), ICM only (N=90), or treatment as usual (N=188). Trial of HUD-VASH started in 1992 (Participants for this study recruited1992-1995) but the programme appears to still be running https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/vash) Direct effects (provide support to access vouchers for housing + mental health care/substance use counselling) Health was a secondary aim (the main aim of this programme evaluated was to help find permanent housing for veterans and their families)","Access to accommodation","Other (vulnerable groups , homeless veterans with psychiatric and substance use disorders)","USA - 4 sites but not specified - Local ",1992,"3 years","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (intensive case management to veterans) ","Not reported","Empirical assessment","Units of alcohol consumed / illicit drugs consumed","Treatment as usual: days intoxicated M=2.2 days drug use M=4.9 / ICM days intoxicated M=2.5 days drug use M=5.2 / HUD-VASH days intoxicated M=2.0 days drug use M=4.5 (M is estimated marginal means averaged across 2yr follow up, controlled for significant  covariates)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Increase in number of social contacts, including in number of days worked - only slight. ","Not reported","Not reported","NA","O'Connell MJ, Kasprow WJ, Rosenheck RA. Differential impact of supported housing on selected subgroups of homeless veterans with substance abuse histories. Psychiatric Services. 2012 Dec;63(12):1195-205.","Link","• 10.1176/appi.ps.201000229"]
[162,"4 Housing","UK_Housing Benefit - Local Housing Allowance","Policy","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Those who fulfil criteria are able to apply for housing benefits as a private renter, the money is transferred to their account or they are paid by cheque . The study objective was to examine the association between housing benefits reduction and mental health/depression. Socio-economic groups (focused on persons aged 16–69 years who were then renting housing in the private sector (n=179,037) - comparing those in receipt of housing benefits and those not)  While health was not a primary aim of the overall policy, this is housing benefits does provide some links to health and the impact on mental health was an aim of study conducted.","Access to accommodation","Socio-economic (low income population)","UK - National",2010,"2 years","• Implementation costs: approx £24 billion per year, and LHA cut was £1.6 billion per year  \n• Passed through legislation (Welfare Reform Act 2010)\n","Not reported ","Epidemiological study (difference-in-difference models)","Increase in depression/mental health issues","We consistently found that the April 2011 reforms to the HB increased the risk of depressive symptoms among persons claiming the HB by approximately 1.8 percentage points above the risk in private renters not claiming the benefit. This  equates to roughly 10% increase in those with depression among private renter HB recipients. Worst in areas hardest hit (inner London & Tyne and Wear)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Policy reduced spending by Government on HB","Not reported","Yes?","Reeves A, Clair A, McKee M, Stuckler D. Reductions in the United Kingdom's government housing benefit and symptoms of depression in low-income households. American journal of epidemiology. 2016 Sep 8;184(6):421-9.","Link","• 10.1093/aje/kww055"]
[163,"4 Housing","Scottish Government Central Heating Programme","Policy","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy programme administered by the EAGA Partnership for households in the private sector who are aged 60 or more and lack central heating, or who have a heating system which is broken and beyond repair and they installed the central heating package in 5,500 homes across Scotland at a cost of 15.4 million. Beneficiaries receive an efficient and modern central heating system (from a choice of gas, electric, oil or solid fuel); insulation (where possible - cavity wall fill, lagging of boiler and pipes, loft insulation, draft exclusion measures);if appropriate - safety alarms (carbon monoxide detector, a smoke alarm and a cold alarm); advice on energy use and the option of receiving a benefit entitlement check.  Social sector landlords (local authorities and housing associations) deliver the part of the Programme for their tenants whose home lacks any central heating system, they were paid a cash grant by the Scottish Executive and by Communities Scotland (formerly Scottish Homes) respectively for each house in which the central heating package was to be installed. 15 of the 32 local authorities and 37 housing associations in Scotland participated in the programme and together, local authorities and housing associations were responsible for more than half of the installations completed in 2002/2003. In line with one of the key priorities of the programme, consideration was also given to maximising the number of installations to members of priority household groups. Subsidy Health was a primary aim (improving the health of the elderly, reducing the number of winter deaths, lowering the incidence of cold-related illness and reducing pressure on the NHS)","Housing conditions","General population","UK - Scotland - Regional",2002,"1 year","Not reported","Programme replaced from 6th April 2009 by the Energy Assistance Package","Epidemiological study","1. Heart disease\n2. Blood pressure\n3. Nasal allergy\n4. SF-36 Physical Functioning scale\n5. SF-36 General Health scale\n6. Other measures of respiratory, circulatory  and immunity problems, including  cold/flu symptoms/asthma/bronchitis/eczema/circulation problems/shortness of breath/tightness of chest/wheezing/coughing phlegm and GP and hospital attendance frequency.\n","1. heating recipients were significantly less likely to report receiving a first diagnosis of heart disease (OR 0.69; 95% CI 0.52 to 0.91) \n2. high blood pressure (OR 0.77; 95% CI 0.61 to 0.97)\n3. more likely to receive a first diagnosis of nasal allergy (OR 1.52; 95% CI 1.05 to 2.20)\n4. significantly higher scores on the SF-36 Physical Functioning scale (estimated difference 2.51 units; 95% CI 0.67 to 4.37 units) \n5. significantly higher scores on the SF-36 General Health scale (estimated difference 2.57 units; 95% CI 0.90 to 4.34 units). \n6. No significant effect of the programme was observed for the remaining 25 measures investigated.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Walker JJ, Mitchell RJ, Petticrew M, Platt SD. The effects on health of a publicly-funded domestic heating programme: a prospective controlled study. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health. 2008 Sep 18:jech-2008.","Link","• 10.1136/jech.2008.074096"]
[164,"4 Housing","NZ_housing_offer_elderly","Programme","Government (Ministry of health -local health district board)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The target population for the HSAM intervention was community-dwelling older people aged 65+ years in the year 2011 who were resident in the CMDHB Health District. The program was assumed to run like a screening program where participants are “screened” for their agreement to participate (have their home modified). That is each person aged 65+ is sent a letter by DHB staff and there is a follow-up phone call (to determine participation and if so to arrange a time for the HSAM).This programme provided free/subsidised home safety assessments and make structural adjustments to the house to reduce falls. Health was a primary aim (to reduce falls in older people).","Housing conditions","Elderly","New Zealand -South Auckland - Local","110 (cohort lifetime)","Multiple follow-ups: maximum 20 years","Implementation costs: one-off intervention cost for running the program and assessing and modifying all the dwellings was estimated at $9.57 million.","Not reported ","Modelling (Markov macro-simulation model with annual cycles)","Gains in quality-adjusted life years ","2800 QALYs gained in base case scenario (modelled to end of lifetime, discount rate 3%). 1380 QALYs gained over 10 year horizon. 2360 QALYs gained over 20 year horizon.","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) was $5480 (95%UI: cost saving to $15,300).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Wilson N, Kvizhinadze G, Pega F, Nair N, Blakely T. Home modification to reduce falls at a health district level: Modeling health gain, health inequalities and health costs. PloS one. 2017 Sep 14;12(9):e0184538.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0184538"]
[165,"5 Gambling","AUS_gamblingbehaviour_maximumbetrestrictions","RCT","NA","Other (Input restrictions)","RCT run in several New South Wales (Australia) hotels and casinos, with participants complementing tests to identify problem vs non-problem gamblers. Examining impact of combinations of different bet reduction interventions by modifying on electronic gaming machines  to achieve: \n• Reduction in maximum bets by 90% per wager (AUS$10 to AUS$1); \n• Reduction in reel spin speed for each wager cycle from 3.5 seconds to 5 seconds with 1 second break between plays; \n• Reconfiguration of note acceptors to allow only AUS$5, AUS$10 and AUS$20 notes, but not AUS$50 and AUS$100. \nModified and unmodified machines were set to provide the usual expected player return rate of 87.5% stipulated by legislative requirements for standard machines in New South Wales. Participants monitored by researchers for 7 days , between the hours of 9am and 1am.\n","Gambling frequency and gambling expenditure","General population","Australia - Sydney metropolitan area - Local","2000*","1 week","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","• Time spent on betting machine\n• Number of bets placed\n• Losses sustained\n• Cigarette consumption\n• Alcohol consumption\n","Only reducing the maximum bet size (from AUS$10 to AUS$1) was significantly associated with gambling behaviours and health behaviours: \n• Time spent on betting machine  reduced by 4.6 minutes\n• Number of bets placed reduced (11.3 fewer bets)\n• Losses sustained reduced ($5.19 lower net losses – that is gains of $5.19 on average))\n• Cigarette consumption reduced (0.11 fewer cigarettes smoked)\n• Alcohol consumption reduced  (0.22 fewer drinks consumed)\nNo association between reduction of the reel spin speed and modification of note acceptors with any of the outcomes above was identified. No impact of any gambling reduction strategy on credits per line, lines per wagers, use of bill acceptors of over AUS$20 and visits to ATM machines.\n","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported","Note of potential bias: one report was prepared for  The Gaming Industry Operators Group by the authors based at University of Sydney Gambling Research Unit","NA","• Sharpe L, Walker M, Coughlan MJ, Enersen K, Blaszczynski A. Structural changes to electronic gaming machines as effective harm minimization strategies for non-problem and problem gamblers. Journal of Gambling Studies. 2005 Dec 1;21(4):503-20.\n• Blaszczynski A, Walker M, Sharpe L. The assessment of the impact of the reconfiguration on electronic gaming machines as harm minimisation strategies for problem gambling. Sydney: University of Sydney Gambling Research Unit; 2001 Nov.\n","• https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10899-005-5560-8\n• https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3181/9051ef2d00ac26d61d8a1549faa1e2ea45a6.pdf\n","• 10.1007/s10899-005-5560-8\n• NA"]
[166,"5 Gambling","NO_gamblingbehaviour_noteslotprohibition","Observational study","Government","Other (Input restrictions)","Mandatory From July 1st 2006, bank note acceptors on all slot-machines in Norway were removed. The highest stake was reduced from notes equivalent of EUR 25 to coins equivalent to EUR 2.50 ","Gambling frequency and gambling expenditure","Adolescents","Norway - National",2006,"1 year","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Epidemiological analysis","• Gambling expenditure\n• Gambling frequency\n• Probability of gambling\n• Prevalence of problem gambling\n","• Gambling expenditure reduced (average amount spent EUR3.10/week prior to intervention to EUR2.40/week post intervention)\n• Gambling frequency reduced (15 times a year prior to intervention to 12 times a year post intervention)\n• Probability of gambling reduced (Odds of gambling weekly reduced by 26%, odds of having gambled in the last week reduced by 50% and odds of having gambled more than EUR63 reduced by 27%)\n• Prevalence of problem gambling reduced (17–29% decrease in the prevalence of problem gambling after the intervention)\n","Not reported","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported","No other interventions in the gambling market occurred concurrent with the prohibition of note acceptors during the data collection period. However, it appears that there has been a change in the norm climate in the Norwegian society. This has been expressed in several ways; firstly by an increased focus and concern by clinicians, relatives to gamblers and pathological gamblers and secondly actions taken by politicians to curb the negative consequences of slot machine gambling. It seems likely that norm climate and attitudes towards slot machine gambling has turned more negative in part due to media focus on gambling problems. If so, it is possible slot machine gambling has become less socially acceptable during this period which again may have reinforced the intervention effect.","No?","Hansen M, Rossow I. Limited cash flow on slot machines: Effects of prohibition of note acceptors on adolescent gambling behaviour. International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction. 2010 Jan 1;8(1):70-81.","Link","• 10.1007/s11469-009-9196-2"]
[167,"5 Gambling","US_healthimpacts_revenueredistribution","Observational study","Government","Other (Redistribution of gaming revenue)","To assess the possible impact of redistribution of gambling revenue to fund public health services and improve community health status by comparing US counties with casino activity to comparator counties with no casinos.","Revenue for availability of public health services","General population","USA - Mississippi/Missouri - Tunica County, Pemiscot County - Regional",1993,"11 years","Not reported","Not reported ","Ecological approach comparing casino vs non-casino counties using freely available health and social data to identify outcomes.","• First-trimester prenatal care\n• Infant mortality rate\n• Other health outcomes (% births to teens, motor vehicle death rate, low birthweight rate, years of potential life lost under age 65, overall mortality rate)","• Gaming revenue positively associated with first-trimester prenatal care\n• Gaming revenue positively associated with infant mortality rate\n• Gaming revenue not significantly associated with any of the other health outcomes (% births to teens, motor vehicle death rate, low birthweight rate, years of potential life lost under age 65, overall mortality rate)\n","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported ","Gaming industry revenue from Mississippi casinos totalled $2.8 billion in fiscal year 2004, an 89.8 % increase over 1994.Tunica County casinos generated more than $1.1 billion of that total. Total gaming-related revenues earned for the state were $332.2 million in fiscal year 2004. Tunica County casinos earned $45.5 million of that revenue for the county. This is up considerably for Tunica County from the 1994 level of less than $5.7 million. These revenues have been used primarily for infrastructure repairs and improvements, public safety, housing, education, and transportation. In Pemiscot County in 2006  gaming revenues to the City of Caruthersville from Casino Aztar totalled $1.3 million in 2004, up from just over $.5 million in 1995, and per capita income was $23,230, up 56 %, while the total employment number was down 1 % since 1995. In Mississippi, a county without a casino, per capita income in 2004was$21,754, up 48 % since 1995, while total employment number increased 10 % since 1995. Gross gaming receipts from all Missouri casinos in 2004 were $1.4 billion with $22 million coming from Casino Aztar. Total state gaming revenue earned on those receipts in the same period was $387 million. The impact of Caruthersville’s new resources from gaming revenues is most evident in city infrastructure improvements. Uses of gaming revenues included public safety, water and drainage, street improvements, and other important infrastructure developments.","Not reported","NA","Honoré PA, Simoes EJ, Moonesinghe R, Wang X, Brown L. Evaluating the ecological association of casino industry economic development on community health status: A natural experiment in the Mississippi delta region. Journal of Public Health Management and Practice. 2007 Mar 1;13(2):214-22.","Link","• NA"]
[168,"5 Gambling","AUS_harmreduction_various","Observational study","NA","Other (Input restrictions)","Mandatory policy which applies to all EGM license holders:  1) Limiting free vouchers for gambling to less than $10; Not requiring an individual to gamble more than $10, to receive an inducement, obtain a prize or enter a prize draw; Not requiring an entrant in a promotional prize draw to attend the draw when the prize is worth more than $1,000. 2) Player loyalty programs must provide player activity statements and responsible gambling information, and be operated in a socially responsible manner; Rewards to player loyalty programs members for use in gambling must not exceed $10. 3) Ban on having ATMs in venues operating EGMs, Keno or totalizer wagering (with exception in two casinos); No more than one cheque per day, with a maximum amount of $200, is able to be cashed for gambling purposes; Cash advances from credit accounts are not permitted in casinos; The amount able to withdraw from venue EFTPOS facilities, casino ATMs, and cheques cashing facilities is reduced ($400 in casino ATMs, $200 for EFTPOS withdrawal for gambling purposes in all venues). 4) Restricting the amount of cash for EGM and Keno pay outs to $1,000; Cheques for the payment of winnings must not be cashed on the same trading day they are issued. 5) Reduction in reel spin speed. Health as an indirect aim (main aim was to reduce gambling activity and reduce bet size and frequency ) ","Gambling frequency and gambling expenditure","General population","Australia - Tasmania - Regional",2008,"NA",null,"Not reported ","Epidemiological analysis","• Gambling expenditure\n• Gambling frequency","The cross-sectional analyses suggested that the suite of EGM harm minimisation measures appear to meet the simultaneous aims of decreasing expenditure of a significant proportion of at-risk (PGSI>0) EGM gamblers (11.8-34.0%) without decreasing the enjoyment of a significant proportion of non-problem (PGSI=0) EGM gamblers (7.5-7.8%). Moreover, at-risk gamblers were more likely to report that the measures had decreased their EGM expenditure and enjoyment than non-problem gamblers. These findings are, however, limited by the self-report and attributional nature of the data. \n The longitudinal analyses identified mixed support for the effectiveness of the EGM harm minimisation measures. For example, there was evidence that some EGM gamblers who did not perceive a decrease in EGM expenditure (6.5%) and enjoyment (7.4%) as a result of at least one of the EGM harm minimisation measures did so one year later. Moreover, as expected, EGM gamblers who reported awareness of any EGM harm minimisation measure were more likely to display decreased gambling behaviour (i.e., total gambling expenditure, and total gambling frequency) over time compared to EGM gamblers who were not aware, but only if they also had high initial gambling behaviour. Taken together, these findings suggest that the EGM harm minimisation measures effectively targeted EGM gamblers with higher initial gambling behaviour. \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","The Allen consulting group. Social and economic impact study of gambling in Tasmania. Third social and economic impact study of gambling in Tasmania volume 3 assessment of gambling harm minimisation measure. 2015","Link","• NA"]
[169,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_weightloss_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT testing the utility of an individually targeted Internet-based intervention with monetary incentives (INCENT) to reduce the weight of overweight and obese employees when compared to a less-intensive minimal intervention\n that included newsletters and on-site educational sessions delivered on a quarterly basis. Incentive programme was delivered via daily e-mails over 12 months while the information intervention was delivered quarterly via both newsletters and on-site educational sessions. IN the financial incentives intervention, for every 1% of weight loss, participants received $1.00. The incentives were provided  through participants’ quarterly weigh-ins at a Health SpotTM, which included a calibrated scale and a built in digital camera.","Multiple health behaviours (Physical activity, diet)","Other (workers with a BMI above 25 kg/m^2)","USA - Virginia - 28 worksites in Roanoke and Richmond - Local",2008,"12 months","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (Information package for healthy living) ","RCT lasted up to 1 year, not follow-up actions","RCT","• Weight loss and BMI reduction\n• Dietary macro and micronutrient intake \n","• Participants in the INCENT group on average lost 2.27 lbs (P < 0.001) and had a BMI decrease of 0.36 kg/m2 (P < 0.001) while participants in the LMW group lost 1.30 lbs (P < 0.05) and decreased BMI by 0.20 kg/m2 (P < 0.05). However, the differences between INCENT and LMW in weight loss (20.97 lbs) and BMI reduction (20.16) were not significant. \n• Participants in both groups showed improvement in fruit and vegetable intake (INCENT: 0.32, P < 0.001; LMW: 0.12, P < 0.01); reduction in fat intake (INCENT: 26.05, P < 0.001; LMW: 25.83, P < 0.001); increases in dietary fibre intake (INCENT: 1.00, P < 0.001; LMW: 0.42, P < 0.001); reduction in SSB intake (INCENT: 226.42 kcal, P < 0.001; LMW: 228.08 kcal, P < 0.001); and increases in moderate PA behaviour (INCENT: 22.55 min/week, P < 0.001; LMW: 18.04 min/week, P < 0.001). Among those behavioural changes, INCENT participants showed larger improvements in their fruit and vegetable (0.20 servings, P < 0.001) and dietary fibre intake (0.58 g, P < 0.001). Furthermore, participants in the INCENT group showed a statistically significant increase in their average daily water consumption (1.66 fl. oz., P 5 0.01), while the LMW group showed no change over the 6 months (0.47 fl. oz., P 5 0.575). \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","From systematic review: Weerasekara YK, Roberts SB, Kahn MA, LaVertu AE, Hoffman B, Das SK. Effectiveness of workplace weight management interventions: a systematic review. Current obesity reports. 2016 Jun 1;5(2):298-306. individual article Almeida FA, You W, Harden SM, Blackman KC, Davy BM, Glasgow RE, Hill JL, Linnan LA, Wall SS, Yenerall J, Zoellner JM. Effectiveness of a worksite‐based weight loss randomized controlled trial: the worksite study. Obesity. 2015 Apr;23(4):737-45.","Link","• 10.1002/oby.20899"]
[170,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_biometrics_discount","Programme","Non-governmental (Safeway Inc (corporate))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","A voluntary outcome-based biometric screening program, incentivized with health insurance premium discounts. For each measure passed (Body Mass Index, blood pressure, cholesterol, glucose, and nicotine ) the employee earned a portion of the maximum eligible discount (up to nearly 20%) off their health insurance premium contribution. Employees were also eligible to receive a retroactive rebate for unmet standards by retesting and meeting standards the following year. For those not meeting the BMI standard, an incremental improvement was established (reduction of 10% or more of body weight) to earn the rebate.","Multiple health behaviours (Body Mass Index, blood pressure, cholesterol, glucose, and nicotine)","General population","USA - 1 Large employer mostly in Western - Local",2009,"5 years","Passed through corporate decision enabled by legislation (Affordable care act)","For those not meeting the BMI standard, an incremental improvement was established (reduction of 10% or more of body weight) to earn the rebate","Retrospective cohort analysis","Change in multiple biometrics studies","Overall, participants at high risk for chronic diseases who continuously participated in Safeway’s Healthy Measures program significantly improved most biometrics. Those who did not meet standards their initial year showed the greatest improvement between their first and second years of participation: On average, participants who did not meet the incentive threshold at baseline decreased their BMI (1%), glucose (8%), blood pressure (systolic 9%, diastolic 8%), and total cholesterol (8%) by year 2 with improvements generally sustained or continued during each additional year of participation. No difference in glucose, nicotine over time was detected. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Fu PL, Bradley KL, Viswanathan S, Chan JM, Stampfer M. Trends in biometric health indices within an employer-sponsored wellness program with outcome-based incentives. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2016 Jul;30(6):453-7.","Link","• 10.1177/0890117116658241"]
[171,"6 Healthy workplace","US_worksitebehaviourchange_incentive","Programme","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary workplace financial incentives ranging between $0 to $360 for completion of program registration, risk change and health coaching. Company-level risk change was calculated from the average per-person number of risks on baseline and follow-up health risk assessments.","Multiple health behaviours (Alcohol, back care, driving, nutrition, exercise, smoking, stress, weight, and well-being (depression))","General population","USA - 24 companies, clients of StayWell Health Management - Local",2007,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported","Retrospective cohort analysis","Health risks (not specified)","• Incentive values were not significantly associated with risk improvement rates (p= 0.240)\n• The average risk improvement rate for companies with no incentive was 8.5%. The average risk improvement rates for companies that offered incentives of less than $100 and companies with incentives of $100 or more were 6.6% and 7.5%, respectively. There were no statistically significant differences between these average risk change rates.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Gingerich SB, Anderson DR, Koland H. Impact of financial incentives on behaviour change program participation and risk reduction in worksite health promotion. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2012 Nov;27(2):119-22.","Link","• 10.4278/ajhp.110726-ARB-295"]
[172,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","Korea_weightloss_incentive(gold_medals)","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary incentive-based obesity management program (the Midas Project aimed to improve good health habits) at an electronics company. Each participant was awarded 1 Don, the Korean gold unit equal to 3.75 g of gold, for each kilogram of body fat a person lost during the program. The major elements of the program were counselling by factory nurses, an assisting self-help group, free gym facilities, trainers, and health information seminars and bulletin boards. Additionally, a minimum fat loss of 3 kg was requested to ensure active participation and a maximum fat loss of 7 kg was established to avoid excessive exercise. One kilogram of body fat and not body weight was the defining determinant to qualify for a gold medal and this also served to prevent unhealthy fasting or liposuctions.","Multiple health behaviours (Smoking, temperance, sleep, exercise, appropriate body weight, avoidance of eating between meals, and eating a regular breakfast)","General population","Korea - Electronics industry workplace at Pyungtaik - Local",2005,"3 months","Not reported ","Not reported","Single Group Assignment RCT","• Mean BMI \n• mean weight \n• mean body fat \n• Mean systolic and diastolic blood pressure \n• cholesterol \n","All of the objective health status variables with the exception of cholesterol exhibited significant decreases during the three months of the program:\n• Mean BMI decreased from 28.8 to 27.8 kg/m² (p = .000)\n• mean weight decreased from 87.2 to 83.5 kg (p = .000)\n• mean body fat decreased from 25.4 to 23.3 kg (p = .000)\n• Mean systolic and diastolic blood pressure decreased from 130.5 to 125.1 mmHg (p = .002), and from 86.4 to 81.7 mmHg (p = .009), respectively.\n• There was an unfavourable change in cholesterol from 164.6 to 172.6 mg/dL but this trend was not significant (p = .172) and the increased level was still within the normal range.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Hwang G, Yoon C, Jung H, Kim Y. Evaluation of an incentive-based obesity management program in a workplace. International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics. 2011 Jan 1;17(2):147-54.","Link","• 10.1080/10803548.2011.11076885"]
[173,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_weightmanagement_subsidy","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","RCT testing the impact of workplace subsidised counselling programs (Weight Watchers) at four different subsidy levels, ranging from 100% to 50% (including hybrid schemes)","Weight loss programme","General population","USA - 2 companies - Local",2013,"12 months","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","• Enrolment \n•Weight loss\n","• Enrolment differed significantly by subsidy level (p< 0.001). The 100% subsidy produced the highest Enrolment (7.7%), significantly higher than each of the lower subsidies (vs. 80% subsidy: 6.2%, p=.002; vs. 50% subsidy: 3.9%, p<.0001 vs. hybrid: 3.7%, p<.0001). Enrolment in the 80% subsidy group was significantly higher than both lower subsidy groups (vs. 50% subsidy: 3.9%, p <0.001; vs hybrid 3.7%, p<0.001). \n• Among enrolees, there were no differences among the four groups in attendance or weight loss.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","John LK, Troxel AB, Yancy Jr WS, Friedman J, Zhu J, Yang L, Galvin R, Miller-Kovach K, Halpern SD, Loewenstein G, Volpp K. The Effect of Cost Sharing on an Employee Weight Loss Program: A Randomized Trial. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2018 Jan;32(1):170-6.","Link","• 10.1177/0890117116671282"]
[174,"6 Healthy workplace","US_smoking_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","National study of adult smokers employed at GE who were offered a financial incentive of up to $750 to quit smoking. This program was offered to employees at 87 GE worksites. Employees were eligible to participate if they were aged 18 years or older, smoked at least 5 cigarettes per day, and had no plans to leave the company within the next 18 months. A total of 878 eligible employees participated in the study. Surveys to assess participants’ demographic information and smoking and cessation behaviours were conducted at baseline and at 6- and 12- month follow-ups. ","Tobacco","Other (smokers)","USA - 87 General Electrics worksites and 7 industries - Local",2005,"6 and 12 months","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","Quit rates at 12 months follow-up","Overall, the quit rate among participants receiving financial incentives was 14.7% at 12-month follow-up.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kim AE, Towers A, Renaud J, Zhu J, Shea JA, Galvin R, Volpp KG. Application of the RE-AIM framework to evaluate the impact of a worksite-based financial incentive intervention for smoking cessation. Journal of occupational and environmental medicine. 2012 May 1;54(5):610-4.","Link","• 10.1097/JOM.0b013e31824b2171"]
[175,"6 Healthy workplace","US_diabetes_incentive","Observational study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary programme by insurance scheme.  Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island offered large employer groups the opportunity to participate in a diabetes disease management initiative that featured reduced co-payments (from $7/$25/$40 for generic, tier 2, and tier 3 drugs, respectively, to $0 for generic and $0-$2 for brand drugs) for diabetes-related medications .Reduction is conditional on completing the following: (a) participate in care coordination with their case managers, (b) have an annual physical exam, (c) have an A1c blood test at least twice a year, and (d) have an LDL-C test performed at least once per year.  ","Multiple health screens (Diabetes screening, cholesterol screening)","Clinical populations of employees (diabetics)","USA - Rhode Island - Blue Cross Blue Shield - Local",2008,"12 months","Not reported ","Not reported","Epidemiological study","Uptake of care processes recommended for diabetics","Patients participating in this incentive program featuring diabetes medication co-payment reduction and disease management components did not receive recommended care any more or less frequently than other enroled members with diabetes. Patients in the intervention and non-intervention groups were similarly likely to have all 5 recommended processes of care performed (40.1% vs. 38.9%, respectively, P=0.543).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","There were no significant differences between the intervention and comparison groups in mean [SD] PPPY all-cause medical care costs ($7,475 [$17,601] vs. $8,577 [$22,972], respectively, P=0.213) or total all-cause costs ($10,613 [$18,590] vs. $11,431 [$24,060], P=0.666).","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kogut SJ, Johnson S, Higgins T, Quilliam BJ. Evaluation of a program to improve diabetes care through intensified care management activities and diabetes medication copayment reduction. Journal of Managed Care Pharmacy. 2012 May;18(4):297-310.","Link","• 10.18553/jmcp.2012.18.4.297"]
[176,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_weightloss_incentives","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Employer-sponsored financial incentives for employee weight loss, testing the effectiveness of two financial incentive designs for promoting weight loss among obese employees: 24 weeks of monthly weigh-ins (control)(n=35); individual incentive, designed as $100 per person per month for meeting or exceeding target weight loss (individual arm)(n=35); group incentive, designed as $500 per month split between any participant within groups of 5 who met or exceeded their target weight loss (group arm)(n=35).","Multiple health behaviours (Physical activity, diet)","Other (workers with body mass index between 30 and 40 kg/m^2)","USA - Philadelphia - Children's Hospital - Local",2011,"5.5 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Weight loss between incentive type groups at 12 weeks\n• Weight loss between incentive type groups compared to control at 12 weeks\n","• Group incentive participants lost more weight than individual arm participants (between-group difference in weight loss favouring group = mean 9.7 pounds, 95% CI 4.4 to 14.9; P < 0.001). \n• Twelve weeks after incentives ended and adjusting for 3-group comparisons, group arm participants maintained greater weight loss than control arm participants (between-group difference in weight loss = mean 6.5 pounds, 95% CI 1.2 to 11.7; P = 0.016) but not more than individual arm participants (difference = 5.9 pounds, 95% CI, 0.8 to 11.0; P = 0.024). \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kullgren JT, Troxel AB, Loewenstein G, Asch DA, Norton LA, Wesby L, Tao Y, Zhu J, Volpp KG. Individual-versus group-based financial incentives for weight loss: a randomized, controlled trial. Annals of internal medicine. 2013 Apr 2;158(7):505-14.","Link","• 10.7326/0003-4819-158-7-201304020-00002"]
[177,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","Scotland_dietnutrition_subsidy","Observational study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Price subsidy of 10-20% of the cost of workplace meals, included as part of a broader intervention: Price incentives focused on consumer and caterers preference for “healthy meal deals” at a 10-20% cost reduction. Recipes aimed to achieve a nutrient composition consistent with the FSA traffic light grading low (or maximum of one medium) for fat, saturated fat, sugar and salt. Due to recently introduced EU Regulation, individual items could not be labelled as “healthy” but were labelled with value for money symbols. Marketing focused on a value strategy by promoting reduced prices, products and key placing of targeted items within the canteen setting","F&V and healthy food","General population","UK - Scotland - 2 sites with canteens - Local",2012,"2.3 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","Dietary intake from work catering","Limited impact on diet: Throughout the intervention period there was greater uptake of intervention soup (range 44 to 138) compared to the price incentivised meal deal (range 4 to 31). The intervention did not appear to impact on snacks with snack sales remaining buoyant during the intervention period. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Mackison D, Mooney J, Macleod M, Anderson AS. Lessons learnt from a feasibility study on price incentivised healthy eating promotions in workplace catering establishments. Journal of human nutrition and dietetics. 2016 Feb;29(1):86-94.","Link","• 10.1111/jhn.12283"]
[178,"6 Healthy workplace","US_presciptiondrugconsumption_incentive","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary Free annual screenings, tailored feedback on screening results, financial incentives for modifying and maintaining certain health behaviours, and health promotion education. ","Multiple health behaviours (Physical activity, diet)","General population","USA - Salt Lake County Government - Local",2008,"4 years","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (The Healthy Lifestyle Incentive Program) ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","• Frequency and cost of prescription drug  claims\n• Frequency and cost of medical claims\n","• The annual average number and cost of prescription drug claims per person was significantly greater among non- HLIP employees (15.5 claims, $1162.7 mean cost per person) compared to HLIP employees (8.6 claims, $603.3 mean cost per person)\n• The annual average number  and cost of medical claims per person was significantly greater for non-HLIP employees (10.2 claims, $4806.6 mean cost per person) compared to HLIP employees (7.37 claims, $2838.0 mean cost per person)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Over the study period, the cost savings in lower prescription drug and medical costs was $3 568 837. For every dollar spent on the HLIP the county saved $3.85. \n","Not reported","NA","Merrill RM, Hyatt B, Aldana SG, Kinnersley D. Lowering employee health care costs through the healthy lifestyle incentive program. Journal of Public Health Management and Practice. 2011 May 1;17(3):225-32.","Link","• 10.1097/PHH.0b013e3181f54128"]
[179,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_healthyeating_discount","Observational study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The BB program is a hospital cafeteria nutrition intervention in two hospitals using marketing and direct price incentives/disincentives to improve health-promoting purchasing behaviour. Hospital employees were provided with a 35% price differential for better bites products (i.e. the bundles of food items considered as healthy option) within their workplace cafeteria, as part of an nonrandomized evaluation study.","F&V","General population","﻿USA - Colorado - Penrose-St. Francis Health Services Hospital in Colorado Springs - Local",2011,"9 months","Not reported ","Not reported","Nonrandomized evaluation study","Changes in dietary intake and purchases","• Significant impact was demonstrated on all burger sales in the desired direction during intervention (P < .001). Most notably, the average weekly turkey burger sales at Penrose Hospital (PH) increased 13-fold (10.85-145.59) and became the majority of the market share (51.8%, P < .001). For salads, significant interaction between phase and food type was found at St. Francis Medical Center (SFMC) (P = .002) but not at PH (P = .304). ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Patsch AJ, Smith JH, Liebert ML, Behrens TK, Charles T. Improving healthy eating and the bottom line: impact of a price incentive program in 2 hospital cafeterias. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2016 Jul;30(6):425-32.","Link","• 10.1177/0890117116658237"]
[180,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_ICM_employee_childhealth_incentive","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","IBM’s Children’s Health Rebate offered a cash incentive for parents to complete a 12-week program of self-selected activities in family food planning and meals, family physical activity, and sedentary time related to electronic entertainment (“screen time”). A pre-program/post program comparison of self-reported activities was used to assess behaviour change. Employees completing all program steps  (Healthy family meal engagement and consistent healthy eating; collaborative physical activity; appropriate screen time; and positive parental role-modeling.) receive a $150 cash rebate, paid as taxable income in their pay check .","Multiple health behaviours (healthy diet, physical activity, screen time, parental modelling)","Children","USA - IBM - Local",2008,"12 weeks","Not reported ","Not reported","Retrospective cohort analysis","• physical activity \n• entertainment screen time \n•  eating healthy dinners >5 days\n","The 11 631 employees who completed the final program step of the 12-week follow-up family inventory demonstrated significant changes in all 9 assessment items. Throughout the 12-week program, the largest improvements were seen in:\n• physical activity behaviour (a 17.1- % point increase in family physical activity (from 23.2% to 40.3%),  and 15.8-% point increase for children), \n• some of the smallest improvements were in the area of appropriate entertainment screen time increased by a 8.3-% point increase for children (from 22.4% to 30.7%) and by 6.1 % points for adults (from 18.1% to 24.2%).  \n•  eating healthy dinners >5 days/week increased by 11.8 % points (from 74.9% to 86.7%), \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Sepúlveda MJ, Lu C, Sill S, Young JM, Edington DW. An observational study of an employer intervention for children's healthy weight behaviours. Pediatrics. 2010 Sep 28:peds-2009.","Link","• 10.1542/peds.2009-3210"]
[181,"6 Healthy workplace","Sweden_earlyreturntowork_subsidy","Policy","Government (Ministry of health)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The subsidies in relation to the number of employees connected to the occupational health care service provider were initiated by the ministry, and they were developed in cooperation with the Swedish OH service association, which includes most Swedish OH service providers as members. The SSIA was involved as the authority to administer the subsidies. Four different subsidies were introduced (sums in brackets indicate available funding for 2010; 1 € was calculated as 10 SEK): 1. A basic subsidy in relation to the number of employees connected to the OH service provider, maximum 20 € per employee and year. (10 million €) 2. A subsidy for costs of medical services, e.g. blood tests, X-rays, maximum 10 € per employee and year. (10 million €) 3. A subsidy for visits to OPs, involving a work ability assessment, 35 € per visit. (10 million €) 4. A subsidy for coordinated early interventions, involving multi-professional assessments and actions within 45 days of sick leave. OH service providers should assess the individual’s work ability, visit the workplace, assess the need for workplace adjustments, and initiate proper actions in cooperation with relevant stakeholders (including the employee and the employer), in order to promote RTW. A coordinated intervention was subsidized with 560 €. (25 million €)","Provision of occupational health care services","General population","Sweden - National",2010,"1 years","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Retrospective cohort analysis","Use of occupational health services"," Only 1-2% of the employers stated that they used OH services more after the introduction of the subsidies. The employer survey also indicated that employers’ general use of OH services primarily included health investigations, OP visits, psychological counselling, and ergonomic assessments, while it was less common to consult the OH service provider on rehabilitation, work environmental issues and organizational development","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Ståhl C, Toomingas A, Åborg C, Ekberg K, Kjellberg K. Promoting occupational health interventions in early return to work by implementing financial subsidies: a Swedish case study. BMC public health. 2013 Dec;13(1):310.","Link","• 10.1186/1471-2458-13-310"]
[182,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_dietnutrition_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT looking at social norms and incentives for healthy eating: involved sending out letters stating social norms on healthy eating, and offering financial rewards for purchasing products in the workplace cafeteria that are labelled with the colour green (healthy), (other colours included yellow (less healthy), or red (unhealthy)). Participants were randomized in 2012 to three arms: 1) monthly letter with social norm feedback about healthy food purchases, comparing employee to “all” and to “healthiest” customers (feedback-only); 2) monthly letter with social norm feedback plus small financial incentive for increasing green purchases (feedback-incentive); or 3) no contact (control). Consumption thresholds had to be met and were rewarded with $10 towards the cafeteria account. Passing a threshold in one month and not being able to reach the next threshold resulted in a reward of $5 towards the cafeteria account. The main outcome was change in proportion of green-labelled purchases at end of 3-month intervention.   ","F&V","General population","USA - Massachusetts General Hospital - Local",2012,"3 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","Increase in green-labelled (healthy) purchases ","increase in green-labelled purchases ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Thorndike AN, Riis J, Levy DE. Social norms and financial incentives to promote employees' healthy food choices: A randomized controlled trial. Preventive medicine. 2016 May 1;86:12-8.","Link","• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2016.01.017"]
[183,"6 Healthy workplace","US_smoking_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary intervention. Participants in the incentive group received $100 for completion of a community-based smoking cessation program, $250 for smoking cessation, confirmed with the use of a cotinine test, within 6 months after study enrolment, and $400 for continued abstinence for an additional 6 months after the initial cessation.","Tobacco","Other (smokers)","USA - Company work sites  - Local",2005,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 18 months","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","• smoking cessation at  9 or 12 months after enrolment \n• smoking cessation at  15 or 18 months after enrolment \n• enrolment in and completion of a smoking-cessation program completion of a smoking-cessation program\n","• The incentive group had significantly higher rates of smoking cessation than did the information-only group 9 or 12 months after Enrolment (14.7% vs. 5.0%, P<0.001) \n• The incentive group had significantly higher rates of smoking cessation than did the information-only group 15 or 18 months after Enrolment (9.4% vs. 3.6%, P<0.001). \n• Incentive-group participants also had significantly higher rates of Enrolment in a smoking-cessation program (15.4% vs. 5.4%, P<0.001), completion of a smoking-cessation program (10.8% vs. 2.5%, P<0.001)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Volpp KG, Troxel AB, Pauly MV, Glick HA, Puig A, Asch DA, Galvin R, Zhu J, Wan F, DeGuzman J, Corbett E. A randomized, controlled trial of financial incentives for smoking cessation. New England Journal of Medicine. 2009 Feb 12;360(7):699-709.","Link","• 10.1056/NEJMsa0806819"]
[184,"6 Healthy workplace","Korea_smokingcesation_incentive(financial)","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","The purpose of this study was to identify the efficacy of the financial incentives given to teams in improving long-term rates of smoking cessation among employees. Each team consisted of smoking participants and non-smoking fellow workers from the same department. All team members were informed that the teams they belonged to would receive financial incentives based on their team efforts at smoking cessation, which is to engage social networks to provide social support and pressure for the quit attempt and abstinence. All smoking participants were given usual smoking cessation counselling and 3-month coverage of varenicline, a selective nicotine receptor partial agonist. In addition, nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) was permitted. Financial incentive of USD45 to the team for each successful participant after the first week and then after one month. USD 90 for each successful participant after 3 and 6 months. ","Tobacco","General population","Korea - St. Paul's Hospital - Local",2011,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 1 year","Not reported ","Not reported","Single Group Assignment RCT","Self-reported and biochemically validated smoking cessation rate at 3, 6, 12 months post-quit date","Self-reported abstinence rates validated by urinary cotinine\ntest at 3, 6, and 12 months were 61%, 54%, and 50%,\nrespectively.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Yeo CD, Lee HY, Ha JH, Kang HH, Kang JY, Kim SK, Kim MS, Moon HS, Lee SH. Efficacy of team-based financial incentives for smoking cessation in the workplace. Yonsei medical journal. 2015 Jan 1;56(1):295-9.","Link","• 10.3349/ymj.2015.56.1.295"]
[185,"6 Healthy workplace/Prevention","US_participationwellnessprogram_discount","Observational study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary Gift cards that could be used to reduce health insurance premiums. Employees received discounts worth $240 for completion of health risk assessments, and $240 for participation in screening programmes. ","Multiple health screens ","General population","USA - Large manufacturing employer in the Midwest - Local",2011,"3 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Statistical analysis of collected data","• Participation in health risk assessments (HRAs) \n• Participation in the biometric screening program  \n• Annual prescription drug fills\n","• Participation in health risk assessments (HRAs) increased by 50 percentage points among members of unions that bargained in the incentive, and increased 22 percentage points among non-union employees.\n• Participation in the biometric screening program increased 55 percentage points when financial incentives were provided. \n• Biometric screenings led to an average increase of 0.31 annual prescription drug fills, with related spending higher by $56 per member per year. The largest increase in medication utilization as a result of biometric screening was for statins, which are widely used to treat high cholesterol. This therapeutic class accounted for one-sixth of the overall increase in prescription drug utilization. Second were antidepressants, followed by ACE inhibitors (for hypertension), and thyroid hormones (for hypothyroidism). Biometric screening also led to significantly higher utilization of biologic response modifiers and immunosuppressants. These specialty medications are used to treat autoimmune diseases, such as rheumatoid \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The added spending associated with the combined increase in fills of 0.02 was $27 per member per year—about one-half of the overall increase in prescription drug spending from those who participated in biometric screenings.","Not reported","NA","Fronstin P, Roebuck MC. Financial incentives, workplace wellness program participation, and utilization of health care services and spending.","Link","• NA"]
[186,"6 Healthy workplace/Prevention","US_Enrolmenthealthriskassessment_lottery","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary programme assessed by RCT: Two arms: 1) $25 incentive for conducting a health risk assessment plus $25 gift voucher for completion of the assessment; 2) $25 incentive for conducting a health risk assessment plus entering a lottery with the chance of winning $100 ","Multiple Health screens (Health risk assessment)","General population","USA - Large health care management and information technology consulting company (14 offices) - Local",2008,"4 months","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","• Health risk assessment completion rate","• The HRA completion rates were 64% in the lottery arm, 44% in the grocery gift certificate arm, and 40% in the comparison condition. Completion rates in the lottery arm were significantly greater than the $50 grocery gift certificate arm and the $25 comparison arm. Completion rates in the grocery gift certificate arm were not significantly higher than in the $25 comparison arm. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Haisley E, Volpp KG, Pellathy T, Loewenstein G. The impact of alternative incentive schemes on completion of health risk assessments. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2012 Jan;26(3):184-8.","Link","• 10.4278/ajhp.100729-ARB-257"]
[187,"6 Healthy workplace","US_diabetescontrol_discount","Programme","Health body (Cleveland Clinic)","Financial incentive","Voluntary health insurance discounts offered to all employees of the Clevenlan Clinic, for achieving set goals: The programs offered to all employees. Beginning in July 2005, the Cleveland Clinic implemented a series of wellness initiatives, initially focused on changing the work environment to promote healthier lifestyles. Starting in 2008, the EHP offered free smoking cessation, weight management, and fitness programs. The EHP also administers disease management programs for diabetes and other cardiovascular risk factors including obesity, hypertension, and hyperlipidaemia. In 2009, a fixed $100 financial incentive was offered for participation in an employer-sponsored disease management program; the incentive increased to $300 in 2010. In 2011, the incentive changed to a 30 % health insurance premium discount ($600-$1200 depending on type of plan) tied to both participation (15 % discount) and achievement of clinical goals (additional 15 % discount). The same incentive continued in 2012. Clinical goals included achievement of set HbA1c, low-density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol, and blood pressure targets. If requested, the HbA1c target could be individualized, but >90 % of employees had a standardized goal of <130. The weight target was individualized. ","Metabolic health (HbA1c, systolic blood pressure, and low-density lipoprotein cholesterol)","Clinical populations (diabetics)","﻿USA - Cleveland Clinic - Local",2009,"4 years","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (Cleveland Clinic Employee Health Plan) ","Not reported","Retrospective cohort analysis","• Health management plan participation\n• diabetes and cardiovascular risk factor control in first year of incentives\n• diabetes and cardiovascular risk factor control in second year of incentives\n","• the implementation of financial incentives to join disease management programs was associated with an increase in program participation. As the initial goal of the financial incentives was to encourage employees with diabetes to join disease management, this program succeeded. \n• offering of incentives coupled with disease management improved diabetes and cardiovascular risk factor control in employees compared to matched non-employees: At the population level, fixed, small financial incentives (2008–09 and 2009–10 cohorts) and the first year in which incentives were tied to treatment targets (2010–11 cohort) were not associated with a significant decreases of HbA1c among employees. \n• In the second year that incentives were tied to treatment targets (2011–12 cohort), HbA1c declined significantly among employees and the comparison group, with no significant difference between the two groups. Weight decreased in employees throughout the study period, with significant changes compared to the non-employees only in the initial cohort. Changes in mean LDL and SBP throughout the study period were similar for the employees and comparison group (difference in change p > 0.05 for all cohorts).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Misra-Hebert AD, Hu B, Taksler G, Zimmerman R, Rothberg MB. Financial incentives and diabetes disease control in employees: a retrospective cohort analysis. Journal of general internal medicine. 2016 Aug 1;31(8):871-7.","Link","• 10.1007/s11606-016-3686-2"]
[188,"7 Prevention services","US_colorectal screening","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary Walmart gift cards of $5 or $10 if participants returned the Faecal Immuno Testing (FIT) kit- also had support for completion of the FIT including mail material, and telephone reminder communications. The policy could target everyone but boosting adherence are especially important for ethnic minorities, non-English speaking, uninsured and those with a low income or low educational level and in particular targeting aged 50-64yrs not up-to-date with colorectal cancer screening. Health was a primary aim (increase screening rates) . ","Health screens (Colorectal cancer)","General adult population","USA - Texas - Tarrant country - Regional",2013,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","Screening uptake","FIT participation was 36.9% with vs. 36.2% without any financial incentive ( P =0.60) and was also not statistically different for the $10 incentive (34.6%, P =0.32 vs. no incentive) or $5 incentive (39.2%, P =0.07 vs. no incentive) groups, so no clinically significant eff ect on the proportion of people completing FIT screening. Results were consistent across subgroups, and the sample size of the study makes it unlikely that a larger study would produce different results. No downstream effects such as decreased time to return of FIT kits or decreased need for phone calls to promote screening completion was observed in the incentive vs. no incentive groups. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Adler, Jeffrey, and Jason A. Dominitz. \"Financial Incentives to Improve Colorectal Cancer Screening: Does it Make Cents?.\" The American journal of gastroenterology 111.11 (2016): 1637.     \n• Gupta S, Miller S, Koch M, Berry E, Anderson P, Pruitt SL, Borton E, Hughes AE, Carter E, Hernandez S, Pozos H. Financial incentives for promoting colorectal cancer screening: a randomized, comparative effectiveness trial. The American journal of gastroenterology. 2016 Nov;111(11):1630.\n","Link","• 10.1038/ajg.2016.286"]
[189,"7 Prevention services","‘Stamp Out Chlamydia’ program (SOC)","Programme","Government","Financial incentive","Voluntary incentive: AUD10 cash reward  given in exchange for a urine sample. Health was a primary aim (Chlamydia screening) ","Health screens (Chlamydia)","General population (16-30yr olds)","Australia - Australia Capital Territory- Local",2007,"3 years","Implementation costs: The direct costs in Phase 2 (4 days on 1 university campus) were substantially less than those incurred during Phase 1 (promotion and self-administered urine test): $13,132 compared with $111,720. The cost per case identified was $3,283 in Phase 2 compared with $7,448 in Phase 1","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","• Chlamydia screening yield (proportion of people providing a sample\n• Chlamydia test positivity rate\n","• Overall screening yield was 43.8% (1318/3011; range 20 to 77%).  If the number of chlamydia screens performed is the principal outcome measure of a program, then the cash incentive model appears to be efficient with nearly 24 individuals screened per hour i.e. one every 2.5 minutes that the screening activities were running. In comparison, Canberra’s two sexual health clinics conducted 6,950 chlamydia tests in 2009, approximately 140 tests per week or 4 tests per hour of service. \n• Overall positivity rate of 1.7% (95% CI: 1.1–2.5) with a range among the 18 events of 1.5% to 5.6%. If case finding effectiveness is the measure of efficiency the SOC2 program overall was less efficient (0.4 cases per hour) than the non-clinical sites in California described by Morris et al. where the number of chlamydia cases per paid person-hour ranged from 2.0 (95% CI 1.0–4.2) in schools to 3.2 (95% CI 1.6–6.6) in parenting centres [8]. Case yields from population screening are usually lower than from clinic based services. \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Bowden FJ, Currie MJ, Todkill M, Schmidt M, Webeck S, Del Rosario R, Bavinton T, Tyson A. A pragmatic assessment of the relative efficiency of outreach chlamydia screening events conducted in non-clinical settings. BMC public health. 2012 Dec;12(1):341.\n• Currie MJ, Schmidt M, Davis BK, Baynes AM, O’Keefe EJ, Bavinton TP, McNiven M, Martin SJ, Bowden FJ. ‘Show me the money’: financial incentives increase chlamydia screening rates among tertiary students: a pilot study. Sexual health. 2010 Mar 9;7(1):60-5.\n","• https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2458-12-341\n• https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Belinda_Davis3/publication/248882418_%27Stamp_out_Chlamydia%27_project_-_Bringing_Chlamydia_screening_to_tertiary_students_in_the_Australian_capital_territory/links/581ab7a608ae30a2c01cb8db/Stamp-out-Chlamydia-project-Bringing-Chlamydia-screening-to-tertiary-students-in-the-Australian-capital-territory.pdf\n","• 10.1186/1471-2458-12-341\n• 10.1071/SH08091"]
[190,"7 Prevention services","Canada prenatal subsidy","Policy","Government","Financial incentive","Prenatal care is free, but the programme provides prenatal income support up to CAD 81.41 monthly to low-income women in the second and third trimesters, without any conditions or restrictions on spending. Health was a primary aim (improving maternal and child outcomes).","Prenatal care","Pregnant women - Socio-economic groups (low-income population)","Canada - Manitoba - Regional",2001,"2 years","Not reported","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","Birth and early life outcomes","Compared to non HBPB recipients: increase in breastfeeding initiation (RR 1.03 (1.03 to 1.09); reduction in low birth weight births ( RR 0.71 ( 0.63 to 0.81);  reduction in preterm birth (RR 0.76 (0.69 to 0.84)); reduction in small for gestational age births (RR  0.90 ( 0.81 to 0.99); increase in large for gestational age births ( RR 1.13 ( 1.05 to 1.23); increase in 1 year immunisation rate ( RR 1.13 (1.10 to 1.16) and 2-year rates ( RR 1.20 (1.15 to 1.25))","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The UK provides free at point of service prenatal care.","NA","• Brownell MD, Chartier MJ, Nickel NC, Chateau D, Martens PJ, Sarkar J, Burland E, Jutte DP, Taylor C, Santos RG, Katz A. Unconditional prenatal income supplement and birth outcomes. Pediatrics. 2016 Jun 1;137(6):e20152992. \n• Brownell MD. Impact of the Healthy Baby Prenatal Benefit on Perinatal Outcomes : A PATHS Equity for Children Project. 2015. Available from: https://www.cahspr.ca/en/presentation/55745db937dee82b15501956.","• http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/137/6/e20152992\n• https://www.cahspr.ca/en/presentation/55745db937dee82b15501956.\n","\n• NA\n• NA"]
[191,"7 Prevention services","NHS Health Checks","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary scheme which provides incentives for health checks is tested through RCT:  Types of incentives – 3 arms :  \n• Standard (no financial incentive)\n• Question–behaviour effect (QBE) where participants are sent a questionnaire as well as reminder about appointment. Prepaid envelope to return questionnaire.\n• Incentive:  Participants are sent the QBE questionnaire and a £5 retail voucher as an incentive to return questionnaire  as well as prepaid envelope. \n Health was a primary aim (to increase CVD screening) \n","Multiple health screens (CVD, kidney disease, type 2 diabetes,  stroke)","General population (40 - 74 years with no existing CVD-related comorbidities)","UK - England -16th and 14th most deprived  boroughs - Local","2013-14","6 months","Implementation costs: The Department of Health’s economic model provided evidence to show that the costs of the NHS Health Check programme would be between £180 Million and £243 Million per year (2008 costs) ","Trial phase still","RCT","completion of the health check within 6 months of invitation"," The offer of a £5 incentive did not increase the rate of return of the QBE questionnaire: difference in uptake associated with the offer of an incentive to return the QBE questionnaire was –0.01% (95% CI –1.59% to 1.58%; p = 0.995):","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported ","Not reported","Not reported ","NA","• Forster AS, Burgess C, McDermott L, Wright AJ, Dodhia H, Conner M, Miller J, Rudisill C, Cornelius V, Gulliford MC. Enhanced invitation methods to increase uptake of NHS health checks: study protocol for a randomized controlled trial. Trials. 2014 Dec;15(1):342.\n• McDermott L, Wright AJ, Cornelius V, Burgess C, Forster AS, Ashworth M, Koshaba B, Clery P, Fuller F, Miller J, Dodhia H. Enhanced invitation methods and uptake of health checks in primary care. Rapid randomised controlled trial using electronic health records. Health Technology Assessment. 2016 Nov 1;20(84):385.\n","• https://trialsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1745-6215-15-342\n• http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67916/7/Rudisill_Enhanced%20invitation%20published_2017.pdf\n","• 10.1186/1745-6215-15-342\n• 10.3310/hta20840"]
[192,"7 Prevention services","Incentives in Diabetic Eye assessment by Screening Programme IDEAS)","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary scheme which provides incentives for diabetic eye checks: the control group gets standard care, the fixed incentive group gets a voucher offering a financial incentive of £10 after screening is completed and the probabilistic incentive group gets a voucher offering entry into a prize draw for a 1 in 100 chance of winning £1000 following attendance at screening.  Health was a primary aim (to increase rates of diabetes eye screening) ","Health screens (Diabetic Eye)","General population (+16 years olds)","UK - England - London - Local",2015,"1 month","Implementation costs: £10,000","Not reported ","RCT","Attendance to diabetic eye screening ","Those receiving incentives were not more likely to attend a DES than those receiving a usual invitation letter in patients who are regular non-attenders. Both fixed and lottery incentives appeared to reduce attendance: Participants offered incentives were 44% less likely to attend screening than controls (RR 0.56, 95% CI 0.34 to 0.92). Lottery group were 58% less likely to attend screening than controls (RR 0.42, 95% CI 0.18 to 0.98); Fixed incentive were 30% less likely to attend than control groups (RR 0.70, 95%CI 0.35 to 1.39) or between fixed and lottery incentive groups (RR 1.66, 95%CI 0.65 to 4.21).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported ","Not reported","Not reported ","NA","• Judah G, Vlaev I, Gunn L, King D, King D, Valabhji J, Darzi A, Bicknell C. Incentives in Diabetic Eye Assessment by Screening (IDEAS): study protocol of a three-arm randomized controlled trial using financial incentives to increase screening uptake in London. BMC ophthalmology. 2016 Dec;16(1):28.\n• Judah G, Darzi A, Vlaev I, Gunn L, King D, King D, Valabhji J, Bishop L, Brown A, Duncan G, Fogg A. Incentives in Diabetic Eye Assessment by Screening (IDEAS) trial: a three-armed randomised controlled trial of financial incentives.\n","• https://bmcophthalmol.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12886-016-0206-4\n• https://spiral.imperial.ac.uk/bitstream/10044/1/51549/2/3010300.pdf\n","• 10.1186/s12886-016-0206-4\n• 10.3310/hsdr05150"]
[193,"7 Prevention services","No Jab, No Play_Aus_immunisation policy","Policy","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory  programme. Unless children or young people are up to date with their early childhood immunisations the families will not qualify for the child care benefit, child care rebate and family tax benefit part A. Family Tax Benefit Part A (FTB-A) is a two-part payment supporting disadvantaged families with dependent children or secondary students younger than 20 years of age, consisting of an adjusted base rate and a supplement of up to $726.35 per child at the end of the financial year. The maximum adjusted taxable income limits for FTB-A are over $100 000, and it is likely most refugee background families will be eligible for this payment. The Child Care Benefit supports costs of registered/approved childcare and outside-school-hour care, with current rates of $4.17 per hour or $208.50 per week (85% for school-aged children), which is income-tested and adjusted for family size, service type and hours attended. The Child Care Rebate (non-income-tested) covers 50% of out-of-pocket expenses for childcare to an annual limit for each child, in addition to other childcare assistance. Health was a primary aim (increase immunisation %) ","Immunisation (Childhood diseases)","General population (children and young people < 20yrs and their families)","Australia - National",2016,"NA","Passed through legislation ( Social Services Legislation Amendment (No Jab, No Pay) Act 2015)","Each state has slightly different rules ","Multiple sources, reports and government publications","Vaccination uptake","• More than 210,000 families have taken action to ensure that they now meet the immunisation requirements. \n• As a result of the Government’s No Jab No Pay policy, national immunisation rates have increased across all three target groups of one, two and five year olds. \n• This means children and the wider community are being protected from preventable diseases like whooping cough.\n• From December 2015 to March 2017, the immunisation rate for one year olds increased 1.35 percentage points to 93.63 per cent; the coverage rate for two year olds rose 1.75 percentage points to 90.06 per cent; and, the rate for five year olds increased 0.73 percentage points to 93.32 per cent. \n• Indigenous immunisation rates have also increased across all relevant age cohorts.\n• the scheme had failed to sway some parents who were unsure about the vaccination process\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Government budget papers reported that the new measures would save $508.3 million over five years.","Australian immunisation rates are actually quite high compared with other developed countries, and have topped 90% since at least the early 2000s.","No?","• National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance. No Jab No Play, No Jab No Pay Policies 2017. Available from: http://www.ncirs.edu.au/consumer-resources/no-jab-no-play-no-jab-no-pay-policies/.\n• Beard FH, Leask J, McIntyre PB. No jab, no pay and vaccine refusal in Australia: the jury is out. Med J Aust. 2017 May 15;206(9):381-.\n• Paxton GA, Tyrrell L, Oldfield SB, Kiang K, Danchin MH. No Jab, No Pay—no planning for migrant children. Med J Aust. 2016 Oct 3;205(7):296-8.\n• Fielding JE, Bolam B, Danchin MH. Immunisation coverage and socioeconomic status–questioning inequity in the ‘No Jab, No Pay’policy. Australian and New Zealand journal of public health. 2017 Oct;41(5):455-7.\n• ABC News. 'Don't punish children for decisions of parents': Researcher urges rethink of no jab no play policy. 2018. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-07/nsw-urged-to-rethink-no-jab-no-play-vaccination-policy/9839992\n• JOINT MEDIA RELEASE, Further Strengthening No Jab, No Pay [press release]. Monday, 1st May 2017.\n","• http://www.ncirs.edu.au/consumer-resources/no-jab-no-play-no-jab-no-pay-policies/.\n• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/206_09/10.5694mja16.00944.pdf\n• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/205_07/10.5694mja16.00351.pdf\n• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1753-6405.12676\n• http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-07/nsw-urged-to-rethink-no-jab-no-play-vaccination-policy/9839992\n•  http://www.health.gov.au/internet/ministers/publishing.nsf/Content/DBB1F1F64C6FF607CA25811300090154/$File/GH041.pdf\n","• NA\n• 10.5694/mja16.00944\n• 10.5694/mja16.00351\n• 10.1111/1753-6405.12676\n• NA\n• NA"]
[194,"7 Prevention services","UW Health Gas Card Pilot Program","Programme","Health body (UW health in Madison, Wisconsin)","Financial incentive","Voluntary scheme where a gift card worth $6 at a local gas station (a gas card) is given to  participants who received diabetic tests. Health was a primary aim (increased uptake of  diabetes tests for diabetics) ","Health screens (Diabetes)","Clinical populations (diabetics)","USA - Wisconsin - Regional",2005,"2 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","• Diabetes (HBA1C) screening uptake\n• Cholesterol (LDL-C) screening uptake\n• HbA1c Levels","• Over 2 years the target patient population received about two-thirds more screenings than the matched comparison group, and a smaller proportion. The improvement appears to persist for a relatively long time period, given the nature of the initiative.\n• Limited effect during the pilot period itself, with each targeted patient receiving 0.21 more LDL-C screenings on average during the pilot 3 months, but  following 2 years, the targeted patients were less likely than the comparison patients to receive an LDL-C screening.HbA1c Levels\n• Pilot program had some success in increasing the proportion of participants with levels of HbA1c levels that are “under control” (49% in the intervention groups, 36% in the control group), but lack of recorded HbA1c levels for many patients limits the analysis of this outcome","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Austin S, Wolfe BL. The effect of patient reminders and gas station gift cards on patient adherence to testing guidelines for diabetes. WMJ. 2011 Jun;110(3):132-7.","Link","• NA"]
[195,"7 Prevention services","Cash transfer program Oportunidades as part of the PROGRESA scheme","Policy","Government","Financial incentive","Cash transfer programme where cash transfer amount is linked to household demographic structure, but equals approximately 20% of the family’s pre-program monthly expenditures .Health was a primary aim (lifetime experience of a pregnancy and current use of a modern contraceptive method) ","Prenatal care","Women aged 15-54 years","Mexico - National",1992,"NA","• Implementation costs: Mexico invests 100 million pesos per year (about $US 8 million)in the program \n• Policy overlaps with other fiscal policy (wide ranging policy which provides cash to improve health of low-income households- much has been written about the improved educational attainment.  \n• Passed through legislation\n","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","•  lifetime experience of a pregnancy\n• current use of a modern contraceptive method\n","• smaller proportions of adolescent and young adult women exposed to Oportunidades had experienced a pregnancy (12% vs. 21%, and 51% vs. 58%); exposure to Oportunidades was not independently associated with pregnancy experience after education and other variables were controlled for\n• smaller proportions of adolescent and young adult women exposed to Oportunidades reported current use of a modern contraceptive method (4% vs. 8%, and 20% vs. 27%).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","A greater proportion of adolescents exposed to the program reported currently being in school versus those not exposed (47% vs. 43%).  ","Not reported","Not reported","?","Darney BG, Weaver MR, Sosa-Rubi SG, Walker D, Servan-Mori E, Prager S, et al. The oportunidades conditional cash transfer program: effects on pregnancy and contraceptive use among young rural women in Mexico. International perspectives on sexual and reproductive health. 2013;39(4):205.","Link","• 10.1363/3920513"]
[196,"7 Prevention services","Chlaymdia testing England","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary Types of incentives – was 5 different arms – \n• Voucher\no £5 Tesco voucher (1 arm received voucher after test returned other received it with the test)\no £10 Tesco voucher (1 arm received voucher after test returned other received it with the test)\n• Lottery\no Entered into a lottery with a 90% chance of £0 payoff and a 10% chance of a £50 Tesco voucher\n• Choice\no Given choice of receiving a £5 Tesco voucher or being entered into the lottery (described above)\no Given choice of receiving a £10 Tesco voucher or being entered into a lottery with a 90% chance of £0 payoff and a 10% chance of a £100 Tesco voucher\n• Charity\no Receive £5 donation on their behalf to Children in Need.\n Health was a primary aim (STI (Chlamydia) screening Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year)","Health screens (Chlamydia)","General population (16-24 yr olds)","UK - England - National",2011,"2 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Chlamydia screening test return","• The overall return rate was 71.0%. There were  only very minor differences in return rates across incentive structures and none are statistically significantly different from the control or each other. The group receiving the £5 voucher regardless of their behaviour and those receiving the £5 voucher on sample return had the highest rates of return (73.2%) while those receiving an endowment of a £10 voucher had the lowest (67.9%).","No differential effect of any of the incentives across deprivation level","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No?","Dolan P, Rudisill C. The effect of financial incentives on Chlamydia testing rates: evidence from a randomized experiment. Social Science & Medicine. 2014 Mar 1;105:140-8.","Link","• 10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.11.018"]
[197,"7 Prevention services","Chlaymdia testing Cairns Australia","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Testing incentives to improve uptake of chlamydia screening coupled with SMS reminders: Control:  A clinic mobile telephone was set up with the SMS reminder templates ‘3 mths r up, drop in 4 a check-up or call for an appointment’. Intervention received message saying ‘3 mths r up, drop in 4 a check-up or call for an appt & get $10’. SMS reminders were manually sent on Mondays, or Tuesdays if Monday was a public holiday, for all participants due for a reminder in the coming week. Delivery reports were received. The messaging system would intermittently attempt to deliver an SMS reminder for up to 7 days before it was reported as undelivered. Health was a primary aim (increase of chlamydia screening) ","Health screens (Chlamydia)","General population (+16 years olds)","Australia - Cairns - Local",2010,"1 year","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","Chlamydia re-testing rates","SMS reminders with and without an incentive payment significantly increased chlamydia re-testing rates to 26.7% and 28.1%, respectively","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Downing SG, Cashman C, McNamee H, Penney D, Russell DB, Hellard ME. Increasing chlamydia test of re-infection rates using SMS reminders and incentives. Sex Transm Infect. 2013 Feb 1;89(1):16-9.","Link","• 10.1136/sextrans-2011-050454"]
[198,"7 Prevention services","Aus__CVDtest_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Testing incentives for attendance to CVD risk assessment. Intervention group received $25 shopping voucher for attending no cost cardiovascular risk assessment with GP within 6 months of the invitation date + information brochure. The control group received an invitation letter to attend cardiovascular risk assessment without financial incentive + information brochure.","Health screens (cardiovascular disease)","Elderly (patients aged 40–74, without diagnosed cardiovascular disease (n= 301) from two Adelaide urban general practices Sex: M (41%) Older adults (+60) in the sample: 57%)","Australia - National","2012*","6 months","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","• Screening attendance","• No significant results on the effectiveness of financial incentives:\n• Monetary incentive did not lead to a statistically significant increase in screening attendance.\n• Attendance in both groups (with and without financial incentive) was low.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic review: Tambor M, Pavlova M, Golinowska S, Arsenijevic J, Groot W. Financial incentives for a healthy life style and disease prevention among older people: a systematic literature review. BMC health services research. 2016 Aug;16(5):426., individual article: Stocks N, Allan J, Frank O, Williams S, Ryan P. Improving attendance for cardiovascular risk assessment in Australian general practice: an RCT of a monetary incentive for patients. BMC Fam Pract. 2012;13(1):54  obtained from the ","Link","• 10.1186/s12913-016-1517-0"]
[199,"7 Prevention services","USA_SmokingCessation_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT of a fixed schedule cash in incentive (Total value of incentive payments 2011 $US): $786, targeting attendance and participation of  sessions and cessation as an outcome delivered in the community and workplace.\nControl group: Usual care .","Tobacco (smoking cessation)","General adult population","USA - National","2009*","Multiple follow-ups: maximum 18 months","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","• Smoking cessation","• Smoking cessation significantly higher in intervention vs. control group: Cessation at 3 or 6 months was 20.9% in the intervention group, vs. 11.8% in the control group (p<0.001); at 9 or 12 months 14.7% in the intervention group vs. 5% in the control group (p<0.001); at 15 or 18 months 9.4% in the intervention group vs. 3.6% in the control group (p<0.001).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic review:  Giles EL, Robalino S, McColl E, Sniehotta FF, Adams J. The effectiveness of financial incentives for health behaviour change: systematic review and meta-analysis. PloS one. 2014 Mar 11;9(3):e90347., individual article: Volpp KG, Troxel AB, Pauly MV, Glick HA, Puig A, et al. (2009) A randomized controlled trial of financial incentives for smoking cessation. The New England Journal of Medicine 360: 699–709 ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0090347"]
[200,"7 Prevention services","USA_ImmunisationHepB_Incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT of cash & specific goods/services lottery; Total value of incentive payments 2011 $US: $273 (certain component), at least $16,800 (chance component),  all instances incentivised on attendance). Delivery setting: community –  clinical - outpatient .  Control arm: Usual care ","Immunisation (Hepatitis B)","General adult population ","USA - National","2010*","5.5 months","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","• Attendance for Hep B immunization","• Attendance for all injections was significantly higher in intervention vs. control group (p=0.107).\n• Attendance for all injections in incentive group 77% vs. control 46%.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From systematic review:  Giles EL, Robalino S, McColl E, Sniehotta FF, Adams J. The effectiveness of financial incentives for health behaviour change: systematic review and meta-analysis. PloS one. 2014 Mar 11;9(3):e90347., individual articles Stitzer M, Polk T, Bowles S, T.. Kosten (2010) Drug user’s adherence to a 6-month vaccination protocol: effects of motivational incentives. Drug Alcohol Depend 107: 76–79 obtained from the systematic review: ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0090347"]
[201,"7 Prevention services","USA_Diabetesmanagement_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT of impact of receiving $100 if decreasing HbA1c level by 1% and $200 is decreasing it by 2% or to an HbA1c level of 6.5%. Nonfinancial incentive: peer mentoring Control group: usual care, no mentoring and no incentives.","Diabetes control (Reduction of haemoglobin A1C (HbA1C) levels after 6 months)\n","Elderly (African-American Veterans at the Philadelphia Medical Center with poor diabetes control (n= 118) Age range: 50-70y (mean age: 59-60y) Sex: M (90-100%))","USA - National","2009-2010","6 months","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","Glucose control","• NO significant results on the effectiveness of financial incentives:\n• The decrease HbA1c levels in a group with financial incentives was not statistically significant.\n• Peer mentors had a statistically significant effect on improvement of glucose control.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From the Systematic review: Tambor M, Pavlova M, Golinowska S, Arsenijevic J, Groot W. Financial incentives for a healthy life style and disease prevention among older people: a systematic literature review. BMC health services research. 2016 Aug;16(5):426, individual articles: Long JA, Jahnle EC, Richardson DM, Loewenstein G, Volpp KG. Peer mentoring and financial incentives to improve glucose control in African American veterans: a randomized trial. Ann Intern Med. 2012;156(6):416–24.  ","Link","• 10.1186/s12913-016-1517-0"]
[202,"7 Prevention services","Faecal Occult blood test","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT testing the impact of financial incentive on uptake of faecal occult blood testing: In the 1st stage individuals were assigned to the control group and received  usual care or to the intervention group that received an incentive of $5, $10, $15 for completing their FOBT within 30days\nIn the second stage of testing incentives, control group individuals were assigned to usual care or receipt of incentives of $5, a1in10 chance of $50, or entry into a $500 raffle for completing their FOBT within 30 days.\n Health was a primary aim (colorectal screening) \n","Health screens (Colorectal cancer)","Other (veterans)","USA - Philadelphia - Local",2012,"1 month","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","FOBT completion within 30 days","• 1st stage : none of the fixed payments led to a statistically significant increase in rates of 30-day FOBT completion compared with usual care\n• 2nd stage: a 1 in 10 chance of $50 increased 30-day FOBT completion compared with usual care (between- group difference, 19.6% [95% CI, 10.7% to 28.6%]; P < 0.001). However, a $5 fixed payment and raffle for $500 did not lead to statistically significant increases in rates of 30-day FOBT completion.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kullgren, Jeffrey T., et al. \"Financial incentives for completion of fecal occult blood tests among veterans: a 2-stage, pragmatic, cluster, randomized, controlled trial.\" Annals of internal medicine 161.10_Supplement (2014): S35-S43.","Link","• 10.7326/M13-3015"]
[203,"7 Prevention services","USA_FluImmunisation_Incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT: One-off incentive of vouchers for restricted range of goods/services; the total value of incentive payments was $US: $5.16, and was targeted at attendance for influenza vaccination and paid on attendance. This programme was delivered in the community and workplace. Control arm: Usual care (influenza advertising) ","Immunisation (Influenza)","General adult population ","USA - National","2010*","1 year","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","• Immunisation rates","• Average change in vaccination rate from previous to current year significant in intervention group (p<0.005).\n• Attendance for vaccination: 11.1% in intervention group, 4.7% in control group.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Nowalk MP, Lin CJ, Toback SL, Rousculp MD, Eby C, Raymund M, Zimmerman RK. Improving influenza vaccination rates in the workplace: a randomized trial. American journal of preventive medicine. 2010 Mar 1;38(3):237-46.","Link","•  10.1016/j.amepre.2009.11.011"]
[204,"8 Tobacco - hypothecation - levy","French tobacco industry levy","Policy","Government","Other (Hypothecation of tobacco industry levy)","Mandatory tax of 5.6% on suppliers (fournisseurs) of tobacco. By taxing suppliers, the government casts a wide net that catches the largest supplier of tobacco in France – Logista. Brands distributed by Logista account for 98% of tobacco product sales revenue in France. The government anticipates that Logista will pass this new charge on to the big tobacco companies whose products they distribute. A key feature of this new tax is that all the money will be devoted to government anti-tobacco initiatives. The government agency normally responsible for tobacco control in France is the Health Department. However, because the new tax measure was included in the law that governs universal health insurance, the new tobacco control funds will be administered by a national health insurance agency, known by its French acronym CNAMTS (Caisse nationale de l’assurance maladie des travailleurs salariés / the French national health insurance fund for salaried workers). CNAMTS is used to administering health insurance claims, but has little experience in tobacco control. Tobacco industry estimates that this new tax will increase a 20 pack of cigarettes by 15 centimes to 6,50 euros; and will increase the price of a 30g pack of rolling tobacco by 15 centime sto 7,40 euros; and increase a pack of 20 cigarillos by 35 centines to 7 euros.  Health as an indirect aim (funding national security - NHS equivalent) ","Tobacco","General population","France - National",2017,"Not applicable","• Policy overlaps with non-fiscal policies,  including cigarette plain packaging is fully in force as of 1 January 2017). \n• Passed through legislation\n","Not reported ","Estimation of future impact","No impacts but included in framework for future reference - to add impact when available",null,"Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Government estimate a yield of 130 million Euros per year will be coming indirectly from the revenues of Big Tobacco that will be earned in France.  Earmarking of this revenue will increase France’s current government spending on anti-tobacco work (currently about 30 million Euros) more than four times over.  ","Government, notably the minister of \" solidarities and health\" and minister of \"action and public accounts\" Tobacco industry; political parties both on left and right side of political spectrum. Main arguments advanced are the impact of this hypothecation will be an increase in prices, which will increase both the illegal black market and legal  cross-border purchasing across France's many borders with countries where the price is up to 40-50% lower. Also the impact that increased prices from this industry tax will have on tobacconists in France - often the main social focal point of rural communities. Amendments suggested were that the tax be imposed on tobacco manufacturers, and not distributors (Logistica, representing 99% of tobacco distribution in France). However, this will not be possible when producers are outside of France, as the near totality of them are. ","No?","• Physicians for a smoke free Canada - http://smoke-free-canada.blogspot.com/2017/02/france-leads-way-with-four-and-counting.html\n• Article 28 LOI n° 2016-1827 du 23 décembre 2016 de financement de la sécurité sociale pour 2017 (1) (2017).https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2016/12/23/ECFX1623944L/jo#JORFARTI000033680746 \n• Décret no 2016-1671 du 5 décembre 2016 portant création d’un fonds de lutte contre le tabac (2016).\n• Marita Hefler. France: breaking new ground in tobacco control 2017. Available from: https://blogs.bmj.com/tc/2017/03/02/france-breaking-new-ground-in-tobacco-control/.\n• French Government. Projet de loi de financement de la sécurité sociale pour 2018. Article 12. 2017. Available from: https://www.nosdeputes.fr/15/seance/588#table_686.\n• Le Monde du Tabac. Nouvelles taxes sur le tabac : des motifs bien alambiqués 2016. Available from: http://www.lemondedutabac.com/nouvelles-taxes-sur-le-tabac-des-motifs-bien-alambiques/. (Tobacco industry website)\n• Ministère des affaires sociales et de la santé. Fonds de lutte contre le tabac 2018. Available from: http://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/prevention-en-sante/addictions/article/fonds-de-lutte-contre-le-tabac.","•http://smoke-free-canada.blogspot.com/2017/02/france-leads-way-with-four-and-counting.html\n• https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2016/12/23/ECFX1623944L/jo#JORFARTI000033680746 \n• https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000033540845&dateTexte=20180719\n• https://blogs.bmj.com/tc/2017/03/02/france-breaking-new-ground-in-tobacco-control/\n• https://www.nosdeputes.fr/15/seance/588#table_686\n• http://www.lemondedutabac.com/nouvelles-taxes-sur-le-tabac-des-motifs-bien-alambiques/\n• http://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/prevention-en-sante/addictions/article/fonds-de-lutte-contre-le-tabac.\n","• NA\n• NA\n• NA\n• NA\n• NA\n• NA\n• NA"]
[205,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Burlington pregnancy vouchers 2001","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary • Experimental Group (40 women): Contingent vouchers: awarded for proven abstinence during first 5 days. From 2nd week vouchers given for urine cotinine ≤ 80 ng/ml. Vouchers entirely contingent on biochemical specimens, not on self report. Values started at USD 6.25, increasing by USD 1.25 per consecutive negative sample, to a maximum of USD 45, where they stayed until a missed visit or a positive test. If reset required, value went back to start point, but two valid tests restored to previous level \n• Control Group (37 women): Vouchers delivered independent of smoking status, at USD 15 per visit antepartum and USD 20 per visit postpartum. This would average the mean payments earned in the other group Voucher-Based Reinforcement Therapy (VBRT) applied until 12 wks post-partum. \n• Abstinence monitoring for first 5 for all pts, then twice weekly for next 7 weeks, then once a week for 4 weeks, then every other until delivery. In post-partum period, monitoring increased to every Wednesday for first 4 weeks, then bi-weekly for next 8 weeks to week 12. Final 24-week post-partum testing. All pts received standard care from their clinic, over and above trial conditions. Also a pamphlet from study staff at baseline, plus another for those not smoking at end of pregnancy. NRT was discouraged for all pts, as it might contaminate testing \n","Tobacco","Pregnant women","USA - Vermont - Burlington - Local",2001,"5.5 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Abstinence at end of pregnancy, 12 and 24 weeks post-partum.\n• Biochemical confirmation by urine cotinine < 80 ng/ml, apart from CO ≤ 6 ppm for first week \n","Odds Ratio of smoking cessation at 24 weeks post-partum ( 3.44 ( 0.34; 34.73)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Heil SH, Higgins ST, Bernstein IM, Solomon LJ, Rogers RE, Thomas CS, et al. Effects of voucher-based incentives on abstinence from cigarette smoking and fetal growth among pregnant women. Addiction 2008;103(6):1009–18. [ClinicalTrialsID: NCT00497068] \n•   FROM SRME Cahill K, Hartmann-Boyce J, Perera R. Incentives for smoking cessation. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2015(5):CD004307., individual article: Higgins ST, Bernstein IM, Washio Y, Heil SH, Badger GJ, Skelly JM, et al. Effects of smoking cessation with voucher based contingency management on birth outcomes. Addiction 2010;105(11):2023–30. \n","• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2731575/pdf/nihms96837.pdf\n• https://europepmc.org/abstract/med/25983287\n","• 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2008.02237.x\n• 10.1002/14651858.CD004307.pub5 "]
[206,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Detroit pregnancy incentives","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary • Experimental Group: 1.CD-5As: PC tablet,with interactive software; pts accessed with headphones, for privacy. Content was 5As programme (Ask, Advise, Assess, Assist, Arrange), or 5Rs (Relevance, Risks, Rewards, Roadblocks, Repetition) for those unwilling to set a quit date. Included a 4 - 6 minute professional video of black male obstetrician + 3 testimonials , tailored to pt’s reactivity, defensiveness, quit status. All gave positive advice to quit. Programme led pt through advice, feedback, plan development, support options Pts at baseline completed 5-itemadditional assessment of likelihood of quitting, intention to quit, confidence in ability to quit, readiness to quit, desire to quit 2. \n• Experimental Group: 2. CM-Lite: designed for non-treatment-seeking pts in a healthcare setting. No proactive tracking, but relying on pt to request verification of smoking status. Testing offered only at antenatal visits, rather than multiple times per day. Pts eligible for unlimited incentivisation attempts, but only five reinforcement vouchers available (retail gift cards worth USD 50).  \n• Experimental Group: 3. Combination of CD-5As and CM-Lite. \n• Control (TAU): Standard care from prenatal clinic staff, without any input from research team. Pts used PC tablets to complete a brief series of questions about their musical preferences, watched a series of tailored music videos, and answered questions about the videos, i.e. computer time was blinded, and comparable with intervention groups All pts completed baseline 11-item assessment of ease of use, enjoyment, helpfulness, satisfaction  \n• Programme was delivered by a website, which took pts through verification process and recorded result (urinary cotinine test) \n","Tobacco","Pregnant women","USA - Detroit - Local",2008,"2 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• 7-day PPA, 30-day CA, validated by CO < 4 ppm, urinary cotinine (Nicalert strips) <100 ug/ml","Odds Ratio of smoking cessation at 10 weeks post-partum (3.76 (0.43; 32.70)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Ondersma SJ, Svikis DS, Lam PK, Connors-Burge VS, Ledgerwood DM, Hopper JA. A randomized trial of computer-delivered brief intervention and low-intensity contingency management for smoking during pregnancy. Nicotine & Tobacco Research 2012;14(3):351–60. \n• FROM SRME Cahill K, Hartmann-Boyce J, Perera R. Incentives for smoking cessation. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2015(5):CD004307. individual article: Ondersma SJ, Chase SK, Svikis DS, Schuster CR.Computer-based motivational intervention for perinatal drug use. Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 2005;28(4):305–12. \n","• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3281243/\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25983287\n","• 10.1093/ntr/ntr221\n• 10.1002/14651858.CD004307.pub5"]
[207,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Cessation in Pregnancy Incentives Trial (CPIT) Team","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT:  Randomly allocated eligible women to either receive the offer of up to £400 of shopping vouchers (if they engaged with services and subsequently quit) added to routine specialist pregnancy stop smoking services or routine care alone. Health was a primary aim (RCT to assess the efficacy of a financial incentive added to routine specialist pregnancy stop smoking services versus routine care to help pregnant smokers quit) ","Tobacco","Pregnant women (low socio-economic communities)","UK - Scotland - Glasgow - Regional",2011,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Pregnancy outcomes\n• QALYS\n• Smoking cessation\n","• No between group differences were seen for birth weight, still birth, miscarriage, or premature birth. With regard to postnatal relapse, of 26 cotinine validated quitters in the control group, three could not be contacted and 11 self reported as relapsed (42% of cotinine validated quitters). \n• a gain of 0.04 QALYs (95% CI: -0.058, 0.145)\n• Significantly more smokers offered incentives stopped smoking (22.5%) than controls (8.6%): RR of not smoking at the end of pregnancy was 2.63 (95% CI 1.73 to 4.01); the absolute risk difference was 14.0% (95% CI  8.2% to 19.7%); Women who were validated as abstinent by cotinine measurement towards the end of pregnancy were followed up by telephone postnatally at least 12 months after their original quit date; self report data collected at this point continued to show a large difference (15% v 4%) in abstinence rates between the incentives and control groups.; No between group differences were seen for engagement with stop smoking services,\n","Not reported","Cost-utility and lifetime Markov Modelling","• The short term incremental cost per quitter at 34-38 weeks’ gestation was £1127, and longer term cost per quality adjusted life year gained was £482\n• The lifetime model resulted in an incremental cost of £17 (95% CI: -£93, £107) and a gain of 0.04 QALYs (95% CI: -0.058, 0.145), giving an ICER of £482/QALY ($734/QALY). Probabilistic sensitivity analysis indicates uncertainty in these results, particularly regarding relapse after birth. The expected value of perfect information was £30 million (at a willingness to pay of £30,000/QALY), so given current uncertainty, additional research is potentially worthwhile.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Tappin DM, Bauld L, Tannahill C, de Caestecker L, Radley A, McConnachie A, et al. The cessation in pregnancy incentives trial (CPIT): study protocol for a randomized controlled trial. Trials. 2012;13:113. \n• Tappin D, Bauld L, Purves D, Boyd K, Sinclair L, MacAskill S, et al. Financial incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy: randomised controlled trial. BMJ. 2015;350:h134. \n• Tappin D, Bauld L, Purves D, Boyd K, Sinclair L, MacAskill S, et al. Financial incentives for smoking cessation during pregnancy: a randomised controlled trial. The Lancet. 2014;384:S4. \n• Boyd KA, Briggs AH, Bauld L, Sinclair L, Tappin D. Are financial incentives cost-effective to support smoking cessation during pregnancy? Addiction. 2016;111(2):360-70 \n• McConnachie A, Haig C, Sinclair L, Bauld L, Tappin DM. Birth weight differences between those offered financial voucher incentives for verified smoking cessation and control participants enroled in the Cessation in Pregnancy Incentives Trial (CPIT), employing an intuitive approach and a Complier Average Causal Effects (CACE) analysis. Trials. 2017;18(1):337.\n","• https://trialsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1745-6215-13-113\n• https://www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h134.long\n• https://www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h134.long\n• http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/112073/1/112073.pdf\n• https://trialsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13063-017-2053-x\n","• 10.1186/1745-6215-13-113\n• 10.1136/bmj.h134\n• 10.1136/bmj.h134 \n• 10.1111/add.13160\n• 10.1186/s13063-017-2053-x"]
[208,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Burlington pregnancy vouchers 2006","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary • Experimental Groups: 1. Usual contingent voucher (39 women): First 5-day week validated by CO, thereafter by urine cotinine. Vouchers based exclusively on valid bio testing, not self report. Vouchers began at USD 6.25 and rose by USD 1.25 per time to a max of USD 45. Missed or positive results meant schedule was reset, but 2 passes reset the schedule to former point \n• Experimental Groups: 2. Revised contingent voucher (40 women): Same pattern as above, but with potentially USD 296.25 available early in weeks 1 - 6 by maintaining a ≤ 4 ppm breath CO in week 1 (i.e. USD 18.75 day 1 to USD 33.75 day 5 (going up by USD 3.75 per day)), testing cotinine-negative on 2nd Monday for an additional USD 87.50 and thereafter testing negative twice per week to week 6. The 2nd test each week increased by USD 15.50 if it was negative and the first had also been negative. This was meant to reinforce early continuous abstinence\n• Non-contingent voucher [Control Group] (39 women): Voucher value was USD 15 per antepartum and USD 20 per postpartum visit, irrespective of smoking status. Total available earnings were comparable across all 3 groups Duration: to 24 weeks post-partum \n• All pts received standard antenatal care for smoking; study staff delivered additional counselling as 4 sessions over first 2 weeks, at final antepartum visit and during 3 postpartum study visits. Those who quit during pregnancy got brief counselling at routine visits whenever they reported temptations to smoke. Study staff used a printed booklet tailored for pregnant smokers, . Women chose one of next 2 Mondays as a quit date; were then monitored from Monday to Friday that week, Monday and Thursday next 7 weeks, then every Wednesday for 4 weeks, then every other Wednesday until delivery for the UCV and NCV groups; in the RCV group it was every other week to wk 12 and then every 3rd week through to delivery. After delivery all 3 groups were on weekly monitoring for 4 wks, then every other week through to 12 wks post-partum. One final assessment at 24 wks. People who relapsed could continue the schedule or recycle back round the entire process (only offered once per woman). This was used fairly equally by all 3 groups (RCV 40%, UCV 46% and NCV 41%) ","Tobacco","Pregnant women","USA - Vermont - Burlington - Local","2006-2012","5.5 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• 7-day PPA at baseline, 1m, end of pregnancy, 2, 4, 8, 12 and 24 wks post-partum. Biochemical validation: CO ≤ 4 ppm or 6 ppm, + urine cotinine ≤ 80 ng/ml","Odds Ratio of smoking cessation at 24 weeks post-partum (2.55 (0.61; 10.66)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","FROM SRME Cahill K, Hartmann-Boyce J, Perera R. Incentives for smoking cessation. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2015(5):CD004307., individual article: Higgins ST, Washio Y, Lopez AA, Heil SH, Solomon LJ, Lynch ME, et al. Examining two different schedules of financial incentives for smoking cessation among pregnant women. Preventive Medicine 2014;pii: S0091-7435 (14):00118-2.","Link","• 10.1002/14651858.CD004307.pub5"]
[209,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Chesterfield smoking cessation trial for pregnancy","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","The scheme involved provision of a shopping voucher upon carbon monoxide  validation of self-reported abstinence. The size of incentives increased by £1 for each visit at which smoking cessation was confirmed, from the first voucher (worth £8) to the last voucher (worth £39), providing a maximum total of £752-worth of vouchers. Testing positive for smoking resulted in the incentive being withheld at that visit and the value being reset to baseline (£8) for the next visit. Following two consecutive test results indicating no smoking, the incentive value was reset to the highest point attained prior to the lapse. Up to 32 visits were possible from early pregnancy until 6 months postpartum (up to 16 during pregnancy and 16 post delivery), occurring most frequently in the first 2weeks of participation and the first 2 weeks after birth and then decreasing in frequency until delivery and 6 months postpartum, respectively.","Tobacco","Pregnant women (low socio-economic communities)","UK - Derbyshire - Regional",2011,"10 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Single arm RCT","• Smoking quit attempts\n• Smoking cessation at delivery\n• Smoking cessation at 6 months postpartum\n","• Smoking quit attempts: 60% of those enroled on the scheme made a quit attempts (received at least one voucher for smoking cessation)\n• Smoking cessation at delivery: 20% of those enroled into the scheme, and 64% of those who initiated a quit attempt were confirmed sustained quitters at deliver (representing 8% of the total cohort of 615 smokers)\n• Smoking cessation at 6 months postpartum: 10% of those enroled on the scheme we confirmed sustained quitters at 6 months postpartum; (representing 4% of the total cohort of 615 smokers)\n","• No difference in making a quit attempt between women who were most deprived compared to those who were less deprived.\n• Comparing those quit at delivery with those enroled who did not quit, the chances of being quit at delivery decreased in women who were more deprived compared to those who were less deprived.\n• Comparing those quit at 6months postpartum with those who enroled but were not quit at this time, the chances of being quit at 6months postpartum decreased in women who were more deprived compared with those who were less deprived.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Ierfino D, Mantzari E, Hirst J, Jones T, Aveyard P, Marteau TM. Financial incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy: A single‐arm intervention study assessing cessation and gaming. Addiction 2015;110(4):680-8.","Link","• 10.1111/add.12817"]
[210,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Dallas Tobacco Cessation Clinic Incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary. Eligible participants (n =153) were randomly assigned to usual care (UC) for smoking cessation (n = 75) or to UC plus financial incentives for smoking abstinence (CM; n =78). Participants assigned to CM received all components of UC as described previously. In addition, participants had the opportunity to earn weekly incentives in the form of gift cards, if they (1) self-reported abstinence during the past approximately 12 hours on the quit day (i.e., abstinence since 10 P.M. the previous evening), or self-reported abstinence during the past 7 days at each weekly visit from 1 week through 4 weeks after the quit date; and (2) provided an expired CO sample consistent with abstinence (i.e., CO £ 10 ppmon the quit date, CO<8 ppmat weeks 1---4 after the quit date). Participants earned a $20 gift card to a popular retail chain in exchange for biochemically confirmed abstinence on the quit date. An escalating schedule was employed, such that the amount of the incentives increased by $5 with each weekly successive abstinent visit through 4 weeks after the quit date (up to $150 total). Participants who were non abstinent at any visit were eligible to earn incentives for abstinence at the next visit, although the amount was reset to $20. Health was a primary aim (evaluated the effectiveness of offering adjunctive financial incentives for abstinence (contingency management [CM]) within a safety net hospital smoking cessation program) Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year) majority uninsured, unemployed, and had a household income of less than $12 000 per year)","Tobacco","Socio-economic (low income population)","USA - Texas - Regional",2011,"1 month","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Smoking cessation","• CM participants were significantly more likely to achieve 7-day point prevalence abstinence than UC participants at 4 weeks after the quit date (49.3% [n=37] vs 25.4% [n= 18] abstinent; all Ps <0.05)., \n• CM participants were also more likely to achieve 30-day point prevalence abstinence at 12 weeks after the quit date (28.1% [n=18] vs 10.9% [n =7] abstinent).  \n• CM participants were more likely to achieve continuous abstinence at 12 weeks after the quit date compared to usual care participants (20.3% [n=13] vs 7.8% [n=5] abstinent). CM participants were more likely to achieve continuous abstinence at 4 and 12 weeks after the quit date, even when more conservative definitions of continuous abstinence were used.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kendzor DE, Businelle MS, Poonawalla IB, Cuate EL, Kesh A, Rios DM, et al. Financial incentives for abstinence among socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals in smoking cessation treatment. American journal of public health. 2015;105(6):1198-205","Link","• 10.2105/AJPH.2014.302102"]
[211,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Give It Up For Baby","Programme","Government (NHS Tayside Health Board)","Financial incentive","Voluntary scheme to encourage smoking cessation in pregnant women. Those who agreed to take part were asked to set a quit date and received an initial brief intervention and then attended for weekly support from a member of the local pharmacy team for up to 12 weeks.  An incentive payment of £12.50 was chosen arbitrarily for the intervention; little evidence on effective levels of payment was available to inform judgement. The administrative system enabled participants to be credited with their weekly incentive payment within about 5 working days, which they could then redeem at a local participating supermarket in return for any goods, excluding alcohol and tobacco products. Health was a primary aim (Give it Up for Baby was specifically designed to help pregnant women living in deprived communities to stop smoking)","Tobacco","Pregnant women (low socio-economic communities)","UK - Scotland - Glasgow - Regional","2007-2009","3 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study + behavioural insights","• Smoking cessation","• Around one fifth of pregnant women identified as smokers engaged with GIUFB.\n• All smokers together: Overall, 7.8% of pregnant smokers across the three areas had quit at four weeks, with on-going measures showing 5.1% quit at three months and 4% tobacco-free at delivery.\n• Analysis shows rates were 54% at 4 weeks, 32% at 12 weeks and 17%, 3 months after birth in those who engaged in the programme.\n• Of the 393 quit attempts 101 (26%) resulted in no payment, primarily because they were smoking after the first week, but also because of participants not continuing with the scheme further than the initial visit. ","Overall, around 47% of those in the most deprived quintile who set a quit date remained quitters at 4 weeks vs in 68% in 2nd quintile and52% in top quintile (least deprived), significant difference at p<0.001","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Radley A, Ballard P, Eadie D, MacAskill S, Donnelly L, Tappin D. Give It Up For Baby: outcomes and factors influencing uptake of a pilot smoking cessation incentive scheme for pregnant women. BMC Public Health. 2013;13:343.","Link","• 10.1186/1471-2458-13-343"]
[212,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Supporting a Smoke Free Pregnancy Scheme (SaSFPS)","Implemented scheme assessment","Government (Local government)","Financial incentive","The SaSFPS set out a common protocol that defined the enhanced support that was provided across all areas. Enhanced support was offered to those women who set a quit date and achieved a 4-week quit, within the scheme, and to encourage them to remain smoke free throughout the pregnancy and for 12 weeks post-partum. This comprised: • providing face-to-face contact, at least 4-weekly, between the pregnant woman and a smoking cessation advisor; • recruiting a non-smoking “significant other” to support the women’s quit attempt throughout the pregnancy and the postpartum period; • performing CO screening, as a motivational tool, at each 4-weekly contact meeting; • provide a voucher to the pregnant woman, as a financial reward, for each 4-weeks that she remained smoke free - subject to validation by CO screening • keeping an accurate record of 4-weekly contact for each individual registered on the scheme. Women agreeing to participate in the SaSFPS received “Love to Shop” vouchers that could be spent at a range of high street shops (Love to Shop vouchers cannot be used for the purchase of alcohol or tobacco). Each woman was eligible to receive a maximum of £260 worth of vouchers - if she was recruited in the early weeks of pregnancy and remained smokefree at the 12-weeks post-partum point. Incentives were phased: • to set and maintain a 4-week quit date, each woman received a £10 voucher for each week that she remained quit; • every subsequent four weeks that she remained non-smoking, and where this was verified by CO screening, each woman received a further £20 voucher; • the final financial incentive was a £60 voucher if she had stayed quit at 12 weeks post-partum – again, this was subject to CO verification.  ","Tobacco","Pregnant women","UK - North West- Regional",2012,"13 months","This scheme was based upon the Pregnancy Reward Scheme, an incentivised relapse prevention programme for pregnant women, evaluated by the UK Centre for Tobacco and Alcohol Studies and the University of Stirling. This scheme provided the groundwork for the SaSFPS and was the forum within which obstacles were conquered; of note here gift cards or vouchers could not be used to purchase tobacco or alcohol. The project had a total budget of £101k. This was based on the cost of providing vouchers to a value of up to £260 for up to 408 women across North West England. The vouchers were acquired by utilising unused vouchers from the earlier Reward scheme. If the vouchers had not been used and returned to the voucher issuers, they would have been refunded at a 50% rate. Hence the marginal cost for running the scheme was about £50kThe project did not lead to additional costs for the local areas involved, as the work by local SaSFPS project leads and stop smoking advisers was performed within pre-existing job roles. Tobacco Free Futures is funded as a local collaborative programme, which covered project development and management costs. ","The scheme has since run in Greater Manchester and Lancashire and has just commenced in Stoke. It will be running across the next 5 years in Suffolk. Discussions are underway about an extended scheme for GM as part of a wider package to support smokefree pregnancy.","Epidemiological analysis","• Four-week quit rate\n• Smoking cessation at delivery\n• Smoking cessation at 12 weeks postpartum","• 69% (n=277) of the 403 women recruited to the scheme set a quit date and achieved a four-week quit\n• 71% (n=200) of those who were quit at 4 weeks went on to be still quit at time of delivery – these were all CO validated\n• 51% (n=142) of those who were quit at 4 weeks were still not smoking at 12 weeks post-partum.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","46% (n=36) of respondents reported that somebody close to them had quit because they themselves had quit or because they were pregnant. Although it cannot be stated definitively from the survey data, it is likely that many of these included the significant others who also gave up.","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Tobacco Free Futures. Supporting a Smokefree Pregnancy Scheme: A Success Story.","Link","• NA"]
[213,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Baltimore pregnancy incentives","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary • Control group: Treatment as usual: All pts completed an initial 8-day residential course, then went to outpatient status. In 1st wk, all completed an Addiction Severity Test (ASI), a structured clinical interview for DSM-IV disorders (SCID), revised FTND. CO testing 3 times per wk, urine samples 3 times per wk (cotinine) + random cocaine testing once a week ASI repeated at 1m and 3m and at 6 wks post-partum, + CO and urine tests. At each testing all pts received brief (10 mins) MI feedback. Standard info on adverse effects of smoking for mother and baby. RCT of financial incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy:  Control group: Treatment as usual: All patients completed an initial 8-day residential course, then went to outpatient status. Carbon Monoxide testing 3 times per week, urine samples 3 times per week (for cotinine) + random cocaine testing once a week. At each testing all patients received brief (10 mins) feedback. Standard info on adverse effects of smoking for mother and baby.  In the experimental Group: patients received cognitive behavioural therapy: 12 weeks of eligibility for contingent behavioural incentives rewards contingent on reduction or abstinence. Incentives for each negative breath test on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, as follows: week 1: any reduction; weeks 2 - 4 10% reduction; weeks 5 - 7: 25% reduction; weeks 8 - 9: 50% reduction; weeks 10 - 11: 75% reduction; week 12 - delivery: abstinence (CO < 4ppm). Vouchers started at USD 7.50 and increased by USD 1 per day up to USD 41.50. If negative sample missed through the 12 weeks, schedule was reset to USD 7.50. If patient achieved 5 consecutive negative tests, the voucher value was restored to former level NCBI group: “pseudo-yoked” schedules. NCBI pts were each yoked to a random participant in the pilot study (i.e. had submitted CO samples for at least 2 weeks). Patients were told that their behaviour did not determine rewards received, but that they would receive incentives as per a previously established schedule. NCBI patients had to give breath and urine samples to receive their scheduled incentive. They were eligible for 12 weeks or until delivery.• Experimental Group: CBI: 12 wks of eligibility for contingent behavioural incentives rewards contingent on reduction or abstinence. Incentives for each negative breath test on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, as follows: wk 1: any reduction; wks 2 - 4 10% reduction; wks 5 - 7: 25% reduction; wks 8 - 9: 50% reduction; wks 10 - 11: 75% reduction; wk 12 - delivery: abstinence (CO < 4ppm) Voucher started at USD 7.50 and increased by USD 1 per day up to USD 41.50. If negative sample missed through the 12 wks, schedule was reset to USD 7.50. If pt achieved 5 consecutive negative tests, the voucher value was restored to former level NCBI: “pseudo-yoked” schedules. NCBI pts were each yoked to a random participant in the pilot study (i.e. had submitted CO samples for at least 2 wks). Pts were told that their behaviour did not determine rewards received, but that they would receive incentives as per a previously established schedule. NCBI pts had to give breath and urine samples to receive their scheduled incentive. They were eligible for 12 wks or until delivery ","Tobacco","Pregnant women (methadone maintained)","USA - Baltimore - Local",2005,"1.5 months ","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Cessation was PPA, biochemically verified (CO < 4 ppm; urinary cotinine < 300 ng/ml)","Odds Ratio of smoking cessation at 10 weeks post-partum (29.75(1.69; 523.18)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","FROM SRME Cahill K, Hartmann-Boyce J, Perera R. Incentives for smoking cessation. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2015(5):CD004307. Tuten M, Fitzsimona H, Chisolm MS, Nuzzo PA, Jones HE. Contingent incentives reduce cigarette smoking among pregnant, methadone-maintained women: results of an initial feasibility and efficacy randomized clinical trial. Addiction 2012;107(10):1868–77. ","Link","• 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2012.03923.x"]
[214,"8 Tobacco - MUP","US minimum pack price model - $5","Policy","Government (Food and Drug Administration (FDA))","Price increase (MUP)","Mandatory  federal retail minimum price for cigarettes ($5 per pack) Health was a primary aim (reduction of consumption) ","Tobacco","General population","USA - National",2013,"1 year","Not reported","Not reported","Modelling (log-linear regression model)","• Expected pack price\n• Expected reduction in sales\n• Numbers of smokers quitting\n","• $6.20 per pack\n• 549 million packs (95% CI (445 m to 654 m)) per year nationally, corresponding to an approximate 4.0% reduction in sales.\n• 1 million fewer smokers due to cessation\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","A federal minimum price is now a viable policy option in the USA due to the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), which provided the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with the authority to regulate retail tobacco sales. The TCA gives the FDA broad authority to ‘require restrictions on the sale and distribution of a tobacco product, including restrictions on access to, and the advertising and promotion of, the tobacco product”’ (FSPTCA, 906(d))  .","No","Doogan NJ, Wewers ME, Berman M. The impact of a federal cigarette minimum pack price policy on cigarette use in the USA. Tob Control. 2018;27(2):203-8.","Link","• NA"]
[215,"8 Tobacco - MUP","US minimum pack price model - $7","Policy","Government (Food and Drug Administration (FDA))","Price increase (MUP)","Mandatory federal retail minimum price for cigarettes ($7 per pack) Health was a primary aim (reduction of consumption)","Tobacco","General population","USA - National",2013,"1 year","Not reported","Not reported","Modelling (log-linear regression model)","• Expected pack price\n• Expected reduction in sales\n• Numbers of smokers quitting\n","• $7.37 per pack\n• 2.5 billion packs (95% CI (2.02 b to 2.95 b)) per year nationally, corresponding to an approximate 18.0% reduction in sales.\n• 4.7 million fewer smokers due to cessation\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","A federal minimum price is now a viable policy option in the USA due to the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), which provided the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with the authority to regulate retail tobacco sales. The TCA gives the FDA broad authority to ‘require restrictions on the sale and distribution of a tobacco product, including restrictions on access to, and the advertising and promotion of, the tobacco product”’ (FSPTCA, 906(d))  .","No","Doogan NJ, Wewers ME, Berman M. The impact of a federal cigarette minimum pack price policy on cigarette use in the USA. Tob Control. 2018;27(2):203-8.","Link","• NA"]
[216,"8 Tobacco - MUP","US minimum pack price model - $10","Policy","Government (Food and Drug Administration (FDA))","Price increase (MUP)","Mandatory  federal retail minimum price for cigarettes ($10 per pack). Health was a primary aim (reduction of consumption) ","Tobacco","General population","USA - National",2013,"1 year","Not reported","Not reported","Modelling (log-linear regression model)","• Expected pack price\n• Expected reduction in sales\n• Numbers of smokers quitting\n","• $10.06 per pack\n• 5.7 billion packs (95% CI (4.75 b to 6.60b)) per year nationally, corresponding to an approximate 41.0% reduction in sales.\n• 10.7 million fewer smokers due to cessation\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","A federal minimum price is now a viable policy option in the USA due to the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), which provided the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with the authority to regulate retail tobacco sales. The TCA gives the FDA broad authority to ‘require restrictions on the sale and distribution of a tobacco product, including restrictions on access to, and the advertising and promotion of, the tobacco product”’ (FSPTCA, 906(d))  .","No","Doogan NJ, Wewers ME, Berman M. The impact of a federal cigarette minimum pack price policy on cigarette use in the USA. Tob Control. 2018;27(2):203-8.","Link","• NA"]
[217,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 13","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory removal of the current Wine Equalisation Tax on wine, fortified wine and cider, and applying an excise rate equivalent to low-strength offsite beer for these beverages Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm)","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 59000 (UI 48000to 71000)\n• -1.3%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case): 15.4% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$840 (UI -$1200  to -$530)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$820 (UI -$1200  to -$510)","Not reported","Yes","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[218,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 3","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory  universal tax rate on alcoholic beverages equivalent to a 10 per cent increase in the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm)","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Implementation costs: $22 million ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 220000 (UI 180000 to 270 000)\n• -10.6%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 49.8% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$3200 (UI -$4600  to -$2000)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$3100 (UI -$4600  to -$2000)\n","Not reported","No","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[219,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 7","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tiered tax rate, with excise rate increasing exponentially by 3 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 110000 (UI 87000 to 130000)\n• -1.4%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 16% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$1500 (UI -$2200  to -$960)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$1500 (UI -$2100  to -$940)","Not reported","Yes","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[220,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 8","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory two-tiered tax system. The first tier applies a tax rate on alcoholic beverages (excepts spirits and alcopops) that increases exponentially by 3 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent; the second tier applies the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 83000 (UI 68000 to 99000)\n• -1.7%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 19.8% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$1200 (UI -$1700  to -$750)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$1200 (UI -$1700  to -$730)","Not reported","No","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[221,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 5","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tiered tax rate, with excise rate increasing exponentially by 1 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 33,000 (UI 27,000 to 40,000)\n• -0.5%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 6.6% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$470 (UI -$700  to -$300)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$450(UI -$670  to -$270)","Not reported","Yes?","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[222,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 6","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tiered tax rate, with excise rate increasing exponentially by 2 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm)","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","•65,000 (UI 53,000 to 78,000)\n• -0.9%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 11.7% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$920(UI -$1300  to -$590)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$900(UI -$1300  to -$570)\n","Not reported","Yes?","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[223,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 9","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory two-tiered tax system. The first tier applies a tax rate on alcoholic beverages (excepts spirits and alcopops) that increases exponentially by 5 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent; the second tier applies the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm)","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 100,000 (UI 85,000 to 120,000)\n• -2.2%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 23.1% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$1500 (UI -$2100  to -$940)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$1500(UI -$2100  to -$920)\n","Not reported","Yes?","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[224,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 10","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory Two-tiered tax system. The first tier applies a tax rate on alcoholic beverages (excepts spirits and alcopops) that increases exponentially by 7 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent; the second tier applies the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 120,000 (UI 98,000 to 140,000)\n• -2.6%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 26.6% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$1700 (UI -$2500  to -$1100)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$1700(UI -$2500  to -$1000)\n","Not reported","Yes?","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[225,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 11","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory two-tiered tax system. The first tier applies a tax rate on alcoholic beverages (excepts spirits and alcopops) that increases exponentially by 10 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent; the second tier applies the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops  with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits.  Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 140,000 (UI 110,000 to 170,000)\n• -3%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 32.4% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$2000 (UI -$2900  to -$1200)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$2000(UI -$2900  to -$1200)\n","Not reported","Yes?","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[226,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 12","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory two-tiered tax system. The first tier adopts the current excise rate on low-strength beer and varies taxation rates for higher alcohol content beverages, such that total taxation receipts remain unchanged from base case; the second tier applies the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all\nbeverages, except spirits. Health ws a primary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 9,900 (UI7,300 to 13,000)\n• 3.40 %\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 0% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$140 (UI -$220  to -$77)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$120(UI -$200  to -$55)","Not reported","Yes?","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[227,"9 Alcohol - lower strength","National AUS model volumetric ","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","A new mandatory uniform volumetric tax on all beverages of  AUD 41.68 per litre of alcohol (LAL)  in wine and beer, with an exemption from taxation for the first 1.15% of alcohol and retain the AUD 70.61 per LAL for spirits. Full tax pass through is assumed in the estimations.","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Panel data analysis)","Mean alcohol costs  (see disitrbutional effects for more outcomes)","Replacing the current ad valorem tax on wine with a specific tax of A$41.68 per LAL will lead to large increases in the mean annual alcohol costs for those who purchase wine, across all income quintiles: when a new specific tax is applied to 4-l casks of wine containing 36 standard drinks (or 0.456 l of pure alcohol), the estimated mean retail price per product would increase by 140% from A$12.38 to A$29.75 and there will be increases in the mean retail price of fortified wine (63%), table wine (30%) and sparkling wine (15%) under a new specific tax; more so than under a MUP policy.   ","Ad-valorem taxation will be regressive at aggregate level, but is particularly regressive for those who purchase beer than those who purchase wine.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","In Australia, taxation of alcohol is the responsibility of the federal government which has two regimens: (i) a value-based ‘ad valorem’ tax for wine and traditional cider, and (ii) 16 different specific tax rates (excise duties on domestic products and equivalent customs duties on imported products) for beer, spirits and other excisable alcohol. The dissimilar rate of government taxation across alcohol products  in Australia translates into large disparities between product types in the amount of tax paid per standard drink, which unevenly affects the retail price of products, and can influence consumption decisions in ways that may be deleterious to health,.","No?","Vandenberg B, Sharma A. Are Alcohol Taxation and Pricing Policies Regressive? Product-Level Effects of a Specific Tax and a Minimum Unit Price for Alcohol. Alcohol Alcohol. 2016;51(4):493-502.","Link","• 10.1093/alcalc/agv133"]
[228,"9 Alcohol - lower strength","Volumetric tax Australia model scenario 1","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory volumetric tax rate that maintains the current deadweight loss of taxation: AUD$28.61 per litre of pure alcohol ; this was calculated by varying the tax rate continuously until the deadweight loss equalled that of the current tax system;  Health was a primary aim (study aimed to estimate the public health benefits and costs of implementing a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia)","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2003,"1 year","Implementation costs: annualised equivalent of AUD$0.58 Million ($0.47 to $0.69), Cost offsets: −AUD$110 Million (−$210 to −$36), Net costs: −AUD$110 Million (−$210 to −$36)  No (model) ","Not reported ","Modelling (multistate life table model)","• Disability-adjusted life years\n• Units of alcohol consumed\n","• 21 000 (12 000 to 31 000) DALYs averted\n• 2.77% reduction in alcohol units consumed\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","intervention is cost-saving and associated with a health gain","Economic the price of spirits and RTD beverages decreased and the price of beer and wine increased. The increased consumption of spirits was more than offset by reduced consumption of beer and wine.","Annual increase in taxation revenue of AUD$492 million.","Not reported","Yes?","• Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Doran CM, Vos T, Shakeshaft AP. Cost-effectiveness of volumetric alcohol taxation in Australia. Med J Aust. 2010;192(8):439-43. Epub 2010/04/21. PubMed PMID: 20402606;  \n• Byrnes J, Petrie DJ, Doran CM, Shakeshaft A. The efficiency of a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia. Applied health economics and health policy. 2012;10(1):37-49. \n• Cobiac L, Vos T, Doran CM, Wallace A. Cost effectiveness of interventions to prevent alcohol related disease and injury in Australia. Addiction 2009; 104: 1646-1655\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/192_08_190410/byr10773_fm.pdf\n•https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joshua_Byrnes/publication/51899855_The_Efficiency_of_a_Volumetric_Alcohol_Tax_in_Australia/links/5446d2cd0cf2d62c30504e27.pdf\n• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02708.x\n","• NA\n• 10.2165/11594850-000000000-00000\n• 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02708.x"]
[229,"9 Alcohol - lower strength","Volumetric tax Australia model scenario 2","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory volumetric tax rate that maintains existing taxation revenue: AUD$24.81 per litre of pure alcohol  Health was a primary aim (study aimed to estimate the public health benefits and costs of implementing a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2003,"1 year","Implementation costs: annualised equivalent of AUD$0.58 Million ($0.47 to $0.69), Cost offsets: −AUD$2.0 Million (−$3.7 to −$0.69), Net costs: −AUD$1.4 Million (−$3.2to −$0.11)  No (model) ","Not reported ","Modelling (multistate life table model)","• Disability-adjusted life years\n• Units of alcohol consumed\n","• 380 (220 to 570) DALYs averted\n• 0.05% reduction in alcohol units consumed\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The policy increased the price of beer and wine and decreased the price of spirits and RTD beverages (only marginal).","Annual increase in taxation revenue of AUD$0 million","Not reported","Yes?","• Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Doran CM, Vos T, Shakeshaft AP. Cost-effectiveness of volumetric alcohol taxation in Australia. Med J Aust. 2010;192(8):439-43. Epub 2010/04/21. PubMed PMID: 20402606;  \n• Byrnes J, Petrie DJ, Doran CM, Shakeshaft A. The efficiency of a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia. Applied health economics and health policy. 2012;10(1):37-49. \n• Cobiac L, Vos T, Doran CM, Wallace A. Cost effectiveness of interventions to prevent alcohol related disease and injury in Australia. Addiction 2009; 104: 1646-1655\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/192_08_190410/byr10773_fm.pdf\n•https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joshua_Byrnes/publication/51899855_The_Efficiency_of_a_Volumetric_Alcohol_Tax_in_Australia/links/5446d2cd0cf2d62c30504e27.pdf\n• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02708.x\n","• NA\n• 10.2165/11594850-000000000-00000\n• 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02708.x"]
[230,"9 Alcohol - lower strength","Volumetric tax Australia model scenario 3","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory volumetric tax rate equal to the existing rate applied to spirits AUD$57.97 per litre of pure alcohol to be consistent with the current tax rate applied to spirits. Health was a primary aim (study aimed to estimate the public health benefits and costs of implementing a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2003,"1 year","Implementation costs: annualised equivalent of AUD$0.58 Million ($0.47 to $0.69),  Cost offsets: −AUD$870 Million (−$1600 to −$300), Net costs: −AUD$870Million (−$1600 to −$290)  No (model) ","Not reported ","Modelling (multistate life table model)","• Disability-adjusted life years\n• Units of alcohol consumed\n","• 170 000 (99 000 to 250 000)DALYs averted\n• 23.85% reduction in alcohol units consumed\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The policy increased in the price of beer: the negative relationship between the price of beer and consumption of spirits, measured by the cross-price elasticity, means that spirit consumption falls as people’s budget for alcohol is reduced by higher prices paid for beer.","Annual increase in taxation revenue of AUD$3094 million.","Not reported","Yes?","• Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Doran CM, Vos T, Shakeshaft AP. Cost-effectiveness of volumetric alcohol taxation in Australia. Med J Aust. 2010;192(8):439-43. Epub 2010/04/21. PubMed PMID: 20402606;  \n• Byrnes J, Petrie DJ, Doran CM, Shakeshaft A. The efficiency of a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia. Applied health economics and health policy. 2012;10(1):37-49. \n• Cobiac L, Vos T, Doran CM, Wallace A. Cost effectiveness of interventions to prevent alcohol related disease and injury in Australia. Addiction 2009; 104: 1646-1655\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/192_08_190410/byr10773_fm.pdf\n•https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joshua_Byrnes/publication/51899855_The_Efficiency_of_a_Volumetric_Alcohol_Tax_in_Australia/links/5446d2cd0cf2d62c30504e27.pdf\n• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02708.x\n","• NA\n• 10.2165/11594850-000000000-00000\n• 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02708.x"]
[231,"9 Alcohol - lower strength","Different Alcohol Taxation and Price Policies on Health Inequalities","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory volumetric tax: Replace current excise duty with a duty of £0.22 per unit for all beverage types (UK unit = 8 g ethanol), implemented on top of the current system of excise duty and value added tax (VAT) in England - designed  tax to be comparable for political relevance, we chose the level of each policy that would achieve a 4.3% reduction in population level mortality as this is the estimated impact of a £0.50 minimum unit price, a policy that is being considered or in the process of implementation by all four UK governments. This means that Price = (net price for retailer + £0.22 × number of alcohol units in product) × (100% + 20% VAT). There is no change to any taxes in the rest of the supply chain, either at the production or wholesale stages. Health was a primary aim (study aim to appraise the relative public health merits of minimum unit pricing and three of the most common tax structures globally) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","UK - National","2014-2015","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM)","• Number of deaths averted\n• Alcohol consumption and spending\n","• 4.3% reduction in number of deaths per year in total drinker population compared to baseline, corresponding to 530 fewer deaths per year\n• Largest reduction in consumption was in heavy drinkers: −2.8%  and -1.4% in moderate drinkers, compared to baseline scenario. Volumetric tax was estimated to slightly reduce spending overall (−0.8% [PSA −1.5% (UI −4.7%,+1.0%)]), with declines in all but the highest income group. Further analyses show that although the tax on beer and cider would increase under a volumetric tax of £0.22 per unit, the tax on spirits would decrease, and, together with switching behaviour, this leads to an overall reduction in spending.\n","Progressive for health. Volumetric tax was estimated to slightly reduce spending overall (−0.8% [PSA −1.5% (UI −4.7%,+1.0%)]), with declines in all but the highest income group. Further analyses show that although the tax on beer and cider would increase under a volumetric tax of £0.22 per unit, the tax on spirits would decrease, and, together with switching behaviour, this leads to an overall reduction in spending. Equity gap in the alcohol-related death rates between those in routine/manual and professional/\nmanagerial occupations in total drinker population and heavy drinkers is reduced with volumetric taxation.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes?","Meier PS, Holmes J, Angus C, Ally AK, Meng Y, Brennan A. Estimated effects of different alcohol taxation and price policies on health inequalities: a mathematical modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2016;13(2):e1001963.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0080936"]
[232,"9 Alcohol - lower strength","Victoria Aus model MUP vs volumetric tax","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory new uniform volumetric tax on all beverages of  A$41.68 per litre of alcohol (LAL) with an exemption from taxation for the first 1.15% of alcohol in all beverages ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - Victoria State -Regional","1905-07-02","1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Panel data analysis)","Mean annual change in volume of alcohol purchased per capita, %","For Wine: Ranges from -36.4% in 5th quintile ( 20% heaviest consumers) to -29.7% in 1st quintile ( 20% lowest consumers); For Beer Ranges from -2.0% in 5th quintile ( 20% heaviest consumers) to -1.7% in 1st quintile ( 20% lowest consumers); ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Sharma A, Vandenberg B, Hollingsworth B. Minimum pricing of alcohol versus volumetric taxation: which policy will reduce heavy consumption without adversely affecting light and moderate consumers? PLoS One. 2014;9(1):e80936.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0080936"]
[233,"9 Alcohol - MUP","Saskatchewan MUP","Policy","Non-governmental (The Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority)","Price increase (MUP)","Mandatory comprehensive set of minimum prices across multiple beverage categories which were also made partially ‘alcohol volumetric’ apply both to sales in liquor stores (off-premise outlets) and to prices paid by owners of bars and restaurants (on premise outlets): Average Minimum Prices for Different Types of Alcoholic Beverage per Standard Drink (17.05 mL ethanol). Health was an indirect aim (Many Canadian provinces have implemented minimum prices for alcoholic beverages, albeit largely for revenue raising and economic reasons rather than those of public health and safety) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Canada - Saskatchewan - Regional",2010,"2 years","Passed through Legislation (In Saskatchewan, the Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority has a monopoly on an alcohol distribution and a partial monopoly on liquor store sales(some bars are also allowed to sell alcohol for off-premise consumption). and is therefore provided the power to control alcohol minimum pricing)","There were adjustments to mark-ups of some alcoholic drinks (e.g., a $0.16/L increase for beer introduced in April 2010) that accompanied the changes in minimum prices.","Modelling (multivariate ARIMA time-series models)","• Reduction in per capita consumption\n• Reduction in emergency department visits in all alcohol related injuries, assaults,  motor vehicle collisions and falls categories.\n","• A 10% increase in in minimum price of all beverages was  associated with a total 8.43% reduction in total alcohol, a 10.1% reduction in the consumption of  beer, a 4.6% reduction in the consumption of wine and a 5.9% reduction in the consumption of spirits, all of which were highly statistically significant\n• The implementation of  new, higher minimum price levels in Saskatchewan was associated with an approximately 40% reduction in motor vehicle collision related ED visits for women aged 26 and over only,  6 months after the policy intervention. No impact on other age groups or men.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Alcohol-related offenses: This minimum price intervention was associated with an 8.0% reduction (P<0.01) in alcohol-related night-time traffic offences among men, but there were no significant changes for women. ","Not stated amount, but mentioned that government revenue has increased. ","This natural policy experiment is perhaps the closest to Scotland’s intended policy of an MUP, but Candata does have an alcohol distribution monopoly.","NA","• Stockwell T, Zhao J, Giesbrecht N, Macdonald S, Thomas G, Wettlaufer A. The raising of minimum alcohol prices in Saskatchewan, Canada: impacts on consumption and implications for public health. American Journal of Public Health. 2012;102(12):e103-e10. \n• Stockwell T, Zhao J, Sherk A, Callaghan RC, Macdonald S, Gatley J. Assessing the impacts of Saskatchewan's minimum alcohol pricing regulations on alcohol‐related crime. Drug and alcohol review. 2017;36(4):492-501.\n• Sherk A, Stockwell T, Callaghan RC. The effect on emergency department visits of raised alcohol minimum prices in Saskatchewan, Canada. Drug Alcohol Rev. 2018;37 Suppl 1:S357-S65.\n","• https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdfplus/10.2105/AJPH.2012.301094\n• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/dar.12471.\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29431280\n","• 10.2105/AJPH.2012.301094\n• 10.1111/dar.12471\n• 10.1111/dar.12670"]
[234,"9 Alcohol - MUP","National AUS model MUP ","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (MUP)","Mandatory a MUP of AUD$1.00 per 12.67 mls of alcohol (i.e. 1 standard drink measure in Australia). Full tax pass through is assumed in the estimations.","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Panel data analysis)","Mean alcohol costs  (see distributional effects for more outcomes)","MUP will lead to large increases in the mean annual alcohol costs for both wine and beer consumers across all income quintiles, but not for spirits consumers because the current price of most spirits products exceeds the MUP level of A$1.00 per standard drink that are modelled: e.g. 4-l casks of wine containing 36 standard drinks, the estimated mean retail price per product would increase by 190%, from A$12.38 to A$36.00       ","MUP will have a regressive impact:\n• spending increases representing 2.7% of income for consumers in the lowest-income quintile, compared with 0.3% of income for those in the highest-income quintile. \n• The predicted change in mean alcohol consumption per capita for low-income wine will be a reduction of around 11.5 standard drinks per week. For the highest-income wine consumers, the predicted change in consumption will be considerably less: around 2.5 standard drinks per week. \n• Among those who purchase beer, the mean cost increases for the lowest-income consumers will be smaller than that for the highest-income consumers (around $2.80 compared with $6.90 per week, respectively). However, these costs represent a larger proportion of income for those in the lowest-income quintile. \n• Among those who purchase beer, the predicted change in consumption among the lowest- and highest-income beer consumers will be similar: a reduction of around 5.7 and 5.4 standard drinks per week, respectively.   \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","In Australia, taxation of alcohol is the responsibility of the federal government which has two regimens: (i) a value-based ‘ad valorem’ tax for wine and traditional cider, and (ii) 16 different specific tax rates (excise duties on domestic products and equivalent customs duties on imported products) for beer, spirits and other excisable alcohol. The dissimilar rate of government taxation across alcohol products  in Australia translates into large disparities between product types in the amount of tax paid per standard drink, which unevenly affects the retail price of products, and can influence consumption decisions in ways that may be deleterious to health,.","Yes (Scotland)","Vandenberg B, Sharma A. Are Alcohol Taxation and Pricing Policies Regressive? Product-Level Effects of a Specific Tax and a Minimum Unit Price for Alcohol. Alcohol Alcohol. 2016;51(4):493-502.","Link","• 10.1093/alcalc/agv133"]

{"sheet":"Diet & Obesity","index":4,"n_rows":119,"n_cols":27,"rows_kept":119,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["ID number","Policy area","Policy name","Evidence type","Policy owner","Mechanism type","Mechanism details ","Target risk factor/behaviour/commodity","Target population / demographics","Setting (Geographical)","Year of implementation","Timeline(s) for the policy's impact assessment","Policy implementation (policy owner, voluntary vs mandatory policy, implementation mechanism (if implemented), overlap with other policies and cost of implementation)","Follow-up actions for policy","Type of analysis","Policy outcomes (health or intermediate impact)","Quantitative outcomes (health or intermediate)","Distributional effects","Type of economic evaluation analyses ","Quantitative economic evaluation results","Other impacts (co-benefits, unintended/perverse effects) ","Revenue information (amount, beneficiary and utilisation/earmarking)","Policy context","National policy presence","Reference to original sources","Reference link","Digital Object Identifier"]
["ID number","Policy area the policy relates to","Name given to policy, if no name is established, name in the following format: [Country or country region]_[commodity or policy area]_[policy type]","Note if a policy, an academic study (eg a modelling study, RCT or smaller scale study) or a small scale programme","Name of the organisation responsible for designing and/or implementing the policy","What is (are) the mechanism(s) of the policy?","Add detail about the specifics of the policy mechanism","Which risk factor/product/commodity/behaviour is the policy aimed at?","Which segment of the population is the policy targeted at?","Country - region/locality - setting level ( Local - Regional - National - International)","Start year of the policy. If this is not available, note the year of the oldest publication on this policy followed by an asterisk e.g. 2008*."," What are the timelines for the policy’s impact assessment/follow-up?","Information on whether the policy was implemented, whether it was voluntary or mandatory, what mechanism was used for passing the policy, whether it overlaps with any other policies and any information on the cost if implementation","Combination of follow-up actions and any sunset clause","Type of analysis used to derive the outcome information","List of health or intermediate outcomes reported for the policy","The quantitative results on health and intermediate impacts achieved by the policy (values)","What distributional effects are reported on for this policy?","What type of economic evaluation analysis was undertaken?","List or paste the quantitative results from economic evaluations.","Information on any co-benefits, other unintended perverse effects, and other non-health impacts of the policy ","Combination of  fields (Revenue, beneficiary of revenues, utilisation of revenues)","Information provided on the context around the policy, including opponents and proponents.","Has the policy been implemented nationally in England (or UK country if specified). Yes, No, NA(if not a national policy) and ? If unclear","Reference used to extract information about the policy","Hyperlink to PDF if freely available; URL if not.","DOI for publications if available"]
[1,"1 Diet and obesity","Mexico_SSB_Tax","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 1-peso-per-liter tax (equivalent to 10% price increase on drinks containing added sugar) implemented nationally on all sugar added-drinks. Health was a primary aim, specifically the prevention and control of obesity.","SSB","General population","Mexico - National",2014,"2 years","• Policy overlaps with strategy for the prevention and control of overweight, obesity and diabetes\n• Passed through legislation (Law on the Special Tax on Production and Services)\n","An energy dense food tax came in. ","Empirical assessment","• Purchasing of drinks\n• Consumption of drinks\n• Population BMI\n• Overweight and obesity prevalence\n• diagnosed diabetes averted cases \n","• In total, during 2014 the average urban Mexican purchased 4241 mL (seven 600 mL or 20 oz bottles) fewer taxed beverages than expected (based on pretax trends). This was related to a decrease in purchases of non-carbonated sugar sweetened beverages (−17% relative to the counterfactual) and taxed sodas (−1.2% relative to the counterfactual). For untaxed beverages, there was an average increase in the purchase of 36 mL/capita/day (4% relative to the counterfactual), which translates to the purchase of 12 827 mL (21 600 mL or 20 oz bottles) more untaxed beverages by the average urban Mexican over 2014 than expected.\n• Between 2012 and 2014 there was a significant decrease in the proportion of households that purchased SSBs and a concurrent increase in the proportion of households that purchased water. Overall, water consumption continued to grow at a constant rate during the two years. \n• Modelling population BMI  decreasing by 0.15 kg/m2 under average and 0.29 kg/m2 under peak monthly tax effects  Younger adults showed the largest reduction in BMI; the 10% tax increase would induce a 0.18 kg/m2 reduction under average and 0.33 kg/m2 under peak monthly tax effect over 10 years.\n• After 10 years, under the average tax effect the simulations indicate that the prevalence of obesity would decrease by 2.54%, while overweight and normal weight would increase 0.51% and 2.25%, respectively. Under the peak monthly tax effect, obesity prevalence would decrease by 6.38%, while overweight (0.42%), and normal weight (6.66%) would increase. \n• These changes would translate into 86K to 134K averted cases by 2030 under average and 161K to 251K averted cases under peak monthly effect.  These would increase to 225K to 324K averted cases by 2050 under the average effect, and 421K to 605K under the peak monthly effect\n• In another modelling study:  the tax will likely prevent approximately 189,300 new cases of type 2 diabetes, 20,400 incident strokes and heart attacks, and 18,900 deaths over 10 years among adults 35–94 years of age\n","• The authors found that a price increase in all SSBs would be associated with a greater consumption of water, milk and a decrease consumption of candies, snacks and traditional snacks. They found higher elasticities among households living in rural areas (for soft drinks), in more marginalized areas and with lower income, so they expected that implementation of a tax to SSBs could decrease consumption particularly among the poor. They concluded that substitutions and complementarities with other food and beverages should be evaluated to assess the potential impact on total calories consumed.  \n• Between 2012 and 2014 among the three poorest income quintiles, the percentage of households that reported consuming these beverages decreased. This contrasts with the previous increasing trends in the percentage of households buying SSBs in these quintiles, particularly until 2008. This was not the case among households in the richest quintile whose consumption slightly increased during this time frame. \n• Taxed beverage purchasing: In the post-tax period both the absolute and the relative differences in predicted post-tax purchases compared with the counterfactual were largest for households of low socioeconomic status, while the purchase levels of untaxed beverages before the tax were stable across all socioeconomic status households.\n• Baseline BMI was higher among high-SES participants, yet low-SES participants experienced larger BMI reductions than all others (0.20 kg/m2 and 0.37 kg/m2 for average and peak monthly effect, respectively) after 10 years.\n","Only 1 study did some cost estimations","A population-wide 10% reduction in SSB intake (with 39% calorie compensation) is projected to reduce the number of new cases of diabetes by 189,300 (95% UI 155,400–218,100) for the time period 2013 to 2022, a 4.9% lower incidence than what is projected when assuming no change in SSB consumption (Table 2). The resulting reduction in diabetes burden would amount to a total savings in direct healthcare costs incurred by diabetes patients of about 983 million international dollars (95% UI $769 million–$1.2 billion) over 10 y","Not reported","Mexico raises most revenues at around 0.38% of total tax revenue government the tax revenue has not been specifically earmarked, the senate made a resolution to use part of the taxes for providing potable water to public schools, particularly in low income areas.  The tax is expected to result in 983 million international dollars in savings in healthcare costs because of the prevention of diabetes cases over 10 years in modelling study.","Government, public health institutes, civil society organisation (farmers etc) and medical academic institutions support this.  The opposition came from the beverage and food industry, sugar companies, bottling companies, and some allies in the executive and legislative branches of government, as well as lobbyists and civil society organizations.  Press campaigns  raising obesity and need for revenue and reducing the weight of oil in government revenues. ","Yes","• Barrientos-Gutierrez T, Zepeda-Tello R, Rodrigues ER, Colchero-Aragonés A, Rojas-Martínez R, Lazcano-Ponce E, et al. Expected population weight and diabetes impact of the 1-peso-per-litre tax to sugar sweetened beverages in Mexico. PloS one. 2017;12(5):e0176336.\n• Bonilla-Chacín ME, Iglesias R, Suaya A, Trezza C, Macías C. Learning from the Mexican Experience with Taxes on Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Energy-dense Foods of Low Nutritional Value: Poverty and Social Impact Analysis: World Bank; 2016.\n• Colchero MA, Molina M, Guerrero-Lopez CM. After Mexico Implemented a Tax, Purchases of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Decreased and Water Increased: Difference by Place of Residence, Household Composition, and Income Level. J Nutr. 2017;147:1552-7.\n• Colchero MA, Popkin BM, Rivera JA, Ng SW. Beverage purchases from stores in Mexico under the excise tax on sugar sweetened beverages: observational study. bmj. 2016;352:h6704.\n• Colchero MA, Rivera-Dommarco J, Popkin BM, Ng SW. In Mexico, evidence of sustained consumer response two years after implementing a sugar-sweetened beverage tax. Health Affairs. 2017;36(3):564-71.\n• New Zealand Ministry of Health. Mexican Sugar Tax - Evidence of Impact 2015. Health Report Number: 20151086].\n• Sánchez-Romero LM, Penko J, Coxson PG, Fernández A, Mason A, Moran AE, et al. Projected impact of Mexico’s sugar-sweetened beverage tax policy on diabetes and cardiovascular disease: a modeling study. PLoS medicine. 2016;13(11):e1002158.\n\n\n","• http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0176336\n• https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/24701/Learning0from00cial0impact0analysis.pdf?sequence=1\n• https://academic.oup.com/jn/article-abstract/147/8/1552/4669734\n• https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/352/bmj.h6704.full.pdf\n• https://europepmc.org/backend/ptpmcrender.fcgi?accid=PMC5442881&blobtype=pdf\n• https://www.health.govt.nz/system/files/documents/pages/hr20151086.pdf\n• http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002158\n","•10.1371/journal.pone.0176336\n• 10.1596/24701\n• 10.3945/jn.117.251892\n• 10.1136/bmj.h6704\n• 10.1377/hlthaff.2016.1231\n• NA\n• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002158"]
[2,"1 Diet and obesity","Mexico_energydensefood_tax","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory ad-valorem tax of 8 % of the value of high-calorie foods of low nutritional value, defined as foods containing 275 kcal or more per 100 grams. This includes chips and snacks, candies and sweets, chocolate, puddings, peanut and hazelnut butters, ice cream and ice pops and cereal-based products with substantial added sugar. Health was a primary aim (prevention and control of obesity) ","Unhealthy food","General population","Mexico - National",2014,"2 years","• Policy overlaps with strategy for the prevention and control of overweight, obesity and diabetes\n• Passed through legislation (Law on the Special Tax on Production and Services)\n","Adjustments were made to the coding of healthy/unhealthy foods.","Empirical assessment","• Purchases (energy-dense non-essential foods)\n• Purchases (non-taxed foods)\n","• Purchases (energy-dense non-essential foods): after 1 year 5.1% reduction in mean purchasing of taxed foods (equivalent to 25g/capita/month(12; 38) or 70 to 110 kcal/month); 2-year mean decline of 6% in taxed foods. This 2-year average varied by household purchasing pattern: unhealthy purchasers ( high taxed foods/low untaxed foods) reduced purchasing of taxed foods by 12.3%. Low purchasers of both taxed and untaxed reduced by 5.3% and high purchasers of both taxed and untaxed foods reduced their taxed food purchases by 4.4%.\n• Purchases (non-taxed foods): no changes in purchasing of untaxed foods, overall or by household purchasing pattern\n","Low SES households' purchases of taxed foods declined by 10.2% and medium SES households by 5.8%, whereas high SES did not change","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The gross revenue raised specifically collected for the non-essential food tax in 2014 and 2015 was 29.6 billion Mexican pesos (approximately 2 billion USD)","Government, public health institutes, civil society organisation (farmers etc) and medical academic institutions support this.  The opposition came from the beverage and food industry, sugar companies, bottling companies, and some allies in the executive and legislative branches of government, as well as lobbyists and civil society organizations.  Press campaigns  raising obesity and need for revenue and reducing the weight of oil in government revenues. ","Yes","• Batis C, Rivera JA, Popkin BM, Taillie LS. First-year evaluation of Mexico’s tax on nonessential energy-dense foods: an observational study. PLoS medicine. 2016;13(7):e1002057.\n• Bonilla-Chacín ME, Iglesias R, Suaya A, Trezza C, Macías C. Learning from the Mexican Experience with Taxes on Sugar-Sweetened Beverages and Energy-dense Foods of Low Nutritional Value: Poverty and Social Impact Analysis: World Bank; 2016.\n• Taillie LS, Rivera JA, Popkin BM, Batis C. Do high vs. low purchasers respond differently to a nonessential energy-dense food tax? Two-year evaluation of Mexico's 8% nonessential food tax. Preventive medicine. 2017;105:S37-S42.\n\n","• http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002057\n• https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/24701/Learning0from00cial0impact0analysis.pdf?sequence=1\n• https://europepmc.org/abstract/med/28729195\n","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002057\n• 10.1596/24701\n• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2017.07.009"]
[3,"1 Diet and obesity","FRANCE_soda_Tax","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory  tax on SSBs, with the aim of a reduction in obesity. The rate was adjusted every 1st of January in order to be in line with the growth rate of the consumption’s price index of the second year preceding the levy: In 2012: EUR 7.16 / hectolitre of SSB; in  2013: EUR7.31/ hectolitre of SSBs; in 2014: EUR7.45/ hectolitre of SSBs. ","SSB","General population","France - National",2012,"1 year","Passed through legislation","Tax of EUR 1/litre of energy drinks came in in 2014 (Energy drinks defined as beverages with caffeine content ≥220mg/l) ","Behavioural insights  and price changes","• Reductions in consumption\n• Substitution effects\n","• A decrease in demand of 6.7% for regular cola and 6.1% for low calorie cola for 2012 and 2013 combined.\n• The available literature on the French tax on sugared and non-sugar-sweetened soft drinks concludes that no substitution effect is observed from soft drinks towards other food product categories\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","One industry interviewee in the case study mentioned that due to the decreased consumption and product substitution resulting from the tax on sugared and non-sugar-sweetened soft drinks, the tax could have a negative impact on employment. However no figures or specific experiences were obtained in either the EU level interviews or the France case study.","After 6 months, the tax was fully shifted to soda prices, while there was a significant under-shifting of the tax to the prices of flavoured water and a slight under-shifting to the prices of fruit-flavoured drink.","Supported by health experts, opposed by industry","Yes","• Berardi N, Sevestre P, Tepaut M, Vigneron A. The impact of a ‘soda tax’on prices: evidence from French micro data. Applied Economics. 2016;48(41):3976-94.\n• ECORYS. Food taxes and their impact on competitiveness in the agri-food sector - Final report. Ref Ares(2014)2365745. 2014:1-82.\n","•https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036846.2016.1150946\n•http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/5827/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/pdf\n","• 10.1080/00036846.2016.1150946\n• NA"]
[4,"1 Diet and obesity","Hungary Public Health Product (Chips) Tax","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory public health tax that applies to certain categories of pre-packed food which are high in salt, sugar or caffeine. The basis of the tax is the quantity of the product, not the price. Exemption applies if the merchant sells less than 50 litres or 50 kilograms per year of the otherwise taxable product. Whether a product is taxable or not depends only on its ingredients, thus the tax does not discriminate for example among producers. In 2012, the tax base and rate was extended to different food categories. See PDF link Table 1 for very detailed information about the tax by product category.","Unhealthy food","General population","Hungary - National",2011,"4 years","Passed through legislation. Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (From 18 February 2014, it is prohibited to release such a food product which contains more than 2% of trans fat within its total fat content. A second set of regulations came into effect in January 2015 which ensure that the food and drink offered at public canteens satisfy some health requirements. For example, sugared soft drinks and high fat meat are prohibited, and salt and sugar are forbidden to be displayed on the tables)","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","1. Nutritional status\n2. Purchasing/sales\n","1. \n• A higher proportion of overweight and obese adults than of adults who were underweight or of normal weight changed their consumption habits.\n• Overweight and obese adults were 1.8–2.7 times more likely to change their consumption than adults who were underweight or of normal weight (independently of sex and age).\n• With regard to different product groups, overweight and obese adults were even more likely (1.5–4.3 times) to reduce their consumption than adults who were underweight or of normal weight.\n2. \n• Most consumers (59–73%) sustained reduced consumption of the target products. • The consumption of 19–36% of the participants was even lower than in the first impact assessment.\n• The consumption of 19–36% of the participants was even lower than in the first impact assessment.\n• Among those who changed their consumption: 7–16% chose cheaper products,  5–16% consumed less, 5–11% chose another brand of the product,  2–6% substituted other types of food product\n• Most of those who made substitutions chose a healthier alternative. The most frequent healthier alternatives were mineral water (63%), fresh fruit and vegetables (82–86%), home-made sweets (95%) and green herbs and spices (84%).\n","Progressive for health: For each product group, a higher proportion of adults with primary education than of those with higher education changed their consumption.\n• A higher proportion of adults with a lower level of education than of those with higher education chose a cheaper product (two to seven times more, depending on the product group).\n• A significantly higher proportion of adults with a lower level of education chose a different brand (three to ten times more, depending on the product group).\n• The proportion of adults who reduced their consumption did not differ significantly by level of education for any product group.\n• Only 0–20% of people with a lower level of education reduced their consumption because they learnt that the product was unhealthy).\n","Not reported","Not reported","The health literacy of consumers has improved over that in the first impact assessment.  In the second assessment, significantly more people had reduced their consumption because they learnt that the product was unhealthy rather than because of the price increase.\nThe higher price of sugary soft drinks became the second reason for reduced consumption.\n ","Since the introduction of the PHPT, HUF 61.3 billion (€200 million) have been generated, corresponding to the planned revenue.\n• The top 50 tax-paying companies paid 90% of the total tax revenue, and the proportion remained similar over the years.\n• Tax on four product groups accounted for 90% of the total PHPT revenue and, in 2014, for half the total revenue generated on pre-packaged sugar-sweetened products, 16% on salty snacks, 14% on salty condiments and 9% on soft drinks. These proportions did not change significantly over the years.\n• Sugar-sweetened soft drinks (kg/L) represent the highest proportion (65%) of the trade that forms the basis of the reported tax. The second highest component is pre-packaged sweets (19%) and the third, energy drinks (8%). Salty snacks and powdered soups and salty condiments each contributed 3% to the total PHPT.\n Health sector to benefit as income from the tax used for wage increases of 95,000 health workers.","The food industry opposes this: The Federation of Hungarian Food Industries issued an announcement soon after the introduction of the junk food tax, claiming that the tax enforces the producers to substitute natural ingredients (salt and sugar) with artificial ingredients. This was followed by other announcements, stating that the tax is detrimental for the industry, resulting in financial losses and layoffs. The Hungarian Chocolate and Confectionery Manufacturers also claim that while the junk food tax has minor effect on the salt and sugar intake, it substantially increases the losses in the affected industries.","No","• Bíró A. Did the junk food tax make the Hungarians eat healthier? Food Policy. 2015;54:107-15.\n• WHO Europe. Assessment of the impact of a public health product tax. Final report. 2016:30.","• https://www.research.ed.ac.uk/portal/files/19730752/Biro_A_Did_the_junk_food_tax_make_the_Hungarians_eat_healthier_2015.pdf\n• http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/disease-prevention/nutrition/publications/2017/assessment-of-the-impact-of-a-public-health-product-tax-hungary-2016.\n","• 10.1016/j.foodpol.2015.05.003\n• NA"]
[5,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_F&V_subsidy","Programme","Health body (Aboriginal Medical Corporations/Associations/Health Clinics)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy programme established by the Bulgarr Ngaru Medical Aboriginal Corporation as a response to poor nutrition among low-income families visiting health services . Weekly, eligible families pay AUD 5 contribution to the programme in the fruit and vegetable shops and collect for a box of fruit and vegetables worth AUD40 (88% subsidy), or AUD 60 if 5 children or more in the household. The box contains more fruit than vegetables and families could exchange some unwanted fruit and vegetable for alternative fruit and vegetable. This subsidy is combined with annual health assessment organised by the medical corporation, including dental and hearing check-ups. ","F&V","Socio-economic groups (disadvantaged Aboriginal communities)","Australia - New South Wales - Local",2005,"1 year","• Policy overlaps with annual check-ups at health clinics\n• Implemented by community organisation\n","Ongoing as of 2013 ","Epidemiological study","• Health services usage\n• Anthropometric changes\n• Changes in haemoglobin and iron status\n• Nutrient intakes\n","• There was a significant decrease in oral antibiotics prescribed (-0.5 prescriptions/year; 95% CI, -0.8 to -0.2) during 12 months of participation in the program compared with the 12 months before the program and reductions in the number of annual  illness-related health service or hospital visits - 0.6 (- 1.2 to - 0.001)\n• The proportion of children classified as overweight or obese at baseline was 28.3% (38/134) and the proportion in each weight category did not change (P=0.721) after 12 months.\n• A small but significant increase in mean haemoglobin level (3.1 g/L; 95% CI, 1.4–4.8g/L) was shown, although the proportion with iron deficiency (baseline, 41%; follow-up, 37%; P=0.440) and anaemia (baseline, 8%; follow-up, 5%; P=0.453) did not change significantly.\n• Significant increases (P,0·05) in b-cryptoxanthin (28·9 nmol/l, 18 %), vitamin C (10·1mmol/l, 21%) and lutein–zeaxanthin (39·3 nmol/l, 11%) levels were observed at the 12-month follow-up in 115 children, although the self-reported F&V intake was unchanged. The improvements in the levels of biomarkers of F&V intake demonstrated in the present study are consistent with increased F&V intake.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Black AP, Vally H, Morris P, Daniel M, Esterman A, Karschimkus CS, et al. Nutritional impacts of a fruit and vegetable subsidy programme for disadvantaged Australian Aboriginal children. British Journal of Nutrition. 2013;110(12):2309-17.\n• Black AP, Vally H, Morris PS, Daniel M, Esterman AJ, Smith FE, et al. Health outcomes of a subsidised fruit and vegetable program for Aboriginal children in northern New South Wales. Med J Aust. 2013;199(1):46-50.\n","• https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/bitstream/handle/11343/41868/Nutritional%20impacts_British%20Journal%20of%20Nutrition.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y\n• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_01_080713/bla10445_fm.pdf\n","• 10.1017/S0007114513001700\n• 10.5694/mja13.10445"]
[6,"1 Diet and obesity","Danish saturated fat tax","Policy","Government (Fiscal Affairs Committee)","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax levied on food manufacturers and food importers, but expected to be transmitted onto the consumer prices. The tax on saturated fat amounted to 16 DKK/kg saturated fat (2.14€/kg) in the following foods meant for human consumption if the level of saturated fat exceeded 2.3 g/100 g: meat, dairy products, animal fats that were rendered or extracted in other ways, edible oils and fats, margarine and spreads. The tax was topped up by 25% value added tax (VAT). To simplify administration for companies and producers, a fixed rate was determined by type of meat, regardless of the saturated fat content. The tax was to be paid on the amount of fat used for production rather than the actual fat content of the final product. Foods determined for exports or animal fodders were exempt from the tax. Health was an indirect aim, revenue was primary aim.","Saturated fat","General population","Denmark - National",2011,"15 months","Passed through legislation. Policy overlaps with other fiscal policy (Planned extension of existing sugar tax to include more foodstuffs - eventually cancelled in 2013 and part of a larger reform aimed at reducing income tax) ","Abolished late 2012","Empirical analysis of consumer panel and sales data for impact on consumption and modelling (comparative risk assessment) for impact on health ","1. Number of disease incidences averted and number of deaths averted\n2. Purchasing/sales\n","\n1.\n• One estimate of a total 0.2% increase in the risk of Ischemic Heart disease (40 extra cases per year)\n• One estimate of a total 0.3% decrease in the risk of Ischemic Heart disease (50 cases averted per year)\n•  123 (95%CI 59;187) yearly deaths averted or delayed, 76 (95%CI 51;100) of which in under 75 year olds.\n• 109 (95%CI 47–170) cardiovascular disease cases avoided; 0 diabetes cases avoided ; 14 (95%CI 1–25) total cancer cases avoided.\n2. \nShort run effects: \n• 10-15% decrease in the consumption of butter, blends, margarine and oils compared to intake levels before the introduction of the tax\nLonger term effects:\n• 4.0% reduction in saturated fat intake (1.6% for older men to 4.9% for middle aged women)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Projected to be 1 billion DKK (approx 184 USD million) for the Government. The overall aim of this reform was to reduce the pressure of income taxation rates for all people actively participating in the labour market and to finance this by, among other things, increased energy and environmental taxes and increased taxes to reduce adverse health behaviour.","The law passed with 96% of votes in 2011, but soon after, some political party members who lost the concurrent Danish elections stated that they regretted passing the fat tax). There was originally cross-party support and only the neo-liberal party opposed the tax  (96% of vote) and public health professionals, although public health professionals were not actively involved in the tax design process. Only one statement was found for a proponent in the public debate after the development of the tax (the chair of the Disease Prevention Commission). Opponents included the food industry, trade associations (heavily involved in the tax legislation process) and later the media with negative press coverage. Three prominent nutrition researchers claimed that the tax on fat would be harmful to health, as it would increase consumption of carbohydrates and thus also increase the risk of type 2 diabetes and heart disease. The fact that the tax did not differentiate between lean and fat meat products was also criticised for having adverse health effects, as people were expected to substitute the more expensive lean products with cheaper and fattier meat. The fat tax received substantial negative media coverage focusing on the illogical design of the tax. Intense political lobbying by trade association and the industry left to a loss of public popularity Food industry, trade associations  conducted lobbying under various guises: threatening lawsuits, predicting welfare losses, casting doubt on evidence of a public health effect, diverting focus, requesting postponements and joining forces with other lobbying groups. Industry and trade were heavily involved in the consultation and tax design political process. ","No","• Bødker M, Pisinger C, Toft U, Jørgensen T. The Danish fat tax—Effects on consumption patterns and risk of ischaemic heart disease. Preventive medicine. 2015;77:200-3.\n• Bødker M, Pisinger C, Toft U, Jørgensen T. The rise and fall of the world's first fat tax. Health policy. 2015;119(6):737-42.\n• Jensen JD, Smed S. The Danish tax on saturated fat–short run effects on consumption, substitution patterns and consumer prices of fats. Food Policy. 2013;42:18-31.\n• Smed S, Scarborough P, Rayner M, Jensen JD. The effects of the Danish saturated fat tax on food and nutrient intake and modelled health outcomes: an econometric and comparative risk assessment evaluation. European journal of clinical nutrition. 2016;70(6):681.\n• Vallgårda S, Holm L, Jensen JD. The Danish tax on saturated fat: why it did not survive. European journal of clinical nutrition. 2015;69(2):223.\n\n","• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0091743515001589\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0168851015000706\n• http://okonomi.foi.dk/workingpapers/wppdf/wp2012/wp_2012_14_danish_fat_tax.pdf\n• https://www.nature.com/articles/ejcn20166\n• https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Signild_Vallgarda/publication/267741946_The_Danish_Tax_on_Saturated_Fat_Why_It_Did_Not_Survive/links/54d38d680cf28e0697285d45.pdf\n\n","• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2015.03.031\n• 10.1016/j.healthpol.2015.03.003\n• 10.1016/j.foodpol.2013.06.004\n• 10.1038/ejcn.2016.6\n• 10.1038/ejcn.2014.224"]
[7,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_F&V_discount","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy programme to provide a 20% price discount on all fresh and frozen fruit and vegetables (excluding frozen potato products), all bottled water and all artificially sweetened soft drinks applied at point of sale and promoted in participating stores in the area, as part of an RCT. The aim was to increased purchase of F&V in the short-term in disadvantaged communities. This programme overlaps with another non-fiscal policy of consumer education as one arm of the RCT.","F&V, artificially sweetened drinks","Socio-economic groups (disadvantaged Aboriginal communities)","Australia - Northern Territory - Local","2012-2014","6 months","Not reported","Not reported","RCT","Purchasing of fruit and vegetables ","• Price discount alone was associated with a 12·7% (95% CI 4·1–22·1) increase in purchases in grams of fruit and vegetables combined (primary outcome), and a 19·8% (6·2–35·1) increase post discount (after vs before); an effect of 12 g and 18 g per capita per day. Sensitivity analyses did not modify the results for the primary outcome measure.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Brimblecombe J, Ferguson M, Chatfield MD, Liberato SC, Gunther A, Ball K, et al. Effect of a price discount and consumer education strategy on food and beverage purchases in remote Indigenous Australia: a stepped-wedge randomised controlled trial. The Lancet Public Health. 2017;2(2):e82-e95.\n• Brimblecombe J, Ferguson M, Liberato SC, Ball K, Moodie ML, Magnus A, et al. Stores Healthy Options Project in Remote Indigenous Communities (SHOP@ RIC): a protocol of a randomised trial promoting healthy food and beverage purchases through price discounts and in-store nutrition education. BMC Public Health. 2013;13(1):744\n","• http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lanpub/PIIS2468-2667(16)30043-3.pdf\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3751924/pdf/1471-2458-13-744.pdf\n","• 10.1016/S2468-2667(16)30043-3\n• 10.1186/1471-2458-13-744"]
[8,"1 Diet and obesity","Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC)","Programme","Government (Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children  as part of the US Federal grants to States for supplemental foods, health care referrals, and nutrition education for low-income pregnant, breastfeeding, and non-breastfeeding postpartum women, and to infants and children up to age five who are found to be at nutritional risk. Health was therefore the primary aim. Participants receive fixed cash-value vouchers (CVV) for the purchase of fruits and vegetables and quantity-based WIC food vouchers, cheques or electronic benefit cards for other foods. The 2009 revisions aimed to promote breast-feeding and increase consumption of fruits, vegetables and whole grains while reducing intakes of saturated fat, cholesterol and sugar. Revisions to the benefits to participants include \n• Reduced total maximum milk prescription and cheese substitution allowance; \n• Increased availability of soy products; \n• Disallowance of whole milk prescription for women and children over age 2; \n• Addition of a cash value voucher (CVV) exclusively for fruit and vegetable purchases;\n• Reduced maximum egg prescription; \n• Allowance of whole grain bread and cereal products; \n• Allowance of canned beans as replacements for dry beans and/or peanut butter; and\n• Increased low-mercury (non-tuna) canned fish options.\n","Prenatal diet / Breastfeeding / Healthy diet","Socio-economic (low income population - mothers and children)","USA - National",2009,"Varied (multiple studies)","• Implementation costs: $6 billion budget \n• Overlaps with other policies in the package including promoting breastfeeding to all pregnant women, provides nutrition education and health and social service referrals to eligible participants \n• Passed through legislation\n","Policy was revised in 2009; Trump administration plans to move WIC from USDA remit to Health and Human services.","Empirical assessment","1. Pregnancy and birth outcomes\n2. Infant mortality\n3. Nutrition\n4. Breastfeeding initiation and infant feeding practices\n5. Food insecurity\n6. Immunization rates\n","1. Nutrition\n• Average scores for young, low-income children on the Healthy Eating Index — a measure of diet quality that assesses conformance to the Dietary Guidelines for Americans — increased more than twice as much (11 %) among WIC participants as among non-participants (5 %) between 2003-2008 (before implementation) and 2011-2012 (after implementation).\n2. Breastfeeding initiation and infant feeding practices\n• Between 2002 and 2013, the percentage of all children who were breastfed increased from 71.4 % to 81.1 %. Over roughly the same period, from 2002 to 2014, the percentage of infants participating in WIC who were breastfed increased from 48.3 percent to 69.8 %.\n• 20% of mothers participating in WIC introduce cereals, fruits, vegetables, or meat before 4 months, compared to at least 60 % 20 years ago\n• cow’s milk is introduced to most infants near their first birthday, consistent with current guidance: at 8 months of age, only 10 % of infants have consumed cow’s milk, and by 11 months, 37 % have.\n• several studies have found that participation in WIC is associated with increased iron intake.\n3. Food insecurity\n• Participation in WIC reduces the prevalence of food insecurity among children by at least 20 %.\n4. Immunization rates\n• Low-income children who have never participated in WIC have immunization rates ranging from 5 to 19 percent lower than current participants, while children who remain in WIC tend to have immunization coverage comparable to higher-income children.\n","Progressive for health: Rate of 9.6 per 1,000 live births among African-American WIC participants compared to 21.0 among non-WIC African-American participant.","Not reported","Not reported"," 1. School performance\n• New research suggests that prenatal and early childhood participation in WIC is associated with improved cognitive development and academic achievement. WIC is quite effective in reaching women during, rather than after, their pregnancy: 83 percent of new mothers. \n• Children whose mothers participated in WIC while pregnant scored higher on assessments of mental development at age 2 than similar children whose mothers did not participate. The benefit associated with WIC participation persisted into the school years, as children whose mothers participated in WIC when they were in utero performed better on reading assessments.\n2. Neighbouring food environments\n• Multiple studies, conducted in various locations using different study designs, have consistently found that availability of healthy foods increased after implementation.\n  ","Not reported","Not reported","?","• Carlson, Steven, and Zoë Neuberger. 2015. “WIC Works : Addressing the Nutrition and Health Needs of Low-Income Families for 40 Years.” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities: 1–23.  \n• Fox, Mary Kay, William Hamilton, and Biing-Hwan Lin. 2004. “Effects of Food Assistance and Nutrition Programs on Nutrition and Health: Volume 4, Executive Summary of the Literature Review.” United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service: 118. \n• Colman S, Nichols-Barrer IP, Redline JE, Devaney BL, Ansell SV. Nutrition Assistance Program Report Series Effects of the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC): A Review of Recent Research. 2012.\n• Nestle M. Food Politics. Food Politics. 2018. \n","• http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/5-4-15fa.pdf.\n• https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/46575/30211_fanrr19-4a_002.pdf?v=41479\n• https://www.mathematica-mpr.com/-/media/publications/pdfs/nutrition/wic_research_review.pdf\n• https://www.foodpolitics.com/tag/wic/\n","• NA\n• NA \n• NA\n• NA"]
[9,"1 Diet and obesity","USA_Berkley_ SSB_tax","Policy","Government ","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax levied: $0.01 -per-ounce tax on the distribution of SSBs, including soda, energy, sports and fruit-flavoured drinks; sweetened water, coffee and tea, and syrups used to make SSBs.  Health was a primary aim (prevention and control of obesity).","SSB","General population","USA - Berkeley - Local",2015,"5 months","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","obesity reductions and disease cases avoided","After passage of Berkeley’s SSB tax, adjusted consumption of SSBs decreased in Berkeley (–21%) and increased in the comparison cities (+4%); Figure 2; P= .046). Specifically, adjusted consumption ofregular soda decreased by 26% in Berkeley and increased by 10% in the comparison cities (P= .05), and adjusted consumption ofsports drinks decreased by 36% in Berkeley and increased by 21% in the comparison com- munities (P= .02).\n In addition, as illustrated in Figure 2, water consumption increased more in Berkeley (+63%) than in comparison cities (+19%; P< .01).  In addition, of the 124 (22%) who reported changing drinking habits because of the tax, 101 (82%) reported drinking SSBs less frequently and 48 (40%) reported drinking smaller sizes because of the tax.","Effects more pronounced in higher SES groups","Not reported","Not reported","The tax is quite local so some respondents reported switching purchasing place to avoid tax.","Not reported","The Berkeley protax campaign—“Berkeley vs. Big Soda”—achieved success, which has been attributed to early and diverse coalition building, reflected in the campaign having prominently featured community representatives and endorsements from a wide range of supporters. Campaign messages focused not only on health harms of SSBs, but also on inappropriate behaviour by the SSB industry. Campaign exposure, knowledge that the tax passed by a high margin (76%) of votes, or awareness of widespread support for the tax may have altered social norms, but the publications did not assess social norm.","NA","• Cawley J, Frisvold DE. The Pass‐Through of Taxes on Sugar‐Sweetened Beverages to Retail Prices: The Case of Berkeley, California. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 2017;36(2):303-26.\n• Falbe J, Thompson HR, Becker CM, Rojas N, McCulloch CE, Madsen KA. Impact of the Berkeley excise tax on sugar-sweetened beverage consumption. American journal of public health. 2016;106(10):1865-71.\n• Silver LD, Ng SW, Ryan-Ibarra S, Taillie LS, Induni M, Miles DR, et al. Changes in prices, sales, consumer spending, and beverage consumption one year after a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages in Berkeley, California, US: A before-and-after study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(4):e1002283.\n","• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/pam.21960\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5024386/pdf/AJPH.2016.303362.pdf\n• http://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1002283","• 10.1002/pam.21960\n• 10.2105/AJPH.2016.303362\n• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002283"]
[10,"1 Diet and obesity","Mexico conditional cash transfer (Oportunidades)","Policy","Government","Financial incentive","Voluntary programme of financial incentives to promote healthy behaviours: The three chief components of Oportunidades are education, health, and nutrition. Under the education component, grants are provided for primary school through to high school. The grants increase as children progress to higher grades and, beginning at the secondary level, are slightly higher for girls than for boys. The amounts of the monthly grants range from about $10.50 (105 pesos) in the third grade of primary to about $58 (580 pesos) for boys and $66 (660 pesos) for girls in the third year of high school. Beginning with secondary school, the grants are higher for girls to remain in school because they tend to have a higher drop-out rate; the health component provides basic health care for all members of the family, with a particular emphasis on preventive health care. This service is provided by government public health institutions. The nutrition component includes a fixed monetary transfer, equal to about $15.50 (155 pesos) monthly, for improved food consumption, as well as nutritional supplements for children between the ages of four months and two years, malnourished children aged 2 to 4, and pregnant and lactating women. Health was a primary aim, this was designed to provide incentives in the form of cash transfers to poor families, to improve the use of preventive and other basic health services, nutrition counselling, and supplementary foods and to increase school enrolment and attendance.","Overall diet","Socio-economic (low income population and remote deprived communities)","Mexico - National",1997,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 18 years most assessments are shorter","Implementation costs: Expenditures on Progesa totalled about $770 million per year by 1999 and $1 billion in 2000, translating into fully 0.2 percent of the country's GDP and about 20 percent of the federal budget. Of that, administrative costs are estimated to absorb about 9 percent of total program costs.   ","Programme was renamed twice (Prospera to Oportunidades to now Prospera); There have been two principal modifications in Oportunidades, in large part, due to the IFPRI evaluation. First, the program has been extended to urban areas. Oportunidades was originally a rural program focused on primary and secondary education, although its plan was to first achieve a generalized coverage in rural areas and then slowly extend to poor urban areas. This is exactly the pattern that has evolved. The second important change has been the extension of education grants to the high school level.","Multiple epidemiological, RCTs","• Hypertension\n• General health\n• Child growth /nutritional status\n• BMI\n• Maternal health\n","• Adults in intervention communities had a lower combined prevalence of uncontrolled hypertension (33.80% vs 34.52%, P = .008) and lower Mean systolic (β = –2.60, P < .001) and diastolic (β = –2.84, P < .001) blood pressures\n• A decline of 11.8 percentage points in the incidence of anemia among children under age two; Children under 5 in Progresa, had a 12 percent lower incidence of illness\n• increased height-for-age z-scores; decreased levels of stunting, and levels of children being overweight; an increase of 16 percent in mean growth rate per year (corresponding to 1 cm) for children who received treatment between 12 and 36 months of age\n• BMI was lower in adults from intervention communities than in those from control com-munities (26.57 kg/m2 vs 27.16 kg/m2, P < .001), as was the prevalence of obesity (20.28% vs 25.31%, P < .001) and overweight (59.24% vs 63.04%, P = .03);  \n• Oportunidades was not associated with pregnancy experience among adolescents.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","• Young male beneficiaries of Progresa have on average 0.85 years or nearly 10 additional months of schooling and young women participants on average have 0.65 years or nearly eight additional months of schooling. The largest impacts were reported on children who enter secondary school, where impacts represent a percentage increase of Enrolment over 20 percent for girls and 10 percent for boys.\n• Adult beneficiaries of Progresa between 18 and 50 years had 19 percent fewer days of difficulty with daily activities due to illness than their non-Progresa counterparts.\n• For beneficiaries over 50 years, those in Progresa had 19 percent fewer days of difficulty with daily activities, 17 fewer days incapacitated, and 22 percent fewer days in bed, compared with similar individuals who did not receive program benefits.\n\n  ","Not reported","Not reported","No","• Center for Global Development. CASE 9: Improving the health of the poor in Mexico. Available from: https://www.cgdev.org/doc/millions/MS_case_9.pdf.\n• Darney BG, Weaver MR, Sosa-Rubi SG, Walker D, Servan-Mori E, Prager S, et al. The oportunidades conditional cash transfer program: effects on pregnancy and contraceptive use among young rural women in Mexico. International perspectives on sexual and reproductive health. 2013;39(4):205.\n• Fernald LC, Gertler PJ, Neufeld LM. 10-year effect of Oportunidades, Mexico's conditional cash transfer programme, on child growth, cognition, language, and behaviour: a longitudinal follow-up study. The Lancet. 2009;374(9706):1997-2005.\n• Fernald LC, Hou X, Gertler PJ. Oportunidades program participation and body mass index, blood pressure, and self-reported health in Mexican adults. Prev Chronic Dis. 2008;5(3):A81.\n• Newcommer AJ. The Long-Term Effects of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs on Health: An Analysis of Mexico’s Oportunidades: University of Pittsburgh; 2017.\n• Parker SW. Mexico’s Oportunidades Program. Shanghai Poverty Conference. 2004;50:1-3.\n• The World Bank. A Model from Mexico for the World 2014. Available from: http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/19/un-modelo-de-mexico-para-el-mundo.\n\n","• https://www.cgdev.org/doc/millions/MS_case_9.pdf.\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4096692/pdf/nihms577217.pdf\n• http://www.cegadev.org/assets/cega_research_projects/65/Cash_Transfers_and_Child_Development.pdf\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2483550/pdf/PCD53A81.pdf\n• http://d-scholarship.pitt.edu/33595/1/Newcomer_BPhil_Pitt_Dec2017.pdf\n• http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website00819C/WEB/PDF/CASE_-62.PDF.\n• http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/11/19/un-modelo-de-mexico-para-el-mundo.\n\n","• NA\n• 10.1363/3920513\n• 10.1016/S0140-6736(09)61676-7\n• NA\n• NA\n• NA\n• NA"]
[11,"1 Diet and obesity","National School Lunch Program (NSLP)","Policy","Government (federally-funded. The Food and Nutrition Service, an agency of the USDA administers NLSP at federal level, then usually Department for Education at state level)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The voluntary means-tested component of the National School Lunch Programme (NSLP) targets students from households with low income relative to national standards, and it now accounts for over half of the total number of program participants and subsidized school lunches. The aim is to reduce undernourishment in children and increase their ability to resist infections. Participating school districts and independent schools receive cash subsidies and USDA Foods for each reimbursable meal they serve. In exchange, NSLP institutions must serve lunches that meet Federal meal pattern requirements and offer the lunches at a free or reduced price to eligible children. School food authorities can also be reimbursed for snacks served to children who participate in an approved afterschool program including an educational or enrichment activity. Children may be determined “categorically eligible” for free meals through participation in certain Federal Assistance Programs, such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, or based on their status as a homeless, migrant, runaway, or foster child. Eligible students pay 40 cents or less, or nothing for school lunches if they come from a household with income below 185% or 135% of the Federal poverty guidelines, respectively. All NSLP lunches must meet Federal requirements, though decisions about the specific foods to serve and the methods of preparation are made by local school food authorities. Information about the NSLP nutrition standards, along with technical assistance and guidance materials, may be found on the School Meals website: https://www.fns.usda.gov/school-meals/nutritionstandards-school-mealsThe local average treatment effect for children receiving full and partial subsidies is an additional 10.8 servings of fruit per week, 3.1 servings of green salad per week, 5.6 servings of carrots per week, 5.2 servings of other vegetables per week, and 10.2 servings of 100% fruit juice per week.","School lunch","Children (school age)","USA - National",1946,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 13 years","• Implementation costs: $11.1 billion in 2011\n• Policy overlaps with school breakfast program) \n• Passed through legislation (National School Lunch Act 1946)\n","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","• Nutritional status\n• Nutrient availability & dietary intakes\n","• Estimates indicate significant positive associations between NSLP means-tested subsidies and children’s consumption of fruit, carrots, other vegetables, and 100% fruit juice by a magnitude in the range of 0.5–1.2 servings per week; how- ever, the association is strongest among the pop- ulation of children receiving full school lunch subsidies.\n• NSLP reduces food insufficiency among low-income households with children. In summer months when the NSLP is not available, the food insuffi-ciency rate among recipients is about .7 percentage points higher than that in non-summer months. Since the average monthly food insufficiency rate is 3.9% in the sample, our finding indicates that the NSLP participation is associated with a 14% reduction in the risk of experiencing food insufficiency; & significant increases in the number of servings of fruit, green salad, carrots, other vegetables, and 100% fruit juice consumed in 1 week for subsidized children relative to unsubsidized children: an additional 10.8 servings of fruit per week, 3.1 servings of green salad per week, 5.6 servings of carrots per week, 5.2 servings of other vegetables per week, and 10.2 servings of 100% fruit juice per week.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","• Howard LL, Prakash N. Do school lunch subsidies change the dietary patterns of children from low‐income households? Contemporary Economic Policy. 2012;30(3):362-81.\n• Huang J, Barnidge E. Low-income Children's participation in the National School Lunch Program and household food insufficiency. Social Science & Medicine. 2016;150:8-14.","Link","• 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2011.00264.x\n• 10.1016/j.socscimed.2015.12.020"]
[12,"1 Diet and obesity","DEU_SSB_TAX","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","A mandatory 20% sales excise tax (in addition to VAT) on sugar sweetened beverage, with health as a primary aim , specifically the reduction overweight/obesity AND an impact on caries.","SSB","General population","Germany - National",2015,"<6 months","Not reported ","A second study looked at 10yrs","Modelling (Monte Carlo simulations)","• reductions in consumption\n• change in BMI\n• incidence of caries\n• Price elasticities\n","• Based on our simulations, a 20% SSB tax reduced daily energy consumption in males and, to a lesser degree, females\n• On the population level, taxation avoided 1,028,000 (−3%) overweight individuals and 479,000 (−4%) obese individuals. The benefit of a tax for reducing the prevalence of overweight and obesity was largest in those aged 20–29 years and male groups (Table 5). Obesity was also reduced mainly in male populations. \n• Taxation reduced caries increment in most males but not most females (Table 2), with the same applying to treatment costs. Caries and cost reduction were higher in younger than older groups and in low- than in middle- or high-income individuals. The greatest reduction in caries increment (>10%) was observed in males from low- or middle-income backgrounds. By contrast, taxation was disadvantageous for low-income older females, for whom increases in caries increment and costs were both seen— because SSB consumption in that group was low, while that of juices was relatively high. Based on cross-price elasticities, sugar intake via juices (among others) increased considerably, while decreases through reduced SSB consumption were low;  Over 10 y, total mean (SD) caries increment at the population level was estimated to be 82.27 (1.15) million and 83.02 (1.08) million new lesions at 20% and 0% SSB tax, respectively.\n• Mean SSB price elasticity for low or middle income stratum -1.21 (-3.87 to -0.69) and for high income stratum -0.908 (-2.903 to -0.518)\n","Taxation also decreased the BMI in groups with low rather than high income, and males rather than females.","Not reported","Caries generated costs of 2.64 (0.39) billion and 2.72 (0.35) billion euro, respectively. Additional tax revenue for a 20% SSB tax (including altered revenue for the VAT) was 37.99 (3.41) billion euro over the 10 years","Not reported","For caries\n• Revenue = 37.99  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Base case Caries increment +50% Revenue = 37.99  billion euro over the 10 y\n• 0.4% caries increment change per 1 g of sugar daily Revenue = 37.99  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Pass-on 80% Revenue = 34.00  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Restoration with anaesthesia, moisture control Revenue = 37.99  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Required restorations involve 3 surfaces Revenue = 37.99  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Discount 0% Revenue = 43.65  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Discount 5% Revenue = 35.28  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Discounting health outcomes 3% Revenue = 37.99  billion euro over the 10 y\n• Cross-price elasticity of SSBs also for water, tea, coffee Revenue = 50.78  billion euro over the 10 y\nNo revenue for overweight/obesity reduction due to short time horizon\n ","This tax has been blocked in Germany. It is supported by Health experts, but opposed by industry and also the government.","Yes","• Schwendicke F, Stolpe M. Taxing sugar-sweetened beverages: impact on overweight and obesity in Germany. BMC public health. 2017;17(1):88.\n• Schwendicke F, Thomson W, Broadbent J, Stolpe M. Effects of taxing sugar-sweetened beverages on caries and treatment costs. Journal of dental research. 2016;95(12):1327-32.\n","• https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-016-3938-4\n• https://europepmc.org/abstract/med/27671690\n","• 10.1186%2Fs12889-016-3938-4\n• 10.1177/0022034516660278"]
[13,"1 Diet and obesity","AUS_SSB_Tax (20%)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","A mandatory 20% tax on SSBs. Health was a primary aim, specifically a reduction in obesity – disease and costs associated but also gains in productivity (paid and unpaid work) as a result of obesity reduction.","SSB","General population (modelled age >=20yrs)","Australia - National",2010,"25 years","Implementation costs: AUD 27.6 million ","Not reported ","Modelling (multi-state life table Markov model)","Life years, DALYS, % reduction in obesity","The 20% increase in price would result in an average change in consumption of SSBs from 141 g/day to 124 g/day across the Australian adult male population and from 76 to 67 g/day for women, representing a 12.6% decrease. Average energy intake would go down by 16 kJ/day for men and 9 kJ/day for women, and average body mass index of men by 0.10 kg/m2 (0.09–0.11), which is about 320g for 1.78m males. Women would lose 0.06 kg/m2 (0.06–0.07), or about 170g, assuming a height of1.63m. The reductions in BMI would be larger for younger age groups (who consume higher volumes of SSBs) than older age groups. The tax could result in a decline in the prevalence of obesity of about 2.7% (0.7 percentage point) among men, and 1.2% (0.3 percentage point) among women, compared to business as usual. Over the lifetime of Australian adults alive in 2010, these seemingly modest changes in body mass translated to gains of 112,000 health-adjusted life years for men (95% uncertainty interval [UI]: 73,000–155,000) and 56,000 (95% UI: 36,000–76,000) for women. The annual gains rise almost linearly over the first 25 years after the start of the tax. The estimated benefit for 20–24 year old males is the equivalent of about 7.6 days in full health, of which 4.9 in life extension and 2.7 in improved quality of life. For their female peers the model predicts 3.7 health-adjusted days gained, of which 2.2 from increased longevity. \nMost notably, the 20% tax would reduce the number of type 2 diabetes cases, with incidence down by approximately 800 per year. This is roughly a 0.6% reduction com- pared to the number expected without the tax (approximately 130,000 per year). The annual number of new cases of heart disease and stroke would be reduced by 240 and 70, respectively. After 25 years there would be 16,000 less prevalent cases of diabetes, 4,400 fewer cases of IHD and 1,100 of stroke. In total, an estimated 1600 fewer deaths will occur by year 25, with heart disease accounting for the largest share of this postponed mortality.\nThe SSB tax was estimated to reduce the number of people with obesity by 437,000 persons (95% CI: 400,000 persons to 473,000 persons) which was 1.96% of the entire population, and to reduce the number of workers with obesity by 317,000 persons (95% CI: 290,000 workers to 343,000 workers).\nThe Tax would also result in 25,000 extra life years (LYs) for men (95% CI: 18,000–32,000 LYs) and 10,000 LYs gained for women (95% CI: 8000–14,000 LYs). Over the lifetime, 43,000 DALYs could be gained for men (95% CI: 28,000–60,000 DALYs) and 20,000 for women (95% CI: 14,000–28,000 DALYs). The reduction in the healthcare costs (savings) over the lifetime of the 2010 population aged 20 years or older was AU$427 million (95% CI: AU$305 million to AU$554 million)","Not reported","Human capital approach, and fricton cost approach","The total additional weeks in the paid and unpaid sectors due to the tax on SSBs were 363,000 weeks (95% CI: 275,000 weeks to 453,000 weeks). The additional hours of paid work as a proportion of the total hours worked per year by the Australian population in 2010 is 0.04% [52]. The total productivity gains in the working- age population due to the tax on SSBs was estimated to be AU$751 million (95% CI: AU$565 million to AU$954 mil- lion), using the HCA. \nThe HCA were sustained over the first 5 years, reaching around AU$23 million per year (95% CI: AU$16 million to AU$30 million), and then decreased over time. This is because the participation in paid work decreases rapidly around the retirement age (65 years).\nThe annual total productivity gains in the unpaid sector increased to around AU$25 million per year (95% CI: AU$20 million to AU$31 million) after the first 25 years. The total productivity gain of household work that could be achieved was AU$1042 million (95% CI: AU$826 million to AU$1276 million) over the lifetime. In addition, the total productivity gain in volunteer and community work was AU$129 mil- lion (95% CI: AU$103 million to AU$159 million) over the lifetime. The productivity gains (including those in the paid sector using the HCA and those in the unpaid sector) that could potentially be achieved summed to AU$1922 million (95% CI: AU$1494 million to AU$2389 million).  The reduction in the healthcare costs (savings) over the lifetime of the 2010 population aged 20 years or older was AU$427 million (95% CI: AU$305 million to AU$554 million) (Table 2). If we add healthcare cost savings to those in paid and unpaid sectors, the over- all potential economic gain due to the hypothetical tax of 20% on SSBs was estimated to be AU$2347 million (95% CI: AU$1802 million to AU$2935 million) over the lifetime (Table 2). This productivity gain is equivalent to AU$5375 over the lifetime per person whose obesity is prevented or cured by the intervention. ","Not reported","A 20% tax on these products would raise taxation revenue in excess ofAUD400 million each year. The modelling study but suggest can be put towards promotion activities or used to subsidise healthy foods.","Not implemented but politically an SSB tax is not seem as acceptable in Australia. Proponents would be health experts, while government, industry reps oppose it.","Yes","• Veerman JL, Sacks G, Antonopoulos N, Martin J. The impact of a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages on health and health care costs: a modelling study. PloS one. 2016;11(4):e0151460.\n• Nomaguchi T, Cunich M, Zapata-Diomedi B, Veerman JL. The impact on productivity of a hypothetical tax on sugar-sweetened beverages. Health Policy. 2017;121(6):715-25.\n","• http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0151460\n• https://www.healthpolicyjrnl.com/article/S0168-8510(17)30094-5/fulltext\n","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0151460\n• 10.1016/j.healthpol.2017.04.001"]
[14,"1 Diet and obesity","France_sugar_price_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory ad-valorem tax of 10% on  full-fat and 5% on semi-skimmed yoghurts, fromages blancs and dessert yoghurts. Health was a primary aim.","Fat (in yoghurts)","General population","France - National",2007,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (structural econometric model)","Price elasticities- purchasing of yoghurt products","Price elasticities: Ignoring producer price responses, reudction in fat pruchases of 300-3025g ( around 38%). After accounting for producer price responses - down to 76.5g (9.1% reduction). ","Other (Fat tax affects all demogrpahic groups similarly (8% to 10% reduction, taking into account producer strategic price response). However, reduced elasticities if main shopper is a man (6.4% reduction))","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Allais O, Etile F, Lecocq S. Mandatory labels, taxes and market forces: An empirical evaluation of fat policies. J Health Econ. 2015;43:27-44.","Link","• 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2015.06.003"]
[15,"1 Diet and obesity","Barbados_SSB_Tax (10%)","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% excise tax (ad valorem) on SSBs. Health was a primary aim, in particular the reduction in obesity.","SSB","General population ","Barbados - National",2015,"2013-2016","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Empirical assessment (looked at differences between pace of growth in SSB and non-SSB prices leading up to and immediately following the tax implementation","Drink prices","In the three quarters prior to the introduction of the tax, SSBs and non-SSBs experienced very similar year-over-year price growth of approximately 1% for both beverage categories, and had parallel patterns of fluctuation. During the third quarter of 2015, at the end of which the SSB tax took effect, the trends diverged. At that time, the growth in SSB prices approached 3%while the growth innon-SSBprices decreased; thereafter, thechange in SSB prices outpaced that ofnon-SSBs. In the two quarters after the tax took effect, the growth in average SSB prices compared to the previous year reached 5.9%, while stayingmostly flat, between 0 and 1%, for non- SSBs.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Alvarado M, Kostova D, Suhrcke M, Hambleton I, Hassell T, Samuels TA, et al. Trends in beverage prices following the introduction of a tax on sugar-sweetened beverages in Barbados. Preventive medicine. 2017;105:S23-S5.","Link","• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2017.07.013"]
[16,"1 Diet and obesity","India_palmoil_tax","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 20% excise tax on palm oil purchases. Health was a primary aim, specifically the reduction of the consumption of saturated fats.","Palm oil","General population","India - National",2014,"9 years","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Modelling (discrete time microsimulation model)","Number of disease incidences averted and number of deaths averted","\"A 20% palm oil tax without substitution with other oils would lower saturated fat intake per person in India by about 1.3 (95% confidence interval 0.8 to 1.8) g/day and lower polyunsaturated fatty acid consumption by about 0.2 (0.1 to 0.3) g/day.\" The change in cholesterol from the palm oil tax would be expected to avert approximately 251 000 (171 000 to 331 000) deaths from myocardial infarction (1.4% (0.6% to 2.1%) of myocardial infarction deaths) and 112 000 (76 000 to 148 000) deaths from stroke (0.8% (0.5% to 1.1%) of stroke deaths) over the 10 year period from 2014 to 2023\". Also look at substitution with other oils and under a pessimistic scenario still reduces deaths from MI and strokes.","\"In terms of health equity, much of the decline in deaths is concentrated among men and urban dwellers, reflecting the heightened prevalence of major risk factors such as hypertension and hyperlipidemia among this group. This, combined with the worst case scenario of increased food insecurity, suggests that a palm oil tax may cause a net transfer of health from rural to urban populations and from women to men.\"","Not reported","Not reported","A 20% palm oil tax along with substitution with other oils would be expected to result in a reduction of intake of 13.1 kilocalories per person per day in India and an increase in food insecurity by about 0.59% (0.50% to 0.68%), leading to new chronic food insecurity for 73 000 (46 000 to 100 000) Indians, after changes in household expenditure due to the tax and kilocalorie differences among oils have been accounted for.","Not reported","Not reported","No","Basu S, Babiarz KS, Ebrahim S, Vellakkal S, Stuckler D, Goldhaber-Fiebert JD. Palm oil taxes and cardiovascular disease mortality in India: economic-epidemiologic model. BMJ. 2013;347:f6048.","Link","• 10.1136/bmj.f6048 "]
[17,"1 Diet and obesity","US_Sugar_cap_and_trade","Modelling study","NA","Other (Cap and trade)","Mandatory policy in which sugar trading is capped In the same way as emissions trading works in environmental policy: “added-sugar emissions” of food manufacturers into the food supply would be capped by creating tradable added-sugar permits, which manufacturers must secure and surrender in numbers equal to their added-sugar emissions into the food supply. Manufacturers whose added-sugar levels fall below their permitted level may sell surplus permits to other manufacturers, whereas manufacturers exceeding their permitted level must buy permits or reformulate their products to reduce added-sugar content, creating an incentive to lower added-sugar emissions into the food supply. The overall cap on sugar emissions would be lowered over time a 20% reduction over 20 years (at a linear rate of 1% from the starting level annually) )by requiring a proportion of all permits to be retired  to meet dietary recommendations and allow sufficient time to detect chronic disease effects. Health was a primary aim (the study aimed to evaluate the impact on the consumption and disease and how much it might cost food manufacturers and consumers) ","Added sugar","General population","USA - National",2010,"20 years","Not reported ","The overall cap on sugar emissions would be lowered over time by requiring a proportion of all permits to be retired periodically, aiming toward a reduction target set by an independent scientific panel.","Modelling (a stochastic, discrete-time, agent-based mathematical model)","• Weight reduction\n• Obesity reduction\n• Diabetes incidence avoided\n• Healthcare costs avoided\n","• The  reduced added-sugar emissions would be expected to lower weight among people in the United States by 3.0 pounds on average over 20 years (95% CI=2.8, 3.2)\n• this reduction in body weight would correspond to a 1.7-percentage-point lower expected obesity prevalence rate than in the scenario without the cap-and-trade policy (95% CI =0.9, 2.4), representing a 4.6% decrease\n• The reduced added-sugar emissions would also be expected to lower type 2 diabetes incidence by 21.7 cases per 100 000 people (95% CI =12.9, 30.6), a 4.2% lower incidence rate\n• On the basis of recent health care cost estimates for obesity the cap-and-trade system would be expected to avert $9.7 billion in health care spending over the 20-year simulation period (95% CI=$4.5 billion, $14.9 bil-lion), at a standard 3% annual discount rate. \n","Heterogeneous effects among different demographic groups; racial/ethnic minorities generally experienced the largest declines in obesity prevalence and type 2 diabetes incidence under the simulated policy.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The sum of the added-sugar permits purchased by industry averaged $3.7 billion over the same simulation period (95% CI =$3.6 billion, $3.8 billion), when also tabulated at a 3% annual discount rate.  ","Not reported","?","Basu S, Lewis K. Reducing added sugars in the food supply through a cap-and-trade approach. American journal of public health. 2014;104(12):2432-8.","Link","• 10.2105/AJPH.2014.302170"]
[18,"1 Diet and obesity","France_sugar_price_model","Modelling study","NA","Other (Floor price removal)","Mandatory reduction in the reference price for sugar (the floor price) by 36% over a 4 year period . Health as a secondary aim (sugar price reduction).","Sugar","General population","EU - International",2006,"1 year","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Modelling (structural econometric model)","Price elasticities; consumption of SSBs","Price elasticities: 36% decrease in the sugar price which generates a decrease in the production cost of 2 EURO cents for regular products (1.79 to 2.68 EURO cent, depending on sugar content).  Assuming a full transmission of the production cost decrease to the final price, consumer prices of regular products decrease by more than 3.4% in average (1.7 to 6.5% depending on products modelled).  Decreases in prices lead to  an increase in agggregate market share of 7.5& for regular products, a decrease of 3.5% for diet products. Consumption: Average consumption of regular products increases by 1.16 liters while the average consumption\nof diet products remains roughly identical. Consumption of added sugar would raise by 124 grams per person and per year. ","Health- regressive (The presence of overweight or obese individuals in the household plays a role in consumption changed. For households where less than half of the members are overweight and obese, the increase is about 1.3 liters of regular soft drinks and 141 grams of added sugar, which are statistically di¤erent from the results of an average househol: 1.16L and 124 g added sugar.)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Bonnet C, Requillart V. Does the EU sugar policy reform increase added sugar consumption? An empirical evidence on the soft drink market. Health Econ. 2010;20:1012-24.  ","Link","• 10.1002/hec.1721"]
[19,"1 Diet and obesity","UK_SSB_Tax(model)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tiered taxation of SSB with different taxation levels depending on the sugar content of beverages. High-sugar drinks have more than 8 g of sugar per 100 mL, mid-sugar drinks have 5–8 g of sugar per 100 mL, and low-sugar drinks have less than 5 g of sugar per 100 mL. Three possible industry responses were modelled: First, reformulation to reduce sugar concentration; second, a rise in price; and third, activities to change the relative market share of high-sugar, mid-sugar, and low-sugar drinks. For each response the better-case and worse-case scenarios for reduction of sugar consumption resulted in six scenarios\n1. Scenario 1: The better-case reformulation scenario assumed that industry would reduce the sugar con- centration of high-sugar drinks by 30% and mid-sugar drinks by 15%. \n2. Scenario 2: the worse-case scenario, we assumed a 5% reduction in sugar concentration of both high-sugar and mid-sugar drinks.  Under both scenarios 1 & 2, the volume consumed is assumed to remain constant\n3. Scenario 3: assumed that the tax is passed on only through SSBs. \n4. Scenario 4: we assume that the levy is passed on evenly across all soft drinks (both diet beverages and SSBs), fruit juice, and bottled water, resulting in a 6% price rise.\n5. Scenario 5: we assume the market share of high-sugar drinks would need to fall by 12% alongside a 6% increase for each of mid-sugar and low-sugar drinks, \n6. Scenario 6: acknowledges that increased marketing of new mid-sugar drinks might lead consumers to switch to this category from low-sugar drinks. We assume that mid-sugar drinks double their market share alongside equal reductions in the market share of high-sugar and low-sugar drinks.\n","SSB","General population","UK - National",2014,"NA","Passed through legislation","Not reported","Modelling (monte carlo modelling)","obesity reductions and disease cases avoided","The better case for reformulation (scenario 1) resulted in a fall in mean sugar content of SSBs equivalent to a reduction of 58·5 mL (95% uncertainty interval [95% UI 54·5–62·6; 10 kcal [9–10]) of SSBs per person per day. This reduction is the largest among scenarios modelled. All simulated scenarios led to a fall in equivalised SSB consumption except for the worse case for market share, which resulted in a small increase. The largest falls for both sexes were among 11–18-year-olds who consume the largest volume of SSBs.\nThe reduction in obesity prevalence resulting from each scenario is estimated to be greatest after scenario 1. Results varied by age, with larger reductions in the number of children with obesity than in that of adults in scenario 1. The relative reduction in obesity prevalence was predicted to be greater in male individuals than in female individuals because male individuals consume a greater volume of SSBs. Effect size estimates were significantly increased when an energy balance equation was used. Across the scenarios modelled, the pattern of results seen with obesity is repeated for type 2 diabetes. \nScenario 1 (better case for reformulation) resulted in an estimated 19 094 (95% UI 6920–32 678; incidence reduction of 31·1 per 100 000 person-years) fewer new cases of diabetes per year and scenario 6 (worse case for change in market share) led to an increase of 1238 (455–2359; incidence increase of 2·0 per 100 000 person-years) cases per year. However, by contrast with the obesity results, adults aged older than 65 years saw the largest absolute reduction in diabetes incidence, reflecting the positive association between age and disease burden.\nReduction in the number of obese individuals with each scenario\n• Scenario 1: 144,383 (0.9%)\n• Scenario 2: 26,774 (0.2%)\n• Scenario 3: 81,594 (0.5%)\n• Scenario 4: 29,555 (0.2%)\n• Scenario 5: 91,042 (0.6%)\n• Scenario 6: -9,211 (-0.1%)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","~£500 million for the Government. In England, the new levy revenue will be invested in giving school-aged children a brighter and healthier future, including programmes to encourage physical activity and balanced diets. For Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the Barnett formula will be applied to spending on these new initiatives in the normal way.","Over 60 public health organisations have called for a tax on sugary drinks. This includes Public Health England, The British Medical Association and the Royal Society for Public Health. Dame Sally Davies, Chief Medical Officer for England, has said that reformulation and resizing are the key wins for tackling obesity. Manufacturing and industry reps  are opponents. Media campaigns have been used to attempt to change political opinion and promote the levy.","Yes","Briggs AD, Mytton OT, Kehlbacher A, Tiffin R, Elhussein A, Rayner M, et al. Health impact assessment of the UK soft drinks industry levy: a comparative risk assessment modelling study. The Lancet Public Health. 2017;2(1):e15-e22.","Link","• 10.1016/S2468-2667(16)30037-8"]
[20,"1 Diet and obesity","EU School Fruit Scheme","Programme","Government (in-country dependent: in Italy implemented by Italian Ministry of Agriculture jointly with the Ministry of Education and Research)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Campaign consisting of the distribution of products to children at school and provision of information on a correct and healthy diet to children, teachers and parents. In Italy the varieties of fruit and vegetables distributed were slightly different across regions. The following products were distributed across all schools: oranges, strawberries, kiwi, apples, pears, carrots, fennels and cherry tomatoes. Voluntary activities included visits to farms, working in the school garden, games associated to the consumption of fruit and vegetables, and homework activities focusing on the healthy properties of fruit and vegetables. Health was a primary aim, to increase children’s intake of fruit and vegetables and to promote healthy diet habits and more balanced nutrition patterns.","F&V","Children ","International - 24 EU Member states in 2010/2011",2010,"1 year","• Implementation costs: 90million Euros in 2010/2011\n• Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (education, activities, farm visits etc)\n","Scheme replaced in Aug 2017 by a school fruit, vegetables and milk scheme under a single legal framework.","Empirical assessment (case - control study in Rome 2009-2011 looking at supermarkets matched with intervention schools vs non-intervention schools and analysing sales of snacks)","Reduction in consumption","\"Compared to the control group, the sales of snacks in the treated group declined mildly (-4.6 percent) after the treatment, although the estimated difference is not statistically significant.\" \"Stores in wealthier areas include both regular and discount stores. Since we expect higher income consumers to shop mainly in regular stores, we distinguish between these stores in high income areas and other stores (stores in low income areas and discounts in high income areas). ...the relative effect of the campaign on the consumption of unhealthy food has been negative and sizeable in the former group of shops (-12.2 percent) and close to zero in the latter group.\"","Health- regressive (The presence of overweight or obese individuals in the household plays a role in consumption changed. For households where less than half of the members are overweight and obese, the increase is about 1.3 liters of regular soft drinks)","Not reported","Not reported","Sales patterns of snacks returned to pre-intervention levels at end of implementation (only implemented Feb-July in Italy)","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Brunello G, De Paola M, Labartino G. More apples fewer chips? The effect of school fruit schemes on the consumption of junk food. Health policy. 2014;118(1):114-26. ","Link","• 10.1016/j.healthpol.2014.03.012"]
[21,"1 Diet and obesity","Brasil Bolsa Familia","Programme","Government","Financial incentive","Conditional cash transfers to families which are voluntary and conditional on fulfilling some requirements in participation in health and educational activities. Transfers of  R$15 (now R$22) per child or pregnant/breastfeeding mother per month to eligible families, up to maximum of R$95/month (now R$200/month or US$95. Conditionalities include school attendance rate of at least 85% for children age 7-15; vaccinations for children age 0-6 years; prenatal care visits required for pregnant women. Eligibility criteria included families with monthly per capita income below R$120 ($57). Households “likely to be eligible” were registered in national registry . Health was a secondary aim (cash was given to promote health and education).","Food insecurity","Socio-economic (low income population)","Brasil - Paraiba - Towns of Sao Jose dos Ramos and Nova Floresta - Local",2003,"Varied (multiple studies)","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Epidemiological studies and RCT","• Prenatal care\n• Nutritional status\n• Vaccinations\n• Health visits \n• Food availability\n","• Prenatal care: Bolsa Família increased pregnant mothers’ use of prenatal care by 1.5 prenatal care visits on average. \n• Nutritional status: Bolsa Família had no impact on mean HAZ, WAZ, stunting prevalence or wasting. However, Bolsa increased mean BMI-for-age z-scores by 0.4 standard deviations.  \n• Vaccinations: Bolsa Família increased the probability that a child receives all seven vaccines required by age 6 months by 12-15 percentage points. However, on-time vaccination rates remain low in Bolsa and non-Bolsa households\n• Health visits:  Bolsa Família has increased the odds of children’s visits to the health post for preventive services; associated with increased odds for growth monitoring (OR = 3.1; 95% CI 1.9-5.1), vaccinations (OR = 2.8; 95% CI 1.4-5.4), and checkups (OR = 1.6; 95% CI 0.98-2.5). There were positive spillover effects on older siblings (ages 7-17) no longer required to meet the health conditionalities. Bolsa Família increased their odds for growth monitoring (OR = 2.5; 95% CI 1.3-4.9) and checkups (OR = 1.7; 95% CI 0.9-3.2) and improved psychosocial health (β = 2.6; p = 0.007).\n• Compared to non-beneficiaries, the beneficiaries households had 6 % higher food expenditure (p = 0.015) and 9.4 % higher total energy availability (p = 0.010). It was found a 7.3 % higher expenditure on minimally processed foods and 10.4 % higher expenditure on culinary ingredients among the Bolsa Família Program families. No statistically significant differences were found regarding the expenditure and the availability of processed and ultra-processed food and drink products. In the in natura or minimally processed foods group, the expenditure and the availability of meat, tubers and vegetables were higher among the Bolsa Família Program beneficiaries.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Among girls, the program significantly increases school participation (by 8 percentage points) and grade progression (by 10 percentage points), with large, significant effects across both younger and older girls in rural areas but concentrated among girls aged 15–17 years in urban areas. There were few significant impacts found among boys.\n  ","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Cabral CS, Lopes AG, Lopes JM, Vianna RPdT. Food security, income, and the Bolsa Família program: a cohort study of municipalities in Paraíba State, Brazil, 2005-2011. Cadernos de saude publica. 2014;30(2):393-402.","Link","• 10.1590/0102-311X00140112"]
[22,"1 Diet and obesity","Colombia_SSB_tax","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 20%  ad valorem tax on SSBs. Health was a primary aim (reduction in obesity).","SSB","General population ","Colombia - National",2017,"3 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling ","• Reduction in consumption\n• Price elasticities\n","• Our study shows that a 20% SSB tax would reduce significantly their consumption (roughly1,197 million liters), and therefore may meaningfully lower the prevalence ofobesity and related non-communicable diseases, and reducing associated healthcare costs.\n• We found own-price elasticities of-1.62 for SSBs, -1.05 for unsweetened unflavored milks, -1.35 for coffee and tea, -0.80 for sweets and candies (including sugar), -0.94 for dairy based products, -0.85 for grain based staples, -0.84 for animal based products, -0.96 for fruits and vegetables, and -1.01 for condiments and snacks.\n","Low SES households have higher own-price elasticities for sweets and desserts and SSBs (as well as for fruits and vegetables, condiments and snacks, milk, tea water and coffee, and dairy products), meaning that their consumption ofSSBs after a tax would reduce relatively more than in mid-high SES households. Furthermore, these results reflect that households from different SES have significantly different underlying preferences. One particular example is given from the fact that in mid-high SES households, SSBs and milk are complements, while the same relationship is not significant in the low SES group","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Policy would provide the Colombian government with an additional 1% of total revenues per year on average. Authors suggest investment in public health but no clear mention of hypothecation.","Not reported","Yes","Caro JC, Ng SW, Bonilla R, Tovar J, Popkin BM. Sugary drinks taxation, projected consumption and fiscal revenues in Colombia: Evidence from a QUAIDS model. PloS one. 2017;12(12):e0189026.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0189026"]
[23,"1 Diet and obesity","Chile_food_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 40% price tax on SSB (17% higher than current 13% tax). (One scenario from many in publication)","SSB","General population","Chile - National",2011,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric QUAIDS model)","Nutrient availability","• 40% tax on SSB: change in energy (+36 kcal/person/d), carbohydrates (+12g/person/d), sugar (-3g/person/d), sodium (17 mg/person/d), fats (-2g/person/day), saturated fats (-0.6g/person/day) and protein (+0.91 g/person/day)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Caro JC, Ng SW, Taillie LS, Popkin BM. Designing a tax to discourage unhealthy food and beverage purchases: The case of Chile. Food Policy. 2017;71:86-100.","Link","• 10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.08.001"]
[24,"1 Diet and obesity","Chile_food_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax of  5 cents per gram of sugar on products with added sugar.  (One scenario from many in publication)","Added sugar","General population","Chile - National",2011,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric QUAIDS model)","Nutrient availability","• 5 cents per g sugar: change in energy (-23 kcal/person/d), carbohydrates (9g/person/day), sugar (-10g/person/d), sodium (-24 mg/person/d), fats (-6g/person/day), saturated fats (-2/person/day) and protein (-0.68 g/person/day)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Caro JC, Ng SW, Taillie LS, Popkin BM. Designing a tax to discourage unhealthy food and beverage purchases: The case of Chile. Food Policy. 2017;71:86-100.","Link","• 10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.08.001"]
[25,"1 Diet and obesity","Chile_food_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 30% price tax on all marketing controlled foods and beverages(unhealthy/junk & SSBs)  (One scenario from many in publication)","Unhealthy food, SSB","General population","Chile - National",2011,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric QUAIDS model)","Nutrient availability","• 30% tax on junk food and SSBs: change in energy (-383 kcal/person/d), carbohydrates (-34g/person/d), sugar (-15g/person/d), sodium (-302 mg/person/d), fats (-11g/person/day), saturated fats (-4g/person/day) and protein (-13g/person/day)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Caro JC, Ng SW, Taillie LS, Popkin BM. Designing a tax to discourage unhealthy food and beverage purchases: The case of Chile. Food Policy. 2017;71:86-100.","Link","• 10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.08.001"]
[26,"1 Diet and obesity","Catalonia SSB tax","Policy","Government (Catalan Parliament)","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax on sugar sweetened beverages (soda drinks, fruit juices, sport drinks, teas and coffees, energetic drinks, sweetened milks and shakes, vegetable drinks, and flavoured waters, excluding natural fruit or vegetable juices,  drinkable yogurts, drinkable fermented milks, products used for medical reasons, and alcoholic drinks). Tax per litre, depending on the beverage’s sugar content: 0-5g/100ml are exempt, 5-8 g/100ml are taxed at 0.08EUR/L and >8g/100ml: are taxed at 0.12EUR/L. The law requires the tax pass-through rate to be 100% transferred to the final consumer. The tax affects the consumption of SSB’s in the entire Catalan territory independently of the place where the SSBs have been produced. Health was a primary aim, specifically to reduce the consumption of these beverages given the negative effects of excessive sugar consumption on population health.","SSB","General population","Spain - Catalonia - Regional",2017,"1 year","Passed through legislation (Law (5/2017))","Not reported ","Epidemiological (using scanner data)","• Price change\n• Consumption \n","• Price change: More specifically, prices increase between 5-10% for smaller recipients (cans) and around 20% for bigger recipients: for SSBs in two litre recipients, the price increases on average by around 23%. \n• Consumption: consumption of SSBs decreased by 22% vis-à-vis zero/lights but the reduction was much more pronounced for big recipients (-26%) than for small recipients (-16%), following the differences reported in price increases. This effect is partly due to the reduction in SSB consumption and partly due to increases in zero/light drinks (substitution effect) whose prices remained stable.\n","The impact is stronger in non-touristic regions as well as in areas with a higher incidence of obesity rates. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Castelló JV, Lopez Casasnovas G. Impact of Ssb Taxes on Consumption. CRES-UPFWorkingPaper#201804-110. 2018.","Link","• NA"]
[27,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_taxes","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory  tax on saturated fat:  AUD1.37/100g ( in foods with >2.3% saturated fat, excluding drinking milk ","Saturated fat","General population","Australia - National",2010,"Lifetime (100 years)","Implementation costs: AUD 22 million (95% Uncertainty Interval: AUD14 to 31 million) (one-off up-front cost) ","Modelling individual until everyone is dead or has reached 100 (maximum timeline 100 years)","Modelling (multi-state lifetable)","Disability-adjusted life years","Mean, net DALY averted for saturated fat tax: 97,000 (95%Uncertainty Interval: 77,000 to 120,000)","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Dominant (net health gain and net cost-saving)","Not reported","Mean disease costs offsets for saturated fat tax: AUD 1.3 billion ( 95%UI:AUD 0.9 to 1.8 billion).  ","Not reported","No","Cobiac LJ, Tam K, Veerman L, Blakely T. Taxes and subsidies for improving diet and population health in Australia: a cost-effectiveness modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(2):e1002232.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002232"]
[28,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_taxes","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelled mandatory excess salt tax: AUD0.3/1g  sodium in excess of Australian max recommended levels, excluding fresh fruits, vegetables, meats and dairy products ","Sodium","General population","Australia - National",2010,"Lifetime (100 years)","Implementation costs: AUD 22 million (95% Uncertainty Interval: AUD14 to 31 million) (one-off up-front cost) ","Modelling individual until everyone is dead or has reached 100 (maximum timeline 100 years)","Modelling (multi-state lifetable)","Disability-adjusted life years","Mean, net DALY averted for excesssodium tax: 130,000 (95%Uncertainty Interval: 120,000 to 140,000)","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Dominant (net health gain and net cost-saving)","Not reported","Mean disease costs offsets for excess salt tax: AUD 1.6 billion ( 95%UI:AUD 1.1 to 1.9 billion).  ","Not reported","No","Cobiac LJ, Tam K, Veerman L, Blakely T. Taxes and subsidies for improving diet and population health in Australia: a cost-effectiveness modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(2):e1002232.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002232"]
[29,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_taxes","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelled mandatory  SSB tax: AUD0.47/L of soft, energy, fruit drinks and cordials ","SSB","General population","Australia - National",2010,"Lifetime (100 years)","Implementation costs: AUD 22 million (95% Uncertainty Interval: AUD14 to 31 million) (one-off up-front cost) ","Modelling individual until everyone is dead or has reached 100 (maximum timeline 100 years)","Modelling (multi-state lifetable)","Disability-adjusted life years","Mean, net DALY averted for SSB tax: 12,000 (95%Uncertainty Interval: 2,100 to 21,000)","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Dominant (net health gain and net cost-saving)","Not reported"," Mean disease costs offsets for SSB tax: AUD 0.14 billion ( 95%UI:AUD 0.03 to 0.3 billion).  ","Not reported","No","Cobiac LJ, Tam K, Veerman L, Blakely T. Taxes and subsidies for improving diet and population health in Australia: a cost-effectiveness modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(2):e1002232.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002232"]
[30,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_taxes","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelled mandatory sugar tax: AUD0.94/100ml ice cream containing >10g sugar per 100g or all other products AUD0.85/100g sugar content in excess of 10g per 100g , excluding fresh fruits, vegetables, and unflavoured dairy products.","Sugar","General population","Australia - National",2010,"Lifetime (100 years)","Implementation costs: AUD 22 million (95% Uncertainty Interval: AUD14 to 31 million) (one-off up-front cost) ","Modelling individual until everyone is dead or has reached 100 (maximum timeline 100 years)","Modelling (multi-state lifetable)","Disability-adjusted life years","Mean, net DALY averted for sugar tax: 270,000 (95%Uncertainty Interval: 250,000 to 290,000)","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Dominant (net health gain and net cost-saving)","Not reported","Mean disease costs offsets for sugar tax: AUD 2.7 billion ( 95%UI:AUD 1.9 to 3.5 billion).  ","Not reported","No","Cobiac LJ, Tam K, Veerman L, Blakely T. Taxes and subsidies for improving diet and population health in Australia: a cost-effectiveness modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(2):e1002232.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002232"]
[31,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_taxes","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Modelled fruit and vegetable subsidy: AUD0.14/100g for all fresh and preserved fruits and vegetables.","F&V","General population","Australia - National",2010,"Lifetime (100 years)","Implementation costs: AUD 22 million (95% Uncertainty Interval: AUD14 to 31 million) (one-off up-front cost) ","Modelling individual until everyone is dead or has reached 100 (maximum timeline 100 years)","Modelling (multi-state lifetable)","Disability-adjusted life years","Mean, net DALY averted for fruit and vegetable subsidy: -13,000 (95%Uncertainty Interval: -44,000 to 18,000)","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Dominated (no health improvement and no reduction in disease treatment costs)","Not reported","Mean disease costs offsets for fruit and vegetable subsidy: - AUD 0.9 billion ( 95%UI:AUD -0.4 to -1.4 billion).  ","Not reported","No","Cobiac LJ, Tam K, Veerman L, Blakely T. Taxes and subsidies for improving diet and population health in Australia: a cost-effectiveness modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(2):e1002232.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002232"]
[32,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_taxes","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelled mandatory fiscal policies range of foods:\n1. Saturated fat tax: AUD1.37/100g in foods with >2.3% saturated fat, excluding drinking milk; \n2. Excess salt tax: AUD0.3/1g  sodium in excess of Australian max recommended levels, excluding fresh fruits, vegetables, meats and dairy products; \n3. SSB tax: AUD0.47/L of soft, energy, fruit drinks and cordials; \n4. Sugar tax: AUD0.94/100ml ice cream containing >10g sugar per 100g or all other products AUD0.85/100g sugar content in excess of 10g per 100g , excluding fresh fruits, vegetables, and unflavoured dairy products; \n5. Fruit and vegetable subsidy: AUD0.14/100g for all fresh and preserved fruits and vegetables.\n Health as a primary aim (as it was specified to reduce unhealthy food intake) \n","Combination of saturated fat, sugar, sodium, SSB, F&V","General population","Australia - National",2010,"Lifetime (100 years)","Implementation costs: AUD 22 million (95% Uncertainty Interval: AUD14 to 31 million) (one-off up-front cost) ","Modelling individual until everyone is dead or has reached 100 (maximum timeline 100 years)","Modelling (multi-state lifetable)","Disability-adjusted life years","Mean, net DALY averted for combined intervention package: 470,000 (95%Uncertainty Interval: 420,000 to 510,000)","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Dominant (net health gain and net cost-saving)","Not reported","Mean disease costs offsets for combined intervention package: AUD 3.4 billion ( 95%UI:AUD 2.4 to 4.6 billion).  ","Not reported","No","Cobiac LJ, Tam K, Veerman L, Blakely T. Taxes and subsidies for improving diet and population health in Australia: a cost-effectiveness modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2017;14(2):e1002232.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002232"]
[33,"1 Diet and obesity","USA_NY_schoolbreakfast  Breakfast in the Classroom","Programme","Government ","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Programme of provision of breakfast in the classroom (BIC). The Federal Government subsidises school breakfast, but BICis  implemented by schools. Not every school implements BIC school-wide - and this may be classroom dependent.  Breakfast is handed out in the first 10-20 mins of class, which differs from the national School Breakfast programme which provides food in the cafeteria before school hours. The intent of BIC is to increase breakfast participation among students who are unable or unwilling to arrive early to school, and to reduce stigma associated with visiting the cafeteria before school for a subsidized meal. BIC meals usually consist of cold, prepacked items such as cereal, fresh fruit, or bagels. Health was a secondary aim (goal is to increase participation and ensure no child starts the school day hungry) ","School breakfast","Children (elementary & middle school)","USA - 18 states (This study: New York City) - Regional",2007,"1-4 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","BMI ","In grades 6 through 8, there is somewhat of an upward trend in BMI and obesity prior to program adoption, which halts after BIC adoption, although differences from year zero are again statistically insignificant. All other analyses of BMI and BIC find no statistically significant association.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Academic achievement: no significant difference was found: \"We find no evidence of an impact of BIC on achievement in either subject [maths or English language]. Point estimates are again small in absolute value, imprecisely estimated, and vary in sign. The only statistically significant effect we observe is for middle school math, for schools with at least 25 percent of classrooms covered (but not full BIC), a positive 0.007 SD per 100 days (P < 0.05).\" Increased school breakfast participation: \"we find BIC increased SBP participation rates by 4.4 percentage points, on average, when BIC is offered in fewer than 25 percent of classrooms. On a baseline rate of 20.1, this represents an increase of 22 percent. When BIC is offered in 25 percent or more classes but not schoolwide, the increase in participation is 19.5 points—a near doubling. Finally, in schools reporting that they offered BIC schoolwide, we observe a 30.2 point increase in the SBP participation rate\" ","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Corcoran SP, Elbel B, Schwartz AE. The effect of breakfast in the classroom on obesity and academic performance: Evidence from New York City. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. 2016;35(3):509-32.","Link","• NA"]
[34,"1 Diet and obesity","UK Magic Breakfast","Programme","Government ","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary programme. The Magic Breakfast project provided schools with support and resources to offer a free, universal, before-school breakfast club, including to all Year 2 and Year 6 pupils. Schools were provided with free food, support from a Magic Breakfast school change leader, and a £300 grant towards up-front costs. The intervention itself was delivered by school staff and volunteers. In terms of the trial design: Schools were randomly allocated to one of two groups; the intervention group, who received support and resources to establish a universal free breakfast club before school in the academic year 2014/2015, and the control group, who received support and resources for the two following academic years (2015/2016 and 2016/2017).The project was jointly funded by the Department for Education and the Education Endowment Foundation and delivered by the charity Magic Breakfast)","School breakfast","Children (relatively high proportion of disadvantaged pupils)","UK - England -106 schools  - Local",2005,"1 year","• Implementation costs: The cost per pupil per year over three years is £11.86, averaged across all pupils in the breakfast club schools. The total cost was, on average, £4,462.11 per school.\n• Policy overlaps with activities thought to increase take-up of the breakfast provision included promoting it to parents and encouraging all children to attend while sensitively targeting pupils most likely to benefit\n• Passed through legislation\n","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","• Negative effect on BMI \n• Reported hunger\n","• fewer students  with a 'healthy' BMI\n• Not significantly different between intervention and control for Year 2, and p=0.080 for Year 6 (then if exclude Ramadan pupils, p=0.039)\n","Socially progressive :From this subgroup analysis we conclude that the effect for non-FSM students is stronger than for FSM students at KS1 and KS2, although the provision of a breakfast club had a positive effect for both groups.","Not reported","Not reported","Greater academic achievement: \"Breakfast club provision has positive, statistically significant impacts on KS1 scores in maths, reading, and writing. Progress in maths and writing was moderately enhanced by the intervention; scores in intervention schools were on average 0.14–0.15 standard deviations higher, equivalent to about two months’ progress. The impact for KS1 reading was a slightly smaller, though still significant, at 0.10 standard deviations.\" \"At KS2, the effects of intervention on primary outcomes are smaller and not statistically significant. KS2 reading scores were affected to a similar degree as reading scores at KS1, but a larger degree of uncertainty means that the KS2 results are not statistically different from zero. Maths results at KS2 were positively affected but by a small amount (0.07 standard deviations) that is not significantly different from zero\" - this could be because 91% of control groups offered free school breakfasts to year 6s in the run up to their KS2 tests. \"Pupil behaviour, as measured by a teacher survey, improved in breakfast club schools. This is interesting because it shows that breakfast clubs may improve outcomes for children who do not even attend breakfast club, by improving classroom environments.\" \"Attendance at school also improved for children in breakfast club schools, resulting in about 26 fewer half-days of absence per year for a class of 30.\" \"Students in intervention schools were less likely to be recorded as ‘healthy weight’ and had higher BMIs, on average, although these results are not statistically significant. ...These results could imply that schools implementing a breakfast club should be mindful that students could over-consume, although the results here are not conclusive enough to give a strong recommendation.\"","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Crawford et al (2016) Magic Breakfast - Evaluation report and executive summary (report)","Link","• NA"]
[35,"1 Diet and obesity","France F&V public policy model","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory reduction in VAT on fruit and vegetables from 5.5% (the current level) to 2.1%. This new rate corresponds to the minimum value allowed by the European tax policy.","F&V","General population","France - National",2006,"1 year","Implementation costs:  EUR 465 million (corresponds to the loss of tax revenues due to the VAT reduction)  and overlaps with other fiscal policy (‘National Nutrition and Health Program’ has been carried out by health authorities since 2001) ","Not reported ","Modelling (economic log linear model with Monte Carlo simulations)","• Deaths avoided\n• Years of life saved\n• Change in fruit and vegetable consumption (g/day)\n","• 363 (95% CI 200 to 582) Deaths avoided\n• 5024 (95% CI 2711 to 8132) Years of life saved\n• 4.8 (95% CI 3.1 to 7.1) g/d\n","Not reported","• Cost per death avoided\n• Cost per  year of life saved\n","• EUR 1379,000 ( 95% CI 799,000 to 2322,000)\n• EUR 100,000 (95% CI 57,000 to 171,000) \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Dallongeville J, Dauchet L, de Mouzon O, Requillart V, Soler L-G. Increasing fruit and vegetable consumption: a cost-effectiveness analysis of public policies. European Journal of Public Health. 2010;21(1):69-73.","Link","• 10.1093/eurpub/ckq013"]
[36,"1 Diet and obesity","France F&V public policy model","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy programme to increase F&V consumption through F&V stamps given to low-income consumers (LIC):  EUR100/year/person F&V stamps, considered as an increase in the income of targeted consumers.","F&V","Socio-economic (low income population)","France - National",2006,"1 year","• Implementation costs: EUR 465 million were used to subsidize F&V consumption . This represents a EUR100/year/person F&V stamp. \n• Policy overlaps with other fiscal policy (National Nutrition and Health Program has been carried out by health authorities since 2001)  \n","Not reported ","modelling (economic log linear model with Monte Carlo simulations)","• Deaths avoided\n• Years of life saved\n• Change in fruit and vegetable consumption (g/day)\n","• 77 (95% CI 48 to 116) Deaths avoided\n• 1032 (95% CI 634 to 1554)Years of life saved\n• 0.4 (95% CI 0.2 to 0.6) g/d\n","Not reported","• Cost per death avoided\n• Cost per  year of life saved\n","• EUR 6316,000 (95% CI 4015,000 to 9663,000)\n• EUR 474,000 (95% CI 299,000 to 733,000) \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Dallongeville J, Dauchet L, de Mouzon O, Requillart V, Soler L-G. Increasing fruit and vegetable consumption: a cost-effectiveness analysis of public policies. European Journal of Public Health. 2010;21(1):69-73.","Link","• 10.1093/eurpub/ckq013"]
[37,"1 Diet and obesity","USA_Bronx_subsidised_supermarket","Programme","Government (assessment of application to build supermarket by New York City Industrial Development Agency - local government)","Other (Tax exemptions)","NYC Food retail expansion to support health (FRESH) programme financial are open to grocery store operators renovating existing retail space or developers seeking to construct or renovate retail space that will be leased by a full-line grocery store operator. NY City designates zones lacking in full-service supermarkets and retailers can apply for voluntary financial and zoning incentives to defray costs of operating in these high-need zones. To qualify, a store must meet basic nutrition criteria, including dedicating at least 30% of floor space to perishable food items and designating 500 ft2 (46·45m2) to fresh produce. \nBenefits of the FRESH incentives programme include: 1) building taxes may be stabilized at pre-improvement real estate tax amounts for up to 25 years (with benefits phasing out at not more than 20% per year); 2) Land taxes may be fully abated for up to 25 years (with benefits phasing out at not more than 20% per year); 3)The 8.875% city and state sales tax may be waived on materials used to construct, renovate, or equip facilities; 4) The mortgage recording tax applicable to a project mortgage may be reduced from 2.8% to 0.3%, lowering upfront costs Health as a primary aim (part of a collection of obesity prevention efforts initiated in New York City to improve the food environment in underserved neighbourhoods) \n","Supermarket zoning in food insecure areas","Socio-economic groups (food insecure households)","USA - Bronx - Local",2011,"9 months","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (https://www.nycedc.com/program/food-retail-expansion-support-health-fresh)","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","• Food availability at home\n• Dietary intake\n","No appreciable differences in availability of healthful or unhealthful foods at home, or in children’s dietary intake as a result of the supermarket zoning initiative.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Elbel B, Moran A, Dixon LB, Kiszko K, Cantor J, Abrams C, et al. Assessment of a government-subsidized supermarket in a high-need area on household food availability and children’s dietary intakes. Public health nutrition. 2015;18(15):2881-90.","Link","• 10.1017/S1368980015000282"]
[38,"1 Diet and obesity","Australia_food_discount","Programme","Non-governmental (Retail management company)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary 10% price discount on grocery, fresh fruit and diet soft-drinks in Outback stores in disadvantaged communities","Grocery, F&V and artificially sweetened beverages","Socio-economic groups (disadvantaged Aboriginal communities)","Australia - Northern Territory and Western Australia - Local",2010,"1 year","Implemented by retail mangement decision","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","Purchasing/sales","No discernible impact of the discounts on groceries, fresh fruit and veteables and diet soft-frinks  on store turnover was detected.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Ferguson M, O'dea K, Holden S, Miles E, Brimblecombe J. Food and beverage price discounts to improve health in remote Aboriginal communities: mixed method evaluation of a natural experiment. Australian and New Zealand journal of public health. 2017;41(1):32-7.","Link","• 10.1111/1753-6405.12616"]
[39,"1 Diet and obesity","Tax model (comparing 3 fiscal policies)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% tax on unhealthy food in the UK (soft drinks and snack foods, but other specific foods were included). Health was a primary aim (overweight and obesity reduction) ","Unhealthy food, SSB","General population (overweight and obese)","UK - National",2010,"9-15 years","No implementation cost","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric)","%age point reduction in overweight-obesity","9% point reduction in overweight-obesity from 57% without the policy to 48%.","Not reported","Cost-benefit","GBP12,241 Million Benefit (avoidable healthcare costs)+ revenue","Not reported","GBP818 Million in revenue  ","Not reported","No","Flores M, Rivas J. Cash incentives and unhealthy food consumption. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2017;69(1):42-56.","Link","• 10.1111/boer.12085"]
[40,"1 Diet and obesity","Subsidy model (comparing 3 fiscal policies)","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary 10% subsidy for healthy food (not specified) in the UK Health as a primary aim (overweight and obesity reduction) ","Healthy food","General population (overweight and obese)","UK - National",2010,"9-15 years","Implementation costs: GBP 102 million","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric)","%age point reduction in overweight-obesity","50% point reduction in overweight-obesity from 57% without the policy to 7%.","Not reported","Cost-benefit","GBP56,3271 Million Benefit (avoidable healthcare costs)- price of subsidies","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Flores M, Rivas J. Cash incentives and unhealthy food consumption. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2017;69(1):42-56.","Link","• 10.1111/boer.12085"]
[41,"1 Diet and obesity","Cash incentive (comparing 3 fiscal policies)","Modelling study","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary cash incentive (money given to consumers each quarter equalling the difference between the quarterly cost of consuming healthy food and the quarterly cost of consuming unhealthy food) in the UK. Health as a primary aim (overweight and obesity reduction) ","Healthy food","General population (overweight and obese)","UK - National",2010,"9-15 years","Implementation costs: GBP 158,266 million","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric)","%age point reduction in overweight-obesity","56% point reduction in overweight-obesity from 57% without the policy to 48%.","Not reported","Cost-benefit","GBP -29,159 Million Benefit (avoidable healthcare costs) - costs of implementing incentives","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Flores M, Rivas J. Cash incentives and unhealthy food consumption. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2017;69(1):42-56.","Link","• 10.1111/boer.12085"]
[42,"1 Diet and obesity","Tax model (comparing 3 fiscal policies)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% tax on unhealthy food in the USA (soft drinks and snack foods, but other specific foods were included) Health was a primary aim (overweight and obesity reduction) ","Unhealthy food, SSB","General population (overweight and obese)","USA - National",2010,"9-15 years","No implementation cost","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric)","%age point reduction in overweight-obesity","11% point reduction in overweight-obesity from 68% without the policy to 57%.","Not reported","Cost-benefit","$191,426  Million Benefit (avoidable healthcare costs)+ revenue","Not reported","GBP13,350 Million in revenue  ","Not reported","No","Flores M, Rivas J. Cash incentives and unhealthy food consumption. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2017;69(1):42-56.","Link","• 10.1111/boer.12085"]
[43,"1 Diet and obesity","Subsidy model (comparing 3 fiscal policies)","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary 10% subsidy for healthy food in the USA ( food type not specified) Health as a primary aim (overweight and obesity reduction) ","Healthy food","General population (overweight and obese)","USA - National",2010,"9-15 years","Implementation cost: $86,426 million","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric)","%age point reduction in overweight-obesity","60% point reduction in overweight-obesity from 68% without the policy to 8%.","Not reported","Cost-benefit","$874,355 Million Benefit (avoidable healthcare costs)- price of subsidies","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Flores M, Rivas J. Cash incentives and unhealthy food consumption. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2017;69(1):42-56.","Link","• 10.1111/boer.12085"]
[44,"1 Diet and obesity","Cash incentive (comparing 3 fiscal policies)","Modelling study","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary cash incentive (money given to consumers each quarter equalling the difference between the quarterly cost of consuming healthy food and the quarterly cost of consuming unhealthy food) in the USA. Health as a primary aim (overweight and obesity reduction) ","Healthy food","General population (overweight and obese)","USA - National",2010,"9-15 years","Implementation costs:  $2,606,856 million","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric)","%age point reduction in overweight-obesity","67% point reduction in overweightg-obesity from 68% without the policy to 1%.","Not reported","Cost-benefit","$-743,447  Million Benefit (avoidable healthcare costs) - costs of implementing incentives","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Flores M, Rivas J. Cash incentives and unhealthy food consumption. Bulletin of Economic Research. 2017;69(1):42-56.","Link","• 10.1111/boer.12085"]
[45,"1 Diet and obesity","Tiffin & Arnoult (2011)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Mandatory increase in the price of fatty foods by 1% for every percent of saturated fats they contain (ceiling 15%); subsidy on fruit & vegetables to offset tax burden .","Saturated fat, F&V","General population","UK - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","• Disease\n• Consumption\n","• Negligible effect on disease: the model suggests a 2-3% reduction in coronary heart disease, stroke and lung cancer.)\n• Small effect (shift in consumption toward recommendations, ≈15% fruit & vegetable subsidy effective in increasing average intakes to recommended intakes) Ineffective (negligible effect on disease)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article:  Tiffin R, Arnoult M. The public health impacts of a fat tax. Eur J Clin Nutr. 2011;65:427–433. ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[46,"1 Diet and obesity","Zhen et al. (2011)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory  0.5 cents per ounce tax on regular carbonated soft drink, diet carbonated soft drink, whole milk, low-fat milk, bottled water, sports & energy drinks, fruit juice, coffee & tea, sugar-sweetened fruit drinks ","Beverages","General population","USA - National ","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","Effective [long-run household sugar-sweetened beverages ↓118–135 12-oz cans/y (low-income); ↓110–128 12-oz cans/y (high-income)]","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article:  Zhen C, Wohlgenant MK, Karns S, et al. Habit formation and demand for sugar- sweetened beverages. Am J Agric Econ. 2011;93:175–193. ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[47,"1 Diet and obesity","France fat, sugar and ready meals tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10 % tax on foods in the cheese-butter category,  as well as high sugar- high fat products, and ready meals. ","Fats and ready-meals","General population","France - National","2010*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","All tax rises decreased total energy and saturated fat intake; taxing both sugar and fat products and cheese and butter products increased polyunsaturated fat use; taxing all three food groups gave weight decrease of 1.3 kg/year","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Allais O, Bertail P, Nichele V. The effects of a fat tax on French households’ purchases: a nutritional approach. Am J Agric Econ. 2010;92:228–245 ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[48,"1 Diet and obesity","France sugar and SSB subsidy model","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory removal of the floor price, import duties, export subsidies, & quotas for sugar. This resulted in the price decreasing by 36% in 2006–2009, leading to 3% decrease in soft drink price.","Sugar","General population","France - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","Effective (consumption of regular soft drinks ↑1 L /person/y, added sugar ↑124 g/ person/y)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Bonnet C, Réquillart V. Does the EU sugar policy reform increase added sugar consumption? An empirical evidence on the soft drink market. Health Econ. 2011;20:1012–1024. ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[49,"1 Diet and obesity","France sugar and SSB tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax of 0.0716 euros per L for soft drinks which approximates to a tax of 10% on carbonated soft drinks.","SSB","General population","France - National","2012*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","Effective (soft drink consumption ↓3 L /person/y. Sugar-sweetened beverage consumption decreases more with sugar-sweetened beverages-only tax)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Bonnet C, Réquillart V. Sugar Policy Reform, Tax Policy and Price Transmission in the Soft Drink Industry. Working Paper No. 4, Transparency of Food Pricing (TRANSFOP) project. Brussels: European Commission; 2012 ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[50,"1 Diet and obesity","Dong & Lin USA F&V subsidy model","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary 10% subsidy on the price of fruit and vegetables  available for households who are income-eligible for the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program—that is, households with an income below 130 percent of Federal poverty guidelines ","F&V","Socio-economic (low income population)","USA - National","2009*","Within year","Implementation costs: : US$ 308 million for fruit subsidy, US$ 274 million for vegetable subsidy","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","Effective but very small (fruit consumption ↑2.1–5.2%; vegetables ↑2.1–4.9%)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Dong D, Lin BH. Fruit and Vegetable Consumption by Low-Income Americans: Would a Price Reduction Make a Difference? Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture; 2009. ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[51,"1 Diet and obesity","Norway SSB tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory increase in VAT from 13% to 25%  on sugar-sweetened carbonated soft drinks ","SSB","General population","Norway - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Purchase; calories","Effective (low-purchasing households reduce purchases by ≈5 L, high-purchasing households by ≈20 L (NS); Price increase of 10.6% = ↓10.8% reduction in purchase","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Gustavsen GW, Rickertsen K. The effects of taxes on purchases of sugar- sweetened carbonated soft drinks: a quantile regression approach. Appl Econ. 2011;43:707–716.  ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[52,"1 Diet and obesity","Khan et al. (2012)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory  5–10% price increase on milk.","Milk","General population","USA - National","2012*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (behaviours)","Consumption","Effective (1% increase in price of whole milk decreased consumption by 2.73% (shift to lower-fat milk).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Khan R, Misra K, Singh V. Will a Fat Tax Work?Paper presented at: Summer Institute in Competitive Strategy 2012; July 9–13, 2012; Berkeley, CA ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[53,"1 Diet and obesity","Kotakorpi et al. (2011)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Mandatory tax of 1 euro per kilogram of added sugar (price ↑9.2% for sugar/sweet); abolition of the current VAT on fresh fruit, vegetables, & fish (price ↓11.5%).","Added sugar, F&V, fish","General population","Finland - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","Effective (sugar tax: sugar & sweet ↓23%. VAT cut: fruit & vegetable demand ↑5%; fish ↑11%; combined tax & subsidy had slightly larger effect)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Kotakorpi K, Härkänen T, Pietinen P, et al. The welfare effects of health-based food tax policy. CESifoWorking Paper No. 3633. Paper presented at: CESifo Area Conference ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[54,"1 Diet and obesity","Lin et al. (2010)","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory 10% price subsidy on healthy food: fruits (juice & non-juice), vegetables, & fluid milk","F&V, milk","General population","USA - National","2010*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (household purchase)","Consumption","Effective but small (consumption: vegetables ↑4.7%, fruits ↑7.0%, dairy products ↑4.22%)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Lin BH, Yen ST, Dong D, et al. Economic incentives for dietary improvement among food stamp recipients. Contemp Econ Policy. 2010;28:524–536","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[55,"1 Diet and obesity","Miao et al. (2011)35","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory product tax of 39.30% on “sweetener products”, 27.47% on sugars, 42.95% on corn sweeteners, & a very small rate on other sweeteners aimed at reducing caloric sweetener consumption by 10% ","Added sugar","General population","USA - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (behaviours)","Consumption","Effective (10% reduction in caloric sweetener consumption, by design; tax on inputs minimizes loss of consumer welfare)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Miao Z, Beghin JC, Jensen HH. Taxing sweets: sweetener input tax or final con- sumption tax? Contemp Econ Policy. 2011; doi: 10.1111/j.1465- 7287.2011.00278. ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[56,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand Shop N Go subsidy ","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy of 12.5% of the price of core (healthier) foods that met the program criteria through the  Shop’N Go shops. RCT tested set of interventions in 4 groups: price discounts on healthier foods, tailored nutrition education, discounts plus education, control).","Healthy food","General population","New Zealand - Local","2010*","6 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Purchase volume of healthy foods\n• Purchase volume of saturated fat\n","• Effective (healthier foods at 6 mo ↑11%; at 12 mo ↑5%); \n• Ineffective (no effect on saturated fat purchased)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Ni Mhurchu C, Blakely T, Jiang Y, et al. Effects of price discounts and tailored nutrition education on supermarket purchases: a randomized controlled trial. Am J Clin Nutr. 2010;91:736–747 ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[57,"1 Diet and obesity","Nnoaham et al. (2009)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory17.5% VAT on major sources of saturated fat","Saturated fat","General population","UK - National","2009*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (spreadsheet-based model)","• CVD and cancer mortality\n• Consumption\n","• no mortality reduction\n• Ineffective: Calories ↓0.5%, saturated fat↓2.4%, salt ↑0.2%, fruit & vegetables ↓2.7%\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Nnoaham KE, Sacks G, Rayner M, et al. Modelling income group differences in the health and economic impacts of targeted food taxes and subsidies. Int J Epidemiol. 2009;38:1324–1333 ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[58,"1 Diet and obesity","Nnoaham et al. (2009)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 17.5% VAT on unhealthy foods ","Unhealthy food","General population","UK - National","2009*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (spreadsheet-based model)","• CVD and cancer mortality\n• Consumption\n","• CVD and cancer deaths increased by 35–1300 per year; \n• Ineffective: Calories ↓2.4%, saturated fat↓3.1%, salt ↓1.9%, fruit & vegetables ↓1.5%\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Nnoaham KE, Sacks G, Rayner M, et al. Modelling income group differences in the health and economic impacts of targeted food taxes and subsidies. Int J Epidemiol. 2009;38:1324–1333 abstract/72/9/551/1859025?redirectedFrom=fulltext.","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[59,"1 Diet and obesity","Nnoaham et al. (2009)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Mandatory 17.5% VAT on unhealthy foods & 17.5% subsidy on fruit & vegetables","Unhealthy food, F&V","General population","UK - National","2009*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (spreadsheet-based model)","• CVD and cancer mortality\n• Consumption\n","• up to 2900 CVD and cancer deaths averted per year; \n• Effective: Calories ↓0.9%, saturated fat ↓1%, salt ↓1.1%, fruit & vegetables ↑4.8%\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Nnoaham KE, Sacks G, Rayner M, et al. Modelling income group differences in the health and economic impacts of targeted food taxes and subsidies. Int J Epidemiol. 2009;38:1324–1333 ","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[60,"1 Diet and obesity","Nnoaham et al. (2009)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Mandatory 17.5% VAT on unhealthy foods & 32.5% subsidy (revenue neutral) on fruit & vegetables","Unhealthy food, F&V","General population","UK - National","2009*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (spreadsheet-based model)","• CVD and cancer mortality\n• Consumption\n","• up to 6400 CVD and cancer deaths averted per; \n• Effective: calories ↑0.4%, saturated fat↓0.8%, salt ↓0.5%, fruit & vegetables ↑11%\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Nnoaham KE, Sacks G, Rayner M, et al. Modelling income group differences in the health and economic impacts of targeted food taxes and subsidies. Int J Epidemiol. 2009;38:1324–1333 abstract/72/9/551/1859025?redirectedFrom=fulltext.","Link","• /10.1111/nure.12123"]
[61,"1 Diet and obesity","Okrent & Alston (2011)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)"," Modelled the effects of a range of voluntary subsidies and mandatory taxes: Removal of all grain subsidies; removal of all agricultural subsidies, including border measures; implementation of 10% fruit & vegetable product & commodity subsidies; $0.005 tax per gram of fat, $0.002688 tax per gram of sugar, & $0.000165 tax per calorie (designed to cause equivalent calorie reduction).","Agricultural products","General population","USA - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (behaviours)","Calories","• Farm subsidy removal ineffective (negligible effect)\n• Taxes may be effective [calorie consumption ↓19,642 kcal/adult/y (more than half from food away from home): calorie tax least distortionary]: a fat tax of USD$0.15 and $0.23 per pound may reduce calorie consumption of est. 20,000 kcal/adult/year and a sugar tax of USD$1.67 and $1.73 per pound reduced calorie consumption of est. 3,000 kcal/adult/year\n• Subsidy ineffective (increase in fruit & vegetable consumption, increase in calories by ≈1%; commodity subsidy less distortionary than product subsidy)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Okrent A, Alston JM. The Effects of Farm Commodity and Retail Food Policies on Obesity and Economic Welfare in the United States.Working Paper no. 1101. Davis, CA: Robert Mondavi Institute, Center forWine Economics; 2011 ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[62,"1 Diet and obesity","Schroeter et al. 200832","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% tax on soft drinks; Health was a primary aim (target behaviour is diet, obesity and chronic disease) ","SSB","General population","USA - National","2008*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (dietary intake)","Body weight","2) 0.099% (0.086 kg) decrease in men and 0.122% (0.091 kg) decrease in women indaily weight\n\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Schroeter et al. 2008 ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[63,"1 Diet and obesity","Schroeter et al. 200832","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory 10% subsidy for fruit and vegetables; Health was a primary aim (target behaviour is diet, obesity and chronic disease) ","F&V","General population","USA - National","2008*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (dietary intake)","Body weight","3) 0.222% increase: 0.193 kg in men and 0.166 kg in women daitly weight change","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Schroeter et al. 2008 ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[64,"1 Diet and obesity","Schroeter et al. 200832","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory 10% subsidy for diet soft drinks.  Health was a primary aim (target behaviour is diet, obesity and chronic disease) ","Artificially sweetened beverages","General population","USA - National","2008*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (dietary intake)","Body weight","4) 0.071% decrease in daily weight\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Schroeter et al. 2008 ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[65,"1 Diet and obesity","Schroeter et al. 200832","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% tax or subsidy on food away from home; Health was a primary aim (target behaviour is diet, obesity and chronic disease).","Takeaway","General population","USA - National","2008*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (dietary intake)","Body weight","1) 0.196% increase in daily weight","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Schroeter et al. 2008   ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[66,"1 Diet and obesity","Khan et al. (2012)44","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% price increase on fast food.","Unhealthy food","General population","USA - National","2012*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (behaviours)","Consumption","Effective (frequency of  weekly fast food consumption ↓5.7%)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article:Khan T, Powell LM, Wada R. Fast food consumption and food prices: evidence from panel data on 5th and 8th grade children. J Obes. 2012; doi: 10.1155/2012/ 857697 ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[67,"1 Diet and obesity","Miao et al. (2011)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Model scenario that would result in a reduction in calories by same amount as a soda tax of 1 cent per liquid ounce:  Food items with higher values than the reference (average) value in food group are classified as high fat/high sugar, while foods with equal or lower values than the reference are classified as low fat/low sugar.  ","Added sugar","General population","USA - National","2011*","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (behaviours)","Consumption","Effective (calorie intake ↓2.19%, by design; internal composition of food groups changes toward leaner & lighter choices to abate the taxes) Sugar tax: “Soft drinks, carbonated,”“Sugars & sweets,”“Coffee & tea” ↓16% or more; “Fruit juices” 1%","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic Review: Thow, A M, S Downs, and S Jan. 2014. “A Systematic Review of the Effectiveness of Food Taxes and Subsidies to Improve Diets: Understanding the Recent Evidence.” Nutr Rev 72(9): 551–65.  - individual article: Miao Z, Beghin J, Jensen HH. Accounting for Product Substitution in the Analysis of Food Taxes Targeting Obesity.Working paper no. 10-WP 518. Ames, IA: Center for Agricultural and Rural Development; 2011. ","Link","• 10.1111/nure.12123"]
[68,"1 Diet and obesity","Danish selective food taxation model","Modelling study","Government","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Mandatory halving of the rate of value-added tax (VAT) on fruit and vegetables (from 25% to 12.5%) and increasing taxation on fat  to approximately DKK 8.00 (EUR 1.08) per kilogram of fat and sugar to approximately DKK 5.60 (EUR 0.75) per kilogram of sugar). Health was a primary aim (specify).","Fat and F&V","General population","Denmark - National",2012,"Within year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment)","DALYs","The biggest reduction in burden of disease could be obtained through changed demand for fruit and vegetables (32.9 DALY per 100 000 people), followed by fibre (11.0 DALY per 100 000 people), fat (2.4 DALY per 100 000 people) and saturated fat (1.8 DALY per 100 000 people). The health impact of the selective taxation scenario thus differed for the included dietary risk factors.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Holm AL, Laursen M-B, Koch M, Jensen JD, Diderichsen F. The health benefits of selective taxation as an economic instrument in relation to IHD and nutrition-related cancers. Public health nutrition. 2013;16(12):2124-31.","Link","• 10.1017/S1368980013000153"]
[69,"1 Diet and obesity","AUS_SSB_Tax (20%)","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 20% sales tax on SSBs. Health was a primary aim (reduction in obesity, and looking at impact on life expectancy).","SSB","General population","Australia - National","2011-12","10 years","Implementation costs: AUD12.69 million (assumed to be the same as the costs of the plain packaging for tobacco)","Not reported ","Modelling (CRE- Obesity model (to estimate how a change in the distribution of the prevalence of overweight and obesity caused by an intervention impacts the epidemiology of several obesity-related diseases, which in turn influence the total HALYs in the population))","HALYs","As a result ofa 20% SSB tax, the Australian population was estimated to gain 175,300 HALYs (95% CI: 68,700; 277,800) and save 111,700 years of life (95% CI: 43,600; 175,800) (Table 3). The HALY gains were highest in the 2 most disadvantaged quintiles, with 49.4% of the total HALYs gained accruing to these quintiles. Quintile 5 had the lowest HALYs gained and years of life saved for men and women.","Enacting a 20% SSB sales tax in Australia was estimated to result in greater decreases in weight for the 3 most disadvantaged quintiles than for the 2 least disadvantaged quintiles for both men and women, with larger decreases in men. Quintile 5 (least disadvantaged) had the lowest predicted","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","The tax was estimated to be cost saving across all intervention scenarios (sensitivity analyses) and all quintiles. Over the lifetime ofthe population cohort, expected healthcare cost sav- ings were AU$1.73 billion, intervention costs were estimated to be AU$119.6m (95% CI: $91.9m; $162.1m)—approximately $4.8m (95% CI: $3.9m; $6.1m) in the first year and $3.7m 95% CI: $2.8m; $5.0m) in subsequent years, discounted at 3%. For every dollar invested in the first 10 years, the tax would result in AU$17 (95% CI: $9; $19) in healthcare cost savings. The tax revenue generated at the population level was estimated to be AU$642.9m annually (95% CI: $348.2m; $1,117.2m). For the total population, the out-of-pocket healthcare costs saved were estimated to be AU\n$299.4m (95% CI: $113.8m; $476.2m). Healthcare cost savings as a percentage ofhousehold expenditure by quintile were highest in the most disadvantaged groups. Per capita, the most disadvantaged quintile was estimated to incur the most tax, at an estimated AU$35.40 (95% CI: $18.70; $62.80) per year, or 0.54% ofexpenditure on food and non-alcoholic drinks.","Not reported","The tax revenue raised outweighed the DWL for the total Australian population, with an estimated net deadweight impact of+AU$587.9m (95% CI: +$329.2m, +$1,027.6m) per year. ","High obesity levels, universal healthcare, ageing population Not implemented but politically no, an SSB tax is not seem as acceptable in Australia Health experts Government, industry reps  (comparisons across other nations who have done it is quite common) ","Yes","Lal, Anita, et al. \"Modelled health benefits of a sugar-sweetened beverage tax across different socioeconomic groups in Australia: A cost-effectiveness and equity analysis.\" PLoS medicine 14.6 (2017): e1002326.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002326"]
[70,"1 Diet and obesity","Brazil_fat_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling a mandatory linear symmetric revenue neutral tax on saturated fat. The rate calculated for each food group, so that no net revenue to the public sector is achieved. ","Saturated fat","General population","Brazil - National",2008,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric model)","Change in weight","3,558,036 lbs lost in total population","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No revenue for the Government.","Not reported","No","Leifert RM, Lucinda CR. Linear Symmetric “Fat Taxes”: Evidence from Brazil. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. 2015;37(4):634-66.","Link","• 10.1093/aepp/ppu062"]
[71,"1 Diet and obesity","Brazil_fat_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling mandatory 1% price increase for each gram of saturated fat for each of these 8 food group (sugars, poultry, meat, processed meats, flour and pasta, dairy,  oils and fats, baked). \n\n","Saturated fat, grains, F&V and tubers","General population","Brazil - National",2008,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric model)","Change in weight","1,096,342 lbs lost in total population","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","BRL 91,591,085 to the Government.","Not reported","No","Leifert RM, Lucinda CR. Linear Symmetric “Fat Taxes”: Evidence from Brazil. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. 2015;37(4):634-66.","Link","• 10.1093/aepp/ppu062"]
[72,"1 Diet and obesity","Brazil_fat_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling a voluntary 5% price subsidy for grains, fruits, vegetables and tubers.\n","Saturated fat, grains, F&V and tubers","General population","Brazil - National",2008,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric model)","Change in weight","1.210,773 lbs lost in total population","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","BRL 52,931,163 to the Government.","Not reported","No","Leifert RM, Lucinda CR. Linear Symmetric “Fat Taxes”: Evidence from Brazil. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. 2015;37(4):634-66.","Link","• 10.1093/aepp/ppu062"]
[73,"1 Diet and obesity","Brazil_fat_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 1% price increase for each gram of saturated fatty acids for each of these 12 food group (sugars, poultry, meat, processed meats, grains, flour and pasta, fruits, dairy, vegetables, oils and fats, baked, tubers) Health was a secondary aim  Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year)","Saturated fat","General population","Brazil - National",2008,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric model)","Change in weight","998,930 lbs lost in total population","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","BRL 138,912,593 to the Government/","Not reported","No","Leifert RM, Lucinda CR. Linear Symmetric “Fat Taxes”: Evidence from Brazil. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. 2015;37(4):634-66.","Link","• 10.1093/aepp/ppu062"]
[74,"1 Diet and obesity","Brazil_fat_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 1% price increase for each gram of saturated fatty acids for each of these 8 food group (sugars, poultry, meat, processed meats,  flour and pasta,  dairy,  oils and fats, baked). Grains, fruits, vegetables and tubers are exempt. Health was a secondary aim.","Saturated fat","General population","Brazil - National",2008,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (econometric model)","Change in weight","985,679 lbs lost in total population","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","BRL 127,550,872 to the Government.","Not reported","No","Leifert RM, Lucinda CR. Linear Symmetric “Fat Taxes”: Evidence from Brazil. Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy. 2015;37(4):634-66.","Link","• 10.1093/aepp/ppu062"]
[75,"1 Diet and obesity","Mexico conditional cash transfer (Programa de Apoyo Alimentario)","Programme","Government","Financial incentive","Voluntary conditional cash transfer programme targeted to communities that do not receive benefits from other federal food aid programs, have ,2500 inhabitants, and have a high level of marginalization.  The program provided beneficiary households either a cash transfer of 150 Mexican pesos/month (equivalent to ~14 USD at the time) or a monthly food basket with a cost to the program of 150 pesos. The basket was designed to contribute 450 kcal (1883 kJ)/d per adult in an average-sized household. Households received the transfer once every 2 mo. required to attend nutrition and health education sessions and had to participate in program-related logistic activities to receive the benefits. These program conditions, however, were not strictly enforced. Health was a primary aim (To attend to the needs of communities with limited access to education or health services) ","Overall diet","Socio-economic (low income population and remote deprived communities)","Mexico - National",2003,"14 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study (cohort follow-up)","Energy, nutrient intake","• PAL was associated with increases (P<0.01) in the consumption of total energy (5–9% increase), energy from fruits and vegetables (24–28% increase), and energy from animal source foods (24–39% increase) in both the cash and the basket transfer. \n• PAL increased the consumption of all macro- and micronutrients (P<0.05) (iron, zinc, and vitamin A and C consumption (P <0.05)) with the exception of heme iron in the cash group. \n• The consumption of energy and all nutrients was greater in the food basket group (P<0.05) except for fiber, which did not differ.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Leroy, J L, P Gadsden, S Rodriguez-Ramirez, and T G de Cossio. 2010. “Cash and in-Kind Transfers in Poor Rural Communities in Mexico Increase Household Fruit, Vegetable, and Micronutrient Consumption but Also Lead to Excess Energy Consumption.” J Nutr 140(3): 612–17. ","Link","• 10.3945/jn.109.116285"]
[76,"1 Diet and obesity","SA_SSB_tax","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 20% SSB tax for a period of 20 years with 100% pass on rate. The implemented tax is fixed at 2.1 cents per gram of sugar content that exceeds 4g per 100ml.  Health was a primary aim (prevention and control of obesity) ","SSB","General population","South Africa - National",2018,"20 years","• Policy overlaps with Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Control of NCDs, 2013–2017\n• Passed through legislation\n","Not reported ","Modelling (Markov modelling)","Number of disease incidences averted (e.g. strokes, etc.)","• Our model estimates that without the tax intervention, there would be approximately 6 400 000 new adult stroke cases over 20 years, compared to 6 300 000 cases with the intervention. This translates to relative changes of between 1.0 and 1.8 %\n• The tax is predicted to reduce the number of prevalent stroke cases in adults by approximately 13 000 (95 % UI: 8 400–17 000) by year 20. We estimate that over 72 000 deaths may be averted by the tax over the same period (95 %UI: 51 000–98 000)\n• The model estimates that about 550 000 stroke-related DALYs will be averted over a 20 year period (9 5 % UI: 361 000–767 000). \n","Not reported","Costs avoided","In year 20 of the intervention, a potential ZAR342 million (USD27 million) (95 % UI: ZAR222–463 million, USD 18– 37 million) may be saved, compared to ZAR30 million (USD2 million) (95 % UI: ZAR21–ZAR39 million, USD1.7–3.1 million) in year one, for a total of over ZAR5 billion (USD 400 million) over the entire 20 year period (95 % UI: ZAR3.7–7.2 billion, USD296–576 million","Not reported","Not reported","This policy was delayed by a year for more consultations. Proponents include government, public health bodies while opponents include industry groups  (note, at publication, the tax was only 3 months old) ","No","Manyema, Mercy, et al. \"Modelling the potential impact of a sugar-sweetened beverage tax on stroke mortality, costs and health-adjusted life years in South Africa.\" BMC public health 16.1 (2016): 405.","Link","• 10.1186/s12889-016-3085-y"]
[77,"1 Diet and obesity","France_fish_tax_subsidy","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a health taxation/subsidy program  alongside providing information on fish consumption and consumers’ welfare. Both a per-unit tax would be imposed on tuna to reduce population exposure to methylmercury, and a per-unit subsidy supplied for sardines because of omega-3 are selected to maximize welfare by taking into account a costly information policy. Health was a primary aim (reduce consumption of high-containing methylmercury fish and increase consumption of high omega-3 fish) ","Fish (tuna and sardines)","General population","France - National",2002,"NA","Policy overlaps  with  providing information to consumers about the health implications of methylmercury\n","Not reported ","Modelling (quasilinear utility function. Combine willingness to pay (coming from the experiment) with the calibrated partial equilibrium model measuring imperfect substitution between sardines and tuna)","consumers’ welfare ( no further details as to what welfare entails, but discuss the impact of omega-3 on reducing the risk of cardio-vascular diseases and its contrinution to brain development and growth of children, as well as the impacts of methylmercury on a lack of brain development in the fetus and children.\n","\"for most cases, a per-unit tax on tuna and a per-unit subsidy on sardines without any information revealed to consumers lead to the highest welfare, because both the tax and subsidy directly internalize health characteristics. The information policy combined with a per-unit tax on tuna and a per-unit subsidy on sardines is socially profitable only if a large proportion of consumers (greater than 95%) receives health information.\"","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The general population The revenues collected by the tax on tuna are used to subsidise sardines in Fiscal model 2. \"Fiscal program 1 will maximize the regulatory program without balancing the budget linked to the regulation on the fish market. In other words, the fiscal deficit B(tt , ss, I × C)< 0(or surplus B(tt , ss, I × C)> 0) is financed by a lump-sum tax (or leads to a lump-sum transfer) accounted for in the overall welfare (see Crespi and Marette 2001). This may correspond to a transfer coming from a more general health policy decided by a state.\"","Not reported","No","Marette S, Roosen J, Blanchemanche S. Taxes and subsidies to change eating habits when information is not enough: an application to fish consumption. Journal of Regulatory Economics. 2008 Oct 1;34(2):119-43.","Link","• 10.1007/s11149-008-9057-0"]
[78,"1 Diet and obesity","Healthy Start (UK)","Policy","Government (Department of Health)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Women who are at least ten weeks pregnant and families with children up to their fourth birthday can register for Healthy Start if they receive qualifying welfare benefits or qualifying tax credits with a household income of £16,190 or less (2013/14), or they are pregnant and aged under 18 irrespective of benefits or tax credits. Those registered for Healthy Start receive vouchers which can be exchanged for fresh or frozen fruit and vegetables, plain cows’ milk or infant formula, and coupons for free vitamin supplements. The current voucher value is £3.10 per week for pregnant women and children between the ages of one and four, and £6.20 per week for children up to their first birthday. Health was a primary aim (improve nutritional status of pregnant women and their children) ","Food insecurity","Socio-economic groups (food insecure households)","UK - Yorkshire and the Humber, and London - Regional",2006,"NA","• Policy overlaps with any public health policies that are targeted at pregnant women/children \n• Passed through legislation\n","Not reported ","Empirical assessment (qualitative interviews)","Increasing nutritional status","Both beneficiaries and practitioners valued the contribution of Healthy Start food vouchers to improve the diets of pregnant women, mothers and young children under four years-old in low-income families. Women reported that food vouchers increased the quantity and range of fruit and vegetables eaten by them and their children. This was said to improve the quality of family diets while receiving food vouchers and to establish good habits for the future. The influence of food vouchers appeared to have particular salience for teenage pregnant women who may not otherwise have had autonomy or access to resources to buy nutritious food.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","For those eligible for the programme, barriers to registration meant that not all those who could benefit from food vouchers received them. These barriers included complex eligibility criteria that are difficult for women and health practitioners to understand, inappropriate targeting of information about the programme by health practitioners to those they judge to be eligible and low level of awareness of the programme among the general population. Additionally a complex application process led to some potential beneficiaries losing out and caused delays in receiving time-limited vouchers for others.","Not reported","Not reported","NA","McFadden A, Green JM, Williams V, McLeish J, McCormick F, Fox-Rushby J, Renfrew MJ. Can food vouchers improve nutrition and reduce health inequalities in low-income mothers and young children: A multi-method evaluation of the experiences of beneficiaries and practitioners of the Healthy Start programme in England. BMC public health. 2014 Dec;14(1):148.","Link","• 10.1186/1471-2458-14-148"]
[79,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand School Breakfast Programme - trial","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","RCT evaluation of a voluntary school breakfast programme. Eligible primary schools did not have an existing breakfast programme and agreed to start one in the 2010 school year. Schools needed to be of sufficient size that they estimated at least 25 students would attend a breakfast programme each day. Eligible participants were children aged 5-13 years who planned to attend the SBP and did not have a diagnosed food allergy. Only one child per household could take part. no attempts were made to standardise the intervention or its delivery in schools, other than requesting that the programme be available 5 days/week. Health as a secondary aim (primary outcome was children’s school attendance. Secondary outcomes were academic achievement, self- reported grades, sense of belonging at school, behaviour, short-term hunger, breakfast habits and food security)","School breakfast","Children","New Zealand - 14 schools in Auckland, Waikato and Wellington - Local",2010,"1 year","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","Reduced reported hunger","There was a significant decrease in children’s self-reported short- term hunger during the intervention phase compared with the control phase, demonstrated by an increase of 8.6 units on the Freddy satiety scale (95% CI 3.4 to 13.7, p=0.001).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No significant effect of intervention on attendance - in fact attendance dropped through the school year (likely unrelated). The odds of children achieving an attendance rate <95% was 0.76 (95% CI 0.56 to 1.02) during the intervention phase and 0.93 (95% CI 0.67 to 1.31) during the control phase, giving an OR of 0.81 (95% CI 0.59 to 1.11, p value 0.19).","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Mhurchu CN, Gorton D, Turley M, Jiang Y, Michie J, Maddison R, Hattie J. Effects of a free school breakfast programme on children's attendance, academic achievement and short-term hunger: results from a stepped-wedge, cluster randomised controlled trial. J Epidemiol Community Health. 2012 Oct 6:jech-2012.","Link","• 10.1136/jech-2012-201540"]
[80,"1 Diet and obesity","Welsh Government’s Primary School Free Breakfast Initiative (PSFBI)","Programme","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary school breakfast initiative. Offers all primary schools resources and guidance to provide free, healthy breakfasts before the start of the school day without any cost being borne by parents. A particular focus was placed upon limiting available food choices to breakfast items considered to be healthful. Breakfasts provided included items from four food types: non-sugar coated cereals, bread, milk products and fruits, in addition to drinks. Schools were provided with guidelines regarding how the scheme should be run, in terms of staff to student ratios and the food to be provided, but were given a reasonable degree of autonomy in the operation of the scheme. Health was a primary aim (breakfast consumption and improvement of the nutritional quality of children’s breakfasts) Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year)  An estimated three-quarters of primary schools throughout Wales have taken up this scheme to date.","School breakfast","Children (9-11 year old)","UK - Wales - Regional",2005,"1 year","Passed through legislation (School Standards & Organisation (Wales) Act 2013)","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","dietary intake at breakfast","Children in intervention schools ate a greater number of healthy items for breakfast than children in control schools (on average 0.25; servings 95% CI 0.07, 0.44) ","There were larger increases observed in number of servings of healthy items for breakfast in more deprived schools.A significant interaction was observed, indicating declines in breakfast skipping in more deprived schools and households. No significant influence on inequality was observed for the remaining outcomes.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Moore, G F et al. 2014. “Impacts of the Primary School Free Breakfast Initiative on Socio-Economic Inequalities in Breakfast Consumption among 9-11-Year-Old Schoolchildren in Wales.” Public Health Nutr 17(6): 1280–89. ","Link","• 10.1017/S1368980013003133"]
[81,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand fiscal policy models","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a 20% flat rate fruit and vegetable subsidy on total cost of fruit and vegetables (dried, canned, frozen, and fresh).  Health was a primary aim (The aim was to estimate the effects of health-related food taxes and subsidies on deaths prevented or postponed (DPP) in New Zealand.) ","F&V","General population","New Zealand - National",2007,"Immediate (counterfactual in year)","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment Macrosimulation)","• Changes in mortality from diet-related diseases at national level\n• Changes in food and nutrient purchases\n\n","• Fruit and vegetable subsidy: 467 (321, 612) CVD deaths averted; 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) diabetes deaths averted; 88 (55, 116) diet-related cancer deaths averted; 555 (402, 702) early deaths averted; 1.9% annual deaths\n• Fruit and vegetable subsidy: 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) % change in total energy; -0.98 (-1.12, -0.83) % change in saturated fat; -0.61 (-0.77, -0.45) % change in sodium; 11.66 (9.58, 13.64) % change in fruit; 17.68 (16.47, 18.93 )% change in vegetables\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Ni Mhurchu, C et al. 2015. “Effects of Health-Related Food Taxes and Subsidies on Mortality from Diet-Related Disease in New Zealand: An Econometric-Epidemiologic Modelling Study.” PLoS One 10(7): e0128477. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0128477"]
[82,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand fiscal policy models","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory 20% saturated fat tax on total cost of major food contributors to saturated fat intakes  (butter; cakes and biscuits; cheese and cream; pastry cook products; beef, lamb and hogget; poultry; and prepared, preserved, and processed meat). Health was a primary aim (The aim was to estimate the effects of health-related food taxes and subsidies on deaths prevented or postponed (DPP) in New Zealand.) ","Saturated fat","General population","New Zealand - National",2007,"Immediate (counterfactual in year)","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment Macrosimulation)","• Changes in mortality from diet-related diseases at national level\n• Changes in food and nutrient purchases\n","• Saturated fat tax: 1034 (552, 1622) CVD deaths averted; 206 (153, 256) diabetes deaths averted; 153 (114, 193) diet-related cancer deaths averted; 1451 (948, 2051) early deaths averted; 5.0% annual deaths\n• Saturated fat tax: -4.69 (-5.36, -4.01) % change in total energy; -5.83 (-7.12, -4.56) % change in saturated fat; -6.02 (-6.77, -5.25) % change in sodium; -3.36 (-5.43, -1.26) % change in fruit; -2.79 (-4.77, -0.79)% change in vegetables\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Ni Mhurchu, C et al. 2015. “Effects of Health-Related Food Taxes and Subsidies on Mortality from Diet-Related Disease in New Zealand: An Econometric-Epidemiologic Modelling Study.” PLoS One 10(7): e0128477. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0128477"]
[83,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand fiscal policy models","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory 20% sodium tax on total cost of major food contributors to sodium intakes  (bread and breakfast cereals; prepared, preserved and processed meat; sauces and condiments; beef, lamb, and hogget; poultry; and takeaway foods and beverages). Health was a primary aim (The aim was to estimate the effects of health-related food taxes and subsidies on deaths prevented or postponed (DPP) in New Zealand.) ","Sodium","General population","New Zealand - National",2007,"Immediate (counterfactual in year)","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment Macrosimulation)","• Changes in mortality from diet-related diseases at national level\n• Changes in food and nutrient purchases\n","• Sodium tax: 1363 (683, 2,116) CVD deaths averted; 280 (206, 336) diabetes deaths averted; 256 (205, 304) diet-related cancer deaths averted; 1977 (1289, 2745) early deaths averted; 6.8% annual deaths\n• Sodium tax: -7.17 (-7.63, -6.70) % change in total energy; 2.19 (1.53, 2.87) % change in saturated fat; -10.77 (-11.35, -10.16) % change in sodium; 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) % change in fruit; -1.90 (-3.38, -0.38) % change in vegetables\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Ni Mhurchu, C et al. 2015. “Effects of Health-Related Food Taxes and Subsidies on Mortality from Diet-Related Disease in New Zealand: An Econometric-Epidemiologic Modelling Study.” PLoS One 10(7): e0128477. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0128477"]
[84,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand fiscal policy models","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory combination of taxes and  subsidy: 20% subsidy total cost of fruit and vegetables with a 20% tax on major food group contributors to saturated fat and sodium intakes (maximum 20% tax subsidy was applied to foods high in both saturated fat and sodium). Health was a primary aim (The aim was to estimate the effects of health-related food taxes and subsidies on deaths prevented or postponed (DPP) in New Zealand.) ","F&V, saturated fat, sodium","General population","New Zealand - National",2007,"Immediate (counterfactual in year)","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment Macrosimulation)","• Changes in mortality from diet-related diseases at national level\n• Changes in food and nutrient purchases\n","• Combination scenario: 1720 (1,150, 2,363) CVD deaths averted; 252 (187, 309) diabetes deaths averted; 309 (253, 362) diet-related cancer deaths averted; 2352 (1755, 2996) early deaths averted; 8.1% annual deaths\n• Combination scenario: -6.15 (-6.89, -5.38) % change in total energy; -3.64 (-4.92, -2.36) % change in saturated fat; -10.79 (-11.58, -9.94) % change in sodium; 11.66 (9.62, 13.62 % change in fruit; 14.89 (12.52, 17.25) % change in vegetables\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Ni Mhurchu, C et al. 2015. “Effects of Health-Related Food Taxes and Subsidies on Mortality from Diet-Related Disease in New Zealand: An Econometric-Epidemiologic Modelling Study.” PLoS One 10(7): e0128477. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0128477"]
[85,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand fiscal policy models","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory greenhouse gas tax: 20% tax on total cost of major food group contributors to carbon emissions (milk, yoghurt and eggs; cheese and cream; butter; ice cream; beef, lamb and hogget; pork; prepared, preserved and processed meat; and poultry).Health was a primary aim (The aim was to estimate the effects of health-related food taxes and subsidies on deaths prevented or postponed (DPP) in New Zealand.) ","Green house gas","General population","New Zealand - National",2007,"Immediate (counterfactual in year)","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment Macrosimulation)","• Changes in mortality from diet-related diseases at national level\n• Changes in food and nutrient purchases\n","• Greenhouse gas emissions tax: 826 (430, 1,348) CVD deaths averted; 166 (124, 210) diabetes deaths averted; 125 (93, 158) diet-related cancer deaths averted; 1163 (749, 1696) early deaths averted; 4.0% annual deaths\n• Greenhouse gas emissions tax: -3.58 (-4.20, -2.96) % change in total energy; -3.72 (-4.72, -2.69) % change in saturated fat; -3.08 (-3.73, -2.42) % change in sodium; 0.00 (0.00, 0.00) % change in fruit; -2.53 (-5.04, 0.03) % change in vegetables\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Ni Mhurchu, C et al. 2015. “Effects of Health-Related Food Taxes and Subsidies on Mortality from Diet-Related Disease in New Zealand: An Econometric-Epidemiologic Modelling Study.” PLoS One 10(7): e0128477. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0128477"]
[86,"1 Diet and obesity","Sweden_grain_tax_modelling VAT reform 1","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory removal of the VAT on wholesome bread and breakfast cereals, while keeping the VAT on all other grain products at the initial 10.71 %  Health was a secondary aim (the main aim was to simulate the impact on the average household of tax reforms entailing either a subsidy on commodities particularly rich in fibre or a subsidy of the fibre density in grain products) ","Whole grain","General population","Sweden - National",2003,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (demand equations from Almost Ideal Demand System model)","• Consumption of wholesome bread and breakfast cereals\n• Consumption of unhealthy bakery products and ready meals\n• Fibre consumption\n","• removing the VAT on wholesome bread and breakfast cereals results in the average household achieving the recommendation that half of bread and breakfast cereal consumption should be wholesome. However, the increase in amounts of bread and breakfast cereals consumed is small, only 3%, \n• Average household’s consumption of bakery products and ready meals would increase by 1 %. \n• The fiber density of the grain diet increases from 3.32g per 100g to 3.37g per 100g for the average household which is also shown in the moderate increase in fiber consumption, just 4% and there are slight decreases in the density of all other (unhealthy) nutrients. \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","A 30 % decrease in public revenues from VAT on grain products consumed by the average household.","Not reported","No","Nordstrom, J, and L Thunstrom. 2009. “The Impact of Tax Reforms Designed to Encourage Healthier Grain Consumption.” J Health Econ 28(3): 622–34.","Link","• 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.02.005"]
[87,"1 Diet and obesity","Sweden_grain_tax_modelling VAT reform 2","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory 50% subsidy of the price of wholesome bread and breakfast cereals (this comes in the form of extensive VAT reform, designed to increase the fibre intake of the average household by the recommended 3%). Health was a secondary aim (the main aim was to simulate the impact on the average household of tax reforms entailing either a subsidy on commodities particularly rich in fibre or a subsidy of the fibre density in grain products) ","Whole grain","General population","Sweden - National",2003,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (demand equations from Almost Ideal Demand System model)","• Consumption of wholesome bread and breakfast cereals\n• Consumption of unhealthy bakery products and ready meals\n• Fibre consumption\n","• Consumption of wholesome bread and breakfast cereals: the proportion of wholesome bread and break- fast cereals consumed, out of total bread and breakfast cereals, rises to almost 70 percent.\n• Consumption of unhealthy bakery products and ready meals: The proportion of bakery products and ready meals, of total grain consumption, does not change, however. The amount consumed of bread and breakfast cereal would increase by 40 percent.\n• Fibre consumption: The impact on dietary quality as measured by the density of the nutrients is also mixed. The density of fiber increases to 3.80g per 100g from 3.32g per 100g at baseline, but achieve the recommended 38 percent increase in fiber intake. The increase in salt and sugar intake is particularly high: 25 percent. Also, the intake of kilojoules increases by 20 percent. whereas the density of all other nutrients decreases.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The reform turns out to be costly, measured by public revenues lost: revenues from VAT on grain products paid by the average household decrease by 160 percent. \n ","Not reported","No","Nordstrom, J, and L Thunstrom. 2009. “The Impact of Tax Reforms Designed to Encourage Healthier Grain Consumption.” J Health Econ 28(3): 622–34.","Link","• 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.02.005"]
[88,"1 Diet and obesity","Sweden_grain_tax_modelling subsidy","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory  SEK 0.046 subsidy per gram of fibre per kilogram of grain product , designed to increase the fibre intake of the average household by 38%: Health was a secondary aim (the main aim was to simulate the impact on the average household of tax reforms entailing either a subsidy on commodities particularly rich in fibre or a subsidy of the fibre density in grain products) ","Whole grain","General population","Sweden - National",2003,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (demand equations from Almost Ideal Demand System model)","• Consumption of wholesome bread and breakfast cereals\n• Consumption of unhealthy bakery products and ready meals\n• Fibre consumption\n","• Consumption of wholesome bread and breakfast cereals: the proportion increases so that the nutritional recommendation is attained for the average household: the amount of bread and breakfast cereals consumed would increase by 11% under the fiber subsidy reform, which is much less than under VAT reform\n• Consumption of unhealthy bakery products and ready meals: the amount consumed of bakery products and ready meals would decrease by 4 %.\n• Fibre consumption: 38 percent increase in fiber intake; the density of kilojoules would increase substantially to 989kJ per 100g, whereas the density of salt, sugar, and added sugar would decrease substantially. There would be only small changes in the density of fat and saturated fat compared to baseline. The rise in the intake of fat, saturated fat, kilojoules ,and added sugar would be higher than under VAT reform , whereas the increase in the intake of salt and sugar would be lower.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The fibre subsidy reform is less costly, though it still imposes a sizeable burden on public revenues: the VAT and excise duty paid by the average house hold would decrease by 129 percent ","Not reported","No","Nordstrom, J, and L Thunstrom. 2009. “The Impact of Tax Reforms Designed to Encourage Healthier Grain Consumption.” J Health Econ 28(3): 622–34.","Link","• 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2009.02.005"]
[89,"1 Diet and obesity","Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP)","Programme","Government (US Department of Agriculture)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The FFVP provides participating schools with $50 to $75 per student per year—roughly $2 per student per week—for the purchase, preparation, and serving of fresh fruit and vegetable. Schools are granted substantial discretion in implementation, with no target number of fruit and vegetable servings or specific types of fruit and vegetable to be provided. Regulations require that the fresh fruit and vegetable must be served outside of school meals, but there are no rules about how frequently or at what times of day they should be offered. FFVP is offered in selected low-income elementary schools with high rates of free and reduced-price meal enrolment.  Health was a primary aim (The evaluation assessed FFVP effects on student fruit and vegetable consumption and total energy intake in and out of school.)","F&V","General population","USA - National",2008,"1 year","• Intervention costs: $101 million in 2010-2011, the year in which data for this evaluation were collected. Funding increased to $150 million in the 2011-2012 school year, to continue at that level thereafter, indexed for inflation  \n• Passed through legislation  (2008 Farm Bill,19 the Richard B. Russell national School Lunch Act was amended to authorize the expansion of the existing FFVP pilot to selected schools nationwide)\n","Not reported ","Epidemiological study (regression discontinuity)","Fruit and vegetable consumption ","• Students in FFVP schools consumed approximately 1/3 of a cup (0.32 cups per day; P<0.001) more F/V on FFVP days than students in comparable schools not participating in the program.\n• The effect of FFVP on adjusted mean daily total F/V consumption in school was 0.26 cups per day\n• the effect on adjusted mean daily fresh F/V consumption in school was 0.25 cups per day in both cases, this represents about 80% of the total 0.32-cup per day difference observed on FFVP days. The remainder of the difference came from a difference in adjusted mean consumption out of school (0.05-cup per day effect on adjusted mean total F/V intake,P=0.125; 0.06-cup per day effect on adjusted mean fresh F/V intake; P=0.043).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes?","Olsho, L E et al. 2015. “Increasing Child Fruit and Vegetable Intake: Findings from the US Department of Agriculture Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program.” J Acad Nutr Diet 115(8): 1283–90.","Link","• 10.1016/j.jand.2014.12.026"]
[90,"1 Diet and obesity","CVD fiscal policies modelling - F&V subsidy","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a voluntary, national subsidy to reduce fruit and vegetables prices by 10% compared to baseline scenario of “no intervention” assuming that recent and current trends in consumption simply continue. Another scenario looked at a SNAP-specific subsidy to reduce fruit and vegetables prices by 30%, similar to the successful US Department of Agriculture (USDA) Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP) in Massachusetts compared to baseline scenario of “no intervention” assuming that recent and current trends in consumption simply continue. Health was a primary aim (aimed to quantify and compare the potential effects on total CVD mortality and disparities of specific dietary policies to increase fruit and vegetable consumption in the US) ","F&V","General population","USA - National",2015,"15 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (US IMPACT Food Policy model based on CHD IMPACT BAM)","• CVD deaths prevented or postponed (DPP)\n• Dietary intake of fruits\n• Dietary intake of vegetables\n• Dietary intake of SSBs\n","•10% FV subsidy:  4.04 (3.80–4.26) DPP per 100,000;  30% SNAP FV subsidy: 0.94 (0.85–1.01) DPP per 100,000\n• 10% FV subsidy:  29.7% increase in fruit intake, 30% SNAP FV subsidy: 23.2% increase in fruit intake,\n• 10% FV subsidy:  14.4% increase  in vegetable intake; 30% SNAP FV subsidy: 9% increase  in vegetable intake;\n• 10% FV subsidy:  36.5% reduction in SSB intake. 30% SNAP FV subsidy: 36.5% reduction in SSB intake.\n","The targeted SNAP 30% F&V subsidy would yield the largest number of averted deaths in SNAP participants, yielding approximately 35,100 DPPs (95% UI 31,700–37,500). This represents a reduction in CVD mortality of 9.5/100,000 in this group compared to those ineligible for SNAP. the targeted SNAP 30% F&V subsidy would also be the most effective in reducing CVD disparities; while the national F&V subsidy would reduce CVD disparities between SNAP participants and the SNAP-ineligible population, but less than the targeted 30% F&V subsidy.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Pearson-Stuttard, J et al. 2017. “Reducing US Cardiovascular Disease Burden and Disparities through National and Targeted Dietary Policies: A Modelling Study.” PLoS Med 14(6): e1002311. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002311"]
[91,"1 Diet and obesity","CVD fiscal policies modelling- SSB tax","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory, national tax to increase SSB prices by 10%compared to baseline scenario of “no intervention” assuming that recent and current trends in consumption simply continue. Health was a primary aim (aimed to quantify and compare the potential effects on total CVD mortality and disparities of specific dietary policies to reduce sugar-sweetened beverage consumption in the US) ","SSB","General population","USA - National",2015,"16 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (US IMPACT Food Policy model based on CHD IMPACT BAM)","• CVD deaths prevented or postponed (DPP)\n• Dietary intake of fruits\n• Dietary intake of vegetables\n• Dietary intake of SSBs\n","• 0.83 (0.72–0.95) DPPs per 100,000\n• 13% increase in fruit intake\n• 0.4% reduction in vegetable intake; \n• 41.3% reduction in SSB intake.\n","The targeted SNAP 30% F&V subsidy would yield the largest number of averted deaths in SNAP participants, yielding approximately 35,100 DPPs (95% UI 31,700–37,500). This represents a reduction in CVD mortality of 9.5/100,000 in this group compared to those ineligible for SNAP. the targeted SNAP 30% F&V subsidy would also be the most effective in reducing CVD disparities; while the national F&V subsidy would reduce CVD disparities between SNAP participants and the SNAP-ineligible population, but less than the targeted 30% F&V subsidy.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Pearson-Stuttard, J et al. 2017. “Reducing US Cardiovascular Disease Burden and Disparities through National and Targeted Dietary Policies: A Modelling Study.” PLoS Med 14(6): e1002311. ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pmed.1002311"]
[92,"1 Diet and obesity","US-Food tax_subsidy_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory tax to increase the price of 4 foods  and a subsidy to decrease the price of 3 foods associated with cardiometabolic outcomes: 10% increase in price of SSB, processed and unprocessed meats and 10% decrease in price of fruits, vegetables, whole grains, nuts/seeds. Health was a primary aim (estimate the impact of specific dietary taxes and subsidies on CMD deaths and disparities in the US) ","SSBs, processed meat, F&V, wholegrains, nuts and seeds","General population","USA - National",2012,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment)","• Number of cardiometabolic deaths (CHD, hypertensive Heart disease, stroke and diabetes) prevented per year\n• Proportion of cardiometabolic deaths prevented \n","• Total 23,174 deaths/year (95% UI 22,024–24,595) prevented (111 CMD deaths per million US adults could be potentially prevented)\n• 3.4% (95% UI 3.2–3.6) of all CMD deaths in the US (the greatest estimated impact was for reducing the price of vegetables (6294 fewer CMD deaths/year), fruits (5265), and nuts/seeds (3413), and increasing the price of SSBs (4647). By cause, diabetes deaths would be most influenced by price changes in SSBs (1.5% reduction in deaths) and processed meats (0.7% reduction); while CHD deaths would be most influenced by price changes in SSBs (1% reduction) and nuts/seeds (0.9% reduction). The largest effect was observed for stroke by subsidizing fruits and vegetables (2.4% and 2.8% reduction, respectively)","• When stratified by educational attainment, a generally larger estimated proportion of CMD deaths would be prevented among those with lower than high school (< HS), high school or some college (HS), compared to those with higher education level. Under the scenario of a low SES gradient in price responsiveness, a joint 10% price change would avert approximately 3.1% of CMD deaths among those with < HS, 3.6% among those with HS, and 2.9% among those with COL. Applying a higher SES gradient in price-responsiveness, the corresponding estimated reductions were 3.7%, 3.6%, and 2.5%, respectively. \n• Under the scenario of a higher SES gradient in price responsiveness, price changes in these seven dietary targets would reduce disparities in all outcomes. Under the scenario of a low SES gradient in price-responsiveness, these pricing interventions tended to reduce disparities for CHD, and total CMD, but not stroke, although none of these differences were statistically significant. In comparison, current disparities in diabetes mortality would be significantly reduced by any of the pricing scenarios.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Peñalvo, José L. et al. 2017. “The Potential Impact of Food Taxes and Subsidies on Cardiovascular Disease and Diabetes Burden and Disparities in the United States.” BMC Medicine 15(1): 1–13.","Link","• 10.1186/s12916-017-0971-9"]
[93,"1 Diet and obesity","US-Food tax_subsidy_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory tax to increase the price of 4 foods and a subsidy to decrease the price of 3 foods associated with cardiometabolic outcomes: 30% increase in price of SSB, processed and unprocessed meats and 30% decrease in price of fruits, vegetables, whole grains, nuts/seeds. Health was a primary aim (estimate the impact of specific dietary taxes and subsidies on CMD deaths and disparities in the US) ","SSBs, processed meat, F&V, wholegrains, nuts and seeds","General population","USA - National",2012,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment)","• Number of cardiometabolic deaths (CHD, hypertensive Heart disease, stroke and diabetes) prevented per year\n• Propotion of cardiometabolic deaths prevented \n","• 63,268 deaths/year (95% UI 60,425–66,719) (303 deaths/million could be potentially prevented)\n• 9.2% (95% UI 8.8–9.7) of all CMD deaths\n","• When stratified by educational attainment, a generally larger estimated proportion of CMD deaths would be prevented among those with lower than high school (< HS), high school or some college (HS), compared to those with higher education level. Under the scenario of a low SES gradient in price responsiveness, a joint 30% price change would avert approximately 10% of CMD deaths among those with < HS, 9.8% among those with HS, and 6.7% among those with COL. \n• Under the scenario of a higher SES gradi- ent in price-responsiveness, price changes in these seven dietary targets would reduce disparities in all outcomes. Under the scenario of a low SES gradient in price-responsiveness, these pricing interventions tended to reduce disparities for CHD, and total CMD, but not stroke, although none of these differences were statistically significant. In comparison, current disparities in diabetes mortality would be significantly reduced by any of the pricing scenarios.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Peñalvo, José L. et al. 2017. “The Potential Impact of Food Taxes and Subsidies on Cardiovascular Disease and Diabetes Burden and Disparities in the United States.” BMC Medicine 15(1): 1–13.","Link","• 10.1186/s12916-017-0971-9"]
[94,"1 Diet and obesity","SSB tax on alcohol intake model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory tax on SSB on the consumption of alcohol.\nThe tax structure matches the proposed levy on sugary drinks producers in the UK which will be enacted in 2018, which categorises the sugar content of SSBs into: \n• high-sugar SSBs include >8g of sugar per 100mL\n• medium- sugar SSBs include 5–8g of sugar/100mL \n• low-sugar SSBs have <5g of sugar/100mL.\n Health was a primary aim (The research presented here is the first to provide a direct analysis of the relationship between price increases for SSBs and alcohol purchases, across income groups) \n","SSB","General population","UK - England - National",2012,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) applied to household expenditure data0","• Alcoholic beverage purchases","• A 1% increase in the price of high-sugar SSBs: 0.7% and 0.24% reduction in high sugar SSB and medium SSBs, and 0.18% reduction in spirits acting as complements. Increase in purchasing for low sugar SSBs (0.06%), juice (0.15%) and lager (0.23%) acting as supplements.\n• A 1% increase in the price of medium-sugar SSBs results in reduction in purchasing for all beverage categories (0.04% high sugar SSBs, 0.75% medium sugar SSBs, 0.09% juice, 0.11% water, 0.12% beer, 0.13% lager and 0.03% wines) except for spirits (0.29% increase in purchasing)\n• A 1% increase in the price of low-sugar SSBs results in an increase in purchasing for all beverage types, expect a reduction in low sugar SSBs (0.61%) and in spirits (0.68%): increase for juice (0.13%),  milk-based drunks (0.69%), water (0.40%), beer (0.36%), lager (0.27%), cider (0.28%), wines (0.29%).\n","In the high-income group, increases in the price of high-sugar SSBs decreases the purchase of cider (0·5% for 1% price increase), in the middle- income group it reduces the purchases of spirits (0.2% for 1% price increase) no decrease is evident in alcohol purchases in the low-income group. For medium-income groups there is also an increase in lager purchase if the price of high-sugar SSB increases. For an increase in the price of medium-sugar drinks, a common pattern is seen of complementary purchases, predominantly with juice and lager, across all income groups; although of different magnitudes.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No?","Quirmbach, Diana et al. 2018. “Effect of Increasing the Price of Sugar-Sweetened Beverages on Alcoholic Beverage Purchases: An Economic Analysis of Sales Data.” Journal of epidemiology and community health: jech-2017-209791. ","Link","• 10.1136/jech-2017-209791"]
[95,"1 Diet and obesity","Weight loss incentive pilot  Pounds for Pounds","Programme","Government (NHS)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The voluntary Pounds for Pounds (P4P) programme tied rewards directly to weight loss results The programme itself was provided by a commercial company, ‘Weight Wins’.Participants chose a weight loss plan based on their target weight. Plans ranged from 15 lb (6.8 kg) weight loss over 3 months to 50 lb (22.7 kg) weight loss over 7 months, with optional additional ‘maintenance’ periods. Rewards, which were received after successful plan completion, ranged from £70 to £425 per year. P4P credited participants monthly for cumulative weight loss up to a maximum target weight loss rate of 7.1 lb (3.2 kg) per month, and for maintenance of weight loss. Participants received their accumulated financial rewards, plus a bonus equal to 50% of the total maximum reward if they had achieved their final target weight at plan completion. Participants were provided with a booklet of weight loss tips. Health was a primary aim (pilot financial incentive scheme for weight loss was instituted as part of their health promotion strategy)","Weight loss","General adult population (obese)","UK - NHS Eastern and Coastal Kent - Local",2009,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 7 months","Not reported ","Pilot programme, further commissioning could be possible","Epidemiological study (cohort follow-up)","Weight change","• Clinically significant weight loss (≥5%) occurred in 44.8% [95% confidence interval (CI): 40.0–49.7%] of participants. \n• Estimated mean weight loss at 12 months was 4.0 kg (95% CI: 2.4–5.6 kg) under the assumption of return-to-baseline weight for those who had left the programme before reporting a 12 month weight\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Relton, C, M Strong, and J Li. 2011. “The ‘Pounds for Pounds’ Weight Loss Financial Incentive Scheme: An Evaluation of a Pilot in NHS Eastern and Coastal Kent.” J Public Health (Oxf) 33(4): 536–42. ","Link","• 10.1093/pubmed/fdr030"]
[96,"1 Diet and obesity","Aus_Junkfoodtax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 10% price increase on tax on foods in selected ‘unhealthy’ food categories (sweet bakery products such as biscuits, cakes, pastries and pies, snack foods, confectionery and soft drinks). The policy was assumed to be operating in steady- state (running at  full effectiveness potential) and were measured against current practice in Australia where these foods, along with the majority of processed foods, attract 10% goods and services tax, but are not subject to other sales or excise taxes Health was a primary aim (This analysis formed part of the Assessing the Cost-Effectiveness of Preventive interventions (ACE-Prevention) project, which aimed to provide a comprehensive analysis of the comparative cost-effectiveness of over 100 preventive intervention options addressing the non-communicable disease burden in Australia.","Unhealthy food","General adult population","Australia - National",2003,"NA","Implementation costs: AUD18 million (95% UI: 14.4; 21.6)   ","Not reported ","Modelling (behaviours)","• DALYS\n• Consumption\n","• Predicted that tax resulted in DALYs averted (559,000)\n• Predicted that tax resulted in reduced mean weight (1.6 kg) and suggest these benefits are attributable to reduced energy intake of 121-175 kJ\n","The intervention is likely to be regressive; however, the health benefits of the tax are also likely to be relatively greater in lower income groups.","Cost-effectiveness (ICER)","Junk food taxation was found to be dominant compared to current baseline scenario","Not reported","Based on national household expenditure data in 2003/2004,44 expenditure on cakes and biscuits, soft drinks and confectionery amounted to AUD21 per household per week, indicating that a 10% tax on these products would raise taxation revenue in excess of AUD855 million each year (not taking into account changes in consumption in response to the tax). ","Not reported","No","Sacks, G, J L Veerman, M Moodie, and B Swinburn. 2011. “‘Traffic-Light’ Nutrition Labelling and ‘Junk-Food’ Tax: A Modelled Comparison of Cost-Effectiveness for Obesity Prevention.” Int J Obes (Lond) 35(7): 1001–9. ","Link","• 10.1038/ijo.2010.228"]
[97,"1 Diet and obesity","Netherlands Schoolgruiten Fruit and Vegetable subsidy","Programme","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The Schoolgruiten intervention's main strategy to improve fruit and vegetable intake was by means of better availability and accessibility of fruit and vegetables at school through a free fruit and vegetables scheme. The Schoolgruiten intervention lasted for 2 school years (starting in grade 5 (10 years old) and continuing in grade 6 (11–12 years old)) and did not include a family component nor a computer tailored feedback tool) . Health was a secondary aim (The study aimed to provide an example of how these calculations can be done, by using the data of two existing Dutch intervention programs, and to estimate cost-effectiveness for these two intervention programs.)","F&V","Children (school age)","Netherlands - National",2008,"Cohort lifetime (up to 100 years)","• Implementation costs: nationwide implementation among all 10 years old will come to EUR7.1 million for the Schoolgruiten intervention. \n• Voluntarily, the schools were encouraged, but not obliged, to use a curriculum to increase knowledge and skills related to fruit and vegetables consumption. \n","Not reported ","Modelling (Comparative Risk Assessment)","• DALYs saved\n• Daily fruit and vegetable intake\n","• 236 DALYs/100,000 children (292 DALYs/100,000 boys and 178 DALYs/100,000 girls)\n• the children in the intervention group reported a 29.6 g/day (95% CI 14.3–45.0) intake at follow-up compared to children in the control group, adjusted for baseline intake levels at 1 year and  17.4 g/day (95% CI-0.9 to 35.6) at 2 year follow-up\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (ICER)","• The savings for the Schoolgruiten intervention were estimated to be EUR2.3 million\n• The ICER is EUR10,674/DALY for the Schoolgruiten intervention in comparison with no intervention\n• For the decision threshold of EUR19,600 the probability that the interventions are cost-effective compared to no intervention is 67% for Schoolgruiten.\n","Not reported","The NMB in comparison with no intervention was estimated to be EUR4.0 million for the Schoolgruiten intervention.","Not reported","Yes?","Sacks, G, J L Veerman, M Moodie, and B Swinburn. 2011. “‘Traffic-Light’ Nutrition Labelling and ‘Junk-Food’ Tax: A Modelled Comparison of Cost-Effectiveness for Obesity Prevention.” Int J Obes (Lond) 35(7): 1001–9. ","Link","• 10.1038/ijo.2010.228"]
[98,"1 Diet and obesity","UK_fat_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory increase the price of fatty foods by 1% for every percent of saturated fats they contain; for instance, milk which contains 1.72%of saturated fats will see its price increasing by 1.72%. A ceiling on the price increase of 15% was implemented. To offset this tax burden and to encourage consumption of fruit and vegetables, a subsidy on fruit and vegetables is introduced, so as to exactly cancel the costs of the fat tax paid by consumers (-14.78% for all fruit and vegetable). Health was a primary aim (study explores the impacts of such a policy in achieving Department of Health guidelines and on the risk of being affected by diet-related diseases) ","Saturated fat, F&V","General population","UK - National",2005,"1 year","Implementation costs not reported  but policy planned to be revenue neutral","Not reported ","Modelling (demand equations from Almost Ideal Demand System model)","• Impact on diet-related diseases (average odds of being affected by a condition across the population relative to a situation in which the whole population conforms to dietary guidelines)\n• achieving Department of Health guidelines and on the risk of being affected by diet-related diseases\n","• average odds of being affected by a condition across the population relative to a situation in which the whole population conforms to dietary guidelines are reduced by 0 to 27%, depending on nutrient  and health condition of interest. These relatively small changes in health status are understandable when, for example, it is recognised that the effect of the subsidy on fruit and vegetable consumption is to only reduce the proportion of the population that consumes less than 100 g of fruit and vegetables per day from 13 to 12%.\n• The subsidy brings mean levels of fruit and vegetable consumption in line with dietary recommendations, but the tax is insufficient to achieve this goal for fat intakes.:  Tax reduced intake of all fats but does not bring them in line with the recommendation, including PUFAS, which should be increased to meet guidelines but intake is decreased, for salt and fibre intakes.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Tax and subsidy were designed as a revenue-neutral scheme.","Not reported","No","Smith, C, W R Parnell, R C Brown, and A R Gray. 2013. “Providing Additional Money to Food-Insecure Households and Its Effect on Food Expenditure: A Randomized Controlled Trial.” Public Health Nutr 16(8): 1507–15.","Link","• 10.1017/S1368980012003680"]
[99,"1 Diet and obesity","New Zealand Spend Study","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Evaluating the impact of food vouchers (coupons) from a supermarket for 4 weeks, with a value adjusted for age and sex of each member of the family, based on five dollars per adult female per week. Vouchers were posted weekly and the food preparer was asked to spend the voucher within two weeks or one week for the final voucher.  Health was a primary aim (the main objective of the present study was to examine the effect of additional money (in the form of supermarket vouchers) on food expenditure in food-insecure households with children).","Food insecurity","Socio-economic (low income population)","New Zealand - Dunedin - Local",2009,"1 month","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","Food and healthy food purchasing","• The voucher group spent $NZ 15.20 (95% CI 1.46, 28.94) more per week on food during the intervention phase compared with the control group (P=0.030). \n• There were no differences in expenditure between the voucher and the control group for the food groups ‘fruit and vegetables’ (mean difference: $NZ 0.46; 95% CI 21.97, 2.89; P=0.709), ‘meat and poultry’ (mean difference: $NZ 0.29; 95% CI 23.07, 3.64; P=0.866) and ‘dairy’ (mean difference: $NZ 0.82; 95% CI 20.75, 2.42; P=0.302).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Smith, C, W R Parnell, R C Brown, and A R Gray. 2013. “Providing Additional Money to Food-Insecure Households and Its Effect on Food Expenditure: A Randomized Controlled Trial.” Public Health Nutr 16(8): 1507–15.","Link","• 10.1017/S1368980012003680"]
[100,"1 Diet and obesity","US_sodium_tax_model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the health benefits and costs, in terms of risk for myocardial infarction and stroke, of 3 governmental strategies to reduce sodium intake in the United States, including 2 modelled on the United Kingdom experience, and a tax on sodium used for food production. The study estimated that collaboration) with industry (strategy 1 would decrease sodium intake by the same amount as in the United Kingdom (9.5%), with a range of 5% to 40% (the United Kingdom goal is to decrease sodium intake by 37%) (9–11). A tax was modelled (strategy 2) an excise tax on sodium used for food production at the industrial level that would increase the price of salty foods by 40%, a level similar to the cigarette tax. A tax on sodium at the industrial level (strategy 3) simplifies the administration of the tax, and taxing foods exceeding a threshold might simply induce manufacturers to change the serving size. The study assumed that producers would pass the cost of the tax on to consumers in the price of foods but not change the sodium content of food products. An increase in price of 40% was estimated to result in a decrease in sodium intake of 6.0% (range, 1.2% to 21.6%). Health was a primary aim (prevention of stroke & MI) ","Sodium","General adult population (40 to 85 years)","USA - National",2008,"Lifetime (100 years)","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (computer-simulated, state-transition\n(Markov cohort) model)","• Number of disease incidences averted (e.g. strokes, and Myocardial infarctions (MI))\n• QALYs\n","Tax on sodium  decreases population sodium intake by 6%, averts 327 892 strokes, 306 137 MIs, and increases  QALYs by 1.3 million and over the cohort lifetime.","Low-income persons would benefit as the tax revenue would subsidize the cost of lower-sodium foods for low-income persons.","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","Lifetime Predicted Cumulative Health and Economic Consequences in Adults Aged 40 to 85 Years: 2,060,790 QALYs gained, $32.1bn saved in medical costs using collaboration with industry, and 1,313,304 QALY's gained, $22.4bn saved in medical costs using sodium tax.","Not reported"," Total savings in medical costs, $$22.4 billion over cohort lifetime. ","The model is based on the UK sodium experience \"The United Kingdom Food Standards Agency, an independent government department that monitors food safety, began working with manufacturers in 2003 to cut sodium in processed foods by developing voluntary maxi- mum sodium targets for specific foods.","No","Smith-Spangler CM, Juusola JL, Enns EA, Owens DK, Garber AM. Population strategies to decrease sodium intake and the burden of cardiovascular disease: a cost-effectiveness analysis. Annals of internal medicine. 2010 Apr 20;152(8):481-7.","Link","• 10.7326/0003-4819-152-8-201004200-00212"]
[101,"1 Diet and obesity","Advertising tax US model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling a mandatory elimination of the tax subsidy of TV advertising costs for nutritionally poor foods and beverages advertised to children and adolescents. The intervention would apply to TV programming watched on traditional TV and to TV advertising aired during children’s programming defined as >35% child-audience share 1 ads seen on children’s programming advertising aired during children’s programming defined as >35% child-audience share.  Children’s programming defined as>35% child-audience share. Ads seen on children’s programming account for >40% of total exposure to food and beverage TV advertising for children aged 2–11 years. The effect of changes in advertising exposure to adults or the impact of changes in non-TV forms of digital advertising and marketing were not modelled.  Health was a primary aim (models the effect of a national intervention that eliminates the tax subsidy of advertising nutritionally poor foods and beverages on TV to children aged 2–19 years) ","Unhealthy food advertising","General population","USA - National",2014,"10 years","Implementation costs: minimal costs and included those related to processing and auditing the new tax. Overhead costs of the tax system included administrative costs and expenses related to tax audits and litigation and were estimated at the cost of five full-time federal employees. These estimates were based on the assumption that 20%–25% of the 44 food companies responsible for the majority of expenditures for food and beverage marketing to children would be audited for compliance. Fify year cost: $1.05 Million (95%CI 0.69; 1.42); ten year cost $9.26 Million (95%CI 6.03; 12.51);   (Modelling study) ","Not reported ","Modelling (modification of Australian ACE model, US Childhood Obesity Intervention Cost Effectiveness Study (CHOICES) model and markov modelling)","• Total population reached (millions)\n• Mean per capita BMI unit reduction for youth 2–19 years of age\n• Total BMI units reduced for youth 2–19 years of age (millions)\n• Cost per BMI unit reduced for youth 2–19 years of age ($)a\n• Total QALYs gained\n• Healthcare costs avoided ($ millions)\n","• 74 millions population reached\n• 0.028 (0.011, 0.046) Mean per capita BMI unit reduction for youth 2–19 years of age\n• 2.13 million (0.83, 3.52) Total BMI units reduced for youth 2–19 years of age \n• $1.16 (0.51, 2.63) Cost per BMI unit reduced for youth 2–19 years of age \n• 4,540 (1,750, 7,490) Total QALYs gained\n• $352 million (138; 581) healthcare costs avoided \n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (ICER)","Cost-saving","  Reformulation may improve quality of snack foods/sweets/drinks Benefit to adults who watch mixed programming or those who are parents of children and adolescents as a result of reduced pester power. Media advertising may increase  or increased advertising costs may be offset by increased food prices.","Over the 2015–2025 period, these BMI reductions would result in $352 million (95% UI¼$138 million, $581 million) in healthcare cost savings and a $343 million (95% UI¼$129 million, $572 million) reduction in net societal costs. The policy change would lead to increases in QALYs: 4,540 (95% UI¼1,750, 7,490). The intervention was “cost saving,” as it would result in an increase in QALYs and reduction in total costs compared with current practice. The intervention would save an estimated $38.0 (95% UI¼ $14.3, $74.3) for every dollar spent on the intervention.  Overall,  the cost-saving intervention would likely have a significant societal impact. The tax policy change would also generate additional tax revenue of an estimated $80 million during the first year, with continuing additional revenue in later years.  "," Eliminating the tax subsidy of advertising expenses would likely be met with great opposition from the food industry and great support from the public.  Public and parents are proponents, Food industry are opponents. This is legally plausible and feasible. If it is implemented it will likely be challenged in court. Poor compliance would be possible without audits. ","No","Sonneville, K R et al. 2015. “BMI and Healthcare Cost Impact of Eliminating Tax Subsidy for Advertising Unhealthy Food to Youth.” Am J Prev Med 49(1): 124–34. ","Link","• 10.1016/j.amepre.2015.02.026"]
[102,"1 Diet and obesity","South Africa insurance Healthy Food Program cash rebate","Programme","Health body (South African Health Insurer Discovery, as part of its health promotion program, Vitality)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary scheme whereby all Vitality members  (insurance scheme members) are eligible for a healthy food benefıt at no additional cost to them, but they have to activate the benefıt online or by phone. Following activation, members immediately receive a 10% rebate for healthy foods, which increases to a 25% rebate on completion of an online health risk assessment questionnaire. The rebate is capped at a maximum monthly purchase amount of 4000 rands (approximately $480) per household and a limit related to participation in health promotion activities.  Food items eligible for the rebate program were based on nutrition guidelines on healthy nutrition. Some items are eligible only in certain forms:  raw or minimally processed fruits and vegetables are eligible, but not those pre-pared with added sugars or salt; only non-fat dairy products are eligible. All foods not specifıcally classifıed as either healthy or less desirable were considered neutral and were neither encouraged nor discouraged.   Health was a primary aim (Evaluate the impact of a rebate for health food in purchasing) ","Healthy food","General population  (eligible for Healthy Food program through Health insurer's Vitality health scheme)","South Africa - National",2009,"3 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study using scanner data","Healthy food purchasing","Rebates of 10% and 25% for healthy foods were associated with an increase in the ratio of expenditure on healthy foods to total food expenditure by 6.0% (95% CI 5.3, 6.8) and 9.3% (95% CI 8.5, 10.0); an increase in the ratio of expenditure on fruit and vegetables to total food expenditure by 5.7% (95% CI 4.5, 6.9) and 8.5% (95% CI 7.3, 9.7); and a decrease in the ratio of expenditure on less-desirable to total food expenditure by 5.6% (95% CI 4.7, 6.5) and 7.2% (95% CI 6.3, 8.1).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Sturm, R, R An, D Segal, and D Patel. 2013. “A Cash-Back Rebate Program for Healthy Food Purchases in South Africa: Results from Scanner Data.” Am J Prev Med 44(6): 567–72. ","Link","• 10.1016/j.amepre.2013.02.011"]
[103,"1 Diet and obesity","Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP)","RCT","Government (Food and Nutrition Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary programme where for every dollar of SNAP benefits spent on targeted fruits and vegetables (TFVs) at participating retailers, SNAP households received a 30-cent incentive on their SNAP Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) card. Health was a primary aim (making fruits and vegetables more affordable for participants in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)) ","F&V","Socio-economic groups (SNAP participants)","USA -  Massachusetts - Hampden - Local",2011,"13 months","• Implementation costs of pilot: Total costs for the pilot were $4.4 million. System changes accounted for a little over half of all costs. Incentive payments to HIP participants represented just 6 % of total costs ($263,043). Retailer recruitment, participant notifications and training, and expenses for management and oversight of HIP accounted for the remaining costs. \n• Implementation costs: Projected start-up costs to expand HIP nationwide are estimated to be $89.8 million. The projected value of incentives with nationwide expansion, based on plausible scenarios about SP households’ fruit and vegetable spending, ranges from $0.8 billion to $4.5 billion annually.\n• Passed through legislation (Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 authorized funds for pilot projects to determine if providing financial incentives to SP recipients at the point of sale would increase their consumption of fruits, vegetables, or other healthful foods\n","The experience in Hampden County demonstrated that implementing and operating HIP was both technically and operationally feasible. Expansion of HIP would require developing a framework for implementation that would include legislation, regulations, and industry standards. ","RCT","• Fruit and vegetable consumption \n• SNAP benefits expenditure\n","• HIP participants consumed almost a quarter of a cup more targeted fruits and vegetables than non-HIP participants. This 26 % increase in consumption over non-HIP participants\n• HIP households spent $78.17 each month on all fruits and vegetables in all types of stores and with cash as well as SNAP benefits. In contrast, non-HIP households reported spending $72.02 each month, which was $6.15 (or 8.5 %) less than spending reported by HIP households.\n","HIP impacts were not affected by the presence of children in the household, employment status, age, or amount of the household’s SNAP benefit. Some evidence indicated that impacts were larger for households who before HIP had more positive attitudes about fruits and vegetables.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","USDA. 2010. Evaluation of the Healthy Incentives Pilot (HIP): Data Collection Instruments:","Link","• NA"]
[104,"1 Diet and obesity","Breast feeding financial incentive ","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT testing the impact of financial incentive to promote breast feeding in low income, WIC participants. In addition to usual WIC services and periodic assessments, participants in the incentive group were asked to demonstrate breastfeeding in front of research staff at monthly sessions completed either at a WIC office or participant’s home and received financial incentives (cash) if breastfeeding was demonstrated. The incentive amount was $20 at the end of the first month and increased by $10 every month until the end of 6 months. The maximum potential earning from monthly financial incentives during the course of the study was $270 for participants who breastfed for all 6 months. When a participant did not demonstrate breastfeeding or pumping, she did not receive the incentive. The participant was given an opportunity to demonstrate breastfeeding within a week to be eligible for the monthly incentive. Health was a primary aim (breastfeeding maintenance) ","Breastfeeding","Socio-economic groups (low-income Hispanic women)","USA - Philadelphia - Local",2015,"6 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","breastfeeding rates and infant outcomes","Significantly higher percentages of breastfeeding mothers in the incentive group at each time point compared with those in the control group (89% vs 44%, P = .01 at 1 month; 89% vs 17%, P < .001 at 3 months; 72% vs 0%, P < .001 at 6 months). No significant differences were detected at any time point between study groups for self-reported exclusive breastfeeding rate and infant outcomes (ie, weight, emergency department visits)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Washio Y, Humphreys M, Colchado E, Sierra-Ortiz M, Zhang Z, Collins BN, Kilby LM, Chapman DJ, Higgins ST, Kirby KC. Incentive-based intervention to maintain breastfeeding among low-income Puerto Rican mothers. Paediatrics. 2017 Feb 6:e20163119.","Link","• 10.1542/peds.2016-3119"]
[105,"1 Diet and obesity","Canada dietary tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a 10% subsidy on consumption of fruits and vegetables.  Health was a primary aim (Modelling four dietary tax regimes on household expenditure and health. ","F&V","General population","Canada - National",2001,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (regression modelling)","Energy and nutrient intake","1. A 10% subsidy on fruits and vegetables causes consumption of fruits and vegetables to increase, it increases energy intake and consumption of other nutrients. For low income households, consumption of high calorie foods, such as meat, fish, dairy, eggs, and oils increases due to increased consumption of fruits and vegetables. Hence, a policy of subsidising fruits and vegetables at 10% would potentially increase calorie consumption by 18.17 kcal (24.73 kcal, 26.76 kcal) per day for an average adult in a low (medium, high) income household","A subsidy on fruits and vegetables is the most progressive policy, and it would potentially improve consumer welfare for all income groups at the expense of higher government costs. Among the rest of the food policies, a lump-sum transfer is the most economically efficient and progressive approach, followed by using collected revenues to subsidise fruits and vegetables. A stand-alone fat tax with collected revenue discarded is the least economically efficient and most regressive approach.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Xiang, Di. 2015. Ph.D. “Estimating the Impact of Behaviour Altering Taxes on Household Consumption.” University of Manitoba. ","Link","• NA"]
[106,"1 Diet and obesity","Canada dietary tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory 10% tax on SSBs, salt-fat products, sugar-fat products, and prepared meals. Health was a primary aim (Modelling four dietary tax regimes on household expenditure and health. ","Unhealthy food, SSB","General population","Canada - National",2001,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (regression modelling)","Energy and nutrient intake","2. A 10% tax on SSBs, salt-fat products, sugar-fat products, and prepared meals decreases total energy intake for low (medium, high) income households by 1.51% (1.88%, 2.13%). As a result, the fat tax decreases calorie consumption of high income households by 44.33/day, followed by a reduction in medium income households of 38.43/day, and a reduction in low income households of 29.51 /day. Further, the fat tax decreases protein, sugar, fat, saturated fat, and sodium consumption.","A subsidy on fruits and vegetables is the most progressive policy, and it would potentially improve consumer welfare for all income groups at the expense of higher government costs. Among the rest of the food policies, a lump-sum transfer is the most economically efficient and progressive approach, followed by using collected revenues to subsidise fruits and vegetables. A stand-alone fat tax with collected revenue discarded is the least economically efficient and most regressive approach.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Xiang, Di. 2015. Ph.D. “Estimating the Impact of Behaviour Altering Taxes on Household Consumption.” University of Manitoba. ","Link","• NA"]
[107,"1 Diet and obesity","Canada dietary tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory cash transfer: revenues from a 10% fat tax are returned to each household as a lump-sum transfer. Assuming a revenue-neutral scenario (the collected fat tax revenue is fully used to fund either a lump-sum transfer).  Health was a primary aim (Modelling four dietary tax regimes on household expenditure and health. ","Unhealthy food, SSB","General population","Canada - National",2001,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (regression modelling)","Energy and nutrient intake","3. A tax with a revenue-neutral lump-sum transfer decreases energy intake by 1.51% (1.88%, 2.13%) for low (medium, high) income households. The results are equivalent to a stand-alone fat tax, as the overall impact of the transferred money on calorie and nutrient intake is trivial—only 12 cents/day (6.6 cents/day, 3.9 cents/day) of the transferred money is used for food purchases for low (medium, high) income households, including both healthy and unhealthy food spending.\n","A subsidy on fruits and vegetables is the most progressive policy, and it would potentially improve consumer welfare for all income groups at the expense of higher government costs. Among the rest of the food policies, a lump-sum transfer is the most economically efficient and progressive approach, followed by using collected revenues to subsidise fruits and vegetables. A stand-alone fat tax with collected revenue discarded is the least economically efficient and most regressive approach.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Xiang, Di. 2015. Ph.D. “Estimating the Impact of Behaviour Altering Taxes on Household Consumption.” University of Manitoba. ","Link","• NA"]
[108,"1 Diet and obesity","Canada dietary tax model","Modelling study","NA","Price increase & decrease  (Tax and subsidy)","Modelling the impact of a mandatory cash transfer: revenues from a 10% fat tax are returned to each household as a lump-sum transfer, where the revenues are used to subsidise fruit and vegetable purchases. Assuming a revenue-neutral scenario (the collected fat tax revenue is fully used to subsidise fruit and vegetable purchases). Health was a primary aim (Modelling four dietary tax regimes on household expenditure and health).","Unhealthy food, F&V","General population","Canada - National",2001,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (regression modelling)","Energy and nutrient intake","4. A tax with a revenue used to subsidise fruits and vegetables decreases household energy and nutrient consumption, by decreasing expenditures on unhealthy food  reduces the price of fruit and vegetables causes households to increase consumption of other foods thus increasing energy and nutrient consumption. As a result, the impact of food taxes in decreasing energy intake is not prominent\n\n","A subsidy on fruits and vegetables is the most progressive policy, and it would potentially improve consumer welfare for all income groups at the expense of higher government costs. Among the rest of the food policies, a lump-sum transfer is the most economically efficient and progressive approach, followed by using collected revenues to subsidise fruits and vegetables. A stand-alone fat tax with collected revenue discarded is the least economically efficient and most regressive approach.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Xiang, Di. 2015. Ph.D. “Estimating the Impact of Behaviour Altering Taxes on Household Consumption.” University of Manitoba. ","Link","• NA"]
[169,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_weightloss_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT testing the utility of an individually targeted Internet-based intervention with monetary incentives (INCENT) to reduce the weight of overweight and obese employees when compared to a less-intensive minimal intervention\n that included newsletters and on-site educational sessions delivered on a quarterly basis. Incentive programme was delivered via daily e-mails over 12 months while the information intervention was delivered quarterly via both newsletters and on-site educational sessions. IN the financial incentives intervention, for every 1% of weight loss, participants received $1.00. The incentives were provided  through participants’ quarterly weigh-ins at a Health SpotTM, which included a calibrated scale and a built in digital camera.","Multiple health behaviours (Physical activity, diet)","Other (workers with a BMI above 25 kg/m^2)","USA - Virginia - 28 worksites in Roanoke and Richmond - Local",2008,"12 months","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (Information package for healthy living) ","RCT lasted up to 1 year, not follow-up actions","RCT","• Weight loss and BMI reduction\n• Dietary macro and micronutrient intake \n","• Participants in the INCENT group on average lost 2.27 lbs (P < 0.001) and had a BMI decrease of 0.36 kg/m2 (P < 0.001) while participants in the LMW group lost 1.30 lbs (P < 0.05) and decreased BMI by 0.20 kg/m2 (P < 0.05). However, the differences between INCENT and LMW in weight loss (20.97 lbs) and BMI reduction (20.16) were not significant. \n• Participants in both groups showed improvement in fruit and vegetable intake (INCENT: 0.32, P < 0.001; LMW: 0.12, P < 0.01); reduction in fat intake (INCENT: 26.05, P < 0.001; LMW: 25.83, P < 0.001); increases in dietary fibre intake (INCENT: 1.00, P < 0.001; LMW: 0.42, P < 0.001); reduction in SSB intake (INCENT: 226.42 kcal, P < 0.001; LMW: 228.08 kcal, P < 0.001); and increases in moderate PA behaviour (INCENT: 22.55 min/week, P < 0.001; LMW: 18.04 min/week, P < 0.001). Among those behavioural changes, INCENT participants showed larger improvements in their fruit and vegetable (0.20 servings, P < 0.001) and dietary fibre intake (0.58 g, P < 0.001). Furthermore, participants in the INCENT group showed a statistically significant increase in their average daily water consumption (1.66 fl. oz., P 5 0.01), while the LMW group showed no change over the 6 months (0.47 fl. oz., P 5 0.575). \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","From systematic review: Weerasekara YK, Roberts SB, Kahn MA, LaVertu AE, Hoffman B, Das SK. Effectiveness of workplace weight management interventions: a systematic review. Current obesity reports. 2016 Jun 1;5(2):298-306. individual article Almeida FA, You W, Harden SM, Blackman KC, Davy BM, Glasgow RE, Hill JL, Linnan LA, Wall SS, Yenerall J, Zoellner JM. Effectiveness of a worksite‐based weight loss randomized controlled trial: the worksite study. Obesity. 2015 Apr;23(4):737-45.","Link","• 10.1002/oby.20899"]
[170,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_biometrics_discount","Programme","Non-governmental (Safeway Inc (corporate))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","A voluntary outcome-based biometric screening program, incentivized with health insurance premium discounts. For each measure passed (Body Mass Index, blood pressure, cholesterol, glucose, and nicotine ) the employee earned a portion of the maximum eligible discount (up to nearly 20%) off their health insurance premium contribution. Employees were also eligible to receive a retroactive rebate for unmet standards by retesting and meeting standards the following year. For those not meeting the BMI standard, an incremental improvement was established (reduction of 10% or more of body weight) to earn the rebate.","Multiple health behaviours (Body Mass Index, blood pressure, cholesterol, glucose, and nicotine)","General population","USA - 1 Large employer mostly in Western - Local",2009,"5 years","Passed through corporate decision enabled by legislation (Affordable care act)","For those not meeting the BMI standard, an incremental improvement was established (reduction of 10% or more of body weight) to earn the rebate","Retrospective cohort analysis","Change in multiple biometrics studies","Overall, participants at high risk for chronic diseases who continuously participated in Safeway’s Healthy Measures program significantly improved most biometrics. Those who did not meet standards their initial year showed the greatest improvement between their first and second years of participation: On average, participants who did not meet the incentive threshold at baseline decreased their BMI (1%), glucose (8%), blood pressure (systolic 9%, diastolic 8%), and total cholesterol (8%) by year 2 with improvements generally sustained or continued during each additional year of participation. No difference in glucose, nicotine over time was detected. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Fu PL, Bradley KL, Viswanathan S, Chan JM, Stampfer M. Trends in biometric health indices within an employer-sponsored wellness program with outcome-based incentives. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2016 Jul;30(6):453-7.","Link","• 10.1177/0890117116658241"]
[172,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","Korea_weightloss_incentive(gold_medals)","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary incentive-based obesity management program (the Midas Project aimed to improve good health habits) at an electronics company. Each participant was awarded 1 Don, the Korean gold unit equal to 3.75 g of gold, for each kilogram of body fat a person lost during the program. The major elements of the program were counselling by factory nurses, an assisting self-help group, free gym facilities, trainers, and health information seminars and bulletin boards. Additionally, a minimum fat loss of 3 kg was requested to ensure active participation and a maximum fat loss of 7 kg was established to avoid excessive exercise. One kilogram of body fat and not body weight was the defining determinant to qualify for a gold medal and this also served to prevent unhealthy fasting or liposuctions.","Multiple health behaviours (Smoking, temperance, sleep, exercise, appropriate body weight, avoidance of eating between meals, and eating a regular breakfast)","General population","Korea - Electronics industry workplace at Pyungtaik - Local",2005,"3 months","Not reported ","Not reported","Single Group Assignment RCT","• Mean BMI \n• mean weight \n• mean body fat \n• Mean systolic and diastolic blood pressure \n• cholesterol \n","All of the objective health status variables with the exception of cholesterol exhibited significant decreases during the three months of the program:\n• Mean BMI decreased from 28.8 to 27.8 kg/m² (p = .000)\n• mean weight decreased from 87.2 to 83.5 kg (p = .000)\n• mean body fat decreased from 25.4 to 23.3 kg (p = .000)\n• Mean systolic and diastolic blood pressure decreased from 130.5 to 125.1 mmHg (p = .002), and from 86.4 to 81.7 mmHg (p = .009), respectively.\n• There was an unfavourable change in cholesterol from 164.6 to 172.6 mg/dL but this trend was not significant (p = .172) and the increased level was still within the normal range.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Hwang G, Yoon C, Jung H, Kim Y. Evaluation of an incentive-based obesity management program in a workplace. International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics. 2011 Jan 1;17(2):147-54.","Link","• 10.1080/10803548.2011.11076885"]
[173,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_weightmanagement_subsidy","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","RCT testing the impact of workplace subsidised counselling programs (Weight Watchers) at four different subsidy levels, ranging from 100% to 50% (including hybrid schemes)","Weight loss programme","General population","USA - 2 companies - Local",2013,"12 months","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","• Enrolment \n•Weight loss\n","• Enrolment differed significantly by subsidy level (p< 0.001). The 100% subsidy produced the highest Enrolment (7.7%), significantly higher than each of the lower subsidies (vs. 80% subsidy: 6.2%, p=.002; vs. 50% subsidy: 3.9%, p<.0001 vs. hybrid: 3.7%, p<.0001). Enrolment in the 80% subsidy group was significantly higher than both lower subsidy groups (vs. 50% subsidy: 3.9%, p <0.001; vs hybrid 3.7%, p<0.001). \n• Among enrolees, there were no differences among the four groups in attendance or weight loss.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","John LK, Troxel AB, Yancy Jr WS, Friedman J, Zhu J, Yang L, Galvin R, Miller-Kovach K, Halpern SD, Loewenstein G, Volpp K. The Effect of Cost Sharing on an Employee Weight Loss Program: A Randomized Trial. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2018 Jan;32(1):170-6.","Link","• 10.1177/0890117116671282"]
[176,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_weightloss_incentives","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Employer-sponsored financial incentives for employee weight loss, testing the effectiveness of two financial incentive designs for promoting weight loss among obese employees: 24 weeks of monthly weigh-ins (control)(n=35); individual incentive, designed as $100 per person per month for meeting or exceeding target weight loss (individual arm)(n=35); group incentive, designed as $500 per month split between any participant within groups of 5 who met or exceeded their target weight loss (group arm)(n=35).","Multiple health behaviours (Physical activity, diet)","Other (workers with body mass index between 30 and 40 kg/m^2)","USA - Philadelphia - Children's Hospital - Local",2011,"5.5 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Weight loss between incentive type groups at 12 weeks\n• Weight loss between incentive type groups compared to control at 12 weeks\n","• Group incentive participants lost more weight than individual arm participants (between-group difference in weight loss favouring group = mean 9.7 pounds, 95% CI 4.4 to 14.9; P < 0.001). \n• Twelve weeks after incentives ended and adjusting for 3-group comparisons, group arm participants maintained greater weight loss than control arm participants (between-group difference in weight loss = mean 6.5 pounds, 95% CI 1.2 to 11.7; P = 0.016) but not more than individual arm participants (difference = 5.9 pounds, 95% CI, 0.8 to 11.0; P = 0.024). \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kullgren JT, Troxel AB, Loewenstein G, Asch DA, Norton LA, Wesby L, Tao Y, Zhu J, Volpp KG. Individual-versus group-based financial incentives for weight loss: a randomized, controlled trial. Annals of internal medicine. 2013 Apr 2;158(7):505-14.","Link","• 10.7326/0003-4819-158-7-201304020-00002"]
[177,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","Scotland_dietnutrition_subsidy","Observational study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Price subsidy of 10-20% of the cost of workplace meals, included as part of a broader intervention: Price incentives focused on consumer and caterers preference for “healthy meal deals” at a 10-20% cost reduction. Recipes aimed to achieve a nutrient composition consistent with the FSA traffic light grading low (or maximum of one medium) for fat, saturated fat, sugar and salt. Due to recently introduced EU Regulation, individual items could not be labelled as “healthy” but were labelled with value for money symbols. Marketing focused on a value strategy by promoting reduced prices, products and key placing of targeted items within the canteen setting","F&V and healthy food","General population","UK - Scotland - 2 sites with canteens - Local",2012,"2.3 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","Dietary intake from work catering","Limited impact on diet: Throughout the intervention period there was greater uptake of intervention soup (range 44 to 138) compared to the price incentivised meal deal (range 4 to 31). The intervention did not appear to impact on snacks with snack sales remaining buoyant during the intervention period. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Mackison D, Mooney J, Macleod M, Anderson AS. Lessons learnt from a feasibility study on price incentivised healthy eating promotions in workplace catering establishments. Journal of human nutrition and dietetics. 2016 Feb;29(1):86-94.","Link","• 10.1111/jhn.12283"]
[179,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_healthyeating_discount","Observational study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The BB program is a hospital cafeteria nutrition intervention in two hospitals using marketing and direct price incentives/disincentives to improve health-promoting purchasing behaviour. Hospital employees were provided with a 35% price differential for better bites products (i.e. the bundles of food items considered as healthy option) within their workplace cafeteria, as part of an nonrandomized evaluation study.","F&V","General population","﻿USA - Colorado - Penrose-St. Francis Health Services Hospital in Colorado Springs - Local",2011,"9 months","Not reported ","Not reported","Nonrandomized evaluation study","Changes in dietary intake and purchases","• Significant impact was demonstrated on all burger sales in the desired direction during intervention (P < .001). Most notably, the average weekly turkey burger sales at Penrose Hospital (PH) increased 13-fold (10.85-145.59) and became the majority of the market share (51.8%, P < .001). For salads, significant interaction between phase and food type was found at St. Francis Medical Center (SFMC) (P = .002) but not at PH (P = .304). ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Patsch AJ, Smith JH, Liebert ML, Behrens TK, Charles T. Improving healthy eating and the bottom line: impact of a price incentive program in 2 hospital cafeterias. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2016 Jul;30(6):425-32.","Link","• 10.1177/0890117116658237"]
[180,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_ICM_employee_childhealth_incentive","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","IBM’s Children’s Health Rebate offered a cash incentive for parents to complete a 12-week program of self-selected activities in family food planning and meals, family physical activity, and sedentary time related to electronic entertainment (“screen time”). A pre-program/post program comparison of self-reported activities was used to assess behaviour change. Employees completing all program steps  (Healthy family meal engagement and consistent healthy eating; collaborative physical activity; appropriate screen time; and positive parental role-modeling.) receive a $150 cash rebate, paid as taxable income in their pay check .","Multiple health behaviours (healthy diet, physical activity, screen time, parental modelling)","Children","USA - IBM - Local",2008,"12 weeks","Not reported ","Not reported","Retrospective cohort analysis","• physical activity \n• entertainment screen time \n•  eating healthy dinners >5 days\n","The 11 631 employees who completed the final program step of the 12-week follow-up family inventory demonstrated significant changes in all 9 assessment items. Throughout the 12-week program, the largest improvements were seen in:\n• physical activity behaviour (a 17.1- % point increase in family physical activity (from 23.2% to 40.3%),  and 15.8-% point increase for children), \n• some of the smallest improvements were in the area of appropriate entertainment screen time increased by a 8.3-% point increase for children (from 22.4% to 30.7%) and by 6.1 % points for adults (from 18.1% to 24.2%).  \n•  eating healthy dinners >5 days/week increased by 11.8 % points (from 74.9% to 86.7%), \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Sepúlveda MJ, Lu C, Sill S, Young JM, Edington DW. An observational study of an employer intervention for children's healthy weight behaviours. Pediatrics. 2010 Sep 28:peds-2009.","Link","• 10.1542/peds.2009-3210"]
[182,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_dietnutrition_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT looking at social norms and incentives for healthy eating: involved sending out letters stating social norms on healthy eating, and offering financial rewards for purchasing products in the workplace cafeteria that are labelled with the colour green (healthy), (other colours included yellow (less healthy), or red (unhealthy)). Participants were randomized in 2012 to three arms: 1) monthly letter with social norm feedback about healthy food purchases, comparing employee to “all” and to “healthiest” customers (feedback-only); 2) monthly letter with social norm feedback plus small financial incentive for increasing green purchases (feedback-incentive); or 3) no contact (control). Consumption thresholds had to be met and were rewarded with $10 towards the cafeteria account. Passing a threshold in one month and not being able to reach the next threshold resulted in a reward of $5 towards the cafeteria account. The main outcome was change in proportion of green-labelled purchases at end of 3-month intervention.   ","F&V","General population","USA - Massachusetts General Hospital - Local",2012,"3 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","Increase in green-labelled (healthy) purchases ","increase in green-labelled purchases ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Thorndike AN, Riis J, Levy DE. Social norms and financial incentives to promote employees' healthy food choices: A randomized controlled trial. Preventive medicine. 2016 May 1;86:12-8.","Link","• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2016.01.017"]

{"sheet":"Physical Activity","index":5,"n_rows":31,"n_cols":27,"rows_kept":31,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["ID number","Policy area","Policy name","Evidence type","Policy owner","Mechanism type","Mechanism details ","Target risk factor/behaviour/commodity","Target population / demographics","Setting (Geographical)","Year of implementation","Timeline(s) for the policy's impact assessment","Policy implementation (policy owner, voluntary vs mandatory policy, implementation mechanism (if implemented), overlap with other policies and cost of implementation)","Follow-up actions for policy","Type of analysis","Policy outcomes (health or intermediate impact)","Quantitative outcomes (health or intermediate)","Distributional effects","Type of economic evaluation analyses ","Quantitative economic evaluation results","Other impacts (co-benefits, unintended/perverse effects) ","Revenue information (amount, beneficiary and utilisation/earmarking)","Policy context","National policy presence","Reference to original sources","Reference link","Digital Object Identifier"]
["ID number","Policy area the policy relates to","Name given to policy, if no name is established, name in the following format: [Country or country region]_[commodity or policy area]_[policy type]","Note if a policy, an academic study (eg a modelling study, RCT or smaller scale study) or a small scale programme","Name of the organisation responsible for designing and/or implementing the policy","What is (are) the mechanism(s) of the policy?","Add detail about the specifics of the policy mechanism","Which risk factor/product/commodity/behaviour is the policy aimed at?","Which segment of the population is the policy targeted at?","Country - region/locality - setting level ( Local - Regional - National - International)","Start year of the policy. If this is not available, note the year of the oldest publication on this policy followed by an asterisk e.g. 2008*."," What are the timelines for the policy’s impact assessment/follow-up?","Information on whether the policy was implemented, whether it was voluntary or mandatory, what mechanism was used for passing the policy, whether it overlaps with any other policies and any information on the cost if implementation","Combination of follow-up actions and any sunset clause","Type of analysis used to derive the outcome information","List of health or intermediate outcomes reported for the policy","The quantitative results on health and intermediate impacts achieved by the policy (values)","What distributional effects are reported on for this policy?","What type of economic evaluation analysis was undertaken?","List or paste the quantitative results from economic evaluations.","Information on any co-benefits, other unintended perverse effects, and other non-health impacts of the policy ","Combination of  fields (Revenue, beneficiary of revenues, utilisation of revenues)","Information provided on the context around the policy, including opponents and proponents.","Has the policy been implemented nationally in England (or UK country if specified). Yes, No, NA(if not a national policy) and ? If unclear","Reference used to extract information about the policy","Hyperlink to PDF if freely available; URL if not.","DOI for publications if available"]
[109,"2 Physical activity","National Bus Pass","Programme","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary National Bus Pass was introduced for people aged 60 years and older in England in 2006, entitling holders to free local bus travel in their area of residence after 9:30 AM on weekdays, and all day on weekends and public holidays. Since April 2008 this has been extended to apply to travel on all local buses anywhere in England .","Active travel","Elderly (low SES groups)","UK - England - National",2006,"2 years","• Implementation costs:  £1.1 billion or approx. £100 per pass (on average) \n• Passed through legislation","Not reported","Epidemiological study","Active travel","• The % of respondents with a free pass rose from 56.8% in 2005 to 74.7% in 2008 and this  increased across all categories of age, gender, SES, and area population size. \n• A significant positive association (AOR =1.15; 95% CI= 1.07, 1.12; P<.001) between having a bus pass and walking 3 or more times a week \n• In the fully adjusted models, having a bus pass was associated with a greater rate of active travel among those who rented their homes (incidence rate ratio [IRR] =1.14; 95% CI= 1.04, 1.24; P<.001), but not among those who owned their home (IRR =1.08;95% CI = 1.00, 1.17; P<.068). The odds of doing any active travel were similar among pass holders who owned their homes (AOR =4.72; 95% CI=3.99, 5.59; P<.001) and those who rented their homes (AOR =4.06; 95% CI = 3.35, 4.86; P< .001\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","PT use - which can improve PT infrastructure and reduce dependency on cars. Free bus pass eligibility is associated with a 50% higher likelihood of using public transport in England, and 40% of trips on public transport by pensioners in the West Midlands would not have been undertaken without the concessionary pass, with the majority of travel for shopping trips by those on low incomes .","Not reported","Climate of austerity and budget concerns. Amongst the population some groups show different patterns of use that is,  more people used active transport- eg 40% of trips on public transport by pensioners in the West Midlands would not have been undertaken without the concession pass. ","Yes (England) ? (Scotland, Wales & NI)","• Coronini-Cronberg, Sophie, et al. \"The impact of a free older persons’ bus pass on active travel and regular walking in England.\" American Journal of Public Health 102.11 (2012): 2141-2148. \n• Webb, Elizabeth, Gopalakrishnan Netuveli, and Christopher Millett. \"Free bus passes, use of public transport and obesity among older people in England.\" J Epidemiol Community Health 66.2 (2012): 176-180.\n","• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3477933/pdf/AJPH.2012.300946.pdf\n• http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.844.642&rep=rep1&type=pdf\n","• 10.2105/AJPH.2012.300946\n• 10.1136/jech.2011.133165"]
[110,"2 Physical activity","subsidized public transport passes_Eng","Policy","Government (Greater London Authority)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Free travels on buses for adolescents. Health was a secondary aim (as the first aim was to promote use of public transport, embed more environmentally sound travel habits) ","Active travel","Adolescents (12-16 year olds)","UK - England - London - Regional","2005-2006","1 year","Implemented by Transport for London decision","No fare exemption extended a year later to 17yr olds in full time education and now includes all <18 and some 19yr olds in full time education or on a work-based learning scheme (2010).","Behavioural insights "," Walking behaviours","• Mixed results which demonstrate that this policy intervention does not, straightforwardly or exclusively, encourage travel ‘passivity’ but instead facilitates ‘active,’ health-promoting experiences. These include walking to/ from/between bus stops instead of being driven in a private vehicle (especially in more suburban areas); increased numbers of walking trips as part of the additional journeys undertaken as a result of having a free bus pass; and more walking, and even running, within the ‘bus journey’ itself as young people are more inclined to interchange buses given there is no longer a financial cost in doing so.  Bus use replaces walking for short trips: ‘because it’s there, and it’s free’.\n• For some, having free bus travel generated additional walking journeys that would either have not been undertaken without the fare exemption or would have been carried out as a car passenger. By the same token, other journeys might be undertaken less often if free bus travel was not available. Universal free bus travel for young people removes a key potential financial barrier to social inclusion: that of transport costs.\n• Free travel not only opened-up the range of places that young people could go in London, but it also enabled young people to maintain friendship groups (important for mental health)\n","Allows more participation amongst the disadvantaged","Not reported","Not reported","Plausible impacts include: changes in levels of active transport, depending on whether bus trips replaced walking or car use; changes in road injury, as young people are more or less exposed to road danger as pedestrians; changes in assaults, as young people’s exposure to risk changes; increases in access to education, training or work; decreases in social exclusion; decreasing dependence on future car travel; changes in access to bus travel for other users displaced by increased numbers of young people.","Not reported","With the rising obesity crisis people thing that the policy should be scrapped to promote more active methods of travel (cycling or walking). Tension is rising with suggestions that free bus travel contributes to the obesity epidemic.","NA","• Martin A, Suhrcke M, Ogilvie D. Financial incentives to promote active travel: an evidence review and economic framework. American journal of preventive medicine. 2012 Dec 1;43(6):e45-57.\n• Jones, Alasdair, et al. \"Rethinking passive transport: bus fare exemptions and young people's wellbeing.\" Health & place 18.3 (2012): 605-612.\n","• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379712006228\n• http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/20703/1/sa2012Jones_OTBhealth.pdf\n","• 10.1016/j.amepre.2012.09.001\n• 10.1016/j.healthplace.2012.01.003"]
[111,"2 Physical activity","Gym incentives_Uni_students_US","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary financial incentive intervention:  During 12 weeks in the fall semester, participants in the continued-incentive condition received weekly monetary payments for meeting fitness-centre attendance goals, using an escalating rewards plus reset schedule. Students received $5.00 per visit in week 1, which increased by $.25 each week. The reset part of the design meant that if participants missed a goal 1 week, their payment was returned to the beginning of the payment scheme for 2 subsequent weeks. This scheme was used to discourage ‘‘holidays’’ from goal behaviour.  This intervention was compared to the discontinued-Incentive Condition receiving weekly incentives during fall semester 2011, and no incentives during spring semester 2012. Both arms of this RCT were compared to a control condition receiving no incentives for meeting fitness-centre attendance goals.","Physical activity programme participation","Adolescents (18-19yr olds)","USA - Local",2011,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","Fitness centre attendance goal","• During the fall semester the control condition met the fitness center attendance goals 13% of the time, whereas the continued-incentive condition met the goal 62% of the time and the discontinued-incentive group met the goal 64% of the time. The difference between the control condition and the incentive conditions was significant\n• During the spring semester, the control condition met the fitness center attendance goal 3% of the time, as did the discontinued-incentive condition. The continued-incentive condition met the goal number of fitness center visits 39% of the time in the spring semester. The difference between the continued-incentive condition and the other two conditions was also significant\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Study results contradict the criticism that incentives negatively impact people’s intrinsic motives to exercise. ","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Pope, Lizzy, and Jean Harvey. \"The impact of incentives on intrinsic and extrinsic motives for fitness-center attendance in college first-year students.\" American Journal of Health Promotion29.3 (2015): 192-199.\n• Pope, Lizzy, and Jean Harvey. \"The efficacy of incentives to motivate continued fitness-center attendance in college first-year students: a randomized controlled trial.\" Journal of American College Health 62.2 (2014): 81-90.\n","• http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.4278/ajhp.140408-QUAN-135?url_ver=Z39.88-2003&rfr_id=ori:rid:crossref.org&rfr_dat=cr_pub%3dpubmed\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24456510\n","• 10.4278/ajhp.140408-QUAN-135\n• 10.1080/07448481.2013.847840"]
[112,"2 Physical activity","Children’s Fitness Tax Credit (CTFC)_Canada","Policy","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary national programme (Children's Fitness Tax Credit), in which all parents were eligible to claim a non-refundable tax credit to cover the cost of organized physical activity programs for children, in this case up to age16 years (or 18 years for children eligible for a disability tax credit). The maximum claim is $500, resulting in a tax credit of up to $75 per child (i.e., 15%) at current rates. Provincial expenditures for PA type taxes varied across provinces: \n• Manitoba (2007) – Fitness Tax Credit -> non –refundable and budget cost $3 mil\n• Nova Scotia (2005) – Healthy living tax credit -> non –refundable and budget cost $2.2 mil\n• Ontario (2010) – Children’s activity tax credit -> refundable budget cost $75 mil\n• Saskatchewan (2009) Active Families benefit -> refundable budget cost $18 mil\n• Yukon (2007) – Yukon child tax credit -> non-refundable budget cost $0.2 mil\nHealth was a primary aim (to promote an increase in child uptake of physical activity) \n","Physical activity programme participation","Adolescents","Canada - National",2007,"9 years","• Implementation costs: CFTC is estimated to cost the federal government approximately $90 million to $115 million each year in forgone tax revenue \n• Passed through legislation\n","The scheme ended 2016 Yes, it was increased after a few years and was changed to be refundable so that people paid no income tax could get money back rather.","Behavioural insights ","Physical activity levels","• 25.6% parents reported having children enroled in organized PA programs that would be eligible for the CFTC. Less than half of respondents were aware of the CFTC (42.8%), had claimed it for 2007 (12.3%), or planned to claim it for the 2008 tax year (15.5%). \n• Among parents with children between the ages of 2 to 18 years, 54.4% stated their child was enroled in organized PA and they appeared to have higher levels of awareness of the CFTC (55.5%), claims for 2007 (26.1%), and plans to claim for 2008 (33.1%) than Canadians in general. Among parents who had claimed the CFTC for 2007, 15.6% agreed the CFTC had increased their child's participation in organized PA.\n• Regression analysis show the CFTC had no effect on children’s overall participation in physical activity. For time varying effects, the estimate for the CFTC’s impact in the first year after the policy (i.e. 2007) is positive and statistically significant, but its magnitude is small. The magnitude of 0.02 means that the CFTC raised physical activity by only 2 percentage points\n","• It appears a tax credit such as the CFTC will only benefit those people who can afford to pay the costs of registration for a PA program and carry that burden through to the end of the tax year.  For instance 28.2% of parents in the lowest income quartile had claimed the CFTC for the 2007 tax year while approximately 55% of parents in the highest income quartile had claimed it. \n• A related concern is that a tax credit will not provide an equal benefit or incentive to all families and in particular may not have much effect on lower-income groups. In fact, early evidence on use of the credit shows that lower income households are less likely to be aware of the credit or to use it.71,72 In the first 2 years of the federal credit, rates of use ranged from less than 1% of taxpayers in the lowest income categories to around 20% in the highest category\n","Not reported","Not reported","Policy was not widely well known, especially amongst disadvantaged communities.. Of the provinces that charge additional sales tax, most provide an exemption for children’s clothing and footwear. However, these exemptions are designed to minimize the tax payable on  essential goods for families, and they are not intended to achieve objectives related to public health or physical activity. In fact, most provinces specifically exclude clothing and footwear designed for use in sports from the exemption","The Department of Finance reports that the CFTC benefits roughly 1.4 million Canadian families each Year and costs the government about $100 million in foregone tax revenue. ","Other provinces had done this before and implemented at different levels. ","No","• Spence, John C., et al. \"Uptake and effectiveness of the Children's Fitness Tax Credit in Canada: the rich get richer.\" BMC Public Health 10.1 (2010): 356.\n• Nguyen, Hai V., and Paul Grootendorst. \"Does Child Fitness Tax Credit Program Make Children More Active?.\" (2012).\n• Von Tigerstrom, Barbara, Tamara Larre, and JoAnne Sauder. \"Using the tax system to promote physical activity: critical analysis of Canadian initiatives.\" American journal of public health 101.8 (2011): e10-e16.    \n• Government of Canada. Children’s Fitness and Arts Tax Credit 2016. Available from: https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/programs/about-canada-revenue-agency-cra/federal-government-budgets/budget-2016-growing-middle-class/childrens-fitness-arts-tax-credits.html.\n\n","• https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2458-10-356\n• http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.700.7914&rep=rep1&type=pdf\n• https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2011.300201?journalCode=ajph\n• https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/programs/about-canada-revenue-agency-cra/federal-government-budgets/budget-2016-growing-middle-class/childrens-fitness-arts-tax-credits.html.\n","• 10.1186/1471-2458-10-356\n• NA\n• 10.2105/AJPH.2011.300201\n• NA"]
[113,"2 Physical activity","Pol_attendence at fitness centre_US","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Financial incentives studies: In study 1, 2 groups are compared: all participants are paid $25 to attend the gym once a week and people in the one of these two groups were then paid an additional $100 to attend the gym eight more times in the following four weeks. In study 2: People were invited to have their biometric measures taken and be given a  handout regarding the benefits of exercise. They were paid $75 for this part, and were then invited to come twice more, 4 weeks later and 16 weeks later, so that we could obtain their biometrics information. They were promised $50 for each of the two later meetings. Participants were then split randomly into three groups. There were no additional requirements for the people in the control group. Participants in the second group were required to attend the gym once during the one-month intervention period, and participants in the third group were required to attend the gym eight times during the intervention period. \n Health was a primary aim (PA levels) Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year)","Physical activity programme participation","Other (university students)","USA - Regional",2008,"2 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Anthropometric markers (weight, body fat etc)\n• Gym attendance\n","• Significant differences across treatments in the change in these levels over time for body fat percentage, weight, waist size, BMI, and pulse rate. Overall, with the exception of the blood-pressure measures, we see that the eight-times group improved significantly in their biometric measures relative to both the control group and, with the further exception of the pulse rate, the one-time group. Thus, it appears that there are real health benefits that accrue from paying people to go to the gym eight times in a month. There are also some differences between the control and one-time group, but these tend to have lower significance levels; perhaps there is a slight benefit from merely requiring one visit\n• The rate of gym visits after the intervention increased significantly in both studies: Participants who did not attend the gym before our study began to do so during our intervention and continued to go after it was concluded\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Strohacker, Kelley, Omar Galarraga, and David M. Williams. \"The impact of incentives on exercise behaviour: a systematic review of randomized controlled trials.\" Annals of behavioural Medicine48.1 (2013): 92-99.      \n• Charness, Gary, and Uri Gneezy. \"Incentives to exercise.\" Econometrica 77.3 (2009): 909-931.","• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4412849/pdf/nihms678470.pdf\n• https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/66ef/8c8c2006032914c76d3bbf0ff95ac6cb89f9.pdf","• 10.1007/s12160-013-9577-4\n• 10.3982/ECTA7416 "]
[114,"2 Physical activity","Spitsmijden - Rewarding travellers for avoiding peak period_NI","Programme","Government (Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management)","Financial incentive","Voluntary scheme where €3 to €7 could be earned by not using the car during the morning peak between 7.30 and 9.30 am. The amount of the reward changed over time. For three weeks, participants could earn 3 euros each day they avoided the morning peak by car. For another 4 weeks they could earn 7 euros each day, and for yet another 3 weeks they could earn 3 euros if they were not detected in the middle of the peak (8am to 9am) increased to 7 euros if they were not detected at all in the complete morning peak. \nParticipants could not change their route in order to earn a reward, as all routes from Zoetermeer to The Hague were monitored. Hence, the only alternatives available are different departure times, different travel modes, and choosing not to travel. \nThe rewarding experiment was conducted from October to December 2006 during 10 consecutive weeks. The participants were also monitored two weeks two week prior and one week after the rewarding period.  Examples of such programmes were developed at different times: in 2006 in Zoetermeer in the Netherlands. This first project primarily aimed to scientifically investigate the behavioural responses of travellers towards a reward. With only a small number of participants, around 300, it was not intended to solve any congestion problems. \nIn 2007 and 2008 two real projects were defined and put into practice with larger numbers of participants (several thousands) with the aim to influence traffic conditions. Construction and maintenance works on two bridges, Hollandse Brug east of Amsterdam and Moerdijk Brug south of Rotterdam, were the reason of initiating the rewarding projects, in which severe congestion was expected due to the road works. By paying volunteering travellers who often use one of these bridges in the peak period a reward for not travelling by car during the peak period, the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management aimed to relief the increase of congestion.\n","Active travel","General population (car drivers)","Netherlands - Regional","2006-2008","Zoetermeer- 13 weeks (10 weeks of intervention, 2 weeks prior to intervention, 1 week after)\nHollandse Brug – 1 yr\nMoerdijk Brug – 2.5  months\n\n","Policy implemented as a traffic savings measure by government for road works","Modification, the longer you were part of the experiment the more rewards you could get.","Empirical assessment","• Active transport behaviours split by area and incentive value","This experiment showed that travel behaviour could be significantly influenced by such monetary rewards. In particular, the amount of car travel in the peak by participants was reduced by about 50%.\n€3 reward – Zoetermeer\n• Travelled outside peak hours -> 35%;  Public transport -> 9%;  Cycling -> 1%; Work at home -> 1%; No change -> 54%\n€7 reward – Zoetermeer\n• Travelled outside peak hours -> 44%;  Public transport -> 13%;  Cycling -> 1%;  Work at home -> 3%;  No change -> 39%\n€4 reward (base rate) – Hollandse Brug\n• Travelled outside peak hours -> 18%;  Other route -> 9%;  Public transport -> 6%;  Cycling -> 1%;  Work at home -> 5%;  Cancelling activities -> 1%;  No change -> 60%\n€4 reward (base rate )– Moerdijk Brug\n• Travelled outside peak hours -> 15%;  Other route -> 28%;  Public transport -> 2%;  Car sharing -> 3%;  Work at home -> 6%;  No change -> 46%\n\n","Activities such as work from home or cancelling plans was only available to those with flexible working arrangements","Not reported","Not reported","Congestion from travellers departing earlier or later (avoiding peak travel times) was higher.","Not reported","There are congestion charges already in place and further being considered in various jurisdictions in the UK.","NA","Bliemer, Michiel, Matthijs Dicke-Ogenia, and Dick Ettema. \"Rewarding for avoiding the peak period: A synthesis of three studies in the Netherlands.\" European Transport Conference 2009. 2009.","Link","• NA"]
[115,"2 Physical activity","walking_incentives_olderadults_US","Modelling study","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary scheme that added incentives to a 3-days-per-week/30-minute-per-day walking program, the model predicts that an incentive of $9 cash per week ($468 per year) would increase the likelihood of participation by 31% (to 23%; p>0.001). The likelihood of participation for the same program in a formal group is almost 10% lower (p>0.001) and is also less responsive to incentives. Because of the sampling frame, no respondents were participating in moderate activity at the level of public health recommendations (5 days per week, 30 minutes per day); however, the same $9-per-week incentive would increase the stated likelihood of participation to >5% (p>0.001). Health was the primary aim. ","Physical activity programme participation","General population (>=50yrs)","USA - National",2006,"3 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Random-utility model","Participation in walking programs","• The most-preferred walking program was three 20-minute walks per week conducted outside of a for- mal group setting. Longer durations of walking time per day were less preferred, although the difference be- tween 20 and 30 minutes was insignificant. Subjects were strongly averse to walks of 75 minutes per day. The sample also strongly preferred walking programs that did not involve a formal group.\n• For frequency of activity, 3 days per week was significantly preferred to 2 days. Subjects strongly preferred the frequency of both 2 and 3 days per week to the frequency of 5 days per week.\n• The cash compensations required to make an average sedentary adult in the sample indifferent between engaging in a specified 3-month walking program and not engaging in the program are shown in Table 2. A program with three 20-minute walks per week that is conducted outside of a formal group setting—the most preferred program—required the smallest utility compensation, $9.30 per week. Increasing to 30 minutes per day required slightly more than doubling the incentive to $19.60. Adult public health guidelines recommend >=30 minutes per day of moderate-intensity physical activity on 5 or more days per week. Outside of a formal group, this level would require $36.30 per week of cash compensation to offset the utility loss associated with participation. Adding a group requirement to any program requires an additional payment of $37.30 per week in cash.\n• Adding incentives to a 3-days-per-week/30-minute-per-day walking program, the model predicts that an incentive of $9 cash per week ($468 per year) would increase the likelihood of participation by 31%. The likelihood of participation for the same program in a formal group is almost 10% lower and is also less responsive to incentives.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Brown, Derek S., et al. \"Estimating older adults' preferences for walking programs via conjoint analysis.\" American Journal of Preventive Medicine 36.3 (2009): 201-207.","Link","• 10.1016/j.amepre.2008.10.014"]
[116,"2 Physical activity","Women's Active Living Kits (WALK)_Aus","Programme","Research body (Central Queensland University with funding from Australian Office for Women (Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","WALK Community Grant Scheme to increase local capacity to promote and engage priority women in health-related physical activity by implementing a small grant program whereby community groups or individuals could apply for and receive up to AU$1,500 in grant funds. These small grants where intended to (a) support the development of women’s walking groups; (b) increase the physical activity participation levels in Australian women from priority groups, including women with young children, women with busy careers, women from culturally and linguistically diverse (CALD) communities, and indigenous women; and (c) support innovative community ideas for increasing priority women’s physical activity by improving social structures and local environments.","Physical activity programme participation","Women","Australia - National"," 2010*","10 months","• Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (10,000 steps program) \n• Pilot study using government grant\n","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","Community partnerships and programs that were aimed at improving PA were funded at local levels","• Of the micro-grants awarded to the 48 community groups and organizations, 4 went to promote activity in CALD women, 8 went to support physical activity in indigenous women’s groups, 11 went to support mothers with young children, 9 went to older women’s groups, 10 promoted activity in working women, 5 grants supported initiatives in groups made up of young to middle-aged women, and 1 grant was awarded to a disabled women’s group\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Community engagement:  The distribution of the WALK Community Grant also assisted us with building partnerships with com- munity organizations and groups outside of our own local area, as well as organizations and groups whom we would not traditionally be linked to. For instance, as a result of the WALK Community Grant Scheme, we have built ongoing partnerships with a learning center located in VIC, a retirement village located in NSW, and a non-incorporated neighbourhood group located in Far North Queensland. The significance of these partnerships cannot be understated as they provided us with an opportunity to reach a large variety of people who we may not necessarily reach through our traditional channels of communication.  ","Not reported","Not reported","?","Caperchione C, Mummery WK, Joyner K. WALK Community Grants Scheme: lessons learned in developing and administering a health promotion microgrants program. Health promotion practice. 2010 Sep;11(5):637-44.","Link","• 10.1177/1524839908328996"]
[117,"2 Physical activity","Financial_incentives_ gym memberships_US","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","The experiment randomized all new members who enrolled in a gym over the course of an 8 month period into one of four arms: a control group and 3 incentive groups. For all of the incentive groups, subjects earned incentives by attending the gym at least 9 times in the first 6 weeks of membership (i.e., an average of 1.5 visits per week) Among the incentive groups, subjects in one group earned $30 in an Amazon.com gift card for reaching the threshold, subjects in one group similarly earned $60 in an Amazon.com gift card, and subjects in the last group earned a specific but subject-chosen item sold by Amazon.com worth approximately $30. Control group: received a $30 Amazon gift card after six weeks unconditionally. Money $30 group: received a $30 Amazon gift card if attended gym at least 9 days in their first 6 weeks of membership.  Money $60 group: received $60 Amazon gift card if attended gym at least 9 days in their first 6 weeks of membership.  Item group: received a self-chosen item worth approximately $30 from Amazon if attended gym at least 9 days in their first 6 weeks of membership.","Physical activity programme participation","general population","USA - Large midwestern city - Local",2015,"8 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT - intention to treat analysis","Gym attendance","• We conclude that the provision of moderately-sized financial incentives only moderately helped new gym members establish better habits for using the gym. This suggests that, at least for exercise, timing financial incentives to align with endogenous attempts at behaviour change may not be the most successful strategy for improving exercise habits.\n• The most glaring pattern is the downward trend in visits over time for new members.\n• This highlights why an intervention aiming to encourage members to come frequently or consistently might be useful. Eight weeks into their membership, new members go half as frequently as they did in the first week of their membership.\n• The control group visit rates fell from an average of 2 visits during the first week of membership to around 1 visit per week by the end of the second month of membership.\n• The average visit rates for the members assigned to one of the three incentive groups were somewhat higher over the first 6 weeks of membership, consistent with the presence of incentives. The differences, however, were quite modest. On average, across the first six weeks, the members assigned to the incentive treatments made 0.14 more visits per week than the control group. The largest difference was in week 2 when the control group made an average of 1.5 visits while the incentivized groups averaged 1.73 visits. Interestingly, there was a modest bump in visit rates for the incentivized group in the 6th week of membership, which was the last week during which this group could make visits to count toward the 9 visit incentive threshold. From week 10 on, the average visit rates for the incentivized groups and control groups were very similar and hover around 1 visit per week.\n• The average visit rates for the Item group were higher than those of control in all but week 10 suggesting that the Item incentive might have had a larger effect on attendance than the other incentives.\n• that members facing an incentive were 9-10 percentage points more likely to reach the threshold of nine visits in the first six weeks than control group subjects. This result is statistically significant and substantial relative to the control group’s 48 percent probability of meeting the threshold. The increase in the average number of visits, however, is less pronounced and only marginally statistically significant with controls\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Carrera, Mariana, et al. Can Financial Incentives Help People Trying to Establish New Habits? Experimental Evidence with New Gym Members. No. w23567. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.","Link","• 10.3386/w23567"]
[118,"2 Physical activity","ACTIVE (Active Children through Incentive Vouchers - Evaluation)","Programme","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The intervention involved provision of £25 of vouchers (five vouchers in increments of £5) per month for six months. Vouchers could be used to voluntarily: i) enrol in existing activities; ii) fund coaches or new activities directly in communities or at their school, such as Zumba and Boxercise and iii) purchase new sporting equipment for themselves or their school. Recognised providers (i.e., leisure centres, clubs, and dance providers) were recruited during development stages, and their logos were printed on the vouchers to enable easy identification of where they could be used. Vouchers were numbered and contained the participant’s name with a section to complete the type and duration of activity and the signature of the participant and provider. Vouchers were treated like a cash transaction, but no change was provided in order to prevent non-physical activity-related purchases. At the end of the month, all vouchers were collected from each provider with accompanying invoices for monetary reimbursement.","Physical activity programme participation","Adolescents (low socio-economic groups)","UK - South Wales - 1 secondary school in a deprived catchment area - Local","2016*","6 months","Not reported ","One follow-up action required was increasing accessibility of existing activities such as improved PT to distant facilities/reducing dependence on parents for transportation","Behavioural insights ","• Increases in PA type - more moderate-to-vigorous PA, decrease in sedentary behaviour, social changes such as interest in PA, increased competence/body image, increases social interaction","Increases in PA type - more moderate-to-vigorous PA, decrease in sedentary behaviour, social changes such as interest in PA, increased competence/body image, increases social interaction","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Anecdotally increased use of facilities/equipment means increased retail/economic benefits   ","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Christian D, Todd C, Hill R, Rance J, Mackintosh K, Stratton G, et al. Active children through incentive vouchers–evaluation (ACTIVE): a mixed-method feasibility study. BMC public health. 2016;16(1):890.","Link","• 10.1186/s12889-016-3381-6"]
[119,"2 Physical activity","Transport modelling_Belgium","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory increase in car fuel prices with 20%. Health was a primary aim (physical activity, outdoor air pollution and risk of road traffic injury for the current situation).","Fuel price","General population","Belgium - Regional",2007,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling","• DALYs\n• YLDs \n• cases of mortality/disease cases avoided\n• air pollution exposure estimates\n","• The estimated decrease in attributable deaths from EC concentrations was around 2.5%, from 3982 (1367–6441) to 3882 (1333–6274) in the base and fuel scenario respectively, and 0.46% for cardiovascular hospital admissions, from 2800 (1426–4554) to 2788 (1418–4535) admissions. Deaths prevented due to active travel increased from 1526 (1000–2620) to 1567 (1060–2645) or an increase of on average 2.6%. The number of deaths and severely injured by traffic crashes was estimated to decline from438 in the base scenario to 416 in the fuel scenario and from 3913 to 3773, or a decrease of 5.02% and 3.58% respectively. Of all causes considered, mortality due to EC concentrations are responsible for most of the attributable deaths, more than traffic fatalities and deaths prevented due to active travel\n• The fuel scenario leads to an estimated overall gain of 1650 (1010–2330) DALY. Regarding morbidity (YLD), the burden of disease due to extra cardiovascular hospitalizations is rather small with 60 YLD (7–255), while also the health gain is negligible (Table 4). Road traffic injuries result in 5640 YLD (3040–9360) and decrease with 200 (120–290) fewer YLD. The highest health gain is seen in the younger age group, while at later age a slightly negative impact is observed.\n• A total of 1450 (890–2040) YLG were calculated for the fuel scenario, or an increase of 13 (9–18) and 8 (5–12) extra days in life expectancy, for males and females respectively. Air quality results in a total of 21,300 (7200–34,700) YLL, equal to a loss of 7 months of life expectancy for both genders. The gain was estimated at 530 (180–880) YLG, equal to a 5 day increase in life expectancy for each of the genders. Active travel currently adds 7204 (5205–11,258) life years, which increased with an additional 171 (124–251) years, or an extra 3 (2–4) and 1 (1–2) day(s) in life expectancy, for male and females respectively. In both air quality and active travel most life years are gained at older age. Traffic safety accounted for a total of 13,000 YLL (12,400–13,600) and changed with 750 (590–910) YLG. Males accounted for most of the health gain due to prevented traffic fatalities. The large health gain is due the age at which the deaths are prevented. In young and middle-aged males, there is a steeper in- crease in YLG (Fig. 5) compared to women. Despite the higher number of YLG, the fewer deaths prevented for traffic safety lead to an increase in life expectancy for the general population similar to the air quality results, i.e. an increase of5 days in life expectancy for males and an in- crease with 2 days for females.\n","The elderly showed a health impact close to null and even negative.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Dhondt, Stijn, et al. \"Integrated health impact assessment of travel behaviour: model exploration and application to a fuel price increase.\" Environment international 51 (2013): 45-58.","Link","• 10.1016/j.envint.2012.10.005"]
[120,"2 Physical activity","After school physical activity programs_taxcredits_US","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","RCT where participants that were randomly selected to take part in the treatment group were given a letter stating that they will receive up to $200 reimbursement following the enrolment of their elementary school-aged child in a qualified after-school physical activity program of their choice.  Health was a primary aim (increase in PA).","Physical activity programme participation","children","USA - California - Regional","2015*","1.5 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• enrolment in after-school PA\n• frequency in afterschool PA participation\n• time spent in afterschool PA programs \n• Overall moderate to vigorous intensity PA.\n","• After controlling for covariates, group differences in after-school physical activity program enrolment were not statistically significant for either time point. However, the OR was 1.8 (95% CI = 0.2–17.2) for after- school physical activity program enrolment at post-intervention suggesting that children in the intervention group were 80% more likely to be enroled in an after-school physical activity program at the end of the intervention than the control group. The direction of effect shifted when examining continued after-school physical activity program enrolment at the 6-week follow-up (OR = 0.8, 95% CI = 0.6–9.7), with the intervention group being 20% less likely to continue to enrol after 6 weeks.\n• After controlling for covariates, group differences in times per week of attendance to after-school physical activity programs were not statistically significant.\n• After controlling for covariates, group differences in average MVPA min·day−1 were not statistically significant for either time point.\n","MUP will have a regressive impact:\n• spending increases representing 2.7% of income for consumers in the lowest-income quintile, compared with 0.3% of income for those in the highest-income quintile. \n• The predicted change in mean alcohol consumption per","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Dunton, Genevieve, et al. \"The use of refundable tax credits to increase low-income children’s after-school physical activity level.\" Journal of Physical Activity and Health 12.6 (2015): 840-853.","Link","• 10.1123/jpah.2014-0058"]
[121,"2 Physical activity","Active_minutes_cash_incentives_USA","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT where participants assigned to the control group were offered a fixed payment of $75 for attending a 90-minute kickoff meeting, wearing a pedometer daily, and returning all study materials. The treatment group was offered $50 for base participation in the study (the same requirements as for the control group), as well as a variable incentive payment depending on participants' aerobic minutes during each of the 4 weeks of the study: \n• $0 if averaging less than 15 aerobic minutes per day each week, \n• $10 if averaging at least 15 and less than 25 aerobic minutes per day each week, \n• $15 if averaging at least 25 and less than 40 aerobic minutes per day each week, \n• $25 if averaging 40 or more aerobic minutes per day each week.\n For example, a treatment group participant who walked averages of 12, 28, 40, and 20 aerobic minutes per day during weeks 1–4, respectively, would earn a total incentive payment of $0+$15+$25+$10=$50. Including the base payment of $50, a maximum pay out of $150 for the entire study was possible for those in the treatment group. To qualify as aerobic minutes, the participant's continuous walking, jogging, or running had to be at a rate of 60+ steps per minute, involve no more than a 60-second pause, and last 10 min or longer. ","Physical activity levels","General adult population ( >50yrs, sedentary)","USA - North Carolina - Raleigh Durham - Local",2007,"1 month","Not reported ","Activity was capped at 75 mins so there is a max payment you can receive.","RCT","Aerobic minutes","• In the control arm, 20% of participants logged 30 or more aerobic minutes at least 3 days per week during the study period, a figure that climbed to 57% for those in the treatment arm. Only 6.7% of control participants met the public health recommendations for moderate physical activity (5 days per week for N30 minutes per day), while 38% of treatment participants met or exceeded this level. Finally, none of the control participants logged the high threshold of at least 30 min, 7 days a week, throughout the study, but 19% of treatment participants did so. \n• Participants in the control arm averaged just under 20 aerobic minutes per day over the 4-week study period and showed a slight decrease in average walking over the 4 weeks. The treatment arm averaged 35 aerobic minutes per day during the 4 weeks of the study, or 79% more minutes; average weekly minutes were essentially unchanged for this group over the 4 weeks. After controlling for socio-demographics, the adjusted treatment effect is just over 16 more aerobic minutes per day  for those in the treatment arm\n","After controlling for socio-demographics, the adjusted treatment effect is just over 16 more aerobic minutes per day for those in the treatment arm. College graduates logged 11 fewer minutes of aerobic activity than those who did not complete college and those with household incomes above $50,000 logged over 8 fewer aerobic minutes, suggesting that higher income individuals may be less motivated by incentives. Full-time employees also logged fewer aerobic minutes than part time employees or retirees, possibly reflecting a higher opportunity cost of their scarce free time. Although differences between full-time employees and retirees were not statistically significant at conventional levels, this was likely driven by the relatively small samples within these groups.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Finkelstein EA, Brown DS, Brown DR, Buchner DM. A randomized study of financial incentives to increase physical activity among sedentary older adults. Preventive medicine. 2008 Aug 1;47(2):182-7.","Link","• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2008.05.002"]
[122,"2 Physical activity","USA_PA_Incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT looking at the impact of financial incentives: A lottery with a 3 in 10 chance of winning $50 and a 3 in 100 chance of winning $200 every week if walking goals were met in at least 5 of the past 7 days (expected value for the lottery - approx. $21) and nonfinancial incentive: -peer network through an online message board.  Control group: participants receiving weekly feedback on the achievement of walking goals.  All participants receive pedometer. ","Physical activity levels","Elderly (>=65 from a general population who voluntary responded to the advertisement (n= 92) Mean age: 72y Sex: M (30%))","USA - National","2011-2012","2 months","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","Mean proportion of days walking goals","• NO significant results on the effectiveness of financial incentives:\n• Financial incentives, and financial incentives combined with peer network, did not result in a significantly higher mean proportion of days walking goals were met during the 16-week intervention. Also peer networking alone was ineffective.\n• During the post-intervention 8-week follow-up period, there was no significant decrease in mean proportion of days walking goals were met. Still, there was no significant difference between the intervention group and the control group in mean proportion of days walking goals were met.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From the Systematic review: Tambor M, Pavlova M, Golinowska S, Arsenijevic J, Groot W. Financial incentives for a healthy life style and disease prevention among older people: a systematic literature review. BMC health services research. 2016 Aug;16(5):426. individual article: Kullgren JT, Harkins KA, Bellamy SL, Gonzales A, Tao Y, Zhu J, et al. A mixed-methods randomized controlled trial of financial incentives and peer networks to promote walking among older adults. Health Educ Behav. 2014;41(1 suppl):43S–50S  ","Link","• 10.1186/s12913-016-1517-0"]
[123,"2 Physical activity","USA_PA_Incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT of a lottery with changes to win $1-$100, for each day the target number of steps was met + motivational weekly meetings + $5 gift car for each week of participation + $20 for participation in evaluation at the end of the intervention Control group: motivational weekly meetings + $5 gift car for each week of participation + $20 for participation in evaluation at the end of the intervention\n ","Physical activity levels","Elderly (sedentary (walking < 6000 steps per day) older adults (55-75y) from a general population who voluntary responded to the advertisement (n= 45) Mean age: 63y Sex: M (8-24%))","USA - National","2013*","3 months","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","Number of days walking goal were met","• Significant results on the effectiveness of financial incentives:\n• Financial incentives resulted in a significantly higher number of days walking goal were met.\n• In 12-week post intervention follow-up, there was reduction in number of steps, yet there was still significant difference between intervention group and control group\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From the Systematic review: Tambor M, Pavlova M, Golinowska S, Arsenijevic J, Groot W. Financial incentives for a healthy life style and disease prevention among older people: a systematic literature review. BMC health services research. 2016 Aug;16(5):426. individual article Petry NM, Andrade LF, Barry D, Byrne S. A randomized study of reinforcing ambulatory exercise in older adults. Psychol Aging. 2013;28(4):1164  ","Link","• 10.1186/s12913-016-1517-0"]
[124,"2 Physical activity","Sweden_cycling_RCT","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","RCT involving subsidising bicycle price.  The intervention programme consisted of all aspects of standard care combined with a more intensive behavioural counselling package:\n • Three individual 30min sessions with a physician experienced in behaviour change theory and practice at baseline, 6 and 12 months, including detailed physical activity prescriptions (specifically developed by Swedish authorities to promote physical activity within the national health care system, ‘PaP, Physical activity on Prescription’). The prescriptions focused on increased cycling and walking, mainly between work and home. The physician meetings aimed at changing PA behaviour. For example enhancing motivation for physically active commuting, especially bicycling, routine building, overcoming barriers, strengthening self-efficacy, relapse prevention and preventing injurie\n • Two added 2h group counselling sessions during the cycling season (at months 2 and 14). \n• A new ladies model bicycle (Crescent CTC 670, 2005 model, Varberg, Sweden) complete with 7 gears, basket, trip meter, foot brake and helmet (retail cost SEK 6000, approx $900) with free of charge bicycle service.\n Health was a primary aim (increasing the number of cycling km/d) \n","Active travel","Female population (healthy with abdominal obesity, 30-60 years old)","Sweden - National",2005,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 18 months","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (uses measures called the physical activity prescriptions specifically developed by Swedish authorities to promote physical activity within the national health care system, ‘PaP, Physical activity on Prescription’))  ","Not reported ","RCT","Active travel","• Walking increased in both groups over time, with no difference between groups. The intervention group recorded 8692 steps per day at baseline and 10129 steps per day at 18 months (using baseline carried forward). The corresponding values were 8249 steps per day at baseline and 9086 steps per day at follow up in the control group. Using completers only data the 18-month averages were 10568 steps per day in the intervention group and 10050 steps per day in the control group\n• In our main analysis the proportion of participants in each group above the cut-off for cycling treatment success (X2 km/d) was 38.7% in the intervention group and 8.9% in the control group (odds ratio¼7.8 (95% CI: 4.0 to 15.0)). Using a 4km/d cut-off the percentages decreased to 24.8 and 4.6% in the intervention and the control groups, respectively, and remained statistically significant. There was no difference between groups for achieving the secondary outcome of walking 10 000 steps per day: 45.7% in the intervention group and 39.3% in the control group (odds ratio¼1.2 (95% CI: 0.7 to 2.0))\n• In terms of commuting modes, the mean proportion of participants using the bicycle at least once per week during months 2–18 was 29.4% in the intervention group, com- pared with 8.0% in the control group. There was no difference between groups for commuting by walking during the same time period: 40.4% in the intervention group and 47.4% in the control group. During months 2–18, the mean proportion of commuting by car was 25.2% in the intervention group and 28.9% in the control group. Commuting by public transport were 55.5% in both groups during the same time period. In a whole-sample post hoc analysis there was a 34.1% decrease in mean number of commuting journeys by car per participant, and a 37.1% reduction in number of commuting journeys by public transport. Both groups achieved similar reductions in waist circumference and sagittal abdominal diameter after 6 months, which were maintained at 18 months, whereas body weight did not change\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Hemmingsson, Erik, et al. \"Increased physical activity in abdominally obese women through support for changed commuting habits: a randomized clinical trial.\" International journal of obesity 33.6 (2009): 645.","Link","• 10.1038/ijo.2009.77"]
[125,"2 Physical activity","Gasoline price_active travel_US","Observational study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Observational study linking the price of gasoline increase and physical activity data:  Linked data from the CARDIA study to gasoline price data from the Council for Community and Economic Research. At each examination, frequency of participation in 13 categories of moderate and vigorous recreational sports, exercise, leisure, and occupational PA over the previous 12 months was ascertained by an interviewer-administered questionnaire designed for CARDIA. PA scores were calculated in exercise units (EU) based on frequency and intensity of participation for each of the 13 PA categories. Of specific interest, the walking score ranged from zero to 144 EU (regular walking ≥4 hour/ week at 4 MET); biking score ranged from zero to 216 EU (regular, vigorous bicycling at ≥2 hour/week at 6 MET). The calculated scores for all 13 categories were then summarized for a total PA score. The Study modelled walking and bicycling separately given the potential for substitution in transportation modes (from driving to walking or bicycling).  Health was a primary aim (PA) ","Fuel price","General population","USA - National","1985-1986","15 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling","Physical activity ","• Using random-effect longitudinal models, we observed a significant positive association between gasoline price and total PA, after controlling for relevant covariates. A 25-cent increase in inflation-adjusted gasoline price was associated with a 9.9 exercise units (EU) increase in total PA (p=0.01), which was about 3% of total PA.\n• After controlling for all covariates, a 25-cent increase in gasoline price was associated with 1.3 exercise units increase in walking score (p=0.2), which can be translated to an additional 3-min walking per week (Figure 1). Three out of 11 PA sub-categories were significantly associated with gasoline price (positive association: non-strenuous sports; inverse associations: vigorous racket sports and bowling)\n• We observed a positive longitudinal association between gasoline price and total PA. Essentially, a 25-cent increase in inflation-adjusted gasoline price was associated with 9.9 EU increase in total PA (p=0.03). For example, since 144 EU represents regular walking at ≥4 hr/wk (≥240 min/wk), 9.9 EU translates to about 7% of 144 EU or 240min×7%=17min walking per week, a substantial population-level impact. We also observed some evidence of substitution of home-based physical activity (e.g., jogging, walking, and non-strenuous sports) as opposed to physical activities that require driving to a particular location (e.g., bowling and racket sports).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Gas price changes: On average, gasoline price was relatively stable in the 1980s and 1990s ranging from $1.06– 1.25 including tax, with substantial spatial variation across the US. Since the new millennium, the price has increased significantly (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2006). However, relative to many other countries, gasoline prices are considerably low in the US. not reported  not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Hou, Ningqi, et al. \"Longitudinal trends in gasoline price and physical activity: the CARDIA study.\" Preventive medicine 52.5 (2011): 365-369.","Link","• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2011.02.007"]
[126,"2 Physical activity","Physical Activity Loyalty Card_Northern Ireland","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","Financial incentive for physical activity. Participants used their PAL card to self-monitor PA levels, and minutes of PA were converted to points (1 minute=1 point; capped at 30 points per day) over the 12-week intervention period. Points were redeemed for rewards at Week 6 and Week 12. Through successful engagement with the retail sector, rewards were various “in kind” vouchers from local businesses. Health was a primary aim (PA) ","Physical activity levels","Working population","UK - Northern Ireland - Local",2011,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 6 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Quasi-experimental study","Minutes of PA","• Using a novel loyalty card scheme that included financial incentives did not significantly increase PA in adults compared to self-monitoring PA alone.\n• At 12 weeks, participants in the Incentive Group recorded 17.52 minutes of PA/week (95% CI¼12.49, 22.56) compared to 16.63 minutes/week (95% CI¼11.76, 21.51) in the No Incentive Group.  At Week 6, participants in the Incentive Group recorded 26.18 minutes of PA/week (95% CI¼20.06, 32.29) compared to 24.00 minutes/week (95% CI¼17.45, 30.54) in the No Incentive Group. \n• At 6 months participants in the Incentive Group completed a mean of 22.49 minutes/week workplace PA compared to mean of 35.02 minutes/week in the No Incentive Group, measured using the GPAQ (work domain\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The Public Health Responsibility Deal, supported by the UK government, encouraged public health to work collaboratively with business, fostering links between researchers, government, and industry. This study provides an example of how researchers can successfully engage with the business sector in public health. ","NA","Hunter RF, Tully MA, Davis M, Stevenson M, Kee F. Physical activity loyalty cards for behaviour change: a quasi-experimental study. American journal of preventive medicine. 2013 Jul 1;45(1):56-63.","Link","• 10.1016/j.amepre.2013.02.022"]
[127,"2 Physical activity","public transport passes_US","Modelling study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Transcard program in place at the time of the survey provided up to US$100 in subsidy per month for public transport. Health was a primary aim (PA)","Active travel","General population (car drivers/working age - 16-70yrs)","USA - Metropolitan Atlanta - Local",2002,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Multinomial logistic regression","Meeting PA guidelines","Summary: transit users record fewer driver trips and slightly more passenger trips than non-users and also have lower car availability. As income increases, transit users take slightly fewer trips by transit and more by car. Transit users also accumulate greater total walking distance across income groups. Higher-income transit users report the most walking.\n• In our sample, 2.6% met the physical activity recommendation solely by walking for transportation, 8.3% recorded some walking, and 89.2% recorded no walk trips.\n• We measured only moderate physical activity related to transportation on the street network, whereas overall physical activity captures many other kinds of activity that are not transportation-related. We found that 5.4% of the sample used transit, reflecting the low mode share of transit (among all possible modes of transportation) in the Atlanta region\n• We found that 8.7% of our sample had and used an employer-sponsored transit pass, and 11.1% were eligible for such a program but did not use it\n• Having and making use of an employer-sponsored transit pass was both positively and significantly associated with meeting the physical activity recommendation (OR:4.96, CI:2.8–8.9) but was not significantly associated with being a moderate walker. Having access to, but not using, an employer-sponsored transit pass had a non- significant relationship with being a moderate walker and a significant OR of 2.2 (CI:1.15–4.3) of meeting the physical activity recommendation. When estimating OR of meeting the physical activity recommendation with moderate walkers as a reference category (column 5), trips as driver (OR:0.86, CI:0.76–0.98) and car availability (OR:0.25, CI:0.09–0.69) were negatively associated. Public transit trips and having and using an employer-sponsored transit pass (OR:3.6, CI:1.83–7.1) remained positive and significant.\n• Living in a lower density neighbourhood was significantly and negatively associated with being a moderate walker and with meeting recommendation after adjusting for other variables in the\n","Higher- income individuals, on average, took fewer transit trips when they did use transit, and made more car trips as drivers. Interestingly, higher-income transit users reported walking greater distances than other transit users and non-users of transit model. Living within 450m (0.28 miles) of a bus stop or rail station was not associated with walking when only transit users were considered. However, transit users living between 450 and 1,000m (0.6 miles) of transit were more likely to be moderate walkers than those living farther away from transit.","Not reported","Not reported","When the presence of retail stores within a 10- min walk from the workplace is introduced into the model, the OR of using a pass and meeting the recommendation stays relatively constant, but the OR of not using the available program decreases considerably, giving credence to the importance of the built environment at the place of employment for walking.","Not reported","Employers located in areas well served by transit are more likely to consider offering transit pass programs.  Sponsored transit pass programs are attractive to both employer and employee because they are tax-free to employees and tax-deductible for the employer. Furthermore, they may reduce demand on parking space for employers and contribute to employee retention.","NA","Lachapelle, Ugo, and Lawrence D. Frank. \"Transit and health: mode of transport, employer-sponsored public transit pass programs, and physical activity.\" Journal of public health policy30.1 (2009): S73-S94.","Link","• 10.1057/jphp.2008.52"]
[128,"2 Physical activity","commuting subsidies_Belgium","Policy","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy (need to apply for subsidy)  based  on govt based tax rates (commuter subsidies)\n• Car driver/ own car (no reimbursement) -> subsidy in % of costs 0.0%\n• Car driver/ own car (conventional reimbursement) -> subsidy in % of costs 3.8%\n• Car driver/ company car ->subsidy in % of costs 34.7%\n• Train (third payer) -> subsidy in % of costs 50.4%\n• Train (conventional) ->subsidy in % of costs 29.4%\n• BTM (BXL region) -> subsidy in % of costs 37.9%\n• moto ->subsidy in % of costs 2.4%\n• bike -> subsidy in % of costs 34.1%\n Health was a primary aim (move away from car use) ","Active travel","Other (commuters)","Belgium - National",2012,"NA","• Implementation costs: EUR 380 million\n• Passed through legislation \n","Ad hoc tax changes","Modelling","Commuting trips","• Not surprisingly, reverting to the low exemption level for car transport would decrease car use. The 0.4% drop in market share is rather high, which may be explained by the fact that a large number of people is hit by such a policy. Not only commuters by private car are affected, but those commuting by company car, too. All other modes gain, with the closest substitutes (rail and car passenger) relatively more. Bus (and tram) travel, which in PLANET is highly sensitive to congestion, is indirectly favoured by rising speed levels, hence the rise in kilometres by Bus Tram Metro. \n• Abolishing the direct subsidy to rail commuters in the third payer system would obviously have a negative impact on rail travel. Total pkm by rail drops by almost 5%, while its market share in commuting drops by one half percentage point. Speed is negatively affected. This simulation illustrates the importance of current public transport subsidies to alleviate congestion levels. Since congestion is high, there is a case to subsidize public transport, be it through operational subsidies to the railway company, directly to commuters through the third payer system, or indirect ones through the personal income tax system.\n• Lowering the personal income tax level would make the tax exemption of reimbursements less valuable to the employee. Since cars are highly subsidised in absolute terms due to the company car regime, this would erode the subsidy to car commuting more quickly than for other modes, leading to a slight shift away from the car to other modes.\n• Abolishing all exemptions for commuting reimbursements while maintaining the current imputed value for company cars leads to a moderate rise in car use, while rail, bike and BTM lose. For BTM, this is due to lower subsidies as well as higher congestion. These two negative effects dominate, even though their most direct substitute, bike, loses even more in relative terms. The simulation shows how the tax system attempts to favour public modes compared to private modes, at least when the favourable regime for company cars is not taken into account.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","• policy 1: would yield 105 million euros in revenue\n• policy 4: The total gain in tax revenue is estimated at 340 million euros\n","Not reported","?","Laine, Benoît, and Alex Van Steenbergen. Working Paper 11-16-Commuting subsidies in Belgium-Implementation in the PLANET model. No. 1611. 2016.","Link","• NA"]
[129,"2 Physical activity","US_cash incentives for step targets_workplace","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary financial incentives programme for the workplace tested via RCT: The control arm received no other interventions. In the three financial incentive arms, a drawing was held every other day during the 13-week intervention period, in which one team in each arm was chosen at random as the winning team. This design provided variable reinforcement, which has been demonstrated to be more effective for changing behaviour than constant reinforcement.42 In the individual incentive arm, each participant on a winning team was eligible to collect $50, but only if he or she had at least 7000 steps on the prior day. In the team incentive arm, each participant on the winning team was eligible to collect $50 only if all four members of their team had each achieved at least 7000 steps on the prior day. In the combined incentive arm, each participant on the winning team was eligible to collect $20 if he or she had at least 7000 steps on the prior day and then an additional $10 for each team member who also had at least 7000 steps on the prior day.   \nHealth was a primary aim (increase daily step count) \n","Physical activity levels","Working population","USA - Philadelphia - Local",2014,"6 months","Policy overlaps with other fiscal policy (Affordable care act)  ","Not reported","RCT - intention to treat analysis","Step goals reached","• The mean proportion of participant-days achieving the 7000 steps goal peaked at about 0.45 in the combined incentive arm and 0.33 in the individual incentive arm, but was never greater than 0.23 in the team incentive arm or control. These levels declined over the intervention period for all arms\n• Compared to control during the intervention period, the mean proportion of participant-days achieving the 7000 step goal was significantly greater for the combined incentive (0.35 vs. 0.18, difference: 0.17, 95 % confidence interval [CI]: 0.07–0.28, p< 0.0,01) but not for the individual incentive (0.25 vs 0.18, difference: 0.08, 95 % CI: -0.02–0.18, p= 0.13) or the team incentive (0.17 vs 0.18, difference: -0.003, 95 % CI: -0.11–0.10, p= .96). \n• The combined incentive was also significantly greater than the team incentive (0.35 vs. 0.17, difference: 0.18, 95 % CI: 0.08–0.28, p< 0.001), but not the individual incentive (0.35 vs. 0.25, difference: 0.10, 95 % CI: -0.001–0.19, p=0.05).\n• In the main adjusted model during the intervention period, the combined incentive arm had higher odds of achieving goal compared to the control arm (Odds Ratio [OR]: 3.54, 95 % CI: 1.56–8.06, p=0.003) and the team-based incentive arm (OR: 3.02, 95 % CI: 1.37–6.68, p=0.006) \n• Compared to the control group during the intervention period, the mean daily steps were significantly greater for the combined incentive (5280 vs. 3929, adjusted difference: 1446, 95 % CI: 448–2444, p= 0.005), but not for the individual incentive (4516 vs. 3929, adjusted difference: 602, 95 % CI: -393–1596, p= 0.24) or the team incentive (3930 vs. 3929, adjusted difference: 193, 95 % CI: -819–1205, p= 0.71)\nAmong the 70 % that completed the study, mean weight loss was 3.2 kg and 30 % of them lost more than 5 % of their initial weight.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Patel, Mitesh S., et al. \"Individual versus team-based financial incentives to increase physical activity: a randomized, controlled trial.\" Journal of general internal medicine 31.7 (2016): 746-754.","Link","• 10.1007/s11606-016-3627-0"]
[130,"2 Physical activity","Gasoline price__US","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Nominal gasoline prices more than tripled between 2003 and the last quarter of 2008: Increase in gas prices with time and due to events like Hurricane Katrina\nRegression models with state and time effects and other demographic and socio-economic controls are estimated to explore the association between higher gasoline prices and individual level physical activities.\nThe following types of physical activities are considered: \n• Walking, running, bicycling or rollerblading as part of ‘recreational’ or ‘leisure time’ activities. \n• Walking or bicycling as the primary form of transport to commute to work or errands. (\n• Playing with Children.\n• Doing housework that qualifies as at least moderately active \n• Total time spent on all physical activity that meets or exceeds the definition of being ‘moderately active’\n Health was a primary aim (PA) \n","Fuel price","General population","USA - National","2003-2008","5 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Regression modelling","Increases in PA levels","• In the full sample, a little more than 61 percent report at least some level of moderate physical activity in the past 24 hours. However, only about 6.6 percent report leisure time walking, running or bicycling, while about 13 percent report at least some walking or bicycling to do errands. About 42 percent report participating in some form of MEIHW\n• Results indicate that, with the exception of playing with children, there is a statistically significant increase in the time spent on each of the physical activities of interest associated with a $1 increase in gasoline prices. However, the association is only weakly significant and somewhat sensitive to model specification in case of walking/biking to work or errands increases in the probability of any participation for activities like recreational walking/biking/running as well as MEIHW in all models.18 The OLS regression models show that the average estimated increases in the different physical\n• activities associated with a $1 increase in gasoline prices are as follows: 1.29 – 1.55 minutes in recreational walking/running/bicycling; 0.57-0.74 minutes in walking or bicycling to errands (not statistically significant when time-trends interacted with state dummies are included); 7.74-8.66 minutes in MEIHW; and 10.39- 10.74 minutes in overall MEIPA in a 24 hour period. The association between increased gasoline prices and time spent playing with children actually appears to be negative, though it is insignificant in most models\n• In terms of change in participation probabilities, the Probit Models show that a $1 increase in gasoline prices is associated with an estimated 1 percentage points in the probability of recreational walking/biking/running, an estimated 1.5-2.0 percentage point increase in the probability of any MEIHW, and a 2.4-2.8 percentage point increase in the probability of participation in any MEIPA. Overall, it appears that the changes in participation as well as time spent on activities like walking or bicycling are not large, and sometimes statistically weak\n","associations are weaker for minorities and those with relatively low socio-economic status - gas prices effect people differently ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Sen, Bisakha. \"Is there an association between gasoline prices and physical activity? Evidence from American time use data.\" Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 31.2 (2012): 338-366.","Link","• 10.1002/pam.21601 "]
[131,"2 Physical activity/Environment","Australia fuel tax_obesity reduction","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax defined as an AUD0.10 per litre increase in the national fuel excise tax which as of June 2010 was AUD 0.38143 cents per litre.  Health was a primary aim (as this was thought to promote active travel to work, and thereby reduce obesity levels in the populations.","Fuel price","Working population","Australia - National",2010,"NA","Implementation costs:  AUD 4,381,691 in 2010 Authors note that the intervention costs were regarded as minimal given that (i) fuel excise taxation with bi-annual indexation already occurs within Australia and (ii) the excise is levied at the point of production or import and there are relatively few producers/importers of transport fuels in Australia. It is therefore expected that the administrative and compliance burden of the tax would be relatively low","Not reported ","Modelling (Markov)","• Health adjusted life years (HALYs))\n• PA per week\n","• 237 HALYs would be gained as a result of the intervention (95% UI 138–351). The intervention would result in an overall decrease in mortality and morbidity from traffic accidents (3 deaths averted and 79 years lived with disability (YLDs) averted).. \n• Estimates suggest that walking to access PT for commuting purposes could increase walking for transport on average by 90 min per week.\n","Suggestions that the intervention would therefore results in greater financial impact on middle and low-income households than high-income households. ","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per HALY)","A total of AUD2.6 M in healthcare costs would be averted (95% UI AUD1.3 M–3.9 M) \nThe ICER suggests that the intervention would be cost-effective over the lifetime, with a median ICER of 7702 (95% UI 1366–22,125). The probability of the intervention being dominant (cost saving) however is only 0.8%.)","  not explicitly stated but it reasons that reduced emissions due to reduced car journeys  not reported","The approximately AUD1.7B in revenue that the Australian Government would stand to collect on an annual basis through the increase (AUD1.5B in additional excise based on assumed intervention effect and passenger vehicle petrol consumption in 2010 [90] and AUD154M in additional GST) .   Hypothecation/earmarking would be undertaken for a specific expenditure to make increase active transport/PA.","Not reported","No","Brown V, Moodie M, Cobiac L, Herrera AM, Carter R. Obesity-related health impacts of fuel excise taxation-an evidence review and cost-effectiveness study. BMC public health. 2017;17(1):359.","Link","• 10.1186/s12889-017-4271-2"]
[132,"2 Physical activity/Environment","Transport modelling_Belgium","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 20% increase in car fuel prices. Health was a primary aim (physical activity, outdoor air pollution and risk of road traffic injury for the current situation) ","Fuel price","General population","Belgium - Regional",2007,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling","• DALYs\n• YLDs \n• cases of mortality/disease cases avoided\n• air pollution exposure estimates\n","• The estimated decrease in attributable deaths from EC concentrations was around 2.5%, from 3982 (1367–6441) to 3882 (1333–6274) in the base and fuel scenario respectively, and 0.46% for cardiovascular hospital admissions, from 2800 (1426–4554) to 2788 (1418–4535) admissions. Deaths prevented due to active travel increased from 1526 (1000–2620) to 1567 (1060–2645) or an increase of on average 2.6%. The number of deaths and severely injured by traffic crashes was estimated to decline from438 in the base scenario to 416 in the fuel scenario and from 3913 to 3773, or a decrease of 5.02% and 3.58% respectively. Of all causes considered, mortality due to EC concentrations are responsible for most of the attributable deaths, more than traffic fatalities and deaths prevented due to active travel\n• The fuel scenario leads to an estimated overall gain of 1650 (1010–2330) DALY. Regarding morbidity (YLD), the burden of disease due to extra cardiovascular hospitalizations is rather small with 60 YLD (7–255), while also the health gain is negligible (Table 4). Road traffic injuries result in 5640 YLD (3040–9360) and decrease with 200 (120–290) fewer YLD. The highest health gain is seen in the younger age group, while at later age a slightly negative impact is observed.\n• A total of 1450 (890–2040) YLG were calculated for the fuel scenario, or an increase of 13 (9–18) and 8 (5–12) extra days in life expectancy, for males and females respectively. Air quality results in a total of 21,300 (7200–34,700) YLL, equal to a loss of 7 months of life expectancy for both genders. The gain was estimated at 530 (180–880) YLG, equal to a 5 day increase in life expectancy for each of the genders. Active travel currently adds 7204 (5205–11,258) life years, which increased with an additional 171 (124–251) years, or an extra 3 (2–4) and 1 (1–2) day(s) in life expectancy, for male and females respectively. In both air quality and active travel most life years are gained at older age. Traffic safety accounted for a total of 13,000 YLL (12,400–13,600) and changed with 750 (590–910) YLG. Males accounted for most of the health gain due to prevented traffic fatalities. The large health gain is due the age at which the deaths are prevented. In young and middle-aged males, there is a steeper in- crease in YLG (Fig. 5) compared to women. Despite the higher number of YLG, the fewer deaths prevented for traffic safety lead to an increase in life expectancy for the general population similar to the air quality results, i.e. an increase of5 days in life expectancy for males and an in- crease with 2 days for females.\n• The population weighted exposure to EC decreased from 1.17 to 1.14 μg/m3 or a decrease of 2.31%. Local EC concentrations decreased with 1.99%, but as concentrations at work locations and in transport decreased most, people are exposed to lower concentrations, than what is expected from a change in local residential concentrations only (Table\n• Kilometres travelled with active modes increase on average with 2%, equivalent to 100,500 additional trips per day (Fig. 3). The median trip duration was estimated at 35 min for walking trips and 30 min for cycling trips in both scenarios\n","The elderly showed a health impact close to null and even negative.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Dhondt, Stijn, et al. \"Integrated health impact assessment of travel behaviour: model exploration and application to a fuel price increase.\" Environment international 51 (2013): 45-58.","Link","• 10.1016/j.envint.2012.10.005"]
[133,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","Workplace cycle scheme Australia","Programme","Non-governmental (Workplaces in Australia)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary scheme whereby participants were provided with a mountain bike equipped with lights, lock, cycle computer and helmet. The study promoted four periods of regular moderate exercise per week for one-year using the physical incentive of a loan bike. Participants in the study were drawn from 11 CBD-based organisations who were willing to sponsor their own staff at the rate of $400 per rider. The project recruited 100 riders (36 females, 64 males) with an average age of 39 year Health was a primary aim (to increase the proportion of trips made by bike).","Physical activity levels","General adult population (targeting those who live close to work)","Australia - Local",1999,"12 months","Not reported","Not reported","Empirical assessment","• Coronary risk ration and Total cholesterol and aerobic fitness\n• cycling Km travelled/ reduced CO2\n","• Physical Work Capacity: increased p = 0.042. This indicates that aerobic fitness was significantly improved after the year long cycling intervention. Those people in the low fitness category dropped from eight to five people and those in the high fitness category jumped from 24 to 32 people;\n• The cyclists replaced over 121,000 kilometres of car commuting with cycling equating to a reduction of 37 tonnes of “greenhouse” gases (C02 equivalent).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Although corporate sponsorship to fund this project was secured, the process was extremely difficult to achieve. Over 70 organisations approached the DEP for information but only 11 offered funding.","Not reported","Although corporate sponsorship to fund this project was secured, the process was extremely difficult to achieve. Over 70 organisations approached the DEP for information but only 11 offered funding.","NA","• Marshall, Graham, and Janelle Booth. \"The Western Australian Cycling 100 Project.\"\n• Martin A, Suhrcke M, Ogilvie D. Financial incentives to promote active travel: an evidence review and economic framework. American journal of preventive medicine. 2012 Dec 1;43(6):e45-57.\n• Bauman, Adrian Ernest, et al. Cycling: Getting Australia Moving: Barriers, facilitators and interventions to get more Australians physically active through cycling. Melbourne: Cycling Promotion Fund, 2008. \n• Gold Coast City Council. Health & Physical Benefits of Cycling Available from: http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/documents/bf/bnop-report_section2.pdf.\n\n","• http://www.academia.edu/19383471/The_Western_Australian_Cycling_100_Project\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379712006228\n• http://atrf.info/papers/2008/2008_Bauman_Rissel_Garrard_Ker_Spiedel_Fishman.pdf\n• http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/documents/bf/bnop-report_section2.pdf\n","• NA\n• 10.1016/j.amepre.2012.09.001\n• NA\n• NA"]
[134,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","US_PA_incentive","Modelling study","NA","Financial incentive","Modelling the impact of financial incentives employed across 3000 work place schemes, constructing demand curves of a simulated employee population participating in a physical activity program for a direct cash incentive. Analysis used a modelling framework that systematically identifies how to optimize marginal return on investment from programs incentivising behaviour change by integrating commonly-collected data on health behaviours and associated costs. Estimation of the optimal incentive level at $367. Health was a primary aim ","Physical activity levels","Working population","USA - 3000 employers (not specified) - Local","2005-2010","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling","• Increase in physical activity\n• Annual per employee healthcare cost reduction \n","• The model estimated that physical activity among participants in the incentive program would average 4.2 days per week (95% CI: 2.7–6.3), up from a baseline of 2.6 days per week pre-incentive (95% CI: 0.5-3.9).\n• The model estimated an annual $144 (95% CI: $16–314) per employee healthcare cost reduction due to the incentive program\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Basu S, Kiernan M. A simulation modeling framework to optimize programs using financial incentives to motivate health behaviour change. Medical Decision Making. 2016 Jan;36(1):48-58.","Link","• 10.1177/0272989X15585984"]
[135,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","NorthernIreland_physicalactivity_incentive(points to be redeemed for retail vouchers)","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT of a voluntary physical activity incentive in the workplace. Employees used a ‘loyalty card’ to objectively monitor their physical activity at work over 12 weeks. The Incentive Group collected points and received rewards for minutes of physical activity completed. Each time a participant swiped their card at the entrance to a gym and exercise studio, within the grounds of the workplace, a timestamp was created, recording the date and time of each swipe. The minutes between each timestamp were then aggregated, to give the total minutes of physical activity for each bout completed. Minutes of physical activity were  converted into points (1 minute = 1 point; capped at 30 points per day) and these points could be redeemed for rewards (retail vouchers) at week 6 and 12 .The No Incentive Group self-monitored their physical activity only. Collection of loyalty points for minutes of physical activity. Health was a primary aim (increase in employees physical activity)","Physical activity levels","General population","UK - Northern Ireland - Main government offices - Local",2011,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 6 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Increase in physical activity\n• QoL\n","• At week 6 the Incentive Group performed more minutes of physical activity/week (26.18 mins; 95% CI 20.06, 32.29) than the No Incentive Group (24.00 mins; 95% CI 17.45, 30.54) but the difference was not significant (p=0.45). Similarly, at week 12 the Incentive Group performed more physical activity/week (17.52 mins; 95% CI 12.49, 22.56) than the No Incentive Group (16.63 mins; 95% CI 11.76, 21.51) but again the difference was not significant (p=0.59).\n• the Incentive Group reported greater gains in utility at 6 months (0.03; 95% CI 0.01, 0.05) compared to the No Incentive Group (0.02; 95% CI 0.00, 0.04) although these were not significant (p=0.40).\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness analysis (ICER)","The Incentive Group cost more than the No Incentive Group but it was also more effective resulting in a mean ICER of £2,900/QALY (95% CI −28,000,32,000)","After converting EQ-5D scores into productivity estimates, employees in the Incentive Group improved their level of productivity over 6 months more (1.13%; 95% CI 0.34%, 1.92%) than the employees within the No Incentive Group (0.5%; 95% CI −0.39%, 1.39%) but the difference was not significant (p=0.30).","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Dallat MA, Hunter RF, Tully MA, Cairns KJ, Kee F. A lesson in business: cost-effectiveness analysis of a novel financial incentive intervention for increasing physical activity in the workplace. BMC Public Health. 2013 Dec;13(1):953.","Link","• 10.1186/1471-2458-13-953"]
[136,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","Singapore_activity_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary Financial incentive of S$15 for reaching between 50,000 and 70,000 steps, and S$30 for reaching more than 70,000 steps. Health was a primary aim (specify) Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year)","Physical activity levels","General population","Singapore - 13 organisations spanning many industries and sectors of government - Local",2013,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 1 year","Not reported ","Intervention stopped at 6 months but follow-up up to 12 months","RCT","• Physical activity MVPA at 6 months\n• Physical activity MVPA at 12 months\n• Health outcomes (weight, blood pressure, and quality-of-life measures)\n","• The cash incentive was most effective at increasing MVPA bout min per week at 6 months, but when comparing increases in MVPA bout min per week in the cash groups  to those who also had a Fitbit but no cash incentives, the differences were not significantly greater.\n• At 12 months, a decrease in physical activity of –23 MVPA bout min per week (95% CI –42 to –4; p=0·0184) was seen when comparing the incentive group with the Fitbit only group.\n• There were no improvements in any health outcomes (weight, blood pressure, etc) at either assessment.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Finkelstein EA, Haaland BA, Bilger M, Sahasranaman A, Sloan RA, Nang EE, Evenson KR. Effectiveness of activity trackers with and without incentives to increase physical activity (TRIPPA): a randomised controlled trial. The Lancet Diabetes & endocrinology. 2016 Dec 1;4(12):983-95.","Link","• 10.1016/S2213-8587(16)30284-4"]
[137,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","US_PA_incentive","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","This study was designed to determine whether engagement in stair taking can be increased in a worksite setting through the provision of an employer-sponsored, behaviour based incentive system in which employees (members) accumulate points that can be redeemed for merchandise.. This stairs incentive offering was part of a larger health and wellness incentive program where employees from one company could earn up to $150 in points annually if they completed a variety of health and wellness activities. These activities included completing a health risk assessment, biometric testing and feedback, participation in weight loss and healthy lifestyle programs, engaging in health education classes, and utilizing generic medications. Collection of bonus points is based on stair utilisation. Bonus points were awarded for additional stair usage. Final collection of points could be redeemed for merchandise","Physical activity levels","Working population","USA - 1 company (not specified) - Local",2011,"6 months","• Implementation costs: overall cost of incentives for the program was $3,739.30 – this doesn't include admin and set up costs \n• Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (health risk assessment, biometric testing and feed- back, participation in weight loss and healthy lifestyle programs, engaging in health education classes, and utilizing generic medications)\n","Not reported","Nonrandomized evaluation study","Stair usage","The number of total stair transactions for all members for all days monitored increased from 5,070 to 38,900, and the average number of stair transactions per day rose from 39 to 301, representing over a 600% increase. • This effect was substantial and immediate the first month after implementation and sustained throughout all subsequent months. \n• number of new stair takers from baseline to the intervention period also significantly increased by 85 members from 128 to 213 or 66.4%. All but three members recorded at least one stair transaction during the intervention period. \n• The number of total stair transactions for all members from baseline to intervention periods increased from 5,070 to 38,900. On average, each member increased their total stair usage from 23 stair transactions during baseline to 180 stair transactions during the intervention period and from almost no daily stair usage (0.2 times per day) to more than one (1.4 stair transactions) per day.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Schumacher JE, Utley J, Sutton L, Horton T, Hamer T, You Z, Klapow JC. Boosting workplace stair utilization: a study of incremental reinforcement. Rehabilitation psychology. 2013 Feb;58(1):81.","Link","• 10.1037/a0031764"]

{"sheet":"Environment","index":6,"n_rows":16,"n_cols":27,"rows_kept":16,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["ID number","Policy area","Policy name","Evidence type","Policy owner","Mechanism type","Mechanism details ","Target risk factor/behaviour/commodity","Target population / demographics","Setting (Geographical)","Year of implementation","Timeline(s) for the policy's impact assessment","Policy implementation (policy owner, voluntary vs mandatory policy, implementation mechanism (if implemented), overlap with other policies and cost of implementation)","Follow-up actions for policy","Type of analysis","Policy outcomes (health or intermediate impact)","Quantitative outcomes (health or intermediate)","Distributional effects","Type of economic evaluation analyses ","Quantitative economic evaluation results","Other impacts (co-benefits, unintended/perverse effects) ","Revenue information (amount, beneficiary and utilisation/earmarking)","Policy context","National policy presence","Reference to original sources","Reference link","Digital Object Identifier"]
["ID number","Policy area the policy relates to","Name given to policy, if no name is established, name in the following format: [Country or country region]_[commodity or policy area]_[policy type]","Note if a policy, an academic study (eg a modelling study, RCT or smaller scale study) or a small scale programme","Name of the organisation responsible for designing and/or implementing the policy","What is (are) the mechanism(s) of the policy?","Add detail about the specifics of the policy mechanism","Which risk factor/product/commodity/behaviour is the policy aimed at?","Which segment of the population is the policy targeted at?","Country - region/locality - setting level ( Local - Regional - National - International)","Start year of the policy. If this is not available, note the year of the oldest publication on this policy followed by an asterisk e.g. 2008*."," What are the timelines for the policy’s impact assessment/follow-up?","Information on whether the policy was implemented, whether it was voluntary or mandatory, what mechanism was used for passing the policy, whether it overlaps with any other policies and any information on the cost if implementation","Combination of follow-up actions and any sunset clause","Type of analysis used to derive the outcome information","List of health or intermediate outcomes reported for the policy","The quantitative results on health and intermediate impacts achieved by the policy (values)","What distributional effects are reported on for this policy?","What type of economic evaluation analysis was undertaken?","List or paste the quantitative results from economic evaluations.","Information on any co-benefits, other unintended perverse effects, and other non-health impacts of the policy ","Combination of  fields (Revenue, beneficiary of revenues, utilisation of revenues)","Information provided on the context around the policy, including opponents and proponents.","Has the policy been implemented nationally in England (or UK country if specified). Yes, No, NA(if not a national policy) and ? If unclear","Reference used to extract information about the policy","Hyperlink to PDF if freely available; URL if not.","DOI for publications if available"]
[131,"2 Physical activity/Environment","Australia fuel tax_obesity reduction","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax defined as an AUD0.10 per litre increase in the national fuel excise tax which as of June 2010 was AUD 0.38143 cents per litre.  Health was a primary aim (as this was thought to promote active travel to work, and thereby reduce obesity levels in the populations.","Fuel price","Working population","Australia - National",2010,"NA","Implementation costs:  AUD 4,381,691 in 2010 Authors note that the intervention costs were regarded as minimal given that (i) fuel excise taxation with bi-annual indexation already occurs within Australia and (ii) the excise is levied at the point of production or import and there are relatively few producers/importers of transport fuels in Australia. It is therefore expected that the administrative and compliance burden of the tax would be relatively low","Not reported ","Modelling (Markov)","• Health adjusted life years (HALYs))\n• PA per week\n","• 237 HALYs would be gained as a result of the intervention (95% UI 138–351). The intervention would result in an overall decrease in mortality and morbidity from traffic accidents (3 deaths averted and 79 years lived with disability (YLDs) averted).. \n• Estimates suggest that walking to access PT for commuting purposes could increase walking for transport on average by 90 min per week.\n","Suggestions that the intervention would therefore results in greater financial impact on middle and low-income households than high-income households. ","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per HALY)","A total of AUD2.6 M in healthcare costs would be averted (95% UI AUD1.3 M–3.9 M) \nThe ICER suggests that the intervention would be cost-effective over the lifetime, with a median ICER of 7702 (95% UI 1366–22,125). The probability of the intervention being dominant (cost saving) however is only 0.8%.)","  not explicitly stated but it reasons that reduced emissions due to reduced car journeys  not reported","The approximately AUD1.7B in revenue that the Australian Government would stand to collect on an annual basis through the increase (AUD1.5B in additional excise based on assumed intervention effect and passenger vehicle petrol consumption in 2010 [90] and AUD154M in additional GST) .   Hypothecation/earmarking would be undertaken for a specific expenditure to make increase active transport/PA.","Not reported","No","Brown V, Moodie M, Cobiac L, Herrera AM, Carter R. Obesity-related health impacts of fuel excise taxation-an evidence review and cost-effectiveness study. BMC public health. 2017;17(1):359.","Link","• 10.1186/s12889-017-4271-2"]
[132,"2 Physical activity/Environment","Transport modelling_Belgium","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory 20% increase in car fuel prices. Health was a primary aim (physical activity, outdoor air pollution and risk of road traffic injury for the current situation) ","Fuel price","General population","Belgium - Regional",2007,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling","• DALYs\n• YLDs \n• cases of mortality/disease cases avoided\n• air pollution exposure estimates\n","• The estimated decrease in attributable deaths from EC concentrations was around 2.5%, from 3982 (1367–6441) to 3882 (1333–6274) in the base and fuel scenario respectively, and 0.46% for cardiovascular hospital admissions, from 2800 (1426–4554) to 2788 (1418–4535) admissions. Deaths prevented due to active travel increased from 1526 (1000–2620) to 1567 (1060–2645) or an increase of on average 2.6%. The number of deaths and severely injured by traffic crashes was estimated to decline from438 in the base scenario to 416 in the fuel scenario and from 3913 to 3773, or a decrease of 5.02% and 3.58% respectively. Of all causes considered, mortality due to EC concentrations are responsible for most of the attributable deaths, more than traffic fatalities and deaths prevented due to active travel\n• The fuel scenario leads to an estimated overall gain of 1650 (1010–2330) DALY. Regarding morbidity (YLD), the burden of disease due to extra cardiovascular hospitalizations is rather small with 60 YLD (7–255), while also the health gain is negligible (Table 4). Road traffic injuries result in 5640 YLD (3040–9360) and decrease with 200 (120–290) fewer YLD. The highest health gain is seen in the younger age group, while at later age a slightly negative impact is observed.\n• A total of 1450 (890–2040) YLG were calculated for the fuel scenario, or an increase of 13 (9–18) and 8 (5–12) extra days in life expectancy, for males and females respectively. Air quality results in a total of 21,300 (7200–34,700) YLL, equal to a loss of 7 months of life expectancy for both genders. The gain was estimated at 530 (180–880) YLG, equal to a 5 day increase in life expectancy for each of the genders. Active travel currently adds 7204 (5205–11,258) life years, which increased with an additional 171 (124–251) years, or an extra 3 (2–4) and 1 (1–2) day(s) in life expectancy, for male and females respectively. In both air quality and active travel most life years are gained at older age. Traffic safety accounted for a total of 13,000 YLL (12,400–13,600) and changed with 750 (590–910) YLG. Males accounted for most of the health gain due to prevented traffic fatalities. The large health gain is due the age at which the deaths are prevented. In young and middle-aged males, there is a steeper in- crease in YLG (Fig. 5) compared to women. Despite the higher number of YLG, the fewer deaths prevented for traffic safety lead to an increase in life expectancy for the general population similar to the air quality results, i.e. an increase of5 days in life expectancy for males and an in- crease with 2 days for females.\n• The population weighted exposure to EC decreased from 1.17 to 1.14 μg/m3 or a decrease of 2.31%. Local EC concentrations decreased with 1.99%, but as concentrations at work locations and in transport decreased most, people are exposed to lower concentrations, than what is expected from a change in local residential concentrations only (Table\n• Kilometres travelled with active modes increase on average with 2%, equivalent to 100,500 additional trips per day (Fig. 3). The median trip duration was estimated at 35 min for walking trips and 30 min for cycling trips in both scenarios\n","The elderly showed a health impact close to null and even negative.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Dhondt, Stijn, et al. \"Integrated health impact assessment of travel behaviour: model exploration and application to a fuel price increase.\" Environment international 51 (2013): 45-58.","Link","• 10.1016/j.envint.2012.10.005"]
[138,"3 Environment","Stockholm_congestion_charge","Policy","Government (Stockholm city council)","Price increase (Charge)","The Stockholm Trial consisted of three parts extended public transport (16 new bus lines), congestion tax and more park-and-ride sites in the city and the county. The total public transport service was extended by 7% and the park-and-ride capacity was extended by 29%.  A mandatory congestion charge was implemented: The highest amount due was 20 SEK (corresponding to 2.2 EUR) during rush hours and lowest amount (10 SEK) early in the morning or in the evening. Maximum amount to pay for one day was 60 SEK. Night-time, holidays and weekends were free of charge. Taxis, buses, motorcycles, and cars classified as environmental vehicles (e.g. driven by electricity or bio fuels) were exempted. Health as a secondary aim, as a reduction in air pollution was the main aim of the charge.","Congestion","General population","Sweden - Stockholm - Local",2006,"6 months","Trial possible through legislation ( 2004 the Swedish Parliament adopted a law that made it possible to charge a congestion tax in Stockholm up to July 31, 2006)\n","Not reported ","Dispersion modelling","• Mortality\n• Life expectancy \n• NOx concentrations \n• PM10 concentrations\n","• With the reduction in population weighted NOx concentration for Greater Stockholm, 27 (20–37 lives, considering the 95% confidence interval of ER factor of Nafstad et al., 2004) premature deaths per year are gained\n• 11.2 years of life gained for each premature death. This means that 27 less deaths during one year would correspond to 20.6 years of life gained per 100 000 people with the full effects of the exposure reduction\n• Compared with the situation in 2006 with no Stockholm Trial, NOx emissions in the Greater Stockholm area would decrease by 55 ±16 tonnes as result of reduced traffic. Most of this reduction occurs in Stockholm’s inner city, 45 ± 13 tonnes. For PM10, the corresponding reduction would be 30 ± 9 tonnes, of which about two-thirds would be the result of reductions in emissions in the inner city. The increased NOx emission from buses compensate for some of the reduction in emissions from passenger cars. This is the reason for NOx emissions to be reduced by only 8.5% in the inner city, while total road use is reduced by 15%. \n• The mean PM10 values for the 7-month periods show no systematic trend, but the mean for 2006 is substantially lower than any of the other years. But the reduction on Hornsgatan and Sveavagen is larger than can be explained by lower traffic emissions.\nLargest reductions are seen in the city centre, where concentrations are estimated to fall by up to 2 mgm± 3 for both NOx and PM10. Total PM10 concentrations with the Stockholm Trial are estimated to decrease by 4%– 7% on four of the streets and remain unchanged on one street. For NOx the corresponding decrease is 2%–12%, being unchanged on one street. It is interesting to note that the reductions are not large enough to achieve the limit values.\n• The people in the city centre will have the largest reduction in exposure. Annual mean decrease in population weighted concentrations in the inner city is 10%, 7.6% and 10% for NOx, PM10 and PM exhaust, respectively. The corresponding absolute values are 0.81, 0.21and 0.022mgm3, i.e. very small changes concentrations. \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The reduction in total number of vehicle passages across the charge cordon over 24 h was 22%, corresponding to nearly 100 000 fewer passages to/from the inner city.","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Burman L, Johansson C. The effects of the congestion tax on emissions and air quality: evaluation until, and including, the year 2008. SLB. 2010.\n• Johansson C, Burman L, Forsberg B. The effects of congestions tax on air quality and health. Atmospheric Environment. 2009;43(31):4843-54.\n• Brown V, Moodie M, Carter R. Congestion pricing and active transport–evidence from five opportunities for natural experiment. Journal of Transport & Health. 2015;2(4):568-79.\n","• https://trid.trb.org/view/1215560\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1352231008008091\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214140515006738\n","• NA\n• 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2008.09.015\n• 10.1016/j.jth.2015.08.002"]
[139,"3 Environment","Milan Ecopass Scheme (congestion charge)","Policy","Government","Price increase (Charge)","Mandatory congestion change.  In January 2008 the Ecopass programme was launched in the central ‘‘Cerchia dei Bastioni’’ area of 8.2 km2 from 7:30 a.m. to 7:30 p.m. on weekdays. The charge depends on a vehicle’s engine emissions standard with fees varying from €2to €10. Free access to the ‘‘zone a traffico limitato’’ (ZTL) was granted to motorbikes, to several types of alternative fuel vehicles, and to conventional fuel vehicles compliant with at least the European emission Euro3 and Euro4 standards. Residents within the zone were exempted only if driving higher emission standard vehicles with owners of vehicles with older more polluting engines were only given a discount if they bought an annual pass costing up to €250 dependant on the vehicle’s engine emission standards. Enforcement was carried out through digital cameras located at 43 electronic gates, with fines for offenders varying from €70 to €275 • Hybrid/ LPG/Methane and Gasoline Euro 2,4 or more recent and Diesel  Euro 4 with Anti-particulate filters are not subject to the congestion tariff.\n• Gasoline Euro 1 and 2 have a daily charge of €2 and a yearly pass for residents of €50. Discounted multiple entries (max 100 per year) will cost €50 for the first 50 entries and €60 for the next 50\n• Gasoline Euro; 0 Diesel cars Euro 1, 2 and 3; Diesel goods vehicles Euro 3; Diesel buses Euro 4 and 5; have a daily charge of €5 and a yearly pass for residents of €125. Discounted multiple entries (max 100 per year) will cost €125 for the first 50 entries and €150 for the next 50\n• Diesel cars Euro 0; Goods vehicles Euro 0, 1 and 2 Diesel buses Euro 0, 1, 2 and 3; have a daily charge of €10 and a yearly pass for residents of €250. Discounted multiple entries (max 100 per year) will cost €250 for the first 50 entries and €300 for the next 50\nThe one-year policy was later extended the end of 2009, and then to 2011.\n Health was an indirect aim (Air pollution reduction was the focus) \n","Congestion","General population","Italy - Milan - Local",2008,"< 1 year","• Implementation costs: Official data on the MES implementation costs are not available yet, but, according to informal sources, total infrastructure costs amount to €7 million, while annual management costs are €0.6 million \n• Passed through legislation\n","Not reported ","Modelling (regression)","pollution","It is claimed that the MES reduced air emissions of PM10 by 19%, of NOx by 14%, and of CO2 by 15%\nNine months after the introduction of the MES the number of vehicles entering the charging area had decreased by 14.2% \nAccording to AMMA (2008), after nine months of implementation, traffic decreased by 3.6%within the MES area, and by 12.3% outside the MES area. Congestion measured as traffic flow/capacity ratio decreased on average by 4.7%, while the network extension with a flow/capacity ratio higher than 0.9 decreased by 25.1%. Private vehicles’ speed within the charging area increased by 4%, while bus speed increased from 8.67 to 9.34 km/h (+7.8%). Such a difference is probably due to the accompanying traffic management policies such as new bus lanes, revised traffic directions and reduced illegal and on-street parking.\nWe find that the charges significantly decreased the concentration of some pollutants, especially carbon monoxide and particulates, but only in the short run. One week after its implementation, pollution returned to its pre-treatment levels.","Not reported","Cost- benefit","The MES is estimated to generate an annual net benefit of €15.7 million. Transport users as a whole have a net gain equal to €8.4 million (= 3.9-3.5+8.6-0.2). The distribution of this net benefit among user categories is differentiated. Because of data limitations, we could distinguish only by type of vehicle (not by type of user, as in London), between passenger cars and freight vehicles. Passenger cars gain a net benefit of €3.7 million (net of deterred trips), mainly due to time savings (€14.6 million). Freight vehicles instead suffer a loss of €3.5 million. Bus users have a net benefit of €8.6 million\nreduction in accidents, the second most important source of social benefit, has been computed at €6.6 million based on the estimated reduction of accidents in the charging area.\n","A loss to private parking companies. The charging under Area C was temporarily suspended between 25 July and 17 September 2012 because of a ruling by the Council of State following protests by parking space owners in the city centre. ","€9 million to the Government","London has a similar charge. Political acceptability is a low priority since the number of negatively affected users is high: firstly, the ones which are forced to cancel their trip or to change mode; secondly, the users who have a value of travel time saving lower than the toll; and filly those who do not pay the toll but are impacted by the increase in traffic due to transfers to other modes or to other times of the day. The only users who benefit from the toll are those who have a value of travel time savings higher than the toll. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that the politicians were rather reluctant. In a public consultation on June 13 2011, the 79% of voters approved the adoption of the Ecopass, which was re-established on January 16 2012 under the me Area C with its focus purely on congestion mitigation. not reported not reported not reported not reported not reported not reported","NA","• Rotaris, Lucia, et al. \"The urban road pricing scheme to curb pollution in Milan, Italy: Description, impacts and preliminary cost–benefit analysis assessment.\" Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 44.5 (2010): 359-375.\n• Percoco, Marco. \"Is road pricing effective in abating pollution? Evidence from Milan.\" Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment 25 (2013): 112-118.\n","• https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/30908809/wp122.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1533059367&Signature=uMh1nBsYO%2BPybaCe4fxuuPc1T60%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DThe_urban_road_pricing_scheme_to_curb_po.pdf\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1361920913001235\n","• 10.1016/j.tra.2010.03.008\n• 10.1016/j.trd.2013.09.004"]
[140,"3 Environment","London_congestion_charge","Policy","Government","Price increase (Charge)","Mandatory congestion charge covering  approximately 21km2 and containing a resident population of 200,000 compared with the over 7 million residents of Greater London (Government Office Region) . The charge is in operation Monday to Friday 07:00-18:00 and does not apply at weekends, Bank Holidays, or the days between Christmas Day and New Year’s Day, when traffic levels are lighter.  The Congestion Charge is an £11.50 daily tariff and payment enables motorists to drive around, leave and re-enter the charging zone as many times as required in one day.  There are no barriers or tollbooths; instead drivers are paying to register their Vehicle Registration Number (VRN) on a database. Cameras read a vehicle’s number plate as it enters, leaves or drives within the charging zone and checks it against the database of those who have paid the charge or those who do not have to pay (because they are exempt or registered for a 100 per cent discount).  Drivers have up to midnight on the day of travel to pay the £11.50 charge or £14.00 if they pay the next charging day after travelling in the zone. The charge can also be paid via Congestion Charging Auto Pay which is an automated payment system that has a discounted daily charge rate of £10.50.  Drivers who have not paid the charge by midnight on the next charging day after they travel in the zone, will be issued with a Penalty Charge Notice of £160, which is reduced to £80 if paid within 14 days. Health was an indirect aim (reduction in Air pollution/ more active travel were the main aims of the policy). ","Congestion","General population","UK - England - Local",2003,"2 years","• Policy overlaps with introduction of d bus lanes, the use of larger bendy busses, particle traps to  diesel busses, increased bus frequency and changes to traffic light phases) \n• Passed by Transport for London \n","The Western extension was introduced in February 2007, but was removed in January 2011.","Range of different studies (geometric mean analysis, emission dispersion modelling)","air pollution emissions","• There have been modest beneficial impacts to emissions of key road traffic pollutants, with estimated scheme-attributable reductions inside the western extension zone of 2.5 percent to oxides of nitrogen (NOX), 4.2 percent to fine particles (PM10), and 6.5 percent for carbon dioxide (CO2). \n• Trends in measured ambient outdoor air quality across central and inner London continue to primarily reflect factors external to the scheme, such as the weather and vehicle technology changes, not all of which have been beneficial. No clear scheme impacts from either the original central or western extension zones can therefore be discerned.\n• The Greater London population was predicted to gain 26 years of life per 100,000 from the modelled reduction in NO2. Within the congestion charging zone (CCZ wards), the predicted years of life gained (YLG) per 100,000 was 183, while the benefit was only 18 in the remaining wards. \n• The CCZ wards had a smaller population however; and total predicted YLG within the CCZ wards was smaller compared to the remaining wards. Though predicted YLG were modest in magnitude, there was a consistent socioeconomic patterning of benefits.\n• Changes in concentrations of NO2 and PM10 due to traffic reductions were modest across Greater London. Both absolute and relative reductions in concentrations were greatest within the CCZ wards reflecting the localized nature of the scheme. \n• Traffic monitoring indicates an appreciable decrease in annual average daily traffic for cars (26%) and heavy goods vehicles (7%) between the pre and post-CCS periods within the charging zone, a small increase in redirected traffic along the IRR, and no systematic change in traffic on local roadways surrounding the zone.\n• Reductions in NO2 concentrations were greater than for PM10, a pollutant with many non-traffic sources, which would have remained unaffected by the scheme. Based on our model, road-traffic contributes roughly 25% of NO2 concentrations across Greater London, but less than 10% of PM10; though the road- traffic contribution is greater for both pollutants in Central London where vehicle emissions are dominant sources. \n•\n• While the total predicted health benefits were largest for Greater London, the life expectancy gained per 100,000 was greatest within the CCZ wards. Although small in magnitude, this analysis suggests there would be an extension of life expectancy due to reduced traffic-related air pollution from the introduction of the CCS. \n• Furthermore, the scheme appears to have led to a modest reduction in socioeconomic inequalities in air pollution exposures and associated mortality.\n","There was a consistent socioeconomic gradient in concentrations of NO2 and PM10 such that higher concentrations occurred in more deprived areas. The gradient was smaller for PM10, as expected given its relatively homogenous spatial distribution. \n• A more pronounced socioeconomic gradient in YLG was predicted reflecting the greater reduction in exposure and higher baseline mortality among more deprived groups. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","All revenue generated by the Congestion Charge is reinvested in transport in the Capital. Over the last 14 years, the £1.7bn net revenue has been generated and re-invested in the Capital’s transport infrastructure.  Some £1.3bn of has been spent on improvements to the bus network, £196m on roads and bridges, £80m on road safety, £90m on local transport/borough plans and £64m on sustainable transport and the environment.","Not reported","NA","• Transport for London. Freedom of Information request detail - Request ID: FOI-2271-1617 2017. Available from: https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/transparency/freedom-of-information/foi-request-detail?referenceId=FOI-2271-1617.\n• Brown V, Moodie M, Carter R. Congestion pricing and active transport–evidence from five opportunities for natural experiment. Journal of Transport & Health. 2015;2(4):568-79.\n• Atkinson, Richard W., et al. \"The impact of the congestion charging scheme on ambient air pollution concentrations in London.\" Atmospheric Environment 43.34 (2009): 5493-5500.\n• Tonne, Cathryn, et al. \"Air pollution and mortality benefits of the London Congestion Charge: spatial and socioeconomic inequalities.\" Occupational and Environmental Medicine 65.9 (2008): 620-627.\n• Transport for london: Central London congestion charging: Impacts monitoring. Sixth Annual report, July 2008\n","• https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/transparency/freedom-of-information/foi-request-detail?referenceId=FOI-2271-1617.\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214140515006738\n• http://web.mit.edu/cron/Backup/project/urban-sustainability/Discouraging%20Driving_Patrick%20Lynch/Misc/Atkinson%20et%20al%20(2008)%20The%20impacts%20of%20the%20congestion%20charging%20scheme%20on%20ambient%20air%20pollution%20concetrations%20in%20London.pdf\n• http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1016.8304&rep=rep1&type=pdf\n• http://content.tfl.gov.uk/central-london-congestion-charging-impacts-monitoring-sixth-annual-report.pdf\n","• NA\n• 10.1016/j.jth.2015.08.002\n• 10.1016/j.atmosenv.2009.07.023\n• 10.1136/oem.2007.036533\n• NA"]
[141,"3 Environment","Various road policies_portugal","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Range of examples of mandatory taxes based on the average vehicle age, fuel type (gasoline or diesel), engine size (<1.4l, 1.4-2L, >2L), all part of the EU changes to reduce air pollution.  ","Travel","General population","Portugal - National",2001,"1 year","• Policy overlaps with other fiscal policy (EU taxes/incentives to reduce air pollution) \n• Passed through with EU legislation\n","Not reported ","Modelling (emission modelling)","Emissions","Since 2001, a continuous decreasing trend of the EF for all pollutants is observed except for CO2. Between the first and the last year analysed, emission reduction for local pollutant ranges between 57 and 62% for HC, 58–61% for CO, 28–41% for NOx,32–39% for PM (Fig. 4a1–c1). However, if we had a counterfactual scenario in 2011 the emission reduction would be 20–80% higher than the baseline scenario (Fig. 3a2–c2). For CO2, a slight increase was observed (1.5%) for an average speeds lower than 60 km hr but an increase was observed (4.2%) for an average speed of 100 km h?1.\nDuring the period of analysis, EF decreased 28 to 62% for all local pollutants (HC, CO, NOx, PM), nevertheless, if a counterfactual scenario would implemented, the reduction would be 20 to 80% higher than the baseline scenario. \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Fontes, T., and S. R. Pereira. \"Impact assessment of road fleet transitions on emissions: The case study of a medium European size country.\" Energy Policy 72 (2014): 175-185.","Link","• 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.04.044"]
[142,"3 Environment","Fuel_toll_pricing_EU","Policy","Government","Price increase (Charge)","Mandatory toll charge on motorways and roads, with different systems of implementation. In the first group (G1), the A1, A2, A5 and A8 motorways were originally tolled with conventional pay tolls as well as electronic toll collection systems (entitled “Green Lane”). In this system, vehicles have to decelerate from 120 km/h to 60 km/h to pass the toll booth infra- structure. In the second group (G2), the A17, A22, A25 and A29 motorways have recent systems equipped with electronic tolls. In this system, vehicles pass through the tolls without stopping or decelerating, since there is not a physical infrastructure (the transponder placed inside the vehicle is activated each time the vehicle passes a roadside sensor).  Health was an indirect aim as this is mainly a revenue generating policy, but the impact on air pollutants is measured. ","Travel","General population","Portugal - National",1990,"3 years","Not reported ","More roads were added as infrastructure developed","Modelling (ex-post analysis)","Pollutants: Hydrocarbons (HC), NOx and particles (PM)","• A high reduction of emission costs is observed for all scenarios, in particular for G2 motorways after tolls introduction. In this group, A17 and A29 motorways records differences between emission costs of approximately 50%. In both cases, some of the traffic flow seems to returns to other options, in this case to A1 motorway.\n• First, although the majority of the motorways (62.5%) have recorded an increase in traffic volumes between 2008 and 2009 (1-20% increase), a general reduction of emission costs was observed in the studied motorways. \n• This reduction is justified with the improvement of the vehicle fleet efficiency in Portugal. In the following years although this trend was similar, the main factors for such reduction were different. These factors were related not only with the reduction of traffic volumes on the studied motorways but also with some stabilization of the emission factors from 2009 to 2011. \n• Secondly, although all the studied motorways have presented highest emission values during July and August, driven by the increase in traffic volumes (1-32% depending of the motorway and year), the A5 motorway has an opposite pattern. This reduction in emissions is justified with the decrease of 16% in traffic volume during this month. \n• Third, since 2008 all the studied motorways present a reduction in the emission costs over time. Nevertheless, in some of them such as in A1, there is a slight evidence to a stabilization of such costs. Such pattern can be related with the gains of traffic when in 2010 tolls were introduced in A17 and A29 (both alter- natives of A1). Since this period, A1 seems to start recovering the traffic lost some years before. \n• Lastly, the comparison of emission costs between the G1 and G2 motorways shows different trends between both groups. After the introduction of tolls, a high reduction of emissions is observed in G2 motorways, but the effect on G1 was smoother. These reductions are particularly strong for the new motorways A17 and A29 (with emission cost reduction of  approximately 50%). In both cases the A1 motorway is an alternative for these motorways. On the other hand, for the A22 and A25 motorways any motorway alternative exists. In such cases the pattern is very similar to the observed in the motorways of G1 group\n•\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Traffic changes  Almost 75% of the motorways traffic flow shows a high statistical significance correlation (p < 0.05) with toll prices but the correlation with fuel prices is only statistically significant (p < 0.05) for 38-50% of the motorways. This suggests that motorway traffic volumes are mainly affected by toll prices Globally, a negative low correlation was found (|rs| < 50%) between travel demand and prices. To A17 and A29 a moderate or strong correlation is observed (|rs| > 50% or |rs|> 75%) with high statistical significance (p < 0.05). Although, only 12.5% of the motorways have moderate correlation with toll price (|rs|j > 50%), 62.5% A29) (p < 0.05) of them show high statistical significance (A5, A8, A17, A25 and A29)(p<0.05). About 37.5% of the traffic volume on motorways, have moderate or strong correlation with toll price (|rs|j > 50% or |rs|j > 75%) but 75% of them show high statistical significance (A1, A5, A8, A17, A25 and A29) (p < 0.05). Thus, these results suggest that traffic volume can be more affected by toll prices but also that new motorways (previously, without tolls) are more affected by prices than oldest ones.","Not reported","Not reported","No","Fontes, T., et al. \"Assessment of the effectiveness of fuel and toll pricing policies in motorway emissions: An ex-post analysis.\" Research in Transportation Economics 51 (2015): 83-93.","Link","• 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.04.044"]
[143,"3 Environment","Emissions trading_Portugal","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory  uniform tax on emissions (single tax rate for the region). Health was an indirect aim (Air pollution) ","Emissions","General population","USA - National","2014*","NA","Not reported","Not reported ","Modelling (log-linear or log-log C-R relationship between fine particulate concentrations and adult mortality) ","• Number of deaths averted \n• air pollution emissions\n","• The model solves for three abatement policies: efficient abatement, a uniform pollution concentration standard across the region, and a uniform emissions tax. With the efficient abatement policy, concentration reductions (2.2 µg m−3 (log linear) and 3.6 µg m−3 (log-log)) would reduce annual expected deaths across the region by 4,000 with log-linear versus 8,950 for log-log, With a log-log C-R function the total emissions from the efficient abatement policy are only 11% less than with the “best” uniform standard; however, the efficient policy is able to achieve a 52% greater reduction in expected mortality across the region compared with the uniform standard.\n• With the efficient abatement policy, across the 1,000 runs, the median emission reduction is 22% and 38% with log-linear and log-log C-R functions, respectively. With the uniform standards, emissions are reduced by 18% (log-linear C-R) and 30% (log-log). For both policies, total emissions and population-weighted average concentrations are lower for the log-log than for the log-linear C-R function\n","Not reported","Marginal cost analysis","In the median model run, net benefits with a log-linear C-R function are $13 billion for the efficient abatement policy and $5.8 billion for the “best” uniform standard. For the loglog C-R function, net benefits are $26 billion (efficient policy) and $13 billion (uniform standard)\nUnder the efficient abatement policy with both the log-linear and log-log C-R functional forms, marginal damages at the 95th percentile are nearly 3.5 times larger than at the 5th percentile. With a log-log C-R function the marginal damages are approximately 59% greater than with log-linear ($34,700 (log-linear), $55,100 (log-log), median marginal damages per ton)\n\nAcross the 1,000 model runs, the “best” uniform tax policy requires slightly greater emission reductions (23% for log-linear and 39% for log-log) than the efficient policy (22% for log-linear and 38% for log-log), yet the efficient policy has a greater impact on the population weighted average concentration (10.0 µg m−3 (log-linear), 8.6 µg m−3 (log-log)) compared to the uniform tax (10.3 µg m−3 (log-linear), 9.0 µg m−3 (log-log); see Figure 3.7). The efficient policy generates 33% greater net benefits than the uniform tax with a log-linear C-R function, and 27% greater net benefits with log-log model.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Use of transport might be different in the USA compared to the UK.","No","Goodkind, Andrew Lloyd. Economics of air pollution: policy, mortality concentration-response, and increasing marginal benefits of abatement. Diss. University of Minnesota, 2014.","Link","• NA"]
[144,"3 Environment","Air passenger duty_UK","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tax on passengers departing from UK airports, first levied in 1994. Since 2009, the tax has varied according to distance flown (divided into four bands) and the class of flight. Distance is determined by the distance between London and the capital city of the destination country. There are exemptions for those flying on very small aircraft, aged under two, flying from airports in the Scottish Highlands and Islands, and for transfer/transit passengers. Passengers flying from Northern Ireland also pay the short- haul (Band A) rate regardless of distance, because of concerns about lower passenger taxes in the Irish Republic. \n• ≤2,000 miles £13 (economy) £26 (other) \n• 2,001‒4,000 miles £65 (economy) £130 (other) \n• 4,001‒6,000 miles £81 (economy) £162 (other) \n• ≥6,001 miles £92 (economy) £184 (other)\n Health as an indirect aim (Air pollution impacts of an air transport tax) \n","Travel","General population","UK - National",1994,"NA","• Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (Other transport taxes, fuel duties) \n• Passed through legislation\n","Policy has developed over time\nRates for 1 april 2018 have updated:\nBand A (London to <2000 miles)- Standard rate £26\nBand B (london >2000 miles)- Standard rate £156\n","Impact assessment","Other (noise, CO2 emissions)","Noise annoyance is increasing, air pollution persistently breaches legal limits around Heathrow","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported ","£2.7billion in transport taxes, and particularly fuel duty, dominate UK environmental tax receipts. Excluding VAT, fuel duty accounted for £26.9 billion of revenue in 2011, 62% of total green taxes. Including VAT, fuel duty made up 75% of green revenues. Other transport taxes, VED and APD, accounted for 19% of revenues, meaning that altogether transport-based green taxes made up 94% of environmental receipts. By contrast, other green taxes are quite small. Energy-based taxes and resource-based taxes each accounted for about 3% of receipts.","More and more seen as less acceptable as UK consumers and travellers are paying the highest level of aviation tax in the EU.","Yes","Leicester, Andrew. \"Environmental taxes: economic principles and the UK experience.\" (2013).","Link","• NA"]
[145,"3 Environment","Vehicle excise duty_UK","Policy","Government","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory annual ownership tax for road vehicles. Rates vary according to the type of vehicle. Since 2001 the rate for cars has depended on fuel efficiency (measured as carbon dioxide emissions per kilometre driven). Cars are currently allocated to one of 13 bands. Since 2010, new cars have also paid a different rate in their first year of registration, with much stronger differentials in this first year rate across emissions bands.\nCars registered before 2001 pay VED according to the engine size of the vehicle.\n• Registered in or after March 2001 £0‒£475 per year according to vehicle emissions (£0‒£1,030 in first year).\n• Registered before March 2001 £135 (engine ≤1,549cc) £220 (engine ≥1,550cc)\n Health as an indirect aim (Air pollution impacts of a road tax)\n","Travel","General population","UK - National",2001,"20 years","Passed through legislation","Policy has developed over time - latest modification is change to first year rates (FYR)","Impact assessment","Report on CO2 but mentions impact on other pollutants (see bold) ","The latest reforms to vehicle excise duty (VED), including  first year rates (FYRs), are estimated to deliver carbon savings of around 0.9 million tonnes of CO2 by 2020, compared with making no changes to the VED regime. These measures will help ensure that the environmental signal of FYRs is not weakened, and that the forecast carbon benefits are realised. The estimated carbon savings can be valued (in terms of the avoided damage costs of climate change from fewer tonnes of CO2 emitted) using the ‘shadow price of carbon’ recommended by the Department of Energy and Climate Change for use in policy appraisal2 . Using these values gives an average annual benefit of around £1.75 million over the 10-year period 2010-11 to 2020-21 from the FYR element of the VED reform package. The NPV of the FYR carbon savings over this period is estimated at around £15 million (in current prices). There will also be effects on other air pollutants, such as oxides of nitrogen and particulates, but these have not been quantified in this impact assessment.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported ","£5.8 billion ","Not reported","Yes","• Leicester, Andrew. \"Environmental taxes: economic principles and the UK experience.\" (2013).• Leicester, Andrew. \"Environmental taxes: economic principles and the UK experience.\" (2013).\n• HM Treasury. Impact Assessment of reforms to the Vehicle Excise Duty rules on refunds and six month licences 2009. Available from: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2009/115/pdfs/ukia_20090115_en.pdf.\n","• https://www.ifs.org.uk/conferences/Leicester_Environmentaltaxes2012.pdf\n• https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukia/2009/115/pdfs/ukia_20090115_en.pdf\n","• NA\n• NA"]
[146,"3 Environment","Fuel prices_US","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory price increases for fuel. Modelling of various scenarios developed around the baseline current situation using: 10% and 50% as increases in gas prices; 40,965 and 44,065 as numbers of deaths in the year before the price increase (minimum and maximum figures reported by the CDC11 between 1999 and 2003 for motor vehicle crash deaths); and 0.16 and 0.29 as price elasticities for vehicle deaths.","Fuel price","General population","USA - National",2003,"12 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Monte-carlo)","Number of deaths averted ","In the first simulation, which assumed only a 20% increase in price together with alternative assumptions on elasticity, pollution, and deaths, 95% of the reduction in combined deaths was between 1747 and 3714. In the second simulation, which allowed 10%, 20%, and 50% increases in price together with alternative assumptions, 95% of the reduction in combined deaths was between 1547 and 5824. • 1994 fewer deaths; possible range, 997 to 4984) due to highway crashes. Plausible changes in increased gas prices from 10% to 50% had the greatest effect on the estimate of decreased numbers of deaths. \n• The decreased numbers of deaths due to particulate matter in air pollution was 600 fewer deaths; possible range (300 to 1500 ).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Policy changed gas prices (historical data). Mention that automakers and their unions may experience economic declines. ","Study mentions that higher fuel prices, can mean more active transport and reductions in air pollutants. ","Use of transport might be different in the USA compared to the UK.","No","Leigh, J. Paul, and Estella M. Geraghty. \"High gasoline prices and mortality from motor vehicle crashes and air pollution.\" Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine 50.3 (2008): 249-254.","Link","• 10.1097/JOM.0b013e318162f5c4"]
[147,"3 Environment","Road user charging_ congestion/air pollution_UK","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Charge)","Mandatory congestion charge: inner cordon charge was set to £3, deemed politically acceptable by the local government, but below the £5 toll levied in London (current toll is £8). A second test splits this fee over two cordons, which increases trip suppression as more trips are affected by the outer cordon. Using real monetary values in SATEASY, a revenue of £97,000 for 470,000 PCU kilometres travelled is generated. From this a 20 p/km toll is derived that is consistent with tests elsewhere) but gives a trip suppression likely to be far from the economic optimum, even if externality effects were valued highly. Additional distance charges were thus set at half the 20 p/km charge, and at an order of magnitude lower, the latter giving a trip suppression similar to the initial inner cordon charge. All charges were levied according to passenger Car Unit’s with no attempt to differentiate by vehicle type. Health was secondary aim, the main aim was to impact road use  and emissions, in particular NOx) ","Congestion","General population","UK - Leeds - Local",2005,"1 year","Not reported","Potential to explore changing speed. The emissions and speed relationship is U shaped","Modelling (traffic)","other (car trips)","Depending upon the pollutant, distance charging reduces total road traffic emissions by c. 10% under a 2 p/km charge, 42–49% under a 10 p/km charge, and 52–59% under a 20 p/km charge, illustrating a diminishing marginal return in emission abatement with the distance charge. AND suppresses trip demand, improves trip speeds and reduces total vehicle kilometres travelled on the network","Not reported","Considered how traffic trips changed by different cordon charge","City centre (inner orbital) cordon: £3 -> 7.0 (2.0) % reduction in trips\nDouble cordon: £2 inner and £1 outer ->18.5 (17.2) % reduction in trips\nDistance charge: 2 p/km ->8.8 (11.1) % reduction in trips\nDistance charge: 10 p/km -> 47.0 (46.1) % reduction in trips\nDistance charge: 20 p/km -> 62.5 (55.7) % reduction in trips\n","Not reported","Using real monetary values in SATEASY, a revenue of £97,000 for 470,000 PCU kilometres travelled is generated.","Not reported","NA","Namdeo, Anil, and Gordon Mitchell. \"An empirical study of estimating vehicle emissions under cordon and distance based road user charging in Leeds, UK.\" Environmental monitoring and assessment 136.1-3 (2008): 45-51.","Link","• 10.1007/s10661-007-9719-x"]
[148,"3 Environment","Biomass_burning_Greece","Ecological","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Voluntary. Over the last couple of years, the use of biomass as heating source was allowed in Greece as a CO2-neutral means of space heating in the large metropolitan areas of Athens and Thessaloniki affecting more than half of the country's population. At the same time the use of light heating diesel was heavily taxed apparently to combat illegal trafficking of heating diesel. In the same period Greece faced a financial crisis with significant repercussions on the average household income. That combination of parameters resulted in increased use of biomass for residential heating in year. Health was a secondary aim (exposure to PM10 and PM2.5).","Heating (biomass use)","General population","Greece - large metropolitan areas of Athens and Thessaloniki - Local",2012,"1 year","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Modelling","Number of deaths averted ","Overall, the number of excess deaths attributed to PM exposure in the metropolitan area of Thessaloniki (with a population of more than 1 m inhabitants) for 2011 are 1369, while the respective number for 2012 is 1287.\nThus, the air pollution burden associated with particulate matter during the cold season of2012–2013 resulted in an estimate of more than 200 excess premature deaths attributable to airborne PM exposure than in the corresponding period in 2011–2012. Excess mortality during the cold period of the year corresponds to 3540 years of life lost  taking into account the population age distribution\n","Note that socioeconomically disadvantaged people use more heating fuel","Cost- benefit","The additional health burden corresponds to an average cost ranging between 200–250 million euros (up to 1.2 billion). Morbidity, expressed in new cases of chronic bronchitis, cardiovascular disease and respiratory problems, corresponds to a financial cost on the order of 30 million euros.","Based on the results of the study and taking into account the importance of public health and the related socioeconomic cost, specific interventions are recommended, such as:\n– Reduction of the price of light heating diesel through relaxation of the related excise tax\n– Financial incentives for light heating diesel replacement by natural gas or electricity\n– Enhancement of the support given to residential energy conservation schemes and simplification of the relevant regulatory framework to ease the access of larger numbers of households to such programs.","On the contrary, the revenues from excise tax and VAT imposed on heating oil from the over-taxation were 187 million euros less than the previous year in Greece. This was due to the lower amount of heating oil taxed (2,629,931 kt in 2011–2012 compared to 1,335,083 kt in 2012–2013).","Natural experiment during the Greek Austerity which was not popular.","NA","Sarigiannis, Dimosthenis Α., Spyros P. Karakitsios, and Marianthi V. Kermenidou. \"Health impact and monetary cost of exposure to particulate matter emitted from biomass burning in large cities.\" Science of The Total Environment 524 (2015): 319-330.","Link","• 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2015.02.108"]
[149,"3 Environment","Germany road taxes and infrastructure","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Charge)","Mandatory \n• Policy 1: commuters allowed to deduct individual commuting expenses at rates higher than 0.3 €/k\n• Policy 2: direct and uniform commuting subside with rate x per kilo granted by the federal government\n• Policy 3: time cost subsidy- represents an additional investment in road capacity in the city characterised by an increase in the share of land allocated to roads in the city. Implies that capacity is increased by providing additional road infrastructure. \n• Policy 4: subsidy on automobile use by reducing the energy tax on gasoline. A 0.65 €/litre is applied\n• Policy 5: urban public transport characterized by a reduction of the sales tax rate on transit fare where public fare is 0.07 and the German sales tax rate of general consumption is 0.19. \n Health was an secondary aim (Air pollution reduction was the main aim) \n","Travel","General population","Germany - National","2012*","1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (various- spatial methodologies)","Welfare","All polices contribute to an increase in the imbalance of the spatial allocation of residences of jobs because the suburbanization of residents is stronger than the suburbanisation of jobs. As a consequence , all polices indeed strengthen urban sprawl according to the definition of sprawl used here.\nAggregate urban welfare the funding scheme hardly affects the relative advantageousness of a policy compared to the other policies. However, stronger distortions accruing under income tax funding suggest that welfare gains (losses) of urban residents and landowners are smaller (higher)  under income tax funding compared to lump-sum funding.\n","Policy induced distributional effects among urban residents and landowners are considerably large and depend crucially on the funding scheme. In particular high-skilled workers are aaversely affected by income tax funding. ","Not reported","Not reported","People combined errands and commuting with more costly fuel/tax scenarios- reduced congestion.","Not reported","Not reported","No","Tscharaktschiew, Stefan, and Georg Hirte. \"Should subsidies to urban passenger transport be increased? A spatial CGE analysis for a German metropolitan area.\" Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 46.2 (2012): 285-309.","Link","• 10419/48165"]

{"sheet":"Housing","index":7,"n_rows":17,"n_cols":27,"rows_kept":17,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["ID number","Policy area","Policy name","Evidence type","Policy owner","Mechanism type","Mechanism details ","Target risk factor/behaviour/commodity","Target population / demographics","Setting (Geographical)","Year of implementation","Timeline(s) for the policy's impact assessment","Policy implementation (policy owner, voluntary vs mandatory policy, implementation mechanism (if implemented), overlap with other policies and cost of implementation)","Follow-up actions for policy","Type of analysis","Policy outcomes (health or intermediate impact)","Quantitative outcomes (health or intermediate)","Distributional effects","Type of economic evaluation analyses ","Quantitative economic evaluation results","Other impacts (co-benefits, unintended/perverse effects) ","Revenue information (amount, beneficiary and utilisation/earmarking)","Policy context","National policy presence","Reference to original sources","Reference link","Digital Object Identifier"]
["ID number","Policy area the policy relates to","Name given to policy, if no name is established, name in the following format: [Country or country region]_[commodity or policy area]_[policy type]","Note if a policy, an academic study (eg a modelling study, RCT or smaller scale study) or a small scale programme","Name of the organisation responsible for designing and/or implementing the policy","What is (are) the mechanism(s) of the policy?","Add detail about the specifics of the policy mechanism","Which risk factor/product/commodity/behaviour is the policy aimed at?","Which segment of the population is the policy targeted at?","Country - region/locality - setting level ( Local - Regional - National - International)","Start year of the policy. If this is not available, note the year of the oldest publication on this policy followed by an asterisk e.g. 2008*."," What are the timelines for the policy’s impact assessment/follow-up?","Information on whether the policy was implemented, whether it was voluntary or mandatory, what mechanism was used for passing the policy, whether it overlaps with any other policies and any information on the cost if implementation","Combination of follow-up actions and any sunset clause","Type of analysis used to derive the outcome information","List of health or intermediate outcomes reported for the policy","The quantitative results on health and intermediate impacts achieved by the policy (values)","What distributional effects are reported on for this policy?","What type of economic evaluation analysis was undertaken?","List or paste the quantitative results from economic evaluations.","Information on any co-benefits, other unintended perverse effects, and other non-health impacts of the policy ","Combination of  fields (Revenue, beneficiary of revenues, utilisation of revenues)","Information provided on the context around the policy, including opponents and proponents.","Has the policy been implemented nationally in England (or UK country if specified). Yes, No, NA(if not a national policy) and ? If unclear","Reference used to extract information about the policy","Hyperlink to PDF if freely available; URL if not.","DOI for publications if available"]
[150,"4 Housing","Children’s Health in Asthma: Research to Improve Status by Modifying Accommodation (CHARISMA) study","RCT","Government (Local Authority as part of a RCT)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy in the form of a tailored package of housing improvements designed to provide adequate ventilation and heating, and thus reduce mould spores: the local authority installed a new ventilation system in the roof space of each house. This comprises two insulated flexible pipes: one delivers fresh air from outside the house through a cleaning filter to first-floor bedrooms; the other removes stale air from the house, and warms the fresh air. This process stabilises humidity and temperature, as moist air is rapidly replaced by fresh air. The system has a heat-recovery efficiency of up to 70%, and running costs are about £15 a year. If necessary, contractors also improved or replaced central heating systems to bring them to the standard defined by the housing officer. Families did not pay for these improvements.  Health was a primary aim, in particular, the reduction of asthma.","Housing conditions","Children (asthmatics 5-14 years)","UK - North Wales -Wrexham - Local",2004,"2 years","Implementation costs: £151,152 for housing improvement to 88 households (ventilation only for 63 = £57, 507 and ventilation plus heating for 25 = £93,645). Local authority costs depend on the home improvement system required for each house. As this study takes a public-sector perspective, it has not included the running costs of ventilation systems, estimated at £15 a year, or costs to families of running central heating. The cost to Wrexham County Borough Council was £1,718 per child in the intervention group, or £12,300 per child shifted from ‘severe’ to ‘moderate’","First, a multicentre trial is recommended, following children for at least 2 years and measuring a wider range of benefits, including benefits to other members of the family. Second, NICE should commission research to measure utility in children","RCT and CE analysis","Parent-reported asthma module of PedsQL - a validated quality of life measure for children with asthma. The total score for asthma related quality of life on a 100 point scale. ","After 12months, the PedsQL showed a mean (adjusted) improvement of 8.65 in the intervention group and 1.58 in the control group. The resulting difference of 7.07 (95%CI = 2.79 to 11.36) between groups is equivalent to a standardised effect size of 0.42. Intervention therefore moved 17% of children in the intervention group from below the original median (‘severe asthma’) to above that median (‘moderate asthma’), while only 3% of controls moved from ‘severe’ to ‘moderate’. Thus, a net 14% of children (or 29% of children with ‘severe’ asthma) became ‘moderate’. ","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","The difference between groups in mean total cost (£1657) was divided by the difference between groups in mean effect (7.07PedsQLpoints), to yield an estimated ICER of £234 per unit change in the PedsQL asthma-specific quality-of-life score. The ICER and estimated probability that housing modifications are effective depends on local building costs. The authors estimate that in Wales, where the study took place, the intervention has an ICER of £234 (95% CI = £140 to £590); with the same effectiveness, this intervention in London would have an ICER of £294 (95%CI = £174 to £770), and in Northern Ireland, the ICER would be £166 (95%CI = £98 to £430)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Edwards RT, Neal RD, Linck P, Bruce N, Mullock L, Nelhans N, Pasterfield D, Russell D, Russell I, Woodfine L. Enhancing ventilation in homes of children with asthma: cost-effectiveness study alongside randomised controlled trial. Br J Gen Pract. 2011 Nov 1;61(592):e733-41.\n• From Systematic Review: Thomson, H et al. 2013. “Housing Improvements for Health and Associated Socio- Economic Outcomes ( Review ) Housing Improvements for Health and Associated Socio- Economic Outcomes.” The Cochrane database of systematic reviews (3), individual article: Woodfine, Louise et al. 2011. “Enhancing Ventilation in Homes of Children with Asthma: Pragmatic Randomised Controlled Trial.” British Journal of General Practice 61(592): 724–32.  \n","• https://bjgp.org/content/bjgp/61/592/e733.full.pdf\n• http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/856558/1/CD008657.pdf\n","• 10.3399/bjgp11X606645\n• 10.1002/14651858.CD008657.pub2"]
[151,"4 Housing","Warm Up New Zealand: Heat Smart","Programme","Government (administered by the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority (EECA))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy programme providing partial funding for the purchase and installation of eligible products by approved providers for pre-2000 housing. Depending on their existing insulation and heating, and the characteristics of the house, applications to the fund may be for funding for insulation and clean heat, insulation only, or clean heat only: Eligibility is broad, but the level of subsidy depends on economic status: 1)Homeowners who hold Community Services Cards ( economically disadvantaged) are eligible for insulation, subsidised at 60% of the total cost or more, and $1200 in clean heating subsidy (including tax); 2)Landlords with tenants who hold Community Services Cards are eligible for insulation, subsidised at 60% of the total cost or more, and $500 in clean heating (including tax); 3) all other eligible houses are eligible for insulation, subsidised at 33% of the total cost up to $1300 and $500 in clean heating (including tax). Health was a primary aim, since the programme was designed to improve productivity and health outcomes, reduce energy costs and stimulate the economy by generating jobs for New Zealanders involved in producing and installing insulation and clean heating.","Housing conditions","General population","New Zealand - National",2009,"2 years","• Implementation costs: $340 million dollar multi-year year programme ($45.2 million in 2012-2013)\n• Passed through legislation \n","Not reported ","Epidemiological study (retrospective cohort study)","• Hospitalisation rates \n• Mortality  rates among those who had been hospitalised \n• Total mortality rate\n• Total hospitalisation costs ","• Hospitalisation rates were higher in the treatment group than in the control group, both before and after treatment.\n• Among those in the mortality sub-cohort who had been hospitalised with respiratory conditions (ICD-10 chapter X), there was no significant difference in mortality rate after treatment between the treatment and control groups.\n• Lower mortality rate in the treatment compared to the control group, among those who had been hospitalised with circulatory conditions: prevented about 18 deaths (95%CI 0 to 45) among those aged 65 and over.\n• Estimated annual reduction of 0.852 deaths per 1000 households each containing 3.61 individuals, valued at $439.95 per year per treated household.\n• a saving of approximately $64.44 in total hospitalisation costs per year for a household that received some combination of ceiling or floor insulation.\n• We predict an on-going annual benefit of $563.18 (95% CI $123.23 - $889.07) for retrofitted insulation and only $4.64 for improved heating when combining the change in total hospitalisations and total pharmaceuticals with reductions in mortality and benefits imputed from previous studies. \n• (It is important to note that these benefits do not include any improvements in comfort, which are separate from health-related benefits, and so these calculated benefits should be treated as conservative.)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","$951 million in net benefits for the government .","Not reported","Yes?","• Grimes, Arthur et al. 2012. “Cost Benefit Analysis of the Warm Up New Zealand : Heat Smart Programme Ministry of Economic Development.” \n• Barnard, Lucy Telfar et al. 2011. “The Impact of Retrofitted Insulation and New Heaters on Health Services Utilisation and Costs , Pharmaceutical Costs and Mortality. Evaluation of Warm Up New Zealand : Heat Smart.”  \n• Healthy Housing He Kainga Oranga (University of Otago, Wellington). “Evaluation of Warm Up New Zealand: Heat Smart.” http://www.healthyhousing.org.nz/research/past-research/evaluation-of-warm-up-new-zealand-heat-smart/ and https://www.energywise.govt.nz/funding-and-support/funding-for-insulation/\n• Howden-Chapman, Philippa, et al. \"Tackling cold housing and fuel poverty in New Zealand: a review of policies, research, and health impacts.\" Energy Policy 49 (2012): 134-142.\n","• http://sustainablecities.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/NZIF_CBA_report2.pdf\n• http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/sectors-industries/energy/energy-efficiency-environment/documents-library/energy-efficiency-docs/nzif-health-report.pdf\n• http://www.healthyhousing.org.nz/research/past-research/evaluation-of-warm-up-new-zealand-heat-smart/ and https://www.energywise.govt.nz/funding-and-support/funding-for-insulation/\n• https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/39804781/Tackling_cold_housing_and_fuel_poverty_i20151108-10105-w4kgci.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1533058884&Signature=O%2BkmicCeh9CmV3wlQg2WZbv3y2M%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DTackling_cold_housing_and_fuel_poverty_i.pdf\n","• NA\n• NA\n• NA\n• 10.1016/j.enpol.2011.09.044"]
[152,"4 Housing","Housing Choice Voucher Program (section 8 vouchers) / USA_housing_voucher","Programme","Government (US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The housing choice voucher program is the federal government's major program for assisting very low-income families, the elderly, and the disabled to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private market. Participants locate their own housing. A housing subsidy is paid to the landlord directly by the PHA on behalf of the participating family. Family pays the difference. In some cases can be used to purchase a home. Health was a secondary aim as the main aim was to enable very low-income families, the elderly, and the disabled to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private market.","Access to accommodation","Socio-economic (low income population)","USA - National",1937,"5 years","Passed through legislation (Housing Act of 1937)","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","nutritional status","Among food-insecure households, children whose families were not receiving a housing subsidy were 2.11 times (95% confidence interval [CI]: 1.34-3.32) likelier to have a weight (standardized for age) more than 2 SDs below the median weight","In the late 1990s, 14.8% of voucher recipients lived in high-poverty neighbourhoods (poverty rate>30%) compared with 53.6% of public housing residents.\"","Not reported","Not reported","Less overcrowding was mentioned as a benefit.","Not reported","Not reported","?","• Meyers A, Cutts D, Frank DA, Levenson S, Skalicky A, Heeren T, Cook J, Berkowitz C, Black M, Casey P, Zaldivar N. Subsidized housing and children's nutritional status: data from a multisite surveillance study. Archives of pediatrics & adolescent medicine. 2005 Jun 1;159(6):551-6.\n• Lindberg RA, Shenassa ED, Acevedo-Garcia D, Popkin SJ, Villaveces A, Morley RL. Housing interventions at the neighbourhood level and health: a review of the evidence. Journal of Public Health Management and Practice. 2010 Sep 1;16(5):S44-52.\n","• https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamapediatrics/fullarticle/486034\n• https://journals.lww.com/jphmp/Fulltext/2010/09001/Housing_Interventions_at_the_neighbourhood_Level.8.aspx\n","• 10.1001/archpedi.159.6.551\n• 10.1097/PHH.0b013e3181dfbb72"]
[153,"4 Housing","Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing Demonstration project (MTO)","Programme","Government (US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The MTO study randomized low-income families to receive a housing voucher to subsidize a private rental apartment and move out of public housing, thereby improving their neighbourhood and housing environment compared to controls. MTO treatment arms: the “regular Section 8” treatment group was offered Section 8 housing vouchers to subsidize a private market rental apartment in any neighbourhood; the “low-poverty-neighbourhood” treatment group was offered Section 8 vouchers redeemable only in low-poverty neighbourhoods (<10% of Census Tract in poverty) along with housing counselling services to aid relocation; the control group was offered no further assistance but could remain in public housing, Health was a secondary aim, as the main outcome was access to better housing.","Housing conditions","Socio-economic (low income population)","USA - 5 cities (Boston, Baltimore, Chicago, LA, New York) - Local",1994,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 7 years","• Implementation costs: $70 million .\n• The MTO demonstration was authorized by the U.S. Congress in section 152 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992\n","Not reported ","RCT","1. Risk behaviour index (drugs/sexual health behaviours)\n2. Mental health\n3. Housing standards and adult depression\n4. Adolescent depression\n5. Obesity\n6. Morbid obesity\n7. Diabetes\n8. Asthma\n9. Subjective well-being\n\n","1. MTO was associated with non significant risk behaviour index for girls, but harmful RBI for boys.\n2. MTO was associated with better mental health for girls, engagement in fewer risk behaviours ( when matched with a control sample) \n3. MTO was associated with improved housing and lowered adult depression, \n4. MTO in boys  was associated with increased rates of major depression (7.1% vs 3.5%; odds ratio (OR), 2.2 [95% CI, 1.2-3.9]), PTSD (6.2% vs 1.9%; OR, 3.4 [95% CI, 1.6-7.4]), and conduct disorder (6.4% vs 2.1%; OR, 3.1 [95% CI, 1.7-5.8]). Boys in the traditional voucher group had increased rates of PTSD compared with the control group (4.9% vs 1.9%, OR, 2.7 [95% CI, 1.2-5.8]). However, compared with the control group, girls in the traditional voucher group had a decreased rate of conduct disorder (0.3% vs 2.9%; OR, 0.1 [95% CI, 0.0-0.4]).\n5. MTO was associated with lower prevalence of obesity: of 4.61 percentage points (95% confidence interval [CI], −8.54 to −0.69)\n6. MTO was associated with lower prevalence of morbid obesity ) 3.38 percentage points difference (95% CI, −6.39 to −0.36)\n7. MTO was associated with lowered odds of having aa glycated haemoglobin level of 6.5%  or more (.31 percentage points difference (95% CI, −7.82 to −0.80)\n8. MTO had a harmful main effect vs. controls for self-reported asthma diagnosis (b = 0.24, p = 0.06), past-year asthma attack (b = 0.44, p = 0.02), and past-year wheezing (b = 0.17, p = 0.17).\n9. A 1–standard deviation decline in neighbourhood poverty (13 percentage points) increases subjective well-being by an amount equal to the gap in subjective well-being between people whose annual incomes differ by $13,000—a large amount given that the average control group income is $20,000. Subjective well-being is more strongly affected by changes in neighbourhood economic disadvantage than racial segregation, which is important because racial segregation has been declining since 1970, but income segregation has been increasing.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Socio-economic, education, income impacts of moving to a lower-poverty neighbourhood significantly improves college attendance rates and earnings for children who were young (below age 13) when their families moved. These children also live in better neighbourhoods themselves as adults and are less likely to become single parents. The treatment effects are substantial: children whose families take up an experimental voucher to move to a lower-poverty area when they are less than 13 years old have an annual income that is $3,477 (31%) higher on average relative to a mean of $11,270 in the control group in their mid-twenties. In contrast, the same moves have, if anything, negative long-term impacts on children who are more than 13 years old when their families move, perhaps because of the disruption effects of moving to a very different environment.   ","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Sanbonmatsu L, Katz LF, Ludwig J, Gennetian LA, Duncan GJ, Kessler RC, Adam EK, McDade T, Lindau ST. Moving to opportunity for fair housing demonstration program: Final impacts evaluation.\n• Schmidt NM, Lincoln AK, Nguyen QC, Acevedo-Garcia D, Osypuk TL. Examining mediators of housing mobility on adolescent asthma: results from a housing voucher experiment. Social Science & Medicine. 2014 Apr 1;107:136-44.\n• Gennetian LA, Sanbonmatsu L, Ludwig J. An overview of moving to opportunity: A random assignment housing mobility study in five US cities. neighbourhood and life chances: How place matters in modern America. 2011 Feb 17:163.\n• Chetty R, Hendren N, Katz LF. The effects of exposure to better neighbourhoods on children: New evidence from the Moving to Opportunity experiment. American Economic Review. 2016 Apr;106(4):855-902.\n• Leventhal, Tama, and Véronique Dupéré. \"Moving to Opportunity: Does long-term exposure to ‘low-poverty’neighbourhoods make a difference for adolescents?.\" Social science & medicine 73.5 (2011): 737-743.\n• Glymour MM, Nguyen Q, Matsouaka R, Tchetgen EJ, Schmidt NM, Osypuk TL. Does mother know best? Treatment adherence as a function of anticipated treatment benefit. Epidemiology (Cambridge, Mass.). 2016 Mar;27(2):265.\n• Lindberg RA, Shenassa ED, Acevedo-Garcia D, Popkin SJ, Villaveces A, Morley RL. Housing interventions at the neighbourhood level and health: a review of the evidence. Journal of Public Health Management and Practice. 2010 Sep 1;16(5):S44-52.\n• Schmidt NM, Glymour MM, Osypuk TL. Adolescence is a sensitive period for housing mobility to influence risky behaviours: an experimental design. Journal of Adolescent Health. 2017 Apr 1;60(4):431-7.\n• Ludwig J, Sanbonmatsu L, Gennetian L, Adam E, Duncan GJ, Katz LF, Kessler RC, Kling JR, Lindau ST, Whitaker RC, McDade TW. neighbourhoods, obesity, and diabetes—a randomized social experiment. New England journal of medicine. 2011 Oct 20;365(16):1509-19.\n• Ludwig J, Duncan GJ, Gennetian LA, Katz LF, Kessler RC, Kling JR, Sanbonmatsu L. neighbourhood effects on the long-term well-being of low-income adults. Science. 2012 Sep 21;337(6101):1505-10.\n• Kessler RC, Duncan GJ, Gennetian LA, Katz LF, Kling JR, Sampson NA, Sanbonmatsu L, Zaslavsky AM, Ludwig J. Associations of housing mobility interventions for children in high-poverty neighbourhoods with subsequent mental disorders during adolescence. Jama. 2014 Mar 5;311(9):937-47.\n","• https://www.scholars.northwestern.edu/en/publications/moving-to-opportunity-for-fair-housing-demonstration-program-fina\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4070421/pdf/nihms569065.pdf\n• https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=HFAi0f8gKMQC&oi=fnd&pg=PA163&dq=related:Z5BTqbd-fxUJ:scholar.google.com/&ots=V2Okc1jH9J&sig=WRkFE9y3iVP_G-Q8I7Gu6Amc58M&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false\n• https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/30367426/46646672.pdf?sequence=1\n• http://www.medsp.umontreal.ca/IRSPUM_DB/pdf/26198.pdf\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5124504/pdf/nihms828680.pdf\n• https://journals.lww.com/jphmp/Fulltext/2010/09001/Housing_Interventions_at_the_neighbourhood_Level.8.aspx\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5366094/\n• https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/Nejmsa1103216\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3491569/pdf/nihms403688.pdf\n• https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/1835504\n.\n","• NA\n• 10.1016/j.socscimed.2014.02.020\n• NA\n• 10.1257/aer.20150572\n• 10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.06.042\n• 10.1097/EDE.0000000000000431\n• 10.1097/PHH.0b013e3181dfbb72\n• 10.1016/j.jadohealth.2016.10.022\n• 10.1056/NEJMsa1103216\n• 10.1126/science.1224648\n• 10.1001/jama.2014.607"]
[154,"4 Housing","USA_GA_housing_voucher","Programme","Government (Atlanta Housing Authority - AHA)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Residents as part of the Atlanta Housing Authority (AHA) moved to voucher-subsidized rental units in the private market, and could choose any unit provided that it met AHA standards (e.g., no overcrowding, <40 % of units in multifamily communities be supported by Sections 8 or 9). Health was a secondary aim (housing considered obsolete/distressed and unsuitable for housing purposes but indirect effects of the programme were assessed in particular the reduction of depression & perceived community violence . ","Housing conditions","Socio-economic groups (in social housing, African-American adults)","USA - Georgia - Atlanta - Local","2008-2010","3 years","Passed through legislation (Amended United States Housing Act of 1937)","No end date for voucher subsidy stated, but everyone moved out of blocks for demolition.","Empirical assessment","• depression/ mental health\n• Units of alcohol consumed \n• illicit drugs consumed\n","• Depression CES-D scores mean (SD) from 23.8 (9.3) at baseline to 14.7 (11.0) at wave 4 follow-up (CES-D's cutpoint for mild depression =16; cutpoint for major depression =27).  Multivariate analyses suggest that pre-/post relocation improvements in economic conditions predict reductions in depressive symptoms, and that this relationship is mediated by reduced perceived community violence.\n• Binge drinking >=2x in last 30 days from 38% (63/172) to 19% (29/156).\n• Use of illicit drugs weekly or more in last 6 months from 30% (50/172) to 19% (29/156). \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The policy reduced ethnic segregation - not directly described in paper. Decreased ethnic segregation, between waves 1 and 2 participants moved to voucher-subsidized rental units in substantially less poor and socially disordered census tracts. Increased rate of homelessness - at baseline 0/172 (0%) were homeless, compared to 10/156 (6%) at wave 4 follow-up.","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Cooper HL, Hunter-Jones J, Kelley ME, Karnes C, Haley DF, Ross Z, Rothenberg R, Bonney LE. The aftermath of public housing relocations: relationships between changes in local socioeconomic conditions and depressive symptoms in a cohort of adult relocaters. Journal of urban health. 2014 Apr 1;91(2):223-41.","Link","• 10.1007/s11524-013-9844-5"]
[155,"4 Housing","Winter fuel Payment (WFP)_UK","Programme","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The Winter Fuel Program is a labelled but unconditional cash transfer subsidy to households containing an older person (male or female) above the female state pension age 2016 to reduce the cost of keeping the dwelling warn. This means that  health was a secondary aim .","Housing conditions","General population (>65yrs - female state pension age)","UK - National","2000-2001","1 year","Passed through legislation","Age of female pension changes, 2010-60 rose to 65yrs in 2018 and expected to be 67 by 2028","Epidemiological study","1. self-reports of chest infection in the last 3 weeks \n2. hypertension \n3. inflammation/ acute phase: serum values of C-reactive protein (CRP) in excess of 10.\n4. inflammation/ acute phase: Serum values of Fibrinogen equal or in excess of 4.\n","1. Significant reduction in reports of chest infection: beta  -.024 [-.049; .001]\n2. No significant reduction in hypertension: beta -.018 [-.049; .012]\n3. No significant impact on C-reactive protein: beta -.012 [-.044; .020]\n4. Significant impact in reducing fibrinogen: beta -.055 [-.077; -.033]\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes","Crossley TF, Zilio F. The health benefits of a targeted cash transfer: The UK Winter Fuel Payment. Health economics. 2017 Aug 15.","Link","• 10.1002/hec.3666"]
[156,"4 Housing","Housing Choice Voucher / Public housing / multifamily housing (moving to opportunity)","Programme","Government (US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Housing Choice Vouchers  to allow very low-income families, the elderly, and the disabled to afford decent, safe, and sanitary housing in the private market.  In the USA, public housing rent is determined based on family composition and income . The US department of Housing and URvan Development administers Federal aid to local housing agencies that manage the housing for low-income residents at rents they can afford. Multifamily Housing supports the development, rehabilitation and maintenance of multiple-unit housing through mortgage insurance programs and preservation of affordable housing through Project-Based Rental Assistance and other programs. This policy of subsidising housing  has indirect effects  on health.","Access to accommodation","Socio-economic (low income population)","USA - National",1937,"NA","Passed through legislation (Housing Act of 1937)","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","•  reported health status\n• psychological distress\n","• Current residents had lower odds of fair or poor health than did future public housing residents (1.05 × 0.73 = 0.77; 95% CI = 0.58, 0.99). Current multifamily housing residents also had lower odds of fair or poor health than did future residents (OR = 0.77; 95% CI = 0.60, 0.98).\n• Current residents had lower odds of serious psychological distress than did future public housing residents (OR = 0.59; 95% CI = 0.40, 0.88). We did not find a difference in psychological distress between current and future recipients of housing choice vouchers or residents of multifamily housing\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Results were unable to demonstrate consistent health benefits for recipients of housing choice vouchers. This may partially reflect heterogeneity in the effect of vouchers across subgroups which may make it difficult to identify effects.\"","Not reported","Not reported","?","Fenelon A, Mayne P, Simon AE, Rossen LM, Helms V, Lloyd P, et al. Housing assistance programs and adult health in the United States. American journal of public health. 2017;107(4):571-8.","Link","• 10.2105/AJPH.2016.303649"]
[157,"4 Housing","USA_GA_housing_accom","Programme","Government (Georgia Campaign for Adolescent Power and Potential & Georgia Department of Human Resources)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Subsidy for free accommodation in specific housing.  Second Chance Home (SCH) Network was set up to provide homes operated by community-based organisations - each home takes 5-7  parenting girls (<21yo) and their children at a time, as well as some pregnant girls (who stay after delivery). Girls are referred by family organisations as well as courts, schools, shelters, relatives. Average length of stay 2001-2012 was 8.9 months. Intensive case management is provided to ensure that residents are receiving needed supports and resources. Core services also include housing, educational support, relationship support, parenting education, and transportation to health services. The aim of this policy was to help young women become nurturing and self-sufficient parents, to avoid repeat teenage pregnancies, and to promote healthy development of their children).","Access to accommodation","Other (teenage mothers)","USA - Georgia - Local",2001,"2 years","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (as well as housing residents receive \"educational support, relationship support, parenting education, and transportation to health services.\")","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","Proportion with health care and with immunisations","Children having a regular source of health care rose from 91% at intake to 97% at discharge, and children with age appropriate immunisations went from 76% to 96% at discharge.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Improved education and employment of mothers:~50% of past residents had graduated from high school/GED programme compared to a quoted 38% of mothers =<18yo generally. 5% employed at intake, 26% at discharge and 50% 2years post-discharge (57% of 18yos). Increased empathy of mothers Not necessarily associated - didn't say %s of those with custody of their children outside of the SCH network, but \"There was a decline in the percentage of children in the custody of their teenage mothers from intake to discharge to first follow-up, from 76 percent to 56 percent.\" Slightly increased after that to ~66% at 2 year follow up.","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Hudgins R, Erickson S, Walker D. Everyone deserves a second chance: A decade of supports for teenage mothers. Health & social work. 2014 May 1;39(2):101-8.","Link","• 10.1093/hsw/hlu014"]
[158,"4 Housing","Health housing Programme/ NZ_HHP_housing","Policy","Government (Housing New Zealand Corporation (HNZC - the provider of government-funded housing) and Counties Manukau, Auckland, Hutt Valley and Northland District Health Boards)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary, subsidised housing. The Healthy Housing Programme aims to improve access to healthcare, reduce housing related health issues, provide a link with social/welfare care if needed. A key part of the Healthy Housing Programme is the joint assessment undertaken by an area co-coordinator (housing) and a public health nurse (health). Interventions included educating families about health risks, referrals to local health providers, making the house dryer and warmer by installing insulation, modifying houses to address health and disability needs, transferring families to other houses to address overcrowding or, in some instances, increasing the number of bedrooms in the house. Improve housing conditions in response to research which found that children had high rates of infectious diseases when living in crowded housing. Health was a primary aim (to improve the housing conditions of families living in Housing New Zealand homes).","Housing conditions","Socio-economic (low income population)","New Zealand -South Auckland - Local",2000,"9 years","• Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (alongside family education about health risks)\n• Joint initiative between Housing NZ Corporation and County health boards\n","Not reported ","Empirical assessment (The Cox proportional hazard model was used with the Andersen-Gill counting method to estimate crude and adjusted HRs associated with the exposure status in all three categories)","Other (reduction in number of acute hospitalisations)","For 0-4 year olds, acute hospitalisations reduced by 11% post-intervention (HR 0.89, 95% CI 0.79 to 0.99), while admissions among 5-34 year olds reduced by 23% (HR 0.77, 95% CI 0.70 to 0.85). Hospitalisations among adults aged 35 years and over did not change significantly after the intervention (HR 1.04, 95% CI 0.95 to 1.15).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Jackson G, Thornley S, Woolston J, Papa D, Bernacchi A, Moore T. Reduced acute hospitalisation with the healthy housing programme. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health. 2011 Jul 1;65(7):588-93.","Link","• 10.1136/jech.2009.107441"]
[159,"4 Housing","CAN_housing_subsidy_foodinsecurity","Programme","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary, subsidized market rental accommodations for low-income families. Health was a secondary aim, but a primary  aim of the study as it assessed the association between housing status and food insecurity.","Access to accommodation","Socio-economic (low income population)","Canada - Toronto - Local ",2005,"NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","Other (nutritional status)","\"Over the past 12 months, 61.7% of families in market housing were food-insecure compared to 68.9% of those in subsidized housing. After adjusting for household sociodemographic characteristics, there was no association between whether families received housing subsidies and their food security status (OR=0.73, 95% CI=0.50–1.08). However, the odds of food insecurity were lower among subsidized families compared to only those market households on a waiting list for subsidized housing (OR=0.51, 95% CI=0.30–0.86).\"","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kirkpatrick SI, Tarasuk V. Housing circumstances are associated with household food access among low-income urban families. Journal of urban health. 2011 Apr 1;88(2):284-96.","Link","• 1007/s11524-010-9535-4"]
[160,"4 Housing","SPA_housing_subsidy","Programme","Non-governmental (Caritas Diocesana de Barcelona)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Subsidy for housing improvement. Population included those assisted by the Caritas Housing Mediation Service (HMS), which helps individuals at risk of being evicted from their owned or rented dwelling, or by the Direct Assistance Service (DAS), focused on individuals facing economic difficulties.  Participants assisted by social worker from Caritas and some received economic / social assistance from Caritas.  The aim of the study reports was to compare changes in health between those having improved or not improved their situation according to the different dimensions of the conceptual framework: socioeconomic, physical housing, or neighbourhood conditions, regardless of this change being attributable to Caritas, the public administration, or other causes. ","Housing conditions","Socio-economic (low income population)","Spain - Barcelona - Local",2012,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","• Reduced stress\n• Mental health\n","• In the last year worried about not having sufficient money for food - DAS from 75.5% to 63.3%, and HMS from 78.3% to 70.7%\n• No change in average mental health score (GHQ). Fair or poor self-reported health unchanged/ worse: DAS 46.4% both time points, and HMS 53.5% to 57.6%.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Novoa AM, Amat J, Malmusi D, Díaz F, Darnell M, Trilla C, Bosch J, Borrell C. Changes in health following housing improvement in a vulnerable population in spain: a follow-up study. International Journal of Health Services. 2017 Jan;47(1):83-107.","Link","• 10.1177/0020731416676228"]
[161,"4 Housing","USA_housing_subsidy_homeless","Programme","Government (US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy: RCT to assess the impact of receiving intensive social care management (ICM) and social housing vouchers. In addition ICM to participants in the Housing and Urban Development–Veterans Affairs Supported Housing  (HUD-VASH) condition were given priority access to a Section 8 housing voucher and assistance from case managers to obtain a housing voucher and locate an apartment. A total of 460 veterans at four sites were randomly assigned to HUD-VASH (N=182), ICM only (N=90), or treatment as usual (N=188). Trial of HUD-VASH started in 1992 (Participants for this study recruited1992-1995) but the programme appears to still be running https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/hcv/vash) Direct effects (provide support to access vouchers for housing + mental health care/substance use counselling) Health was a secondary aim (the main aim of this programme evaluated was to help find permanent housing for veterans and their families)","Access to accommodation","Other (vulnerable groups , homeless veterans with psychiatric and substance use disorders)","USA - 4 sites but not specified - Local ",1992,"3 years","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (intensive case management to veterans) ","Not reported","Empirical assessment","Units of alcohol consumed / illicit drugs consumed","Treatment as usual: days intoxicated M=2.2 days drug use M=4.9 / ICM days intoxicated M=2.5 days drug use M=5.2 / HUD-VASH days intoxicated M=2.0 days drug use M=4.5 (M is estimated marginal means averaged across 2yr follow up, controlled for significant  covariates)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Increase in number of social contacts, including in number of days worked - only slight. ","Not reported","Not reported","NA","O'Connell MJ, Kasprow WJ, Rosenheck RA. Differential impact of supported housing on selected subgroups of homeless veterans with substance abuse histories. Psychiatric Services. 2012 Dec;63(12):1195-205.","Link","• 10.1176/appi.ps.201000229"]
[162,"4 Housing","UK_Housing Benefit - Local Housing Allowance","Policy","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Those who fulfil criteria are able to apply for housing benefits as a private renter, the money is transferred to their account or they are paid by cheque . The study objective was to examine the association between housing benefits reduction and mental health/depression. Socio-economic groups (focused on persons aged 16–69 years who were then renting housing in the private sector (n=179,037) - comparing those in receipt of housing benefits and those not)  While health was not a primary aim of the overall policy, this is housing benefits does provide some links to health and the impact on mental health was an aim of study conducted.","Access to accommodation","Socio-economic (low income population)","UK - National",2010,"2 years","• Implementation costs: approx £24 billion per year, and LHA cut was £1.6 billion per year  \n• Passed through legislation (Welfare Reform Act 2010)\n","Not reported ","Epidemiological study (difference-in-difference models)","Increase in depression/mental health issues","We consistently found that the April 2011 reforms to the HB increased the risk of depressive symptoms among persons claiming the HB by approximately 1.8 percentage points above the risk in private renters not claiming the benefit. This  equates to roughly 10% increase in those with depression among private renter HB recipients. Worst in areas hardest hit (inner London & Tyne and Wear)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Policy reduced spending by Government on HB","Not reported","Yes?","Reeves A, Clair A, McKee M, Stuckler D. Reductions in the United Kingdom's government housing benefit and symptoms of depression in low-income households. American journal of epidemiology. 2016 Sep 8;184(6):421-9.","Link","• 10.1093/aje/kww055"]
[163,"4 Housing","Scottish Government Central Heating Programme","Policy","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary subsidy programme administered by the EAGA Partnership for households in the private sector who are aged 60 or more and lack central heating, or who have a heating system which is broken and beyond repair and they installed the central heating package in 5,500 homes across Scotland at a cost of 15.4 million. Beneficiaries receive an efficient and modern central heating system (from a choice of gas, electric, oil or solid fuel); insulation (where possible - cavity wall fill, lagging of boiler and pipes, loft insulation, draft exclusion measures);if appropriate - safety alarms (carbon monoxide detector, a smoke alarm and a cold alarm); advice on energy use and the option of receiving a benefit entitlement check.  Social sector landlords (local authorities and housing associations) deliver the part of the Programme for their tenants whose home lacks any central heating system, they were paid a cash grant by the Scottish Executive and by Communities Scotland (formerly Scottish Homes) respectively for each house in which the central heating package was to be installed. 15 of the 32 local authorities and 37 housing associations in Scotland participated in the programme and together, local authorities and housing associations were responsible for more than half of the installations completed in 2002/2003. In line with one of the key priorities of the programme, consideration was also given to maximising the number of installations to members of priority household groups. Subsidy Health was a primary aim (improving the health of the elderly, reducing the number of winter deaths, lowering the incidence of cold-related illness and reducing pressure on the NHS)","Housing conditions","General population","UK - Scotland - Regional",2002,"1 year","Not reported","Programme replaced from 6th April 2009 by the Energy Assistance Package","Epidemiological study","1. Heart disease\n2. Blood pressure\n3. Nasal allergy\n4. SF-36 Physical Functioning scale\n5. SF-36 General Health scale\n6. Other measures of respiratory, circulatory  and immunity problems, including  cold/flu symptoms/asthma/bronchitis/eczema/circulation problems/shortness of breath/tightness of chest/wheezing/coughing phlegm and GP and hospital attendance frequency.\n","1. heating recipients were significantly less likely to report receiving a first diagnosis of heart disease (OR 0.69; 95% CI 0.52 to 0.91) \n2. high blood pressure (OR 0.77; 95% CI 0.61 to 0.97)\n3. more likely to receive a first diagnosis of nasal allergy (OR 1.52; 95% CI 1.05 to 2.20)\n4. significantly higher scores on the SF-36 Physical Functioning scale (estimated difference 2.51 units; 95% CI 0.67 to 4.37 units) \n5. significantly higher scores on the SF-36 General Health scale (estimated difference 2.57 units; 95% CI 0.90 to 4.34 units). \n6. No significant effect of the programme was observed for the remaining 25 measures investigated.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Walker JJ, Mitchell RJ, Petticrew M, Platt SD. The effects on health of a publicly-funded domestic heating programme: a prospective controlled study. Journal of Epidemiology & Community Health. 2008 Sep 18:jech-2008.","Link","• 10.1136/jech.2008.074096"]
[164,"4 Housing","NZ_housing_offer_elderly","Programme","Government (Ministry of health -local health district board)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The target population for the HSAM intervention was community-dwelling older people aged 65+ years in the year 2011 who were resident in the CMDHB Health District. The program was assumed to run like a screening program where participants are “screened” for their agreement to participate (have their home modified). That is each person aged 65+ is sent a letter by DHB staff and there is a follow-up phone call (to determine participation and if so to arrange a time for the HSAM).This programme provided free/subsidised home safety assessments and make structural adjustments to the house to reduce falls. Health was a primary aim (to reduce falls in older people).","Housing conditions","Elderly","New Zealand -South Auckland - Local","110 (cohort lifetime)","Multiple follow-ups: maximum 20 years","Implementation costs: one-off intervention cost for running the program and assessing and modifying all the dwellings was estimated at $9.57 million.","Not reported ","Modelling (Markov macro-simulation model with annual cycles)","Gains in quality-adjusted life years ","2800 QALYs gained in base case scenario (modelled to end of lifetime, discount rate 3%). 1380 QALYs gained over 10 year horizon. 2360 QALYs gained over 20 year horizon.","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","The incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) was $5480 (95%UI: cost saving to $15,300).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Wilson N, Kvizhinadze G, Pega F, Nair N, Blakely T. Home modification to reduce falls at a health district level: Modeling health gain, health inequalities and health costs. PloS one. 2017 Sep 14;12(9):e0184538.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0184538"]

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["ID number","Policy area","Policy name","Evidence type","Policy owner","Mechanism type","Mechanism details ","Target risk factor/behaviour/commodity","Target population / demographics","Setting (Geographical)","Year of implementation","Timeline(s) for the policy's impact assessment","Policy implementation (policy owner, voluntary vs mandatory policy, implementation mechanism (if implemented), overlap with other policies and cost of implementation)","Follow-up actions for policy","Type of analysis","Policy outcomes (health or intermediate impact)","Quantitative outcomes (health or intermediate)","Distributional effects","Type of economic evaluation analyses ","Quantitative economic evaluation results","Other impacts (co-benefits, unintended/perverse effects) ","Revenue information (amount, beneficiary and utilisation/earmarking)","Policy context","National policy presence","Reference to original sources","Reference link","Digital Object Identifier"]
["ID number","Policy area the policy relates to","Name given to policy, if no name is established, name in the following format: [Country or country region]_[commodity or policy area]_[policy type]","Note if a policy, an academic study (eg a modelling study, RCT or smaller scale study) or a small scale programme","Name of the organisation responsible for designing and/or implementing the policy","What is (are) the mechanism(s) of the policy?","Add detail about the specifics of the policy mechanism","Which risk factor/product/commodity/behaviour is the policy aimed at?","Which segment of the population is the policy targeted at?","Country - region/locality - setting level ( Local - Regional - National - International)","Start year of the policy. If this is not available, note the year of the oldest publication on this policy followed by an asterisk e.g. 2008*."," What are the timelines for the policy’s impact assessment/follow-up?","Information on whether the policy was implemented, whether it was voluntary or mandatory, what mechanism was used for passing the policy, whether it overlaps with any other policies and any information on the cost if implementation","Combination of follow-up actions and any sunset clause","Type of analysis used to derive the outcome information","List of health or intermediate outcomes reported for the policy","The quantitative results on health and intermediate impacts achieved by the policy (values)","What distributional effects are reported on for this policy?","What type of economic evaluation analysis was undertaken?","List or paste the quantitative results from economic evaluations.","Information on any co-benefits, other unintended perverse effects, and other non-health impacts of the policy ","Combination of  fields (Revenue, beneficiary of revenues, utilisation of revenues)","Information provided on the context around the policy, including opponents and proponents.","Has the policy been implemented nationally in England (or UK country if specified). Yes, No, NA(if not a national policy) and ? If unclear","Reference used to extract information about the policy","Hyperlink to PDF if freely available; URL if not.","DOI for publications if available"]
[165,"5 Gambling","AUS_gamblingbehaviour_maximumbetrestrictions","RCT","NA","Other (Input restrictions)","RCT run in several New South Wales (Australia) hotels and casinos, with participants complementing tests to identify problem vs non-problem gamblers. Examining impact of combinations of different bet reduction interventions by modifying on electronic gaming machines  to achieve: \n• Reduction in maximum bets by 90% per wager (AUS$10 to AUS$1); \n• Reduction in reel spin speed for each wager cycle from 3.5 seconds to 5 seconds with 1 second break between plays; \n• Reconfiguration of note acceptors to allow only AUS$5, AUS$10 and AUS$20 notes, but not AUS$50 and AUS$100. \nModified and unmodified machines were set to provide the usual expected player return rate of 87.5% stipulated by legislative requirements for standard machines in New South Wales. Participants monitored by researchers for 7 days , between the hours of 9am and 1am.\n","Gambling frequency and gambling expenditure","General population","Australia - Sydney metropolitan area - Local","2000*","1 week","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","• Time spent on betting machine\n• Number of bets placed\n• Losses sustained\n• Cigarette consumption\n• Alcohol consumption\n","Only reducing the maximum bet size (from AUS$10 to AUS$1) was significantly associated with gambling behaviours and health behaviours: \n• Time spent on betting machine  reduced by 4.6 minutes\n• Number of bets placed reduced (11.3 fewer bets)\n• Losses sustained reduced ($5.19 lower net losses – that is gains of $5.19 on average))\n• Cigarette consumption reduced (0.11 fewer cigarettes smoked)\n• Alcohol consumption reduced  (0.22 fewer drinks consumed)\nNo association between reduction of the reel spin speed and modification of note acceptors with any of the outcomes above was identified. No impact of any gambling reduction strategy on credits per line, lines per wagers, use of bill acceptors of over AUS$20 and visits to ATM machines.\n","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported","Note of potential bias: one report was prepared for  The Gaming Industry Operators Group by the authors based at University of Sydney Gambling Research Unit","NA","• Sharpe L, Walker M, Coughlan MJ, Enersen K, Blaszczynski A. Structural changes to electronic gaming machines as effective harm minimization strategies for non-problem and problem gamblers. Journal of Gambling Studies. 2005 Dec 1;21(4):503-20.\n• Blaszczynski A, Walker M, Sharpe L. The assessment of the impact of the reconfiguration on electronic gaming machines as harm minimisation strategies for problem gambling. Sydney: University of Sydney Gambling Research Unit; 2001 Nov.\n","• https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10899-005-5560-8\n• https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3181/9051ef2d00ac26d61d8a1549faa1e2ea45a6.pdf\n","• 10.1007/s10899-005-5560-8\n• NA"]
[166,"5 Gambling","NO_gamblingbehaviour_noteslotprohibition","Observational study","Government","Other (Input restrictions)","Mandatory From July 1st 2006, bank note acceptors on all slot-machines in Norway were removed. The highest stake was reduced from notes equivalent of EUR 25 to coins equivalent to EUR 2.50 ","Gambling frequency and gambling expenditure","Adolescents","Norway - National",2006,"1 year","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Epidemiological analysis","• Gambling expenditure\n• Gambling frequency\n• Probability of gambling\n• Prevalence of problem gambling\n","• Gambling expenditure reduced (average amount spent EUR3.10/week prior to intervention to EUR2.40/week post intervention)\n• Gambling frequency reduced (15 times a year prior to intervention to 12 times a year post intervention)\n• Probability of gambling reduced (Odds of gambling weekly reduced by 26%, odds of having gambled in the last week reduced by 50% and odds of having gambled more than EUR63 reduced by 27%)\n• Prevalence of problem gambling reduced (17–29% decrease in the prevalence of problem gambling after the intervention)\n","Not reported","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported","No other interventions in the gambling market occurred concurrent with the prohibition of note acceptors during the data collection period. However, it appears that there has been a change in the norm climate in the Norwegian society. This has been expressed in several ways; firstly by an increased focus and concern by clinicians, relatives to gamblers and pathological gamblers and secondly actions taken by politicians to curb the negative consequences of slot machine gambling. It seems likely that norm climate and attitudes towards slot machine gambling has turned more negative in part due to media focus on gambling problems. If so, it is possible slot machine gambling has become less socially acceptable during this period which again may have reinforced the intervention effect.","No?","Hansen M, Rossow I. Limited cash flow on slot machines: Effects of prohibition of note acceptors on adolescent gambling behaviour. International Journal of Mental Health and Addiction. 2010 Jan 1;8(1):70-81.","Link","• 10.1007/s11469-009-9196-2"]
[167,"5 Gambling","US_healthimpacts_revenueredistribution","Observational study","Government","Other (Redistribution of gaming revenue)","To assess the possible impact of redistribution of gambling revenue to fund public health services and improve community health status by comparing US counties with casino activity to comparator counties with no casinos.","Revenue for availability of public health services","General population","USA - Mississippi/Missouri - Tunica County, Pemiscot County - Regional",1993,"11 years","Not reported","Not reported ","Ecological approach comparing casino vs non-casino counties using freely available health and social data to identify outcomes.","• First-trimester prenatal care\n• Infant mortality rate\n• Other health outcomes (% births to teens, motor vehicle death rate, low birthweight rate, years of potential life lost under age 65, overall mortality rate)","• Gaming revenue positively associated with first-trimester prenatal care\n• Gaming revenue positively associated with infant mortality rate\n• Gaming revenue not significantly associated with any of the other health outcomes (% births to teens, motor vehicle death rate, low birthweight rate, years of potential life lost under age 65, overall mortality rate)\n","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported ","Not reported ","Gaming industry revenue from Mississippi casinos totalled $2.8 billion in fiscal year 2004, an 89.8 % increase over 1994.Tunica County casinos generated more than $1.1 billion of that total. Total gaming-related revenues earned for the state were $332.2 million in fiscal year 2004. Tunica County casinos earned $45.5 million of that revenue for the county. This is up considerably for Tunica County from the 1994 level of less than $5.7 million. These revenues have been used primarily for infrastructure repairs and improvements, public safety, housing, education, and transportation. In Pemiscot County in 2006  gaming revenues to the City of Caruthersville from Casino Aztar totalled $1.3 million in 2004, up from just over $.5 million in 1995, and per capita income was $23,230, up 56 %, while the total employment number was down 1 % since 1995. In Mississippi, a county without a casino, per capita income in 2004was$21,754, up 48 % since 1995, while total employment number increased 10 % since 1995. Gross gaming receipts from all Missouri casinos in 2004 were $1.4 billion with $22 million coming from Casino Aztar. Total state gaming revenue earned on those receipts in the same period was $387 million. The impact of Caruthersville’s new resources from gaming revenues is most evident in city infrastructure improvements. Uses of gaming revenues included public safety, water and drainage, street improvements, and other important infrastructure developments.","Not reported","NA","Honoré PA, Simoes EJ, Moonesinghe R, Wang X, Brown L. Evaluating the ecological association of casino industry economic development on community health status: A natural experiment in the Mississippi delta region. Journal of Public Health Management and Practice. 2007 Mar 1;13(2):214-22.","Link","• NA"]
[168,"5 Gambling","AUS_harmreduction_various","Observational study","NA","Other (Input restrictions)","Mandatory policy which applies to all EGM license holders:  1) Limiting free vouchers for gambling to less than $10; Not requiring an individual to gamble more than $10, to receive an inducement, obtain a prize or enter a prize draw; Not requiring an entrant in a promotional prize draw to attend the draw when the prize is worth more than $1,000. 2) Player loyalty programs must provide player activity statements and responsible gambling information, and be operated in a socially responsible manner; Rewards to player loyalty programs members for use in gambling must not exceed $10. 3) Ban on having ATMs in venues operating EGMs, Keno or totalizer wagering (with exception in two casinos); No more than one cheque per day, with a maximum amount of $200, is able to be cashed for gambling purposes; Cash advances from credit accounts are not permitted in casinos; The amount able to withdraw from venue EFTPOS facilities, casino ATMs, and cheques cashing facilities is reduced ($400 in casino ATMs, $200 for EFTPOS withdrawal for gambling purposes in all venues). 4) Restricting the amount of cash for EGM and Keno pay outs to $1,000; Cheques for the payment of winnings must not be cashed on the same trading day they are issued. 5) Reduction in reel spin speed. Health as an indirect aim (main aim was to reduce gambling activity and reduce bet size and frequency ) ","Gambling frequency and gambling expenditure","General population","Australia - Tasmania - Regional",2008,"NA",null,"Not reported ","Epidemiological analysis","• Gambling expenditure\n• Gambling frequency","The cross-sectional analyses suggested that the suite of EGM harm minimisation measures appear to meet the simultaneous aims of decreasing expenditure of a significant proportion of at-risk (PGSI>0) EGM gamblers (11.8-34.0%) without decreasing the enjoyment of a significant proportion of non-problem (PGSI=0) EGM gamblers (7.5-7.8%). Moreover, at-risk gamblers were more likely to report that the measures had decreased their EGM expenditure and enjoyment than non-problem gamblers. These findings are, however, limited by the self-report and attributional nature of the data. \n The longitudinal analyses identified mixed support for the effectiveness of the EGM harm minimisation measures. For example, there was evidence that some EGM gamblers who did not perceive a decrease in EGM expenditure (6.5%) and enjoyment (7.4%) as a result of at least one of the EGM harm minimisation measures did so one year later. Moreover, as expected, EGM gamblers who reported awareness of any EGM harm minimisation measure were more likely to display decreased gambling behaviour (i.e., total gambling expenditure, and total gambling frequency) over time compared to EGM gamblers who were not aware, but only if they also had high initial gambling behaviour. Taken together, these findings suggest that the EGM harm minimisation measures effectively targeted EGM gamblers with higher initial gambling behaviour. \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","The Allen consulting group. Social and economic impact study of gambling in Tasmania. Third social and economic impact study of gambling in Tasmania volume 3 assessment of gambling harm minimisation measure. 2015","Link","• NA"]

{"sheet":"Healthy Workplace","index":9,"n_rows":26,"n_cols":27,"rows_kept":26,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["ID number","Policy area","Policy name","Evidence type","Policy owner","Mechanism type","Mechanism details ","Target risk factor/behaviour/commodity","Target population / demographics","Setting (Geographical)","Year of implementation","Timeline(s) for the policy's impact assessment","Policy implementation (policy owner, voluntary vs mandatory policy, implementation mechanism (if implemented), overlap with other policies and cost of implementation)","Follow-up actions for policy","Type of analysis","Policy outcomes (health or intermediate impact)","Quantitative outcomes (health or intermediate)","Distributional effects","Type of economic evaluation analyses ","Quantitative economic evaluation results","Other impacts (co-benefits, unintended/perverse effects) ","Revenue information (amount, beneficiary and utilisation/earmarking)","Policy context","National policy presence","Reference to original sources","Reference link","Digital Object Identifier"]
["ID number","Policy area the policy relates to","Name given to policy, if no name is established, name in the following format: [Country or country region]_[commodity or policy area]_[policy type]","Note if a policy, an academic study (eg a modelling study, RCT or smaller scale study) or a small scale programme","Name of the organisation responsible for designing and/or implementing the policy","What is (are) the mechanism(s) of the policy?","Add detail about the specifics of the policy mechanism","Which risk factor/product/commodity/behaviour is the policy aimed at?","Which segment of the population is the policy targeted at?","Country - region/locality - setting level ( Local - Regional - National - International)","Start year of the policy. If this is not available, note the year of the oldest publication on this policy followed by an asterisk e.g. 2008*."," What are the timelines for the policy’s impact assessment/follow-up?","Information on whether the policy was implemented, whether it was voluntary or mandatory, what mechanism was used for passing the policy, whether it overlaps with any other policies and any information on the cost if implementation","Combination of follow-up actions and any sunset clause","Type of analysis used to derive the outcome information","List of health or intermediate outcomes reported for the policy","The quantitative results on health and intermediate impacts achieved by the policy (values)","What distributional effects are reported on for this policy?","What type of economic evaluation analysis was undertaken?","List or paste the quantitative results from economic evaluations.","Information on any co-benefits, other unintended perverse effects, and other non-health impacts of the policy ","Combination of  fields (Revenue, beneficiary of revenues, utilisation of revenues)","Information provided on the context around the policy, including opponents and proponents.","Has the policy been implemented nationally in England (or UK country if specified). Yes, No, NA(if not a national policy) and ? If unclear","Reference used to extract information about the policy","Hyperlink to PDF if freely available; URL if not.","DOI for publications if available"]
[133,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","Workplace cycle scheme Australia","Programme","Non-governmental (Workplaces in Australia)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary scheme whereby participants were provided with a mountain bike equipped with lights, lock, cycle computer and helmet. The study promoted four periods of regular moderate exercise per week for one-year using the physical incentive of a loan bike. Participants in the study were drawn from 11 CBD-based organisations who were willing to sponsor their own staff at the rate of $400 per rider. The project recruited 100 riders (36 females, 64 males) with an average age of 39 year Health was a primary aim (to increase the proportion of trips made by bike).","Physical activity levels","General adult population (targeting those who live close to work)","Australia - Local",1999,"12 months","Not reported","Not reported","Empirical assessment","• Coronary risk ration and Total cholesterol and aerobic fitness\n• cycling Km travelled/ reduced CO2\n","• Physical Work Capacity: increased p = 0.042. This indicates that aerobic fitness was significantly improved after the year long cycling intervention. Those people in the low fitness category dropped from eight to five people and those in the high fitness category jumped from 24 to 32 people;\n• The cyclists replaced over 121,000 kilometres of car commuting with cycling equating to a reduction of 37 tonnes of “greenhouse” gases (C02 equivalent).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Although corporate sponsorship to fund this project was secured, the process was extremely difficult to achieve. Over 70 organisations approached the DEP for information but only 11 offered funding.","Not reported","Although corporate sponsorship to fund this project was secured, the process was extremely difficult to achieve. Over 70 organisations approached the DEP for information but only 11 offered funding.","NA","• Marshall, Graham, and Janelle Booth. \"The Western Australian Cycling 100 Project.\"\n• Martin A, Suhrcke M, Ogilvie D. Financial incentives to promote active travel: an evidence review and economic framework. American journal of preventive medicine. 2012 Dec 1;43(6):e45-57.\n• Bauman, Adrian Ernest, et al. Cycling: Getting Australia Moving: Barriers, facilitators and interventions to get more Australians physically active through cycling. Melbourne: Cycling Promotion Fund, 2008. \n• Gold Coast City Council. Health & Physical Benefits of Cycling Available from: http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/documents/bf/bnop-report_section2.pdf.\n\n","• http://www.academia.edu/19383471/The_Western_Australian_Cycling_100_Project\n• https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379712006228\n• http://atrf.info/papers/2008/2008_Bauman_Rissel_Garrard_Ker_Spiedel_Fishman.pdf\n• http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/documents/bf/bnop-report_section2.pdf\n","• NA\n• 10.1016/j.amepre.2012.09.001\n• NA\n• NA"]
[134,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","US_PA_incentive","Modelling study","NA","Financial incentive","Modelling the impact of financial incentives employed across 3000 work place schemes, constructing demand curves of a simulated employee population participating in a physical activity program for a direct cash incentive. Analysis used a modelling framework that systematically identifies how to optimize marginal return on investment from programs incentivising behaviour change by integrating commonly-collected data on health behaviours and associated costs. Estimation of the optimal incentive level at $367. Health was a primary aim ","Physical activity levels","Working population","USA - 3000 employers (not specified) - Local","2005-2010","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling","• Increase in physical activity\n• Annual per employee healthcare cost reduction \n","• The model estimated that physical activity among participants in the incentive program would average 4.2 days per week (95% CI: 2.7–6.3), up from a baseline of 2.6 days per week pre-incentive (95% CI: 0.5-3.9).\n• The model estimated an annual $144 (95% CI: $16–314) per employee healthcare cost reduction due to the incentive program\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Basu S, Kiernan M. A simulation modeling framework to optimize programs using financial incentives to motivate health behaviour change. Medical Decision Making. 2016 Jan;36(1):48-58.","Link","• 10.1177/0272989X15585984"]
[135,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","NorthernIreland_physicalactivity_incentive(points to be redeemed for retail vouchers)","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT of a voluntary physical activity incentive in the workplace. Employees used a ‘loyalty card’ to objectively monitor their physical activity at work over 12 weeks. The Incentive Group collected points and received rewards for minutes of physical activity completed. Each time a participant swiped their card at the entrance to a gym and exercise studio, within the grounds of the workplace, a timestamp was created, recording the date and time of each swipe. The minutes between each timestamp were then aggregated, to give the total minutes of physical activity for each bout completed. Minutes of physical activity were  converted into points (1 minute = 1 point; capped at 30 points per day) and these points could be redeemed for rewards (retail vouchers) at week 6 and 12 .The No Incentive Group self-monitored their physical activity only. Collection of loyalty points for minutes of physical activity. Health was a primary aim (increase in employees physical activity)","Physical activity levels","General population","UK - Northern Ireland - Main government offices - Local",2011,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 6 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Increase in physical activity\n• QoL\n","• At week 6 the Incentive Group performed more minutes of physical activity/week (26.18 mins; 95% CI 20.06, 32.29) than the No Incentive Group (24.00 mins; 95% CI 17.45, 30.54) but the difference was not significant (p=0.45). Similarly, at week 12 the Incentive Group performed more physical activity/week (17.52 mins; 95% CI 12.49, 22.56) than the No Incentive Group (16.63 mins; 95% CI 11.76, 21.51) but again the difference was not significant (p=0.59).\n• the Incentive Group reported greater gains in utility at 6 months (0.03; 95% CI 0.01, 0.05) compared to the No Incentive Group (0.02; 95% CI 0.00, 0.04) although these were not significant (p=0.40).\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness analysis (ICER)","The Incentive Group cost more than the No Incentive Group but it was also more effective resulting in a mean ICER of £2,900/QALY (95% CI −28,000,32,000)","After converting EQ-5D scores into productivity estimates, employees in the Incentive Group improved their level of productivity over 6 months more (1.13%; 95% CI 0.34%, 1.92%) than the employees within the No Incentive Group (0.5%; 95% CI −0.39%, 1.39%) but the difference was not significant (p=0.30).","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Dallat MA, Hunter RF, Tully MA, Cairns KJ, Kee F. A lesson in business: cost-effectiveness analysis of a novel financial incentive intervention for increasing physical activity in the workplace. BMC Public Health. 2013 Dec;13(1):953.","Link","• 10.1186/1471-2458-13-953"]
[136,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","Singapore_activity_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary Financial incentive of S$15 for reaching between 50,000 and 70,000 steps, and S$30 for reaching more than 70,000 steps. Health was a primary aim (specify) Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year)","Physical activity levels","General population","Singapore - 13 organisations spanning many industries and sectors of government - Local",2013,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 1 year","Not reported ","Intervention stopped at 6 months but follow-up up to 12 months","RCT","• Physical activity MVPA at 6 months\n• Physical activity MVPA at 12 months\n• Health outcomes (weight, blood pressure, and quality-of-life measures)\n","• The cash incentive was most effective at increasing MVPA bout min per week at 6 months, but when comparing increases in MVPA bout min per week in the cash groups  to those who also had a Fitbit but no cash incentives, the differences were not significantly greater.\n• At 12 months, a decrease in physical activity of –23 MVPA bout min per week (95% CI –42 to –4; p=0·0184) was seen when comparing the incentive group with the Fitbit only group.\n• There were no improvements in any health outcomes (weight, blood pressure, etc) at either assessment.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Finkelstein EA, Haaland BA, Bilger M, Sahasranaman A, Sloan RA, Nang EE, Evenson KR. Effectiveness of activity trackers with and without incentives to increase physical activity (TRIPPA): a randomised controlled trial. The Lancet Diabetes & endocrinology. 2016 Dec 1;4(12):983-95.","Link","• 10.1016/S2213-8587(16)30284-4"]
[137,"2 Physical activity/Healthy workplace","US_PA_incentive","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","This study was designed to determine whether engagement in stair taking can be increased in a worksite setting through the provision of an employer-sponsored, behaviour based incentive system in which employees (members) accumulate points that can be redeemed for merchandise.. This stairs incentive offering was part of a larger health and wellness incentive program where employees from one company could earn up to $150 in points annually if they completed a variety of health and wellness activities. These activities included completing a health risk assessment, biometric testing and feedback, participation in weight loss and healthy lifestyle programs, engaging in health education classes, and utilizing generic medications. Collection of bonus points is based on stair utilisation. Bonus points were awarded for additional stair usage. Final collection of points could be redeemed for merchandise","Physical activity levels","Working population","USA - 1 company (not specified) - Local",2011,"6 months","• Implementation costs: overall cost of incentives for the program was $3,739.30 – this doesn't include admin and set up costs \n• Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (health risk assessment, biometric testing and feed- back, participation in weight loss and healthy lifestyle programs, engaging in health education classes, and utilizing generic medications)\n","Not reported","Nonrandomized evaluation study","Stair usage","The number of total stair transactions for all members for all days monitored increased from 5,070 to 38,900, and the average number of stair transactions per day rose from 39 to 301, representing over a 600% increase. • This effect was substantial and immediate the first month after implementation and sustained throughout all subsequent months. \n• number of new stair takers from baseline to the intervention period also significantly increased by 85 members from 128 to 213 or 66.4%. All but three members recorded at least one stair transaction during the intervention period. \n• The number of total stair transactions for all members from baseline to intervention periods increased from 5,070 to 38,900. On average, each member increased their total stair usage from 23 stair transactions during baseline to 180 stair transactions during the intervention period and from almost no daily stair usage (0.2 times per day) to more than one (1.4 stair transactions) per day.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Schumacher JE, Utley J, Sutton L, Horton T, Hamer T, You Z, Klapow JC. Boosting workplace stair utilization: a study of incremental reinforcement. Rehabilitation psychology. 2013 Feb;58(1):81.","Link","• 10.1037/a0031764"]
[169,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_weightloss_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT testing the utility of an individually targeted Internet-based intervention with monetary incentives (INCENT) to reduce the weight of overweight and obese employees when compared to a less-intensive minimal intervention\n that included newsletters and on-site educational sessions delivered on a quarterly basis. Incentive programme was delivered via daily e-mails over 12 months while the information intervention was delivered quarterly via both newsletters and on-site educational sessions. IN the financial incentives intervention, for every 1% of weight loss, participants received $1.00. The incentives were provided  through participants’ quarterly weigh-ins at a Health SpotTM, which included a calibrated scale and a built in digital camera.","Multiple health behaviours (Physical activity, diet)","Other (workers with a BMI above 25 kg/m^2)","USA - Virginia - 28 worksites in Roanoke and Richmond - Local",2008,"12 months","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (Information package for healthy living) ","RCT lasted up to 1 year, not follow-up actions","RCT","• Weight loss and BMI reduction\n• Dietary macro and micronutrient intake \n","• Participants in the INCENT group on average lost 2.27 lbs (P < 0.001) and had a BMI decrease of 0.36 kg/m2 (P < 0.001) while participants in the LMW group lost 1.30 lbs (P < 0.05) and decreased BMI by 0.20 kg/m2 (P < 0.05). However, the differences between INCENT and LMW in weight loss (20.97 lbs) and BMI reduction (20.16) were not significant. \n• Participants in both groups showed improvement in fruit and vegetable intake (INCENT: 0.32, P < 0.001; LMW: 0.12, P < 0.01); reduction in fat intake (INCENT: 26.05, P < 0.001; LMW: 25.83, P < 0.001); increases in dietary fibre intake (INCENT: 1.00, P < 0.001; LMW: 0.42, P < 0.001); reduction in SSB intake (INCENT: 226.42 kcal, P < 0.001; LMW: 228.08 kcal, P < 0.001); and increases in moderate PA behaviour (INCENT: 22.55 min/week, P < 0.001; LMW: 18.04 min/week, P < 0.001). Among those behavioural changes, INCENT participants showed larger improvements in their fruit and vegetable (0.20 servings, P < 0.001) and dietary fibre intake (0.58 g, P < 0.001). Furthermore, participants in the INCENT group showed a statistically significant increase in their average daily water consumption (1.66 fl. oz., P 5 0.01), while the LMW group showed no change over the 6 months (0.47 fl. oz., P 5 0.575). \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","From systematic review: Weerasekara YK, Roberts SB, Kahn MA, LaVertu AE, Hoffman B, Das SK. Effectiveness of workplace weight management interventions: a systematic review. Current obesity reports. 2016 Jun 1;5(2):298-306. individual article Almeida FA, You W, Harden SM, Blackman KC, Davy BM, Glasgow RE, Hill JL, Linnan LA, Wall SS, Yenerall J, Zoellner JM. Effectiveness of a worksite‐based weight loss randomized controlled trial: the worksite study. Obesity. 2015 Apr;23(4):737-45.","Link","• 10.1002/oby.20899"]
[170,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_biometrics_discount","Programme","Non-governmental (Safeway Inc (corporate))","Price decrease (Subsidy)","A voluntary outcome-based biometric screening program, incentivized with health insurance premium discounts. For each measure passed (Body Mass Index, blood pressure, cholesterol, glucose, and nicotine ) the employee earned a portion of the maximum eligible discount (up to nearly 20%) off their health insurance premium contribution. Employees were also eligible to receive a retroactive rebate for unmet standards by retesting and meeting standards the following year. For those not meeting the BMI standard, an incremental improvement was established (reduction of 10% or more of body weight) to earn the rebate.","Multiple health behaviours (Body Mass Index, blood pressure, cholesterol, glucose, and nicotine)","General population","USA - 1 Large employer mostly in Western - Local",2009,"5 years","Passed through corporate decision enabled by legislation (Affordable care act)","For those not meeting the BMI standard, an incremental improvement was established (reduction of 10% or more of body weight) to earn the rebate","Retrospective cohort analysis","Change in multiple biometrics studies","Overall, participants at high risk for chronic diseases who continuously participated in Safeway’s Healthy Measures program significantly improved most biometrics. Those who did not meet standards their initial year showed the greatest improvement between their first and second years of participation: On average, participants who did not meet the incentive threshold at baseline decreased their BMI (1%), glucose (8%), blood pressure (systolic 9%, diastolic 8%), and total cholesterol (8%) by year 2 with improvements generally sustained or continued during each additional year of participation. No difference in glucose, nicotine over time was detected. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Fu PL, Bradley KL, Viswanathan S, Chan JM, Stampfer M. Trends in biometric health indices within an employer-sponsored wellness program with outcome-based incentives. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2016 Jul;30(6):453-7.","Link","• 10.1177/0890117116658241"]
[171,"6 Healthy workplace","US_worksitebehaviourchange_incentive","Programme","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary workplace financial incentives ranging between $0 to $360 for completion of program registration, risk change and health coaching. Company-level risk change was calculated from the average per-person number of risks on baseline and follow-up health risk assessments.","Multiple health behaviours (Alcohol, back care, driving, nutrition, exercise, smoking, stress, weight, and well-being (depression))","General population","USA - 24 companies, clients of StayWell Health Management - Local",2007,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported","Retrospective cohort analysis","Health risks (not specified)","• Incentive values were not significantly associated with risk improvement rates (p= 0.240)\n• The average risk improvement rate for companies with no incentive was 8.5%. The average risk improvement rates for companies that offered incentives of less than $100 and companies with incentives of $100 or more were 6.6% and 7.5%, respectively. There were no statistically significant differences between these average risk change rates.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Gingerich SB, Anderson DR, Koland H. Impact of financial incentives on behaviour change program participation and risk reduction in worksite health promotion. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2012 Nov;27(2):119-22.","Link","• 10.4278/ajhp.110726-ARB-295"]
[172,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","Korea_weightloss_incentive(gold_medals)","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary incentive-based obesity management program (the Midas Project aimed to improve good health habits) at an electronics company. Each participant was awarded 1 Don, the Korean gold unit equal to 3.75 g of gold, for each kilogram of body fat a person lost during the program. The major elements of the program were counselling by factory nurses, an assisting self-help group, free gym facilities, trainers, and health information seminars and bulletin boards. Additionally, a minimum fat loss of 3 kg was requested to ensure active participation and a maximum fat loss of 7 kg was established to avoid excessive exercise. One kilogram of body fat and not body weight was the defining determinant to qualify for a gold medal and this also served to prevent unhealthy fasting or liposuctions.","Multiple health behaviours (Smoking, temperance, sleep, exercise, appropriate body weight, avoidance of eating between meals, and eating a regular breakfast)","General population","Korea - Electronics industry workplace at Pyungtaik - Local",2005,"3 months","Not reported ","Not reported","Single Group Assignment RCT","• Mean BMI \n• mean weight \n• mean body fat \n• Mean systolic and diastolic blood pressure \n• cholesterol \n","All of the objective health status variables with the exception of cholesterol exhibited significant decreases during the three months of the program:\n• Mean BMI decreased from 28.8 to 27.8 kg/m² (p = .000)\n• mean weight decreased from 87.2 to 83.5 kg (p = .000)\n• mean body fat decreased from 25.4 to 23.3 kg (p = .000)\n• Mean systolic and diastolic blood pressure decreased from 130.5 to 125.1 mmHg (p = .002), and from 86.4 to 81.7 mmHg (p = .009), respectively.\n• There was an unfavourable change in cholesterol from 164.6 to 172.6 mg/dL but this trend was not significant (p = .172) and the increased level was still within the normal range.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Hwang G, Yoon C, Jung H, Kim Y. Evaluation of an incentive-based obesity management program in a workplace. International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics. 2011 Jan 1;17(2):147-54.","Link","• 10.1080/10803548.2011.11076885"]
[173,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_weightmanagement_subsidy","RCT","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","RCT testing the impact of workplace subsidised counselling programs (Weight Watchers) at four different subsidy levels, ranging from 100% to 50% (including hybrid schemes)","Weight loss programme","General population","USA - 2 companies - Local",2013,"12 months","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","• Enrolment \n•Weight loss\n","• Enrolment differed significantly by subsidy level (p< 0.001). The 100% subsidy produced the highest Enrolment (7.7%), significantly higher than each of the lower subsidies (vs. 80% subsidy: 6.2%, p=.002; vs. 50% subsidy: 3.9%, p<.0001 vs. hybrid: 3.7%, p<.0001). Enrolment in the 80% subsidy group was significantly higher than both lower subsidy groups (vs. 50% subsidy: 3.9%, p <0.001; vs hybrid 3.7%, p<0.001). \n• Among enrolees, there were no differences among the four groups in attendance or weight loss.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","John LK, Troxel AB, Yancy Jr WS, Friedman J, Zhu J, Yang L, Galvin R, Miller-Kovach K, Halpern SD, Loewenstein G, Volpp K. The Effect of Cost Sharing on an Employee Weight Loss Program: A Randomized Trial. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2018 Jan;32(1):170-6.","Link","• 10.1177/0890117116671282"]
[174,"6 Healthy workplace","US_smoking_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","National study of adult smokers employed at GE who were offered a financial incentive of up to $750 to quit smoking. This program was offered to employees at 87 GE worksites. Employees were eligible to participate if they were aged 18 years or older, smoked at least 5 cigarettes per day, and had no plans to leave the company within the next 18 months. A total of 878 eligible employees participated in the study. Surveys to assess participants’ demographic information and smoking and cessation behaviours were conducted at baseline and at 6- and 12- month follow-ups. ","Tobacco","Other (smokers)","USA - 87 General Electrics worksites and 7 industries - Local",2005,"6 and 12 months","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","Quit rates at 12 months follow-up","Overall, the quit rate among participants receiving financial incentives was 14.7% at 12-month follow-up.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kim AE, Towers A, Renaud J, Zhu J, Shea JA, Galvin R, Volpp KG. Application of the RE-AIM framework to evaluate the impact of a worksite-based financial incentive intervention for smoking cessation. Journal of occupational and environmental medicine. 2012 May 1;54(5):610-4.","Link","• 10.1097/JOM.0b013e31824b2171"]
[175,"6 Healthy workplace","US_diabetes_incentive","Observational study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary programme by insurance scheme.  Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island offered large employer groups the opportunity to participate in a diabetes disease management initiative that featured reduced co-payments (from $7/$25/$40 for generic, tier 2, and tier 3 drugs, respectively, to $0 for generic and $0-$2 for brand drugs) for diabetes-related medications .Reduction is conditional on completing the following: (a) participate in care coordination with their case managers, (b) have an annual physical exam, (c) have an A1c blood test at least twice a year, and (d) have an LDL-C test performed at least once per year.  ","Multiple health screens (Diabetes screening, cholesterol screening)","Clinical populations of employees (diabetics)","USA - Rhode Island - Blue Cross Blue Shield - Local",2008,"12 months","Not reported ","Not reported","Epidemiological study","Uptake of care processes recommended for diabetics","Patients participating in this incentive program featuring diabetes medication co-payment reduction and disease management components did not receive recommended care any more or less frequently than other enroled members with diabetes. Patients in the intervention and non-intervention groups were similarly likely to have all 5 recommended processes of care performed (40.1% vs. 38.9%, respectively, P=0.543).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","There were no significant differences between the intervention and comparison groups in mean [SD] PPPY all-cause medical care costs ($7,475 [$17,601] vs. $8,577 [$22,972], respectively, P=0.213) or total all-cause costs ($10,613 [$18,590] vs. $11,431 [$24,060], P=0.666).","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kogut SJ, Johnson S, Higgins T, Quilliam BJ. Evaluation of a program to improve diabetes care through intensified care management activities and diabetes medication copayment reduction. Journal of Managed Care Pharmacy. 2012 May;18(4):297-310.","Link","• 10.18553/jmcp.2012.18.4.297"]
[176,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_weightloss_incentives","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Employer-sponsored financial incentives for employee weight loss, testing the effectiveness of two financial incentive designs for promoting weight loss among obese employees: 24 weeks of monthly weigh-ins (control)(n=35); individual incentive, designed as $100 per person per month for meeting or exceeding target weight loss (individual arm)(n=35); group incentive, designed as $500 per month split between any participant within groups of 5 who met or exceeded their target weight loss (group arm)(n=35).","Multiple health behaviours (Physical activity, diet)","Other (workers with body mass index between 30 and 40 kg/m^2)","USA - Philadelphia - Children's Hospital - Local",2011,"5.5 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Weight loss between incentive type groups at 12 weeks\n• Weight loss between incentive type groups compared to control at 12 weeks\n","• Group incentive participants lost more weight than individual arm participants (between-group difference in weight loss favouring group = mean 9.7 pounds, 95% CI 4.4 to 14.9; P < 0.001). \n• Twelve weeks after incentives ended and adjusting for 3-group comparisons, group arm participants maintained greater weight loss than control arm participants (between-group difference in weight loss = mean 6.5 pounds, 95% CI 1.2 to 11.7; P = 0.016) but not more than individual arm participants (difference = 5.9 pounds, 95% CI, 0.8 to 11.0; P = 0.024). \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kullgren JT, Troxel AB, Loewenstein G, Asch DA, Norton LA, Wesby L, Tao Y, Zhu J, Volpp KG. Individual-versus group-based financial incentives for weight loss: a randomized, controlled trial. Annals of internal medicine. 2013 Apr 2;158(7):505-14.","Link","• 10.7326/0003-4819-158-7-201304020-00002"]
[177,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","Scotland_dietnutrition_subsidy","Observational study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Price subsidy of 10-20% of the cost of workplace meals, included as part of a broader intervention: Price incentives focused on consumer and caterers preference for “healthy meal deals” at a 10-20% cost reduction. Recipes aimed to achieve a nutrient composition consistent with the FSA traffic light grading low (or maximum of one medium) for fat, saturated fat, sugar and salt. Due to recently introduced EU Regulation, individual items could not be labelled as “healthy” but were labelled with value for money symbols. Marketing focused on a value strategy by promoting reduced prices, products and key placing of targeted items within the canteen setting","F&V and healthy food","General population","UK - Scotland - 2 sites with canteens - Local",2012,"2.3 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","Dietary intake from work catering","Limited impact on diet: Throughout the intervention period there was greater uptake of intervention soup (range 44 to 138) compared to the price incentivised meal deal (range 4 to 31). The intervention did not appear to impact on snacks with snack sales remaining buoyant during the intervention period. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Mackison D, Mooney J, Macleod M, Anderson AS. Lessons learnt from a feasibility study on price incentivised healthy eating promotions in workplace catering establishments. Journal of human nutrition and dietetics. 2016 Feb;29(1):86-94.","Link","• 10.1111/jhn.12283"]
[178,"6 Healthy workplace","US_presciptiondrugconsumption_incentive","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary Free annual screenings, tailored feedback on screening results, financial incentives for modifying and maintaining certain health behaviours, and health promotion education. ","Multiple health behaviours (Physical activity, diet)","General population","USA - Salt Lake County Government - Local",2008,"4 years","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (The Healthy Lifestyle Incentive Program) ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","• Frequency and cost of prescription drug  claims\n• Frequency and cost of medical claims\n","• The annual average number and cost of prescription drug claims per person was significantly greater among non- HLIP employees (15.5 claims, $1162.7 mean cost per person) compared to HLIP employees (8.6 claims, $603.3 mean cost per person)\n• The annual average number  and cost of medical claims per person was significantly greater for non-HLIP employees (10.2 claims, $4806.6 mean cost per person) compared to HLIP employees (7.37 claims, $2838.0 mean cost per person)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Over the study period, the cost savings in lower prescription drug and medical costs was $3 568 837. For every dollar spent on the HLIP the county saved $3.85. \n","Not reported","NA","Merrill RM, Hyatt B, Aldana SG, Kinnersley D. Lowering employee health care costs through the healthy lifestyle incentive program. Journal of Public Health Management and Practice. 2011 May 1;17(3):225-32.","Link","• 10.1097/PHH.0b013e3181f54128"]
[179,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_healthyeating_discount","Observational study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The BB program is a hospital cafeteria nutrition intervention in two hospitals using marketing and direct price incentives/disincentives to improve health-promoting purchasing behaviour. Hospital employees were provided with a 35% price differential for better bites products (i.e. the bundles of food items considered as healthy option) within their workplace cafeteria, as part of an nonrandomized evaluation study.","F&V","General population","﻿USA - Colorado - Penrose-St. Francis Health Services Hospital in Colorado Springs - Local",2011,"9 months","Not reported ","Not reported","Nonrandomized evaluation study","Changes in dietary intake and purchases","• Significant impact was demonstrated on all burger sales in the desired direction during intervention (P < .001). Most notably, the average weekly turkey burger sales at Penrose Hospital (PH) increased 13-fold (10.85-145.59) and became the majority of the market share (51.8%, P < .001). For salads, significant interaction between phase and food type was found at St. Francis Medical Center (SFMC) (P = .002) but not at PH (P = .304). ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Patsch AJ, Smith JH, Liebert ML, Behrens TK, Charles T. Improving healthy eating and the bottom line: impact of a price incentive program in 2 hospital cafeterias. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2016 Jul;30(6):425-32.","Link","• 10.1177/0890117116658237"]
[180,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_ICM_employee_childhealth_incentive","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","IBM’s Children’s Health Rebate offered a cash incentive for parents to complete a 12-week program of self-selected activities in family food planning and meals, family physical activity, and sedentary time related to electronic entertainment (“screen time”). A pre-program/post program comparison of self-reported activities was used to assess behaviour change. Employees completing all program steps  (Healthy family meal engagement and consistent healthy eating; collaborative physical activity; appropriate screen time; and positive parental role-modeling.) receive a $150 cash rebate, paid as taxable income in their pay check .","Multiple health behaviours (healthy diet, physical activity, screen time, parental modelling)","Children","USA - IBM - Local",2008,"12 weeks","Not reported ","Not reported","Retrospective cohort analysis","• physical activity \n• entertainment screen time \n•  eating healthy dinners >5 days\n","The 11 631 employees who completed the final program step of the 12-week follow-up family inventory demonstrated significant changes in all 9 assessment items. Throughout the 12-week program, the largest improvements were seen in:\n• physical activity behaviour (a 17.1- % point increase in family physical activity (from 23.2% to 40.3%),  and 15.8-% point increase for children), \n• some of the smallest improvements were in the area of appropriate entertainment screen time increased by a 8.3-% point increase for children (from 22.4% to 30.7%) and by 6.1 % points for adults (from 18.1% to 24.2%).  \n•  eating healthy dinners >5 days/week increased by 11.8 % points (from 74.9% to 86.7%), \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Sepúlveda MJ, Lu C, Sill S, Young JM, Edington DW. An observational study of an employer intervention for children's healthy weight behaviours. Pediatrics. 2010 Sep 28:peds-2009.","Link","• 10.1542/peds.2009-3210"]
[181,"6 Healthy workplace","Sweden_earlyreturntowork_subsidy","Policy","Government (Ministry of health)","Price decrease (Subsidy)","The subsidies in relation to the number of employees connected to the occupational health care service provider were initiated by the ministry, and they were developed in cooperation with the Swedish OH service association, which includes most Swedish OH service providers as members. The SSIA was involved as the authority to administer the subsidies. Four different subsidies were introduced (sums in brackets indicate available funding for 2010; 1 € was calculated as 10 SEK): 1. A basic subsidy in relation to the number of employees connected to the OH service provider, maximum 20 € per employee and year. (10 million €) 2. A subsidy for costs of medical services, e.g. blood tests, X-rays, maximum 10 € per employee and year. (10 million €) 3. A subsidy for visits to OPs, involving a work ability assessment, 35 € per visit. (10 million €) 4. A subsidy for coordinated early interventions, involving multi-professional assessments and actions within 45 days of sick leave. OH service providers should assess the individual’s work ability, visit the workplace, assess the need for workplace adjustments, and initiate proper actions in cooperation with relevant stakeholders (including the employee and the employer), in order to promote RTW. A coordinated intervention was subsidized with 560 €. (25 million €)","Provision of occupational health care services","General population","Sweden - National",2010,"1 years","Passed through legislation","Not reported ","Retrospective cohort analysis","Use of occupational health services"," Only 1-2% of the employers stated that they used OH services more after the introduction of the subsidies. The employer survey also indicated that employers’ general use of OH services primarily included health investigations, OP visits, psychological counselling, and ergonomic assessments, while it was less common to consult the OH service provider on rehabilitation, work environmental issues and organizational development","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","?","Ståhl C, Toomingas A, Åborg C, Ekberg K, Kjellberg K. Promoting occupational health interventions in early return to work by implementing financial subsidies: a Swedish case study. BMC public health. 2013 Dec;13(1):310.","Link","• 10.1186/1471-2458-13-310"]
[182,"6 Healthy workplace/ Diet and obesity","US_dietnutrition_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT looking at social norms and incentives for healthy eating: involved sending out letters stating social norms on healthy eating, and offering financial rewards for purchasing products in the workplace cafeteria that are labelled with the colour green (healthy), (other colours included yellow (less healthy), or red (unhealthy)). Participants were randomized in 2012 to three arms: 1) monthly letter with social norm feedback about healthy food purchases, comparing employee to “all” and to “healthiest” customers (feedback-only); 2) monthly letter with social norm feedback plus small financial incentive for increasing green purchases (feedback-incentive); or 3) no contact (control). Consumption thresholds had to be met and were rewarded with $10 towards the cafeteria account. Passing a threshold in one month and not being able to reach the next threshold resulted in a reward of $5 towards the cafeteria account. The main outcome was change in proportion of green-labelled purchases at end of 3-month intervention.   ","F&V","General population","USA - Massachusetts General Hospital - Local",2012,"3 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","Increase in green-labelled (healthy) purchases ","increase in green-labelled purchases ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Thorndike AN, Riis J, Levy DE. Social norms and financial incentives to promote employees' healthy food choices: A randomized controlled trial. Preventive medicine. 2016 May 1;86:12-8.","Link","• 10.1016/j.ypmed.2016.01.017"]
[183,"6 Healthy workplace","US_smoking_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary intervention. Participants in the incentive group received $100 for completion of a community-based smoking cessation program, $250 for smoking cessation, confirmed with the use of a cotinine test, within 6 months after study enrolment, and $400 for continued abstinence for an additional 6 months after the initial cessation.","Tobacco","Other (smokers)","USA - Company work sites  - Local",2005,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 18 months","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","• smoking cessation at  9 or 12 months after enrolment \n• smoking cessation at  15 or 18 months after enrolment \n• enrolment in and completion of a smoking-cessation program completion of a smoking-cessation program\n","• The incentive group had significantly higher rates of smoking cessation than did the information-only group 9 or 12 months after Enrolment (14.7% vs. 5.0%, P<0.001) \n• The incentive group had significantly higher rates of smoking cessation than did the information-only group 15 or 18 months after Enrolment (9.4% vs. 3.6%, P<0.001). \n• Incentive-group participants also had significantly higher rates of Enrolment in a smoking-cessation program (15.4% vs. 5.4%, P<0.001), completion of a smoking-cessation program (10.8% vs. 2.5%, P<0.001)\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Volpp KG, Troxel AB, Pauly MV, Glick HA, Puig A, Asch DA, Galvin R, Zhu J, Wan F, DeGuzman J, Corbett E. A randomized, controlled trial of financial incentives for smoking cessation. New England Journal of Medicine. 2009 Feb 12;360(7):699-709.","Link","• 10.1056/NEJMsa0806819"]
[184,"6 Healthy workplace","Korea_smokingcesation_incentive(financial)","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","The purpose of this study was to identify the efficacy of the financial incentives given to teams in improving long-term rates of smoking cessation among employees. Each team consisted of smoking participants and non-smoking fellow workers from the same department. All team members were informed that the teams they belonged to would receive financial incentives based on their team efforts at smoking cessation, which is to engage social networks to provide social support and pressure for the quit attempt and abstinence. All smoking participants were given usual smoking cessation counselling and 3-month coverage of varenicline, a selective nicotine receptor partial agonist. In addition, nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) was permitted. Financial incentive of USD45 to the team for each successful participant after the first week and then after one month. USD 90 for each successful participant after 3 and 6 months. ","Tobacco","General population","Korea - St. Paul's Hospital - Local",2011,"Multiple follow-ups: maximum 1 year","Not reported ","Not reported","Single Group Assignment RCT","Self-reported and biochemically validated smoking cessation rate at 3, 6, 12 months post-quit date","Self-reported abstinence rates validated by urinary cotinine\ntest at 3, 6, and 12 months were 61%, 54%, and 50%,\nrespectively.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Yeo CD, Lee HY, Ha JH, Kang HH, Kang JY, Kim SK, Kim MS, Moon HS, Lee SH. Efficacy of team-based financial incentives for smoking cessation in the workplace. Yonsei medical journal. 2015 Jan 1;56(1):295-9.","Link","• 10.3349/ymj.2015.56.1.295"]
[185,"6 Healthy workplace/Prevention","US_participationwellnessprogram_discount","Observational study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary Gift cards that could be used to reduce health insurance premiums. Employees received discounts worth $240 for completion of health risk assessments, and $240 for participation in screening programmes. ","Multiple health screens ","General population","USA - Large manufacturing employer in the Midwest - Local",2011,"3 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Statistical analysis of collected data","• Participation in health risk assessments (HRAs) \n• Participation in the biometric screening program  \n• Annual prescription drug fills\n","• Participation in health risk assessments (HRAs) increased by 50 percentage points among members of unions that bargained in the incentive, and increased 22 percentage points among non-union employees.\n• Participation in the biometric screening program increased 55 percentage points when financial incentives were provided. \n• Biometric screenings led to an average increase of 0.31 annual prescription drug fills, with related spending higher by $56 per member per year. The largest increase in medication utilization as a result of biometric screening was for statins, which are widely used to treat high cholesterol. This therapeutic class accounted for one-sixth of the overall increase in prescription drug utilization. Second were antidepressants, followed by ACE inhibitors (for hypertension), and thyroid hormones (for hypothyroidism). Biometric screening also led to significantly higher utilization of biologic response modifiers and immunosuppressants. These specialty medications are used to treat autoimmune diseases, such as rheumatoid \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The added spending associated with the combined increase in fills of 0.02 was $27 per member per year—about one-half of the overall increase in prescription drug spending from those who participated in biometric screenings.","Not reported","NA","Fronstin P, Roebuck MC. Financial incentives, workplace wellness program participation, and utilization of health care services and spending.","Link","• NA"]
[186,"6 Healthy workplace/Prevention","US_Enrolmenthealthriskassessment_lottery","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary programme assessed by RCT: Two arms: 1) $25 incentive for conducting a health risk assessment plus $25 gift voucher for completion of the assessment; 2) $25 incentive for conducting a health risk assessment plus entering a lottery with the chance of winning $100 ","Multiple Health screens (Health risk assessment)","General population","USA - Large health care management and information technology consulting company (14 offices) - Local",2008,"4 months","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","• Health risk assessment completion rate","• The HRA completion rates were 64% in the lottery arm, 44% in the grocery gift certificate arm, and 40% in the comparison condition. Completion rates in the lottery arm were significantly greater than the $50 grocery gift certificate arm and the $25 comparison arm. Completion rates in the grocery gift certificate arm were not significantly higher than in the $25 comparison arm. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Haisley E, Volpp KG, Pellathy T, Loewenstein G. The impact of alternative incentive schemes on completion of health risk assessments. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2012 Jan;26(3):184-8.","Link","• 10.4278/ajhp.100729-ARB-257"]
[187,"6 Healthy workplace","US_diabetescontrol_discount","Programme","Health body (Cleveland Clinic)","Financial incentive","Voluntary health insurance discounts offered to all employees of the Clevenlan Clinic, for achieving set goals: The programs offered to all employees. Beginning in July 2005, the Cleveland Clinic implemented a series of wellness initiatives, initially focused on changing the work environment to promote healthier lifestyles. Starting in 2008, the EHP offered free smoking cessation, weight management, and fitness programs. The EHP also administers disease management programs for diabetes and other cardiovascular risk factors including obesity, hypertension, and hyperlipidaemia. In 2009, a fixed $100 financial incentive was offered for participation in an employer-sponsored disease management program; the incentive increased to $300 in 2010. In 2011, the incentive changed to a 30 % health insurance premium discount ($600-$1200 depending on type of plan) tied to both participation (15 % discount) and achievement of clinical goals (additional 15 % discount). The same incentive continued in 2012. Clinical goals included achievement of set HbA1c, low-density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol, and blood pressure targets. If requested, the HbA1c target could be individualized, but >90 % of employees had a standardized goal of <130. The weight target was individualized. ","Metabolic health (HbA1c, systolic blood pressure, and low-density lipoprotein cholesterol)","Clinical populations (diabetics)","﻿USA - Cleveland Clinic - Local",2009,"4 years","Policy overlaps with another non-fiscal policy (Cleveland Clinic Employee Health Plan) ","Not reported","Retrospective cohort analysis","• Health management plan participation\n• diabetes and cardiovascular risk factor control in first year of incentives\n• diabetes and cardiovascular risk factor control in second year of incentives\n","• the implementation of financial incentives to join disease management programs was associated with an increase in program participation. As the initial goal of the financial incentives was to encourage employees with diabetes to join disease management, this program succeeded. \n• offering of incentives coupled with disease management improved diabetes and cardiovascular risk factor control in employees compared to matched non-employees: At the population level, fixed, small financial incentives (2008–09 and 2009–10 cohorts) and the first year in which incentives were tied to treatment targets (2010–11 cohort) were not associated with a significant decreases of HbA1c among employees. \n• In the second year that incentives were tied to treatment targets (2011–12 cohort), HbA1c declined significantly among employees and the comparison group, with no significant difference between the two groups. Weight decreased in employees throughout the study period, with significant changes compared to the non-employees only in the initial cohort. Changes in mean LDL and SBP throughout the study period were similar for the employees and comparison group (difference in change p > 0.05 for all cohorts).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Misra-Hebert AD, Hu B, Taksler G, Zimmerman R, Rothberg MB. Financial incentives and diabetes disease control in employees: a retrospective cohort analysis. Journal of general internal medicine. 2016 Aug 1;31(8):871-7.","Link","• 10.1007/s11606-016-3686-2"]

{"sheet":"Secondary Prevention","index":10,"n_rows":20,"n_cols":27,"rows_kept":20,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["ID number","Policy area","Policy name","Evidence type","Policy owner","Mechanism type","Mechanism details ","Target risk factor/behaviour/commodity","Target population / demographics","Setting (Geographical)","Year of implementation","Timeline(s) for the policy's impact assessment","Policy implementation (policy owner, voluntary vs mandatory policy, implementation mechanism (if implemented), overlap with other policies and cost of implementation)","Follow-up actions for policy","Type of analysis","Policy outcomes (health or intermediate impact)","Quantitative outcomes (health or intermediate)","Distributional effects","Type of economic evaluation analyses ","Quantitative economic evaluation results","Other impacts (co-benefits, unintended/perverse effects) ","Revenue information (amount, beneficiary and utilisation/earmarking)","Policy context","National policy presence","Reference to original sources","Reference link","Digital Object Identifier"]
["ID number","Policy area the policy relates to","Name given to policy, if no name is established, name in the following format: [Country or country region]_[commodity or policy area]_[policy type]","Note if a policy, an academic study (eg a modelling study, RCT or smaller scale study) or a small scale programme","Name of the organisation responsible for designing and/or implementing the policy","What is (are) the mechanism(s) of the policy?","Add detail about the specifics of the policy mechanism","Which risk factor/product/commodity/behaviour is the policy aimed at?","Which segment of the population is the policy targeted at?","Country - region/locality - setting level ( Local - Regional - National - International)","Start year of the policy. If this is not available, note the year of the oldest publication on this policy followed by an asterisk e.g. 2008*."," What are the timelines for the policy’s impact assessment/follow-up?","Information on whether the policy was implemented, whether it was voluntary or mandatory, what mechanism was used for passing the policy, whether it overlaps with any other policies and any information on the cost if implementation","Combination of follow-up actions and any sunset clause","Type of analysis used to derive the outcome information","List of health or intermediate outcomes reported for the policy","The quantitative results on health and intermediate impacts achieved by the policy (values)","What distributional effects are reported on for this policy?","What type of economic evaluation analysis was undertaken?","List or paste the quantitative results from economic evaluations.","Information on any co-benefits, other unintended perverse effects, and other non-health impacts of the policy ","Combination of  fields (Revenue, beneficiary of revenues, utilisation of revenues)","Information provided on the context around the policy, including opponents and proponents.","Has the policy been implemented nationally in England (or UK country if specified). Yes, No, NA(if not a national policy) and ? If unclear","Reference used to extract information about the policy","Hyperlink to PDF if freely available; URL if not.","DOI for publications if available"]
[185,"6 Healthy workplace/Prevention","US_participationwellnessprogram_discount","Observational study","NA","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Voluntary Gift cards that could be used to reduce health insurance premiums. Employees received discounts worth $240 for completion of health risk assessments, and $240 for participation in screening programmes. ","Multiple health screens ","General population","USA - Large manufacturing employer in the Midwest - Local",2011,"3 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Statistical analysis of collected data","• Participation in health risk assessments (HRAs) \n• Participation in the biometric screening program  \n• Annual prescription drug fills\n","• Participation in health risk assessments (HRAs) increased by 50 percentage points among members of unions that bargained in the incentive, and increased 22 percentage points among non-union employees.\n• Participation in the biometric screening program increased 55 percentage points when financial incentives were provided. \n• Biometric screenings led to an average increase of 0.31 annual prescription drug fills, with related spending higher by $56 per member per year. The largest increase in medication utilization as a result of biometric screening was for statins, which are widely used to treat high cholesterol. This therapeutic class accounted for one-sixth of the overall increase in prescription drug utilization. Second were antidepressants, followed by ACE inhibitors (for hypertension), and thyroid hormones (for hypothyroidism). Biometric screening also led to significantly higher utilization of biologic response modifiers and immunosuppressants. These specialty medications are used to treat autoimmune diseases, such as rheumatoid \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The added spending associated with the combined increase in fills of 0.02 was $27 per member per year—about one-half of the overall increase in prescription drug spending from those who participated in biometric screenings.","Not reported","NA","Fronstin P, Roebuck MC. Financial incentives, workplace wellness program participation, and utilization of health care services and spending.","Link","• NA"]
[186,"6 Healthy workplace/Prevention","US_Enrolmenthealthriskassessment_lottery","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary programme assessed by RCT: Two arms: 1) $25 incentive for conducting a health risk assessment plus $25 gift voucher for completion of the assessment; 2) $25 incentive for conducting a health risk assessment plus entering a lottery with the chance of winning $100 ","Multiple Health screens (Health risk assessment)","General population","USA - Large health care management and information technology consulting company (14 offices) - Local",2008,"4 months","Not reported ","Not reported","RCT","• Health risk assessment completion rate","• The HRA completion rates were 64% in the lottery arm, 44% in the grocery gift certificate arm, and 40% in the comparison condition. Completion rates in the lottery arm were significantly greater than the $50 grocery gift certificate arm and the $25 comparison arm. Completion rates in the grocery gift certificate arm were not significantly higher than in the $25 comparison arm. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Haisley E, Volpp KG, Pellathy T, Loewenstein G. The impact of alternative incentive schemes on completion of health risk assessments. American Journal of Health Promotion. 2012 Jan;26(3):184-8.","Link","• 10.4278/ajhp.100729-ARB-257"]
[188,"7 Prevention services","US_colorectal screening","Observational study","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary Walmart gift cards of $5 or $10 if participants returned the Faecal Immuno Testing (FIT) kit- also had support for completion of the FIT including mail material, and telephone reminder communications. The policy could target everyone but boosting adherence are especially important for ethnic minorities, non-English speaking, uninsured and those with a low income or low educational level and in particular targeting aged 50-64yrs not up-to-date with colorectal cancer screening. Health was a primary aim (increase screening rates) . ","Health screens (Colorectal cancer)","General adult population","USA - Texas - Tarrant country - Regional",2013,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","Screening uptake","FIT participation was 36.9% with vs. 36.2% without any financial incentive ( P =0.60) and was also not statistically different for the $10 incentive (34.6%, P =0.32 vs. no incentive) or $5 incentive (39.2%, P =0.07 vs. no incentive) groups, so no clinically significant eff ect on the proportion of people completing FIT screening. Results were consistent across subgroups, and the sample size of the study makes it unlikely that a larger study would produce different results. No downstream effects such as decreased time to return of FIT kits or decreased need for phone calls to promote screening completion was observed in the incentive vs. no incentive groups. ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Adler, Jeffrey, and Jason A. Dominitz. \"Financial Incentives to Improve Colorectal Cancer Screening: Does it Make Cents?.\" The American journal of gastroenterology 111.11 (2016): 1637.     \n• Gupta S, Miller S, Koch M, Berry E, Anderson P, Pruitt SL, Borton E, Hughes AE, Carter E, Hernandez S, Pozos H. Financial incentives for promoting colorectal cancer screening: a randomized, comparative effectiveness trial. The American journal of gastroenterology. 2016 Nov;111(11):1630.\n","Link","• 10.1038/ajg.2016.286"]
[189,"7 Prevention services","‘Stamp Out Chlamydia’ program (SOC)","Programme","Government","Financial incentive","Voluntary incentive: AUD10 cash reward  given in exchange for a urine sample. Health was a primary aim (Chlamydia screening) ","Health screens (Chlamydia)","General population (16-30yr olds)","Australia - Australia Capital Territory- Local",2007,"3 years","Implementation costs: The direct costs in Phase 2 (4 days on 1 university campus) were substantially less than those incurred during Phase 1 (promotion and self-administered urine test): $13,132 compared with $111,720. The cost per case identified was $3,283 in Phase 2 compared with $7,448 in Phase 1","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","• Chlamydia screening yield (proportion of people providing a sample\n• Chlamydia test positivity rate\n","• Overall screening yield was 43.8% (1318/3011; range 20 to 77%).  If the number of chlamydia screens performed is the principal outcome measure of a program, then the cash incentive model appears to be efficient with nearly 24 individuals screened per hour i.e. one every 2.5 minutes that the screening activities were running. In comparison, Canberra’s two sexual health clinics conducted 6,950 chlamydia tests in 2009, approximately 140 tests per week or 4 tests per hour of service. \n• Overall positivity rate of 1.7% (95% CI: 1.1–2.5) with a range among the 18 events of 1.5% to 5.6%. If case finding effectiveness is the measure of efficiency the SOC2 program overall was less efficient (0.4 cases per hour) than the non-clinical sites in California described by Morris et al. where the number of chlamydia cases per paid person-hour ranged from 2.0 (95% CI 1.0–4.2) in schools to 3.2 (95% CI 1.6–6.6) in parenting centres [8]. Case yields from population screening are usually lower than from clinic based services. \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Bowden FJ, Currie MJ, Todkill M, Schmidt M, Webeck S, Del Rosario R, Bavinton T, Tyson A. A pragmatic assessment of the relative efficiency of outreach chlamydia screening events conducted in non-clinical settings. BMC public health. 2012 Dec;12(1):341.\n• Currie MJ, Schmidt M, Davis BK, Baynes AM, O’Keefe EJ, Bavinton TP, McNiven M, Martin SJ, Bowden FJ. ‘Show me the money’: financial incentives increase chlamydia screening rates among tertiary students: a pilot study. Sexual health. 2010 Mar 9;7(1):60-5.\n","• https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1471-2458-12-341\n• https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Belinda_Davis3/publication/248882418_%27Stamp_out_Chlamydia%27_project_-_Bringing_Chlamydia_screening_to_tertiary_students_in_the_Australian_capital_territory/links/581ab7a608ae30a2c01cb8db/Stamp-out-Chlamydia-project-Bringing-Chlamydia-screening-to-tertiary-students-in-the-Australian-capital-territory.pdf\n","• 10.1186/1471-2458-12-341\n• 10.1071/SH08091"]
[190,"7 Prevention services","Canada prenatal subsidy","Policy","Government","Financial incentive","Prenatal care is free, but the programme provides prenatal income support up to CAD 81.41 monthly to low-income women in the second and third trimesters, without any conditions or restrictions on spending. Health was a primary aim (improving maternal and child outcomes).","Prenatal care","Pregnant women - Socio-economic groups (low-income population)","Canada - Manitoba - Regional",2001,"2 years","Not reported","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","Birth and early life outcomes","Compared to non HBPB recipients: increase in breastfeeding initiation (RR 1.03 (1.03 to 1.09); reduction in low birth weight births ( RR 0.71 ( 0.63 to 0.81);  reduction in preterm birth (RR 0.76 (0.69 to 0.84)); reduction in small for gestational age births (RR  0.90 ( 0.81 to 0.99); increase in large for gestational age births ( RR 1.13 ( 1.05 to 1.23); increase in 1 year immunisation rate ( RR 1.13 (1.10 to 1.16) and 2-year rates ( RR 1.20 (1.15 to 1.25))","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The UK provides free at point of service prenatal care.","NA","• Brownell MD, Chartier MJ, Nickel NC, Chateau D, Martens PJ, Sarkar J, Burland E, Jutte DP, Taylor C, Santos RG, Katz A. Unconditional prenatal income supplement and birth outcomes. Pediatrics. 2016 Jun 1;137(6):e20152992. \n• Brownell MD. Impact of the Healthy Baby Prenatal Benefit on Perinatal Outcomes : A PATHS Equity for Children Project. 2015. Available from: https://www.cahspr.ca/en/presentation/55745db937dee82b15501956.","• http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/137/6/e20152992\n• https://www.cahspr.ca/en/presentation/55745db937dee82b15501956.\n","\n• NA\n• NA"]
[191,"7 Prevention services","NHS Health Checks","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary scheme which provides incentives for health checks is tested through RCT:  Types of incentives – 3 arms :  \n• Standard (no financial incentive)\n• Question–behaviour effect (QBE) where participants are sent a questionnaire as well as reminder about appointment. Prepaid envelope to return questionnaire.\n• Incentive:  Participants are sent the QBE questionnaire and a £5 retail voucher as an incentive to return questionnaire  as well as prepaid envelope. \n Health was a primary aim (to increase CVD screening) \n","Multiple health screens (CVD, kidney disease, type 2 diabetes,  stroke)","General population (40 - 74 years with no existing CVD-related comorbidities)","UK - England -16th and 14th most deprived  boroughs - Local","2013-14","6 months","Implementation costs: The Department of Health’s economic model provided evidence to show that the costs of the NHS Health Check programme would be between £180 Million and £243 Million per year (2008 costs) ","Trial phase still","RCT","completion of the health check within 6 months of invitation"," The offer of a £5 incentive did not increase the rate of return of the QBE questionnaire: difference in uptake associated with the offer of an incentive to return the QBE questionnaire was –0.01% (95% CI –1.59% to 1.58%; p = 0.995):","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported ","Not reported","Not reported ","NA","• Forster AS, Burgess C, McDermott L, Wright AJ, Dodhia H, Conner M, Miller J, Rudisill C, Cornelius V, Gulliford MC. Enhanced invitation methods to increase uptake of NHS health checks: study protocol for a randomized controlled trial. Trials. 2014 Dec;15(1):342.\n• McDermott L, Wright AJ, Cornelius V, Burgess C, Forster AS, Ashworth M, Koshaba B, Clery P, Fuller F, Miller J, Dodhia H. Enhanced invitation methods and uptake of health checks in primary care. Rapid randomised controlled trial using electronic health records. Health Technology Assessment. 2016 Nov 1;20(84):385.\n","• https://trialsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1745-6215-15-342\n• http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/67916/7/Rudisill_Enhanced%20invitation%20published_2017.pdf\n","• 10.1186/1745-6215-15-342\n• 10.3310/hta20840"]
[192,"7 Prevention services","Incentives in Diabetic Eye assessment by Screening Programme IDEAS)","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary scheme which provides incentives for diabetic eye checks: the control group gets standard care, the fixed incentive group gets a voucher offering a financial incentive of £10 after screening is completed and the probabilistic incentive group gets a voucher offering entry into a prize draw for a 1 in 100 chance of winning £1000 following attendance at screening.  Health was a primary aim (to increase rates of diabetes eye screening) ","Health screens (Diabetic Eye)","General population (+16 years olds)","UK - England - London - Local",2015,"1 month","Implementation costs: £10,000","Not reported ","RCT","Attendance to diabetic eye screening ","Those receiving incentives were not more likely to attend a DES than those receiving a usual invitation letter in patients who are regular non-attenders. Both fixed and lottery incentives appeared to reduce attendance: Participants offered incentives were 44% less likely to attend screening than controls (RR 0.56, 95% CI 0.34 to 0.92). Lottery group were 58% less likely to attend screening than controls (RR 0.42, 95% CI 0.18 to 0.98); Fixed incentive were 30% less likely to attend than control groups (RR 0.70, 95%CI 0.35 to 1.39) or between fixed and lottery incentive groups (RR 1.66, 95%CI 0.65 to 4.21).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported ","Not reported","Not reported ","NA","• Judah G, Vlaev I, Gunn L, King D, King D, Valabhji J, Darzi A, Bicknell C. Incentives in Diabetic Eye Assessment by Screening (IDEAS): study protocol of a three-arm randomized controlled trial using financial incentives to increase screening uptake in London. BMC ophthalmology. 2016 Dec;16(1):28.\n• Judah G, Darzi A, Vlaev I, Gunn L, King D, King D, Valabhji J, Bishop L, Brown A, Duncan G, Fogg A. Incentives in Diabetic Eye Assessment by Screening (IDEAS) trial: a three-armed randomised controlled trial of financial incentives.\n","• https://bmcophthalmol.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12886-016-0206-4\n• https://spiral.imperial.ac.uk/bitstream/10044/1/51549/2/3010300.pdf\n","• 10.1186/s12886-016-0206-4\n• 10.3310/hsdr05150"]
[193,"7 Prevention services","No Jab, No Play_Aus_immunisation policy","Policy","Government","Price decrease (Subsidy)","Mandatory  programme. Unless children or young people are up to date with their early childhood immunisations the families will not qualify for the child care benefit, child care rebate and family tax benefit part A. Family Tax Benefit Part A (FTB-A) is a two-part payment supporting disadvantaged families with dependent children or secondary students younger than 20 years of age, consisting of an adjusted base rate and a supplement of up to $726.35 per child at the end of the financial year. The maximum adjusted taxable income limits for FTB-A are over $100 000, and it is likely most refugee background families will be eligible for this payment. The Child Care Benefit supports costs of registered/approved childcare and outside-school-hour care, with current rates of $4.17 per hour or $208.50 per week (85% for school-aged children), which is income-tested and adjusted for family size, service type and hours attended. The Child Care Rebate (non-income-tested) covers 50% of out-of-pocket expenses for childcare to an annual limit for each child, in addition to other childcare assistance. Health was a primary aim (increase immunisation %) ","Immunisation (Childhood diseases)","General population (children and young people < 20yrs and their families)","Australia - National",2016,"NA","Passed through legislation ( Social Services Legislation Amendment (No Jab, No Pay) Act 2015)","Each state has slightly different rules ","Multiple sources, reports and government publications","Vaccination uptake","• More than 210,000 families have taken action to ensure that they now meet the immunisation requirements. \n• As a result of the Government’s No Jab No Pay policy, national immunisation rates have increased across all three target groups of one, two and five year olds. \n• This means children and the wider community are being protected from preventable diseases like whooping cough.\n• From December 2015 to March 2017, the immunisation rate for one year olds increased 1.35 percentage points to 93.63 per cent; the coverage rate for two year olds rose 1.75 percentage points to 90.06 per cent; and, the rate for five year olds increased 0.73 percentage points to 93.32 per cent. \n• Indigenous immunisation rates have also increased across all relevant age cohorts.\n• the scheme had failed to sway some parents who were unsure about the vaccination process\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Government budget papers reported that the new measures would save $508.3 million over five years.","Australian immunisation rates are actually quite high compared with other developed countries, and have topped 90% since at least the early 2000s.","No?","• National Centre for Immunisation Research and Surveillance. No Jab No Play, No Jab No Pay Policies 2017. Available from: http://www.ncirs.edu.au/consumer-resources/no-jab-no-play-no-jab-no-pay-policies/.\n• Beard FH, Leask J, McIntyre PB. No jab, no pay and vaccine refusal in Australia: the jury is out. Med J Aust. 2017 May 15;206(9):381-.\n• Paxton GA, Tyrrell L, Oldfield SB, Kiang K, Danchin MH. No Jab, No Pay—no planning for migrant children. Med J Aust. 2016 Oct 3;205(7):296-8.\n• Fielding JE, Bolam B, Danchin MH. Immunisation coverage and socioeconomic status–questioning inequity in the ‘No Jab, No Pay’policy. Australian and New Zealand journal of public health. 2017 Oct;41(5):455-7.\n• ABC News. 'Don't punish children for decisions of parents': Researcher urges rethink of no jab no play policy. 2018. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-07/nsw-urged-to-rethink-no-jab-no-play-vaccination-policy/9839992\n• JOINT MEDIA RELEASE, Further Strengthening No Jab, No Pay [press release]. Monday, 1st May 2017.\n","• http://www.ncirs.edu.au/consumer-resources/no-jab-no-play-no-jab-no-pay-policies/.\n• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/206_09/10.5694mja16.00944.pdf\n• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/205_07/10.5694mja16.00351.pdf\n• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1753-6405.12676\n• http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-06-07/nsw-urged-to-rethink-no-jab-no-play-vaccination-policy/9839992\n•  http://www.health.gov.au/internet/ministers/publishing.nsf/Content/DBB1F1F64C6FF607CA25811300090154/$File/GH041.pdf\n","• NA\n• 10.5694/mja16.00944\n• 10.5694/mja16.00351\n• 10.1111/1753-6405.12676\n• NA\n• NA"]
[194,"7 Prevention services","UW Health Gas Card Pilot Program","Programme","Health body (UW health in Madison, Wisconsin)","Financial incentive","Voluntary scheme where a gift card worth $6 at a local gas station (a gas card) is given to  participants who received diabetic tests. Health was a primary aim (increased uptake of  diabetes tests for diabetics) ","Health screens (Diabetes)","Clinical populations (diabetics)","USA - Wisconsin - Regional",2005,"2 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study","• Diabetes (HBA1C) screening uptake\n• Cholesterol (LDL-C) screening uptake\n• HbA1c Levels","• Over 2 years the target patient population received about two-thirds more screenings than the matched comparison group, and a smaller proportion. The improvement appears to persist for a relatively long time period, given the nature of the initiative.\n• Limited effect during the pilot period itself, with each targeted patient receiving 0.21 more LDL-C screenings on average during the pilot 3 months, but  following 2 years, the targeted patients were less likely than the comparison patients to receive an LDL-C screening.HbA1c Levels\n• Pilot program had some success in increasing the proportion of participants with levels of HbA1c levels that are “under control” (49% in the intervention groups, 36% in the control group), but lack of recorded HbA1c levels for many patients limits the analysis of this outcome","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Austin S, Wolfe BL. The effect of patient reminders and gas station gift cards on patient adherence to testing guidelines for diabetes. WMJ. 2011 Jun;110(3):132-7.","Link","• NA"]
[195,"7 Prevention services","Cash transfer program Oportunidades as part of the PROGRESA scheme","Policy","Government","Financial incentive","Cash transfer programme where cash transfer amount is linked to household demographic structure, but equals approximately 20% of the family’s pre-program monthly expenditures .Health was a primary aim (lifetime experience of a pregnancy and current use of a modern contraceptive method) ","Prenatal care","Women aged 15-54 years","Mexico - National",1992,"NA","• Implementation costs: Mexico invests 100 million pesos per year (about $US 8 million)in the program \n• Policy overlaps with other fiscal policy (wide ranging policy which provides cash to improve health of low-income households- much has been written about the improved educational attainment.  \n• Passed through legislation\n","Not reported ","Empirical assessment","•  lifetime experience of a pregnancy\n• current use of a modern contraceptive method\n","• smaller proportions of adolescent and young adult women exposed to Oportunidades had experienced a pregnancy (12% vs. 21%, and 51% vs. 58%); exposure to Oportunidades was not independently associated with pregnancy experience after education and other variables were controlled for\n• smaller proportions of adolescent and young adult women exposed to Oportunidades reported current use of a modern contraceptive method (4% vs. 8%, and 20% vs. 27%).\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","A greater proportion of adolescents exposed to the program reported currently being in school versus those not exposed (47% vs. 43%).  ","Not reported","Not reported","?","Darney BG, Weaver MR, Sosa-Rubi SG, Walker D, Servan-Mori E, Prager S, et al. The oportunidades conditional cash transfer program: effects on pregnancy and contraceptive use among young rural women in Mexico. International perspectives on sexual and reproductive health. 2013;39(4):205.","Link","• 10.1363/3920513"]
[196,"7 Prevention services","Chlaymdia testing England","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary Types of incentives – was 5 different arms – \n• Voucher\no £5 Tesco voucher (1 arm received voucher after test returned other received it with the test)\no £10 Tesco voucher (1 arm received voucher after test returned other received it with the test)\n• Lottery\no Entered into a lottery with a 90% chance of £0 payoff and a 10% chance of a £50 Tesco voucher\n• Choice\no Given choice of receiving a £5 Tesco voucher or being entered into the lottery (described above)\no Given choice of receiving a £10 Tesco voucher or being entered into a lottery with a 90% chance of £0 payoff and a 10% chance of a £100 Tesco voucher\n• Charity\no Receive £5 donation on their behalf to Children in Need.\n Health was a primary aim (STI (Chlamydia) screening Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year)","Health screens (Chlamydia)","General population (16-24 yr olds)","UK - England - National",2011,"2 years","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Chlamydia screening test return","• The overall return rate was 71.0%. There were  only very minor differences in return rates across incentive structures and none are statistically significantly different from the control or each other. The group receiving the £5 voucher regardless of their behaviour and those receiving the £5 voucher on sample return had the highest rates of return (73.2%) while those receiving an endowment of a £10 voucher had the lowest (67.9%).","No differential effect of any of the incentives across deprivation level","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No?","Dolan P, Rudisill C. The effect of financial incentives on Chlamydia testing rates: evidence from a randomized experiment. Social Science & Medicine. 2014 Mar 1;105:140-8.","Link","• 10.1016/j.socscimed.2013.11.018"]
[197,"7 Prevention services","Chlaymdia testing Cairns Australia","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Testing incentives to improve uptake of chlamydia screening coupled with SMS reminders: Control:  A clinic mobile telephone was set up with the SMS reminder templates ‘3 mths r up, drop in 4 a check-up or call for an appointment’. Intervention received message saying ‘3 mths r up, drop in 4 a check-up or call for an appt & get $10’. SMS reminders were manually sent on Mondays, or Tuesdays if Monday was a public holiday, for all participants due for a reminder in the coming week. Delivery reports were received. The messaging system would intermittently attempt to deliver an SMS reminder for up to 7 days before it was reported as undelivered. Health was a primary aim (increase of chlamydia screening) ","Health screens (Chlamydia)","General population (+16 years olds)","Australia - Cairns - Local",2010,"1 year","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","Chlamydia re-testing rates","SMS reminders with and without an incentive payment significantly increased chlamydia re-testing rates to 26.7% and 28.1%, respectively","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Downing SG, Cashman C, McNamee H, Penney D, Russell DB, Hellard ME. Increasing chlamydia test of re-infection rates using SMS reminders and incentives. Sex Transm Infect. 2013 Feb 1;89(1):16-9.","Link","• 10.1136/sextrans-2011-050454"]
[198,"7 Prevention services","Aus__CVDtest_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Testing incentives for attendance to CVD risk assessment. Intervention group received $25 shopping voucher for attending no cost cardiovascular risk assessment with GP within 6 months of the invitation date + information brochure. The control group received an invitation letter to attend cardiovascular risk assessment without financial incentive + information brochure.","Health screens (cardiovascular disease)","Elderly (patients aged 40–74, without diagnosed cardiovascular disease (n= 301) from two Adelaide urban general practices Sex: M (41%) Older adults (+60) in the sample: 57%)","Australia - National","2012*","6 months","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","• Screening attendance","• No significant results on the effectiveness of financial incentives:\n• Monetary incentive did not lead to a statistically significant increase in screening attendance.\n• Attendance in both groups (with and without financial incentive) was low.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic review: Tambor M, Pavlova M, Golinowska S, Arsenijevic J, Groot W. Financial incentives for a healthy life style and disease prevention among older people: a systematic literature review. BMC health services research. 2016 Aug;16(5):426., individual article: Stocks N, Allan J, Frank O, Williams S, Ryan P. Improving attendance for cardiovascular risk assessment in Australian general practice: an RCT of a monetary incentive for patients. BMC Fam Pract. 2012;13(1):54  obtained from the ","Link","• 10.1186/s12913-016-1517-0"]
[199,"7 Prevention services","USA_SmokingCessation_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT of a fixed schedule cash in incentive (Total value of incentive payments 2011 $US): $786, targeting attendance and participation of  sessions and cessation as an outcome delivered in the community and workplace.\nControl group: Usual care .","Tobacco (smoking cessation)","General adult population","USA - National","2009*","Multiple follow-ups: maximum 18 months","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","• Smoking cessation","• Smoking cessation significantly higher in intervention vs. control group: Cessation at 3 or 6 months was 20.9% in the intervention group, vs. 11.8% in the control group (p<0.001); at 9 or 12 months 14.7% in the intervention group vs. 5% in the control group (p<0.001); at 15 or 18 months 9.4% in the intervention group vs. 3.6% in the control group (p<0.001).","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From Systematic review:  Giles EL, Robalino S, McColl E, Sniehotta FF, Adams J. The effectiveness of financial incentives for health behaviour change: systematic review and meta-analysis. PloS one. 2014 Mar 11;9(3):e90347., individual article: Volpp KG, Troxel AB, Pauly MV, Glick HA, Puig A, et al. (2009) A randomized controlled trial of financial incentives for smoking cessation. The New England Journal of Medicine 360: 699–709 ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0090347"]
[200,"7 Prevention services","USA_ImmunisationHepB_Incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT of cash & specific goods/services lottery; Total value of incentive payments 2011 $US: $273 (certain component), at least $16,800 (chance component),  all instances incentivised on attendance). Delivery setting: community –  clinical - outpatient .  Control arm: Usual care ","Immunisation (Hepatitis B)","General adult population ","USA - National","2010*","5.5 months","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","• Attendance for Hep B immunization","• Attendance for all injections was significantly higher in intervention vs. control group (p=0.107).\n• Attendance for all injections in incentive group 77% vs. control 46%.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From systematic review:  Giles EL, Robalino S, McColl E, Sniehotta FF, Adams J. The effectiveness of financial incentives for health behaviour change: systematic review and meta-analysis. PloS one. 2014 Mar 11;9(3):e90347., individual articles Stitzer M, Polk T, Bowles S, T.. Kosten (2010) Drug user’s adherence to a 6-month vaccination protocol: effects of motivational incentives. Drug Alcohol Depend 107: 76–79 obtained from the systematic review: ","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0090347"]
[201,"7 Prevention services","USA_Diabetesmanagement_incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT of impact of receiving $100 if decreasing HbA1c level by 1% and $200 is decreasing it by 2% or to an HbA1c level of 6.5%. Nonfinancial incentive: peer mentoring Control group: usual care, no mentoring and no incentives.","Diabetes control (Reduction of haemoglobin A1C (HbA1C) levels after 6 months)\n","Elderly (African-American Veterans at the Philadelphia Medical Center with poor diabetes control (n= 118) Age range: 50-70y (mean age: 59-60y) Sex: M (90-100%))","USA - National","2009-2010","6 months","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","Glucose control","• NO significant results on the effectiveness of financial incentives:\n• The decrease HbA1c levels in a group with financial incentives was not statistically significant.\n• Peer mentors had a statistically significant effect on improvement of glucose control.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","From the Systematic review: Tambor M, Pavlova M, Golinowska S, Arsenijevic J, Groot W. Financial incentives for a healthy life style and disease prevention among older people: a systematic literature review. BMC health services research. 2016 Aug;16(5):426, individual articles: Long JA, Jahnle EC, Richardson DM, Loewenstein G, Volpp KG. Peer mentoring and financial incentives to improve glucose control in African American veterans: a randomized trial. Ann Intern Med. 2012;156(6):416–24.  ","Link","• 10.1186/s12913-016-1517-0"]
[202,"7 Prevention services","Faecal Occult blood test","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT testing the impact of financial incentive on uptake of faecal occult blood testing: In the 1st stage individuals were assigned to the control group and received  usual care or to the intervention group that received an incentive of $5, $10, $15 for completing their FOBT within 30days\nIn the second stage of testing incentives, control group individuals were assigned to usual care or receipt of incentives of $5, a1in10 chance of $50, or entry into a $500 raffle for completing their FOBT within 30 days.\n Health was a primary aim (colorectal screening) \n","Health screens (Colorectal cancer)","Other (veterans)","USA - Philadelphia - Local",2012,"1 month","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","FOBT completion within 30 days","• 1st stage : none of the fixed payments led to a statistically significant increase in rates of 30-day FOBT completion compared with usual care\n• 2nd stage: a 1 in 10 chance of $50 increased 30-day FOBT completion compared with usual care (between- group difference, 19.6% [95% CI, 10.7% to 28.6%]; P < 0.001). However, a $5 fixed payment and raffle for $500 did not lead to statistically significant increases in rates of 30-day FOBT completion.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kullgren, Jeffrey T., et al. \"Financial incentives for completion of fecal occult blood tests among veterans: a 2-stage, pragmatic, cluster, randomized, controlled trial.\" Annals of internal medicine 161.10_Supplement (2014): S35-S43.","Link","• 10.7326/M13-3015"]
[203,"7 Prevention services","USA_FluImmunisation_Incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT: One-off incentive of vouchers for restricted range of goods/services; the total value of incentive payments was $US: $5.16, and was targeted at attendance for influenza vaccination and paid on attendance. This programme was delivered in the community and workplace. Control arm: Usual care (influenza advertising) ","Immunisation (Influenza)","General adult population ","USA - National","2010*","1 year","Not reported","Not reported ","RCT","• Immunisation rates","• Average change in vaccination rate from previous to current year significant in intervention group (p<0.005).\n• Attendance for vaccination: 11.1% in intervention group, 4.7% in control group.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","No","Nowalk MP, Lin CJ, Toback SL, Rousculp MD, Eby C, Raymund M, Zimmerman RK. Improving influenza vaccination rates in the workplace: a randomized trial. American journal of preventive medicine. 2010 Mar 1;38(3):237-46.","Link","•  10.1016/j.amepre.2009.11.011"]

{"sheet":"Alcohol","index":11,"n_rows":20,"n_cols":27,"rows_kept":20,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["ID number","Policy area","Policy name","Evidence type","Policy owner","Mechanism type","Mechanism details ","Target risk factor/behaviour/commodity","Target population / demographics","Setting (Geographical)","Year of implementation","Timeline(s) for the policy's impact assessment","Policy implementation (policy owner, voluntary vs mandatory policy, implementation mechanism (if implemented), overlap with other policies and cost of implementation)","Follow-up actions for policy","Type of analysis","Policy outcomes (health or intermediate impact)","Quantitative outcomes (health or intermediate)","Distributional effects","Type of economic evaluation analyses ","Quantitative economic evaluation results","Other impacts (co-benefits, unintended/perverse effects) ","Revenue information (amount, beneficiary and utilisation/earmarking)","Policy context","National policy presence","Reference to original sources","Reference link","Digital Object Identifier"]
["ID number","Policy area the policy relates to","Name given to policy, if no name is established, name in the following format: [Country or country region]_[commodity or policy area]_[policy type]","Note if a policy, an academic study (eg a modelling study, RCT or smaller scale study) or a small scale programme","Name of the organisation responsible for designing and/or implementing the policy","What is (are) the mechanism(s) of the policy?","Add detail about the specifics of the policy mechanism","Which risk factor/product/commodity/behaviour is the policy aimed at?","Which segment of the population is the policy targeted at?","Country - region/locality - setting level ( Local - Regional - National - International)","Start year of the policy. If this is not available, note the year of the oldest publication on this policy followed by an asterisk e.g. 2008*."," What are the timelines for the policy’s impact assessment/follow-up?","Information on whether the policy was implemented, whether it was voluntary or mandatory, what mechanism was used for passing the policy, whether it overlaps with any other policies and any information on the cost if implementation","Combination of follow-up actions and any sunset clause","Type of analysis used to derive the outcome information","List of health or intermediate outcomes reported for the policy","The quantitative results on health and intermediate impacts achieved by the policy (values)","What distributional effects are reported on for this policy?","What type of economic evaluation analysis was undertaken?","List or paste the quantitative results from economic evaluations.","Information on any co-benefits, other unintended perverse effects, and other non-health impacts of the policy ","Combination of  fields (Revenue, beneficiary of revenues, utilisation of revenues)","Information provided on the context around the policy, including opponents and proponents.","Has the policy been implemented nationally in England (or UK country if specified). Yes, No, NA(if not a national policy) and ? If unclear","Reference used to extract information about the policy","Hyperlink to PDF if freely available; URL if not.","DOI for publications if available"]
[217,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 13","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory removal of the current Wine Equalisation Tax on wine, fortified wine and cider, and applying an excise rate equivalent to low-strength offsite beer for these beverages Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm)","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 59000 (UI 48000to 71000)\n• -1.3%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case): 15.4% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$840 (UI -$1200  to -$530)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$820 (UI -$1200  to -$510)","Not reported","Yes","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[218,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 3","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory  universal tax rate on alcoholic beverages equivalent to a 10 per cent increase in the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm)","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Implementation costs: $22 million ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 220000 (UI 180000 to 270 000)\n• -10.6%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 49.8% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$3200 (UI -$4600  to -$2000)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$3100 (UI -$4600  to -$2000)\n","Not reported","No","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[219,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 7","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tiered tax rate, with excise rate increasing exponentially by 3 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 110000 (UI 87000 to 130000)\n• -1.4%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 16% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$1500 (UI -$2200  to -$960)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$1500 (UI -$2100  to -$940)","Not reported","Yes","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[220,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 8","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory two-tiered tax system. The first tier applies a tax rate on alcoholic beverages (excepts spirits and alcopops) that increases exponentially by 3 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent; the second tier applies the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 83000 (UI 68000 to 99000)\n• -1.7%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 19.8% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$1200 (UI -$1700  to -$750)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$1200 (UI -$1700  to -$730)","Not reported","No","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[221,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 5","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tiered tax rate, with excise rate increasing exponentially by 1 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 33,000 (UI 27,000 to 40,000)\n• -0.5%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 6.6% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$470 (UI -$700  to -$300)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$450(UI -$670  to -$270)","Not reported","Yes?","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[222,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 6","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory tiered tax rate, with excise rate increasing exponentially by 2 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm)","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","•65,000 (UI 53,000 to 78,000)\n• -0.9%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 11.7% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$920(UI -$1300  to -$590)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$900(UI -$1300  to -$570)\n","Not reported","Yes?","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[223,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 9","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory two-tiered tax system. The first tier applies a tax rate on alcoholic beverages (excepts spirits and alcopops) that increases exponentially by 5 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent; the second tier applies the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm)","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 100,000 (UI 85,000 to 120,000)\n• -2.2%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 23.1% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$1500 (UI -$2100  to -$940)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$1500(UI -$2100  to -$920)\n","Not reported","Yes?","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[224,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 10","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory Two-tiered tax system. The first tier applies a tax rate on alcoholic beverages (excepts spirits and alcopops) that increases exponentially by 7 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent; the second tier applies the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits. Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 120,000 (UI 98,000 to 140,000)\n• -2.6%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 26.6% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$1700 (UI -$2500  to -$1100)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$1700(UI -$2500  to -$1000)\n","Not reported","Yes?","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[225,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 11","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory two-tiered tax system. The first tier applies a tax rate on alcoholic beverages (excepts spirits and alcopops) that increases exponentially by 10 per cent for every per cent increase in alcohol content above 3.2 per cent; the second tier applies the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops  with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all beverages, except spirits.  Health was a secondary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 140,000 (UI 110,000 to 170,000)\n• -3%\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 32.4% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$2000 (UI -$2900  to -$1200)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$2000(UI -$2900  to -$1200)\n","Not reported","Yes?","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[226,"9 Alcohol - duty/ lower strength"," AUS alcohol taxation structure model scenario 12","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory two-tiered tax system. The first tier adopts the current excise rate on low-strength beer and varies taxation rates for higher alcohol content beverages, such that total taxation receipts remain unchanged from base case; the second tier applies the current excise applicable to spirits and alcopops with a duty-free threshold of 1.15 per cent applicable to all\nbeverages, except spirits. Health ws a primary aim (aim is for alcohol taxes of beer, wine and spirits to be effective in reducing social harm) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (epidemiological and economic modelling  methodology used to model the taxation scenarios is based on the framework developed for the Alcohol Education Rehabilitation Foundation-funded project entitled “ACE– Alcohol” (assessing the cost-effectiveness of interventions to reduce the burden of harm from alcohol misuse) (Doran et al. 2008).)","• Disability-adjusted life years averted relative to base case scenario\n• Change in quantity consumed (from base case)\n","• 9,900 (UI7,300 to 13,000)\n• 3.40 %\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness","All the modelled scenarios are classified as being dominant in comparison to current practice (ie, they save money and are more effective in reducing alcohol related harm compared with what is currently being achieved).","Not reported","• Change in total tax collected (from base case) : 0% of AUD$ 8576 millions\n• Cost offsets, $millions (95% UI) : -$140 (UI -$220  to -$77)\n• Net cost, $millions (95% UI) : -$120(UI -$200  to -$55)","Not reported","Yes?","• Doran CM, Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Vandenberg B, Vos T. Estimated impacts of alternative Australian alcohol taxation structures on consumption, public health and government revenues. Med J Aust. 2013;199(9):619-22. \n• Victorian Health Promotion Foundation. Strengthening the evidence for volumetric taxation of alcohol. 2011..\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/199_09_041113/dor10605_fm.pdf\n• https://www.vichealth.vic.gov.au/media-and-resources/publications/strengthening-the-evidence-base-for-volumetric-taxation-of-alcohol\n","• 10.5694/mja13.10605\n• NA"]
[227,"9 Alcohol - lower strength","National AUS model volumetric ","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","A new mandatory uniform volumetric tax on all beverages of  AUD 41.68 per litre of alcohol (LAL)  in wine and beer, with an exemption from taxation for the first 1.15% of alcohol and retain the AUD 70.61 per LAL for spirits. Full tax pass through is assumed in the estimations.","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Panel data analysis)","Mean alcohol costs  (see disitrbutional effects for more outcomes)","Replacing the current ad valorem tax on wine with a specific tax of A$41.68 per LAL will lead to large increases in the mean annual alcohol costs for those who purchase wine, across all income quintiles: when a new specific tax is applied to 4-l casks of wine containing 36 standard drinks (or 0.456 l of pure alcohol), the estimated mean retail price per product would increase by 140% from A$12.38 to A$29.75 and there will be increases in the mean retail price of fortified wine (63%), table wine (30%) and sparkling wine (15%) under a new specific tax; more so than under a MUP policy.   ","Ad-valorem taxation will be regressive at aggregate level, but is particularly regressive for those who purchase beer than those who purchase wine.","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","In Australia, taxation of alcohol is the responsibility of the federal government which has two regimens: (i) a value-based ‘ad valorem’ tax for wine and traditional cider, and (ii) 16 different specific tax rates (excise duties on domestic products and equivalent customs duties on imported products) for beer, spirits and other excisable alcohol. The dissimilar rate of government taxation across alcohol products  in Australia translates into large disparities between product types in the amount of tax paid per standard drink, which unevenly affects the retail price of products, and can influence consumption decisions in ways that may be deleterious to health,.","No?","Vandenberg B, Sharma A. Are Alcohol Taxation and Pricing Policies Regressive? Product-Level Effects of a Specific Tax and a Minimum Unit Price for Alcohol. Alcohol Alcohol. 2016;51(4):493-502.","Link","• 10.1093/alcalc/agv133"]
[228,"9 Alcohol - lower strength","Volumetric tax Australia model scenario 1","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory volumetric tax rate that maintains the current deadweight loss of taxation: AUD$28.61 per litre of pure alcohol ; this was calculated by varying the tax rate continuously until the deadweight loss equalled that of the current tax system;  Health was a primary aim (study aimed to estimate the public health benefits and costs of implementing a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia)","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2003,"1 year","Implementation costs: annualised equivalent of AUD$0.58 Million ($0.47 to $0.69), Cost offsets: −AUD$110 Million (−$210 to −$36), Net costs: −AUD$110 Million (−$210 to −$36)  No (model) ","Not reported ","Modelling (multistate life table model)","• Disability-adjusted life years\n• Units of alcohol consumed\n","• 21 000 (12 000 to 31 000) DALYs averted\n• 2.77% reduction in alcohol units consumed\n","Not reported","Cost-effectiveness (Incremental cost-effectiveness ratio, or cost per QALY)","intervention is cost-saving and associated with a health gain","Economic the price of spirits and RTD beverages decreased and the price of beer and wine increased. The increased consumption of spirits was more than offset by reduced consumption of beer and wine.","Annual increase in taxation revenue of AUD$492 million.","Not reported","Yes?","• Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Doran CM, Vos T, Shakeshaft AP. Cost-effectiveness of volumetric alcohol taxation in Australia. Med J Aust. 2010;192(8):439-43. Epub 2010/04/21. PubMed PMID: 20402606;  \n• Byrnes J, Petrie DJ, Doran CM, Shakeshaft A. The efficiency of a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia. Applied health economics and health policy. 2012;10(1):37-49. \n• Cobiac L, Vos T, Doran CM, Wallace A. Cost effectiveness of interventions to prevent alcohol related disease and injury in Australia. Addiction 2009; 104: 1646-1655\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/192_08_190410/byr10773_fm.pdf\n•https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joshua_Byrnes/publication/51899855_The_Efficiency_of_a_Volumetric_Alcohol_Tax_in_Australia/links/5446d2cd0cf2d62c30504e27.pdf\n• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02708.x\n","• NA\n• 10.2165/11594850-000000000-00000\n• 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02708.x"]
[229,"9 Alcohol - lower strength","Volumetric tax Australia model scenario 2","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory volumetric tax rate that maintains existing taxation revenue: AUD$24.81 per litre of pure alcohol  Health was a primary aim (study aimed to estimate the public health benefits and costs of implementing a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2003,"1 year","Implementation costs: annualised equivalent of AUD$0.58 Million ($0.47 to $0.69), Cost offsets: −AUD$2.0 Million (−$3.7 to −$0.69), Net costs: −AUD$1.4 Million (−$3.2to −$0.11)  No (model) ","Not reported ","Modelling (multistate life table model)","• Disability-adjusted life years\n• Units of alcohol consumed\n","• 380 (220 to 570) DALYs averted\n• 0.05% reduction in alcohol units consumed\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The policy increased the price of beer and wine and decreased the price of spirits and RTD beverages (only marginal).","Annual increase in taxation revenue of AUD$0 million","Not reported","Yes?","• Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Doran CM, Vos T, Shakeshaft AP. Cost-effectiveness of volumetric alcohol taxation in Australia. Med J Aust. 2010;192(8):439-43. Epub 2010/04/21. PubMed PMID: 20402606;  \n• Byrnes J, Petrie DJ, Doran CM, Shakeshaft A. The efficiency of a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia. Applied health economics and health policy. 2012;10(1):37-49. \n• Cobiac L, Vos T, Doran CM, Wallace A. Cost effectiveness of interventions to prevent alcohol related disease and injury in Australia. Addiction 2009; 104: 1646-1655\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/192_08_190410/byr10773_fm.pdf\n•https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joshua_Byrnes/publication/51899855_The_Efficiency_of_a_Volumetric_Alcohol_Tax_in_Australia/links/5446d2cd0cf2d62c30504e27.pdf\n• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02708.x\n","• NA\n• 10.2165/11594850-000000000-00000\n• 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02708.x"]
[230,"9 Alcohol - lower strength","Volumetric tax Australia model scenario 3","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory volumetric tax rate equal to the existing rate applied to spirits AUD$57.97 per litre of pure alcohol to be consistent with the current tax rate applied to spirits. Health was a primary aim (study aimed to estimate the public health benefits and costs of implementing a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2003,"1 year","Implementation costs: annualised equivalent of AUD$0.58 Million ($0.47 to $0.69),  Cost offsets: −AUD$870 Million (−$1600 to −$300), Net costs: −AUD$870Million (−$1600 to −$290)  No (model) ","Not reported ","Modelling (multistate life table model)","• Disability-adjusted life years\n• Units of alcohol consumed\n","• 170 000 (99 000 to 250 000)DALYs averted\n• 23.85% reduction in alcohol units consumed\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","The policy increased in the price of beer: the negative relationship between the price of beer and consumption of spirits, measured by the cross-price elasticity, means that spirit consumption falls as people’s budget for alcohol is reduced by higher prices paid for beer.","Annual increase in taxation revenue of AUD$3094 million.","Not reported","Yes?","• Byrnes JM, Cobiac LJ, Doran CM, Vos T, Shakeshaft AP. Cost-effectiveness of volumetric alcohol taxation in Australia. Med J Aust. 2010;192(8):439-43. Epub 2010/04/21. PubMed PMID: 20402606;  \n• Byrnes J, Petrie DJ, Doran CM, Shakeshaft A. The efficiency of a volumetric alcohol tax in Australia. Applied health economics and health policy. 2012;10(1):37-49. \n• Cobiac L, Vos T, Doran CM, Wallace A. Cost effectiveness of interventions to prevent alcohol related disease and injury in Australia. Addiction 2009; 104: 1646-1655\n","• https://www.mja.com.au/system/files/issues/192_08_190410/byr10773_fm.pdf\n•https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joshua_Byrnes/publication/51899855_The_Efficiency_of_a_Volumetric_Alcohol_Tax_in_Australia/links/5446d2cd0cf2d62c30504e27.pdf\n• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02708.x\n","• NA\n• 10.2165/11594850-000000000-00000\n• 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2009.02708.x"]
[231,"9 Alcohol - lower strength","Different Alcohol Taxation and Price Policies on Health Inequalities","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory volumetric tax: Replace current excise duty with a duty of £0.22 per unit for all beverage types (UK unit = 8 g ethanol), implemented on top of the current system of excise duty and value added tax (VAT) in England - designed  tax to be comparable for political relevance, we chose the level of each policy that would achieve a 4.3% reduction in population level mortality as this is the estimated impact of a £0.50 minimum unit price, a policy that is being considered or in the process of implementation by all four UK governments. This means that Price = (net price for retailer + £0.22 × number of alcohol units in product) × (100% + 20% VAT). There is no change to any taxes in the rest of the supply chain, either at the production or wholesale stages. Health was a primary aim (study aim to appraise the relative public health merits of minimum unit pricing and three of the most common tax structures globally) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","UK - National","2014-2015","NA","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM)","• Number of deaths averted\n• Alcohol consumption and spending\n","• 4.3% reduction in number of deaths per year in total drinker population compared to baseline, corresponding to 530 fewer deaths per year\n• Largest reduction in consumption was in heavy drinkers: −2.8%  and -1.4% in moderate drinkers, compared to baseline scenario. Volumetric tax was estimated to slightly reduce spending overall (−0.8% [PSA −1.5% (UI −4.7%,+1.0%)]), with declines in all but the highest income group. Further analyses show that although the tax on beer and cider would increase under a volumetric tax of £0.22 per unit, the tax on spirits would decrease, and, together with switching behaviour, this leads to an overall reduction in spending.\n","Progressive for health. Volumetric tax was estimated to slightly reduce spending overall (−0.8% [PSA −1.5% (UI −4.7%,+1.0%)]), with declines in all but the highest income group. Further analyses show that although the tax on beer and cider would increase under a volumetric tax of £0.22 per unit, the tax on spirits would decrease, and, together with switching behaviour, this leads to an overall reduction in spending. Equity gap in the alcohol-related death rates between those in routine/manual and professional/\nmanagerial occupations in total drinker population and heavy drinkers is reduced with volumetric taxation.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Yes?","Meier PS, Holmes J, Angus C, Ally AK, Meng Y, Brennan A. Estimated effects of different alcohol taxation and price policies on health inequalities: a mathematical modelling study. PLoS medicine. 2016;13(2):e1001963.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0080936"]
[232,"9 Alcohol - lower strength","Victoria Aus model MUP vs volumetric tax","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (Tax)","Mandatory new uniform volumetric tax on all beverages of  A$41.68 per litre of alcohol (LAL) with an exemption from taxation for the first 1.15% of alcohol in all beverages ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - Victoria State -Regional","1905-07-02","1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Panel data analysis)","Mean annual change in volume of alcohol purchased per capita, %","For Wine: Ranges from -36.4% in 5th quintile ( 20% heaviest consumers) to -29.7% in 1st quintile ( 20% lowest consumers); For Beer Ranges from -2.0% in 5th quintile ( 20% heaviest consumers) to -1.7% in 1st quintile ( 20% lowest consumers); ","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Sharma A, Vandenberg B, Hollingsworth B. Minimum pricing of alcohol versus volumetric taxation: which policy will reduce heavy consumption without adversely affecting light and moderate consumers? PLoS One. 2014;9(1):e80936.","Link","• 10.1371/journal.pone.0080936"]
[233,"9 Alcohol - MUP","Saskatchewan MUP","Policy","Non-governmental (The Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority)","Price increase (MUP)","Mandatory comprehensive set of minimum prices across multiple beverage categories which were also made partially ‘alcohol volumetric’ apply both to sales in liquor stores (off-premise outlets) and to prices paid by owners of bars and restaurants (on premise outlets): Average Minimum Prices for Different Types of Alcoholic Beverage per Standard Drink (17.05 mL ethanol). Health was an indirect aim (Many Canadian provinces have implemented minimum prices for alcoholic beverages, albeit largely for revenue raising and economic reasons rather than those of public health and safety) ","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Canada - Saskatchewan - Regional",2010,"2 years","Passed through Legislation (In Saskatchewan, the Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority has a monopoly on an alcohol distribution and a partial monopoly on liquor store sales(some bars are also allowed to sell alcohol for off-premise consumption). and is therefore provided the power to control alcohol minimum pricing)","There were adjustments to mark-ups of some alcoholic drinks (e.g., a $0.16/L increase for beer introduced in April 2010) that accompanied the changes in minimum prices.","Modelling (multivariate ARIMA time-series models)","• Reduction in per capita consumption\n• Reduction in emergency department visits in all alcohol related injuries, assaults,  motor vehicle collisions and falls categories.\n","• A 10% increase in in minimum price of all beverages was  associated with a total 8.43% reduction in total alcohol, a 10.1% reduction in the consumption of  beer, a 4.6% reduction in the consumption of wine and a 5.9% reduction in the consumption of spirits, all of which were highly statistically significant\n• The implementation of  new, higher minimum price levels in Saskatchewan was associated with an approximately 40% reduction in motor vehicle collision related ED visits for women aged 26 and over only,  6 months after the policy intervention. No impact on other age groups or men.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Alcohol-related offenses: This minimum price intervention was associated with an 8.0% reduction (P<0.01) in alcohol-related night-time traffic offences among men, but there were no significant changes for women. ","Not stated amount, but mentioned that government revenue has increased. ","This natural policy experiment is perhaps the closest to Scotland’s intended policy of an MUP, but Candata does have an alcohol distribution monopoly.","NA","• Stockwell T, Zhao J, Giesbrecht N, Macdonald S, Thomas G, Wettlaufer A. The raising of minimum alcohol prices in Saskatchewan, Canada: impacts on consumption and implications for public health. American Journal of Public Health. 2012;102(12):e103-e10. \n• Stockwell T, Zhao J, Sherk A, Callaghan RC, Macdonald S, Gatley J. Assessing the impacts of Saskatchewan's minimum alcohol pricing regulations on alcohol‐related crime. Drug and alcohol review. 2017;36(4):492-501.\n• Sherk A, Stockwell T, Callaghan RC. The effect on emergency department visits of raised alcohol minimum prices in Saskatchewan, Canada. Drug Alcohol Rev. 2018;37 Suppl 1:S357-S65.\n","• https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdfplus/10.2105/AJPH.2012.301094\n• https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/dar.12471.\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29431280\n","• 10.2105/AJPH.2012.301094\n• 10.1111/dar.12471\n• 10.1111/dar.12670"]
[234,"9 Alcohol - MUP","National AUS model MUP ","Modelling study","NA","Price increase (MUP)","Mandatory a MUP of AUD$1.00 per 12.67 mls of alcohol (i.e. 1 standard drink measure in Australia). Full tax pass through is assumed in the estimations.","Alcoholic beverages","General population","Australia - National",2010,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","Modelling (Panel data analysis)","Mean alcohol costs  (see distributional effects for more outcomes)","MUP will lead to large increases in the mean annual alcohol costs for both wine and beer consumers across all income quintiles, but not for spirits consumers because the current price of most spirits products exceeds the MUP level of A$1.00 per standard drink that are modelled: e.g. 4-l casks of wine containing 36 standard drinks, the estimated mean retail price per product would increase by 190%, from A$12.38 to A$36.00       ","MUP will have a regressive impact:\n• spending increases representing 2.7% of income for consumers in the lowest-income quintile, compared with 0.3% of income for those in the highest-income quintile. \n• The predicted change in mean alcohol consumption per capita for low-income wine will be a reduction of around 11.5 standard drinks per week. For the highest-income wine consumers, the predicted change in consumption will be considerably less: around 2.5 standard drinks per week. \n• Among those who purchase beer, the mean cost increases for the lowest-income consumers will be smaller than that for the highest-income consumers (around $2.80 compared with $6.90 per week, respectively). However, these costs represent a larger proportion of income for those in the lowest-income quintile. \n• Among those who purchase beer, the predicted change in consumption among the lowest- and highest-income beer consumers will be similar: a reduction of around 5.7 and 5.4 standard drinks per week, respectively.   \n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","In Australia, taxation of alcohol is the responsibility of the federal government which has two regimens: (i) a value-based ‘ad valorem’ tax for wine and traditional cider, and (ii) 16 different specific tax rates (excise duties on domestic products and equivalent customs duties on imported products) for beer, spirits and other excisable alcohol. The dissimilar rate of government taxation across alcohol products  in Australia translates into large disparities between product types in the amount of tax paid per standard drink, which unevenly affects the retail price of products, and can influence consumption decisions in ways that may be deleterious to health,.","Yes (Scotland)","Vandenberg B, Sharma A. Are Alcohol Taxation and Pricing Policies Regressive? Product-Level Effects of a Specific Tax and a Minimum Unit Price for Alcohol. Alcohol Alcohol. 2016;51(4):493-502.","Link","• 10.1093/alcalc/agv133"]

{"sheet":"Tobacco","index":12,"n_rows":15,"n_cols":27,"rows_kept":15,"cut":false,"hidden":false,"merged":[]}
["ID number","Policy area","Policy name","Evidence type","Policy owner","Mechanism type","Mechanism details ","Target risk factor/behaviour/commodity","Target population / demographics","Setting (Geographical)","Year of implementation","Timeline(s) for the policy's impact assessment","Policy implementation (policy owner, voluntary vs mandatory policy, implementation mechanism (if implemented), overlap with other policies and cost of implementation)","Follow-up actions for policy","Type of analysis","Policy outcomes (health or intermediate impact)","Quantitative outcomes (health or intermediate)","Distributional effects","Type of economic evaluation analyses ","Quantitative economic evaluation results","Other impacts (co-benefits, unintended/perverse effects) ","Revenue information (amount, beneficiary and utilisation/earmarking)","Policy context","National policy presence","Reference to original sources","Reference link","Digital Object Identifier"]
["ID number","Policy area the policy relates to","Name given to policy, if no name is established, name in the following format: [Country or country region]_[commodity or policy area]_[policy type]","Note if a policy, an academic study (eg a modelling study, RCT or smaller scale study) or a small scale programme","Name of the organisation responsible for designing and/or implementing the policy","What is (are) the mechanism(s) of the policy?","Add detail about the specifics of the policy mechanism","Which risk factor/product/commodity/behaviour is the policy aimed at?","Which segment of the population is the policy targeted at?","Country - region/locality - setting level ( Local - Regional - National - International)","Start year of the policy. If this is not available, note the year of the oldest publication on this policy followed by an asterisk e.g. 2008*."," What are the timelines for the policy’s impact assessment/follow-up?","Information on whether the policy was implemented, whether it was voluntary or mandatory, what mechanism was used for passing the policy, whether it overlaps with any other policies and any information on the cost if implementation","Combination of follow-up actions and any sunset clause","Type of analysis used to derive the outcome information","List of health or intermediate outcomes reported for the policy","The quantitative results on health and intermediate impacts achieved by the policy (values)","What distributional effects are reported on for this policy?","What type of economic evaluation analysis was undertaken?","List or paste the quantitative results from economic evaluations.","Information on any co-benefits, other unintended perverse effects, and other non-health impacts of the policy ","Combination of  fields (Revenue, beneficiary of revenues, utilisation of revenues)","Information provided on the context around the policy, including opponents and proponents.","Has the policy been implemented nationally in England (or UK country if specified). Yes, No, NA(if not a national policy) and ? If unclear","Reference used to extract information about the policy","Hyperlink to PDF if freely available; URL if not.","DOI for publications if available"]
[204,"8 Tobacco - hypothecation - levy","French tobacco industry levy","Policy","Government","Other (Hypothecation of tobacco industry levy)","Mandatory tax of 5.6% on suppliers (fournisseurs) of tobacco. By taxing suppliers, the government casts a wide net that catches the largest supplier of tobacco in France – Logista. Brands distributed by Logista account for 98% of tobacco product sales revenue in France. The government anticipates that Logista will pass this new charge on to the big tobacco companies whose products they distribute. A key feature of this new tax is that all the money will be devoted to government anti-tobacco initiatives. The government agency normally responsible for tobacco control in France is the Health Department. However, because the new tax measure was included in the law that governs universal health insurance, the new tobacco control funds will be administered by a national health insurance agency, known by its French acronym CNAMTS (Caisse nationale de l’assurance maladie des travailleurs salariés / the French national health insurance fund for salaried workers). CNAMTS is used to administering health insurance claims, but has little experience in tobacco control. Tobacco industry estimates that this new tax will increase a 20 pack of cigarettes by 15 centimes to 6,50 euros; and will increase the price of a 30g pack of rolling tobacco by 15 centime sto 7,40 euros; and increase a pack of 20 cigarillos by 35 centines to 7 euros.  Health as an indirect aim (funding national security - NHS equivalent) ","Tobacco","General population","France - National",2017,"Not applicable","• Policy overlaps with non-fiscal policies,  including cigarette plain packaging is fully in force as of 1 January 2017). \n• Passed through legislation\n","Not reported ","Estimation of future impact","No impacts but included in framework for future reference - to add impact when available",null,"Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Government estimate a yield of 130 million Euros per year will be coming indirectly from the revenues of Big Tobacco that will be earned in France.  Earmarking of this revenue will increase France’s current government spending on anti-tobacco work (currently about 30 million Euros) more than four times over.  ","Government, notably the minister of \" solidarities and health\" and minister of \"action and public accounts\" Tobacco industry; political parties both on left and right side of political spectrum. Main arguments advanced are the impact of this hypothecation will be an increase in prices, which will increase both the illegal black market and legal  cross-border purchasing across France's many borders with countries where the price is up to 40-50% lower. Also the impact that increased prices from this industry tax will have on tobacconists in France - often the main social focal point of rural communities. Amendments suggested were that the tax be imposed on tobacco manufacturers, and not distributors (Logistica, representing 99% of tobacco distribution in France). However, this will not be possible when producers are outside of France, as the near totality of them are. ","No?","• Physicians for a smoke free Canada - http://smoke-free-canada.blogspot.com/2017/02/france-leads-way-with-four-and-counting.html\n• Article 28 LOI n° 2016-1827 du 23 décembre 2016 de financement de la sécurité sociale pour 2017 (1) (2017).https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2016/12/23/ECFX1623944L/jo#JORFARTI000033680746 \n• Décret no 2016-1671 du 5 décembre 2016 portant création d’un fonds de lutte contre le tabac (2016).\n• Marita Hefler. France: breaking new ground in tobacco control 2017. Available from: https://blogs.bmj.com/tc/2017/03/02/france-breaking-new-ground-in-tobacco-control/.\n• French Government. Projet de loi de financement de la sécurité sociale pour 2018. Article 12. 2017. Available from: https://www.nosdeputes.fr/15/seance/588#table_686.\n• Le Monde du Tabac. Nouvelles taxes sur le tabac : des motifs bien alambiqués 2016. Available from: http://www.lemondedutabac.com/nouvelles-taxes-sur-le-tabac-des-motifs-bien-alambiques/. (Tobacco industry website)\n• Ministère des affaires sociales et de la santé. Fonds de lutte contre le tabac 2018. Available from: http://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/prevention-en-sante/addictions/article/fonds-de-lutte-contre-le-tabac.","•http://smoke-free-canada.blogspot.com/2017/02/france-leads-way-with-four-and-counting.html\n• https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2016/12/23/ECFX1623944L/jo#JORFARTI000033680746 \n• https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000033540845&dateTexte=20180719\n• https://blogs.bmj.com/tc/2017/03/02/france-breaking-new-ground-in-tobacco-control/\n• https://www.nosdeputes.fr/15/seance/588#table_686\n• http://www.lemondedutabac.com/nouvelles-taxes-sur-le-tabac-des-motifs-bien-alambiques/\n• http://solidarites-sante.gouv.fr/prevention-en-sante/addictions/article/fonds-de-lutte-contre-le-tabac.\n","• NA\n• NA\n• NA\n• NA\n• NA\n• NA\n• NA"]
[205,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Burlington pregnancy vouchers 2001","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary • Experimental Group (40 women): Contingent vouchers: awarded for proven abstinence during first 5 days. From 2nd week vouchers given for urine cotinine ≤ 80 ng/ml. Vouchers entirely contingent on biochemical specimens, not on self report. Values started at USD 6.25, increasing by USD 1.25 per consecutive negative sample, to a maximum of USD 45, where they stayed until a missed visit or a positive test. If reset required, value went back to start point, but two valid tests restored to previous level \n• Control Group (37 women): Vouchers delivered independent of smoking status, at USD 15 per visit antepartum and USD 20 per visit postpartum. This would average the mean payments earned in the other group Voucher-Based Reinforcement Therapy (VBRT) applied until 12 wks post-partum. \n• Abstinence monitoring for first 5 for all pts, then twice weekly for next 7 weeks, then once a week for 4 weeks, then every other until delivery. In post-partum period, monitoring increased to every Wednesday for first 4 weeks, then bi-weekly for next 8 weeks to week 12. Final 24-week post-partum testing. All pts received standard care from their clinic, over and above trial conditions. Also a pamphlet from study staff at baseline, plus another for those not smoking at end of pregnancy. NRT was discouraged for all pts, as it might contaminate testing \n","Tobacco","Pregnant women","USA - Vermont - Burlington - Local",2001,"5.5 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Abstinence at end of pregnancy, 12 and 24 weeks post-partum.\n• Biochemical confirmation by urine cotinine < 80 ng/ml, apart from CO ≤ 6 ppm for first week \n","Odds Ratio of smoking cessation at 24 weeks post-partum ( 3.44 ( 0.34; 34.73)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Heil SH, Higgins ST, Bernstein IM, Solomon LJ, Rogers RE, Thomas CS, et al. Effects of voucher-based incentives on abstinence from cigarette smoking and fetal growth among pregnant women. Addiction 2008;103(6):1009–18. [ClinicalTrialsID: NCT00497068] \n•   FROM SRME Cahill K, Hartmann-Boyce J, Perera R. Incentives for smoking cessation. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2015(5):CD004307., individual article: Higgins ST, Bernstein IM, Washio Y, Heil SH, Badger GJ, Skelly JM, et al. Effects of smoking cessation with voucher based contingency management on birth outcomes. Addiction 2010;105(11):2023–30. \n","• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2731575/pdf/nihms96837.pdf\n• https://europepmc.org/abstract/med/25983287\n","• 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2008.02237.x\n• 10.1002/14651858.CD004307.pub5 "]
[206,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Detroit pregnancy incentives","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary • Experimental Group: 1.CD-5As: PC tablet,with interactive software; pts accessed with headphones, for privacy. Content was 5As programme (Ask, Advise, Assess, Assist, Arrange), or 5Rs (Relevance, Risks, Rewards, Roadblocks, Repetition) for those unwilling to set a quit date. Included a 4 - 6 minute professional video of black male obstetrician + 3 testimonials , tailored to pt’s reactivity, defensiveness, quit status. All gave positive advice to quit. Programme led pt through advice, feedback, plan development, support options Pts at baseline completed 5-itemadditional assessment of likelihood of quitting, intention to quit, confidence in ability to quit, readiness to quit, desire to quit 2. \n• Experimental Group: 2. CM-Lite: designed for non-treatment-seeking pts in a healthcare setting. No proactive tracking, but relying on pt to request verification of smoking status. Testing offered only at antenatal visits, rather than multiple times per day. Pts eligible for unlimited incentivisation attempts, but only five reinforcement vouchers available (retail gift cards worth USD 50).  \n• Experimental Group: 3. Combination of CD-5As and CM-Lite. \n• Control (TAU): Standard care from prenatal clinic staff, without any input from research team. Pts used PC tablets to complete a brief series of questions about their musical preferences, watched a series of tailored music videos, and answered questions about the videos, i.e. computer time was blinded, and comparable with intervention groups All pts completed baseline 11-item assessment of ease of use, enjoyment, helpfulness, satisfaction  \n• Programme was delivered by a website, which took pts through verification process and recorded result (urinary cotinine test) \n","Tobacco","Pregnant women","USA - Detroit - Local",2008,"2 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• 7-day PPA, 30-day CA, validated by CO < 4 ppm, urinary cotinine (Nicalert strips) <100 ug/ml","Odds Ratio of smoking cessation at 10 weeks post-partum (3.76 (0.43; 32.70)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Ondersma SJ, Svikis DS, Lam PK, Connors-Burge VS, Ledgerwood DM, Hopper JA. A randomized trial of computer-delivered brief intervention and low-intensity contingency management for smoking during pregnancy. Nicotine & Tobacco Research 2012;14(3):351–60. \n• FROM SRME Cahill K, Hartmann-Boyce J, Perera R. Incentives for smoking cessation. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2015(5):CD004307. individual article: Ondersma SJ, Chase SK, Svikis DS, Schuster CR.Computer-based motivational intervention for perinatal drug use. Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 2005;28(4):305–12. \n","• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3281243/\n• https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25983287\n","• 10.1093/ntr/ntr221\n• 10.1002/14651858.CD004307.pub5"]
[207,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Cessation in Pregnancy Incentives Trial (CPIT) Team","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","RCT:  Randomly allocated eligible women to either receive the offer of up to £400 of shopping vouchers (if they engaged with services and subsequently quit) added to routine specialist pregnancy stop smoking services or routine care alone. Health was a primary aim (RCT to assess the efficacy of a financial incentive added to routine specialist pregnancy stop smoking services versus routine care to help pregnant smokers quit) ","Tobacco","Pregnant women (low socio-economic communities)","UK - Scotland - Glasgow - Regional",2011,"1 year","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Pregnancy outcomes\n• QALYS\n• Smoking cessation\n","• No between group differences were seen for birth weight, still birth, miscarriage, or premature birth. With regard to postnatal relapse, of 26 cotinine validated quitters in the control group, three could not be contacted and 11 self reported as relapsed (42% of cotinine validated quitters). \n• a gain of 0.04 QALYs (95% CI: -0.058, 0.145)\n• Significantly more smokers offered incentives stopped smoking (22.5%) than controls (8.6%): RR of not smoking at the end of pregnancy was 2.63 (95% CI 1.73 to 4.01); the absolute risk difference was 14.0% (95% CI  8.2% to 19.7%); Women who were validated as abstinent by cotinine measurement towards the end of pregnancy were followed up by telephone postnatally at least 12 months after their original quit date; self report data collected at this point continued to show a large difference (15% v 4%) in abstinence rates between the incentives and control groups.; No between group differences were seen for engagement with stop smoking services,\n","Not reported","Cost-utility and lifetime Markov Modelling","• The short term incremental cost per quitter at 34-38 weeks’ gestation was £1127, and longer term cost per quality adjusted life year gained was £482\n• The lifetime model resulted in an incremental cost of £17 (95% CI: -£93, £107) and a gain of 0.04 QALYs (95% CI: -0.058, 0.145), giving an ICER of £482/QALY ($734/QALY). Probabilistic sensitivity analysis indicates uncertainty in these results, particularly regarding relapse after birth. The expected value of perfect information was £30 million (at a willingness to pay of £30,000/QALY), so given current uncertainty, additional research is potentially worthwhile.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","• Tappin DM, Bauld L, Tannahill C, de Caestecker L, Radley A, McConnachie A, et al. The cessation in pregnancy incentives trial (CPIT): study protocol for a randomized controlled trial. Trials. 2012;13:113. \n• Tappin D, Bauld L, Purves D, Boyd K, Sinclair L, MacAskill S, et al. Financial incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy: randomised controlled trial. BMJ. 2015;350:h134. \n• Tappin D, Bauld L, Purves D, Boyd K, Sinclair L, MacAskill S, et al. Financial incentives for smoking cessation during pregnancy: a randomised controlled trial. The Lancet. 2014;384:S4. \n• Boyd KA, Briggs AH, Bauld L, Sinclair L, Tappin D. Are financial incentives cost-effective to support smoking cessation during pregnancy? Addiction. 2016;111(2):360-70 \n• McConnachie A, Haig C, Sinclair L, Bauld L, Tappin DM. Birth weight differences between those offered financial voucher incentives for verified smoking cessation and control participants enroled in the Cessation in Pregnancy Incentives Trial (CPIT), employing an intuitive approach and a Complier Average Causal Effects (CACE) analysis. Trials. 2017;18(1):337.\n","• https://trialsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/1745-6215-13-113\n• https://www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h134.long\n• https://www.bmj.com/content/350/bmj.h134.long\n• http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/112073/1/112073.pdf\n• https://trialsjournal.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s13063-017-2053-x\n","• 10.1186/1745-6215-13-113\n• 10.1136/bmj.h134\n• 10.1136/bmj.h134 \n• 10.1111/add.13160\n• 10.1186/s13063-017-2053-x"]
[208,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Burlington pregnancy vouchers 2006","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary • Experimental Groups: 1. Usual contingent voucher (39 women): First 5-day week validated by CO, thereafter by urine cotinine. Vouchers based exclusively on valid bio testing, not self report. Vouchers began at USD 6.25 and rose by USD 1.25 per time to a max of USD 45. Missed or positive results meant schedule was reset, but 2 passes reset the schedule to former point \n• Experimental Groups: 2. Revised contingent voucher (40 women): Same pattern as above, but with potentially USD 296.25 available early in weeks 1 - 6 by maintaining a ≤ 4 ppm breath CO in week 1 (i.e. USD 18.75 day 1 to USD 33.75 day 5 (going up by USD 3.75 per day)), testing cotinine-negative on 2nd Monday for an additional USD 87.50 and thereafter testing negative twice per week to week 6. The 2nd test each week increased by USD 15.50 if it was negative and the first had also been negative. This was meant to reinforce early continuous abstinence\n• Non-contingent voucher [Control Group] (39 women): Voucher value was USD 15 per antepartum and USD 20 per postpartum visit, irrespective of smoking status. Total available earnings were comparable across all 3 groups Duration: to 24 weeks post-partum \n• All pts received standard antenatal care for smoking; study staff delivered additional counselling as 4 sessions over first 2 weeks, at final antepartum visit and during 3 postpartum study visits. Those who quit during pregnancy got brief counselling at routine visits whenever they reported temptations to smoke. Study staff used a printed booklet tailored for pregnant smokers, . Women chose one of next 2 Mondays as a quit date; were then monitored from Monday to Friday that week, Monday and Thursday next 7 weeks, then every Wednesday for 4 weeks, then every other Wednesday until delivery for the UCV and NCV groups; in the RCV group it was every other week to wk 12 and then every 3rd week through to delivery. After delivery all 3 groups were on weekly monitoring for 4 wks, then every other week through to 12 wks post-partum. One final assessment at 24 wks. People who relapsed could continue the schedule or recycle back round the entire process (only offered once per woman). This was used fairly equally by all 3 groups (RCV 40%, UCV 46% and NCV 41%) ","Tobacco","Pregnant women","USA - Vermont - Burlington - Local","2006-2012","5.5 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• 7-day PPA at baseline, 1m, end of pregnancy, 2, 4, 8, 12 and 24 wks post-partum. Biochemical validation: CO ≤ 4 ppm or 6 ppm, + urine cotinine ≤ 80 ng/ml","Odds Ratio of smoking cessation at 24 weeks post-partum (2.55 (0.61; 10.66)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","FROM SRME Cahill K, Hartmann-Boyce J, Perera R. Incentives for smoking cessation. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2015(5):CD004307., individual article: Higgins ST, Washio Y, Lopez AA, Heil SH, Solomon LJ, Lynch ME, et al. Examining two different schedules of financial incentives for smoking cessation among pregnant women. Preventive Medicine 2014;pii: S0091-7435 (14):00118-2.","Link","• 10.1002/14651858.CD004307.pub5"]
[209,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Chesterfield smoking cessation trial for pregnancy","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","The scheme involved provision of a shopping voucher upon carbon monoxide  validation of self-reported abstinence. The size of incentives increased by £1 for each visit at which smoking cessation was confirmed, from the first voucher (worth £8) to the last voucher (worth £39), providing a maximum total of £752-worth of vouchers. Testing positive for smoking resulted in the incentive being withheld at that visit and the value being reset to baseline (£8) for the next visit. Following two consecutive test results indicating no smoking, the incentive value was reset to the highest point attained prior to the lapse. Up to 32 visits were possible from early pregnancy until 6 months postpartum (up to 16 during pregnancy and 16 post delivery), occurring most frequently in the first 2weeks of participation and the first 2 weeks after birth and then decreasing in frequency until delivery and 6 months postpartum, respectively.","Tobacco","Pregnant women (low socio-economic communities)","UK - Derbyshire - Regional",2011,"10 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Single arm RCT","• Smoking quit attempts\n• Smoking cessation at delivery\n• Smoking cessation at 6 months postpartum\n","• Smoking quit attempts: 60% of those enroled on the scheme made a quit attempts (received at least one voucher for smoking cessation)\n• Smoking cessation at delivery: 20% of those enroled into the scheme, and 64% of those who initiated a quit attempt were confirmed sustained quitters at deliver (representing 8% of the total cohort of 615 smokers)\n• Smoking cessation at 6 months postpartum: 10% of those enroled on the scheme we confirmed sustained quitters at 6 months postpartum; (representing 4% of the total cohort of 615 smokers)\n","• No difference in making a quit attempt between women who were most deprived compared to those who were less deprived.\n• Comparing those quit at delivery with those enroled who did not quit, the chances of being quit at delivery decreased in women who were more deprived compared to those who were less deprived.\n• Comparing those quit at 6months postpartum with those who enroled but were not quit at this time, the chances of being quit at 6months postpartum decreased in women who were more deprived compared with those who were less deprived.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Ierfino D, Mantzari E, Hirst J, Jones T, Aveyard P, Marteau TM. Financial incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy: A single‐arm intervention study assessing cessation and gaming. Addiction 2015;110(4):680-8.","Link","• 10.1111/add.12817"]
[210,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Dallas Tobacco Cessation Clinic Incentive","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary. Eligible participants (n =153) were randomly assigned to usual care (UC) for smoking cessation (n = 75) or to UC plus financial incentives for smoking abstinence (CM; n =78). Participants assigned to CM received all components of UC as described previously. In addition, participants had the opportunity to earn weekly incentives in the form of gift cards, if they (1) self-reported abstinence during the past approximately 12 hours on the quit day (i.e., abstinence since 10 P.M. the previous evening), or self-reported abstinence during the past 7 days at each weekly visit from 1 week through 4 weeks after the quit date; and (2) provided an expired CO sample consistent with abstinence (i.e., CO £ 10 ppmon the quit date, CO<8 ppmat weeks 1---4 after the quit date). Participants earned a $20 gift card to a popular retail chain in exchange for biochemically confirmed abstinence on the quit date. An escalating schedule was employed, such that the amount of the incentives increased by $5 with each weekly successive abstinent visit through 4 weeks after the quit date (up to $150 total). Participants who were non abstinent at any visit were eligible to earn incentives for abstinence at the next visit, although the amount was reset to $20. Health was a primary aim (evaluated the effectiveness of offering adjunctive financial incentives for abstinence (contingency management [CM]) within a safety net hospital smoking cessation program) Short-term elasticities (i.e. 1-2 year) majority uninsured, unemployed, and had a household income of less than $12 000 per year)","Tobacco","Socio-economic (low income population)","USA - Texas - Regional",2011,"1 month","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Smoking cessation","• CM participants were significantly more likely to achieve 7-day point prevalence abstinence than UC participants at 4 weeks after the quit date (49.3% [n=37] vs 25.4% [n= 18] abstinent; all Ps <0.05)., \n• CM participants were also more likely to achieve 30-day point prevalence abstinence at 12 weeks after the quit date (28.1% [n=18] vs 10.9% [n =7] abstinent).  \n• CM participants were more likely to achieve continuous abstinence at 12 weeks after the quit date compared to usual care participants (20.3% [n=13] vs 7.8% [n=5] abstinent). CM participants were more likely to achieve continuous abstinence at 4 and 12 weeks after the quit date, even when more conservative definitions of continuous abstinence were used.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Kendzor DE, Businelle MS, Poonawalla IB, Cuate EL, Kesh A, Rios DM, et al. Financial incentives for abstinence among socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals in smoking cessation treatment. American journal of public health. 2015;105(6):1198-205","Link","• 10.2105/AJPH.2014.302102"]
[211,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Give It Up For Baby","Programme","Government (NHS Tayside Health Board)","Financial incentive","Voluntary scheme to encourage smoking cessation in pregnant women. Those who agreed to take part were asked to set a quit date and received an initial brief intervention and then attended for weekly support from a member of the local pharmacy team for up to 12 weeks.  An incentive payment of £12.50 was chosen arbitrarily for the intervention; little evidence on effective levels of payment was available to inform judgement. The administrative system enabled participants to be credited with their weekly incentive payment within about 5 working days, which they could then redeem at a local participating supermarket in return for any goods, excluding alcohol and tobacco products. Health was a primary aim (Give it Up for Baby was specifically designed to help pregnant women living in deprived communities to stop smoking)","Tobacco","Pregnant women (low socio-economic communities)","UK - Scotland - Glasgow - Regional","2007-2009","3 months","Not reported ","Not reported ","Epidemiological study + behavioural insights","• Smoking cessation","• Around one fifth of pregnant women identified as smokers engaged with GIUFB.\n• All smokers together: Overall, 7.8% of pregnant smokers across the three areas had quit at four weeks, with on-going measures showing 5.1% quit at three months and 4% tobacco-free at delivery.\n• Analysis shows rates were 54% at 4 weeks, 32% at 12 weeks and 17%, 3 months after birth in those who engaged in the programme.\n• Of the 393 quit attempts 101 (26%) resulted in no payment, primarily because they were smoking after the first week, but also because of participants not continuing with the scheme further than the initial visit. ","Overall, around 47% of those in the most deprived quintile who set a quit date remained quitters at 4 weeks vs in 68% in 2nd quintile and52% in top quintile (least deprived), significant difference at p<0.001","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Radley A, Ballard P, Eadie D, MacAskill S, Donnelly L, Tappin D. Give It Up For Baby: outcomes and factors influencing uptake of a pilot smoking cessation incentive scheme for pregnant women. BMC Public Health. 2013;13:343.","Link","• 10.1186/1471-2458-13-343"]
[212,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Supporting a Smoke Free Pregnancy Scheme (SaSFPS)","Implemented scheme assessment","Government (Local government)","Financial incentive","The SaSFPS set out a common protocol that defined the enhanced support that was provided across all areas. Enhanced support was offered to those women who set a quit date and achieved a 4-week quit, within the scheme, and to encourage them to remain smoke free throughout the pregnancy and for 12 weeks post-partum. This comprised: • providing face-to-face contact, at least 4-weekly, between the pregnant woman and a smoking cessation advisor; • recruiting a non-smoking “significant other” to support the women’s quit attempt throughout the pregnancy and the postpartum period; • performing CO screening, as a motivational tool, at each 4-weekly contact meeting; • provide a voucher to the pregnant woman, as a financial reward, for each 4-weeks that she remained smoke free - subject to validation by CO screening • keeping an accurate record of 4-weekly contact for each individual registered on the scheme. Women agreeing to participate in the SaSFPS received “Love to Shop” vouchers that could be spent at a range of high street shops (Love to Shop vouchers cannot be used for the purchase of alcohol or tobacco). Each woman was eligible to receive a maximum of £260 worth of vouchers - if she was recruited in the early weeks of pregnancy and remained smokefree at the 12-weeks post-partum point. Incentives were phased: • to set and maintain a 4-week quit date, each woman received a £10 voucher for each week that she remained quit; • every subsequent four weeks that she remained non-smoking, and where this was verified by CO screening, each woman received a further £20 voucher; • the final financial incentive was a £60 voucher if she had stayed quit at 12 weeks post-partum – again, this was subject to CO verification.  ","Tobacco","Pregnant women","UK - North West- Regional",2012,"13 months","This scheme was based upon the Pregnancy Reward Scheme, an incentivised relapse prevention programme for pregnant women, evaluated by the UK Centre for Tobacco and Alcohol Studies and the University of Stirling. This scheme provided the groundwork for the SaSFPS and was the forum within which obstacles were conquered; of note here gift cards or vouchers could not be used to purchase tobacco or alcohol. The project had a total budget of £101k. This was based on the cost of providing vouchers to a value of up to £260 for up to 408 women across North West England. The vouchers were acquired by utilising unused vouchers from the earlier Reward scheme. If the vouchers had not been used and returned to the voucher issuers, they would have been refunded at a 50% rate. Hence the marginal cost for running the scheme was about £50kThe project did not lead to additional costs for the local areas involved, as the work by local SaSFPS project leads and stop smoking advisers was performed within pre-existing job roles. Tobacco Free Futures is funded as a local collaborative programme, which covered project development and management costs. ","The scheme has since run in Greater Manchester and Lancashire and has just commenced in Stoke. It will be running across the next 5 years in Suffolk. Discussions are underway about an extended scheme for GM as part of a wider package to support smokefree pregnancy.","Epidemiological analysis","• Four-week quit rate\n• Smoking cessation at delivery\n• Smoking cessation at 12 weeks postpartum","• 69% (n=277) of the 403 women recruited to the scheme set a quit date and achieved a four-week quit\n• 71% (n=200) of those who were quit at 4 weeks went on to be still quit at time of delivery – these were all CO validated\n• 51% (n=142) of those who were quit at 4 weeks were still not smoking at 12 weeks post-partum.\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","46% (n=36) of respondents reported that somebody close to them had quit because they themselves had quit or because they were pregnant. Although it cannot be stated definitively from the survey data, it is likely that many of these included the significant others who also gave up.","Not reported","Not reported","NA","Tobacco Free Futures. Supporting a Smokefree Pregnancy Scheme: A Success Story.","Link","• NA"]
[213,"8 Tobacco - incentives for cessation","Baltimore pregnancy incentives","RCT","NA","Financial incentive","Voluntary • Control group: Treatment as usual: All pts completed an initial 8-day residential course, then went to outpatient status. In 1st wk, all completed an Addiction Severity Test (ASI), a structured clinical interview for DSM-IV disorders (SCID), revised FTND. CO testing 3 times per wk, urine samples 3 times per wk (cotinine) + random cocaine testing once a week ASI repeated at 1m and 3m and at 6 wks post-partum, + CO and urine tests. At each testing all pts received brief (10 mins) MI feedback. Standard info on adverse effects of smoking for mother and baby. RCT of financial incentives for smoking cessation in pregnancy:  Control group: Treatment as usual: All patients completed an initial 8-day residential course, then went to outpatient status. Carbon Monoxide testing 3 times per week, urine samples 3 times per week (for cotinine) + random cocaine testing once a week. At each testing all patients received brief (10 mins) feedback. Standard info on adverse effects of smoking for mother and baby.  In the experimental Group: patients received cognitive behavioural therapy: 12 weeks of eligibility for contingent behavioural incentives rewards contingent on reduction or abstinence. Incentives for each negative breath test on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, as follows: week 1: any reduction; weeks 2 - 4 10% reduction; weeks 5 - 7: 25% reduction; weeks 8 - 9: 50% reduction; weeks 10 - 11: 75% reduction; week 12 - delivery: abstinence (CO < 4ppm). Vouchers started at USD 7.50 and increased by USD 1 per day up to USD 41.50. If negative sample missed through the 12 weeks, schedule was reset to USD 7.50. If patient achieved 5 consecutive negative tests, the voucher value was restored to former level NCBI group: “pseudo-yoked” schedules. NCBI pts were each yoked to a random participant in the pilot study (i.e. had submitted CO samples for at least 2 weeks). Patients were told that their behaviour did not determine rewards received, but that they would receive incentives as per a previously established schedule. NCBI patients had to give breath and urine samples to receive their scheduled incentive. They were eligible for 12 weeks or until delivery.• Experimental Group: CBI: 12 wks of eligibility for contingent behavioural incentives rewards contingent on reduction or abstinence. Incentives for each negative breath test on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, as follows: wk 1: any reduction; wks 2 - 4 10% reduction; wks 5 - 7: 25% reduction; wks 8 - 9: 50% reduction; wks 10 - 11: 75% reduction; wk 12 - delivery: abstinence (CO < 4ppm) Voucher started at USD 7.50 and increased by USD 1 per day up to USD 41.50. If negative sample missed through the 12 wks, schedule was reset to USD 7.50. If pt achieved 5 consecutive negative tests, the voucher value was restored to former level NCBI: “pseudo-yoked” schedules. NCBI pts were each yoked to a random participant in the pilot study (i.e. had submitted CO samples for at least 2 wks). Pts were told that their behaviour did not determine rewards received, but that they would receive incentives as per a previously established schedule. NCBI pts had to give breath and urine samples to receive their scheduled incentive. They were eligible for 12 wks or until delivery ","Tobacco","Pregnant women (methadone maintained)","USA - Baltimore - Local",2005,"1.5 months ","Not reported ","Not reported ","RCT","• Cessation was PPA, biochemically verified (CO < 4 ppm; urinary cotinine < 300 ng/ml)","Odds Ratio of smoking cessation at 10 weeks post-partum (29.75(1.69; 523.18)","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","NA","FROM SRME Cahill K, Hartmann-Boyce J, Perera R. Incentives for smoking cessation. Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2015(5):CD004307. Tuten M, Fitzsimona H, Chisolm MS, Nuzzo PA, Jones HE. Contingent incentives reduce cigarette smoking among pregnant, methadone-maintained women: results of an initial feasibility and efficacy randomized clinical trial. Addiction 2012;107(10):1868–77. ","Link","• 10.1111/j.1360-0443.2012.03923.x"]
[214,"8 Tobacco - MUP","US minimum pack price model - $5","Policy","Government (Food and Drug Administration (FDA))","Price increase (MUP)","Mandatory  federal retail minimum price for cigarettes ($5 per pack) Health was a primary aim (reduction of consumption) ","Tobacco","General population","USA - National",2013,"1 year","Not reported","Not reported","Modelling (log-linear regression model)","• Expected pack price\n• Expected reduction in sales\n• Numbers of smokers quitting\n","• $6.20 per pack\n• 549 million packs (95% CI (445 m to 654 m)) per year nationally, corresponding to an approximate 4.0% reduction in sales.\n• 1 million fewer smokers due to cessation\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","A federal minimum price is now a viable policy option in the USA due to the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), which provided the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with the authority to regulate retail tobacco sales. The TCA gives the FDA broad authority to ‘require restrictions on the sale and distribution of a tobacco product, including restrictions on access to, and the advertising and promotion of, the tobacco product”’ (FSPTCA, 906(d))  .","No","Doogan NJ, Wewers ME, Berman M. The impact of a federal cigarette minimum pack price policy on cigarette use in the USA. Tob Control. 2018;27(2):203-8.","Link","• NA"]
[215,"8 Tobacco - MUP","US minimum pack price model - $7","Policy","Government (Food and Drug Administration (FDA))","Price increase (MUP)","Mandatory federal retail minimum price for cigarettes ($7 per pack) Health was a primary aim (reduction of consumption)","Tobacco","General population","USA - National",2013,"1 year","Not reported","Not reported","Modelling (log-linear regression model)","• Expected pack price\n• Expected reduction in sales\n• Numbers of smokers quitting\n","• $7.37 per pack\n• 2.5 billion packs (95% CI (2.02 b to 2.95 b)) per year nationally, corresponding to an approximate 18.0% reduction in sales.\n• 4.7 million fewer smokers due to cessation\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","A federal minimum price is now a viable policy option in the USA due to the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), which provided the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with the authority to regulate retail tobacco sales. The TCA gives the FDA broad authority to ‘require restrictions on the sale and distribution of a tobacco product, including restrictions on access to, and the advertising and promotion of, the tobacco product”’ (FSPTCA, 906(d))  .","No","Doogan NJ, Wewers ME, Berman M. The impact of a federal cigarette minimum pack price policy on cigarette use in the USA. Tob Control. 2018;27(2):203-8.","Link","• NA"]
[216,"8 Tobacco - MUP","US minimum pack price model - $10","Policy","Government (Food and Drug Administration (FDA))","Price increase (MUP)","Mandatory  federal retail minimum price for cigarettes ($10 per pack). Health was a primary aim (reduction of consumption) ","Tobacco","General population","USA - National",2013,"1 year","Not reported","Not reported","Modelling (log-linear regression model)","• Expected pack price\n• Expected reduction in sales\n• Numbers of smokers quitting\n","• $10.06 per pack\n• 5.7 billion packs (95% CI (4.75 b to 6.60b)) per year nationally, corresponding to an approximate 41.0% reduction in sales.\n• 10.7 million fewer smokers due to cessation\n","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","Not reported","A federal minimum price is now a viable policy option in the USA due to the 2009 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA), which provided the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) with the authority to regulate retail tobacco sales. The TCA gives the FDA broad authority to ‘require restrictions on the sale and distribution of a tobacco product, including restrictions on access to, and the advertising and promotion of, the tobacco product”’ (FSPTCA, 906(d))  .","No","Doogan NJ, Wewers ME, Berman M. The impact of a federal cigarette minimum pack price policy on cigarette use in the USA. Tob Control. 2018;27(2):203-8.","Link","• NA"]