

Extract from The United Kingdom Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012 – Regulation 5:

“The sole objective of the investigation of an accident under the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012 shall be the prevention of future accidents through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances. It shall not be the purpose of an such investigation to determine liability nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve its objective, to apportion blame.”

NOTE

This report is not written with litigation in mind and, pursuant to Regulation 14(14) of the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012, shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose purposes is to attribute or apportion liability or blame.

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Grounding of the general cargo ship *Islay Trader* Margate, UK 8 October 2017

SUMMARY

At 0242¹ on 8 October 2017, the Barbados registered general cargo ship *Islay Trader* grounded off Margate, Kent, United Kingdom. The vessel re-floated approximately 12 hours later and anchored nearby. The following day, *Islay Trader* proceeded to Antwerp, Belgium to discharge cargo before continuing to Dordrecht, Netherlands, for inspection and repair. The vessel sustained indentations to its bow and bent frames, but there were no injuries and no pollution.

Islay Trader had dragged its anchor and was moving to re-anchor in another position when it grounded. The MAIB investigation identified:

- The vessel dragged its anchor because the length of anchor cable used was insufficient in the tidal conditions experienced.
- The chief officer did not monitor the vessel's position and was not aware that the vessel had dragged its anchor until alerted by the London Vessel Traffic Service.
- The master was not told that the vessel had dragged its anchor because the chief officer did not want to disturb him, and he was confident he could reposition the vessel himself.
- After weighing anchor, the chief officer soon became uncertain of the vessel's position and was overwhelmed by the situation.



Islay Trader

¹ All times are UTC+1 unless otherwise stated.

- The navigational practices on board *Islay Trader* were adversely impacted by the pressures resulting from having only two bridge watchkeepers.
- Interventions by the London Vessel Traffic Service that were intended to stop the vessel from grounding were timely and appropriate.

A recommendation has been made to *Islay Trader*'s owner and manager, Faversham Ships Ltd, aimed at improving the standard of navigational and bridge watchkeeping practices on board its vessels.

FACTUAL INFORMATION

Narrative

At 1505 on 7 October 2017, the Barbados registered general cargo ship *Islay Trader* sailed from Murphy's Wharf, Greenwich, carrying 2170t of broken glass. The vessel's maximum draught was 4.5m.

At 2115, *Islay Trader* anchored in Margate Road (**Figure 1**), where the master intended the vessel would remain overnight before commencing passage to Antwerp, Belgium at 1100 the following morning. The vessel had been unable to remain alongside Murphy's Wharf as the berth was required for another vessel.

On letting go the starboard anchor with 3 shackles of cable in the water, *Islay Trader*'s master set radar variable range markers (VRM) on the shore to the south, and *Sea Ruby*, a cargo vessel that was anchored 0.7nm to the west. The radar display was set at the 3nm range scale, centred and oriented north-up. The master also set the navigation status on the automatic identification system (AIS) to 'At Anchor' and recorded the vessel's position in the deck logbook. He then remained on the bridge.

At 2300, *Islay Trader*'s master handed over the bridge anchor watch to the chief officer. During the handover, the chief officer checked the vessel's position and read and signed the master's night orders, which stated:

Follow passage plan as far as traffic density allows

Follow masters & Company standing orders

Follow collision & TSS regulations & VTS ADVICES

Keep a radio watch and Log calls & report in to coast stations as required. & REPORTING POINTS

Keep a sharp lookout at all times especially for small craft.

At daylight if all clear send lookout down.

Keep watch alarm switched on at all times.

Between 2000hrs and 0600hrs switch watch alarm on 9mis.

Take all weather report, if necessary, CL 8

CALL ME AT ANY TIME NEEDED OR WHEN EVER IN DOUBT [sic]

On completion of the watch handover, the master went to his cabin and then to bed. The chief officer remained alone on the bridge, where he reportedly corrected charts and completed the passage plan to Antwerp.




Figure 1: Extract of Admiralty chart 1828 showing Islay Trader's AIS positions

At 0158 the following morning (8 October), a Port of London Authority Vessel Traffic Services Officer (VTSO), who had noticed that *Islay Trader* was close to Margate Sand (**Figure 1**), called the vessel via very high frequency (VHF) radio (**Table 1**):

| Time | Transmission by | Transcript |
|---------|---------------------|--|
| 0158:10 | London VTS | <i>Islay Trader</i> , <i>Islay Trader</i> , London VTS, London VTS, over. |
| 0158:21 | London VTS | <i>Islay Trader</i> , <i>Islay Trader</i> , <i>Islay Trader</i> this is London VTS, London VTS over. |
| 0158:29 | <i>Islay Trader</i> | Yes, London VTS this is the <i>Islay Trader</i> . |
| 0158:33 | London VTS | <i>Islay Trader</i> , London VTS. Can you check your position, you may have dragged anchor? I advise you to proceed to the south, approximately half a mile to the south for the deeper water for the anchorage. |

Table 1: VHF radio exchange between *Islay Trader* and London VTS at 0158

The chief officer plotted *Islay Trader*'s position shown on a global positioning system (GPS) receiver onto the paper chart and saw that the vessel was less than 4 cables from the shallow water to the north-west. The chief officer instructed the chief engineer to start the vessel's engine and two able bodied seamen (AB) to heave in the anchor.

At 0213, the chief officer informed London VTS that he intended to re-anchor *Islay Trader* near the south-east Margate cardinal buoy (**Figure 1**). He planned to steer the vessel to the south until the buoy was on its starboard beam and then alter onto a westerly heading and re-anchor in the charted anchorage in the channel to the west of the buoy.

By 0220, the vessel had weighed anchor and was heading to the south at about 5 knots (kts). The chief officer had also changed the navigation status on the AIS to 'Under Way' and advised the two ABs that the anchor would be let go again in about 30 minutes. The ABs remained on the fo'c'sle and the chief engineer accompanied the chief officer on the bridge.

At 0233, the VTSO saw that *Islay Trader* was heading further to the south than he had expected (**Figure 2**) and again called the vessel via VHF radio (**Table 2**)


| Time | Transmission by | Transcript |
|---------|---------------------|--|
| 0233:27 | <i>Islay Trader</i> | London VTS, <i>Islay Trader</i> . |
| 0233:29 | London VTS | <i>Islay Trader</i> , London VTS. Position is good to anchor, there. Do not proceed any further south. |
| 0233:39 | <i>Islay Trader</i> | Yeah, OK thanks for that. I will see where we are. Thanks for that information [unintelligible]. |

Table 2: VHF radio exchange between *Islay Trader* and London VTS at 0233

At 0235, *Islay Trader*'s chief officer plotted a GPS position on the paper chart. Meanwhile, the VTSO became increasingly concerned about the vessel's southerly track (**Figure 3**). At 0236, he again called the vessel (**Table 3**):

| Time | Transmission by | Transcript |
|---------|---------------------|---|
| 0236:13 | London VTS | <i>Islay Trader</i> , proceed to the north, turn your vessel to the north. No further to the south. |
| 0236:20 | <i>Islay Trader</i> | Yes, understood. I'm turning now to the north, turning to the north, thank you. |

Table 3: VHF radio exchange between *Islay Trader* and London VTS at 0236



Meanwhile, the ABs on the fo’c’sle also advised the chief officer via hand-held radio that the vessel was getting close to the shore lights and the chief engineer had asked the chief officer “*where are you going?*” The VTSO continued to monitor *Islay Trader* and saw that the vessel was closing the shallows off Margate (**Figure 4**). At 0238, he again called the vessel and the resulting exchanges took place (**Table 4**):

| Time | Transmission by | Transcript |
|---------|---------------------|--|
| 0238:04 | <i>Islay Trader</i> | Errrr, London VTS, <i>Islay Trader</i> . I’m still turning to the north but still not moving [unintelligible]. |
| 0238:15 | London VTS | <i>Islay Trader</i> , yes turn your vessel to the north. Do not proceed any further south, your vessel will be into shallow water shortly. Turn your vessel north. |
| 0239:13 | <i>Islay Trader</i> | London VTS this is the <i>Islay Trader</i> . I still are pushing my ships astern but still not moving yet. |
| 0239:22 | London VTS | <i>Islay Trader</i> . Understood, you are attempting to go astern, received. |
| 0239:26 | <i>Islay Trader</i> | Yes, I’m still putting my stern [unintelligible]. |




Figure 4: VTS radar extract showing *Islay Trader* at 0238

Table 4: VHF radio exchange between *Islay Trader* and London VTS between 0238 and 0239

At some point, *Islay Trader*’s chief officer moved the controls of the vessel’s Schottel Rudderpropellers (**Figure 5**) to provide propulsion astern, but the vessel continued to head towards the south at about 7kts. He asked the chief engineer if there was a problem. In response, the chief engineer replied that the engines were working as normal. As *Islay Trader* passed a tide gauge, close off Margate’s sea front, the chief officer ordered the ABs on the fo’c’sle to let go the starboard anchor. The ABs did so, and allowed 1 shackle of cable to run free.

At 0242, *Islay Trader* grounded as it crossed the 0m depth contour (**Figure 1**). The vessel’s master was woken up by changes in engine noise and vibration. A call from the chief engineer alerting him to the situation soon followed. When the master arrived on the bridge, he attempted to re-float the vessel by




Figure 5: Front console of conning position

using astern propulsion, but his attempts were unsuccessful. The vessel eventually settled bows south onto a slipway, very close to a life-size sculpture by the artist Sir Antony Gormley (**Figure 6**). The ballast tanks were sounded, but no evidence of water ingress or other damage was found. The master informed *Islay Trader*'s owners and Dover Coastguard of the situation.

Re-floating and inspection

Later during the morning of 8 October, a technical superintendent from Faversham Ships Ltd, *Islay Trader*'s owner and manager, and a classification society surveyor, attended and assessed the vessel's condition. The vessel was subsequently authorised to discharge its cargo in Antwerp, and then proceed to Dordrecht, Netherlands, for a hull inspection.

At 1420, *Islay Trader* was re-floated with tug assistance. Faversham Ships Ltd ordered *Islay Trader*'s master to anchor the vessel in Margate Road to enable its crew to rest. When the vessel appeared to start passage towards Antwerp, the ship owner/manager intervened and again instructed the master to anchor. *Islay Trader* then anchored until 2355. The vessel arrived in Antwerp at 1800 the following day.

Inspections

On 12 October, an out of water inspection in Dordrecht identified that *Islay Trader*'s hull was indented below the waterline either side of the bow (**Figure 7**). Five vertical stiffeners were also bent in way of a fresh water tank towards the stern.

A Flag State inspection was also conducted while *Islay Trader* was in Dordrecht. Its findings included:

- *Poor implementation of navigational procedures:*
 - *Passage planning was very limited. Only waypoints and headings were marked on the paper charts. Position fixing methods or intervals were not defined.*




Figure 6: *Islay Trader* aground



Figure 7: Bow damage

- *Positions were rarely marked on the paper charts. Less than 5 positions were found charted during the passage from the anchorage to the Antwerp pilot station.*
- *Where positions were marked, only GPS positions were charted, no evidence existed of the use of radar or visual means of position fixing.*
- *Chart updating was poor. Charts checked at random were missing Preliminary and Temporary notices.*
- *Standing orders were not countersigned by OOW.*
- *Night orders were not specific for the type of watch (at the time of the accident the night orders showed navigation watch warnings instead of anchor watch details).*
- *No anchor log book was kept. In absence of such, the bearings and distances were also not marked in the deck log book.*
- *Hours of work and rest*
 - *Although watch keeping rotas are posted for all crew, they were not followed.*
 - *Records of hours of rest are not being recorded accurately.*

AIS data

AIS transmissions from *Islay Trader* indicate that the vessel started to drag anchor and move from its initial anchor position towards the north-west at 2353 (**Figure 1**). From then, until being alerted by London VTS at 0158, the vessel's speed over the ground reached a maximum of 1.2kts (0043-0048) and its heading yawed between 023° and 066°. Between 0147 and 0214, *Islay Trader* was stationary on a heading between 052° and 063°.

Environmental conditions

The visibility was good and the sea state was reported as slight. The wind was from the north-west at Beaufort force 6. While *Islay Trader* was at anchor, the predicted tidal stream set to the west and decreased from approximately 1.8kts at 2350 on 7 October to 0.8kt at 0200 the following morning. It was spring tides and, on 8 October, the first predicted high water at Margate occurred at 0214 (4.9m) and the following low water occurred at 0825 (0.7m). The predicted height of tide at the time of grounding was 4.8m above chart datum.

Crew

Islay Trader's crew comprised a master, chief officer, chief engineer and three ABs, one of whom was the cook. All the crew were appropriately qualified for their position on board. At sea, apart from the engineer, the crew worked a 6 on/6 off watchkeeping routine. In port, they assisted with cargo operations and worked up to 12 hours between 0600 and 1800.

The master was a 61-year-old Polish national who had held a Polish certificate of competency (CoC) since 1998. He was experienced in the short-sea trade around the UK and his pilotage exemption certificates included Medway, Thames and Ramsgate. The master joined *Islay Trader* on 14 September 2017 and took over command 6 days later. While in command of *Islay Trader*, the master had completed ten passages on the Thames. At sea, the master kept the 6-12 bridge watches. During the evening of 7 October, the master called the chief officer to relieve him of the anchor watch 1 hour earlier than usual because he had been working all day and needed to rest.

The chief officer was a 42-year-old Filipino national who had worked for Faversham Ships Ltd since 2002. He had started as an AB but had been promoted within the company. He had held a master's CoC since 2015 and was ambitious for his own command. The chief officer had completed three previous contracts on board *Islay Trader* and had re-joined the ship on 12 September following 2 months on leave. At sea, the chief officer kept the 12-6 bridge watches.

Vessel

Islay Trader was owned and managed by Faversham Ships Ltd. The vessel operated mainly in northern Europe, transporting low value cargoes on short passages. The vessel regularly visited Thames ports, including Isle of Grain, Whitstable and Murphy's Wharf.

Islay Trader's propulsion and steering were provided through two Schottel Rudderpropellers (port and starboard), which were fixed pitch propellers whose direction of thrust could be rotated through 360°. Each Schottel unit was driven by a 324kW Cummins engine and was controlled from the bridge. The direction of thrust for each Schottel unit was controlled via the movement of a horizontally-mounted wheel. Engine speed was controlled by a lever mounted in the centre of each wheel (**Figure 5**). The vessel was also fitted with a 100kW bow thruster.

Navigation on board *Islay Trader* was conducted using paper charts. The vessel's bridge navigation equipment included:

- A chart table, sited on the starboard side of the bridge and not visible from the conning position.
- Displays for an X-band radar and a river radar on the forward console, which were not visible from the chart table (**Figure 5**).
- An echo sounder, which recorded onto paper and was switched off at the time of the accident.
- Two GPS receivers, both of which had an 'anchor watch alarm' function.
- An AIS transceiver.
- A bridge navigation watch alarm system (BNWAS) adjacent to the river radar, which was reported to be set to alert every 9 minutes. The operating key was in situ (**Figure 5**).

Islay Trader was fitted with two standard type AC14 high holding power anchors. The starboard anchor weighed 900kg and the port anchor weighed 870kg. Seven shackles of steel cable were attached to each anchor.

Safety management

Faversham Ships Ltd was formed in 1994 and operated 10 general cargo ships of between 75m and 90m in length. The company was owned jointly by its operations and technical directors, both of whom were ex-seafarers. Company superintendents aimed to visit its vessels at least every 2 months. An internal audit on board *Islay Trader* on 30 August 2017 identified one non-conformity related to documentation. The audit report also listed two observations, neither of which were connected to the vessel's navigation.

The safety management system on board *Islay Trader* included:

4.20.4 *The Master shall ensure that a continuous navigational watch is maintained while the vessel is at anchor, which shall:*

- *determine and plot the vessel's position on the chart and record in the Deck Log Book with details of bearings and ranges,*
- *check at frequent intervals the vessel's position to ensure the vessel remains securely at anchor,*
- *ensure that a proper look-out is maintained,*
- *ensure that inspection rounds of the ship are made at frequent intervals, including the windlass and anchor cable,*
- *observe meteorological and tidal conditions and the state of the sea,*
- *notify the Master and undertake all necessary measures if the ship drags anchor.*

Vessel Traffic Services

London VTS's principal control centre is located at Gravesend and provides traffic information, traffic organisation and navigational assistance services within its area of responsibility. The Margate Road anchorage is outside the Port of London Authority's port limits and London VTS does not routinely monitor vessels in this area.

ANALYSIS

Dragging

Between 2353 on 7 October and 0147 the following morning, *Islay Trader* moved 1.3nm to the west-north-west of its original anchorage position. A significant factor contributing to the failure of the vessel's anchor to hold was that only 3 shackles of chain cable was used. For an anchor to achieve its maximum holding power, sufficient cable must lie along the seabed before rising to the hawse pipe. In this case, although the sandy seabed afforded reasonable holding ground, the change of the cable's scope caused by the flooding tidal stream and the rising tide was sufficient to raise the lead of the cable. Consequently, the anchor's holding power was reduced until the vessel entered the shallower water towards Margate Sand.

There are several methods used to calculate the amount of cable to be used when anchoring. These include:

- number of shackles of cable = $1.5\sqrt{\text{depth in metres}}$
- length of cables in metres = 6 to 10 x (depth of water in metres)

However, these formulae provide a range of cable lengths and are only a guide. Factors such as the tidal range, tidal stream, wind, nature of the seabed, sea conditions, vessel condition, the safe water available and duration of stay all have a bearing. Although the length of chain cable used on board *Islay Trader* was almost seven times the charted depth (12m), it was less than five times the depth when the maximum predicted height of tide was added. With the height of tide, the required length of cable derived from the above formulae was between 3.7 and 6.18 shackles.

The use of 3 of the 7 shackles of cable available on the starboard anchor was based solely on *Islay Trader*'s master's previous experience and his usual practice. From his perspective, the vessel had also remained in position for the 2 hours he stayed on the bridge. Consequently, the potentially significant influences of the rising tide and the increasing tidal stream, which occurred during the chief officer's watch, were overlooked.

Position monitoring

The chief officer checked *Islay Trader*'s position when he took over the bridge anchor watch from the master at 2300, but he did not check it again until he was alerted by London VTS at 0158. Consequently, he was unaware of the vessel's movement. Although the VRMs that had been set on the radar were a rudimentary but effective means of monitoring the vessel's position, the chief officer could not see the radar display when working at the chart table.

The chief officer would inevitably have taken several natural breaks during the time he was carrying out passage planning and chart corrections, which would have afforded opportunities for him to check the radar or plot a fix. That he failed to do so for almost 3 hours, indicates that position monitoring was a very low priority. From the chief officer's perspective, the vessel had not moved during the master's watch and he was not necessarily aware that the tide was rising and the rate of the tidal stream was increasing. However, it also indicates that the BNWAS, which was very close to the X-band radar, was not operating as reported, otherwise the chief officer would have seen the radar display when he reset the BNWAS every 9 minutes.

As it took the chief officer 19 seconds to respond to the VTSO calls at 0158, and he was alone on the bridge, it is possible that he was functioning at a low level of arousal, even if working at the chart table. *Islay Trader* had anchored in lieu of staying alongside Murphy's Wharf, and the overnight stay would have been viewed by the crew as an opportunity to catch up and rest. In addition, research has shown that alertness and performance tend to be at their lowest during the early hours of the morning as the human circadian rhythm programmes the body with a 'normal' pattern of daytime wakefulness and sleep at night.

Decision-making

On receipt of the VTSO's warning, the chief officer immediately plotted *Islay Trader*'s position on the paper chart. He saw that the vessel was only 4 cables from the shallows over Margate Sand but he was not aware that the vessel had stopped moving. Therefore, weighing anchor and re-locating the vessel to safe water would have appeared to have been immediate and necessary actions to take.

The chief officer quickly alerted the chief engineer and two ABs, but he did not call the master. In this respect, several factors probably influenced the chief officer's decision-making to varying degrees. First, the master had been awake for most of the previous day and had called the chief officer to take over the anchor watch early because he needed to rest. Second, the chief officer would have been concerned and embarrassed at the distance the ship had dragged its anchor and that he had been alerted by the VTSO. Finally, the chief officer was ambitious for promotion and was confident that he could reposition the vessel without the master's assistance.

In view of the apparent urgency of the situation, his anxiety resulting from not detecting the vessel's movement, and the need to liaise with the ABs on the forecabin, the chief engineer and the VTSO, the chief officer was under considerable pressure. However, by not calling the master he denied himself the oversight and assistance of an experienced officer.

The passage south

The chief officer's intention to head to the south and then turn to the west when the Margate cardinal buoy was on the starboard beam was never formalised as a plan on the paper chart. Consequently, as the vessel started to head to the south at a speed of about 5kts, the chief officer navigated in the darkness solely by eye with a cardinal mark as the only visual reference. The vessel was kept on a steady heading until it grounded about 22 minutes later as it crossed the 0m contour, which was consistent with its draught (4.5m) and the predicted height of tide (4.8m).

When the chief officer was advised by the VTSO at 0233 not to proceed any further to the south, *Islay Trader* was approaching the position the chief officer intended to turn to the west. That he responded by plotting a GPS position on the chart, rather than heed the advice of the VTS or turn to the west as planned, indicates that he was uncertain of the vessel's position. By then continuing to the south despite the repeated challenges of the VTSO, the chief engineer and the ABs on the forecastle, suggests that the chief officer also became overloaded and overwhelmed by the situation.

Although between 0236 and 0239 the chief officer advised the VTSO that he was turning *Islay Trader* to the north and putting the engines astern, the vessel's heading remained steady and its speed did not reduce. It is possible that when he moved the Schottel wheel controls (**Figure 5**) 180° to thrust astern, he inadvertently declutched the Schottel units. Also, with the wheel controls rotated to this extent, operation of the engine speed lever would have been less intuitive and, under stress, the chief officer might have moved the lever in the wrong direction. However, if this was the case, it could only have occurred in the moments before the vessel grounded, otherwise a speed reduction would have been evident.

Onboard practices

On board vessels such as *Islay Trader*, that operate in the short-sea trade with only two bridge watchkeepers, the demands of operational pressures and interrupted rest patterns inevitably impact on working practices. Shortcuts and workarounds are necessary to some degree, and on a 6 on/6 off watchkeeping routine interspersed with cargo operations and pilotage it is usually very difficult for crews to comply with international requirements for work and rest. In such an environment, maintaining navigational standards is a challenge.

The circumstances of *Islay Trader*'s grounding and the findings of the subsequent Flag State survey indicate that the onboard navigational and bridge watchkeeping practices were rudimentary and had declined over the 5 weeks since the last internal audit. Anchorage planning was cursory, the vessel's position was not monitored, the master's night orders had not been tailored to fit the situation, and the master was not alerted when the vessel was known to be in danger. Although the apparent decline in standards was coincident with a change in command, the pressures resulting from *Islay Trader*'s manning were undoubtedly influential.

London VTS

Although *Islay Trader* was anchored in an area not routinely monitored by London VTS, its movement was detected by the VTSO and his call to the vessel was appropriate to prevent it from potentially grounding on Margate Sand. The subsequent calls made during the vessel's passage to the south, which might inadvertently have contributed to the chief officer's stress, were also accurate and well-intended. The VTSO could have done nothing more to prevent *Islay Trader* from grounding.

CONCLUSIONS

- *Islay Trader* dragged anchor because the length of anchor cable used was insufficient in the tidal conditions experienced.
- The chief officer did not monitor the vessel's position and was not aware that the vessel had dragged anchor until alerted by VTS.
- The master was not told that the vessel had dragged anchor because the chief officer did not want to disturb him and he was confident he could reposition the vessel himself.
- After weighing anchor, the chief officer soon became uncertain of the vessel's position and was overwhelmed by the situation.
- The navigational practices on board *Islay Trader* were adversely impacted by the pressures resulting from having only two bridge watchkeepers.
- Interventions by London VTS to prevent the vessel from grounding were timely and appropriate.

ACTION TAKEN

Faversham Ships Ltd has:

- Conducted its own investigation, which highlighted that the working practices on board the vessel were not as expected.
- Issued a fleet circular to inform its masters of the circumstances of this accident and to emphasise the importance of adherence to onboard procedures.
- Replaced the master and employed an additional navigation officer on board *Islay Trader* during November 2017.
- Renamed *Islay Trader* to *Neptune* and transferred the vessel to the UK ship register.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Faversham Ships Ltd is recommended to:

2018/114 Take measures to help ensure that navigation and bridge watchkeeping practices on board its vessels are maintained to an acceptable standard, focusing on, inter alia:

- The impact of operational pressures and demands on board vessels with only two bridge watchkeepers.
- The conduct of anchorage planning and anchor watches.
- The recognition of circumstances warranting the master's input and oversight.

Safety recommendations shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability

SHIP PARTICULARS

| | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Vessel's name | <i>Islay Trader</i> |
| Flag | Barbados |
| Classification society | DNV GL |
| IMO number/fishing numbers | 9030474 |
| Type | General cargo/multipurpose |
| Registered owner | Faversham Ships Ltd |
| Manager(s) | Faversham Ships Ltd |
| Year of build | 1992 |
| Construction | Steel |
| Length overall | 74.86m |
| Registered length | 71.75m |
| Gross tonnage | 1512 |
| Minimum safe manning | 5 |
| Authorised cargo | General cargo |

VOYAGE PARTICULARS

| | |
|-------------------|------------------|
| Port of departure | Greenwich, UK |
| Port of arrival | Antwerp, Belgium |
| Type of voyage | Coastal |
| Cargo information | Broken glass |
| Manning | 6 |

MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATION

| | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| Date and time | 8 October 2017, 0242 (UTC+1) |
| Type of marine casualty or incident | Serious Marine Casualty |
| Location of incident | Margate, Kent, UK |
| Place on board | Bow and hull |
| Injuries/fatalities | None |
| Damage/environmental impact | Plate indentation and frame distortion. No pollution |
| Ship operation | Underway |
| Voyage segment | Shifting anchorage |
| External & internal environment | Wind: north-west force 6; Sea state: slight; Visibility: good |
| Persons on board | 6 |